THE SCOURGE OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN POST-CONFLICTSOCIETIES: A CASE STUDY OF SOUTH SUDAN

Small arms and light weapons (SALW) pose a serious threat and

danger to post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction since

they are widely available after the war and control mechanisms

are weak or even non-existent as in the case of South Sudan. They

are the most prevalent weapons used by criminals, rebels and

terrorists. The fact that they are inexpensive, transportable,

and freely available make them a weapon of choice for many

including civilians. Small arms in the wrong hands can kill many

people, create an atmosphere of horror and contribute to unending

poverty and misery. SALW are the major instruments that have set

back the progress of developing countries especially those that

are just coming out of decades of civil war.

According to Small Arms Survey, there are 875 million small arms

in circulation worldwide, produced by more than 1000 companies

from nearly 100 countries. Most of these are exported to the

developing countries that are either at war or peace. However,

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data from the developing countries are less clear especially in

conflict situations. In many post conflict countries in Africa,

only a small percentage of guns are registered. Estimates of the

total in circulation vary widely and casualties are under

reported (Small Arms Survey, 2012).

By their own right, SALW are capable of dictating whether people

can live in their own homes and communities, whether they earn a

livelihood, enjoy legal rights and protection and have access to

health and education facilities. Their widespread availability

especially in post-conflict societies threatens the welfare and

stability of communities, states and regions.

The use of SALW interfere with conflict resolution, peace

building and viable economic activities in various parts of the

world affecting the lives of millions. Between 50,000- 100,000

people around the world are killed each year by direct SALW fire

and at least twice as much die indirectly as victims of SALW

driven conflicts (Markowski et al, 2008). This means that the

availability and proliferation of SALW contributes not only to

country specific disruption but contributes towards regional

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insecurity and also has global security concerns hence a combined

outlook in resolving the scourge is critical.

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in its preamble acknowledges that the

wide spread and availability of SALW pose security, social,

economic and humanitarian consequences (ATT, 2013). Due to the

fact that they are highly durable, they can outlive peace

agreements and to be used again even after the conflict has ended

by both civilians and members of the armed forces who have not

gone through the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

(DDR) process. Unrestrained availability of SALW threatens the

security of both the people and the state, retards development

and contributes to increasing levels of violent crime and a

possible relapse into conflict.

There is no single agreed upon collective definition of SALW.

However, for purposes of this study, the United Nations (UN)

definition will be used. The UN definition of SALW is contained

in the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and

Trace in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit SALW adopted by

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the UN General Assembly on 8th December, 2005 (UN, 2006). The

Instrument defines SALW to mean;

“any man portable lethal weapon that expels or launches, is designed to expel orlaunch or maybe readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by theaction of an explosive,” (UN, 2006).

However, The Best Practices Guidelines for the Implementation of

the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms

and Light Weapons defines SALW broadly and gives what each

entails. It provides as follows:

“Light Weapons”….shall include the following portable weapons designed for use byseveral persons serving as a crew: heavy machine guns, automatic cannons, howitzers,mortars of less than 100mm caliber, grenade launchers, anti-tank weapons andlaunchers, recoilless guns, shoulder fired rockets, anti- aircraft weapons and launchers,and air defense weapons.

“Small Arms”.... are weapons which are designed for personal use and shallinclude; light machine guns, sub-machine guns including machine pistols, fullyautomatic rifles and assault rifles and semi-automatic rifles. Small arms shall alsoinclude fire arms; meaning any portable barreled weapon that expels, is designed toexpel or maybe readily converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of anexplosive; any other weapons or destructive devices such as an explosive bomb,incendiary or gas bomb, grenade, rocket launcher, missile, missile systems or mine. Itmay also include ammunition; meaning the complete round or its components, partsor replacement parts of a small arms or light weapons provided that those componentsare themselves subject to authorization in the respective state party.

From the above definitions SALW are of a varied types and hence

are easily used by different groups of people to cause havoc, be

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it by ordinary criminals (civilians), terrorists groups or rebel

groups.

Historical background of South Sudan

South Sudan is an extremely militarized society that supports the

use of force. This means that there is a thin line between

civilians and members of the armed forces. The post conflict

political environment is well-defined by a delicate balancing act

between different hostile ethnic groups and power brokers

combined with an ongoing focus on the enemy in the North (Small

Arms Survey, 2010). This means that there is uncontrolled

transfer and circulation of small arms in the country. As the

Government of South Sudan (GoSS) is arming itself to counter

threats over unresolved issues with its northern neighbor

(Khartoum), internally, it has failed to conduct successful

disarmament campaigns among civilians and ex-combatants. A huge

percentage of the SALW used during the conflict are in the hands

of civilians. This is further worsened by the breakdown in state

security apparatus and slow patterns of development, peace

building and reconciliation process in the country. Despite the

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billions of dollars spent by the international community in the

reconstruction of the country, basic social services and

infrastructure such as hospitals, schools, roads, clean water

etc. are lacking. This is due to inter alia high insecurity

throughout the country caused by widespread availability of SALW.

To understand the scourge of SALW better in South Sudan, it is

vital to appreciate the historical background of South Sudan’s

conflict with Sudan that led to the creation of the world’s

newest nation.

Independent South Sudan comprises of ten states; Central

Equatoria, Western Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Northern Bahr El

Ghazel, Western Bahr El Ghazel, Warrap, Unity, Upper Nile,

Jonglei and Lakes. These states are inhibited by three main

ethnic groups which are the Nilotic, the Nilo-hamites and the

Bantu. These states were as a result of a divide by the colonial

masters of Sudan; that is Egypt and Britain who administered the

territory jointly. They divided the country into two colonial

administrations, one for the Arab/ Islamic north and another for

the black African Christian South (Adibe, 2009). The colonizers

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favored the Arabs since they collaborated with them hence leading

to the administrative and economic development of the north. The

inhabitants of the south were hostile, savage like and rejected

British rule. The south was neglected by the British who instead

tried to use the Arabs to colonize it. In 1947, the British fused

the north and south together to form one country ignoring the

borders which were drawn in 1905. The British sent the Arabs to

the south to be administrators, senior officers in the army and

police, teachers and the economy of the south was dominated by

Arab merchants (Douglas, 2003). The South Sudanese also faced

brutality in the hands of the Arabs from the north in the form of

slave raids, plundering, pillage, discrimination and brutal

killings.

For fear of colonization, domination and marginalization by the

north, the south rose up in arms making Sudan the first country

in post-colonial Africa to engage in civil war (Douglas, 2003;

Adibe, 2009). The Torit mutiny on the eve of Sudan’s independence

in 1956 and the subsequent civil war waged by the Anya-Anya

Patriotic Forces from Southern Sudan laid the foundation for

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successive rebellions waged by the South and the eventual call

for secession from Sudan.

When Jaffer Nimeri came to power in 1969, he treated the southern

region better than his successors and the relationship he

developed with the southerners culminated into the Addis Ababa

Agreement of 1972, in which southern Sudan was granted autonomy.

However, despite this arrangement, the north still ruled the

southern Sudan politically, by influencing its leaders to pursue

its policies further in the region. President Nimeri’s cordial

relationship with the southern Sudan was short lived because of

unresolved issues in the Addis Ababa Agreement such as the

precise balance of power and the discovery of oil deposits in

southern Sudan which saw president Nimeri abrogating the

agreement in 1978 (Adibe, 2009). He also made Arabic the national

language and sharia law was imposed throughout the country even

on the non-Muslims

The change in policy sparked off the second civil war in the

Sudan which was officially led by the late John Garang under the

Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). During this

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conflict, a second parallel conflict was conducted between

factions in the SPLM/A led by independent militia groups in

southern states. They fought for control over territory,

resources and influence. In 1991, the SPLA split into two

opposing factions. The SPLA mainstream faction led by Garang and

the other led by Riak Machar (current vice-president of South

Sudan). Khartoum was able to exploit the divisions among the

southerners by funding and arming one group against another. This

led to the militia groups to switch sides during the conflict in

an effort to gain more power. This behavior prolonged the war

because the SPLA was not united. When the SPLA finally decided to

unite, it posed a challenge to president Omar Al Bashir who

failed to defeat the rebels and due to international pressure and

the rising cost of the war, he was forced to conclude a peace

deal in 2005 in the form of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

(CPA) putting a temporary stop to one of Africa’s longest civil

wars.

The CPA offered southerners two options in a referendum that was

to be held in 2011: a united confederated democratic secular new

Sudan or an independent southern African state (Madut, 2006). In9

2011, Sudan held a referendum in fulfillment of the guidelines in

the CPA which saw South Sudanese voting unanimously for

separation ushering in Africa’s and the world’s newest nation on

9th July, 2011.

South Sudan is therefore emerging from years of protracted

destructive war, held hostage by generations of hardships and

scarce opportunities for education and socio-economic

development. As it is the case with every post conflict state,

South Sudan survives on weak state institutions, fragile internal

and external political situation and shaky economic conditions.

SALW widely kept by civilians and members of the armed forces are

the primary factor of injury and insecurity throughout the

country.

During the process of the CPA between the Sudan government and

the then rebel group SPLM/SPLA, it was agreed among other issues

for the two parties to share wealth and a huge reduction in

troops on both sides. However, by the time of its independence,

none of the soldiers of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) or former

militias (SPLA and other militias within South Sudan) had put

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down their weapons and rejoined civilian life despite the

presence of the Sudan’s Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-

integration (DDR) program (New York Times, 2010). To the

contrary, since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

(CPA), both Sudan and South Sudan have been re-arming.

Prior to its independence, it was estimated that there were

between 1.9-3.2 million small arms in circulation in South Sudan

with about two thirds in the hands of civilians (Saferworld,

2012). The government of South Sudan does not have a monopoly on

the use of force as arms are largely unregulated and are

frequently used to commit crimes and create instability within

the country by an array of actors. Several disarmament

initiatives have been carried out by the government especially in

South Sudan’s most troubled region Jonglei. Jonglei, which is the

largest state in South Sudan, has been undergoing an epidemic of

communal violence. The violence has taken the appearance of

natural phenomenon of a long standing animosity that the

government feels it has no right to condemn or no hope to

prevent. However, attempted efforts have been in vain since after

the disarmament activity nothing is done to address the factors11

fuelling demand and supply of these weapons which requires a long

term strategy. The challenges facing South Sudan in terms of the

scourge of SALW presents serious stakes for the sub-region, the

continent and the international community.

Statement of research problem

The research is driven by the desire to bring to light the menace

posed by SALW to post-conflict societies today. South Sudan due

to its historical past of protracted conflict is marred with

massive SALW proliferation. Since the end of the conflict,

increased inter-communal armed violence has engulfed the whole

country. There is high tension among the cattle keeping groups

such as the Dinka, Murle and Nuer especially in Jonglei state.

They compete for water and grazing land among other resources.

There also exists high tension especially in urban areas among

the general population and between the general population of

South Sudan and other nationalities (mainly Ugandans and Kenyans)

that are controlling the job market and the economy of the

country. This has led to systematic armed attacks on the general

population by unknown gunmen.

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The presence of SALW throughout the country has seen many people

being displaced and many civilian deaths. Despite disarmament

efforts and national reconciliation rhetoric, the widespread

proliferation of SALW in the hands of civilians has exacerbated

inter-communal rates of cattle theft and deadly clashes. Cattle

rustling and pastoral conflict in the country has become highly

politicized. The cattle rustlers are often well armed and are

believed to have support from certain factions in the government.

For example , the white army in Jonglei state who continue to

attack civilians and commit human rights abuses once enjoyed

support from some of the top leadership in the government and

there is no doubt that they still enjoy the same support with the

kind of atrocities they commit against civilians.

The huge number of SALW in the wrong hands in post-conflict Sudan

is to blame for the high level of insecurity in the country. SALW

in the hands of military officers who have been relieved of their

military services are being used to commit human rights

violations. An estimated 7,000 and 3,600 former Sudan Armed

Forces (SAF) soldiers who were based in South Sudan during the

civil war and who refused to redeploy to Khartoum are residing13

with their guns in the capital city (Juba) and Malakal

respectively (Sebit, Sewonet and Kenyi, 2009). Due to lack of

alternative means of livelihood, these armed men use their guns

to terrorize civilians.

The availability and proliferation of SALW in post conflict South

Sudan has also intensified cross border inter-tribal conflicts

among the majority of tribes living in the border region of

Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan. These tribes migrate across the

borders in search of scarce resources such as water and pasture

for their herds. Initially, such conflicts were managed through

traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution, but with the

proliferation of SALW in the region (Leff, 2009), they are

increasingly becoming fatal and the consequences are far

reaching; the commercialization of SALW in the region has

intensified what were once minor clashes among the tribes. A 2008

Small Arms Survey study in Eastern Equatoria and Turkana North

reveals that nearly half of all respondents had witnessed a

violent event in their life time due to the scourge of SALW in

the region (Leff, 2009). Therefore, the effect of SALW is not

only a national hazard but a regional and international one as14

well. It is therefore of paramount importance that an integrated

discussion and solution is reached in order to curb the pandemic.

1.3 Significance of study

The end of the Cold War was a significant step towards

achieving world peace and maintaining international security

and stability. However, there were intensified civil wars

around the world especially in developing countries such as

Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola and Sudan, to

mention but a few. Unlike the super power war which was

fought by use of conventional weapons, the civil wars were

fought by use SALW. The increase in the numbers of civil wars

meant an increase in the production of SALW. Due to the fact

that they can easily be transported and stored they can be

used by almost anyone and hence rebel groups employed the use

of women and child soldiers to fight their wars drawing in

all members of societies into these conflicts.

However, the problem usually arises when the war comes to an end.

Peace often comes with certain pre-requisites such as provision

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of security for civilians returning home after the conflict. But

when there is a security gap, civilians tend to take matters into

their own hands. This not only hinders peace building and

reconstruction efforts but also frustrates disarmament

initiatives. Lack of security in post conflict societies

paralyzes human activity and development initiatives. The

proliferations and availability of SALW in the hands of civilians

in post conflict societies means that the threat of conflict is

not yet over and hence the need to maintain the arms.

The policy work by the government of South Sudan and

international organization emphasize the need to disarm

civilians. However, little is done to tackle the issues that

cause civilians to arm in the first place. For example the inter

communal violence in Jonglei is catalyzed by the proliferation of

SALW but the root causes of the conflict are lack of development,

insecurity, inability of the state to attract investment, lack of

sufficient grazing lands and water for the pastoralist

communities within the state, failure to provide social services

and general ineffectiveness of local government. It is therefore

in line with the lack in the right policies that the research is16

undertaken to highlight the importance of tackling the core

causes of why civilian arm and the need for an integrated

national, regional and international approach to the scourge of

SALW in post-conflict South Sudan.

Over view of Literature

Many scholars have undertaken research on the proliferation and

illicit transfer of SALW globally in both countries at peace and

those at war. However, the proliferation and misuse of SALW in

post conflict societies have not been considered in current

discussions yet they have significant implications globally. This

section analyzes some of the academic literature on scourge of

SALW globally and more specifically on post conflict societies.

Small arms kill as many people in homicides and suicides as in

armed conflict. Projected 200,000 people die from SALW imposed

homicides and suicides and 300,000 deaths can be credited

directly to the misuse of SALW by civilians in peaceful countries

(Jojarth, 2009). Excessive arms availability destabilize fragile

and post war countries. However, In the after math of conflict,

the focus by international, regional and national policy makers

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is on reducing the number of arms in circulation, demobilizing

former combatants, providing meaningful reintegration

opportunities, reducing defense expenditures and expanding

welfare spending but not on complex interactions between supply

and demand factors (Muggah, 2010). These initiatives are known to

achieve fewer results than expected.

Roughly ¾ of the world’s estimated 875 million small arms are in

civilian hands rather than in military or police arsenals

(Muggah, 2010). Whether in war, post war or non-war contexts arms

are tremendously controlled by individuals rather than state

security institutions. There are almost 30 million weapons across

Africa-affirming the assertion that Africa is awash and flooded

with arms (Muggah, 2010).

The spread of SALW has made it difficult to distinguish between

conflicts and criminality. The Sudan conflict, fought by use of

SALW has claimed more than two (2) million lives and displaced

more than 4 million people. According to Mkutu, a specialist on

pastoral conflicts in the Rift Valley, South Sudan is now

believed to be one of the major sources of arms flowing into the

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East African region especially the North Rift to pastoralists in

Turkana (Kenya) and Karamoja (Uganda) (Mkutu, 2008). The massive

proliferation of SALW from South Sudan into Kenya and Uganda has

caused an escalation in interethnic resource conflicts and

banditry among pastoralists in the region leading to starvation,

displacement, insecurity and misery, death and injuries, economic

disruption and destruction of infrastructure among the

pastoralist communities in Kenya and Uganda respectively (Mkutu,

2006). He further argues that in 1993-2000 an analysis of

economic cost in Laikipia Kenya shows that over 858 cows, 1,487

goats and 595 sheep were lost by individuals as a result of armed

cattle rustling (Mkutu, 2008). The scourge of SALW on pastoral

communities usually involves direct and indirect consequences.

The direct consequences include; deaths, injuries, loss of

livestock etc., the indirect consequences include; no go buffer

zones, interruption of economic activities and administration and

development work, displacement of people, increase in widow

inheritance and break down in inter-tribal marriage patterns

(Mkutu, 2008).

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The official cessation through peace treaties of violent conflict

often symbolizes the beginning of a long and shaky path from war

to peace. After violence, what are over looked are the concerns

of the people who were personally affected by the fighting and

who have to find their way in the newly achieved peace (Zistel,

2008). The presence of many arms after a conflict ends may allow

conflicts to break out again. Even when further war is eluded

small arms continue to act as instruments for other forms of

violence such as criminal activities, disruption of development

activities and interference with efforts to deliver food,

medicine and supplies to civilians in dire need of relief.

Refugees are often afraid to return home because of large numbers

of weapons still in the hands of former combatants who have not

been demobilized, insecurity and lack of stable social services

(Stohl, 2002).

Small arms hamper post conflict relief programs, peace building

and conflict transformation initiatives and development hence

presenting a considerable challenge to developing nations. In

2005, the United Nations (UN) Secretary General specified that

the increase and proliferation of SALW remains to pose a serious20

danger to peace, stability and sustainable development. The

adverse impacts of small arms on development were mentioned in 19

of the 78 governmental statements made during the 55th Session of

the First Committee and in 38 of 134 during the UN Conference,

2001. The effects were cited as both direct and indirect. SALW

were said to perpetuate or aggravate poverty, hinder post

conflict reconstruction, divert resources away from development

and generally foster insecure environments in which sustainable

development is compromised. The Millennium Development Goals

(MDGs) as adopted by the UN Millennium Summit of September 2000

propose a structure of developmental landmarks whose execution

can stabilize countries coming out of conflict and place them on

the path to recovery; however, the proliferation of SALW in post

conflict societies can fuel an atmosphere of insecurity and

instability which may scare off investments into sustainable

human development which are so critically necessary to promoting

sustainable reconciliation and recovery (Mulikita, 2005). This

only means that countries engulfed by post conflict violence find

it hard to attract external investment that is direly needed to

pull it out of economic stagnation caused by conflict.

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According to Small Arms Survey, the projection of SALW in post

conflict situations hamper countries from meeting the challenge

of social and economic development (Small Arms Survey, 2003). The

unwarranted accrual and uncontrolled accessibility of small arms

and light weapons in post conflict societies were linked to

negative impacts in four distinct sectors; human security,

stability, crime and development (Small Arms Survey, 2003). The

availability of small arms is a prompting rather than a central

cause of underdevelopment.

The fact that the rates of fire arms related homicides in post

conflict societies remain high has grave consequences on the

ability of any society to recover. Escalated levels of insecurity

undermine daily routines and mobility hence posing a serious

obstacle at efforts to rebuild a sense of community. Gun violence

forces people to change their life style e.g. they avoid going

out at night for fear of being attacked and some forms of

solidarity practiced before are dropped (Peace Building

Initiative, 2007-2008).

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SALW left over by the Burundian conflict (1993-2003) particularly

grenades and assault rifles are weapons of choice for those

perpetrating post conflict violence in Burundi. Pezard and

Florquin assert that after the conflict it was estimated that

about 100,000 small arms and grenades are still at large in the

country and due to the fear caused by this large number of

weapons in the city especially in Bujumbura, many citizens have

opted to keep small arms for defensive purposes and self-

protection (Pezard and Florquin, 2007). Therefore, even though

the conflict ended in 2003, Burundi still continued experiencing

armed violence up to 2006. The kind of violence experienced

included armed robberies, gang violence, assassinations, sexual

violence and fights due to alcohol and other fights. The authors

argue that data obtained from public health actors such as

Medicines Sans Frontier (MSF) between 2004 to 2005 on the cause

of injury across the capital city indicate that 83% of all

violent injuries treated were caused by SALW (Pezard and

Florquin, 2007). The proliferation of small arms in post conflict

Burundi left many dead long after the conflict ended.

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SALW have fuelled dozens of intrastate and communal conflicts

around the globe killing, injuring and displacing millions of

people primarily women and children. Garfield maintains that

hostilities in South Sudan have continued with clashes between

the SPLA and other armed groups, among tribal militias and among

pastoral groups competing over scarce resources and grazing

lands; the legacy of the government of arming partisan forces in

the form of vast stockpiles of SALW continues to threaten

community safety and curtail freedom of movement (Garfield, 2007)

The availability and proliferation of small arms in Jonglei state

and Eastern Equatoria state have contributed to a rise in

confrontation and inter-ethnic rivalries as well as to an

increase in the deadliness of these conflicts; persistent civil

insecurity and unrelenting cattle raids and inter clan attacks

remain on going threats to human security. For example in late

July and early August 2007 reported clashes between the Murle and

Nuer tribes left 60-80 people dead (Garfield, 2007).

Achieving durable peace and stability according to Upreti et al

requires among others, getting processes right, monitoring

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mechanisms, sincere implementation of understandings and

agreements, dealing with the past and ensuring transitional

justice and rule of law and securing transitional security,

proper facilitation of DDR, restricting of the security sector,

providing peace dividends, implementing reconstruction and

controlling proliferation of SALW (Upreti et al, 2010). The

authors argue that post conflict transition Nepal is

characterized by multiplication of armed groups, criminalization

of politics, gender based violence, urban crimes, rural

insecurity, militarization of the youths and erosion of social

trusts (Upreti et al, 2010). This is likely to curtail and have

several negative consequences on the establishment of the rule of

law as it contributes to abusive conduct such as forced

disappearances, torture and extrajudicial killings. The

availability of small arms to an expanding circle of actors who

are under trained, cannot practice restraint and give

accountability may also support a culture of impunity and

encourages human rights abuse.

Unrestrained proliferation of SALW threatens post conflict

reunion progressions and plummet countries and regions coming out25

of conflict into more violent attacks. It is difficult to

envision any kind of political reconciliation and democratic

transition in an unsecured environment (Peace Building

Initiatives, 2007-2008).

The availability of small arms in post conflict situations

undermines peacekeeping and peace building operations and the

reconstruction of conflict torn societies (Dahinden, Dahlitz and

Fischer, 2002). They also impact on refugees and mass migration.

Conflicts fuelled by SALW often result in cross border refugee

flows and large numbers of people becoming internally displaced

(IDPs). Bulky buildups of SALW whether legal or illegal has

contributed to destabilizing entire regions. They impede peace

operations and humanitarian assistance, obstructing post conflict

reconstruction and development and contribute to banditry, crime

and social violence (Davis, 2002).

Unlimited availability of SALW in post conflict societies is

therefore associated with unending human suffering, exacerbation

of massive human rights violations, disruption of social routines

such as school going for children because of insecurity, places a

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lot of strain on health facilities due to small arms related

injuries, hikes sexual violence against women and girls and

impacts on environmental sustainability through hunting and

poaching.

Many post conflict situations present more direct and indirect

threats to civilians than the armed conflicts that preceded them.

This is because peace agreements are fragile and luck a solid

foundation to build long lasting peace. Preexisting structures

associated with the war economy may remain intact hence post

conflict armed violence may be perpetrated by a fluid

constellation of state agents and armed groups with competing

motivations and interests (Geneva Declaration, 2008). Therefore,

peace and reconciliation in post conflict societies can only be

achieved if in the first place all aggrieved parties who took

part in the conflict are involved or consolidated in the peace

process that followed the conflict.

THE PROLIFERATION AND DEMAND FOR SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN

SOUTH SUDAN

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The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) failed to establish a

solid mechanism of conflict resolution between Khartoum and Juba

and among southerners themselves because during the civil war,

South Sudanese fought under different loyalties; therefore, any

peace initiative should have considered all the stakeholders in

the protracted conflict. Hence due to the loopholes in the CPA,

Sudan and South Sudan are at logger heads with each other,

disgruntled armed militia groups are opposing the Sudan People’s

Liberation Movement/Arm (SPLM/A) led government and there is

widespread insecurity throughout the country attributed to the

failure of the government of South Sudan (GoSS) to provide a

functioning system of governance that benefits every citizen.

Current and evolving threats such as border conflict with

government of Sudan (GoS), militia and proxy forces, inter and

intra-ethnic fighting continue to shower the country with steady

supplies of small arms and light weapons (SALW).

The declaration of independence in July 2011 gave rise to queries

regarding the country’s security, economic feasibility and

ability to address its many development challenges among others.

Small arms in South Sudan are easily accessible and misused by28

all sectors of society. Pervasive poverty and a lack of

educational and employment opportunities sustain armed violence.

Robust demand for SALW is driven by the perceived need for

protection in the absence of functioning security institutions.

Post conflict South Sudan remains a highly militarized society

with a limited employment opportunity especially for the youth, a

large number of armed groups, a heavily armed civilian population

and a series of intractable local conflicts.

The decades of war and proxy arming by all sides left South Sudan

awash with firearms. This situation is made worse by the fact

that the current national army suffers from a lack of command and

control over poorly disciplined soldiers who are occasionally a

source of grievance to the people they are assigned to protect.

The market for SALW thrives with strong demand and supply

undermining stability and threatening the fragile peace (O’Brien,

2009).

THE PROLIFERATION OF SALW IN SOUTH SUDAN

The problem of proliferation of SALW in the Republic of South

Sudan (RSS) is a legacy of years of protracted conflict among

29

other factors. Since the signing of the CPA and South Sudan

gaining independence, it has been aggravated by arms flow inside

South Sudan, diverse cross border exchanges and international

sale of arms to the South Sudan government, pointing to the

national, regional, and international character of SALW related

insecurity.

The primary sources of weapons to civilians throughout the civil

war were the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) under the GoS, the rebel

group (SPLM/A), and militia groups who distributed weapons to

civilians in order to win support. For example in lakes state,

the SPLA provided weapons to cattle keepers to enable them to

protect themselves and their communities from cattle raiders;

this was intended to divert attention of the youth from community

security to the ongoing war with the government of Sudan

(Saferworld, 2012). In addition, arms distribution by GoS to

armed militia who opposed the SPLA spiked during the civil war

when oil revenues begun to flow in 2001; the channeling of

weapons to local proxies facilitated proliferation which was

further eased by the almost total absence of transparency in

stockpile management (Small Arms Survey, 2007). For instance the30

Khartoum government armed Paulino Matiep’s movement in Unity

State and the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) led by Riak

Machar and Lam Akol (Saferworld, 2012). This was an effective

scheme employed by the GoS to engage and weaken the SPLM/A’s

ability to become a united and strong rebel movement.

Insecure stockpiles also serve as a source of weapons to

civilians and communities. Arms and ammunitions in South Sudan

are stored in sub-standard conditions such as in unprotected mud

huts, abandoned school buildings, hospitals and corrugated steel

huts (Sudan Issue Brief, 2012). This makes the weapons not only

vulnerable to theft but also make over loaded depots prone to

explosions because of little ventilation. After the SPLA captured

Kapoeta (Eastern Equatoria) in 2002 from the SAF, security at

arms stores was lax or non-existent and as a result Toposa

tribesmen were able to seize thousands of weapons and when the

SPLA laid off several hundred troops after the war, they offered

them small arms as part of their retirement package (Leff, 2009).

All these arms are today in civilian hands.

31

In 2006, an explosion in an ammunition depot in Juba left two

soldiers dead and injured 8 people including a United Nations

Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) monitor. According to SAF

spokesperson, Colonel El Bahar, the explosion was due to high

temperatures and that the depot was a temporary one in which

ammunitions of different sizes including shells of tank guns had

been placed (Sudan Tribune, 2012). In some places such as the

northern most parts of South Sudan especially border areas, after

fighting, the SPLA hand over their arms depots to community

leaders; similarly, the Joint-integrated Units (JIUs) are said to

have left large quantities of arms and ammunitions in their

barracks when they reintegrated into their respective armies

(Sudan Issue Brief, 2012). Unsafe storage also promotes leakage

of SALW and ammunitions into civilian communities and increases

the problem of civilian arms possession (Kahl, 2011).

The majority of weapons used by tribes are old assault rifles

that have circulated in South Sudan throughout the decades of

civil war. However, of late government security forces and rebel

militias are resupplying new weapons to various tribes to buy

patronage (Sudan Issue Brief, 2012).32

The South Sudan police services (SSPS) and the SPLA are also a

source of weapons for tribal militias. In Jonglei for example it

was reported that SSPS officers compromised security of the state

to their tribes and supplied them with weapons during the clashes

between the Dinka and Lou Nuer in June-August 2011 (Sudan Issue

Brief, 2012). This has posed a major problem to disarmament

initiatives since the collected weapons are often leaked back to

the population through the same military that has collected them.

Both South Sudan and Sudan were supplied with weapons by other

countries during and after the war. UN data reports shows that

between 1992 and 2005, at least 34 countries exported SALW to

Sudan and approximately 96% of these transfers were from Iran and

China (Saferworld, 2012). Even though South Sudan has been viewed

as the source of arms to Uganda and Kenya, arms are readily

available through the porous borders between Democratic Republic

of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. Most of the small

arms in Western Equatoria State (WES) are traded across the

Ugandan border with Torit and Nimule towns acting as the main

trading centers (Small Arms Survey, 2007).

33

Since South Sudan gained independence, official weapon bans

especially by the United States (US) have been lifted hence

giving the GoSS the opportunity to enter into defence contracts

with a number of interested states; at the same time, an

increasing number of non-state actors in South Sudan including

tribal militia groups are acquiring weapons illicitly at an

increasing rate (Sudan Issue Brief, 2012). The SPLA is believed

to have acquired between 2010-2011 large quantities of SALW and

their ammunitions; and Ukraine has been its principal supplier of

weapons since 2005 with Kenya and Uganda acting as transshipment

points (Sudan Issue Brief, 2012). In 2008, a Ukrainian vessel

Fiona, loaded with tanks and SALW was confirmed by the US navy to

be heading to rebel groups in South Sudan for use in the raging

Sudanese conflict (Stohl and Tuttle, 2009).

Weapons also flow freely among civilians through porous

international borders, either for international purpose of

selling or trading or because armed nomadic groups travel

throughout the border regions with their weapons. Due to the vast

nature of African territories, border areas are often neglected

34

as they are difficult to monitor and hence the aspect of arms

flow is very difficult to monitor (Saferworld, 2012).

REASONS WHY SALW ARE POPULAR

South Sudan has not known peace for more than four decades. The

popular and large scale use of SALW during the conflict has

caused deaths and many injuries and affected millions. SALW in

post conflict South Sudan has become the weapons of choice for

combatants and other criminals because they are cheap, durable

and robust and their spread has continued to thrive in the face

of disarmament processes by national, regional and international

bodies (Johnson and Gbara, 2012).

Worldwide, SALW are a choice for many for various reasons

majority of which are related to their many activities. These

include; simplicity and durability, low costs and wide

availability, portability and easiness to conceal, lethality and

usability by a wide range of actors such as the military, police

and civilians.

Widely available and cheap

35

Due to the existence of the kind of civil wars fought in the horn

of Africa e.g. in Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia, Uganda and

Sudan, the region is awash with SALW especially among the border

communities. Easily available and regularly cheap for

pastoralist, SALW have caused havoc in these regions. For example

the price of a gun has gone down since the 1970s because of

increased supplies (Mkutu, 2006). The fact that they are

inexpensive makes them to be diffused easily across borders. The

unregulated availability of SALW can lead to tensions, facilitate

their indiscriminate use and lead to a rise in civilian casualty

levels. The fact that making these weapons is simple and does not

require sophisticated technology and hence low cost of

production, the cost of the end product is low hence many

countries especially those at war or anticipating war can buy

them in bulk. In the case of South Sudan, the uncertainty

surrounding its political and economic environment with Sudan has

made the people to hold on tight to their SALW especially since

the Heglig incident in 2012 saw the two countries almost wage a

full blown war against each other.

Simple and durable36

SALW are easy to use and maintain. It requires little or no

training at all to use them effectively. According to Muggah and

Berman, they require little logistical support and have lifelines

that may span many decades; hence an AK-47 is said to have a life

span of 20-40 years (Muggah and Berman, 2001). The fact that SALW

are simple to use means anyone can use them and so in many

African conflicts such as it happened in Liberia, Sierra Leone,

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda and even the Sudan

conflict, the use of child soldiers (boys and girls) was very

high during these conflicts.

Portable and concealable

The flow of SALW is extremely difficult to track and monitor as

they can be hidden either indoors or outdoors. They can easily be

transported from one place to another and due to their small

nature can be hidden and concealed easily. They can be carried by

individuals, strapped on animals used for transport purposes and

even on small vehicles. They are also easy to hide in shipments

of legitimate cargo crossing borders of states especially in

Africa hence making it difficult to track the trade of their flow

37

within the continent. SALW are popular among rebel groups such as

the LRA (Lord’s Resistance Army) and the former rebel group SPLA

from South Sudan.

Lethality and usability by a wide range of actors

SALW are capable of firing up to 300 rounds a minute

(www.armscontrol.org). This means that one single individual in

possession of a firearm can pose a tremendous threat to society.

The use of SALW is not exclusive to only the major security

apparatus of a state. Their wide availability and proliferation

has given non-state actors a fire power that often exceeds that

of police and military forces (Religions for Peace, 2007). In

countries without gun laws such as South Sudan, they are used by

a wide range of the population including the police, armed

forces, fire brigade, wild life officers, immigration and customs

officials at border check points and civilians. The fact that

anyone can use them at their own discretion poses a great danger

not only to the government but to civilians especially women and

children who are often the biggest casualties in SALW related

deaths and injuries.

38

FACTORS THAT MOTIVATE DEMAND FOR SALW IN SOUTH SUDAN

In Africa, security is aimed at protecting the national integrity

of the state and maintaining governments in power rather than

providing internal security for its citizens. This means that

African governments are more concerned with external rather than

internal security issues. Despite the fact that it is described

as resource rich, South Sudan is riddled with abject poverty,

high unemployment, social deprivation and injustices, lack of

rule of law and under-development and pervasive insecurity. The

aforementioned factors coupled with widespread availability of

SALW have created disgruntled groups of state and non-state

actors who organize crimes and wreak havoc among civilians.

According to estimates 2.7 million SALW are available in the

whole of the former Sudan with around 720,000 in the hands of

civilians in the Republic of South Sudan (Kahl, 2011). The use of

SALW is high due to glaring social, political and economic

inequalities, explosive conditions that are exacerbated by social

conflict, resource depletion and environmental degradation

(Wassara, 2007).

39

CUSTOMS AND TRADITIONS

Customs and traditions in South Sudan mainly pertain to cattle

and land ownership. Cattle are a great source of pride in South

Sudan especially among the Nilotic communities. It is used as a

form of currency especially among the pastoral communities and it

denotes a sign of wealth and power. They are a central part of

the culture of many communities as they are used in bride price

payments. Men are respected and celebrated in their communities

when they have successfully stolen cattle and some groups will

mark themselves with tattoos to reflect how many people they have

killed in cattle raiding battles (Saferworld, 2012). Armed

attacks by the Murle are usually associated with cattle theft and

abductions of children. The Murle is a minority tribe that

suffers from political isolation worsened by extreme poverty,

geographical isolation and underdevelopment. They are popularly

known to abduct children who can then be exchanged for cattle to

pay Bride price.

Traditional weapons, such as spear, club or stick would always

have been seen as symbols of juvenile masculinity (Mackenzie and

40

Smith, 2004). However, as the availability of weapons increased,

the social significance of guns has simply over taken these

traditional weapons leading to high fatality and injury rates

from retaliatory and revenge attacks. In 2009, the United Nations

(UN) estimated that 2,500 people died in tribal violence in South

Sudan and much of it was attributed to cattle raids (Kahl, 2011).

The erosion of traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution such

as customary laws has rendered communities unable to control

their heavily armed youths (McEvoy and Lebrun, 2010). The

protracted civil war and the proliferation of SALW have altered

the nature of traditional conflicts in South Sudan hence

rendering indigenous methods of conflict resolution ineffective.

Another factor related to customs and traditions is land

ownership. Land policy and administration is extremely weak in

Southern Sudan. Therefore, conflicts associated with land tend to

be very diverse in RSS between internally displaced persons

(IDPs) and host communities, and between farmers and

pastoralists. Disputes over natural resources include ownership

and use of arable land, trespassing of animals into agricultural

41

land and use of water resources and occupying plots of people

forced out by the civil war (Wassara, 2007). In Central Equatoria

State (CES), where the capital city is also located and where

various ethnic groups reside side by side, violent clashes are

experienced daily especially over land issues. In March, 2012, a

violent clash over land ownership sparked a nationwide alarm when

armed men gunned down a whole family in Juba’s Kemeru area. The

dispute erupted between members of the Bari community and non-

Bari community especially the Dinka and Nuer inhabitants in the

capital. The incident involved the use of firearms that left

eight dead, several injured and a number of houses burnt down

(Sudan Tribune, 2012).

Initially land belonged to the Community but with the advent of

the CPA, GoSS has been trying to alter land policies to include

ownership by the state. Enticed by foreign investors to achieve

rapid economic development the government is selling large scale

private land to both domestic and foreign investors. Over five

million hectors of land has already been signed away for

investment for biofuels, ecotourism, agriculture and forestry

(IRIN, 2011). These deals are premised on the myth that large-42

scale development projects are the quickest way to improve food

security and stimulate the economy in South Sudan but these deals

are likely to have the reverse effect by undermining food

security and dispossessing people from land and natural resources

that are indispensible to their livelihoods as the deals are done

with little or no community benefit or consultation (IRIN, 2011).

Since the vast majority of people in South Sudan depend on land

for their livelihoods, the land deals by the government also

threatens to undermine the land rights of rural communities,

intensify food insecurity, deepen poverty and slow down local

development initiatives.

ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

Over the past years, the pastoral tribes living in the border

areas of South Sudan, Uganda and Kenya have experienced drastic

environmental changes such as droughts and famine. This has

forced the tribes living in these areas to move deeper into each

other’s territory in search of pasture and water to cater for

their herds. During the dry season, vegetation dry up and water

sources disappear. From 1975-2006, the number of people affected

43

by drought rose from 16,000 to and estimated three (3) million

(Leff, 2009). Historically, the seasonal movements of herders

with their cattle were relatively less violent but several years

of war especially in Uganda and Sudan has led to high levels of

armament acquisition and accumulation by pastoralists as a means

to protect themselves from other pastoralists. So during tough

times, conflict among pastoralists is intensified. Prolonged

droughts and cattle deaths associated with it brought escalating

levels of violence in the affected communities. Due to scarcity,

persistent droughts and a way of life based on mobility, it

inevitably leads to conflict between the different pastoralist

groups and between pastoralists and farmers (De Costa, 2012). In

South Sudan particularly, climate change has been characterized

by rising temperatures and decreased precipitation; over the past

thirty years, it has been among the most rapidly warming

locations on the globe with station temperatures increasing as

much as 0.4C per decade and at the same time rainfall in South

Sudan from 1990-2009 has been an average (Richardson, 2011). The

UN estimates that the ongoing food crisis and the absence of

rains in 2009 will force pastoralist to move their animals

44

further in search of water and pasture, increasing the likelihood

of continued clashes in the following year (McEvoy and Lebrun,

2010).

In 2006, the Dinka authorities in Jonglei state asked the Lou

Nuer pastoralists to surrender their weapons before passing into

Dinka land to graze their herds but when the Nuer refused to

disarm, there was a clash between the two tribes that left many

dead (Brewer, 2010). The violent communal conflict in Jonglei

stems from competition over natural resources and political

control, feelings of political and socio-economic marginalization

of certain groups over others and the pervasive lack of

accountability and reconciliation between communities in post CPA

South Sudan. All these problems are aggravated by the broad

availability of small arms, the weakening of traditional

authority and dispute resolution mechanisms, the manipulation by

local and national elites of local grievances and ethnic

identities and the absence of formal state provided security.

CORRUPTION

45

The GoSS is still struggling to develop accountable, democratic

institutions to provide basic services to its population;

however, the post CPA South Sudan government has been accused of

being exploitative, corrupt, unrepresentative and ill-performing

(McEvoy and Lebrun, 2010). In 2008, the government is said to

have lost $2 billion to well-connected companies in controversial

grain deals where state governors colluded with companies to sign

false delivery notes (Sudan Tribune, 2013). A World Bank forensic

audit discovered that some firms were paid without contracts and

that the companies with contracts that delivered the grains were

not paid (Africa Review, 2013). The government was to buy the

grain with the intention of selling it to the poor at cheaper

prices and the money be paid to the ministry of finance. Again in

2009 the government lost another $ 323,000 deposited into a bank

account in Uganda and meant to support students studying in E.A

without trace (Africa review, 2013).

The latest corruption scandal involving the GoSS was early last

year when the president of RSS Salva Kiir, accused current and

former senior officials of stealing at least $4 billion in state

funds. Government officials are said to be enriching themselves46

at the expense of the poor people (Sudan Tribune, 2013). From

2005 until independence, South Sudan was collecting roughly $2

billion a year from oil exports but half of this amount is

unaccounted for in the past six years. A report released by the

South Sudan Auditor General indicated that between 2007 and 2011,

there was no financial reporting of what happened to non-oil

revenues that were collected in taxes by the national or state

government; according to Paul Moorcraft, the director of the

Center for Foreign Policy Analysis, South Sudan has received $17

billion since 2005 from donors and aid agencies but all this

disappeared into corruption and buying of arms (Aljazeera, 2012).

The signing of the CPA marked the official beginning of a

transition to peace and sustainable development yet post conflict

South Sudan remains unstable and SALW are widespread. The Rampant

corruption coupled with high level of uneducated civil servants

has angered some sections of the military and civilian population

who feel that their hard earned peace is being disrespected by a

few greedy elites and military juntas who do not care about the

development of the country. The high levels of unemployment and

the introduction of austerity measures have forced some sections47

of the population especially the youth to join militia groups in

a bid to get a share of the national cake. Many communities

across South Sudan perceive violence as the only reliable means

to guarantee their safety, secure livelihoods, obtain

redress/revenge for past wrongs and crimes and address

marginalization (De Costa, 2012).

UNEMPLOYMENT COUPLED WITH RISING COST OF LIVING

South Sudan’s economy is fragile and underdeveloped and it’s

considered to have the worst social and economic indicators in

the world (Aljazeera, 2012). With around 70% of the population

being illiterate, in some states there is only one doctor for

every 500,000 people and 90% of the people live on less than a

dollar a day (Aljazeera, 2012). Due to absence of livelihood and

infrastructure combined with a hugely disempowered male

population with little formal education and few marketable

skills, many youths are willing recruits of armed ethnic groups

and raiding parties (McEvoy and Lebrun, 2010). Poverty and

general perception that peace dividends are not shared equally

48

among groups also contributes to feelings of marginalization and

distrust in government (De Costa, 2012).

South Sudan is endowed with significant amounts of natural

resources including large deposits of oil, rich farm land and

abundant water from the Nile River. The toll of globalization is

affecting the south Sudanese population especially the farmers

who now prefer urban lives to rural life and have abandoned

agricultural activities. The South Sudan government is estimated

to rely on oil for 98% of its revenue (e-international relations,

2012). The delivery of basic services such as education, health

and clean water remains a major problem.

According to the 2008 Sudan Population Census, South Sudan had a

population of about 8 million; in addition, a 2010 household

survey revealed that more than 72% of the population is below the

age of 30 and illiteracy is over 70% (UNMISS Radio Miraya, 2013).

Due to the extraordinary rates of illiteracy among the

population, unemployment is very high and getting a job depends

on who you know and hence making ends meet is a daily struggle

for just about everyone. Because unemployment precipitates crime,

49

the potential for insecurity is very high. According to Multi

Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), youth unemployment remains high,

agriculture production is low, one in seven women die in child

birth and access to education particularly to girls is limited

(World Bank, 2013). Research in West Africa, South Asia, the

Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa region has suggested that

youth frustration is usually underpinned by percepts that society

or the political system is unjust and corrupt or that social

norms prevent people from making a successful transition to

adulthood (Walton, 2010). Often the factors behind violence are

not unemployment per se but rather grievances at an unjust and

corrupt patrimonial system that increasingly shuts out young

people (Walton, 2010).

Foreign investors in South Sudan insist that South Sudanese lack

the experience and right attitude to work and the youth complain

that the government has not provided them with the appropriate

skills and training to enable them to compete favorably in the

job market (UNMISS Radio Miraya, 2013). When high unemployment,

poverty and high levels of community violence come together as

they do in South Sudan, they produce environments in which youth50

find armed violence a rational attractive and even necessary

cause of action (Small Arms Survey, 2007).

INSECURITY

Peace in South Sudan remains elusive and even the declaration of

independence did not put an end to the pervasive violence and

insecurity experienced in the new country. After decades of war

and proxy arming, fire arms are not only a monopoly of the

government but are possessed illegally by the civilian population

on large scale.

The SPLM led government has been accused of poor response to

violent incidents in the country. There is a growing police force

in South Sudan but it lacks training and is poorly funded and due

to insufficient transportation and communication cannot respond

in time to violent events. Therefore, deficits in the government

security sector compounded by the common practice of governments

and security forces arming paramilitary groups for political

advantage against opponents has led to widespread availability of

SALW (Leff, 2009).Violent victimization remains pervasive in

51

South Sudan. SALW which are widely kept by civilians are the

primary cause of death, injury and insecurity.

Security in South Sudan deteriorated markedly in 2009 and is

understood by the GoSS as an extension of the civil war. Armed

ethnic and tribal groups with numerous grievances against the

government were involved in violent clashes causing some 2,500

deaths and displacing 350,000 (McEvoy and Lebrun, 2010). The

police force numbers about 28,000 but most of its members are

untrained, illiterate, irregularly paid and have little or no

vehicles, facilities or infrastructure to aid their work (McEvoy

and Lebrun, 2010). Due to dominance of the police force by one

major tribe, they have been accused of favoritism as they often

discriminate openly between their tribesmen and other tribes. The

culture of impunity is aggravated by lack of a functioning legal

system and the willingness of the government to identify and hold

violations to account (McEvoy and Lebrun, 2010).

In the 2008 nationwide disarmament campaign, no civilian

disarmament took place in Western Equatoria State (WES) because

officials in the State argued that as long as the GoSS cannot

52

protect them from attacks by the LRA, the local militia that

offered protection to villages in the state could not be

disarmed. Violence and small arms proliferation is not rife in

WES but civilian possession and trafficking of weapons are major

problems in the state (O’Brien, 2010). The LRA was supported by

the Khartoum government during the civil war to counter president

Museveni’s support for the SPLA. They cause havoc by raiding

unprotected villages for food supplies and abducting children and

women.

The general population in South Sudan has agreed that security in

the country has deteriorated in the post- CPA period and mostly

due to the misuse of small arms; this follows an established

pattern in post conflict South Sudan in which levels of violence

remain high hence presenting more threats to civilians (Small

Arms Survey, 2007). On 12 May, 2012, a Kenyan school teacher was

shot dead by police when passing the monument of the late Dr.

John Garang because her driver did not hear the whistle for

lowering the flag and did not stop the car.

53

The inability of the security forces to provide security to all

citizens of South Sudan is a motivating factor for individuals

and communities to arm retain their arms and resist disarmament

initiatives. According to research, protection of property and

self-defense are the two reasons that are often cited by

civilians for arming themselves. The government in most cases is

adamant to respond to insecurity calls due to lack of capacity to

prevent the widespread loss of life as was seen when fighting

escalated between the Lou Nuer ‘white army’ and the Murle which

resulted in the death of thousands of people between December

2011 and February 2012 (Saferworld, 2012). Communities therefore

develop their own mechanisms to protect themselves and their

property.

ETHNIC VIOLENCE ASSOCIATED WITH DISGRUNTLED MILITIA GROUPS

The structural causes of inter-communal violence and instability

can be found in the lawlessness and vigilantism that results from

the lack of confidence in the state’s capacity to protect its

people and deal with perpetrators (De Costa, 2012). A growing

number of well-armed insurgent commanders launched rebellions

54

against the GoSS in 2010, 2011 and 2012 destabilizing mostly

large parts of the Greater Upper Nile Region. Simultaneously

conflicts between the Lou Nuer and Murle have exploded into the

worst inter-tribal armed violence in years (Sudan Issue Brief,

2012). Insurgent militias emerging in the post-election period of

2010 including the late George Athor and David Yau Yau (Jonglei

state) and Gatluak Gai (Unity State) and others have posed a huge

security threat to civilians and to the government.

There has also been intensified inter-ethnic violence that begun

in early 2012 among the Murle, Lou Nuer and Dinka in Jonglei

State. The Lou Nuer cattle raiders known as the ‘White Army’ made

of about 6,000-8,000 armed men have been causing havoc in the

State. In 2011, they carried out an attack in Pibor that killed

and injured at least 1000 Murle and stealing up to 100,000 heads

of cattle. A counter raid by the Murle also killed up to 1000 Lou

Nuer and led to a loss of up to 100,000 heads of cattle (Snowden,

2012) this collective community violence has put tremendous

pressure on civilians, the government and the international

community who fear that South Sudan is headed in the path of

Somalia.55

Many influential warlords who fought each other during the civil

war and have long and brutal war records have become part to the

GoSS and SPLA/M elites. These individuals continue to feud and

compete for status, influence and access to resources in their

new positions rendering both the GoSS and SPLA extremely

unstable. Deep war related ethnic divisions are also aggravated

and exploited by politicians, military elites and intellectuals

alike (McEvoy and Lebrun, 2010). Just as there has not been an

attempt to promote reconciliation between north and south since

the CPA, there has been very little effort to advance sustainable

southern reconciliation in the aftermath of the CPA and post

independent South Sudan.

UNRESOLVED ISSUES BETWEEN SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN

South Sudan is awash with weapons from its years of protracted

conflict. However, due to outstanding unresolved border disputes

with Sudan, the country continues to import SALW. It has been

claimed that the SAF is supplying the white army with weapons and

ammunitions in order to foment south-south violence (Brewer,

2010). These unresolved issues with Khartoum continue to cause

56

panic in the SPLM led government hence the government has

embarked on a project of building its defence forces as opposed

to cutting it down.

The most outstanding and crucial between Sudan and South Sudan

are over oil transit fees, failure to demarcate the north-south

border (including the disputed Abyei region) and an insurrection

by the SPLM-North (SPLM-N) in Sudan’s South Kurdofan and Blue

Nile states which border South Sudan (Brewer, 2010). The two

countries accuse each other of supporting proxies on their

respective territories. It is widely believed that GoS provides

arms to pastoral communities in the south in order to destabilize

the GoSS power base and to challenge the authority of the SPLM

(Leff, 2009). Due to failure of repeated negotiations over the

disputed Abyei, both the SPLA and SAF have maintained high

readiness in case of aggression by either side. In late march

2012, the national armies of South Sudan and Sudan clashed on

their shared border area of Abyei (Heglig) bringing them to

almost a full blown war since South Sudan became independent (e-

international relations, 2012).

57

Unfortunately, the high tension between the Sudan and South Sudan

is affecting South Sudan more in terms of arms acquisition and

general security. The GoSS seems to be unable to build effective

structures of governance that will ensure that civilian armament

is reduced. Khartoum on the other hand seems to be enjoying the

state of confusion caused by insecurity in South Sudan. But until

the two countries revisit the CPA and renew their commitment to

implement it, the factors motivating civilians to arms will

continue to exist in South Sudan for decades.

THE IMPACT OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN JONGLEI STATE

INTRODUCTION

Eight years after the war between the Sudan and South Sudan

ended, many states like Jonglei are still experiencing violent

conflict and largely insecure with limited investment potential.

it remains extremely underdeveloped and whatever limited

resources have been available are now being stretched further by

the inflow of returning refugees and IDPs following the signing

of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the eventual

58

cession of South Sudan from Sudan (Garfield, 2007). Even though

tribal conflicts have been partly causing unrest in many parts of

the country in the past years, the majority of deadly violence

has taken place in and around Jonglei state (Crisis Group Africa,

2009). The protracted and unprecedented scale and nature of

violence is none like any that the country has ever experienced

since the CPA. It was calculated in 2009 that Jonglei’s rate of

violent deaths had overtaken that of Darfur (Harragin, 2011) as

cattle raids turned into massacres that killed over 2,500 people

in that year alone; a greater number of fatalities than in Darfur

during the same year (Richardson, 2011).

The escalating violence in Jonglei spills into the whole of South

Sudan, her neighbors and the international community at large.

The scale of violence poses a threat to the stability and long

term prosperity of the Republic of South Sudan (RSS) (Richardson,

2011). At the national level, the continued violence to date is

central to political tension which many fear will engulf the

country into a civil war with itself. The uncontrolled violence

is also undermining the authority of the GoSS which has failed to

59

restore security not only to Jonglei but in the South Sudan as a

whole due to wide proliferation of SALW in the country.

At the regional level, the violence in Jonglei which is

exacerbated by misuse of SALW poses challenges to South Sudan’s

neighbors because Jonglei State has become a breeding ground for

armed non-state actors and organized crime as demonstrated by the

recent arrest of criminals involved in money laundering and

counterfeiting in South Sudan (Richardson, 2011). Cross border

cattle raiding between Uganda, Kenya and South Sudan has become

an organized criminal activity that feeds into illicit meat

markets (Richardson, 2011).

At the international level, mounting levels of violence in the

state is likely to hinder international conflict resolution and

post conflict reconstruction; International donors such as the

United States Agency for International Development (USAID) spent

in total $ 152,697 in 2010 alone to rebuild South Sudan

(Richardson, 2011). Therefore, unabated Skirmishes such as is

happening in Jonglei will therefore not only divert attention of

the international community but also undermine South Sudan’s

60

efforts to draw more foreign investment urgently needed for

development into the country.

GEO-STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF JONGLEI TO SOUTH SUDAN

Located in the Upper Nile region, Jonglei is the largest State in

South Sudan and Bor is the capital city. It covers an area of

more than 122,000 km square and has an estimated population of

1.4 million (South Sudan Center for Census, Statistics and

Evolution, 2010). Jonglei borders Ethiopia to the east, Upper

Nile to the north, Unity and Lakes states to the west and Central

and Eastern Equatoria states to the south. The major tribes

occupying the area are the Dinka, Nuer, and Murle. These three

tribes are nomadic agro-pastoralist and they are known to be

aggressive, brave and viciousness during times of tribal wars and

cattle raids (Wel, 2012). The state is made up of 11 counties;

Twic East, Duk, Bor South, Akobo, Nyirol, Wuror, Pibor, Pochalla,

Ayod, Pigi and Fangak. According to recent statistics, it has 84%

rate of illiteracy and 48% of the population live below the

poverty line hence requiring emergency humanitarian aid

(Saferworld, 2011).

61

The Nuer are primarily from Akobo, Nyirol and Wuror counties-a

band stretching across north-central and eastern Jonglei; the

Dinka inhabit the south western portion of the state: Duk, Twic

East and Bor counties including the state capital Bor; the Murle

a minority group in the state occupy Pibor county (Crisis Group

Africa, 2009).

Jonglei state has featured prominently in a number of key events

in the history of South Sudan. It was in Bor that the 1975 mutiny

took place and the 1983 revolt from the Sudan army occurred

leading to the establishment of the Sudan People’s Liberation

Army/Movement (SPLA/M) (Garfield, 2007). The state also made

history in 1991 when forces loyal to Riak Machar split from John

Garang’s SPLM resulting in widespread inter-ethnic violence with

the Lou Nuer waging a massive attack in Bor reportedly massacring

more than 2,000 Dinkas (Crisis Group Africa, 2009). Even in post-

independence South Sudan, the state continues to face serious

threats that impede peace building and post-conflict

reconstruction (Saferworld, 2011). Regular intractable inter-

ethnic tensions have regularly deteriorated into violence either

as part of cattle raiding practices or revenge attacks. The62

heightened insecurity in the state has stunted peace building and

development efforts and hampered national and international

support (Saferworld, 2011).

Although competition for cattle and resources such as pasture and

water have historically been a major source of tension among

communities in Jonglei, the past five years has seen a change in

the way confrontations are experienced; conflicts have become

more violent and no longer follow social rules the way they used

to, with a rising number of deaths and displacement of civilians

(De Costa, 2012). Jonglei state has seen an upsurge in violence

since 2009 as a result of a continuous cycle of tension and

violence that stretches back many years.

There are three main factors that make Jonglei important to South

Sudan. These factors are; the Jonglei Canal, untapped reserves of

oil in Eastern Jonglei and the large number of cattle owned by

the population of Jonglei.

The Jonglei canal

The Jonglei Canal was a hydro-construction project initiated by

the government of Sudan in 1980 to build a canal that would

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divert the White Nile as it passes the swampy areas of Jonglei

known as the Sudd to provide greater water security for the

population in North Sudan and Egypt. About 260 kilometers of the

canal’s 360 kilometers was completed but it was brought to a halt

at the onset of the second civil war in 1984 (Salman, 2011).

The GoSS in 2008 in a new agreement with the government of Egypt

is said to be ready to revamp the construction of the canal and

have it completed by 2032 (Richardson, 2011). The reconstruction

of the canal will have a number of development benefits for the

surrounding areas and the whole of South Sudan through building

new infrastructure and provision of services to the local people

(Sudan Tribune, 2009). Other benefits will include improved

mobility and commerce which will in turn solve the problem of

food insecurity to Upper Nile and Jonglei, relieve areas that

suffer from flooding by draining excess water during the rainy

season, and introduce irrigation projects among others (Doran,

2009).

However, construction work on the canal can impact on the Sudd

ecosystem and on local livelihoods specifically on drinking

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water, pasture, fisheries and access to either side of the canal

by pastoral communities (Salman, 2011). The construction of the

canal can drain up the Sudd, which is one of the largest fresh

water wetland in the world and the largest wetland in the Nile

Valley (New Sudan Vision, 2011). In November 2006, the Sudd was

officially recognized as an internationally important wetland,

under the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands (Salman, 2011). As the

canal holds huge development potential for South Sudan as well as

negative consequence on the local population inhabiting the area,

it is now up to the GoSS to cement its authority as the protector

of South Sudan’s resources and ensure security throughout South

Sudan to end the inter communal violence and armed insurgencies

that have besieged the region for the past eight years.

Untapped oil deposits

According to the government of South Sudan spokesperson, Benjamin

Marial, eastern Jonglei state has large reserves of untapped oil

deposits (IPSOS Synovate, 2013). The GoSS has given a contract to

French oil company Total which has partnered with US Exxon Mobil

and Kuwait’s Kufpec to search for oil deposits in Jonglei state

65

(Reuters, 2013). The civil war prevented Total which has held a

majority interest in Block B since early 1980s from exploring the

120,000 square concessions in Jonglei because of insecurity in

the region since the civil war begun (Reuters, 2013). Despite the

fact that the quantity of how much oil Jonglei state could be

reserving is not known, South Sudan is pushing for the

construction of a pipeline from Lamu in Kenya through Ethiopia

and Djibouti since the GoS is charging it high prices to

transport its oil through their pipeline (IPSOS Synovate, 2013).

South Sudan wants to boost oil exploration in Jonglei because

most of its available oil fields face declining reserves. In

2011, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that South

Sudan production was likely to half by the year 2020 without new

discoveries or improved recovery (IPSOS Synovate, 2013). With

declining reserves in its main producing fields, South Sudan is

eager to start oil exploration in the untapped reserves in

Jonglei but such exploration plans cannot kick off with

escalating fighting between the army and rebels led by David Yau

Yau (Al-Arabiya, 2013) and unresolved communal issues.

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Large herds of cattle

The three main tribes inhabiting Jonglei are known to own very

large herds of cattle on which their lives are centered. Cattle

is the back bone of their economy and apart from being used to

pay dowries in marriages, they provide meat, milk and blood which

is their stable food, they are also used as a means of exchange

to barter for food commodities and other goods (Wel, 2012). The

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that with 11

million cows and 19 million goats and sheep, South Sudan has the

fourth largest herd of livestock in Africa (IRIN, 2011).

Statistics show that South Sudan has over 31 million heads of

cattle, goats and sheep, making it a world leading nation when

the animal wealth is calculated per capita (Sudan Tribune, 2013).

The country could use this under-utilized economic potential to

export meat and dairy products to generate much need hard

currency for its development initiatives.

However, insecurity in places such as Jonglei whose tribes own

large herds of cattle has prevented organizations such as FAO to

give much needed vaccinations to these herds so as to enhance and

67

preserve their quality and quantity; the escalating inter

communal violence and local militia insurgency has killed more

than 10,000 people and 25,000 heads of cattle stolen in two major

cattle raids in Jonglei state in 2011 alone (IRIN, 2011). Such

gaps in security are likely to hinder the potential of South

Sudan to develop its livestock industry.

THE WHITE ARMY

During the civil war between Sudan and South Sudan, a number of

actors competed for power and control of resources in Jonglei

state among which was the white army. The white army is militia

groupings of armed civilians mostly comprising of young armed

Nuer and Dinka men. The primary purpose of the white army was to

protect communities from attacks such as from cattle raiding,

water sources, grazing rights, and revenge feuds as well as

undisciplined acts of the youth (Garfield, 2007). Due to the

influence of the white army on the population, both the SAF and

the SPLA supplied it with SALW and gradually gun possession

became a rite of passage from childhood to adulthood among Nuer

males replacing more traditional weapons such as spears and

68

machetes (Garfield, 2007). The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) is

believed to have at least supplied up to 10,000 weapons to Riak’s

forces, whose primary recipients among the population were the

youth of cattle camps (Young, 2007). It was during this period

that the white army emerged as a distinct entity and managed to

exact the greatest humanitarian disasters on the Bor Dinka during

the last two decades of the civil war killing many civilians,

looting property on a large scale and stealing cattle (Young,

2007).

The basis for the survival of the white army was the lack of a

clear government and the constant unrest caused by other larger

armed groups operating in the republic of South Sudan at the

time. Many youths felt free to join their local white army

militia as a form of self defence from larger rebel groups such

as the SPLA which developed the reputation for harassing and

exploiting civilians; in addition was the commercial factor

attached to cattle raiding, owning a gun and belonging to a

militia which facilitated cattle raids (Arnold and Alden, 2007).

This enriched the marginalized youths as there are limited

economic opportunities available to them in South Sudan.69

With time, the presence of the white army created significant

degree of instability in Upper Nile and Jonglei states and their

militant presence has been one of the major security challenges

for the GoSS in the post CPA era. The United Nations (UN)

estimated that at the beginning of 2006 there were 20,000-30,000

mainly youth members of the white army militias who were loosely

organized under the leadership of chiefs (Arnold and Alden,

2007). However, under the terms of the CPA, the SPLA was granted

supremacy in South Sudan and hence it set out to eliminate

competing armed groups. This forced some of the members of the

white army to join the SPLA and others to disarm voluntarily;

however, some continued resisting the authority of the SPLA

(Young, 2007). The result was the destruction of the white army

resulting in the loss of many lives, the destitution of the

communities and the breakdown of civil order and traditional

authority (Young, 2007). The decline of the white army appears to

have been caused by long term changes within Nuer society as well

as short term political and military development, notably the

advent of the CPA, the Juba Declaration (unification of SPLA and

70

SSDF), and the SPLA’s disarmament campaign of December 2005- May

2006 (Young, 2007).

The dissolution of the white army has produced a large number of

armed and dissatisfied youths who are in danger of resorting to

further violence (Small Arms Survey, 2007). This is due to the

fact that some of the conditions that brought the white army to

existence have not been met; such as the establishment of viable

systems of local government that responds to the need of the

disgruntled and violent youth who made up the white army (Young,

2007).

The youths who made up the white army should therefore be taken

seriously and considered in post conflict reconstruction policies

of South Sudan. Their presence has continued to severely hinder

the ability of the GoSS to exert effective governmental control

over the south namely in Jonglei and other states with similar

armed youth militias.

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FACTORS FUELING VIOLENCE IN JONGLEI

A number of factors have been suggested to be responsible for the

violence in Jonglei State. This section will discuss the factors

that pertain to the root causes of the violence in Jonglei and

factors that pertain to the failure of the government to exert

working systems of governance on the population.

Climate change and diminishing resources

The weather patterns in Jonglei are extreme. The dry seasons are

too dry making it difficult for pastoralists to find water for

their cattle and the wet seasons are too wet often characterized

by floods making most roads inaccessible; this not only obstruct

security provision by state forces, but also obstruct regular

trade, economic activities and social contact with the rest of

the country (Willems and Rouw, 2011).

The seasonal environmental changes dictate pastoral migration.

During the dry seasons communities living in more arid conditions

herd their cattle towards areas with more abundant pasture and

water resources (Harragin, 2011). As a result communities already

living in tension are brought to closer proximity and become

72

engaged in conflicts over access to these essential resources

escalating the frequency and intensity of the conflicts more than

any other in South Sudan (Richardson, 2011). In 2009, more than

350,000 were displaced as a result of violence amongst

pastoralist communities due to migration of rival groups into

each other’s territories in search of water and grazing land

(Saferworld, 2011).

In 2007, some 52,219 households were affected by flooding in

South Sudan. Jonglei and Upper Nile were hit heavily with Jonglei

state cut off for several weeks (Richardson, 2011). According to

the UN, of the 333,406 people estimated to have returned to South

Sudan since October 2010, 19,788 have arrived in Jonglei State

(Sudan Tribune, 2011). In January 2011, 90% of payams surveyed

across six states reported conflicts over water and land due to

increasing number of returnees (save the children, 2011). The

increase in population due to returning IDPs and refugees means

competition for already scarce diminishing resources. These

communities cannot turn to other viable sources of livelihood due

to lack of irrigation and over flow during the rainy season thus

hindering agriculture development. The area floods because the73

soil in Jonglei is black cotton soil that does not dispose off

water very easily (Willems and Rouw, 2011).

As climate conditions continue to worsen, the competition for

scarce resources is likely to intensify not only in Jonglei but

in all the ten states of South Sudan.

Cattle raids and child abductions

Cattle raiding among tribes in South Sudan is not a new

phenomenon. Cattle raiding and retaliations have been part of

life for generations between Nuer, Dinka and Murle and also among

the tribes in Eastern Equatoria. Raids undertaken to increase

stocks and compensate for those lost to pestilence and theft have

been normalized and accepted as part of traditional inter

communal relations; but of recent, the intensity of violence has

become unprecedented in terms of scale and frequency (Richardson,

2011). Cattle in these communities serve as bride wealth as well

as for economic benefits among others. The use of SALW in the

raids has changed the nature of the raids from mere cattle theft

to brutal indiscriminate massacres of civilians and abduction of

children.

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Even though the habit is practiced by other tribes in South

Sudan, the Murle who make up 4% in the state are famous for child

abductions. Sometimes they come as far as Juba (capital city) to

steal children. In Jonglei, the Murle abduct children as part of

cattle raids. Child abductions by the Murle is said to be related

to the need to sustain their low numbers due to low reproduction

rates caused by early marriages and infections such as STDs

(Saferworld, 2011). When the Murle raided the Nuer just two

months after independence in 2011, the majority of victims were

children, the elderly and women. The armed youth took with them

38,000 heads of cattle, killed more than 640 people, wounded 750

others, abducted 300 children and left 200 others orphaned

(SSANSA, 2011).

Small arms and light weapons

The proliferation and wide availability of SALW is a significant

factor in the increasing violence and frequency of cattle raids.

Gun possession has become a means for sustaining livelihoods, for

self-defense, revenge attacks, the threat of cross border

insecurity and expected disarmament benefits (Willems and Rouw,

75

2011). The availability of SALW makes it easier for petty

arguments and minor conflicts to spiral out of control into

deadly violence (Willems and Rouw, 2011).

Initially, weapons were regarded as a collective resource to

protect community’s cattle and were controlled by the tribal

elders, but local chiefs soon lost their ability to monitor the

use and whereabouts of these guns (Small Arms Survey, 2007). As

youths joined armed militia groups they became unruly and

disregarded authority of the elders hence individuals used guns

for personal as opposed to community benefits.

Insecurity

The security situation in Jonglei is complex; with renegade

generals, cattle raiding based on lack of economic and cultural

alternatives, irresponsive and incapable security providers that

often times do not respect human rights in their operations,

roads largely inaccessible during rainy seasons and tension among

the various tribes of Jonglei (Willems and Rouw, 2011).

Lack of police presence in the state (mainly rural areas) and the

inability of the state to bring perpetrators of the abductions,

76

theft and murders related to cattle raiding to justice have led

the communities to take the law into their own hands. In the

absence of sufficient state capacity to provide security and wide

availability of SALW, insecurity became rampant in the state

(DDG, Pact World and Saferworld, 2013; Conflict Dynamics

International, 2012)

Unsuccessful disarmament initiatives

The extensive proliferation of arms and a series of unsuccessful

civilian disarmament processes which begun at the end of 2005

have contributed to the escalation in violence. The government is

often blamed for being segregative in its disarmament activities

in the region. In the 2006 disarmament process, the SPLA imposed

forced disarmament on the white army who had refused to disarm

voluntarily before moving into neighboring territories to graze

their cattle. Since this activity was specifically effected on

the Lou Nuer leaving other groups such as the Murle and Dinka

armed, it exposed them to attacks by their neighbors.

Following the 2006 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

(DDR) process, communities gradually re-armed through looting of

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stores of weapons that had been collected in the disarmament

exercise as well as from the armories of the Joint Integrated

Units (JIU) in neighboring Upper Nile state; other unsuccessful

DDR attempts were carried out in 2007 and 2008 respectively

(UNMISS, 2012). Disarmament campaigns were said to have had

limited success since they only covered major towns ignoring

remote areas where both the Lou Nuer and Murle youths hid arms

(UNMISS, 2012).

Rebel militias

Rebel militias have thrived in post CPA South Sudan and the

largest number was experienced in Jonglei state following

disputes over the 2010 gubernational elections. Militia groups

led by George Athor, Gatluak Gai and David Yau Yau launched armed

attacks to challenge the authority and legitimacy of the SPLA led

government (Saferworld, 2011).

78

There is also a legacy of mistrust between communities and key

actors resulting in part from war time political and military

fault lines; including the creation of militias and self defence

forces along ethnic lines to carry out attacks on and subjugate

neighboring groups (UNMISS, 2012). The factors that led to the

1991 split of forces between Garang and Machar during the civil

war continue to manifest in South Sudan today; i.e. domination of

the government and the armed forces by one ethnic group.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SALW ENGINEERED VIOLENCE IN JONGLEI

STATE

The unheeding violence in Jonglei state and surrounding areas has

had devastating consequences on the population living in this

region. However, despite the ugly effects associated with the

conflict, the situation seems to be getting worse with civilians

now having no options but to seek refuge in the most daring of

conditions such as hiding in swampy bushes where they are exposed

to water borne diseases and cannot be accessed easily by

humanitarian organizations.

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Food shortages and destruction of livelihoods

The conflict has exacerbated a serious food crisis in the region

as civilians fail to cultivate their fields due to insecurity.

Violence committed in the communities has often led to food

shortages as food stores are destroyed and burnt down, livestock

stolen or killed and crops left unplanted. The problem of SALW in

the state is not only a big security threat to the state but also

to the livelihood of citizens and broader national development

(SSANSA, 2011). The use of SALW has increased the intensity of

cattle rustling leading to indiscriminate killings, injuries,

destruction of property and displacement of people (SSANSA,

2011).

Inter communal attacks and civilian disarmament campaigns are

often characterized by a lawless rampage of looting, cattle

raiding and property destruction by all parties involved. In the

2006 forced disarmament campaign, an estimated 400 SPLA and 1,200

white army soldiers were killed and at least 213 civilians died.

In addition there was food shortage because of looting by both

sides (Brewer, 2010).

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An estimated 1.7 million people in Southern Sudan have been food

insecure in the last 10 years; the majority (up to 40%) from

Jonglei, Northern Bahr El Ghazel and Upper Nile states

(Richardson, 2011). The years of civil war and continuous

violence has left Jonglei State deprived of social and economic

development. What makes the problem of food insecurity worse is

the fact that the inhabitants are dependent on livelihoods that

are vulnerable to environmental shifts and drive violent conflict

(Richardson, 2011).

All these conditions have forced the population to retain their

arms and to resist disarmament campaigns in the state.

Increased levels of domestic violence and violations of women

rights

The easy availability and misuse of SALW has not only increased

the death tolls from raids, it has also increased the scale of

women rights violations during the raids as well as other

criminal acts in the state (SSANSA, 2011). For example, in many

states in South Sudan, it is normal for husbands to beat,

threaten, injure and even kill their wives using AK47s; gender

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issues feature prominently in small arms driven conflicts e.g.

revelations by women in Jonglei and Upper Nile states indicate

that during raids, children are abducted and women are raped

(SSANSA, 2011). The destruction of family cohesion and the

undermining of traditional support mechanisms through the death

of a husband or disruption of extended family ties have forced

women to shoulder the economic burden of supporting their

families (SSANSA, 2011).

Impedes humanitarian access to civilians

Insecurity due to SALW engineered violence hinders and restricts

humanitarian access to communities in need including in Jonglei

among other places. In the past few months humanitarian

organizations have been struggling to deliver aid to

approximately 12,000 people displaced in Pibor county affected by

clashes between the SPLA and armed groups because the government

refused them access to aid civilians who have gone into hiding

(UNMISS, 2013). Humanitarian organizations also report increased

levels of interference in their work by authorities and security

forces, including intimidations and harassments (UNMISS, 2013).

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In recent violent attacks by David Yau Yau’s militia, thousands

of people are said to have been cut off from water, food and

medical care in Jonglei state after fleeing violence between

rebels and the government in Pibor County (IRIN, 2013). According

to MSF an estimated 120,000 people have fled Pibor to areas that

are likely to be flooded with water as the rainy season starts

(IRIN, 2013).

This nature of local violence does not give room to aid workers

to assist the fleeing civilians because as long as the government

and the international community does not consider them as serious

the application of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) becomes

very limited.

Unending sporadic violence

In December 2011, an estimated 6,000-8,000 armed members of the

white army launched a series of systematic attacks on areas

inhabited by the Murle ethnic groups. The Murle launched

retaliatory attacks on Lou Nuer and Dinka Bor areas killing,

injuring and displacing hundreds (UNMISS, 2012). The destruction

of homes, property and livelihoods in communities already

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suffering extreme poverty and lack of access to basic government

services makes recovery from such incidents extremely difficult.

The failure of the government to protect civilians from violence,

investigate and hold perpetrators accountable and effectively

administer justice is believed to be contributing to the cycle of

retaliatory inter-communal attacks (UNMISS, 2012).

Between January and May 2011, close to 200 incidents were

recorded within South Sudan, thousands were killed in the

fighting and 116,000 people were displaced (Save the Children,

2011). The death toll in Jonglei violence in 2009 exceeded that

in Darfur in the same year and displaced more than 350,000 people

(Crisis Group Africa, 2009).

Hindrance of development and post conflict reconstruction

On April 9th 2013, armed men attacked UN mission convoy in

Gumuruk, Jonglei state killing 5 Indian peace keepers, 2 UNMISS

national staff and 5 civilian staff contractors while injuring 9

others (UN, 2013). The UN Secretary General condemned the attacks

and called upon the GoSS to bring the perpetrators of this crime

to justice. The Secretary General added that the killing of

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peacekeepers is a war crime that falls under the jurisdiction of

the International Criminal Court (ICC) (UN, 2013). Four months

earlier, the SPLA shot down a UNMISS helicopter while it was

conducting reconnaissance of potential landing sites near

Likuangole, Jonglei state killing all four crew members on board

(UNMISS, 2013). Soon after the incident, Russia threatened to

withdraw helicopters and personnel servicing the UN mission in

South Sudan (Aljazeera, 2012).

Insecurity in the region forced ASCOM, a Moldovan oil and

construction firm operating in the state to stop their operations

in mid-May, 2013 due to insecurity; This company builds and fixes

dikes in the areas worst hit by floods to enable farmers to carry

out their agricultural activities (Sudan Tribune, 2013). Due to

insecurity caused by the violence since the civil war, France’s

Total SA has been unable to start exploration in the region for

more than 30 years (Bariyo, 2013).

Such incidents are likely to hinder members of the international

community and investors who are making an effort to bring long

lasting peace, stability and development in South Sudan.

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Displacement of civilians

Clashes between militias and SPLA have caused civilian deaths and

displacement particularly in Unity, Jonglei and Upper Nile

States. An estimated 67% of conflict incidents reported by the UN

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in

2010 were related to tribal conflicts, 21% to armed incidents and

10% to LRA attacks (UNOCHA, 2010). More than 2,300 people were

killed in violent conflict or crimes in South Sudan in the first

half of 2011 alone (Maxwell, Gelsdorf and Santschi, 2012). An

attack on Pibor market on 21 December 2012, left approximately

200 civilians to seek refuge in the UNMISS former Pibor county

support base compound (UNMISS, 2013).

The conflict has forced people to seek refuge in IDP camps or

move to camps established by international non-governmental aid

organizations in other countries (Wel, 2012). In recent attacks

carried out by David Yau Yau’s militia, the United Nations

Humanitarian Coordination for Refugees (UNHCR) has reported that

an estimated 148,000 people have been affected by the violence

forcing thousands to flee into the neighboring countries; in the

86

first five months of 2013, more than 5,000 Jonglei refugees have

crossed over into the Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya, another 2,700

arrived in Uganda since the beginning of 2013, while 2,175

arrived in Ethiopia between May and June 2013 (IRIN, 2013).

Genocide watch has declared that the ethnic massacres in Jonglei

State constitute genocide (Genocide Watch, 2013). The government,

in an effort to control the violence has carried out a series of

coercive and voluntary civilian disarmament based on the

assumption that SALW are a source of ongoing insecurity in

Jonglei state and throughout the country. The GoSS has failed to

address the root causes of the conflict in Jonglei. Without

efforts to tackle the root causes of the conflict, the violence

is likely to continue for some time and spill beyond this state

to other states and effects will be felt across borders.

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NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONTROL INITIATIVES ON SALW

The wide spread availability and proliferation of small arms and

light weapons (SALW) continue to threaten fragile and stable

states making security situations volatile in most post conflict

societies with a high risk of renewed hostilities. This situation

is increasingly causing the international community, regional

organizations and national governments to become aware of the

spillover effects of SALW driven conflicts. There is widespread

consensus among states on regulation of SALW on their territories

and across so as to curb the scourge of small arms proliferation

and trafficking.

The effects of decades of civil war in Sudan has spread to her

neighbors and is likely to continue with small arms still at

large in the country and renewed hostilities among communities

and between the SPLA and militia groups operating in South Sudan.

Being a land locked country means South Sudan’s neighbors stand a

high risk of experiencing not only cross border arms trade but

also the influx of refugees due to SALW driven conflict.

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Therefore, an integrated approach, be it at national, regional or

international is needed to clean up the widespread availability

of small arms in South Sudan.

This chapter will analyze the various international, regional,

and national initiatives aimed at the control of SALW. The

reasons and objectives of each instrument will be discussed and

the extent to which they have been useful in the control of

proliferation of SALW in their respective areas of jurisdiction

INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES

Most countries have gun control laws that regulate the import,

sale and possession of SALW. However, these national laws have

had a limited success in controlling the proliferation and

trafficking of SALW especially to African countries. Due to the

loopholes in national gun regulation, the international

regulation of gun violence is thus needed to supplement weak

regional and national laws. There are two main international gun

89

regulations; the United Nations Program of Action (UNPoA) and the

Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

The United Nations Program of Action (UNPoA)

The United Nations program of Action (PoA) to Prevent, Combat and

Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons is a

globally agreed structure tackling a wide range of small arms

related issues. The PoA was as a result of a 2001 UN Conference

on the illicit trade in SALW. It draws a framework for states

duties at national, regional and global levels including

legislation on illegal production, possession, stockpiling and

trade in small arms. It also renders assistance to states to

strengthen their ability to identify and trace the illicit

weapons and public awareness campaigns. Priorities for African

countries in implementing the PoA include sustainable Disarmament

Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programming, use of public

awareness as a tool to reduce demand for weapons and addressing

the small arms problem with the nexus of peace, security,

humanitarian and development dimensions (Kytomaki and Wayne,

2006).

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Though its intentions are worthy, the PoA is weak to the extent

that it is not legally binding and can therefore be disregarded

by any member state (Che, 2007) and is also not binding on non-

members of the UN who can continue to engage in the very

activities that the PoA prohibits or intends to control. The

fact that it is not legally binding on member states only means

that it cannot impose sanctions on those violating the agreement.

It does not also guide on civilian use of SALW or on misuse of

arms by members who own arms legitimately.

The ambiguities in the UNPoA directed the UN member states to

agree in 2009 on the need for a durable global arms trade treaty

(Darkwa, 2011). However, the drafting of this treaty was no easy

task as it had to take into consideration the interests of big

powers such as the United States (US), Russia, and China who are

some of the major producers and suppliers of small arms to third

world countries.

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

The ATT adopted in March 2013, is aimed at curbing the illegal

transfer, distribution and use of small arms and light weapons

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which often propagate conflicts, violent crime and even

terrorism. Its objective is to prevent and eradicate the illicit

trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion for the

purpose of reducing human suffering, contributing to

international and regional peace, security and stability (UN

final Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, 2013). In addition it

is meant to establish international standards for the import,

export and transfer of conventional weapons including SALW (Stohl

and Tuttle, 2009). The idea for the ATT emerged as a result of

poorly regulated international trade in arms and the inability of

the UNPoA to hold member states accountable for violations. This

laxity in law contributed to serious human rights abuses and

severe violations of international humanitarian law (IHL),

damaging countries and regions and undermining development. The

idea was that a strong and comprehensive ATT would greatly help

reduce the likelihood of arms ending up in the hands of

irresponsible end-users and help prevent such destructive impacts

on people’s lives (Amnesty International, 2008).

One major weakness with the ATT is that it does not have a

definition of SALW. This is likely to pose a threat to state92

controls on proliferation of SALW. Another weakness is that just

like its predecessor, the ATT is not legally binding on states

and hence member states are free to disregard its provisions at

will. This is one of the major constraints to the implementation

of International law at the global level.

Important to note is the fact that even though the ATT is being

pursued so as to protect countries devastated by war like South

Sudan among others, she is not among the 67 states that have

signed the ATT. Such delays in international participation to

curb the problem of small arms and light weapons is likely to

affect South Sudan in promulgation of domestic laws to the same

effect. Becoming a member to the ATT will be a huge step for

South Sudan towards importation and regulation of SALW not only

domestically but internationally as well.

REGIONAL INITIATIVES

A lot of deaths in war, post conflict, and African countries at

peace are as a result of illicitly procured SALW whose trade

continues to be unchecked and such illegal weapons have fuelled

conflicts in addition to leading to gross human rights

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violations. The biggest challenge for arms control in Africa has

been addressing the problem within the nexus of security,

humanitarian and development dimensions of post conflict

reconstruction and peace building (Kytomaki and Wayne, 2006).

According to the International Action Network on Small Arms

(IANSA) only 34 of the 44 countries in sub-Saharan Africa

regulate the small arms trade (knight, 2010). Despite many

unilateral and multilateral agreements on arms control, countries

have often failed to agree on how best to deal with the

proliferation of SALW in a practical and solid way with each

region promulgating its own arms control laws. The political will

to promote transparency in fighting the proliferation and illicit

flows of SALW in the region has been expressed through the

following instruments.

The Bamako Declaration

The Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the

Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms

and Light Weapons was adopted by the African Union (AU) (then

Organization of African Unity, OAU) in 2000. The goal was to

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develop an African common position on the illicit proliferation,

circulation and trafficking of SALW (Che, 2007) and also to

endorse processes directed towards the restoration of peace,

security and confidence among and between member states with a

view to reducing the resort to arms and most importantly to

promote comprehensive solutions to the problem of illicit

proliferation, circulation and trafficking of SALW (Scott, 2003).

During the meeting of Member States Experts 26th-29th September,

2011, the AU adopted the African Union Strategy on the Control of

Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of SALW to

strengthen coordination and cooperation between and among all

implementing bodies with the objective of improving

implementation at national, regional and continental levels; the

main objective of this strategy is to prevent, combat and

eradicate the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking

of SALW in an integrated and holistic manner across all regions

of Africa (AU, 2011).

One major challenge to this continental initiative is its failure

to achieve a common African position in advance of UN practices.

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For example, the AU was unable to agree a common position on the

ATT negotiations in July 2012, largely due to disagreements

between North African states and sub-Saharan African states

(SIPRI, 2013). The AU Protocol to a large extent has not done

much to regulate the flow of arms into the region as Africa

continues to act as a dumping ground for small arms from the

world’s most powerful states.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention

The ECOWAS Convention on SALW, their Ammunitions and Other

Related Materials, adopted on 14th June, 2006 resulted from the

transformation of the ECOWAS Moratorium on Importation,

Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons into a legally

binding convention. The moratorium of 1998 was the first of its

kind in Africa. However, it had little impact on SALW due to lack

of political will and lack of enforceable sanctions for

violations. This led to the promulgation of a legally binding

ECOWAS Convention in 2006 to regulate the proliferation of SALW

in the sub-region (Darkwa, 2011).

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The Convention in its preamble acknowledges that SALW pose a

direct threat to human security and development and hence the

need to have laws regulating its use in the sub-Sahara region. It

is believed to be the most innovative legal instrument on small

arms control on the continent because it basis its text on

international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights

law and development needs of the region (Garcia, 2009).

Despite the generally peaceful nature of the sub-region, some of

the countries in this region are believed to have the most

developed networks for arms proliferation among other crimes;

being recognized as a paradise for organized crimes due to its

strategic location serving both as a transit and exit point for

Europe and America (Darkwa,2011). It is therefore imperative that

the ECOWAS member states live up to the provisions of this

Convention to ensure that the region experiences peaceful

development.

The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Protocol

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The SADC Protocol is a legally binding instrument to increase

control over the proliferation of small arms in Southern Africa.

It was adopted in August 2001 and entered into force in November

2004. Its primary objective are to prevent, combat and eradicate

the illicit manufacturing of firearms, ammunitions and other

related materials, to promote legal uniformity and minimum

standards in the manufacture, control and possession, import,

export and transfer of firearms and ammunitions and facilitate

cooperation and exchange of information on SALW issues in the

region (Che, 2007; Scott, 2003).

The Nairobi Protocol

The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of

SALW in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering

States is a legally binding instrument that was adopted in April

2004 and entered into force in 2005. its provides in the preamble

that the proliferation of illicit SALW in the Great Lakes Region

and the Horn of Africa have grave consequences in the sub-region

and has contributed in sustaining armed conflict, crime and

degrading the environment among others (Nairobi protocol, 2004).

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The protocol bans civilian ownership of military assault rifles

and imposes obligatory gun registration on member states. It also

requires countries to integrate provisions of the protocol into

their domestic laws and calls upon member states to control the

illicit manufacture, trafficking, possession and misuse of SALW

and obliges them to address the problem of internal conflict.

In June 2005, the Best Practices Guidelines a non-binding

document was adopted to implement the Nairobi Protocol (Che,

2007). The aim of the guide is to elaborate a framework for the

development of policy, national legislations, general operational

guidelines and procedures on all aspects of SALW required for

implementation by the Nairobi Protocol (RECSA, 2005).

Due to challenges posed by warring groups, certain countries in

the Horn of Africa formed a secretariat known as the Regional

Center on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA) to monitor and

implement the protocol. RECSA’s formation was to enhance the

capacity of states to meet the commitments enshrined in the

Nairobi Protocol. It also acts as a forum for cooperation among

national focal points and other relevant agencies to prevent,

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combat and eradicate, stockpiling, and illicit trafficking in

SALW in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa (Leff, 2009).

Currently RECSA has 15 Member States and South Sudan was admitted

into membership in 2011(RECSA, 2012).

It is important to note that majority of these regional

initiatives are donor funded. This only means that they have to

function according to the guidelines imposed by their financiers.

And when there is a conflict of interest between the donor

government and the regional interests, the activities as laid out

by the instruments come to a deadlock hence rendering them

ineffective.

NATIONAL INITIATIVES

The initiative to control SALW in South Sudan is a complex one.

This is due first of all to the failure of the Comprehensive

Peace Agreement (CPA) mandated Disarmament, Demobilization and

Re-integration (DDR) process. Secondly arms possession in post-

conflict South Sudan is not only in the hands of members of the

armed forces but militia groups who feel that the dividends of

peace are not being shared equally by the government of the day.

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These militia groups continue to proliferate small arms to

civilians who in the absence of means of livelihood and

insecurity take up arms to protect themselves and property. The

Government of South Sudan (GoSS) has undertaken several

disarmament campaigns with Jonglei State experiencing more than

four civilian disarmament campaigns. These campaigns to managed

to collect a few arms from civilians but they have not had any

impact on solving the insecurity problem in the state. the

absence of state provided security to protect disarmed civilians

has caused the population to further arm themselves for

protection against raids from neighboring tribes.

Post-Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) Disarmament,

Demobilization and Rehabilitation (DDR)

The DDR program as mandated by the CPA of 2005 was a process

meant to cultivate and to create a conducive environment to human

security and to support post-peace agreements and social

stabilization across Sudan. The process aimed at achieving

voluntary and inclusive disarmament, demobilization and

reintegration of former combatants of the Sudan Armed Forces

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(SAF) and the South People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). It made room

for the creation of institutions that will be in charge of

handling the process among which was South Sudan DDR Commission

(SSDDRC). The implementation of the DDR program started four

years after the CPA was signed in both Sudan and South Sudan.

However, six years after the CPA, less than 13 % of the SPLA’s

targeted adult caseload had entered the process due to absence of

agreement on objectives among stakeholders (Nichols, 2011). The

obligation for the DDR as set by the CPA expired in July 2011

when South Sudan voted for secession (Sudan Issue Brief, 2011).

One major loophole with the CPA authorized DDR was the fact that

it did not provide for the disarmament of civilian and other

militia groups; it only provided for the SPLA and SAF forces

(Knight, 2010). This impacted on South Sudan specifically that

had a number of militia groups who fought alongside or against

the SPLA and Civilians who received arms from both the SPLA and

SAF forces during the civil war.

The Republic of South Sudan Disarmament Demobilization and Re-

integration Council (RSSDDRC) has since then been created to lead

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the DDR program in South Sudan. The program came into effect in

2012 to provide guidance on all the policies and strategic

directions related to the expedition of the process of

disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants

and other specific needs groups associated with the national

regular forces. RSSDDRC is constitutionally mandated to lead DDR

process for 150,000, ex-combatants: 80, 000 from the SPLA and 70,

000 from other national organized forces: The Police, the Prison,

Wildlife Services and the Fire Brigade, starting with the DDR

pilot project for 4, 500 ex-combatants in the first quarter of

2012 (GoSS, 2009-2012).

If well implemented, the RSSDDRC can help to reduce the problem

of rampant crime and increasing armed violence within South

Sudan. However, a notable challenge with this institution is the

fact that it does not have the mandate to disarm civilians who

currently possess large amounts of small arms.

The Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control (BCSSAC)

The BCSSAC which was created in 2008 seeks to address the threat

posed by the proliferation of small arms and community security

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to peace and development in South Sudan. The overall objective of

the Bureau is to strengthen the rule of law through the reduction

in civilian possession of illegal arms by supporting the arms

control initiatives. It is also tasked with rising awareness,

sensitizing and disseminating information on small arms issues at

the local, state and central level (www.goss-online.org, 2013).

In efforts to increase community security and control the

proliferation of small arms, the BCSSAC has received support of

international partners such as the United Nations Development

Fund (UNDP) and Saferworld. In addition it is leading the

government in drafting legislation on SALW to provide a solid

legal backing for any future disarmament initiatives and

subsequent controls on SALW possession (Saferworld, 2012; Willems

and Rouw, 2011). It also cooperates with neighboring countries on

regional agreements with regard to SALW control at the domestic

level.

Disarmament campaigns

Civilian disarmament campaigns in South Sudan have often been

reactive rather than proactive hence not being able to address

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the problem from its roots (Saferworld, 2012). The government of

South Sudan (GoSS) has employed a series of intensive civilian

disarmament initiatives in most parts of the country, with states

like Jonglei experiencing the most of these campaigns. However,

despite the fact that the campaigns were intended to improve the

security situation in some of the states, it had the adverse

effect; it intensified insecurity for disarmed groups as they

become vulnerable to attacks by their un-disarmed neighbors

(Leff, 2009).

The first disarmament campaign in post CPA South Sudan was

conducted between December 2005 and May 2006 in Jonglei state

targeting the Lou Nuer faction of the white army. A total of

3,701 (O’Brien, 2009) weapons were collected from this operation

but due to resistance from the population and the use of force by

the SPLA, an estimated 1,600 white army and SPLA soldiers were

killed (Leff, 2009; Garfield, 2007). There was an estimate of 213

civilian deaths and massive looting of civilian property causing

food shortage (Brewer, 2010) and burning of houses.

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The consequences and failure of this campaign was attributed to

certain factors; the inability of the GoSS to involve all

stakeholders in the campaign, the political motivation behind the

campaign which was aimed at a specific ethnic group and getting

rid of the white army, militaristic approach and involved few

security guarantees (O’Brien, 2009). After the campaign, the Lou

Nuer were left vulnerable to attacks from their neighbors the

Dinka and Murle who live in the state, are equally armed but were

not targeted in the disarmament campaign.

A campaign in Akobo supported by the UN resulted in to the

collection of an estimated 1,400 rifles, machine guns, rocket

propelled grenades and mortars from Murle by July 2006 (Leff,

2009). In the same year, the United Nations Mission in South

Sudan (UNMISS) supported a voluntary campaign in Pibor county and

an estimated 1,126 weapons and 79 rounds of ammunitions were

collected. Even though the returns from these two initiatives

were not as big at least there was no civilian deaths reported.

In 2008, in an effort to assert its authority and eliminate rival

bases of power, President Salva Kiir issued “Operational Order

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No. 1/2008: disarmament of civilian population in South Sudan”.

The stated objective was to have civilians in all ten states of

South Sudan “peacefully” turn over firearms to state authorities

and SPLA forces within six months. Despite the call for a

peaceful campaign, the order authorized the SPLA to use

“appropriate force” against anyone who refused to relinquish

their weapons (O’Brien, 2009). UNMISS and UNDP participated in

the campaign by monitoring the activity, assisting the BCSSAC to

become operational, providing storage facilities for collected

weapons and promoting a peaceful disarmament. However, it did not

and showed the limited scope of UNMISS to intervene or stop the

coercive nature of the campaign (O’Brien, 2009).

This campaign just like the previous one was politically

motivated and was advocated for by the Governor of Jonglei State

Kuol Manyang (O’Brien, 2009). This time round it was targeting

the Murle community who is heavily armed and often raid their

neighbors causing insecurity in the state. Due to poor planning

and budgetary constraints, this nationwide campaign did not

happen as planned since different states have different security

needs. Disarmament did not take place in some states while others107

had limited activity. In Central Equatoria State, Lainya, Yei and

Morobo counties had limited collection of weapons (40 guns in

total), in Upper Nile, Western Bahr El-Ghazel and Western

Equatoria no disarmament took place due to respective issues

pertaining to the states’ security and other problems (O’Brien,

2009; Saferworld, 2012).

The overall success of the 2008 disarmament campaign was hampered

by the failure of the SPLA to deploy in large numbers throughout

the state to protect disarmed populations (Saferworld, 2012). It

also demonstrates that decisions concerning issues of insecurity

and weapons proliferation are made by a small number of high-

level actors operating under political and budgetary constraints

(O’Brien, 2009).

Other smaller disarmament campaigns have since been carried out

by the government at state and national level. However, the

government needs to realize that DDR alone is not capable of

addressing fundamental relevant issues that destabilize security

and stability of the country. The limitations of DDR as a post

conflict intervention strategy exclusively focuses on combatants,

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has the tendency to create inequality and inequities, inadequate

support for sustainable livelihood initiatives, and the failure

to adequately address community safety and security (Garcia,

2009). Due to the failures of these DDR initiatives, the

government should employ more assertive methods of disarming the

communities and the general population. Community initiatives on

disarmament should be encouraged since experience show that top

bottom initiatives have yielded minimal returns.

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SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SUMMARIES

It is without doubt that small arms have become the new weapons

of destruction often causing devastating effects across borders.

They have killed, maimed and displaced populations worsening

security situation for local communities and destroying their

livelihoods. Of recent, they are being used in all situations, be

it in war, peace, post conflict environments, sporadic violence

and homicides.

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They pose security challenges to countries. This forces

governments to spend more on security provision hence diverting

resource from much needed basic services such as health and

education. Insecurity due to the wide availability of small arms

and light weapons has often scared away investors hence hindering

development; peace building; conflict transformation and peaceful

co-existence of communities.

In post conflict situations, the widespread and easy availability

of small arms and light weapons has negative impact on human

security, stability, crime and post conflict development. The

continued availability of small arms in post conflict situations

especially when means of livelihood are non-existent forces

populations to turn to crime and this begets instability. The

lack of basic human security often keeps away refugees and

internally displaced persons from returning home.

The human security situation in post conflict South Sudan is

worse than it was ten years ago due to wide spread availability

of small arms. This has intensified the nature of inter-communal

disputes, pastoral conflicts, increased the number of disgruntled

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militia groups and day to day urban and rural crime. In States

like Jonglei, it has contributed to a rise in inter-tribal

confrontations as well as the deadliness of these skirmishes.

Persistent insecurity and unrelenting cattle raids and inter –

tribal attacks remain on going threats to human security in the

State. The unending human suffering, massive human rights

violations and disruption of social and economic activities in

South Sudan and particularly in Jonglei state can to a large

extent be attributed to the wide uncontrolled availability of

small arms and light weapons in post conflict South Sudan.

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons in South Sudan

can be attributed to the decades of civil war that engulfed the

country for most part of its history. The large amounts of

weapons available are those left from the conflict, continued

international transfers and trade of weapons by the government of

South Sudan, leakages from military and police stockpile, theft,

arms captured from Sudan armed forces and militia groups during

recent fighting, soldiers defecting from armed groups and

inheritance from family and relatives since small arms have

replaced traditional tools and weapons that were used in fighting112

among tribal groups. This means that the scourge of small arms

and light weapons proliferation involves a cycle of arms

circulation both within and outside hence making South Sudan to

remain a highly militarized country.

Small arms are a weapon of choice due to their nature and many

activities. This makes them popular among a wide range of actors

such as terrorists, rebel groups and criminal gangs. In South

Sudan, the demand for SALW is conditioned by structural factors

which political, social, economic and cultural and environmental

in nature.

The escalating violence in South Sudan’s largest State is having

devastating effects on the country’s population and has begun to

have regional and international consequences as well. The militia

led violence coupled with inter-communal clashes have turned so

deadly to the extent that livelihoods are being destroyed,

economic activities coming to a stall and communities being

displaced. The migration of people to neighboring countries from

the state is likely to have a socio-economic impact on those

countries. The continuing violence worries the international

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community and other stakeholders involved because it is hindering

their initiatives to rebuild South Sudan. The scale of violence

poses a long term political threat which if not handled well will

throw the country back into conflict with itself.

Jonglei is the largest state in South Sudan. It is endowed with a

number of strategic features and natural resources such as the

Jonglei canal, oil deposits and animal resources. These have the

potential not only to drive the state out of poverty but

contribute to the development of South Sudan as a whole. However,

the violence in the state has made it impossible for any of these

activities to be explored further damaging the status of this war

ravaged state socially and economically.

The violence in Jonglei State is exuberated by the wide spread

availability of SALW. The population sees the use of small arms

as the only way to guarantee their security, social, economic and

political demands. This mentality coupled with lack of

cooperation with the government has led to devastating

consequences on the state. The factors fueling the conflict have

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become so intertwined such that any conflict resolution

mechanisms must be analyzed carefully.

The government of South Sudan has taken various positive and

negative initiatives in trying to stop the ever escalating

violence in Jonglei state. It has employed several disarmament

campaigns in the state. However disarmament in isolation of other

methods of conflict resolution has failed to yield any fruit.

A notable positive change was made in 2011, when South Sudan

joined the Regional Center for Small Arms (RECSA). This has

helped it to coordinate with governments in Uganda and Kenya to

curb the issue of proliferation of arms and cross border raiding

among the pastoralist communities. However, it is not a member to

the sub-regional Nairobi Protocol which is a legally binding

instrument. This limits restraints on South Sudan to continue to

import and export small arms and light weapons.

The recently adopted international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is

said to give hope to populations of countries like South Sudan

because it will restrict transfer of arms by arms producing

countries to regimes that use them to commit genocide, war crimes

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and violations of human rights and international humanitarian

law. However, despite the fact that South Sudan was actively

involved in the campaign to bring the ATT to pass, she is not

among the 67 states that have already signed the instrument. Such

reluctance to endorse international instruments by the government

of South Sudan limits the involvement of international actors in

South Sudan to play an active and meaningful role in curbing the

scourge of small arms and light weapons in the country. The

scourge of small arms in South Sudan needs an integrated

national, regional and international approach if any solid and

long lasting change is to be felt.

Two years down the road and the government of South Sudan faces

enormous challenges ahead of it. However, it has scored some

social and economic achievements. This year, it managed to set

exams for the South Sudan Certificate of Secondary Education

since she could not agree with Khartoum on the fees to be

charged. She has also managed to live without oil revenue for the

past one year because it decided to shut its oil pipelines that

transported the oil through Khartoum. All this means that as an

independent state, South Sudan is capable of being self-reliant.116

RECOMMENDATIONS

Since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed, there

has been a number of counter accusations between Sudan and South

Sudan. South Sudan seems to be blaming Khartoum for all its

mishaps and failure to perform even in post-independence South

Sudan. The GoSS government however must stop wasting its time,

shifting the blame on Khartoum and instead focus on improving its

capacity to provide security and promote reconciliation as a

first resort among the people of South Sudan. Controlling the

proliferation of Small arms and Light weapons in the country

should be a primary focus for the government. However, reducing

the prevalence of SALW without adequately addressing the root

causes of why people arm in the first place is unrealistic. The

challenges facing the country are enormous and it will probably

take years before real change in terms of disarmament is felt but

to improve the situation, there are a few steps the government

and other stakeholders can take and these are discussed below.

Revision of land laws. Land issues in South Sudan are one of the

major causes of deaths today. In the past the issues were settled

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amicable whether amongst family members, neighbors or any other

group. The wide spread availability of small arms in South Sudan

have caused others to take the law into their own hands. In

absence of weak or non-existence legal mechanisms to settle these

disputes, land authorities have usually not done much to resolve

such issues. Land reforms should therefore be part of the

reconstruction process by enacting stronger laws to protect the

citizens.

Revamp traditional mechanisms of conflict resolutions. Due to the

protracted nature of the civil war that consumed the country for

most part of its history, there was a breakdown in indigenous

methods of settling disputes. Authority of chiefs is no longer

regarded by their subjects or by the government. This means that

when there is a petty dispute, people turn to violence and this

is made possible by the widespread availability of small arms in

the country. Much as the government is trying to revive the legal

system in the country, the authority of traditional leaders

should be restored. This will not only take care of small issues

at the grassroots level but it will also reduce the backlog of

cases in the courts.118

Support the development of alternative means of livelihoods. For

decades the population in South Sudan depended on livestock

because they have never known any other way of sustaining their

livelihoods. The few communities that practice farming do it on a

small scale to support their families. This is because the

defunct regime of the former Sudan did not provide any support

for these communities to build up their livelihood potential in

other areas. South Sudan is believed to have the potential to

feed the whole East African region because of its fertile lands.

But until this potential is made possible for the local

population through support incentives, the economic activities of

communities will continue to be narrow. By encouraging

sustainable development policies e.g. build water wells,

irrigation schemes for agriculture to cater for the dry season.

Communities can stop depending on natural vegetation with the

help of irrigation schemes grow feeds for their animals and for

themselves hence improving their livelihood.

Enact adequate enforceable gun control laws. Legally, South Sudan

has no firearms laws. The Interim Constitution has some

provisions and some pre-CPA laws such as the Penal Code which has119

not yet been signed into law. However, these are not adequate

enough to stop citizens from owning fire arms. South Sudan

therefore must come up with a legal instrument that is exclusive

to the control of fire arms in the country.

South Sudan also needs to strengthen its regional and

international participation on arms control initiatives. It is

one thing to be a member of Regional Center for Small Arms

(RECSA) and it is another thing to be actively involved in the

implementation of the objectives of this organization. To build a

strong base for national gun control legislation, the government

of South Sudan must be loyal to its international obligations

with regards to arms proliferation in the country.

Sensitization and capacity building initiatives to the local

population on the impact of small arms and light weapons. Often

such initiatives only involve government officials and policy

makers. In rare circumstances a few of the heads of these

communities are involved. This approach has not been productive

because the very people it is targeting are not made part of it

and hence they reject whatever recommendations are brought

120

forward. Sensitization should target the most vulnerable and

marginalized groups in the communities so solutions should come

from them and not the government or the donor funding the

initiative. Bottom up approach would be the best method in

finding lasting solutions.

There is need for a nationwide reconciliation and forgiveness

campaign. During the decades of conflict, communities, families

and friends turned against each other in the struggle to survive

the war. Many people were killed because of betrayals. But when

the war came to an end, people started co-existing as if nothing

happened but to some of them, the wounds of these atrocities are

still fresh in their hearts. Forgiveness and reconciliation does

not mean writing a letter to that community and apologizing. The

need to feel remorse for ones actions must be felt in order for

wounds of hatred to be healed. For example the vice president

Riak Machar is aspiring for the presidential seat in 2015.

However, he is one of the leaders who took sides with the

government of Khartoum and committed many atrocities against the

citizens of South Sudan for his own selfish needs. At the moment

he heads the reconciliation process in the country. But never did121

he come out openly and vocally to show remorse for his deeds

during the civil war especially to the affected communities.

People cannot live in harmony and trust each other until wounds

of the past are healed through forgiveness and reconciliation. So

the government must stop its rhetoric calls for reconciliation

and peace when it does not actually practice what it preaches.

Approach disarmament differently. So far the government’s

disarmament initiatives have not yielded much success. This is

largely due to the motive behind these campaigns of being

politically motivated and targeting certain communities and

leaving out others. First of all, the disarmament campaigns for

civilians should be voluntary; Secondly, communities should be

disarmed simultaneously; thirdly the motive driving the

disarmament should be to restore peace and security and lastly a

sustainable security plan for the population should be in place

after disarmament.

Related to disarmament is the issue of compensation to the

disarmed communities. Since they used the small arms to sustain

their means of livelihood, taking the arms away means their

122

source of earning a living and protection has been compromised.

Compensation can be in form of money or any other incentive that

will enable the group to turn away from their arms related

activities. Therefore, disarmament should be a complete package

so as to prevent previously armed groups from re-arming

themselves.

There is a need for weapons destruction programs, stockpile

management and security. Data collected has shown that arms

collected during disarmament campaigns have often found their way

back to the populations through tribal loyalty and sympathy

lines. This is possible because the arms collected are not safely

stored in secured environments. Therefore, to win the trust of

the disarmed communities, it might be necessary to destroy the

arms before them and have the communities witness that such arms

will not land in the hands of their enemies. The government with

the help of the international community needs to build safe

warehouses that meet international standards to safe guard

government’s weapons from theft and from harsh weather

conditions.

123

Change of policy towards local militia groups. There is need for

the government to change its policy of dealing with local militia

groups. The government should negotiate with these militia groups

as opposed to offering them amnesty without any legal basis and

without solid political guarantees. Negotiations can yield long

term solutions as long as both parties were actively involved in

the process and it also gives room for reconciliation and

forgiveness especially to the affected communities.

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