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CONTEtiTS

f.Jy General Carl C

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LiY Major ,C.j-enGh C, IV/acLean, US Army

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by Genera! MatthEw,' B. liicfgway. US Brigadier Genom! vV(1lter H Winton Edltf..Ki hy Df: harold R. Winton

i.:W Ueutenant ColoTte! Ve, ner F? Carf,C:-iOfl, US Arrny, i :etir(;{;'

LIf:ufe")Dui C%nel jonathan K. Burns. U,S Army

the best /rom other jourr a/:;;

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From the Editor The pace of change has been breathtaking in recent months, almost rendering obsolete

existing US strategies for dealing with world commitments. Ptessures to cut defense spending have teached an intensity never before experienced by this generation of military leaders. This combination has generated a flutty of proposals and initiatives aimed at the rapid reduction of militaty budgets. Most of these entail some sort of cut in fotce structure and manpower.

The historians among us say that this is to be expected; whenever there has been a period of diminished threat, the natural US tendency has been to reduce the size of our military establishment and to focus more on domestic ills. That has certainly been the case after each of our major wars and especially between the world wars, when the Standing Anny was reduced to almost cadre force with very Iitr1e funds for weapons development and procurement or training. The price we paid at the beginning of World War 11 in rebUilding and ear1y losses was only ameliorated by the leadership of an able and professional officer corps that had managed to ready itself for war despite the austerity of the interwar years. As we enter an era that many see as similar to that austere period, it must also be a period when the officer corps develops the able and professional leaders needed to handle the demands of a more complex and lethal modem batr1eiield.

This month's fare offers much food for thought in the arena of leadership. The chief of staffofthe Army, General Carl E. Vuono, leads offwith an outline for "Professionalism and the Army of the 1990s." He clearly establishes professionalism as the bedrock of rhe Anny's six fundamental imperatives-quality, doctrine, force structure, training, modemi~

zation and leader development. Two eminent military historians, both fottner Morrison professors at CGSC, Peter Maslowski and Gerald Lindennan, discuss American cultural influences on military leaders. Maslowski, in "Anny Values and American Values," identifies several areas of conflict between the rwo sets of values. Although netr1esome to the average Attny officer, his views deserve careful reading and serious reflection by the military professional. Lindennan, in "Military leadership and the American Experience," describes how the US military ethic has evolved during our relatively short history as a nation. He focuses on military leadership's unique challenge-balancing mission accomplishment and soldier welfare.

A statistical analysis by Major French Maclean in "Gerrilan General Officer Casualties in World War 11: Lessons for Future War" poses serious questions as to the survivability of our own senior leaders in the execution ofAirland Batr1e. Major Ray Palmer, a member of the Center for Army leadership here at Fort Leavenworth, provides a timely look at current initiatives in leader development. In "Developing Anny leaders," Palmer describes the Leadership Assessment and Development Program and views its complete implementation as critical to the future ofour Attny.

Two excellent historical profiles in leadership are presented, one by retired General Matthew Ridgway and retired Brigadier General Walter Winton, and the other by retired Colonel Verner Garlson. In "Troop leadership at the Operational level: The Eighth Anny in Korea," General Ridgway offers, in his own words, the principles rhat carried him from Nonnandy through the hardships ofKorea. Carlson presents in "Portrait ofa German General Staff Officer," not only an engrossing profile of Major General F. W. von Mellenthin, but also, in von Mellenthin's words, vivid descriptions of three of Germany's most renowned commanders: Rommel, Balek and Guderian.

elL

Professionalism and the

Army of the 1990s

General Carl E. Vuono, us Anny

As the AmlY enters a period of dramatic change, it will once again rely heavily on the professionalism ofits officer and noncommi..ioned officer corps. General Carl E. Vuono, the Army chiefof staff, provides his views on the critical role that professionalism w:iII playas the Army meets the demands ofthe 1990.. He presents the qualities of professionalism and offers programs fc>r developing military professionals.

M ORE THAN 200 years ago, the British The overall blueprint that the Anny is fol· amlY of Lord Cornwallis surrendered lowing as we evolve our force for the future is

to combined American and French forces at based on six enduring imperatives- imper· Yorktown. As the British garrison marched out, atives that have forged the AmlY of 1990 and the band played "The World Turned Upside will serve as a beacon that will guide us into the Down II in recognition. of the wholly unex~ next century. These imperatives include: pected outcome of the American Revolution. '8 An uncompromising COmnl1tment to a

As we move into a new decade, some would quality force. argue that it may be appropriate to play that • A powerful war-fighting doctrine that will song again, For the world is, indeed, being dra win both now and in the future. matically altered by the events that we see • A mix of forces including heavy, light, unfolding every day. As a result of thL~ rapidly and special operations forces in our Active and changing environment and in response to di.. Reserve Components. minishing levels of resources available, the • Tough, realistic training. ArnlY has begun to reshape itself into a smaller, • Continuous modernization. but still highly capable force-one that will be • Development of leaders of unmatched as trained and ready to fulfill its global strategic ability. mandate tomorrow as it is today, and one that As we work to shape the fotce within the will defend and advance US interests in a world context of these imperatives, one single, domiof revolutionary change. nating characteristic will be fundamental to our

April 1990 • MILITARY REVIEW 2

PROFESSIONALISM

future. That characteristic is professionalism. In this article, I want to discuss the profes

sionalism that exists in the Army today and to describe what we must do to enhance our professionalism in the years ahead.

The Concept of Professionalism Professionalism is one of the most over

worked terms in American society; it is used to describe everyone from office managers to baseball players. Indeed, in the common lexicon, one can be called a professional by virtue of either being paid for a particular talent or being very good at it.

To each of us, however, the term "professional" is of such profound importance that it warrants a more detailed and discriminating definition. A professional in the Army is a leader who is expert in the profession of arms, is responsible for soldiers and units, is committed to the defense of the nation and is bound by a strong ethical framework.

By this or any other definition, our leadership in the Army today is thoroughly professional, made up of outstanding officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who have dedicated their lives to defend the principles of freedom and democracy. Recent opinion polls reflect the high confidence the American people have in the military and suggest that the Army is widely respected throughout our society. This should be a matter of great personal pride to each of us who serves this great nation.

As capable as the Army is today, however, we cannot afford to rest on our laurels. As we reshape the Army, professionalism will assume even greater significance, for we will be a smaller Army, a closer-knit Army, an Army that will draw its sttength from within. At the same time, we will remain an Army of the people, responsible to the nation and to the Constitution we have sworn to defend. As a corps of officers and NCOs, our professionalism will remain the bond that cements the Army of the future into the cohesive, ttained and ready force that our nation demands.

This requirement is doubly important because we serve a great republic-a nation that relies on a Total Army, Active and Reserve, with the expectation that when the Army is committed, it will be fully ready. Military leaders know more than anyone the effort required to maintain readiness and the price that is paid by oursoldiers ifwe allow it to erode. Consider the Army's fight at Kasserine Pass in 1943-a battle in which, as described by Omar Bradley, "we took a licking." The Army was not rrained and was not prepared for combat, and as. a result, young Ameticans died needlessly. As we confront the challenges of the next century, we will not have the luxury of years of preparation; we must be fully ready at all times.

The Qualities of Professionalism Professionalism-whether within the Army

or in other walks of life-has its roots in three fundamental qualities: competence, responsibility and commitment.* These are the qualities that separate a professional from an employee, and they are qualities that are indispensable for the Army of today and tomorrow- an Army committed to the defense of the nation worldwide.

Competence. The first quality is competence. Put simply, we must be expert in the profession of arms, and we must know our jobs at every level-from fire team leader to chief of staff. Competence is not an inherited rrait; it grows out of dedication, education, experience, tough realistic training and plain hard work.

In developing competence, a delicate balance is essential. On the one hand, we must concenttate on current tasks and be especially well versed in the basics of combat that win on the battlefield. There is no substitute for rocksolid proficiency in the nuts-and-bolts operations that hold the Army together. On the

'Similar characteristics were first /aid out by Samuel P. Huntingum in his seminal work, The Soldier and the Stare, (Cambridge: The Hmmrd Uni"""ity Press, 1957). This book is an excellent pomt ofdeparture ftyr any serious examinanOn of professionalism.

MILITARY REVIEW' April 1990 3

other hand, we are compelled ro develop the skills that we will need to fulfill future responsibilities and continuously embrace an everexpanding vista of duties. In achieving the needed balance between these two dimension., of competence, we can neither sacrifice our focus on current duties nor lose sight of the future.

This balance will be of even greater significance in the future Army - a smaller force that must have the capacity to expand rapidly into

As we work to shapethe force within the context of these

imperatives, one single, dominating characteristic will be fundamental to our future. That characteristic is professionalism . ..

an Army capable of fighting a major conflict. Captains must be prepared to command battalions; lieutenants to command cOlnpanies; and staff sergeants to become first sergeantS almost overnight. The demands of the ft'ture may require rapid commitment and expansion offorces, far faster than our experience ofWorld War II. Our professional development programs must be vibmnt and real, designed with future battlefields in mind.

The Army has an excellent record of developing competence at all levels. Through each of the three pillars of our leader development progmm- through our schools, operational experience and self-development-we are creating legions of competent, confident leaders who are at the very foundation of our trained and ready Army. Today, we have the most tactically and technically proficient leaders our nation has ever fielded, and this has been categorically demollStrated in battle during Operation Just Cause and during training events at our combat training centers.

Our soldiers who fought in Panama report that although they were concerned as they went into combat, they knew that they were well

trained, they were confident in their fellow soldiers, and they knew that their leaders would take care of them. Competence served us well in Panama and will win on any battlefield anywhere in the world.

Many concepts of professionalism today stop with competence, reflecting a belief that a professional is merely someone who has acquired a technical skill. 10 be sure, competence is essential, but competence alone is not enough. We in the Army are required ro take a broader, morc comprehensive view of our profession.

Responsibility. A professional leader is not only competent but is also responsibleresponsible for rhe performance of soldiers and units, and responsible for rhe performance of rhe Army as a whole. In a wider sense, our officers and NCOs are also responsible for the security of the United States and for the defense of the American people-a sacred responsibility that separates the profession of arms from every other walk of life. And most important, we are collectively and individually responsible to our society for the sons and daughters of America entrusted to our care. We must tmin them, prepare them and lead them so that, should they be called upon, they can fight and win the wars of our nation.

Responsibility extelds beyond current performance. We are equally responsible for the future of the Army and for developing the next generation of professionals capable of assuming the mantle of leadership in the years ahead.

Our breadth of professional responsibility has important implications for leaders throughout the Army. For example, a battalion commandet, in the words of that old phrase, is responsible for everything his battalion does or fails to do- its tactical performance, its state of teadiness and its level of training, as well as the health and well-being of every member of his command. Moreover, since his battalion is an integml element of larger organizations, he shares in the responsibility for the performance of those units as well. And beyond that he feels a sense of accountability for the overall state of


Through each of the three pillars of our leader development program-through our schools, operational experience and self-development-we are creating legionsof competent, confident leaders who are the very foundation of our trained and ready Anny. OUr soldiers who fought in Panama report that although they were concerned as they went into combat, they knew that they were well trained, they were confident in their fellow soldiers, and they knew that their leaders would take care of them.

the Army, both now and in the future, even though he may have only marginal influence over events that occur in areas far removed from his command. This is the degree of tesponsibility all of us-officers and NCOs-must willingly assume at all levels.

By its very nature, the Army instills in OUt leaders a deep and abiding sense of tesponsibility. The entite chain of command must keep that all-embracing ethic at the forefront of out thought. ResponSibility is an integral part of every leadership position in the Army and is a quality that we must continue to develop, foster and support at all levels. We want leaders in the Army who personally practice the maxim made famous by President Harry Truman that "the buck stops here."

Commitment. The final quality of a professional is commitment, and fot the soldier, this means in the largest sense an unswerving devotion to selfless service in the defense ofthe Constitution and in support of the American people. As we shape the Army for the 1990s and beyond, we must focus renewed attention on this final and critical quality. We are currently blessed with vast numbers of leaders who have

made an enduring commitment to the Army and to the nation. While there may be some who would make their commitment contingent on tangible rewards-fast promotions, abundant command opportunities and exceptional benefits-the true professional subordinates these considerations to an overarching commitment to selfless service.

To be sure, a professional leader is not blind to the need for tangible rewards and is entitled to a quality of life commensurate with his contribution to the American people and equal to that enjoyed within the society he has sworn to defend. But his commitment transcends the bounds of material gain. A professional has made an unqualified decision to serve the nation under whatever conditions may emerge. This commitment sustains each of us through harsh times and difficult assignments and gives us the focus that we need-a focus on current tasks, on professional growth and on the needs of the Army. It also forges in each of us an unbreakable bond with our fellow soldiers-a bond that will endure even under the most arduous ofconditions in the crucible ofcombat.

In the years ahead, it is vital that we redouble

MILITARY REVIEW. April 1990 5

our efforts to build and enhance the commitment of each officer and NCO to selfless service and to the profession of anns. This unrelenting commitment, when coupled with the other qualities of expertise and tesponsibility, produces leaders who have the competence, the sense ofduty and the moral courage to serve the Anny and the nation through periods of great international tunnoil and domestic uncertainty.

Programs for Professionalism I believe that developing professionalism

within the ranks of our leaders must become a crusade at all levels -a crusadefor the benefit of our soldiers, for the welfare of the Anny, and for the good of the nation. But how do we approach this challenge? What should each of us do to enhance professionalism throughout our ranks? There is a wide range of programs and techniques, and many are being successfully applied in units throughout the Anny. But here 1 want to layout my general guidelines to serve as the foundation for a comprehensive program ofprofessional development Annywide.

Enhance Pride. First, we must exploit the built-in advantages that we have in the profession of anns and capitalize on the pride that grows from a commitment to selfless service. We must recognize and promote the concept that the returns for service to the nation go far beyond material reward. Although we shouldand do-place considerable emphasis on our quality of life programs and equitable pay, our greatest rewards are intangible. They derive from the self-satisfaction of leading American soldiers and from the pride of serving a calling greater than ourselves.

In the early I8OOs, Napoleon said that "a soldier will fight long and hard for a bit of colored ribbon." Ofcourse, as Napoleon knew well, it is not the ribbon itselffor which soldiers fight and die_ The ribbon is of little intrinsic value, cannot be eaten and will not keep the rain off. Soldiers will fight for a bit of colored ribbon because of their pride in the achievement that the ribbon sytnbolizes. Recognition ofachievement

in the eyes of our superiors, peers and subordinates, when accomplished against tough, demanding standards, is a powerful force that drives us all. Many outside the Anny have difficulty understanding this sort of motivation, yet it goes to the very heart ofsoldiering.

This intangible, yet vital, dimension of the Anny is as important today as it was during Napoleon's time and has been demonstrated in examples beyond number. One such case occurred during early February at Fort Polk, Louisiana, when the soldiers of the 4th Battalion, 6th Infantry Task Force, returned from Panama to a division-wide ceremony and parade. It was a rainy, blustery day, and the soldiers were standing on a field that had turned to mud. But the atmosphere of that fonnation and the attitudes of those American soldiers brought out the sun. Several of the wounded were honored at the parade, some with injuries so severe that they came to the field in wheelchairs. But each of these soldiers chose to stand at attention throughout the ceremony, their faces reflecting both their physical pain and their immense pride in the role they had played in the defense of freedom. They had done their duty and done it well. Each of them proudly wore the Purple Heart as a badge of honor.

Leaders at all levels must seize upon every opportunity to build and support the kind of spirit that these soldiers embodied-a spirit that is intangible and yet remains very real, capturing the essence of the profession of arms.

Learn from History. Second, we must build on a sense of our own history-an important and sometimes neglected dimension of the Anny. Americans have long been accused of having no sense of their national past-an accusation that applies equally well to most of us. We are often too embroiled in cuttent crises to examine events and issues that have long been decided.

Within the Anny, the serious study of our history has gained new momentum, and we must build on this in the challenging times ahead. For our history has profound relevance


Soldiers of the 5th Infantry Division are presented awards by Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono during a ceremony honoring those who participated in Operation Just Cause. (Inset) Specialist Roderick S. Ringstaff, a medic for HHC 4th Battalion, 6th Infantry, received the Silver Star for personal bravery and self-sacrifice.

Soldiers will fight for abit of colored ribbon because of their pride in the achievement that the ribbon symbolizes. Recognition of achievement in the eyes of our superiors, peers, and subordinates when accomplished against tough, demanding standards, is apowerful force that drives us all. Many outside the Army have difficulty understanding this sort of motivation, yet it goes to the very heart of soldiering.

to the great issues of today and to the overarching plans that we have developed to shape the Anny of the 1990s and beyond. Few vocations offer the opportunity to make history, and if we are to contribute to the future, we must draw upon our past. The philosopher George Santayana reminds us that "those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it," and it is clear that lessons of history often point out the pitfalls that we must avoid. For example, we need look no further than the devastation of Task Force Smith during the early days of Korea to see what happens when an ill-

MILITARY REVIEW' April 1990

trained, undennanned, poorly equipped Anny is committed to batrle. That is a lesson of history we must never repeat.

Ofequal importance, history conveys a sense of our professional worth far more effectively than any other single source. As a corps oneaders, we must read and discuss our history. We must also understand history, and we must teach it to others, particularly our young soldiers. We have a heritage of battle and bravery, of combat and courage, and every soldier is entitled to share in its glory. Moreover, history teaches us the critical responsibilities that our

7

predecessors have shouldered and the expectations that our nation has of us as members of a profession with such high ideals and values.

Share Ideas and Experience. Third, we must reinforce our skill in the art ofexchanging ideas and opinions among ourselves. Leaders of the past, particularly during the interwar years, corresponded extensively with colleagues throughout the Army. The writings of Marshall, Parton, MacArthur, and scores of others

Competence, responsibility and commitment. These are the qualitiesthat separate aprofessional from an

employee, and they are qualities that are indispensable for the Anny of today

and tomorrow.

like them were instrumental in refining the tacries, techniques and procedures that ultimately won the grear land campaigns ofthe 20th century.

Many of us are involved in such exchanges today, and we must encourage and suppott these efforts across the Army. This dialogue will not only improve our own bartlefield capabilities, it will also help foster the collective bonding that is so fundamental as we shape the Army of tomorrow. Our professional joumalsdesigned to reach the broadest sweep of audiences across the widest range of issues - will be especially important in the years ahead. Each of us must assume a greater and more personal role in the reading of, and writing for, our journals and in the exchange of ideas and thoughts throughout our profession.

Build Our Formal Programs. Fourth, we have to reexamine our formal programs of officer and NCO professional development (OPD and NCOPD) at unit level. We must continue to emphasize these programs Armywide. We cannot allow them to become afterthoughts in the quarterly training plan; rather,

it is essential that they flow from a comprehensive view of professional development as an integral element of leader training. Leaders throughout the Army must scrutinize their programs with care and imagination and use them to build and intensify professionalism at every level. We should look for opportunities, for example, to implement reading and writing programs, and to emphasize practical lessons in our study of history, while not forgetting the more traditional subjects that focus on current job performance and the unit's mission essential task list.

Develop Subordinates. Next, we have to continue to stress decentralization throughout each of our units and at all levels. This is the most effective way to encourage responsibility and support innovation among junior leaders. Part of effective decentralization is the commitment by seniors to underwrite both the sucCesses and the mistakes ofsubordinates who are trying to expand the horizons of the Army. I cannot emphasize this strongly enough. In a smaller Army, we must fight against the tendency to become too conservative, to avoid

. risks and to demand zero defects in everything our units do.

We must be wary of this trap-we can never sacrifice originality and imagination to some unattainable and counterproductive standard of perfection. Our young leaders in particular should be able to take prudent risks, to learn from their honest mistakes and, as a result, to achieve new levels of professional growth.

Build Standards. Finally, we must continue to set, enforce and practice the highest standards of ethical behavior and moral conduct. The Army, like all true professions, has a code of ethics to which each of us is expected to adhere. And, because of the nature of warfare, our code extends beyond the boundaries of American society, embracing international standards universally accepted by civilized nations. On matters of ethies, there can be no compromise, whether on the battlefield, in the motor poel, or in the corridors ofthe Pentagon.

Effective leader development programs are


continuously reinforced by the untarnished image of unrelenting professionalism in our officers and NCOs. This is an image that must be bumished and sustained by a deep and abiding commitment to treat all our soldiers, all our family members and all our civilians with the dignity and respect that they deserve. Leaders listen with concern and act with compassion. If we are uncompromising in enforcing high ethical standards, each of us at every level will be able to look into the eyes of our soldiers and say confidently, "Follow me and do as I do."

A profession depends upon all of its members assuming and discharging their responsibilities to the utmost of their talents. Today, every leader in the Anny L, compelled to shoulder the burden of crafting and implementing effective programs of professional development while monitoring and guiding the programs of subordinate units.

At the most basic level, I believe that we can best enhance professionalism throughout the Total Anny by building on the vety features that make service to the nation unique. We must develop initiatives that revolve around the central tenet of our profession-selfless and devoted service to our soldiers, to our Anny and to the American people.

Our nation asks much of its Army. It asks that we observe higher moral and ethical standards than the society we are swom to protect; it asks that we endure the hardships of serving at isolared posts and quietly enduring onerous duty; it asks that we undergo the tough, realistic training necessary to ensure that the Anny is fully ready. And it asks that we be ready to make the ultimate commitment-the sacrifice ofour very lives in the defense of the nation. This is

PROFESSIONALISM

OUr professional journals-designed to reach the broadest sweep of audiences across the widest range of issues-will be especially important in the years ahead. Each of us must assume agreater and more personal role in the reading of, and writingfor, our journals and in the exchange of ideas and thoughts.

not an abstract concept. It is cold, hard reality brought home to each of us whenever we are called upon to fight in support of freedom and democracy.

We have today an Army of unmatched quality-an Army of dedicated men and women, expert in their calling and committed to the ideals for which our nation stands. It is critical that we now redouble our efforts ro enhance the professionalism of everyone on the Total Army team. As we look to the future and as we shape the Army to meet the demands of a complex and dangerous wotld, our officers and noncommissioned officers will be the linchpin that will bind the Army together and will sustain us into the 21st century.

In many ways, the world of the 1990s, like the world of Lord Cornwallis, is indeed turning upside down. But the Army, a trained and ready professional force, must remain a solid anchor ofreliability, prepared to fulfill its strategic mandate anywhere in the world, under whatever conditions emerge. This is the primary task that we, as professionals, must undertake, and it is a task in which we cannot and shall not faiL

Gen£ral Carl E. 1h«mo assumed the duties ofchie[ofstaffof the us Anny in June 1987. Prior to that, he was commanding general ofthe us Anny Training and Doctrine Command. H~ recent assignments include: A1l1lY deputy chief of staff far operations; commanding general, 8th Infantry Division (Meeh); and comrnandin< general, am... bined Arms Center. He also serwd as: asmtant division com~, I" In{antry Division; andcommander, 8U Airborne Division ArtiIJery. During the Wetnam Wm, he commanded "'" artillery battalions in the I" Camlry Division.


~\#~'~ and

MEl LUES

Peter Maslowski

author, Professor Peter Maslowski, spent the 1986-1987 academic yearas the Morrison Professoron the faculty ofthe US Army Command and General StaffCollege. In this article, Maslowski discusses a disparity, found during his many seminars and numerous exchanges with the Anny majors who made up the student body, between those values held by the mmtary and those that have evolved as America's societal values.

Among the first-tier values were discipline, Values are the bedrock ofour profession. (Former) Secretary or the Anny ]oho 0. Marsh Jr. stamina, skill, loyalty, duty, courage, selfless ser

vice, integrity and commitment. Some ofthese

FOLLOWING the practice established in might be considered traits rather than values, 1981 of annually choosing an important but whether trait or value, each received ex

theme for the Army, in 1985 Secretary of the plicit definition and discussion. By contrast, Anny John O. Marsh Jr., and Chief of Staff the second-tier values received scant attention. John A. Wickham Jr., announced that "Values" Only one paragraph mentioned, but did not would be the theme for 1986. In "White Paper discuss, the sources of these values Oudeo1986: Values," Marsh set forth a two-tier con Christian religious base, Magna Charta, Declacept of values, the first encompassing "univer ration of Independence and Constitution~ Nor sal values that are common to all soldiers in did it discuss several other of these values (trial any era,. in any anny, and in any country," and by jury, free exercise of religion, civilian control the second dealing with broader national val of the military and procedural safeguards of law). ues that explain "why the American soldier is Since Marsh designated the Constitution as unique."l the Army's theme for 1987, the late 1980s be-


came a propitious time to focus more hIlly on these broader national values. Indeed, because some of the Anny values enunciated in the "White Paper: 1986" collide with the ideology that prevails among the overwhelming majority of American citizens who are not professional soldiers, this task takes on special significance as we embark on a new decade.

Even where there is a necessity of the miUtary power, within the land, which by the way but rarely happens, a wise and prudent people will always ha<~

a watchful and a jealous eye over it; far the maxims and rules of the army, are essentially different from the genius of a free people, and the laws of a free government. Samuel Adams2

ProfeSSional soldiers acquire their unique traits and values only through years of specialized education and training. Once acquired, they become the foundation for the distinctive patrerns of thought and behavior that are at the heart of the professional military ethic. For good reasons, the Army emphasizes loyalty, discipline, obedience and the good of the group over that of any particular individual. Omceming this last value, Marsh emphasized that a professional soldier must put "the welfare of the Nation and the accomplishment of the assigned mission before individual welfare. All who serve the Nation must resist the temptation to pursue self-gain, personal advantage, and self-interest ahead of the collective good.'" From the perspective of the military professional's internal logic, these attributes are impeccably correct. Working closely for many years with other professional soldiers who share these values, many officers assume, perhaps unconsciously, that these are the only worrhy values.

No more profound misconception could pervade the officer corps. Within the nation as a whole, the traits that officers consider the highest virtues are often at variance with broader social values, which are embodied in the Dec

lararion of Independence and the Omstitlltion. During the colonial era, the colonists had developed a new identity as Americans. Founded and settled by peoples ofdiffering ethnicity, religion, economic status and traditions, the emergence of any cohesiveness among the British North American colonies was rather astonishing. Despite the absence of those factors that normally serve as the basis for a national identity, as the crisis with the mother country worsened after 1765, it became evident that a common ideology bound most colonists together.4 Two closely related elements in this

Could a government be created that would have sufficient power to preventanarchy, yet wouldnotinvest so much power in one person, ora relatively smallgroup ofpeople, that it would become tyrannical? The framers ofthe Constitution

believed they could. Their solution ••• was to devise a governmental stmcture that

diffused power widely.

ideology were an emphasis on the "natural rights" of mankind, rathet than simply on the rights of Englishmen, and a desire to expand individual freedom by restraining the arbitrary power of government.

The emphasis on natural tights found consummate expression in the Declaration of Independence with its dramatic assertion that "all men" enjoyed"certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness: The phrase "putsuit of Happiness" sounds nebulous, but in the late 18th century, it had a concrete connotation. John Locke's Second Treatise on Government, which profoundly influenced the Founding Fathers, listed three inherent rights: life, liberty and property. Why Thomas Jefferson, who drafted the declaration, substituted "pursuit of Happiness" for property remains unclear, but the phrase and the word


nwant the same thi,ng. '1() peOl?lc of Jdfer'&on's em, th(~ PUt\UH an(l s.ecurity of pn"'pt'rtv "was a hasic right, es..,<;cntial to individu;11 Hberlv)'

The t:onstitut\(HI \\Tcstkd with the difficult pf(ib]e!U (J{ providing rnaxiulum national coher ;';lon (H1S1f'!Cnt 'Nith n1inimal coercion of tl1<-:

({,"fornlitr and cOllSi5tencr, obe.iienee and loralty, repn-sent the heart ofmilitarr

di~cipline. But in th.· civilian n~alm, ther repn'litmt the abn<'gation ofconscience and reason, ofthe individual dignity and sdf-det,~rminationthat i.

C('lIIml to d"mocraq;

individual (and the states), The Founding Fa~

rhcf:\ l)tlk,V(,d that power \\'a8 a c()rrupting influen<:c, that ftlkrs alw,\}'s sought to agfJn\n~ dl;:e their r)\l\\'cr at the expcn&t~ of the people's liberty. On thc nther hand, thlOY knew that lilwrty (OH.ild degenerate into licentiousness. CA,Juld ,1 govcrnnwrH h(;~ crtmed that would have sufficient POWcf to prevent anarchy, yet wflUld IKlt invest s() much pow(~r in one person, or a rdmivdy ,t",tll gmup "i [wopl,,, that ir would hC(OtllC' tymnnirr!1! 'rhe (mn\(:~rs of t:h(~ C,on~

stitution believed the\' cflUld, Their solution to the puzzle of prc-stl'ving liberty while avoiding anarchy \vas. t() dcvi;;c a WiV(:'IT1HlCT1WI structure that diff,,,ed power widdy: Ix,tween the ,lates and the f(+dcra.1 gov(:rnrrH.:'nt; among th(~ latter's thr{~e l:mill(he~; and within t:\\iO hous(~s of the k'gislat~v(' hranch, 'rl)u~. although the Con~

5titution C{ilH'aincd only a few explicit pf(Ni~

",it)llS ($uch tl:; t:host::; prohibiting eX post facto law, and bill, oi "twinder} thar pmteeted individuals from despotic govemment actions, the I~)un,ding EIther'S !X'!kVf~d th.at liberty \v(t." st'CUrt~

l){;(HUSe -rhc "atomization of authority" rc."ult.. ing frotH the sysn:l'O ii ('l1(;(h and halances and the s-cpamtkltl of fX1\ver-s would always fnlstrate a ruler's nal'ural and insatiable lust for pCM'cr.t.i

[)espitt: the Founding Fatlwrs' arb'lunents in.

behalf of their handiwork "mfted at Philaddphia in the summer of 1787, many citiz<'ns (collectively kmmm as the Antifedemlists) belic'Ved tI", document did not adequately ",ieh"ard r>e"onallil",rty. They demanded that the v)Hstitution contain a Bill of Rights-·-an explicit statement oi individual liberties-.. to shield individuals irom potential govemment oppression. So widespread was this sentiment that in a few -emcial states, ratification of the Consritution occurH~d only after the F,~lcmlist' promised to add a BiH oi Rights as amendments.

T(l fulfill the pledge, Congressman (and future president) James Madison considered 210 amendments that had l>een submitted to CongTe&'i and reduC('d the number to 19. Congrt..·ss pared the number still iurther to 12 and submitted them to the state, fot ratification. The states approved 10, which became part of the Constitution in 1791. Although each amendment hedgc~l the fc·deral govemment's power, the one that has lwcn most vital in prt."SCrving iodi; vidual liberty is the First Amendment, which protecrs frec,dom of religion, speech, pre&> and assembly,'!

Within the First Amendment guarantet'"S, the frec't1om of the press wamlllts particular attention, BcliL'Ving that speaking and writing, privately and publicly, without iear were prerequisite" for all other Iihertks, the Founding Fathers indudc't1 in the supreme law of the bnd the principle that "Congn..'SS shall make no law" "bridging freedom of speeeh or of the press.

By the mid,18th century, most Ameticans recol,'I1ized the virtues ofan unfettered press. As the Continental Congress dedared in 1774, the sil,'tliiicance of a free press lay not just in its "advancement of truth, sdena', morality, and arts in general," but also" in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, its ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consc'quential promo' tion oi union among them, whereby (}ppressive oitleial, are shamed or intimidated, into more honourahle and just m(xles of conducting af-


f.lirs."8 In essence, the Rtwolutionary gent~m,

tion viewed the press as an unofficial fourth branch of govcmIncnt. one that was especially well suited to expose misdeeds by the other three branches. As such. the pres.s \\'a5 as vim! as the executive,legislature and judiciary in the system of checks and balances, Thus, although the British common·law pmctice regarding freedom of the press prevailed in theory during the colonial era, Americans rarely enforced it. British practice prohibited prior restraint. but pennittcd punishment .after the fact fc)r sedi, tious libel, which was malicious, scurrilous or false condemnation of rhe goven111lCntY

As rival rditical pattic'S formed during the 17905, the highly pattisan nc'Wspapers of the Federalists and jeffersonians btistled with ill, tempered, intem.perate denunciations of their respective rx)!itical opposition. TIle scathing invective hurled at opponents by the early republic's obstrept~rous nL'Wspapcrs reached a new level of mging fury duting the quasi,war with France in 1798, Driven by a mixture of fear and hate, the pro-British Fc-deralists enacted a sedition act that embodied the scditiOlL' libel concept and detennined to enforee it. In response, the pro-French jeffersonians specifically repudiated the mncept. They arb~led that a law inflicting punishment after publication had the same deadening effect on free political discussion as prior restmint and that all political discussion should be exempt from any legal restrictions.

In the long run, the jdfersonian ar~~lment in behalf of a frl'C press prevailed. After"I800, the idea became increasingly entrenched (hat dis, sent ,,,,even if ,""c,mingly pernicious, impertinent and vile-did not equate with dis!cJj"lty, No matter how severe the provocation, suppres· sion was a WOfS(' evil than tole'ration, As jefferson dcelarc~l in his first inaugural address, "If there be any among us who would wish to di.solve this Union or to change its (epublican fC,ml, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of (he safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is k.ft free to


The Revolutionary· generation .;ewedthe press a.~ an unofficial fourth branch of

government, one that was especially well suited to expose mi~d(,'eds by the other

three branches. A~ such, the press was as vital as the executive, kgislatun, andjudiciary in the sy.~tem ofchecks and balances.

combat it." Or, in the words of Alexis de 1(><:qucvillc, that astut<: Frcnchnlan whe) visited the United States in 1831" 1832, in " (ountry "where the dc~ctrine of tht~ sovereignty of the people mtensibly prc'Vaiis, the censorship of the press is not only dangerou§;, but absurd,YilO

But fre'edom of the press has never been as unfettered in fact MClvillibt,:rtartans have adV()~

cate~l from jeffer"m's day to the prc'SCnt. The Constitution stHttd Ii cornprehensivc princi~ ple"~the Fi"t Amendment contains no ifs, and, or buts to dilute its injunction that Omgn"S,s shan make ll,W law" abridging freedom of the pn.".>SS. But, in practk{~, the mnendment ha." been subjt.'Ct to varying int(~rpretations. G('n(~r'"

allYl it has been constnted to rnc;:m that til(.'

13

For the government to feel secure in suspending constitutional liberties, the

war must bejudged absolutely necessary by a large majority ofcitizens, which means the threat must be perceived as direct, immediate and unambiguous. Such a

situation occurred noticeably during the Civil War and the world wars, butonly in World War IIwas the policy accepted

virtually without dissent.

freedoms of speech and press musr be exercised responsibly. No one has the right to falsely shout "Fire!" in a crowded theater and thereby cause a panic that might result in death or injury. Moreover, Congress and the courts have tried to balance com;"unity concerns, such as public safety and pomography, against individual rights. And in some wars, criminal prosecution to curtail free speech and ptess has been implemented. For the government to feel secure in suspending constitutional liberties, the war must be judged absolutely necessary by a large majority of citizens, which means the threat must be perceived as direct, immediate and unambiguous. Such a situation occurred noticeably during the Civil War and the world wars, but only in World War II was the policy

accepted virtually without dissent. I I

While acknowledging the necessity for occasional wartime infringements when national survival is at stake, most citizens would, in the absrract, agree with the ideal stated by the Supreme Court in the late 1860s. "The Constitution of the United States is a law for tulers and people, equally in war and peace, and covers with the shield of protection all classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances," the Court decreed in a case involving one of the Lincoln administration's many wartime abuses of civil liberty. "No doctrine involving more pernicious consequences was ever in~

vented by the wit of man than that any of its great provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of Government." 12 Even in national emergencies people have good reason to regard the suspension of any civil liberties with suspicion. In other countries, ar other times, liberties "temporarily" suspended during an emergency have had a disconcerting habit of becoming permanently lost.

By the early 19th century, then, the lineaments of rhe characteristic values of American society were well established. Three words that best encapsulate society's closely intertelated values are capitalistic, unrestrained, individualistic. Contrast these with military values! Instead of the selfless sacrifice and denial of "self-gain, personal advantage, and self-interest" called for by Marsh, civilians appear selfish as they pursue happiness through the accumulation of private wealth. From the military perspective, this seemingly greedy materialism (or as one general phrased it, this "sordid commercialism"), with its emphasis on personal aggrandizement even at the expense of the responsibilities of good citizenship, threatens to leave the nation wealthy but weak. 13

During the colonial era, the traditional restraints on individual behavior, such as the state, established religion and hereditary class hierarchy, either disappeared or diminished greatly. 14 And the government established under the Constitution ensured that these con

14 April 1990 • MILITARY REVIEW

straints would never be reimposed. Thus, in· stead of the hierarchical orderliness of mili· tary life, civilian society is decidedly unregi· mented. General George Washington recogoized this gulf between civil and military life. "Men accustomed to unbounded freedom, and no cantraul," he wrote, l<cannot brook the Re.. straint which is indispensably necessary to the good order and Government of an Army; without which, licentiousness, and every kind ofdisorder triumphantly reign. To bring Men to a proper degree of Subordination, is not the work of a day, a Month or even a year ..."IS

]n an essay titled, "Self·Reliance," the mid19th century transcendentalist Ralph Waldo Emerson "'tote that he hoped "in these days we have heard the last of conformity and consistency. Let the words be gazetted and ridiculous hencefonvard."16 Conformity and consistency, obedience and loyalty, represent the heart of military discipline; within military organizations they can never be ridiculous. But in the civilian realm, they represent the abnegation of conscience and teason, of the individual dignity and self-determination that is centtal to democracy. The Army's chain-of-eommand system has a structure and symmetry altogether lacking in civil society, which, by comparison, is hyperactive and in constant disarray. Yet, despite the rampant individualism-the lack of conformity and consistency-by and large the society functions so successfully that it remains the envy ofmost of the wotld. The genius of the American people is that they have created a cacophonous harmony in their national affairs.

How important are these social values that comprise "the American way of lifer' NSG68, one of the seminal state papers of the postWorld War II era, considered them essential and discussed them at length,l7 It recognized that military power served not only to deter an attack, but also to fight, if necessary, to preserve American lives and property and "to defend the integrity and vitality ofour free society" -that is, to protect "the system of values which animates our society-the principles of freedom,

8 J ! 5 ~ 1 g ~ 0

Despite the rampant individuaIismthe lack ofconfonnity and consistencyby and large the society functions so successfully that it remains the envy ofmost ofthe world. The genius ofthe American people is that they have created a cacophonous harmonyin theirnationalaffairs.

tolerance, the importance of the individual and the supremacy of reason over will."

NSG68 argued that American values were a tremendous strength. They gave the United States "a unique degree of unity. Our society is fundamentally more cohesive than the Soviet system, the solidarity of which is artificially created through force, fear and favor." The document warned against those who "would seek to defend the United States by creating a regimented system" since this would corrupt national morale and subvert "the integrity and vitality ofour system." Indeed, said NSG68, "It is only by a practical affirmation, abroad as well as at home, of our essential values, that we can preserve our own integtity, in which lies the real frusttation of the Kremlin design."

Professional officers thus have the intimidating task of internalizing two sets of values that, in theirfundamenta] aspects,. can be contradic

15MILITARY REVIEW. April 1990

tory. Can they be good soldiers and still be good Americans? Can they be good Americans and still be good soldiers? The nation's safety from external foes, and from domestic militarization that would undermine the American way of life, depends on the answer.

Unfortunately, many mid-career officers have apparently mastered military values, but have little appreciation of broader societal values. For example, the majors who attended the US Anny Command and General Staff College (CGSC) in 1986-1987 exhibited an almost unanimous collective contempt toward civilians who, of course, exemplifY national values but do not, in the ordinary course of events, typify military values. With distressing regularity, the majors denigrated ordinary civilians as "stupid," displayed a genuine viciousness toward the press and heaped opprobrium upon Congress in particular and "politicians" in general. IS Would men and women who understood American values and the workings of a democracy hold such beliefs?

Since war is not an act ofsenseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration. Once the experuUture ofeffort exceeds the value ofthe political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow. Cad von Qausewitt19

Compounding the majors' inadequate understanding of national values was their insufficient knowledge of militaty history. These two deficiencies merged and became evident whenever the subject of the Viefnam War arose.

Michael Howard, an eminent British military historian, insisted that officers must study military history in Width, depth and context to minimize the risks that arise when using history for didactic purposes. By width, he meant the study ofmilitary history throughout the ages; by depth, the thorough investigation of a single campaign to try to understand "what war is

really like"; and by context, the necessity to . understand not just the armed forces ofsocieties

at war, but also the societies themselves. "The roots of victory and defeat often have to be sought far from the battlefield," he wrote, "in political, social and economic factors which explain why armies are constituted as they are, and why their leaders conduct them in the way theydo."lo

Many of the students at the CGSC violated all of Howard's maxims. Few of them had even a rudimentary understanding of American, much less of European, Asian or African, military history. Fewer still had an in-depth knowledge of any campaigns, beyond the simple (and simplistic) creed that in Viemam "we won all the battles," a questionable assertion that depends on the definition of "won" and "battles." And virtually none demonstrated any insights into the war's societal context except to note, with a disdainful glare, that Vietnam generated opposition on the home front.

Perhaps the students' ignorance of military history is nor surprising. Howard's insights, after all, come from a lifetime devoted to the subject. But professional officers rising to the rank of major have had little time for reading and reflection, because mastering their craft's technical intricacies is a full-time job. Recognizing the students' weakness in military history, the CGSC offered a superb course on 20th century US military history. The casc's Combat Studies Institute taught the course and assigned, among other books, General Bruce Palmer Jr.'s The 25-Year War: Amerial's Military Role in Vietnam, one of the most important books written about Viemarn,ll

I participated in four iterations of this course and had the same experience each time. During the discussions from World War I through the Korean War, most students demonstrated a willingness to probe, to question, to understand what had happened with an open, inquiring attitude that was exemplary. With a critical (yet empathetic) eye, students identified errors in ttaining, tactics, logistics and even strategy.


The Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze (seated secondon McNamara's

ThefeS failed to inform the president or secretary ofdefense that the strategy being pursued would probably fail, and thefeS gave the president "unanimous" advice even when they were, in fact, divided on key issues. Since the military failed to undel'

stand the wars tJue nature ••• [itl employed a fauItr strategy emphasizing the "big unit" war instead ofVietnamizalion, which . .. should have always been the military's top priority;

The students' examination of the armed services' mistakes in World War I, World War II and Korea, and their efforts to draw lessons from those mistakes, repeatedly elicited classroom exchanges worthy of the country's best history graduate student seminars,

But when the classes got to Vietnam, it became obvious that discovering military errors in past victorious wars (Korea looks more and more like a victory since the United States now knows what a genuine defeat is), was entirely different from admitting errors in a recent, clear-cut defeat,

If the students read Palmer's book, the vast majority of them surely did not understand it, When classes discussed Vietnam, an iron curtain of preconceived notions slammed down, The students believed they already kfl£W what

caused defeat: yellow-streaked politicians, irresponsible journalism and the collapse of home front morale, A twinge of truth adheres to each of these causes, Historians will never confuse Lyndon B, Johnson with Franklin D, Roosevelt; at times the press did not perform as responsibly as it should have, if we lived in either a perfect world or a totalitarian regime; by early 1968, home front dissent against the war had escalated to epidemic proportions, But as Palmer points out in painful detail that the students invariably ignored, along with the politicians, press and people, two other elements share responsibility for American defeat: the Anned Forces of the United States and the enemy, As usual in an unsuccessful war, there is plenty of blame to spread around,

A careful reading of Palmer's book reveals a


few [CGSC students} had c.'en a mdimentarr undel'litanding of

Ameri<:an, mu<:h I"",s ofEuropean, A~ian or African, militarr history, fewer stiR had an in...lcpth knowledge ofanr camp.1igns, be~'(md the simple creed that in Viemam "we won all the battles, " a questionable al!st!rtion that depends on the definition

(,f "nun"and "battles." And \~rtuallrnone demonstrated anr insights into the

",ar:~ societal wntext.

large l1umiwt' of miSL:lkts IHade by the Armed Forces that had little to du with political constnlints, critical press dippinW' (If citizens excrrising First Arncndment rights; F(lt instance. th(' J()int Chk~fs of Staff OC5) {;li!cd to infonl1 tb~ prct;ident ()f sccretary of de,{ense that the mateln' being pursued ,,,,,,Id probably fail, and tht' JCS gav{' the prcskl<~nt "unanimous" advjc(· <'ven when tht!, we"" in fact, divided on key IS-SlWS. Since the military failed to understand the war':, tlU(: nature, (;eneral William C, West,,mordand <>Inploy<xl a f"nlty strategy emphasizing the: ~lbig unie' war instl'ad of Vietnamiza~

tion, which Palmer bdkves should haw always been dw military's (rip priority. EXt~cssivc fe,' \lanCt on fircprM'cr and hdicoptf:TS- had many udvcT'Se ramifications; int(~lligcn(e and countcr~ imd.ligerK(~ efforts wt'rc dismally indftdcnt; the logbtic~ system was a shambles; and the comm;Jnd system WllS unllCcessarily Clltnb<~r~

some. The Army e(>needed the night to the ene-tny, used an unwise Olw~ycar rotation system f()f c.arCCf otricersand noncommissioned offlv «(~rs, and fought with Hf~lhll arr()gancc, cmlxK.I.. kxl in the "ean"lo" attitude. Self·confider",e It.d lx,<:ollle sdf."\lruhip, and as a result, the Unit"d States undewstimated both the Vietcong and dw North Victnarm\se army.

[It,'Spite his \Candor in ",,,,\yzing the maiwry's mistak,,"S (most of thl~m egregious), Palnwr can"'" n(~t bring himself to pron()unct~ the judgment

dnt logically follo\vs from his anaRysis. After specifically referring to a tlUmbfr of dll;-SC prohh:~n"\s! he asks j\vhether any significant improve·· mcnts in US pcrf{)nnanct would have madc <.lny difh.~rence in the outcome," and condtlCk':S that the answer is "probably 'no: The \Var was lost primarily at the strategic, diplomatic. and do~ mestic politicallevds. , ." The diffi\Culties with this conclusion are threddd. First, he hedges by using the word "probably" j the answer might just as rc(\s<mabty be "probah\y 'yes.''' Scc.ond, his statement assumes that inettecti've military performance had no impact on the strategic, dipknnatic and domestic p<,lliticallcvds, which is illogicaL Third, he undcmlines his conclusi()l1 by admitting that "American military professionals have much to lcan\ from the tragic (~xperi('ncc of Vietnam, because heeding those lessons could mean the diffc·renee &el1.Veerl tvinning and lo~ing in ,1 fu.tu.re om/lict."12

Aside: frOln their unwiHiIib'llt':&..'; to confront PalmcrJs candclr ~.~ to think atx;l.lt the war rather than rdy on tired dichcs-·the students made three unwarranted assumptions when discuss~

ing Vietnam. First, they ''''''lllned that if only the restmints had been tah'n off, the United States would have won. This is one possible out· come, but two oth"r effe\Cts were possible. It might have made no difference in the outcome, but only neated a stalemate at a higher level of violenc(" because North Vietnam's tlwiH to per~ sist was inextinguishable, tI according to Palmer. ()r it might have madt~ the situation much «J(ff,~e by involving new belligerent.s, particuhl.rly Chi~ na. 'jOne cannot quarrel with the decision not to invade North Victnam/< writes Palmer, <lbc~

caus(~ it was toO close to China; our CXpericlKc in misjudging the Chinese intervention in Ko~ rca was still fresh in our memory.ljB But because tht, Chinese did not intervene, the students argued that tht!, never would have no matter what the Unit<·d States did. Neither the JCS nor the political leadership could afford to make sud, a leap of fa;th,24

From the assumption that fighting an unlimited war could llllve yidded victory carne


Excessive reliance on firepower and helicopters had many advers<' ramifications: intelligence and count.."f'intel1igencc efforts were dismally inefficient . .. and the comnmlld

system was unnecessarily cumbersome. The Army conced..>d the night to the encm}; usedan unwise ooc'1'eat'rOOltion system for career otlicers andnoncommissiont>d officers,

and fought with a fatal arrogance, embodied in the "can-do" attitude.

the second assumption: winning was worth any price. But this assertion contradicts the Clausewiuian concept that j'um is only a lrranch of political activity; that it is in no sense autrmomous," Therefore, "MUS must vary with the nature of their motivtoS and of the situations which gave: rise to tht~m:'15 Wars viral to national survival demand extreme exertion. Like World War II, th..'Y will be large and long. Since these wars are, in many ways, simpler (0 fight than limited wars, the AmlCd Fotces seem to prefer rhcm,2f, But what about a war like Vietnam, which, as Palmer admits, was "not Viral"?''! Were limited, nonvital goals in Southeast Asia worth an unlimitt'<! commitmt-nt that "nuld possibly impait the economy and endanger more vital international obligations such as those in Europe or Korea?

Finally. the failure to prevail in Vietnam, students d.,dar..od. was further proof thar a de

mocmcy cannot fight a long war. What does "long" mean? The United Stares fought from 1775--1783 in the Rt'Volution; from 18(>\ ,·1865 in the Civil War; and from 1964·1973 in Vietnam. These seem reason~tbly long. Should rhe United States have fought on against Britain in 1815; Mexico in 1848; Spain in 1898; the Philippines in 1902; and China in 1953, when it had already achit-ved its wat aims? Should it have hattled on against Germany after November 1918 even though an annisticc had been declared! Whose fault was it that all US cnernie' had surrendert,,1 hy Septembet 1945? In other words. the democraticUnitd Statte;, like other systems of g(",(~mmt"tlt. has fought long WJrs or short wars, all-out waf'S or limited wars, depending on the politk:al motiws Hnimating them and the correl;,tion ht'twcen the irt\{K}rranee of the policy ohjet.tives and the "",ince, ncct"Ssary to obtain them.


It is true that you may fool aU the people some of the time; you can even fool some ofthe people aU the time; but you can't fOol aU of the peo/,le aU tile time.

Abraham Lincoln28

What is the nature of "the people"? No definitive response is possible since the answer is a matter of perceptions, not literal truth. Jefferson's view of mankind was optimistic. He believed humans had an innate sense of right and wrong, much like the sense of hearing or sight. With their instinctive wisdom and good sense, the people could be trusted to govern themselves with minimum coereion.29 Many Federalists were more pessimistic, believing that instinctive public virtue was a scarce COIn~ modity compared to greed, ambition and immorality. Good government depended upon an elite composed of the wellborn and welleducated who could make correct decisions for the people.30

The majors who attended CGSC in 19861987, with their widespread disdain for civilians, adhered more closely to the Federalist than the Jeffersonian perspective. Undoubtedly, some civilians are, as so many majors said, stupid-perhaps even a few Army officers fan into that category. But does the blanket assertion that "civilians ar~ stupid" make sense? Civilians include doctors, lawyers, corporate managers, teachers, ministers and so on, all of whom are as well educated as the majors.

When they denounce everyone else in the country but themselves, professional soldiers may mean that most civilians have little understanding of the military profeSSion's specialized technical knowledge, rituals, insignia and language. To that charge, most civilians would plead guilty. Few of the men and women in the Congress today have been professional soldiers, and thus do not have much expertise in technical military matters that take years of srudy and experience to master. On the other hand, few professional soldiers have experience as politicians and, apparently, have little appreciation for the political process in a democratic society.

What, exactly, do the majors so despise about the people's elected representatives? First, Congress never seems to attach sufficient importance to military affairs. With their specialized perspective on the world, Army officers suffer from monomania when it comes to defense. With a single-mindedness akin to Captain Ahab pursuing Moby Dick, they insist on bigger defense budgers and more weaponry, convinced that military strength is the sole source of national security. Congressmen know better,

Few in Congress today have been professional solcliers, and thus do not have much experti5e in technical military matters that talc.e years ofstudy and experience to master. On the otherhand, few professional solcliers have experience as politicians and, apparendy, have little appreci

ation for the political process.

and consequently make decisions that, considered in a vacuum from a solely military perspective, seem illogical. They understand that in assessing national security, other elements must be factored into the equation: economic strength, the vitality of scientific research and technological development in academia and the private sector, the strength of the US alliances, national morale and the appeal of our way of life.31 Regarding the last point, a State Depattment official emphasized "the importance ofarticulating our values strongly, continuously, and persuasively. Western ideals of individualism, personal dignity, and representative government strike responsive chords everywhere."32 The United States has to set immigration quotas primarily because of the attractions of its way of life, not because it has an abundance of high-tech weaponry!

A second objection to Congress is that it does not quite fit in the chain of command, which runs downward from the president. Yet

April 1990 • MIUTARY REVIEW 20

Congress constantly intrudes in military matters, primarily by controlling the purse strings and by various investigations. From the military view, Congress holds the purse strings too tight and investigates the Armed Forces too frequently and thoroughly.

Finally, while the military wants swift, precise policy guidance, the democratic process seems murky, ambiguous, indecisive. Slowly, awkwardly, representative government muddles along, infuriating officers who thrive on energy and action, on having a specific mission and getting it done-now! Yet, in a republic, with its widespread distribution of power that protects the people from despotism, a variety of different interests (of which the Armed Forces are only one of many specialized lobbies) have access to the government. Reconciling these competing interests requires lengthy deliberations through governmental mechanisms that can seem cumbersome. The "messy" decisionmaking process is inherent in the democratic system established by the Constitution.

Almost any professional soldier accepts Clausewitz's concept of the "fog" or "friction" of war-that constellation of factors that renders warfare so difficult, inefficient and wasteful. Those who have read Howard's essay on "Military Science in an Age of Peace" will also be familiar with the "fog of peace," which obscures the shape, size and character of the next war and hence instills uncertainty in peacetime preparations.33 Yet the majors at case were unwilling to accept a third concept, the "fog of politics," that makes precise, swifr decision making difficult.

Perhaps attitudes developed by mid-career, when many officers (and many academics) are so cocksure of their judgments that they run the risk of being intellectual without being intelligent, represent only a passing phase. "Older people can be wiser, " wrote a historian (and former navy officer) who had many profound insights into human nature.34 Some individuals become ossified in their thinking at an early age, but in other cases new experiences and in-


During the Revolution, !Washington] complainedoften to andabout Congress

regardinginadequate manpowerand logistic support. Buthis criticisms were

tempered by the rea/iTation thatnational values wereparamount, that itdid no good to 6ght the war in amanner that undermined those ideals. Despite his

complaints, he remained unswervingly loyalto civilsupremacy.

21

creasing maturity foster more profound per~

spectives, Washington serves as an instructive exam~

pie. From the beginning of his military career, he displayed many of Marsh's first-tier values. But as a young officer cOlnmanding the Virginia Regiment during the French and Indian War, he was also a hot-tempered, petulant, arrogant

While the military wants swift, precise policyguidance, the democratic process seems murky, ambiguous, indecisive . •• In a republic, with its widespread distribu

tion ofpower that protects the people from despotism, a variety ofdifferent

interests have access to the government. Reconciling these competinginterests

requires lengthy deliberations.

critic of his political superiors. Especially exasperating ro him was the Virginia government's inability to give explicit guidance. "My orders," he cOlnplained, "are dark, doubtful, and uncertain; to-day approved, to-morrow condemned." His anomalous position meant that he was "left to act and proceed at hazard, accountable for the consequence, and blamed without the benefit of defence!"35

By the time of the Revolution, however, Washington had developed an inexhaustible patience with the democratic process based on a great respect for American values. The transfomlation occurred, in part, because of natural maturity. Equally important, Washington had become immersed in civilian life as the manager of his plantation and as a legislator, first in the Virginia House of Burgesses and then as a delegate to the Omtinental Omgress. Absorbing and studying civilian concerns, he came to understand the deliberative, slow nature of representative govemment and the many concems other than military matters that demanded its attention, even in wartime.36

Certainly, Washington continued to exercise a soldier's inalienable right to complain. During the Revolution, he complained often to and about C'Alngress regarding inadequate manpower and logistic support. But his criticisms were tempered by the realization that national values were paramount, that it did no good to fight the war in a manner that undermined those ideals. Despite his complaints, he remained unswervingly loyal to civil supremacy, even when, in desperdtion, Congress attempted to invest him with dictatorial power, even when congressional inefficiency threatened his army's survival. On matters large and small, immense and trivial, Washington consulted with and obeyed Congress. He knew that congressmen were doing their best to hurdle insurmountable obstacles, that the)' had no more desire than he did to suffer a traitor's fate. "We should all be considered Congress, Army ... as one people," he wrote, ~lembarked in one Cause, inoneinter~

est; acting on the same principle and to the same End."37

Revolutions often spawn permanent presidents, emperors and kings, but because Washington never forgot that he was a citizen first and only secondarily a soldier, the American Revolution did not end that way. Contrary to many historical examples, Washington rejected personal power. He had no desire to become an American Caesar or Cromwell. Liberty, he said, was the basis for American independence and the national character, "and whoever would dare to sap the foundation, or overturn the Structure, under whatever specious pretexts he may attempt it, will rnerit the bitterest execration, and the severest punishment which can be inflicted by his injured Country ..."38

Perhaps the 1986-1987 casc class will eventually yield a George Washington-or a Ulysses S. Grant, George C. Marshall or Dwight D. Eisenhower. Each of these men displayed the intellectual capacity and common sense (an altogether too scarce commodity) to reconcile being a good soldier with being a good American. "1..


VALUES

NOTES 1, Secretary 01 the Anny John O. Marsh Jr., White Paper 198(1: Values, 9,

The following two paragraphs are also based on this document. The quotes are on pages 5 and 6.

2. The ~ofsafT/lJelAdams. ed, Harry Alonzo Cushing, 4 -...015., (G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1904-1908). 1:264-65

3, Marsh, 7, For discussion of the professional military ethic, see Samuel P. Huntinqlon, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Rel8rions (Harvard Universily Press, 1957).

4. This discussion 01 ideology relies heavily on 'r\lhoshua Arieli, IndividJalism and Nationalism in American Ideology (Harvard University Press, 1964,

5. Page Smith, A New Age Nt:m Begins: A People's HistoryoftheAmericBn Revolution, vol, 1, (McGraw-Hili Book Company, 1976), 696.-97; Arieli, 137 and 145.

6" For adetaileddiscussion ofthesEI complex matters, see Gordon S, Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1969).

7. This discussion of the Bill and Rights, especially the First Amendment, relies heavily on leonard W. Levy, Emergenceofa Free Press (Oxford University Press, 1985) and "The Bill of Rights,~ 'in his Consritutlonsl OpInJoos: As,oectsof the Binal Rights (Oxford University Press, 1986). see also Irving Bran!, The Bill or Rights: Its Origin and Meaning {Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965}.

e. Jamals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, ed. Washington C Ford et aI., 34 vols" (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office IGPO], 1904-37), 1:108,

9. levy, Emergence, makes these points. 1O. Gatpilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presid&nts, 1789-1897,

ed. James D.Aichardson, 10vols.,{Washington, DC: GPO, 1OO?}, 1:322; Alexis de Tocquevi!Je, Democracy in America, 2 vels., (Vintage Books, paperback reprint 011945 edition), 1:190.

11. John Braeman, Before the Civil Rights Revolution: The Old Court and Indivk:iJai Rights (Westport, CT: GIe9flWOOd Press, 1988) shows some of the restrictions that have been imposed on freedom of expression and the difficulty "of balancing - 01deciding iloW far the rights Dlthe individual may be limited lor the larger oommunltygood.~ As Braeman also demonstrates, one great expansion of First Amendment rights occurm<l as a result of the Supreme Court ooending "to the states via tl~3 cLe process clause 01 the Fourteenth Amend· ment the First Amendment rights ollree speech, lree press, and assembly:" The quotes are trom pages 120 and 117,

12. The case was Elt parte Mliligan. which dealt with the OO"lStitutionaJity of using m~itary courts in areas where civil courts were functioning.

13. Huntington, 267-68. Civilians, especiany those closelycoonected 10military affairs, sometimes share the same concern. For example, in 1817 a House of Representatives committee that had studied the question of militia reorganization urged "the diffusion of militaJy discipline and a military spirit through the whole body of the peop!e~ to counteract "that inordinate desire of wealth which seems \0 hlM't pervaded the whole nation .. :' see The Nrm AmerIcan States Pap9rs: Military Affairs, 19 vols., (W~mlngton; Scholarly ResourctlS, Inc_. 1979). 14:204.

14. The breakdown in traditional restraints is a main theme in a history of the United States written by Benjamin G. Rader and John M, Dobson, forthcoming try west Publishing Company.

15. The \o\11tings of George washingtO'l, ed, John C, Fitzpatrick, 39 vols., (WaShington, DC: GPO, 1931-44), 6: 111 ,

16. Selections from RaJph Waldo Emorsoo: An Organic Anthology, ad. Stephen E. Whicher, (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957), 154.

17, NSC-68 is reprinted in the Naval War College Review (MayfJune 1975):51-108.

18. These comments are based on my experience as the John F. Morrison Professor 01 MWtary History at the US Army Command and General Staff Co~ lege during 1986-1987. Fortunately, despite their f&rvent and frequent criticism of cMfJans, particular1y the men and v.omen In Congress and in the journalIsm profession, the majOrS remained respectful of civilian control, especiaDy as 8Kerclsed t1t the president As long as this paradox of contempt (or civilians yet resoect ror civifJan control remains Intact, then democratic government is

secure, But might not this disdain lor civilians lead to a severe challenge to civilian control sometime in the future? j should add throe other points. First, numerous students and I debated these issues in a forthright manner that I found intellectually stimulating; few disagreed when I used the words "contempt~ and "disdam~ to descrilrothe majors' attitudeS toward civilians. 5econcf, and somewhat paradoxically, the students and faculty treated me as "one of their own~ - that Is. with the utmost friendliness and COtlrtesy _ not as a civilian who had never worn a uniform. I consider some of theolficers I met there to be among my best friends-despite our differences on many substantive issuesl Third, Iwas in college during the heighl ollha anti-Vietnam war m0ve

ment, with which I sympathized; SO I may be hypersensitive abOut issues involving civil-military re'latlons.

19.Carl vonClausewitz, On war, eel. and trans. by Michael Howardand Peter Paret, (Princeton University Press, 1976), 92.

20. Michael Howard, "The Use and Abuse of Military History," in his The Causes of ViarS and Other Essays (Harvard University Press, 1963), 195~97.

2L General Bruce Palmer Jr" The 25-'lt!ar \lVar.' Amet1c.as Military Role in Vietnam {The University Press ot Kentucky, 1984).

22. Ibid., 171 (italics added). 23_lbid., 176-77. 24. For a brilliant exposition of the fallacy that loosening the restraints

imposed on air power -early in the war would have led to victory, see Mark Clcdfelter, The Umits 01 Air PrJwer: The American Brxnbing of North VIetnam (The Free Press, 1989).

25. Clausewilz, 605 and 68. 215. Palmer, 192, makes the point about total war being easier to fight than

limited war, as did Douglas Pike during two lectures in the Combat Studies Institute's S, L. A. Marshall lecture Series during the 1986--1967 academic year,

27 Palmer, 6 and 189, 28. Alexander K. McClure, Lincoln's Yams and Stories. ,(J. C. Winston

Company, 1904), 124, 29. As an example, see Jefferson 10 Pater Carr, 10 August 1787. in The

Papers of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Julian P. Boyd et aI., 22 voIs. to date, (Princeton University Press, 1950--), 12;15,

30. See for example, John Adams' DiSCOUfSBS on Davila: A Series of Papers on PolItIcalHistory byan American Citizen In The Woms ofJohn Adams, 5econd President of the United Stales, ad. Charles Francis Adams, 10 voIs.• (Little, Brown and Company, 1856), 224-399.

31. Historically, of course, some soldiers have understood that defense mat· ters do not exist independently from the rest of society, For example, in 1790, Secretary of war Henry Knox wrote that "The strength altha Government, like the strength 01 any oth9r vast and complicated machine. will depend on a due acl)Jstment of its several parts: its agriculture, its commere&, its laws, its finance. its system of defence, and its manners and habits, all mquire consideration, and the higheSI exerCise of political wlsdom~ New American State Papers. MilltaryAffairs,14:167.

32. "National security and u.S.-USSR Relations," an address by Matthew Nimetl, Counselor for the Department of Stale, at Duke University on 17 November 1979, and distributed t1t the Department of Stale's Bureau of Public Affairs as "Current Policy No. 113~

33. Michael Howard, "MllilarySCience in an Age of Peace, ~ RUS/:JoumaJof the RoyaIlklited Services Institute for Defence Studies, \101, 119, no. 1, (March 1974):3---11.

34. Michael T. isenberg, Puzzles of the Past: An /ntrodJCtion to Thinking About History (Texas A & M University Press, 1985), 73

35, 11Ie ~ orGeorpe Kttsh.hgtM, 1:528. 36. Don HigginbOtham, Geotge WBshington and the American Military Tradi

tion (University of Georgia Press, 1985) describeS this lransformatlon, 37. 11Ie Writlllgs or Geotpe WilsI1k7gtcn, 11 :291. When Washington resigned

10 the Continental Congress in December 1783, the president, Elias Boudiool. commended Washington for having "conducted the great m'II1tary contest with wisdom and fa1itude, Invariably regarding the rights of civ" paNer through aIf disasters and changes:' Ford, 25:838.

36.11Ie ~ofGoorge ~,26:487.

Peter Maslowski ~ professar ofhiswry, Uni"",sil)' ofNebraska-Liru:oln. He receiwd a BA from Miami University, andanMA and PhD. fromOhW State Uni"",sity. He has written and taught extensi",ly in <he field ofmilitary histary and was <he 1986-1987 John F. Morrison Professar o[Military Histary, US Amy Command and General Staff CoUege, fur'Looven1OOrm, Kansas.


ILIT LE ~ HIP

and the

ERI£AN RIENCE

Gerald F. Linderman

The foHowing article is an edited version ofa lecture presented to the US Anny Command and General Staff OfJicer Course students on 4 October 1988, by GeraldE Linderman, the]ohn E Morrison Professor ofMilitary History for 1988-89. In his talk, Professor Linderman highlights the historical underpinnings of the unique leadership challenges that face today~ generation of American military leaders.

M ILITARY leadership in this society in wartime ptesents, and has always pre

sented, a problem ofspecial severity. At the root of the problem is the relationship between the individual American and that larger society of Americans. Despite complaints in every generation that individualism is on the decline, by any comparative measurement-simply setting this society against others-we have not sought to express ourselves through the social group. Nor do we often accept that the success of the group represents, in some equivalent and satisfying measure, the success of the individual. Nor are we often willing to subordinate to the group our own interests and perceptions.

Let me rry to draw a contrast. Johannes Steinhoff was a World War II fighter pilot, an ace, a Luftwaffe major trying to combat Allied air power over Sicily. In July 1943, he received from Hennann Goring, commander in chief of the Luftwaffe, this teleprinter message addressed to the Gennan fighter aircraft rorces in Sicily:

"Together with [our] fighter pilots in France, Norway and Russia, I can only regard you with contempt. I want an immediate improvement in fighting spirit. If this improvement is not forthcoming, flying personnel from the commander down must expect to be remanded to the ranks and transferred to the eastern front to serve on the gtound."

Such a transfer was to be not exactly a promotion; these pilots would have been thrown against the Red Anny as untrained infantry.

Goring's message was an unjust and outrageous signal. He was wrong. The problem was not "fighting spirit." Pilots were dying daily. The problem was that German aircraft had been surpassed technologically and that so many experienced pilots had been killed and could not be replaced. Steinhoff was furious, filled with anger and indignation. He protested to his own general, who in tum said to him:

"Listen, you're not to take it seriously. I did what I could. I've been urging [Goring] to abandon the whole business, but then he sent this

MILITARY REVIEW. April 1990

sigoal to the Air G:>rps . . • And once again: don't take the teleprint too seriously. Do you promise me that?"

Though still explosive, Steinhoff hesitated and then answered, "Yes, sir."

Immediately, however, he began to think of the disparity between the force of his emotion and the meekness of his reaction:

"I felt almost ashamed ... when speaking to the general. It seemed to me that I had been an

"The obedience practised {or centuries by me German soldier had always presupposedan unshabble trufit mat the orders he received would be sensible orders and tltat me high command would search mea hearts very carefully

before sacrificing whole formations. And the many who were sacrificeddied in

me certainty tltat this was so!'

accessory to an act of treachery of which our pilots were the victims ... I had thrown in the sponge, simply answering, ·Yes, sir.'»

So why had he done it? "In this answer lay that trust in one's supe

rior-a whole attitude toward life-which had been instilled into us, into our fathers and into their fathers before them. For us soldiers, it had hithetto been the only right attitude, indeed the only conceivable one. The obedience practised for centuries by the Gennan soldier had always presupposed an unshakable trust that the orders he received would be sensible orders and that the high command would search their hearts very carefully before sacrificing whole fonnations. And the many who were sacrificed died in the certainty that this was SO."1

"An unshakable trust that the orders .. , received would be sensible orders" ... what a small part that precept has played in our military experience. It is not the American way. The United States has never possessed an

25

unquestioning soldiery and has never even approached the idea of legions, those willing or compelled to expend themselves in the name of remote and ill-understood policy, as were the formations of Rome or of 19th century Britain

In the Civil War, few thought that wal" making required specialized knowledge . .. James A. Garfield entered the war as a lieutenant colonel, a nice place to start out in the Anny, especially since he possessed no

military knowledge-none. But he did not for a moment doubt his fitness for

high command. "Pluck," he said, simple readiness to fight, was infinitely more

important than "military science."

in defense of the outposts of the empire. The absence of such forces has not previously constituted much of a problem for us; it has, however, become a problem-as yet unsolved-in those situations of limited war that have confronted us since 1950. When decisive military vicrory on the scale of World War I or World War II is not attainable, when wars are concluded by torruous negotiations over elusive ends while combat continues, American willingness to sacrifice shrinks. As many of the men in Korea asked themselves, if there is to be no winner, why die for a tie?

The Ametican refusal to pay much deference to military leadership has also meant that we have had no experience ofa military culture, no military island within our own society on which values other than those of the society at large perrain. It is true that 4 liz hours after midnight on the first day of basic training, new privates feel themselves catapulted into a military culture utterly different from their life ourside, but not many remain intimidated. American civil society so permeates military life, rendering a military isolation so difficult that military leaders have had to understand that orders in

war must be framed not only for Americans as soldiers but for those same Americans as civilians temporarily in military uniforms.

"An unshakable trust that orders '" received would be sensible orders"-from the Army's earliest days, foreign observers have noted the absence of that confidence in Americans. Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, George Washington's inspector general, said of the American soldiers he observed, "One must first explain-and then give the order."z And implicit in that formulation is the possibility that one's explanation will prove unconvincing and that one's order will not be obeyed. Von Steuben was not the last to discover that giving orders in the American Army was a lot less tlm than in the Prussian Army.

Let me offer you, as a brief study of the difficulty of exercising military leadership in this society, the situation that confronted a com~

pany commander in the American Civil War. He had to understand, above all, that leadership was not his to exercise by virtue of the rank he held. Several factors contributed to his troubles.

In the Civil War, a captain did not ordinarily know much more than his men. US Army Field Manual (PM) 22-100, Military leadership. tells us that, in order to be a military leader, there are certain things that one must be, that one must do, and that one must know.' In the Civil War, it was vital that an officer be a person of the requisite qualities and that he do certain things to prove that he possessed those qualities. But what was he to know? The technical and technological aspects of war are so much more demanding today than they were in 1861. A leader today must know so much more than citizens at large that his experrise becomes an important source of others' respect for him. But, in the Civil War, few thought that warmaking required specialized knowledge. Few thought that there was anything to soldiering beyond the firing of a rifled musket, an experience with which many recruits were already familiar. James A. Garfield entered the war as a

April 1990. MILITARY REVIEW 26

lieutenant colonel, a nice place to statt out in the Anny, especially since he possessed no military knowledge-none. But he did not fot a moment doubt his fitness for high command. "Pluck," he said, simple readines.' to fight. was infinitely more important than "military science:4

For anothet teason, too, rank counted for little. Men entered military service detennined not to be "bossed." The Southern soldier, said one Confederate enlisted man, was "an individual who could nor become the indefinite portion of a mass, but [he1fought for himself, on his own account." A Confederate officer observed that the rank and file "failed utterly to understand . . . why. as soldiers ... they were not each and all entitled to be treated as free men." At the top. Robert E. Lee complained that "our people are so little liable to control that it is difficult to get them to follow any course not in accordance with their own inclination: And it was no better on the Union side, where William T. Sherman grumbled that "each private thinks for himself-I doubt if our democratic form of government admits of that organization and discipline without which an anny is a mob.".5

Now, what could a Civil War company officer do in such a situation? One would expect him to issue the essenrial orders and see that they were executed and discipline enforced. Ah, that he could not do. because his was not a 20th century America. not an urban and industrial America. but a society of fannsteads and small towns. Nor was his a 20th century American Army. Units were not national composites, drawing. as they do today, men from all parts of the country. Most companies were made up of residents of the same town. at most the same county, a situation that gave enlisted men a powetful leverage. In most cases, the captain had been elected by those in his company. Those in the ranks were his boyhood friends, and he expected to return to that small town to live in their midst and among their families once the war was over.

A lieutenant colonel in the 3d Ohio, John


'l4.n unshakable trust that the orders ..• received would be sensible orders"what a smallpart that precept has played in our military experience. It is not the American way. The United Sf1ltes has

neverpossessedan unquestioningsoldiery and has never even approached the idea

oflegions, those willingor compelled to expend themselves in the name ofremote

andiJl..understoodpolk" as were the fo17IJ' adons ofRome orof19th century Britain in defense ofthe outposts ofthe empire.

Beatty, decided that he had to discipline the men who were straying from camp at their whim. The court-martial charges he pressed, however, brought down on him. in his words, "not only the hatred and the curses of the soldiers ... but. .. the ill will oftheir fathers, who for years were my neighbors and friend,." And his attempt to establish discipline simply aggravated insubordination. Some of the men drifted away for days, and those who remained refused to drill. When Beatty ordered one ofthe worst, a drunken and rebellious soldier, to be buckled

27

While Civil War camp discipline remainedabominable and march discipline abysmal, discipline was best where it was most necessary-in battle .•. Men wouldrespond to orders in and around battle when their own courage was at issue and when orders were given by officers ofwhose courage the men were convinced• ••It was not ideology, notany notion

ofcause, not organization, not training, not the coercion ofa courts-marti:J system thatprovided Civil War armies the minimal cohesiveness essential to fight their battles.

to a ttee. the whole regiment protested: "The bitter hatred that the men entertained for me had now culminated." Beatty faced them down; he drew his sword and told them that he would die before he would let them free the man; finally, they dispersed. But it was not over. At last, the colonel of the regiment intervened, but only to plot with the men against Beatty; 225 soldiers signed a petition demanding Beatty's removal. Again, Beatty persevered, but you can imagine how poisoned were his relations with friends around him and friends at home.6

Now, the Civil War did not, of course, come to a halt because the problems of command were so painful. It was fought not because armies were held together by external discipline but because officers and men shared a dedication to the same set of values-values that all were anxious to express in combat. The most

important of them was courage-an assertive, aggressive, fearless courage. So, while Civil War camp discipline remained abominable and march discipline abysmal, discipline was best where it was most necessary - in battle-and here courage was the key. Men would respond to orders in and around battle when their own courage was at issue and when orders were given by officers of whose courage the men were convinced.lt is this courage that, in the early years, held Civil War armies together. It was not ideology, not any notion of cause, not organization, not training, not the coercion of a courtsmarital system that provided Civil War armies the minimal cohesiveness essential to fight their battles. It was courage, invoked by officers who understood their society and their men.

The way a Civil War officer ordinarily won that essential reputation as a brave man was by demonstrating courage, notably, by calmly and

28 April 1990 • MILITARY REVIEW

Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, George Washington~ inspectorgeneral, said ofthe American soldiers he observed, "One must first explain-and then give the order!'

And implicit in that fomlUlation is the possibility that one~ explanation willprove unconvincingand that one~ order will not be obeyed. [He] was not the last to discover that

giving orders in the American Anny was alot less fun than in the Prussian Anny.

coolly exposing himself to enemy fire. This was how Beatty finally ended his tribulations with the 3d Ohio. In the Battle of Perryville, he ordered his men to the ground while he remained standing amid "shot, shell and canister ... thick as hail," a gesture that won over the regiment. "Now they are," he said, ('without exception, my fast friends."7

As the Civil War officer built a reputation for bravery, he built credits that he could then use to challenge and to draw out his men's courage. He might employ gestures of reassurance, such as by casually lighting a pipe and strolling about as the enemy's bullets flew past, or he might shame his men with his own courage. A cavalry officer trying to stem the Union retreat at Chickamauga deliberately walked up to a rail

pile far in advance of his men, standing erect and exposed to enemy musketry until his soldiers, previously "driven back by hot fire" ofthe Confederates but now embatrassed by their timidity, rallied to him. He repeated the gesture several times until, in midaftemoon, he was fatally wounded.S Orders from such men were heeded.

If, however, an officer had not yet had a chance to prove himself or if his courage in combat remained unclear, he would continue to be tested by the men. They could not, of course, force him to thrust himself forward in battle, but they had other ways. They could purposely and flagrantly violate a regulation and then watch for his reaction. If he punished justly, he would win respect; if justly and dev

29MILITARY REVIEW' April 1990

A cavalry otDcer trying to stem the Union retreat at Chickamauga delib

erately walked up to a rail pile far in advance ofhis men, standing erect and

exposed to enemy musketry until his soldiers, previously "driven back by hot fire" ofthe Confederates but now embarrassed

by their timidity, rallied to him.

erly, he would win even more. If, however, he punished harshly, he would be counted a martinet, would be despised, and would open himself to his men's retaliation. He would go unsaluted, would be mocked in company theater performances, would be targeted tor derisive, sardonic cheers on the march, or would be manhandled in company snowball fights. And if matters were not repaired, he would be hung in effigy or treated to his own funeral:

"[We] built a coffin of cracker boxes. We made a dummy ofstraw and old clothes, laid the corpse carefully in. We paraded around the camp, and afrer a suitable funeral, we buried it with military honors. Our new would-be lieutenant departed the next day, never to retum."9

At the extreme, he would be threatened directly with what in Vietnam was fragging.

Now, I do not mean to suggest that, in the Civil War, all the cards rested in the hands of the enlisted men. Soldiers were just as intent on demonstrating their own courage as they were determined to compel officers to prove their courage. Thus, the possibility that a soldier might be branded a coward in the columns of his hometown newspaper was a powerful deterrent. Also intimidating were the Army's public degradations of cowardly or refractory soldiers-the head shaved, the buttons cut, the coat turned, and the miscreant drummed out of camp as the band played "The Rogue's March." There were physical punishments roo, and some of them-tying men up by their thumbs or binding them to the racks of battery wag-

ons-were excruciating. And there were military executions. Soldiers, however, seldom reacted to such episodes as their officers intended -with the resolve to be better soldien;-but with anger and revulsion. Often repulsed by what they had seen, they simply walked away into desertion. Or their resistance increased. Sentries aimed high when prisoners ran to escape. Men selected for firing squads loaded blanks, aimed poorly, or simply failed to pull the trigger. For one Confederate execution, 24 soldiers had to be marshaled to shoot a single man. 1O Thus, all official responses to indiscipline had to be used sparingly and with the greatest care. ll

Let me attempt to bring these observations down to our own day. Following the Civil War, the Army became a small frontier constabulary whose job it was to discipline the Indians of the Plains. In the process, it became a professional force- lean, sinewy, imbued with a highly professional discipline. That, however, counted for little in the Spanish-American War, when the Regulars were once again inundated by civilian volunteers, in numbers 10 times their own. Officer-enlisted man relationships were again much as they had been at the outset of the Civil War.

The novelist Sherwood Anderson was one of those volunteers in 1898, one of those hometown-company National Guardsmen. He was amused that officers and men had been told that they should not mess together:

"Ed and Doug [company officers, again elected] are all right. They have to live off by themselves and act as though they were something special, kind ofgrand and wise and gaudy. It's kind of a bluff, I guess, that has to be kept up." 12

Anden;on could not separate the company commander from the janitor he had known back in Ohio, or the fin;t lieutenant from the celery raiser at home, orthe second lieutenant from the knife sharpener.13 And they did not control him:

"An officer might conceivably 'get away'

3D April 1990 • MILITARY REVIEW

with some sort of injustice for the momentbut a year from now, when we are all at home again[?] . . . Did the fool want to take the chance of four or five [of us] huskies giving him a beating some night in the alleywayl"14

So, while such companies were on active duty in 1898, fistfights between officers and men were frequent. Marching columns often broke ranks for sightseeing. Orders requiring that water be boiled and orders forbidding the men to sleep in huts previously occupied by yellow fever victims-orders delivered by hometown friends-were ignored. In 1898, for every soldier who was killed on the battlefield, 15 died of disease.

But the Spanish-American War was the last of the hometown wars, and the power of command was strengthened dramatically by the experience ofWorld Wars I and II. Here, several developments came into play. Today's America is no longer fragmented, but integrated. It is a centralized society and becoming more so. Washington exerts a direct and powetful role in our daily lives, far beyond that which 19th century Americans could have imagined. The Army, itself a much more powerful bureaucratic organization than it was 100 years ago, draws additional strength from its role as an arm of Washington. In the 19th century, for example, soldiers did not worry about dishonorable discharges. The small town, while still autonomous, did not care what Washington thought of one of its citizens. Today, within a far less personal mode of life, dishonorable dischatges hurt oppottunities in education, careers and housing. They can affect one through life, and soldiers know it.

The power of command has also been strengthened directly by those technological aspects of war that now require a specialized knowledge, thus enhancing the influence of those "iho possess expertise. The basic unit of war is no longer only a man and his rifle, and we no longer maintain, as did Theodore Roosevelt, that to find the best military commanders one need only to look for the best citizens.


The Anny, itselfa much more powerful bureaucratic organization than it was 100 years ago, draws additional strength from its role as an ann ofWashington. In the

19th century, for example, soldiers did not worry about dishonorable discharges. The small town .•• did notcare what

Washington thought ofone oEits citizens. Today, within a far less personalmode of life, dishonorable discharges hurt oppoz<tunities in education, careers and housing

••• and soldiers know it.

And, finally, command meets less resistance because war itself has become a phenomenon immensely more potent and overwhelming than it was in 1861-65. Thus, men entering the Army are far less confident that they can control their fates on the basis of their own individualized behavior.

Still, although the power of command has been made stronger by changes within our society and by changes in war itself, the job ofcommand remains painfully exacting. We have always had a diverse society, but its wildly heterogeneous and assertively multiethnic quality today requires of the Army officer complex cross-cultural understanding of a high order. And that is made more important by the disappearance, in the wake of Viemam and Watergate, of a set of standards, generally described as white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant and male, which, despite their severe deficiencies, at least identified a mainstream of American values

31

We appear ••• kJ be entering a periodin wbkh low-intensity contlict

threatellii us more than does general war. l.cw-intensity conflict will bring with it a

St'\'ere rnaldimibuoon o{saaifice. A few will be ca.JleJ to do the diflicult work. Deciding which few will, I fear, create problem~ of

equity reminiscent o{Vietnam.

that could lx: invoh-d by office'" as a measure of common expectations, We appear, moreover, to be entering a period in which low-intc,,\Sity confliet threatens us mote than does general war. Low·intemity conHict will bring with it a severe maldistribution of sacrifice. A it"" will be Gl11ed to do the difficult work. Deciding which it"" will, I fear, create proble"" of equity reminiscent of Vietnam. We still have no legions, nor shall we ever.

The proble"" of military leadership today may not leave offiee'" standing practknlly on their own aSlVas theidiUt: in 1861, hut difficul· tit'S persist. I'M 22 ~ I00 says that the leader "has to foc,L; his attention on acc.omplishing

rhe mis'ion while looking out lilt the well·being of his soldiers."!5 Put in this easy way, thut is a dream, for it neglects the cenrral tact thilt there is almost a\ways~a tension, and often an opp(,si~ tion, hetwt~cn the accornplishJnent ('If the misF

sion and the well-bdn~~ of the men. And thne is no escape, The tension cannot he resolved by simply moving in one direction or the otheL A body dedicared ro its own well·being may be a college fraternity or 11 busint:ssmen 's ~1t1b, but it I.S not an army. Conversely, a hiRh command pursuing single-mindedly the accomplishment of mission, while relying largely on f(umal disci~

pline to set its relationship with the rank and file, will find itself, within the American mcial and historical context, without an a.n-ny.

S(), tme \eadcThhip will continue to f(':5t in accepting that tension; in understanding hll~ man beings I their special experience in Ameri~

can history and the nature of the S(Klcty to which that experience brings us today; and in operating an amlY within the space that opens to perceptive people who understand such things and are able to keep in some rough and always difficult balance the requirements of the mission and the peculiarities of the American citizen-soldier. "i..

NOTES

AGo, HMt'J171~-62

t 10kI-, 1YJ·40. 6, 4<;1} D, C<:o/, Mi;"tfl'Y fhmin~ncm; of rim Civil \I\l1lr (NcIIi York: C

SCtib!'l('fl''fi SOt\1l, 19()(lj, "".)12, 31 9. €~ D. VIt~, ~.m&OOm-;:e~ ot /I 80y if! tfw eMI VV'!lr (f1rooklyn, NY

f~irI100byl)llthor, 11115~ 113 10, Chnr/3!l T. Qulntl'lrd, f)(x;tr:J( Qv!nwrJ, CImpI",1n C S, A. and Sttcond

O/Vlop (I( Tl!noolmC(l (ScwMtoo, TN: ThIll.hli;(trMy PrM$, 1005~ tKH)f.\ 1,. Much ol thltll'lMlyuk; dmws 00 l~ llfJ6l.1ker'ti Emb&!t"kK'i Cwtl'fgfI: Thri f~ QI CctrIh;l;I In the A~ c,YIJ War (~'fcfk: Tho FlOO Proof>,

'''7)12.$hofWll()d ~on,A S10ty Tolmrh 5rory((ilnrdl'tnCi1y, NY: G~r<:i!mCrty

Publmhing Co" 192"}. 234 13.1b!d.;2tll.~, 14,lbld.,202, 15, FM 22~ 100, 32,

April 1990 • MILtTARY REVIEW 32

eveloping

The leadership Asses~ment

and Development Process

Major Ray Palmer, US Army

The de.'elopment of leaders t"T a streamlined Am'r wi11 be a critical task in t/.e next sever.u rears. The author describe.• the Armr:' initiatives in leader development and a....,...ment and urges increased emphasis on iUlplenlcnting a comprehensive pl'()gram and a supportive envil'()nment throughout the Anny.

AREDUCTION in force is imminenr; the question is not if it will take place, rather

when and how much will rake place. Recent peace talks have created a relaxation of our for~ tnerly strained relations \\'Ith the Soviets, A general feeling of optimism and well-being by Americans, coupled with (:ver~preSt'nt budget.ary constraints, h.as brought this to reality. The expected reductions in our military forces will affect an members of our profession! regardless of brand, of service or rank,

OUltion should be the warchword of the US Anned Forces as we engage in tMs drawdown of military strength, for we want to avoid another dark (~ra similar to the onc created between the two world wars when a similar air of oprlmism emered the American lifestyle, Ir was during this time that President Wocdrow Wilson seemed indifferent to military matters and planned his League of Nations that would

MILITARY REVIEW' Ap'i11990

surely put an end to all wars, He, along with hi, suppr)rtcn;, agreed that tilt: le1~gllc would provide br future world securiry. I

TI", management of rhe Anny of the 1920s was predicated on the assumption that wars had (~nd(;d forever, Despitt: initial (;ncourag(~mcnt

raised by the Narlonal Defense Act of 1920, the actual result was an Anny less ready to fIght than at any time in its history, Congressional cuts H.'<lched phenomenal proportion, In fact, by 1921, the Anny's strength had b"en cut to 150,000 and by 1927, the figure reached an unprecr·t!eo",'d It,w of only 118,750 Regu· lars. Training resources did not esc,pe the cuts. Fleeting talks of increasing armored watfare strength (1927·,1931), b,~",xl on rhe British suc· cesst.'fj seen in World War r, nlade no real pro... grcss ducw the "indistinct nature offuture con." fliets," ,k'SCrib<.-d by one popular congrts,sman."

We enre",d the 19300, rhe Hmw"r admin·

33

Despite initial encouragement raised by the National Defense Act of1920,

the actual result was an Anny less ready to fight than at any time in its history.

Congressional cuts reached phenomenal proportion. In fact, by 1921, the Army ..•

had been cut to 150,000 and by 1927, the figure reached an unprecedented

low ofonly 118,750 Regulars.

istr,ltil.w\ and the Depfe:,sion yeaI:' with an Anny in pitiable C\1ndition. The Wat Department's g<.lal was tl.) t'~)(llS its plans toward total llh)bilization llsing an envisioned. citizen Annv, tr.lined and rC<.llly to reSptH1d should the un' likely need arise. Several iterations of the Indus~

trial Mobilization Plan emerged during this timeframc; however. these stirred much interest and. Ctiticism lll1 the part ofa discouraged public sect<.)r.

Even as omens of global war mounted at the tum of the decade, the United States held to its traditional interest in unilateralism, neutrality and the hemisphetic secutity. Spending only 2 petcent oi each dollat on defense duting this period. with an all~time lc)\\, f,)rce of around 110,000. the United States had "disanned itself more effectively than the Versailles Treaty dis-

GLOSSARY Assessment. A stmcwred evaluation process

that focuses on developing leaders by llsing written instnJments and multiple independent observations to provide infonnation alx1ut a leader's readiness or potential to lead effectively in a particular position or level \\'ithin the Anny,

Assessment opportunity. A specific event that provides the. opportunity to observe behavior and ratc l--~rf()nnance in competency areas. To be valid, assessment opportunities must be relevant to the requirements of the targeted position of the leader being assessed.

Assessor. A petson knowledgeable of the task being assessed and trained to use the assessment process. Assessors have the skills to observe and record l~ader behaviors, classify those behaviors into com~

armed Ciennany.") Pl'rh,lp,s the only area uf strength that sur~

t~Kl'd during these intenvar yean; was that of ntfice[ education and training. The War De~

p,lrtment ([elted an integrated sequential sys~

tem of officcr educatioll., progressive in nature, and designed to providl2 for tactical problem solving thm would help develop competent leadership tl)r future wars. With this in mind, f()lIf distinct officer development periods were established. and Fort LeavenwOtth became the heart of this educational system that laid. a com~

mon base fClt the leadetship development of officers.4

The goal of this intenvar education and train ing system was to produce professional of~

ficers at all levels capable of executing large~tmit

operations and thinking in terms <..l theaters of war. It made officers bce the problems of detetmining strategic objectives, mobilizing large f{)rces and managing tnassive amounts of logis, tic support, It was during this petiod that George C. Marshall served as assistant com.mandant at the Infantry School, assisted by Joseph W. Stilwell and Omar N. Bradley as department heads. They cteated opportunities for practicing mental, intellectual, judgmental and decision-making aspects of leadership at the highet levels of command. In fact, more than 70 petcent of the insttuction consisted of practical wotk. The goal was graduates who,

_ petencies, rate the petfonnance observed and give immediate feedback on observations and ratings.

Competency. A description of organizational leadership behaviors that can be operationally de~ fined and under which leader behaviors can be reliably classified. Competencies establish broad categories of skills, knowledge and attitudes that define effective leader perfi.mnance.

Master Assessor_ A petson cettified by the Center for Anny Leadership to design assessment pro~ grams, train assessors and senior as.sessors, and serve as program administrators and evaluators.

Targeted Position. A specifk rank, military occupational specialty or branch, and position that serves as a guide for identifying assessment oppor~ tunities, tasks and expected perfonnance levels.


Draftees training with wooden rifles on Governor's Island, New York, during America's effort !p rearm mscratc .1941,

Even as omens ofglobal war mounted at the tum ofthe decade, the United States held to its traditional interest in unilateralisrn, neutrality and the hernispheric security. Spending only Zpercent ofeach dollar on defense during this

period, with an aU-time low force ofaround 110,000, the United States bad "disanned itselfmore effectively than the Versailles Treaty disarmed Germany."

speaking the same language, could lead with technical and tactical competence, and were capable of assuming responsibilities of not only their own grade but those of two or three levels above their own.5 Only by creating such a force of leaders during this era were we able to mobilize and meet the challenges presented during World War II.

Training our new streamlined force of the 1990s will present many challenges similar to those that faced our officer corps during the interwar years. In many respects, the challenge will be more complex, requiring an even more sophisticated and innovative approach to officer education and in particular leadership development. To meet this demanding challenge, the Army must offer modem-day leader

development strategies that assure both successful preparation of a fighting force and at the same time provide a comprehensive program of individual leader assessment and development.

US Army Field Manual (FM) 25-100, Training the Farce, says, "We train the way we intend to fight because our historical expetiences amply show the direct cortelation between realistic training and success on the battlefield."6

According to US Army FM 100-5, Operar dons, the four dynamics of combat power are maneuvet, firepower, protection and leadership.7 Of these, leadership is the least likely to be evaluated in quantifiable terms. Leadership appears to be too subjective, often evasive when empirical methods are used to measure it. How


ever, F1v1 100-5 goes on to sa';.' that "the most essential element of combat power is co-m!)ctenr and confident le"deTshi/). Leadership provides purpose, direction, and mottvation in combat

hi)

Historically, ourAnny has provided • •. the requisite training in the school system, we then attempted to complement their education with practical work in unit as

signments. Thi~, howel'er, often created a "mt or mi~s"situation for young leaders. It resulted in many poorperfo17llance ratings issued by frustrated superiors umvilling to

tolerate mistakes and impatient with junior leader development.

""

... Ilr1f] it is the leader who wii! dctcnnine the degree to which maneuver, firepower, and protection are maximized; who will ensure these elements are effectively balanced; and who will decide how to bring them to bear against the enemy."8 In the current conditions of combat, no challenge excc"ds leadership in importance.

As Geneml George S. Patton]r. said, "Wats may be fought by weapons, but they are won by men. It is the spirit of the men who (dlow and the man who leads that gains victory,"\)

Currently, there are established tools for measuring the first three dynal'nics of cornbat power; f{)r example, command post exercises, field tmining exercises, Army Tmining and Evaluation Program, National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, Califomia, and others. At the NTC, trained observer/controllers evaluate a unit's firepower, maneuver and protection capabilities. These appear to be teadily measurable by scoring losses, movement times and techniques, and application of approved AirLand Battle doctrine. The I'JUrth dynamic of combat power should not escape evaluation. In fact, leadership, the most essential element of combat IX')Wer, is the most in need of an aCCUr

rate evaluation system. Do we currently have

the capability of evaluating Army leaders accurately and reliably, using standardized quantifiable cri teria?

Historically, our AnllY has provided only two real sources of le<J.dcr development training in the schoolhouse and regular duty in field units. After providing the requisite training in the school system, we then attempted ro complement their education with practical work in unit assignments. This, however, often created a "hit or miss" situation for young leaders, It resulted in many poor performance ratings issued by frustrated superiors unwilling to tolerr

atc mistnles and impatient \vith junior leader deve!()[HUent in their units. What was and is needed is a. nonthreatening, uninflated and accurate evaluation tool, in addition to the offl~

cia] perkml1ance rating, \Xle need an assessment instrument capable of providing specific developmental feedback to leaders at all levels, using common language understood throughout the Army.

In October 1989, the US AmlY Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) issued instructions for implementation of the Leadership Assessment and Development Program (LADP) into resident leader training courses. With these instructions, initial monthly training sessions began in November 1989 for master assessors) whose role it is to teach assessors at their host installations and to develop assessment opportunities within their existing curric~

ulum. This program, using existing and planned training events and the leadership assessment process, will offer the Anny an effective tool for measuring the fourth element ofcombat power. Since all peacetime training is by nature a simu~

fation) that is simulating our wartime mission, the asses.sment process will afford us the opportunity to assess (evaluate) leadership during specific training events, called targeted assessment opportunities at various levels within the TRArXX~ school system. While students are performing their required functions (targeted positions), the assessment process may be Uin~

jected with little pain."


At the NTC, trained observer/controllers evaluate a unit's firepower, maneuverandprotection capabilities ••• The fourth dynamic ofcombat power should not escape evaluation. In fact, leadership, the most essential element ofcombat power,

is the most in need ofan accurate evaluation system.

An important element of the process is its predictive nature based on logical design.

Logic of Assessment If: A leader performs well in assessment

opportunities for a targeted position, and If: These opportunities are similar to the

realities of the targeted position, Then: The leader will do well in the ac

tualleadership position. The results of an assessment are normally

used for either selection or development of individuals in organizations. For selection l many civilian organizations require that individuals be assessed as part of the hiring process. The results of this assessment are then used to determine if the person will be hired. For development purposes} an organization can assess indi-

MILITARY REViEW' ApTil1990

vidual leaders at various stages of their careers, then use the results to improve their performance and enhance their growth and professional development. Whether using the assessment results for selection or development, there are five uni versally accepted steps to the assessment process:

• Observe a leader's performance. e Objectively record the actions taken by

the leader. o Classify these actions into nine leadership

competencies. • Rate performance in each competency

observed. OIl Provide immediate feedback to the leadet

using the aftchlction review process. The use of simulations and the assessment

process for evaluating individual perfonnance is

37

not a new concept. In fact, it has existed since late World War II, when the Office of Strategic Services set up "Station S," our original appli· cation of the process, to select spies. 1O Exist· ing widely as the industry standatd today, the assessment process is used successfully in thou· sands of civilian organizations. Ametican Tele· phone and Telegraph conducted a classic longi.

Many civilian organizations require that individuals be assessed as part ofthe

hiring process . .• For development pulpO' ses, an organization can assess individual leaders at various stages oftheir careers,

then use the results to improve their performance and enhance theirgrowth

and professional development.

tudinal research project during the 1960s, reo suIting in very impressive validity figures. ll In 1977, while the Officer Candidate School (OCS) study was in progress at Fort Benning, Georgia, the Army chief of staff directed the Review of Education and Training for Officers study, resulting in a recommendation to "de~

velop the assessment center and leadership lab· oratory concepts" for use Armywide.' z At Fort Carson, Colorado, from 1979 through 1984, the 4th Infantry Division successfully used a two· day assessment center as part of the two·week required pre.command course for companylbat· tery/troop-level commanders. This application also resulted in an impressive validity coeffi dent of .895 when analyzing the predictive va· lidity of the process. 13 In 1984, the Army chief of staff directed a reexamination of all aspects of the Officer Professional Development system and included recommendations out to year 2025. One of the Professional Development of Officers Study recommendations was to "estab· lish individual assessment control mechanisms, and implement the assessment program." 14

Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC)

Command's Leadership Assessment Program (LAP) is currently the Army's most successful formally established assessment program. In 1982, the Assessment Center Technology Task Force, consisting of representatives from Army Research Institute, ROTC and Development Dimensions International, established the orig· inal design features ofLAP, which included four simulations designed f()r the targeted position of second lieutenant. After years of use, Cadet Command's LAP has evolved into an extrem· ely successful tool for evaluating cadets, using their annual advanced camp as the "leadership laboratory" and infantry tactics as the training vehicle for assessment. Cadet performance is carefully scrutinized in two broad areas: tech· nical and tactical proficiency and leadership skills. Although developmental in nature, the final assessment results, in the form of ratings in 16 leadership dimensions, are ultimately part of each senior·level cadet's accession packet that is used to determine such things as Active versus Reserve forces duty and branch selec· ctions. 1S

Cadet Command's LAP provides for an excellent transition of newly commissioned officers to the Anny's LADP. In fact, the five· step process is the same for both programs, and since over 70 percent of our newly commis· sioned lieutenants surface from Cadet Com· mand, there is already an existing pool of of· ficers quite familiar with the process. Addi· tionally, the two remaining commissioning sources, US Military Academy and OCS, cur· rently have individual leadership assessment programs similar to the LAP. Another LAP provision enabling the smooth transition of cadets to active duty LAD is the existing pool of LAP.experienced officers and noncommis· sioned officers (NCOs) (assessors) who have recently served in an ROTC assignment. An· other significant advantage of LAP is the addi· tional training cadets receive at advanced camp each summer. Cadet Command has truly mas· tered the use of the leadership assessment proc· ess for these young cadets and can accurately


After years ofuse, Cadet Command's LAP has evolved into an extremely successful tool for evaluating cadets, using theirannualadvanced camp as the "leadership laboratory" and infantry tactics as the training vehicle for assessment. Although developmentalin nature, the final assessmentresults, in the form ofratings in 16 leadership dimen

sions, are ultimately part ofeach senior-level cadet's accession packet that is used to determine such things as Active versus Reserve forces duty and branch selections.

provide multiple, independent, uninflated assessment feedback opportunities throughout camp. This feedback is accurate, realistic and presented in a positive manner so as to develop the cadets' leadership skills in preparation for commissioning. Cadet Command's LAP complements nicely the cadets' transition to the Army's LADP, where further development may take place.

In 1987, the chief of staff of the Army directed Major General Gordon R. Sullivan, Deputy Commandant, US AmlY Command and General Staff College, to conduct a study to assess leader development in the Army. The results of this study yielded 52 reconllnendations, fonr of which ontlined future use of the leadership assessment program. One recom

mendation stated that the Army should "continue to build on the success of Cadet Command's LAP.J6

The Goal of LADP Building on the successes of Cadet Com

mand's LAP is not as easily done as some might envision. LAP is designed specifically for the skill levels and competencies required of a second lieutenant. The goal of the Army's LADP is to develop leaders for all levels ofthe Army. In support of this goal, LADP objectives are to:

e Give student leaders an accurate assessment of their demonsrrated leadership performance.

e Use assessment feedback to help student leaders prepare self-development plans to im

39MILITARY REVIEW· April 1990

Anothersignificant advantage ofLAP is the additional training cadets receive at advanced camp each summer, Cadet Command• •• can accurately provide multiple, independent, unintlated assessment feed

back opportunities throughout camp. This feedback is accurate, realistic and

presented in a positive manner.

prove their leadership performance. • Help student leaders become more effec

tive by better understanding themselves. • Familiarize student leaders with the lead

ership assessment process so they can use it to develop their subordinate leaders in future assignments.

• Establish and maintain rhe proper school learning environment to develop leaders with the needed skills, knowledge and attitudes.

LADP incorporates the use of nine organizational leadership competencies, originating from a 1976 study, that establish broad categories of skills, knowledge and attitudes, and also define and measure effective leader performance in all Army organizations. In behavioral terms, these competencies can be defined as "those behaviors required of all leaders for Army organizations to function effectively."!7 They are:

• Communications. • Supervision. • Teaching and counseling. • Soldier team development. • Technical and tactical proficiency. • Decision making. • Planning. • Use of available systems. • Professional ethics. Within LADP, there are currently three

types of assessment opportunities, termed "eyes" because they provide the leader a different look, and when combined, present a total view ofthe leader. All thtee eyes are based on the lead

ership competencies for feedback. Examples ar"':

Self-assessment. Self-completed personal feedback such as psychological measurement instnlments, selfpassessment fonus, Myers Briggs Type Indicator, and so on.

Associate assessment. Feedback as to how other student leaders see them, such as that obtained by using competency-based assessment forms.

Cadre/superior assessment. Feedback from trained assessors after observing student leaders performing in particular event.s; an example would be observing a platoon leader during a field training exercise.

Although not currently part of the formal LADP in TRADOC, based on research conducted at the NTC, a possible fourth eye exists in subordinate assessmenr. 18 Additionally, TRADOC guidance establishes minimum num-

SENIOR LEVEL

R A N K

JUNIOR LEVEL

o OPERA110NAL ASSIGNMENlS

DIRECT LEADERSHIP

MODE

(Years)

Awe· Army War College OAC . 01ficers Advanced Course CGSOC . Command and General· OBC Officers Basic Course

Staff Oflicers Course ROTC· Reserve Officers Training Corps CASl . Combined Arms and OCS· Oflicer Candidate School

Services Staff School' USMA . United States Military Academy

Figure I. leadership modes

Apnl1990 • MILITARY REVIEW

35

40

The BCTp, after two years in operation, provides realistic command post exercise training for division- and corps-level commanders. Using state-of-the-art automated

combatsimulation and a realistic opposing force, these commanders and their staffs receive feedback from independentand objective observer/controller teams.

bers of assessments, termed llfloors," within each of these types. Obviously, the more often an individual is assessed, and the greater number of different assessors involved, the more valid the assessment feedback. However, in some cases the course length limits the optimum number and types of assessments.

According to US Army FM 22-100, MiUtary Leadership, (final approved draft), "Effective leader development programs will continuously influence the Army as younger leaders progress to higher levels of responsibility." 19 By incorporating the three "pillars of leader development" outlined in FM 22-100 (self-development, institutional training and operational assignments), we see the natural progression and growth (development) of leaders as they move through their careers.20 At each school, the assessment process is used to further prepare leaders for their next assignments. They are

able to prepare developmental action plans (OAPs), based on assessment feedback while in leader training courses. Assessments at these courses are tailored to meet the specific targeted level and positiou for students in each training course. This design characteristic) coupled with the predictive nature of assessment results, makes it progressive and sequential in that student leaders go to Dperational assignments to work on reaching the goals they set in their DAPs. These DAPs, which are confidential, are used by the students to capitalize on identified strengths and change identified weaknesses so that leaders can ultimately grow and develop, both professionally and personally.

According to FM 22--100, "There is general agreement that leaders lead in different ways at different organizational levels. Juniorlevel leaders accomplish missions and build teams primarily through face-to-face contact or

41MILITARY REVIEW· April 1990

Institution-directed faculty and superior assessments plar a major role at the junior level, where inexperience and

often a lack ofmaturity br leaders wananls the need to have extemaIlr directed assessment opportunities. However, as leaders progress in rank and experience, their

increased maturity level, skiIls and knowledge . .. enable senior leaders to learn

more from self-assessment opportunities.

the direct leadership mode. In larger organiza~

tions, the scope of missions broadens and com~

manders provide vision and influence indi~

rectly through layers. They create conditions that enable junior-level leaders to accomplish tasks and 111155ion5:'21 As seen in figure I, the two modes of leadership (direct and indirect) cut across all organizational levels, All leaders must use both modes, but the gradual shift from predominately direct at lower levels to predominantly indirect at higher levels brings with it special assessment design features for LADP.

According to US Am1Y FM 22-103, Leadershi(> and Cmnma"d at Senior LeveLl, "Ttl meet the requirements of the AirLand battlefield and deal with its challenges, senior leaders and commanders possess special characteristics . . , [they must be] able rapidly to assess the situation and fonn their battlefield vision ... have a high tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty ... have a capability to learn rapidly.""

Remembering that assessment opportunities must fit the specific requirements of the targeted position, how do we best assess senior leaders? Figure 2 depicts the methodology to be used, given these special design requirements. 1nstitution-directed faculty and superior assessments play a major role at the junior level, where inexperience and often a lack ofmaturity by leaders warrants the need to have externally directed assessment opportunities. However, as leaders progress in mnk and experience, their

increased maturity level, skills and knowledge, coupled with an increased self-awareness, enable senior leaders to leam more from selfassessment opportunities designed for their specific job requirements. The Anny War College is currently meeting this demanding challenge by using several assessment insrruments that look at preferred communication styles, work preferences and personality types. Unlocking the secrets to self-assessment at senior levels presents an exciting challenge that can only be achieved through much time and continued work. As seen in figure 2, even senior officers can benefit from assessrnent experiences. As a practical matter, since assessors must be familiar with the duties being perf'onned by the person they are assessing, it is difficult to find qualified assessors for senior leaders; therel'ore, selfasseSSll1ent events become more realistic.

Other assessment opportunities exist for our senior leaders. For example, the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), after two years in operation, provides realistic command post exercise training for division- and corps-level commanders. Using state-of-the-art automated combat simulation and a realistic opposing force, these commanders and their staffs re-

ASSESSMENT OPPORTUNITY

snF· DIRECTED

SENIOR LEVEL

~ R A N K

FACULTY & SUPERIOR

ASSESSMENTS

o OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS 35 {YEARSl

figure 2, leadership Assessment


ceive feedback from independent and objective observer/controller teams. Leadership assessment techniques could be applied with great success in the BcrP experience.

Another potential assessment opportunity for senior leaders is the Tactical Commanders Development Program ([COP), a recent addition to the Pre-Command Course. This program concentrates on improving the capabilities of battalion and brigade commanders to synchronize combat power on the battlefield. For selected combat arms commanders, this two-week course is gaining in popularity and provides another opportunity for developing our senior leaders.

The decade of the 1990s brings with it challenges similar to those that faced our Army in the decades between the world wars, but unique in their complexities. Breathtaking technological advances, the startling pace of political change sweeping the world and increasing demands on shrinking resources all combine to make these challenges even more imposing on our senior civilian and military leadership. If significant force reductions occur, as now seems inevitable, we must ensure that the leaders of our smaller force possess the right skills, knowledge and attitudes enabling them to be effective in any environment. They must be participants in a rigorous development and assessment program that prepares them to function not only at their present levels of responsibility but at one or two echelons higher. Be it for low-intensity conflict in a Third World country or all-out global war, the future, smaller officer and noncommissioned officer corps must be made up of leaders able to mobilize, take charge and lead the US Army into battle.

While our force structure shrinks, as it did during the intetwar years, we must seek to reemphasize the natural strengrh of our Army by training and developing today's and tomorrow's leaders. We can do that by providing firm direction and adequate resources to the implementation of the Army's leader assessment and development program. The Army must provide


LEADER DEVELOPMENT

top quality instruction based on practical exercises at the appropriate level in the schoolhouses; it must promote leadet development in the field by ensuring that commanders create an environment in which junior leaders can

Assessments at these courses are tailored to meet the specific targeted leveland position for students in each

training course. This design characteristic, coupled with the predictive nature of

assessment results, makes it progressive and sequential in that student leaders go

to operationalassignments.

implement their own development plans; and, it must encourage the continued development of senior leaders through self-assessment and the innovative use of existing programs such as BCTP and TCDP. We must create a system and an environment that develops leaders with skills and the character necessary to plan, mobilize, organize and execute our war-fighting doctrine at all levels of participation.

The only prudent measure to take in developing leaders who possess these characteristics is to aggressively implement the best possible leadership development program available today. LADP, logical in format, proven effective in industry and the military, is in its early implementation stages today. Many officers and NCOs are already familiar with it from ROTC's LAP, and TRA[X)C has begun the essential training ofassessors necessary for full implementation in the school system. Full adaptation by commanders in the field and adequate emphasis and resourcing of LADP will allow for the development of capable leaders of all ranks for the Army of the 1990s and beyond.

"Effective leader development programs will continuously influence the Army as younger leaders progress to higher levels of responsibility.Hz3 "1..

43

NOTES

1. Russell F. W9igley, Histoty of the Uniled States Army (Ne'N York: Mac· miIlan Publishing Company, 1967).

2. Ibid. 3. Allan R. MUlett and P9ter MasloWski, FortheCommoo Defense: A Military

History of the /.klited Stares of America (New York: The Free Press, 1984). 4. TlTTIOthy K. Nenninger, "Creating OHicers: The LeavenWOl1h Experience,

1920_1940,n MifiratyR6'view(Novemoor 1989):58 5. Ibid. 6. US DepartmenlOf lhe Army Field Maroa! (FM) 25 -1 00, Training the

Forca (Washington, DC: Government Printing OfffC9 {GPO), November 1988), H.

7. US Departmool of the Army FM 100- 5, Operations (W'ashinglon, DC' GPO, May 1986), 1L

8.ibkL 13. 9. US Depaf1ment of the Army FM 22-103, Lea{iership and Command at

Senior Levels (Washington, DC: GPO, June 1987). 1. 10. Beginning with the Office of Stralagic Services, during World War II,

General Wdliam J. "Wild Bmn Donovoo successlully ran "Station S:' an initial application of the assessment process to select spies for the United Stales to counter the Nazi spy network:, Station S was one grand three-and-a·half.day simulation. Each applicant was given a fictitious name, background and cover story. During the sirrulalion, applicants could nol slep ootoltheir role play. Due to several alteraHons in program administraHon at Station S, accurate statisHcal proof 01 success Of the program is not available; however, the increased number of successful intelligence operations that took place IWar the end of World War l! would lead one to belie\le that at leasf part althe successes of Station S was the sel&ction of the right people as spies,

11. Joseph Moses and W~liam Byham, Applying the Assessment center Method (New 'Wrk: Pergamon Press, 1977). AT&T's Management Progress Study irNoIving 274 managers (college and noncollege) embarking on their careers with AT&T. After initial assessment upoo being hired, the assessment center made prodlctklns about whether these managers would succeed. IIo'hich was defined as "reaching middle management positions." Alter eight yearn, these managers were looked at again. II was found that 82 percenl of those predicted to succeed had in fact done so, and 94 percent 01 those prodlcted not to advarlooho.d not made it to mid-level management positions.

12. The assessment process was used at Fort Benning, GOOfgia, during 1973-1978 as part 01 a research project headed by Dr. Kay Smith, Army Research Institute. One of tile purposes of this study conducted in Officer Candidate SChaoI was to test the value of assessment and counseling as a personal and car9l!lr development aid. Results published in November 1978 indicated that e-ighl of the 12 dimensions (categories under which specific llI(llmples of behavior could be reliably classified, such as "oral communicaIioris") were measUlUd either adequately Of quite weR by the assessment process. Addit\onaUy, instructOOI who took part in this study overwhelmingly mted perb'mllJ"lC&.ba:sed assessment as extremely valuable fOr applicant selection and Itt leadership delr9lopment: Review of Education and Trainlng lor Officers (REm), (Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff. 1978). In August 1m, the Army ch~ of slaff directed the RElO study, a massive data collectiOn effort whlch Included a "description Of fNe/yofficerpositfon, a comprehensiwJ SUl'V8'J 01 offi<::er opinionS and attitudes, and an extensive study of oth&r systems (other gef"Yices, foreign armies, Industry and academic). With respect to prec:ommlsslor'lirYd screening alooe, the folk:lwing recommendations were made: moYe immediately to deYelop medical, physical fitness and I1l&rltal assessment center concept for fuD tmpIementatlon, Fiscal Year 19B1: US Army TRAlX)C develOP the leadership laboratory for assessment center use; and all cornmlsstoning progam applicants be processed through the assessment eentero,

13.1'I1e 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fen Carson, Colorado, Human Aesourtes OffIce ran a two week pnKXlmmand course for all company-level

commanders in the diviSion during 1979--1984. This course titled "Leadership El1ectl\1eooss and Assessment Development;' consisted of three phases: phase one was a two-day assessment center experience: phase two was an orientation 10 post facilities; and phase three consisted of WOfkshops designed foimproye ttose weak areas identified by the assessment process. The assessment phase consisted of four simulations designed to elicit behaviors required 01 a COI"f1)al1Y ccrnmarder. Assessors ware field QIllde officers wOO were trained (certified) during a three- to Iour-day session, then!3&rved as assessors once or twiOO per)Ear on a rotatng basis. The majority of atterdges and trailed assesslX"S rated this progam highly, and although the assessments were used strictty for dewlopment, there was a cooeIation coefficient of .895 be\v.Ieen low rafngs in the assessment process and failura to ooo,:>lele a successM canmand, It is lffllOl"tant to note lhat assessment results were not given fo battaJioo commaooers so the resuns IWt9 never used 10 select ca1lXlfIV commanders.

14. PrmessiOM! Development 01 Officers StUdy {PDOS}, (Department 01 the Army, Office of th& Chief of Stall, 1965). in February 1984. the chief 01 staff 01 the Army directed a reexamination of all aspects of the Officer Professional Development JOPO) system as it evolved since the 1976 REro study, and to project the applicability of that system, including recommendations out to 2025. The resulting PDOS, published in April 1985, recommended no major overhaul to OPO, rather a transitional approach toolficers' educatioo and train. ing that would meet tomorrow's challenges. With respect to leadership assessment, the following recoo1mendations ware made: establish individJaI assessment control mechanisms; develop and define "core" skills, knowledge and proficiencies required of all offICers and cadets; implement the individla! assessment program.

15. How Ta Fight Manual (Ftlrt Monroe, VA; ROTC Cadet Command, 1988). 16. Leader Development Action Plan (LDAP), Departmenl of the Army Chiel

of Staff, MG GOI"don R Sullivan, 1988, Called the Leader Development Study Of "Sullivan Study," this provided for 52 specific JeCOmrnendations lot leader development in the Army and created the Leader Development Office, part Of the Genter for Army Leadership (CAL), as the O'o'9rwatchfmoniloring agency lor implementing these recommendations. With respect to assessment, them were lour recommendations made: continue to build on the success Of Cadet C0mmand's Leadership Assessment Program; incorporate leadership assessment into all phaSeS 01 our sequential and progressive leader training and education process: continue ongomg CAL efforts to develop improved methods 10 strengthen leadership skillS, knowledge and attitudeS; make the director, CAL, the proponent !of leadership assessment in the Army.

17. The leadership competencies first appeared in 1976 in Monograph No. B, A Matrix of Otganiz8tiona1 Leadership Dimensions, one of the US Army Administration Center's Leadership Monograph serles. The research methOdOlogy used to develop the competencies ~ an rooensiWl review 01 behavioral research, management merature and a SiIl'VElY of promlf'l.ent industrial development programs. The leadership competencies next appeared in "TRAOCK) Pam 525-28, U. S Almy ~Conoept fa~,Match 1963. The Operational Concept papers were designed as a vehicle to get new concepts publiShed untU included in doctr1nalupdates. Starting in 1987, the ~tencies provided the framework lor the Army's emerging leader:ship assessment program. The ettJlP9Iencies are now formalized as a part of our basic leadership doctrine in the 1989 Final Approved Draft of FM 22 -100, Mi/ltlJly L&8dershlp .

18. MAJ (p) William A Knowlton Jr., "In Aatlngthe Leaders, Ask the Led," AJmy {June 1987):20-25, points out the very real possibility at usirg SUbordinate feedback as an accurate predictet. 01 unit and: leader performance because it COfT9lates so cIos&ty to command Climate in organizations.

19. US Department of the Army FM 22-100, MHftary Leadership, (Approved Final Draft), June 1989, xiii.

20. Ibid. 21. Ibid, xvI. 22. FM 22-103,2-3.

Major Ray /'abner ~ a leadership assessment oift«r, primary insouc<or fur Master Assessor Training, Center [or AffilY Uadership, US Affill Command and General Staff CoUege, Fort Leaven_rh, Kansas. He received a B. S. from the University ofGeorgia; an M.A. !ram Webster University; and an M.S. from the Uni""sity of Southern CalifiJrnia. He has serwd as an organitatianal effectiveness staffof{U:er; and an assess· ment center administrawr. He also managed Fort Carson Assessment Center [or Company Commanders and serwd as ass~tan! profess", of military sdence, Cadet Command, Uniwrsity of Florida.


German

General Officer Casualties .in

WorldWarll

Lessons for

FutureWar Major French L. MacLean, US Army

The author correcdy states the doctrinal necessity for frontline senior leadership. He provides a case study of Gennan general officer casualties in World War II that both recognizes the sUnilarities in Gennan and US leadership styles and illustrates the high cost ofsuch leadership in losses among general officers. He recommends added emphasis to the training ofsenior leaders in personal battIe6eld survival.

I N THE theoretical realm, Henri de )omini Significant general officer casualties in World defines a decisive point as one that enables War II severely strained the German command

its holder to make a correct application of the and control system. Enemy action was the direct principles ofwar. He further states that arrange cause for the losses. Indirectly, however, German ments should be made for striking the decisive doctrine, training, personal experiences and inblow upon this point'! Decisive points can be creased battlefield lethality magnified the probclassified into three categories: physical, cyber lem. This article examines those indirect fuctors netic and moral. Cybernetic decisive points to see if: one, the bctots are present in the US comprise command and control and the com Army today: and two, if so, what influence they manders who exercise it.2 Charismatic military may have on AirLand Battle. commanders also influence the moral domain Airl..and Battle depends on excellent leaders ofbattle. JtiSt as they are a strength ofa military at all levels. Senior commanders may well suffer force, they can also be a weakness as both the significant losses, even if they do everything moral and cybernetic systems can be adversely "right." It is the intent of this article to see if we affected by the loss of senior commanders. are making it easier for the enemy to inflict these


losses, and if so, to find ways to enhance protection for these individuals.

German General Officer Casualties Gennan general officer casualties in World

War II were staggering and adversely affected unit proficicncies. Due to these losses, divisions were often commanded by colonels; regiments, by majors; and battalions, by captains. This article will focus only on those general officers who were in command of divisions or higher fonnations and who were killed in action or died of wounds. These positions correspond directly to current US Anny force structure command positions, with lessons concerning these men still relevant today. Some 136 of these officers fall into this category.} The extent of damage to the Gennan command and control system (cybernetic domain) by general officer losses is reflected in the figure below.4

General Officer Commander Casualties Grade Number Killed

Colonel General 1 General of Infantry, etc. 19 Lieutenant General 55 Major General 61 Total 136

Position Number Killed Army Commanders 3 Corps Commanders 23 Division Commanders 110 Total 136

Peak unit proficiency simply could not be maintained with these losses. Over the course of the war, this drain on leadership averaged a corps commander killed every three months and a division commander killed in action every three weeks! Although World War II was very lethal, could this problem have been minimized? An examination of Gennan doctrine, general officer training, battlefield experience and command rotation suggests it could have been.

Gennan Doctrine. The Gennan anny's views on war, which would be executed in World War II, were outlined in 1936, in the Truppen[Uhrung (Command of Troops). The following guidelines reflected the importance of fronrline senior-Ievelleadership:s ! "Personal influence by the commanding officer on his troops is of the greatest importance. He must be located near the fighting troops."

"A divisional commander's place is with his troops ... During encounters with the enemy seeing for oneself is best."

"Commanders are to live with the troops and share with them danger, deprivation, happiness, and suffering. Only thus can they gain a real insight into their troops' combat power and requirements,"

Gennan officers of all grades took this doctrine to heart, achieved spectacular tactical successes and paid a high price in blood. There was nothing surprising in this, as their attitude toward combat had already been strongly shaped during World War 1.

Frontline Service. The World War I service of many Gennan junior officers who later became generals in World War II was characterized by a high degree of frontline service and bravery. The early experience of these officers helped them fonn their basic professional ethic concerning leadership, personal danger and responsibility to their men, and would be reflected in their wartime actions some 20 years later. By examining this early wartime service, we can better understand the frame of mind of these officers with respect to leadership and their concept of battlefield lethality, a concept


that would be greatly outdated in the next war. One measure offrontline service and bravery

is awards. An examination of awards and decorations received by the World War II Ger.man generals killed in action serves as a guide to the level of service and bravery they displayed in combat.

During World War I, the basic decorations for frontline bravery were the Iron Cross 1st Class and 2d Class. The Iron Cross 2d Class recognized a single act of bravery in combat beyond the nor.mal requirements of duty, while the Iron Cross 1st Class was usually awarded for an additional three to five significant acts of bravery.61() measure wounds received in com~

bat, Kaiser Wilhelm II instituted the Wound Badge on 3 March 1918. Different grades were awarded based on the number of incidents in which wounds were received. The wound badge in black designated one or two wounds; the badge in white, three to four wounds; and the badge in yellow-gold, five or more wounds.?

World War I awards are known for 97 of the Genman generals later killed in action in World War II. Overall, 95 percent were awarded one of the grades of the Iron Cross; 88 percent received the 1st Class. Wounded in action at least once were 5+ percent; 12 percent were wounded on three or four combat engagements and I percent were wounded at least five times. Repeated demonstrations of bravery in action were expected ofGer.man junior officers during the war, and this professional ethic is amply represented by the exploits of these individuals. Overall it is evident that these junior Ger.man officers, who, as general officers, were later killed in action during World War II, developed their concept of battlefield leadership and danger the hard way-they earned it.s

A large number of Ger.man general officers killed in World War II had exceptional frontline service in World War 1. Did these men continue to show frontline service and bravery as senior officers in World War II?

On 1 September 1939, Adolf Hitler instituted the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross for


continuous acts of exceptiorml bravery, or in the case of highcr~ranking officers, for successful execution of battle or f()r formulating olltstand~

ing battle plansY During the French Campaign, Hitler instituted the next higher grade of Knight's Cross, the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oakleaves, This award recognized previous winners of the Knighes Cross for con~

tinued significant bravery and initiative. JO One year later, l--litlcr again introduced another higher grade of award, the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oakleaves and Swords, which recognized previous recipients of the Oakleaves who accomplished additional fears of military achievement, Although all German military personnel we[e eligible to receive this mvard l

only 159 officers actually did," On 15 july 1941, Hitler introduced an additional upgrade, the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oakleaves, Swords and IJiatnonds,! 7. Again it re~

warded furrher achievement. By the end of the War, only 27 had been awarded, II

Division, corps and army comrnanders, who were later killed in action, figured prominently as recipienrs of all of these awards, Forry-two percent received the Knighr's Cross as their highest decoration; 21 percent, the Oakleaves; 4 percent, the Swords; and Lpercent, the Diamonds14 It is apparent from these results that the general officer commanders continued to display high degrees of bravery and independent action during World War II, These were not characteristics the German High Command would have wanted changed in their combat

leaders-bravery and independent action went hand in hand with their concept of Aufrragstakuk. Yet, while doctrine and personal bravery caused leaders to command from the front, the German system of command rotation and gen~

eral officer training courses put theIn at a severe disadvantage when they got there.

Rotation of General Offieers and Command Duration, The history of the German general officer replacement system in World War Il is an interesting saga, one in which the system attempted unsuccessfully to meet increasing officer needs with decreasing personnel assets, Initially efficient, it deteriorated during the war, in part due to heavy officer casualties.

During preparation for mobilization in the late 1930s, the central branch of the atmy General Staff filled general officer vacancies ro brigade level and General Staff positions, When war began, general officers were directly assigned by a different organization - the Anny Personnel Office, After 1942, the procedure changed again. General officer unit commanders were assigned by the Personnel Office in accordance with instructions from the commander in chief of the army, but with input from the chief of the anny General Staff. ls Senior General Staff officers, on the other hand, scheduled for assignment as chiefs of staff for army groups, armies and corps, were selected directly by the chief of the amlY General Staff, Many of these officers were also in demand for unit command,16 This was quite a convoluted process even without serious personnel losses,

Further compounding the problem was the increasing number of units requiring general officer commanders. The strength of the German army in December 1940 stood at L40 divisions. This total increased to 208 at the starr of the Russian Campaign, to 226 in July 1942 and to 243 by july 1943. By the beginning of June 1944, the division total had reached 257.'7 The number of corps also increased during the war, peaking at 77 in january 1945.18

Many general officers transferred from more


protected rear area staff assignments directly to the front, with fatal results. Henning von Thadden, for example, remained in Germany from 1943 to 1945 as the chief of staff for the 1st Military District Corps. He then went to the Eastern Front to command the 1st Infantry Division and was killed within two months.l9

Otto Beutler, commander of the 340th Infantry Division, served with the General Staff in the Otganization for Total War office in Berlin for 15 months before assuming command. He was killed in action just 35 days later. IO Werner Duerking served as the commander of the War School at Dresden for about two years before going to the Eastern Front as commander of the 96th Infantry Divisibn. He died of wounds received in combat after only 10 days in command/I

It is evident that some type of maturation occurred as an officer stayed in command. Forty-five percent of those commanders killed served for less than five months, while 66 percent fell before their 10th month in command. If an individual could survive the initial dangerous months, he became more likely to safely complete his command. The distribution of command duration prior to being killed in action supports the danger to newer, less experienced general officer commanders in combat. This, in tum, is partly the result of increased battlefield lethality. •

Battlefield Lethality. Battlefield lethali ty increased from World War I to World War II, multiplying the ways a commander could be killed in action. It included enemy artillery, minefields, antitank fire, small arms fire, grenades, air attacks, tank fire, snipers and partisans. Many of these calL,es, such as air attacks and tank fire, were relatively infrequent occurrences in Wotld War I. Others, such as artillery fire with better acquisition and fuzing, were quantum improvements over previous systems. The turbulent situation during the last years of World War II limits om knowledge of the exact cause of death to only 41 percent of general officer fatalities. Assuming the following figure


reflects a relative consistency in cause of death, the enel11Y attack means were quite varied as indicated in the figure below.

In World War I, personal danger for officers had been the great artillery barrages and heavy machinegun fire. Although these two weapons systems again accounted for many general offi~

cer deaths in World War II, a wide variety of orher systems played an equally deadly role. The total number of causes of death, however, tells only part of the story.

In reviewing individual accounts of general officer fatalities. several conclusions can be drawn. First, most of the deaths occurred from quick, unexpected attacks. Air bombardments, artillery barrages, hidden minefields, snipers and partisan attacks were quite different than the deadly, but more methodical, operations these men had experienced in World War I. Second, a great many deaths occurred in ve-

Causes of Death for General Officer Commanders

Percentage of Cause of Death Number Known Deaths

Artillery 8 14 Minefield 5 9 Antitank fire 5 9 Small arms fire 7 13 Grenade 3 5 Airaltack 18 32 Tank fire 2 4 Partisans 5 9 Sniper 3 5

hicles moving through the battle area. Such movement attracted air attacks and set up potential ambush situations. Although the commanders had to move by vehicle to control the battlefield better, it appears most did so without an adequate escort capable ofdiscouraging some of the attacks. Much of this movement was done in hours ofvery good visibility, which facilitated enemy air attacks. Some of their disdain for enemy capabilities may have resulted from Luftwaffe reports of friendly air superiority or the belief that a staff car was too small a target to be effectively engaged. Finally, throughout the war, German generals retained distinctive, but dangerous, markings of their grade. They continued to wear distinctive uniforms and flew vehicular pennants advertising their position. Both provided target information for snipers, ambushes and partisans.

Given this high level of battlefield lethality, it would seem that general officer training would have been tailored to reflect these dangers. Unfottunately, it did not. Despite the establishment, in January 1943, of a four- to sixweek pre-command course for division and corps commanders, no protective measures were in~

eluded in the lessons.22 We have seen the magnitude ofGerman gen

eral officer commander casualties on all fronts during World War II. Doctrine, from World War I to World War II, emphasized frontline leadership. Personal bravery, reflected in their World War I service, was carried into the next war by all the generals later killed in action. However, their concept of personal battlefield lethality, shaped as it was in World War I, was outdated by the increased lethality of World War II.

Rotation of general officers within the German army was a case of too few senior grades for too many positions in the expanded army. To meet the requirements, competent staffofficers were often sent to the front with inadequate preparation, where many died within a few months of assuming command. The increased battlefield lethality multiplied the ways in which


senior leaders could be killed and included air attacks, artillery, partisans, minefields and snipers. Many of rhe faral engagements occurred while moving in command vehicles as rhe commanders rraversed the battlefield. Finally, training was inadequate to prepare rhese men for all the threats they would encounter.

The doctrine of forward senior leadership and the quality of general officers carried the Gennans to a high level of tactical and operational success. Current US Anny Airl.and Battle concepts also depend on these two foundations for future battlefield success. But are the same factors that contributed to the staggering losses ofGennan senior commanders present in our own preparation for, and conduct of~ war? If so, we must ask if the factors will cause high losses in US Anny general officer leadership.

Future US Army General Officer Losses/AirLand Battle Doctrine

Current us Army doctrine stresses frontline leadership by senior-level leaders. US Anny Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, succinctly state. the importance of this concept to future battlefield success:

"The most essential element of combat power is competent and confident leadership. Leadership provides' purpose, direction, and motivation in combat."

"The personal influence of large joint and combined force, field anny, corps, and division commanders will have a major bearing on the outcomes ofbatrles and campaigns."23

PM 22-103, LeadershipandO:nnmandat Senior Levels, also states the importance of this combat element:

" ... failure to balance it [Management] with sound application of leadership and exercise of command can have lasting consequences, such as ... not personally getting out and seeing the battle when it is approptiate."Z4

It also states that it is essential that leaders share the dangers and hardships of their units because they demonstrate their professionalism by everything they say and do.


The dClctrine is cleric US general officers will be coiled on to provide frontline direction, Most have already been 'lttuned to such (-lirec~

tion by cOlnbat as junior officers in Vietnam, Vietnatn Service. 'Most: of the current gen~

eration of US Army general officers served in Vietnam, and this will continue to be a f~lctor

tor some years to come. Much as with young Gennan officers some 70 years before, this combat service has undouhtedly shaped many ofour own generals' professional ethics, concept of personal danget on the battlefield and responsibility to their soldiers, It is safe to say that Vietnam was the battlefield where today's generals conceived their wartime leadership traits and habits,

T() measure this degree of frontline service, the awards and decorations received by 495 US general officers as reported in 1986 were re~

viewed, The primary awards won by these men indude the Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service Cross, the Silver Star and the Purple HearL Possession of any of these awards cer~

tainly indicates frontline service, and the distribution of bravery awards to officers who later became generals supports this,25

The results indicate that many current US Anny generals demonstrated bravery in com~ bat duting Vietnam, Over 3 percent of these officers were awarded the Medal of Honor or the Distinguished Service Cross for their gallantry, while an additional 18 percent received

the Silver Star, The majotity of the other officers were awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross, Bronze Star Medal or Soldier's Medal during this conflict, Further, almost 20 percent were wounded in action, Although statistics for cause of wounds were not available, the type of engagements typical in Vietnam would indicate that many of these individuals were probably wounded by small arms, mortar and rocket attacks, booby traps and helicopter crashes after receiving enemy fire. Their most vivid memo~

ries of battlefield lethality are probably of these types of weapuns,

General Officer Training. General officer commanders' courses and the National Training Center (NTC), Fort [rwin, California, do not stress the battlefield hazards to general officers, The US Army Command and General Staff OJlIege '5 School for Professional Development presents a detailed program of instruction at the Division Commander!Assistant Division Commander Pre-Command Course. The course includes historical perspectives on warfighting and segments on operational art, tacties, joint operations, dynamies of combat p0w

er, synchronization of deep, close and rear opetations, and doctrinal tenets. Battlefield survival is not included,26

The NTC also does not present a realistic picture of battlefield lethality to general officers, The level of training focus at the NTC is the btigade and battalion task force, Division and corps commanders have no active role in the conduct of operations on the "battlefield: During a 1988 discussion of the role of general officers visiting units at the NTC, the US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) leade~'s orientation command briefer stated in response to a question on general officer training: "They [general officersJ get to roam where they want on the battlefield:'2? This "roaming" is without MILES (multiple integrated LASER engagement system) equipment used to simulate battlefield engagements and assess casualties, or any other system that might convince generals of their own vulnerability, Should general of-


ficers eventually "MILES up," many of the systems lethal to them are currently not sufficiently sophisticated to accurately represent the threat. Artillery fires often are not responsive. Minefield "kills" must now be observed by controllers to be effective. FASCAM (family of scarterable mines) obstacles are marked by yellow smoke, giving an unreal picture as to their dimensions. Such a training environment sets the general up as a safe, neutral observer, rather than the lucrative target he would be in actual combat.

Command Duration. Rotation of general office,,; indicates that at the outbreak of hostilities, many will be new in command. Although some division and corps commanders will remain in command, others may be required to fill higher positions if the Army expands. Other less experienced officers will be promoted to fill the vacancies; especially at division level. Just as with the German commanders in World War II, the initial period of combat will be most dangerous for these new commanders. An even greater burden will be placed on Reserve Component general officer commanders who will have to transition from civilian occupations to wartime frontline assignments with perhaps only a few weeks to complete final preparations for war.

Battlefield Lethality. Battlefield lethality has increased from previous conflicts, multiplying the ways a general officer commander can be killed in action. Current US Army doctrine, as expressed in FM 100- 5, characterizes the future high- and mid-intensity battlefield as highly destructive. Although this manual does not emphasize the destructiveness with respect to senior leaders, others do. FM 100-2, The Soviet Army, does amplify the dangers inherent to senior leaders as seen in Soviet tactics and equipment.

Soviet artillery poses a great threat to commanders at all levels. Soviet fire planners often target nuclear-eapable US artillery and missiles and their control systems, and command posts and communications nodes. Both areas are fre-


qlWIH lO;;:;'lthms I~'r !'>Cni,)f (ltfinTs,2K()ncC' a tar~

i~('t i:;, loc!tcd, Soviet fire pLinners implement' required norms !(lr sur'preSSlon or destruction. A dug"1n ('tWIny COHlIn,lIhl!''I\lSl \\'nuld thus rate 150 {"(HJnd:; of 1S21nm Ihrwit;:cr firc Of 60 rounds {~f 201mm h(lwitzer fire. 1\ US command post in tht:' (lfx'n or ;1 comnulhl vehicle, pos-,;ibly wah ;\ division «(lt1\lnandcr on hoard, \\i(Hlld draw tither 4{) rounds (If 152mnl or i 5 rounds of 10:3mm "'"~~I VNy l(;rhal torn:nt of sted. 29

Sovitt air l..h.'fCIlst weap·ons are both prolific and dl,'ctive at all c'chdons. Although US «(lmm;,odcfS frequentlv ('mployed c()fnlnand and control hdicoptcrs in Vit'rnam t~Jr in~

crcased flexibility, such techniques \\'ould probal1Jy result in rn,lny 10M aircraft and COlnm;:U'\

'.Ins if used against &,ViCf f(lnx:s. As arnply deIlHJllStrat(,'d at the N1C, the ft.'.

Cflnrlaissancc battalion of the motorized rifle and lank division is a t'(wmidahk· ('mit'y. Within this unit, thl~rt~ art radio dirl:ction £inck'rs and radio int<~rcept: recdvcrs, 0\0 Both types of equip~

nwnt will cnabk' the Sovi(~t$ to kKate senior uHlHHandt.:I'i', At the Soviet frotH level, an en~

tirt' radio/radar intcr{:cpt n:gitncnt is dew)f(~d ((1

this clectn:mk warf;lfc task Jl &)vict aviation nsscts also p<)SC a lethal prob~

lern ft)f gene'ral offict:r comnHuH.lers. According to the S\.Y\dets, aviation assets SUppt)rting fronts, Honlt;?; Hnd divisions (~In execute independent operations very similar to those on the Eastcm From some 45 YC~lhl ago. The illnjority of aircraft may ,mack NAT() nuc:!eat weapon sys

tt."inS, command and control centers and air~

fields. \1 Although in training exercises the &wicts have shown sonw reservations arnmt ct11pk'l\'ing "frec hunting" rear area interdiction flights until air superiority is achieved. we cannot discount tlw p()s,sibility of this technique 1

:;

being used in selected areas, \\'ith hJw-tcvd or dive ddiwry attacks by high-pcrtonnancc airctaft, or an ATGM (antitank guided missile) rocket attack by a rotary wing aircrnft,n

Additionally, cOflskkrable S<wiet aviation interest has been directed t() aviation "strike f,lfOUpS," organiuHions capable of conducting independent operations against key (~nemy targets at stmtcgic and operational depth. These strike groups could consist of upwards of two to three air divisions (216 to 324 aircraft!) in strength. This concept would seem to be din'((ed at NATO corps- and army-level targets and would include command and control as; scts. H

Finally, thert arc mor(' Soviet organizations directed at command and control systems such as airbon1t4helilxmle forces and unconventional warf~lre assets. Tactical airlx)mc and helibome f(lfC('S often have, as their objectives, nuclear weapons and command instaUation". Soviet unn)[lventional warillfc missions include disnlption of enemy command and c.onnol and assassination of key political-military leadership.1I

This article indicates that the f'letors of doctrine, training 1 personal experience and in~

(",ased battlefield lethality contributed to heavy lo&,",s of Gennan general officer commanders in World War 1I. The ('Vidence further indicatt'S many of these same factors are prescnt again as the US Anny prepares to fight AirLand Banle. Unforrunately, the result may well be very heavy lo,;.,",s for our own seniot leadership in the next conflict. What conditions could be ehangcxl to reduce these potential general officer losses?

The Gennan Blitzkrieg offensive doctrine required competent senior leaders to be sue.. c('SSfuL Success demanded that they be well


versed ()n the current tacti(al battlefield situa· tion.if they were to make quick, accurate dcci~ sions cmeial to the doctrine. To gain this cur~

rent tactical insight. the cfHnmandci::' led from the front. AirLand Battle also requires frontline leadership to prof1Crly synchronize battlefield as,'i{~ts and maintain initiative. Neither ckxtrine can be slIcct:':&'\ful unless senior leaders arc "up frone" tk"'Spitc the pCI..';sibility of even severt' senior officer losses, senior leadership doctrine should not bc chang<,,!.

Most of the (icnuan generals in World \X/ar II had served 20 years earlier as junior officers in World \Var L Their views of battlefIeld lethality and pcrs<malleadership were shapt~d in this car~

lier war. In much the same way, current senior US Army generals s(~rvcd in Vietnam as junior ofliccrs, Their vic\\'s of \var \\lef(;~ f<mned in a conflict of nebulous frontlint'S, friendly air superiority and overwhelming friendly ratios of firepower. This view of war may be an as.'~ct in future low-intensity conflicts, but a liability in mid.. to high~intcnsity wars.

The German army was forced to meet in~

creasing gcneral officer requirements with decreasing assers as the artny expanded and senior leader lossc'S began to mount. This resulted in many genemls quickly transferring from relatively safe rear areas to dangerous frontline assignments and, in tum, caus.xl a high lc'Vel of new command(~r deaths bef()fc being "acclimatized" ro the <:urrent tempo of battle. Parr of rhe problem was undoubtedly caused by a fragmented personnel assignrncnt system that jcal~ olesly compet,,,l for assets. The US Amly should be in somt"what better condition as general officer assignments arc more centralized; but as the AmlY' expands during wartime, wit.h Re.serve Comp:ment generals assuming active a,'iSignnlCot'i, we may fact~ a similar situarion.

It is probably a fundamental tnlth that the nt.",t WJr will most often be m,)re lethal than the preceding one. Gemmn general 10&1t..." in World War II seem to beat out this tmth. Future mid- to high-intensity wal'S will be won by senior leaders in the front lines, even though

MILITARY REVIEW· April 1990

this will expose them to an even gteater degree of lethality. Protection may not be able to keep pace with enemy destructive capabilities.

The Gennan army had a very comprehensive officer tmining progmm, but did not indude necessary aspects of general officer survival on the battlefield. This point, combined with preconceived World War I experiences, contributed to many fatalities. Although division and corps commander training courses were in existence, many commanders did not attend, and those that did were not taught

appropriare lessons on geneml officer vulnerability. It is in this area that the US Army can make the most improvements. Neither the Division Commander's Course nor the NTC currently emphasize commander survivability. Both, however, could be modified at little cost. Compared with the moral and cybernetic U costs" at the loss of each senior commander, this may be "money" well spent up front. We can be assured that at least 136 dead German general officer commanders would have agreed with such changes. ~

NOTES 1. AntOine Henri ,Jomini, The Art of War (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,

1970),170. 2. Melvin E. Richmond, C<Jmmunist Insurgencies and the Relevance ofihe

CoruxJpts of Genler of Gravity and Decisive Points (Fort Leaven'NOrth, KS' SChool of Advanced Military Studies monograph, US Army Command and Geooral Staff Collegi.\ lUSACGSC]. 1988), 6

3, Josef Foltlmann and Harms Moeller·Wittan, Opfergang der Genernie (Berlin', Bernard & Graefe, 1959),85. Foltlmann served as lhe division CQf11

mander for lhe- 164th Ligh! OivislOll,the 338th Infantry Division and Forness Division Crate. He finished the war on the army High Command staff in Bertin.

4, Wolf Kellig, Die (}(lnamle des Heeros (Friedberg, FAG: Podzufl<Palias Verlag, 1983). This work COfltaiflS biographical sketches for all general officers in the German a rmy. A review ollhis work indicates that 135 werE! killed in action or diW of wounds. This source was also use<! to determine most of the com· maod duratlons.

5, 1hJppenfuhrung{Berlin: E.S. MilIlor& Sohn, 19361, 2-4, 33~34.

6. John R. Angolia, On the FkkJ or Honot; A History of the Knight's Cross 8cIJrors. vol. 1 and 2, (San Jose, CA: R. James Bender, 1980), vol. 1, 14-22,

7. John R Ango!ia, For Fliehrer and Fatherland: Military ANaJds of the Third Reich, vol. 1and 2,(8anJQse,CA:R.James6ender, 1976), vol. 1, 256, 337aOO 343,

B. RangllstB das deulschen R'Jlchshoors, (rlBCh dem Stande 1 May 1929), (Borlin: Minier & Sohn, 1929). This book is a rank listing lor all officers in the Rck;.hsWfJhr. !rlcluded in ii is a listing of all World War I awards for each inclividuaJ. Those officers who were no! Of! the Relchswehr rolls, that is, those who enlored sorvice at a later date or who transferred from the German police or Austrian army in tho mfd.1930s, are ootlisted. This accounts fortha difference in tlw total figuM with tll6136 who were killed,

9. Angolia, ForFufJllror, vol. 1,356··57. 10, AngoIia, On the Field, VOl. 2, 108 and 125. 11, Angolia, ForFuchrer, vol. 1, 366··67. 12. Angolia, On too FifJId, vol. 1, 52. 13, Angolia, For Fuehror, vol. 1, 336. 14. Walter·Poor Fellgiebel, Die Trooger des Ritterlirouzes des Eisemen

Krouzes, 1939~ 1945 (Friedberg. FAG: Podzun.PaJIas verlag, 1986), multiple pag9S - each name was cross,rofemnced to detennine whether the individual won any of the- grades of this award.

15. Helmut Kleikamp, "German Army High Command, The Army Personnel OftiCe,~ US Army Historical DivIsion Study MS# P.{)41hh {Washington, DC: Office 01 the Chlef of Military History, 1952), Band 10, Kloikamp served in lhe army personnel office before assuming comma-ncl ollhe 36th Infantry DiviSion.

16.Fraru: Halder, "Control of tho German Army General Staff, M US Army HistOfical Division Study MSH P.{)41d (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of MI1i1ary History, 1952),6. Haldar served as chief altha German army Generat

StaHlrOOl 1938 to \942. 17, Burkhart Mueller·Hillebrand, Das Heor 1933-1945, Band /-lli (Frankfurt,

FAG: E. S. Mittler & SoM, 1969) vol. 2,110-11; vol. 3, 122 and 155. MuellerHillebrand served as the chief of staff forthe XXXXVI Panzer Cofps and the 3d PanzarArmr

18. GOOfg Tesslll, Yert>aende unci Truppen der cteutschen Wohrmacht und ~ im ZlNeiten 'We1rMeg 1939-1945, Band I-XTV (Osnabrueck, FAG: Biblio 'Jerlag, 1979), Band I, 17-19.

19. MueI!er·Hillebrand, Des Hoor, vol. 3, 211 :337, 20. Ibid., 211 :27. 2t, Ibid., 211:70. 22. Lener roceived by the author from Dr. Dermot Bradley, 7 OCtober 1988.

Or. Bradley, a noted Gennan army historian and author of the bOOk Taetigkeitsberichl des Chers des Heerespersonalamtes General dar /nfanterie Rudolf 5chroondt, slatoo lhat in many cases German generals look OYer dM-slons Of corps without havlng attended such courses, He a<klitionally inter· viewed Hellmuth Fleymann, forme:r commander of the 2121h Infantry and 11th Infantry divisions, who did attend tllis course frOm 3 January to 28 January 1945, but did not recall any instruction concerning general officer safety Of battlefield Iethali1y.

23. US Department of tile Army Field MarlJaI (FM) 100-5, 0petatI0ns (Washington, DC: US Governroont Printing Office [GPO], 1986~ 13--14.

24, US Department a1tlle Army FM 22-103, Lasdership andCommand at SenIorLewls(Washlngton, DC: GPO. 1987).44.

25, Department olthe Army Pamphlet 360 - 10, General OfficerBiographies (Washington, DC: 21 February 1986), mJltiple pages.

26, Program oflnstruclion lA--f4 (Fort leavenworth, KS: USACGSC School tor Professional Development, Division Commander/AssiStant Division Commander Pre-Command Course, 29 July 1988),

27 Discussion with Na1ional Training Center FORSCOM leaders orientation briefer, Fort Irwin, CA, 21 september 1988.

28. US Department of the Army FM 100-2-1, The Soviet Army, Opera. tkns and Tactics (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984), 9-7 and9-19.

29. Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet Front Fire SUpport, 006-1 t3O8-82 (WashingtOll, DC; 1982~ 83.

30, US Department of the Army FM 100-2-3, The Soviet Army, Troops, Organization, and Equipment(Washington, DC: GPO, 1984~ 4-67.

31.lbid,,4--130. 32, FM 100-2-1,12-1. 33.lbld., 12-6 and 12-7. 34, Ibid" 12~9 and 12-10. 35. US Department of lhe Army FM 100-2-2, 7he Soviet Army. Spa

cJaJizedvmtaro{Washlngton, DC: GPO, 1984~ 2-2,5-1 through 5-4.

Major Fn'flCh L MacLean ~ a G3 plans and exercises offU:er, 3d Annored Division, frankfUrt, We" Gennany. He receiwd a BS from the US Military Academy and ~ a gr","<ate ofthe Onnmand and General StaffOfficer Om", and the School ofAdmnced MilUary Studies. USACGSC. He has serwd in u:trious command and staffpositions in injillltry and cavalry uni~, includrng "'" previous assignments in US Anny, Europe.

April 1990 • MILITARY REViEW 56

General Matthew B. Ridgway, US Arm R . Brigadier General Walter R. Winton Jr '~S'Aetxred'Ran~ d

., 'lj. rmy, etlre

As we enter the 19908, we will begin to see the inevitable reviews and assessments ofthe events and people thatshapedour world dU1" ing the 20th century. Scholars, historiansand the media willall seek to put them into some sort ofperspective. When the focus turns to the military-which certainly itmust, for the great and small wars of this century made u1!paraHeled impact on the course of world events-the names of many imposing miIirnry leaders will take the forefront. Arne,.. iea:' military leaders will hold their own with the accomplishments of Pershing and Eisenhower, MacArthur and Patton, Mal" shall and Nimitz, to name only a few, dese,.. vedly being recognized in the world arena. lVhen wartime accomplishments and contributions to theirprofession are assessed, other names will undoubtedly emerge, especiaHy among those intimately knowledgable ofthe profession ofarms.

One name that quickly rises to the very top among the "great captains" of the 20th century is that ofGeneral Matthew B. Ridgway. A soldier's soldier, Ridgway at 95is a living legend who continues to impart his leadership philosophy ashehas done throughout 38 years ofactive service and more than 34 years of retirement. Many will point to his personal leadership at Nonnandy, where


he made his first combat jump as the commander of the 82d AJroorne Visision, or to his direction of the XHII Airborne Corps in the Ardennes Campaign as models for senio,..level command. But perbaps ofeven more lasting significance was the discipline and sense ofpurpose that he instilled in an anny in disarray in Korea in the winter of 1951. Ridgway:' leadership successfulJr demonstrated the difficult marriage required between the demands of high command and the duty to care for the well-beingofsoldiers.

This article ha.s been drawn from a seminarpresentedby GeneralRidgway to the students and faculty ofthe School ofAdvanced Military Studies, US Anny Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 9 May 1984. He was accompanied by Brigadier General Walter E Winton Jr., US Anny, Retired, who was General Ridgway:' aide-de-camp and the chiefof staff of the 24th Infantry Division in Korea. During the seminar, Gener.aIRidgway, then 89, stood for questions {or approximately 2 hours. The following text, edited by Dr. Harold R. Winton Professor of Milirnry Art and Science S~hool ofAdvanced Millrnry Studies, USACGSC, contains excetpts ofthe reconled transeriptand clearly illustrates the enduring value ofthe Ridgway leadership legacy.

51

When I gM [to Kor('a}, the V('0' tirst thing wa5 to visit every wmmander in hi. own tidd . . , The next

big thing was to rt'Store the spirit "fthat amly. It h.1d

been n't'}' bad/~' halldled, tacticall~; logistically and

really spiritually. It had bt-en mmmitted to action at

a tim(~ when the forces in Japan were about as

unpl't~pared for combat as an ann y could bt~.

Gcncrnl Ridgway. Fir:'t I \l,';mt to CXPH:$.'3 my pleasure at . b(:ing here. It is a trcHl.cndous ch~lllcngc and a vtry

sumulating experience to appear before gentlemen like vou . , . il~ an in~t:itution like this, with you free to ask any quc;tions you want. I tnlst there arc 1)0 inhil;itions on ~mything you want to ask.

Gent'raJ RidgwG)', 1111}riced from nne of yom biogra-/)hies you \vcre dlso a ttvu-ycar atrendce ar hll'[ LC(H)cnu'{}rth .. , H{:ase comment on IKlu' yCIl( jtd ,lUll secun.d )'('ar at Li'ilvcnwonn (lk1cd yOH in Im-,fessiotUll ,t,Tfmvlh .

I f()lInd th,lt sccOl){i~year course here, 1 \vas in the cla5-"; of 19J1·,-19:~5< was invaluable to me. The whole first yen \Vas on the d!vI5ion. The Inf,mtTY School had taken us through tlw separate hrigade; and then tht' first YC;lr \\'<\S on the \.livision; and the second Y('~lr was altogether the CClrps and the army. \\1(, had more time allowed us i()r independent resean:h in the librarics----\\.-'{mdcrful lihrary hcrl>-' and I GHl (mly say the experience I gained (rom tl1(~

cXfcl1cnt hKIJ!ry here was (lbsolutdy invaluable t() me. both as a corps and as an army c()mmandcr.

\X/hen yO!. gO! flO Koreal and a5swned ymr duties and assessed the situdtion. U!(lS it al)!J{lfcrH to you very <JHickl)' thar the trroblern tH15 a kadershilJ {nnblcm or a training {nublem? How did you go alxlUt (Jssess~

lng, in a slum mnmmt of time. what the IJrohlem uus arul how you l,(,'CTC

gf1ing to snit-x: tlte lmAJlem and nUlJ«.~ things right in this critical sitllati{m? I'd had the great advantage (){ havin.g been deputy chief of staft

in Washington and had fejlkl\\'ed the Korean operation 14 hours a day, I would ~ay, from the time of the outbreak (If that invasion on the 25th of June until! k,ft in [)t'cembcr. So I was thoroughly hmiliar, as hI' as one could be at that distance from the theater, with \vhal was going on there and I knew the commanders and so fe)lth.5<) I had an inestimable advHnt<Jgc there. I did not come into something cold. \Vha!: I did not kno\v was the fecling of the com; manders in the fidd, , . Of course when! got the"" the very first thing was to visit every commander -in his own field. rnlat, of toun.(:, was after a visit to tht prcsid('nt (President Syngman Rh(~cl of the country. with our Anlbassador {John j,1 Jv1uccio, who was a very courageous and competent ambassador. I never went to sec Mr. Rhec widl(H.lt OUI' ambassador being present. At our first visit, he wa, kind of standoffish with an irnpassiV<: f,\Ce, I didn't know what he was thinking, but in my greetings.! said what! reallyfdt.! said, ''I'm glad to be here, Mr. Pt<'Sidcnt, aml I intend to stay." With a big smile on his face, Iw teached out his hands and twk my hands in both of his,

But the next big thing was to restore tht spirit of that army. It had been very badly handled, t"':tkally, logistically and really spir· ltually, It had been romrnlttcd to action at a time when the forces


Aidg'ttiiY with MaJor General Charles O. Palmer, commander o-f too 1st Cavalry Division, 25 March 1951,

in Japan were alxmt as unprepared fC)f cornbat as an army could be. I guess you all knov.' the circumstances. They wefe living the l'life of Rilev"; there wefe garrison attitudes thnJugholit there. The enlisted men had peorie to shine theit shoes and they did not do any KP. Th,')' stripptd at least one firing battery out of each artillery battalion, stripped the tanks away frorn the infantry regiments and all sorts of things like thaL But rHost orall, it was an attitude of rnint!, I think ... So the very first thing to do was to vLlit your top commanders in the fidd, pt:rsonally, and make each commander brief his situation, on his own ground. Then you can get a W)od idea of what his st£1t(' of mind is. Is he confident, docs h" know what he is doing, docs he kno\\/ th(: terrain in his area! Tlwn you talk to as many en.listed men as you can. And that all (O(lk ~ome day,. But within 48 hours or so, I had visited every corp' and every division (()Jnmand(~rl t..:xcept one way over on the cast CClast .. , So that t(x,k the first few day,. I had come thert wirh rhe kka rhat it: was time to pass to the offensive as S{)(H1 as I could. But afrer these visits, what was perfectly, clearly apparent was that this army was in no C()ndition for a major offensive anion.

Sir, "long I,.,se same Unes, ]. E G F"lh." 'U'5 wrilten a r.x,k calU,d Generalship: Its Diseases andll'lcir CUfe mul ju:: .'itre5SC,~ Vt."1)' heavily ... lhe !JL'rsorUlI!JfeSCllCe 1m lhe Ixntlefiekl Iry .Ienior officers, rcaUy


Make each commander briefhis situation, on hL~

own l.'Mund. Then you can get agood idea ofwhathis state ofmind i~. Is he confident, dot."S h.., know what he is doing, dt)CS he know the termin in his area? Then you talk to as man y enIi~u't1 men a,~ you can.

59

Tht'Se divi~ion command.,rs did not know the t(,rrnin. 1rememht'r a,~king one man the nam..,; of ,'erv promint,nt peaks in his own

.~tor. He did not know th.,m. He didn't even know

m., nanlt' ofthe riv.,r that ran through his St'ct<lr. 1

a.~ked what about the ground over there. Is thllt

feasible for armor! Well, he did not know that either.

l-cadcnhij} aU tIt) and (In-UTI rhe c~"a,in cornnuind. Do you d&'recK'ith tiull {;tiTt:Lldar fl.5sessrncnr aHd did )'OH .find in Korea, at l.o::lSt ini~,.{tll),

clUll r}k~rf mlS somewhat. of fl reluctance, csf.1ccid1y at rhe senior leveLs, fr,r the cmnmanders to get out and be suffering tlv,' hardshi-tls with the rroot:!;: and (jettu-Jill' kading them 05 fiir as battk goes?

\X!dl to me, a basic dcnwnr in troop kadership is the responsi~

bi\it'r' of the commander to be where the criSIS of action 1S going to happen. He does not helong back at his corn.mand post, and I \vould SiW that goes right dm\'n the line, maybe not quite as far as the ({)]lIpan): cOll1nlandcG, platoon G)mniander of an infantry unit, and certainly yeJU don~t want to be the lerKi scout. From the battalion on up, I think the cornmander should be \vhere the crisis of acth:m b, where th(~ going \s the toughest. t'Ie \s not there to trespass on the sl1herc of his su11()fdin<lt'c,'" I-Ic is there to drink in, by his senses and all his cxp'cricnce, the actual situation, the human ckn\{"l\t ;'lttl..)Vlo: an (:lSt~. \\that b 111(' 'i',ti1tt.~ of feeling in that unit! . , . particulnrly of dw commander's concern and that goes all the way dmvn the line. I think an ebnent of that. that always come;; into it too, is a qucstio!lc!f the physical clement. I think that lthc KoreanJ war should have driven it home to our Anny people as perhaps no other did, bCC,IU5('~ within 48 hours, you could be pulled out ofyour tomftmable home here in the United States and 1)C in combat, I had k',ss than 24 hours' notice to lt~a\"e. to take over the command. So I want to come back to one other little point that you rn(~ntioned .. , I think that the division commander should luwc just about as fine a physique as his infantry battalion commanders; tllt~ CC'fl)S commander, ct~rtainly as good as the reg, hncntal commanders, because it is going to tah: a lot out of him. He has to lx, up tbere duting tbe daylight hours when things ate going at theit ""I'>t. and he has to get back to his CP at dark and do his paperwork and what('Vcr may dtmand his attention then. T1\05(; arc just basics in my mind, I know there are sornc; the other part of your question, th,tt find a rductanct~. Yes there certainly was, and most: of all it: showed in their lack of familiarity with the t(;w.\in in which (h...'Y were operating. These division commanders did not knm\' the terrain. I remember asking one man thcnarm.'S of wry prominent p',aks in his own sector. He did not know them. He didn' t t;~en know the name of the river that ran through hiS sector. I asked what abollt the gtOund ovet there. Is that £t"t,ible fot amwr? Well, he did not know that either,

Sir, w cotltim", with tlul! ' . , (me of the elements of a successfUl comnwt1ib, eSI~,cklUy '" the letd ofctm,y. is o/";(nlsly his conl"knee in the com/lew»ce of he, swff. You luwe *,k<.,., ,<bout the conditions of tlw. hlJ01J.'i in )'OUT subardinme units wht''H you arritJCd; «-'ould )'Ou comment, I,k",e, Oil l""r swff and yo"r fi:elings /C>r them. Did y,m llUd<e any

Aplil1990 • MILITARY REVIEW

changEs in )'OHr 5c.aff rather early or did you reulin those men as you mOl''i~d a}xllit to in:,pecr and visit your units?

I do not v.·'ant to denigrate ;.:tny officers by name that \-Vl'rc there. f did not kno\v the anny staff, with exception cl the chid of staff i went OV(.'f there alone. Incidentally, 1didn't even tak{~ an aide with me. I knew Lev Allen. I had known him very well; we had been to the Infantry Sch,()ol together, many years ago, Fie '''las about the only officer on the army staff that 1 had known bet'''c. Well 01>viow,ly, when ycm go in to take over a new command, particularly at a timt~ when tlw situation was such as it was then, the troops were mnf"sed ..~. they had been badly handled tactically, logistically, and the X Corps had bad handling up there. Th,,,, didn't know just what \Va;:; going on. So, 'You must be very careful there. about how a new broom sweeps clean. First pla{:(~, as I think I said bet,,,e, I knew personally the two US corps commanders. There were only two there at the time, X C{)rps was up in north~

cast Korea and was. still aHnat, \,av\og l'V,;\c.tmt('{\ up thl~re, l knl.'W all the division commanders, not well, but enough to pretty well size them up, So you HUJSt tread softly. I had three ruk'S that I followed in World War I1 in combat with rc'$P.,ct to relieving an officer in batrle ... Firsr I must kmM' him and what he h~,d done personally over a sutficient length of time by personal observ<ltkm lip in his own area. Second. wh<:n w()uld b(· the effect on his unit if he was rclievt~l! I havt, in mind one of the vety fine examples ... the men )",t loved this man, they thought highly of him, there wasn't anything wrong with him. except he W(15 just mediocre and you do not want mediocre leadership when the liv..", of ttX) many m'~ arc at stake. , .~nte third requisite was thac you had someone eLo;c on hanel who was better, to put in place right away, I am talking about World War II now and Korea, whN" I had to relit",e twO division cOffiInandcrs. You do it on the bi:lsis of your own per"

To me, a bask element in troop leadership is the responsibilir,.' ofthe commander to be where the cri~is ofactivn is going to h,~ppen_ He does not belong back at his command post ..• from the battalion on up, I think the commatlder should be [where] . •• the going i.~ the toughest. He is not there to trespass on the sphere ofbi~ subordinates. He is there to drink in, by hi~ senses and all his experience, the actual situation, the human element above aHelse.

MI~ITARY REVIEW· April,990 61

I had three rules that I foHowed in World War II in

combat with respect to relieving an officer in battle

.•• First I must know him and what he had done per

sonaHy over a sufficient length oftime by personal observation up in his own area. Second, what would be the effect on his unit if he was relieved! ••• The

third requisite was that you hadsomeone eL~e on hand

who was better, to put in place right away.

sonal knowledge, not secondhand reports, and that again comes back to the leadership thing. Ifyou have been up there with him in the crisis ofaction, you see how he operates and what his degree of confIdence is. Then it makes it easy to reach your decision, but by and large I took a long time as General Winton well knows. Some ofthese men were tired; some of the commanders were tired. They had been through the whole thing since June. One man had a very painful back, and I could sympathize with him because I had had that trouble myselffor years. So it was easy to letthem out and I got magnificent support from back home. I submitted a list ofgenerals I would be happy to have as corps and division commanders, and I was never turned down. But it was a lengthy process and I did not change the staff. Lev Allen was running the staff very, very well. A highly competent offker ... he had been General [Walton H.J Walker's chiefof staff from the beginning, and there was no reason for making a change there. And that's about that.

You said you fOlmd the conditions, after your personal experience, not suitable to conduct offensi,'e operations, which I am sure there was a great deal ofpolitical pressure to execute. How did you go about setting the situation right, in tenns of impro,,;ng the capability of your army? What priorities did you set far immediate action?

First thing was to restore the confidence of the troops in their leadership. That meant sizing up the leaders themselves, talking to them as I said. Then, in the presence of their staffs, at least their general staffs, I would express confidence in this particular individual-yes, I served with him before-you know, whether I felt that way or not. When you take over in an emergency like that you just can't sweep them out, your effect may be devastating. So that is the main thing to do, to build confidence, and then you allow it to grow.

Another thing that I wanted to do particularly was to get these two corps to cooperate. They were not doing it. The I and the IX corps were the only two I had on line; the X Corps was still at sea. They had not had sufficient cooperation between the two corps, intimate contact, patrols and everything. Those are the first things you get to, but most of all, the basic thing was to restore the confidence of the troops. The fighting spirit will come with it, and you cannot do that unless you have the confidence ofthe commanders and get them to working together. The lack of cooperation between the adjacent units was deplorable. When I would go up front to visit the battalions and so fotth, as soon as I got up there, I said, "Your infuntty predecessors would roll over in their graves the way you have been conducting operations here. You are road bound; you cannot get off the road. You say you don't have communications ... you have got runners, use them. Oet up in the


hills and take the high ground." They got mousetrapped there, time and time again, by advancing down these little narrow valleys, because they were road bound. They did not want to climb steep knife ridges.

Would you comment on some of the specialleadershil> challenges you faced as the commandL'T of a multination command, in terms of language and getting them to do what you wanted.

I visited every one of those combat contingent commanders, again as soon as I could. The first thing was to get to know the corps and division commanders, then get down to their subordinate commanders. The largest unit was a brigade. The Greeks had a brigade; the Turks had a brigade; British had a brigade; the rest were battalion strength. I would go to visit them and make an effort to establish personal relations with them, so I knew them. On New Year's Eve ... I sent each one of them a personal telegram, trying to rack my brains on the history of his particular country and something he and his men should be proud of, and I had no doubt that they were. I got a nice reception from all of that. Some of them responded, the British particularly, because I had served with them in Euro!JC' so I could draw on that experience. But I would inquire of them, how was the supply situation, was it satisfactory to them? Some of these contingents required very special things. The Turks wanted an enormous amount of barley bread as I remember it; the Dutch wanted something; and seme-

Go visit the hospitaland talk to the men there. Go to the commanding of6cerof the hospital andask how the nurses are treating these patients; are they instiDing in them the intense desire to get back to their unit! One replacement there, who has been woundedand comes back to his own unit, back with his own buddies-he's worth four or five ofthe men who have come 9,000 miles.

MILITARY FlEVIEW. April 1990 63

"Your infantry predecessors would roll over in

their graves the way you have been conducting oper

ations here. You are road bound; you cannotget of

the road. You say you don't have communications . .. you havegot runners, use

them_ Get up in the lWJs and /1lke the high ground!'

They got mousetrapped there, time and time again,by advancing down these

little narrow valleys,because they were road

bound. They did not want to climb steep knife ridges.

body else wanted something different, too. But we were trying to supply them. I think our logistics support from Japan out was magnificent. They did supply all these special items for these troops, but those are the little things.

All of this business of restoring the fighting spirit ... it is a multitude of little details, gentlemen. The synergistic effect over a long time is what works the miracles to them. If you stop and ask these men, stop and talk to senior noncommissioned officers and find out, little by little, you find out what is on their minds. Take immediate steps 'to remedy a problem, if it should be remedied. Little things like ... I asked one man what was his particular gripe. He wanted to write home, but he never got any stationary to write on. So I had somebody send up a supply of stationary that night to that particular unit marked for this particular soldier. That word gets around. When I got there, I came with very few hours' notice from Washington. I had my combat clothes on, but I did not have any gloves. I had civilian gloves and I did not have anything but a cotton cap. I nearly froze there the first few days, until some major saw me one day holding my ears, and he went in and got me one of these pile-lined caps with the flaps and got me a pair of GI gloves. After that I took an extra pair of gloves along. I did that in Europe a lot too. Any soldier up there sure would like to have a pair of gloves, you know, when the temperature is down below or around zero and his hands are cold and raw . . . a thousand and one little things like that. Go visit the hospital and talk to the men there. Go to the commanding officer of the hospital and ask how the nurses are treating these patients; are they insrilling in them the intense desire to get back to their unit? One replacement there, who has been wounded and comes back to his own unit, back with his own buddies-he's worth four or five of the men who have come 9,000 miles with the strains of the trip. Ger the nurses to pep these men up; they can do it better than anybody else. I cannot go over all the little details, there's just a lot of little tiny details, but the sum of them is what counts.

Then I never would penuit my senior officers to ride around in an automobile, I mean a sedan of any kind. He must be in an open jeep, top down. For safety, as well as anything else, so he can get out in a hurry, ifhe would have to. That does the GI good to see his commander up there, as cold as helL At the end of the day, my hands would be so cold I could hardly hold a rea cup. I mention a tea cup because the last drink I had was with my wife, the night I left Washington. I did not have another drink until she joined me in Tokyo, 11 months later. Anotherthing-I am just mentioning these things as they come to mind - when I got up there the command post of the Eighth Anuy was 180 miles behind the bartle front, in a nice big comfortable building. Now that is nor the place.


How do the people back in the rear areas relate with the fellows up front being' shot at, coming up these frozen steps and standing there all night in the dark with cold rations only? They want to see the commander taking it along with them, too ... It took me weeks before I could get the electrical communications in, so I could move the CP where it belonged. Up in my own office, it was two 8.by.I2 tents, end to end, midway between two US corps and about a third of the way across the peninsula, I was right up close where I could be in touch by jeep or light plane at any time. I got them out of that building back in Taegu where they were very comfortable.

It was your carps that was the strategic reser~'e for SHA.PE [SU/J'reme Headquarters Allied Powers EuropeJ[when the German offensive began in December 1944J ... Yours was the carps that was really largely hurled into the path of the German offensive. The 101st was detached from your command, sent to Bastogne, and you, with the 82d, were sent north to head offUoachimJ Peiper's breakthrough. What was your feeling at the time? Did you view that battle as an oppartullity; did you believe it was a crisis; were you optimistic; were you pessimistic; what were your thoughts during those first four days of the battle?

My mind is as clear as a bell, and it always has been on that thing ... I stopped in on my own command post there, at Rheims I guess it was, and I remember the first message I dictated to Doc Eaton [corps chiefofstafl]. I said, "You get out to this corps that we


Wltbin 48 hours, you could be pulled outofyour comfortable home here in the United Smtes and be in combat. I hadless than 24 hours' notice to leave, to take over the command • •• I had my combat clothes on, but I did not have any gloves. I had civilian gloves and I did not have anything but a cotton cap. 1nearly froze there the first few days, until some major saw me one day holding my ears, and he went in andgot me one ofthese pile-lined caps with the Raps andgot me a pair ofGI gloves.

65

[When the Gennan offensive began in De

cember 19441 the first message I dictated to Doc Eaton

[corps chiefofstaff] said "You get out to this corps that we are going to stop

this German penetration as soon as we can and then we

are going to attack. Attack right away, get that across to these people. They may be

moving bac know under pressure, but we will stop

them as soon as we can, and we willgo on the offensive.

are going to stop this German penetration as soon as we can and then we are going to attack. Attack right away, get that across to these people. They may be moving back now under pressure, but we will stop them as soon as we can, and we will go on the offensive." So then I went up to contact them-I had been urged by [Courtney Hicks] Hodges, the army commander at the time, to get those two divisions, the IOIst and 82d, out. The 82d had already cleared its area. I stopped by the IOlst and it was just about cleared ... got them both moving up to the front. Then I went on up to Troy Middleton's VIII Corps and spent that night with him. Got up in the morning, and it was pitch dark. These are little things that impinge upon your mind. I went outside to the latrine and I heard a couple of GIs there saying, "What are we going to do? We are surrounded." Well to the airborne, that did not mean anything. We had been surrounded many times. Somebody said, "The poor bastards they've got us surrounded." I had a choice but everything was kind of confusing in there. VIII Corps had to be pushed back because one division had been broken up there, I guess it was the 28th. I had a choice of two roads. This is just pure luck. You do not go real far in this world without luck, certainly not in combat. I decided to take one of the two roads, and the other road, I found, had alteady been taken over by the Germans. So I guessed right on that. I got up there at a little crossroads, at Werbemont, and there was an important, essential terrain feature that the Germans were trying to get. The situation was completely fluid. I don't think we ever had, any of us, any qualms about the thing. In this fannhouse, I think it was Christmas night, I saw an orderly coming down the stairs of this farmhouse with a bedroll on his ann, on his shoulder. I said, "Whose bedroll is that?" and he told me. I said, "Where are you taking it?" He said, "We're getting out," and I said, 'The hell we are!" I said, "That's not what we are here for ... we get all the bazookas we can, if the tanks are coming down the road in the dark, we'll get them as they come down the road." I think that was the spirit of everybody not just mine; we were completely confident. I can say here, with complete sincerity, that was the spirit of the airborne.

Sir, several commanders in the past have had their own means of gaining a special kmd ofmteUigence, a special feeling far the battlefield. You spoke to us aruI remiruIed us of the necessity of the commander IJersonally seeing the battlefield aruI getting his Owll feel for the troops' morale, aruI so forth. [George S.] Patton used the cavalry regiment; [Dwight D.] Eisenhower at times used [Ornar N.] Bradley to check OIl

situatiOllS in various units; other commanders have used their aides-decamp at some time to gain special information that they needed aruI wanted. Did you have a system set up with General Wmton or with


other personnel to help you gain that kind of special intelligence at the plac~ where you could not be? ... to get other bits and pieces ofinformation that would help you put together the big picture?

I'll let General Winton answer the part that pertains to him, himself. I would say no, the answer is no. You ate dealing with combat intelligence. [Walter] Bedell Smith was head of the CIA at the time - ftiends fot many years - we were classmates here at this institution. Bedell came ovet thete and I said, "Bedell, this is deplomble. The whole intelligence effort of our govemment can only provide me with one goose egg out in front and 174,000 Chinese. That's all I can get. My own limited intelligence capabilities are very meager up there." You could send agents in there, but the North Koreans would pick them up right away, and you wouldn't get much back. I don't remember that you got anything, did you?

General Winton. General Ridgway's activities, both in intelligence and in checking on troop morale, involved a very high degree of participation on his part. He did not use me or any other staff officer to my knowledge to find out things that would reflect on the protessional competence of any of his commanders. He determined that for himself. He did use us frequently to get factual information as to weather, terrain, rations, troop morale, this sort of thing, which we were glad to do. But he chiefly relied on his own two eyes.

Ridgway. I want General Winton to comment here. You know I have done a hell ofa lot oftalking here about Korea. He was there with me on the thing ... throughout the war, too.

Winton~ Well, serving with General Ridgway was quite a privilege, because it gave to my personal view one of the most virtuoso, as a matter offact bravura, performances in the art of leadership I think the world has evet seen. The gentleman, in his modest way, has not really painted you a picture of the conditions on that desolate, blank awful peninsula, when he took over. The skies were far from sunny. The Eighth Army had lost a very fine leader in General Walker; it had been beat up, punched around, disorganized; its morale was nearly nonexistent; its rations were bad ... If you had been a betting man, you would not have bet an awful lot on the United Nations forces at that juncture in history. Weather terrible, Chinese ferocious, morale stinko, short summation of the situation. The Eighth Army commander, General Ridgway, took hold of that thing like a magician taking hold of a bunch of handkerchiefs out of a hat, like so. It mayor may not be true that no man is a hero to his valet, but General Ridgway is certainly a hero to his aide-de-camp. This tremendous performance was done by vigorous application of the textbook principles of leadership. You


RIDGWAY

He did not turn the [Eighth] Anny around by beingmean to people, by shootingpeople, by relieving people, by chopping peoples' heads off• •• He breathedhumanityinto that operation. He got their spirits up; he saw that the soldiers were wann, properly fed, properlyled. Sure a few people had to go. They were good people, mostofthem, but theyhad been in that war too long and were worn out.

67

During the time he was in commandofthe Eighth

Anny in Korea, I can't hardly think ofhalfa dozen

days when he was not under hostile nre .•. The

troops knew it and once they got the idea that some

body was looking out for them, not for himself, the

miracle happened. He saved the nation ~~ honor, he

is a great man, thank you.

can read them, they are in your field manual. General Ridgway's been reading them fClr 25 or 30 years. He followed them precisely right down the line. He did not tum the [Eighth] AmlY around by being mean to people, by shooting people, by relieving people, by chopping peoples' heads off, or striking fear ... quite the opposite. He breathed humanity into that opemtidn. He got their spirits up; he saw that the soldiers were wann, properly fed, properly led. Sure a few people had to go. They were good people, most of them, but they had been in that war too long and were worn out. He effected a gradual and orderly relief. He kept alive the old spirit of the o{fcnsive'~-spiritof the bayonet~callit what you wilL

Talk abDut personal surveillance of the point of crisis, I can testify that General Ridgway practices what he preaches. During the titne he was in cOinmand of the Eighth Anny in Korea, I can hardly think of half a dozen days when he was not under hostile fire, This impressed me not because it involved his aide, but be~

cause he was there. The troops knew it and once they got the idea that somebody was looking out for them, not for himself, the rnira~

de happened. He saved the nation's honor, he is a great man, thank vou.

General Ridgway, Sir, I want to thank you very much. It has been a fttscinating a{remonn and one we will kmg remember.

Well, thank you. Let me just say, gentlemen, I want to thank you all ... not only for the stimulation of your fine questions and all, but for the pleasure it is to be with you ... here in this institution, particularly at this very crucial time, I think. You are privileged to live at this time, because it is going to demand a type of leadership with a vision to see, with the integrity to choose and the courage to execute. You are serving a country that is a bulwark of freedom of the individual in the world today and you could not ask fc)r a finer opportunity. ~

General Matthew B. Ridguil)'. US Ann)', Retired, has send his country with di5tinCl'ion at all &~vds of miliwf)' SL"rVlce in both t)face and war. His ext,erience ranges from that of a staff of!iC<.'l.' in the War Departmmt under George Manhall, to the comnumd ofa divisian and carps in combat in Wbrld W(lr II and afdd army in rhe Km"('.an War, He «-'as supreme commaru:k...,. in /)oth the Far East and Europe antle/liefof staffof the us AmLy. He is a soldier in the most [oml>lete S(.'nse of the wo'rd.

r.h(~adieT General Wl:dter F Winton Jr., US Army, Retired, served in World W·hr 11 and a Htriety of airborne and infi:mtry assignments ranging from l"Klttillion excC1ttitJf Officer ami commander, to division and later. curps 02. Dw·ing the Km"e(m \y'tlr, he served as General Ridgu:a.y's aide,de~caml) and as chief of staff of the 24th lnfanll)' Di1!ision. He also served as cornmander. 2d Bligade, 25th Infantry Dit:ision, j1, JCS, and assistant divL~ion cmmTU1nder, 6tlllnfantry Di'tiision.


rtrait ofa

German ene I

aff Officer

Lieutenant Colonel V 'red The author provides rat' f severalofGennanys gre'ilAtest Wor{d mma'1T~' ;weH as a piercing look at the makf>-up,of '. h s~die~u'. ' an General Staff. Based on an interview wit1f1/ie ofthe few'Flmaining senior General Staffofficers, M1Jjor Gel#1ral E W. vonMeH~!!iJ thin, this portrait offers the unique experieBbes andobservations ofone who served with Rommel, Balck, G~derian and others.

W HEN I first tead the masterfully written book, Panzer Battles, it was simply

to gain a better understanding of the 1943 battie ofKursk, where Adolf HitIer squandered the bulk of his armor. I never expected to meet its author, Major General Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin. A General Staff officer of such seniority who had seen so much action during World War II must be gone by now, I thought. The book, published more than 30 years ago (1956~ left no clue other than a single inviting line in the preface: "F. W, von Mellenthin, Johannesburg."

His book indicated he had seen combat in every theater of the European war from 1939 ro 1945. His career was a map trace of Germany's


i panzer armies as they moved though Poland, France, the Balkans, then across the deserts of North Africa with Erwin Rommel's Afrika Karps and across the winny wastes and muddy gridlock of the Russian heartland, ending finally with his capture by the Allies while trying to break out of the Ruhr pocket. l

A chorus of questions demanded answers, Was he still alive? Was he one of those silent, enigmatic Prussians from east of the Elbe? Was he alunkerof the military caste? Itwas from this class that the Imperial General Staff of World War I had drawn itsofficers. Some ofthe younger ones had survived to become Hitler's generals and field marshals. Was von Mellenthin one of them? I wondered.

69

How to find him? A few long-distance telephone calls to ]ohannesbUtg, South Aftica, brought some answers. The name was pf(y nounced Fon-Mell-enn-teen. He was still there and would welcome my visit for an interview. The logistics were arranged.

The man who met me at the garden gate of rhe comfortable townhouse in the upper class suburb of Sandron in northern ]ohannesbUtg, was slim, aristocratic and urbane. His energy and vitality made him appear taller than 5 feet 6 inches. He was wearing a blue, three-piece European business suit, topped off by a starched, white French cuff shirt and regimental stripe tie. Even as an octogenarian, he did not wear glasses. His only jewelry was a pair of antique cufflinks and a signet ring. His tanned face was calm and serene, free of the worry lines normal to executives who have worked undet stress. He looked more like a bank director than a general.

Getting to Know the General His first invitation was for a full-course meal:

Baltic herring, Wiener schnitzel, red cabbage, potato dumplings and a crisp Rhine wine. He called it a "working lunch:' It lasted all day. When it was over, the dining table was covered with situation maps and battle sketches the general had drawn.

When he spoke of battles past, his pale blue eyes acquired a long-distance focus, as if he were at the forward edge of the battle, still seeing the approaching Soviet tanks. One felt the smoke and dust of battle, the crash of artillery and the clang of metal. He seemed to relive the agonies of Kursk and Stalingrad along with the earlier victories in France, Poland and North Africa.

There was unusual balance in the man, an economy of motion and steadiness to his actions-no wasted gesture. His self-control seemed natural, not affected. He also seemed able to control those around him by the power of subtle suggestion. It was not until I saw his riding stable that I made the connection. He was a master of dressage!

Dressage demands the utmost in self-control.

The rider is under the intense scrutiny of five judges for over 10 minutes. No other sport requires such coordination between man and animaL It is control of another living being by subtle suggesrion; no whips, no spurs. The horse cannot be commanded, but must be made to feel proud, to feel he is an extension of the rider. When he feels sufficiently proud, he will want to work for the rider. The general's rrophy case was filled wirh gold cups.

The ancestral homes of Mel1enthin and Uenichen in Pomerania, rhe general told me, had been in his family since 1460. About 300Junker families had owned the land of 05telbien (East Prussia, Pomerania and Silesia). The landowners had lived in castles with broad, massive facades three srories high, with 20 or 30 rooms that were never quite warmed by the small tile stoves scattered in dark comers. It was from this class that the General Staff had drawn an inordinately large percentage of its officers. The von Mellenthin land holdings had not been as large as most Junker5, since most of his forebears had been soldiers.2

All that remained of his German past were a few snapshots and small mementos that he and his family had been able to carry out on their backs as they tied the advancing Soviet armies. After the war, he spent two and a half years as a prisonerofwar and another three, as a homeless refugee in West Gerrnany.3

In 1950, von Mellenthin moved to South Africa because the country was one of the few accepring refugees. And, at 50, when most men start thinking about retirement, he started over again at the bottom rung of a new ladder in the business world. He downplayed his successes, explaining that he was "a lucky guy." He preferred his colleagues to call him FW, shott for Friedrich Wilhelm.4 As I came to know him over the next several weeks, there emerged the portrait of the quintessential German General Staff officer. He was the aristocrat who considered the military a calling and not a job.

Von Mellenthin has meticulously followed two historic General Staff decrees: "General

AprJl1990. MILITARY REVIEW 70

GENERAL STAFF OFFICER

Staff Officers have no names" (issued to preserve general staff anonymity after its being outlawed by Versailles) and "Great achievements, small display; more reality than appearance."5 In discussing battles won, he downplays his role, removing himself from the scenario.

He is equally humble about his business accomplishments. In 1953, he founded Trek Air (now called Luxavia) in Johannesburg. He linked it to Europe, made it profitable and captured a sizable portion of Lufthansa's market. Lufthansa hired him and made him its regional director. "The airline business," said von Mellenthin, Ilis really ~nly a matter of good staff work and selecting the right people."6

The general was born on 30 August 1904, in the ancient German trading city of Breslau, at the garrison of his father's regiment. When he was 14, his father, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Henning von Mellenthin, was killed on the Western Front on 29 June 1918, while directing artillery. His elder brother Horst was buried alive by a French artillery barrage, but managed to survive. War tragedies were part of the family's history.

Descended from an old Pomeranian noble family, von Mellenthin claims among his ancestors, Prince August von Hohemollern of Prussia and Frederick the Great. He is related either directly, or by marriage, to most of the ancient aristocratic German families and can trace his lineage back beyond the Teutonic Knights. The family tree in his study dates to the year 1200 A.D.

Upon graduating from high school, the general enlisted in the 7th Cavalry Regiment on 1 April 1924 as a lancer. His passion for horses and competition riding, mainly steeplechasing, led him to spend the first 11 years of his service in the cavalry. After 18 months' enlisted service, he was promoted to corporal and, in 1926, he was selected by the army personnel directorate to attend the Infantty School at Ohrdruf and the Cavalry School at Hannover. On 1February 1928, he was commissioned Leutnant (2d Lieutenant) in the 100,ooo-man Reichswehr,

Wlren Ite spoke ofbatdes past, his pale blue eyes acquired a long-distance focus, as ifhe were at the forward edge of

the battle, still seeing the approaching Soviet tanks ••• He seemed to relive the agonies ofKursk and StaIingrad along

with the earlier victories in France, Polandand North Africa.

one of only 4,000 officers permitted in the entire amlyJ

Von Mellenthin's superior education and tactical flair led to his nomination as a candidate for General Staff training. Before he could enter the program, however, he had to take the arduous week-long qualifYing examination. He recalled that of the more than 1,000 officers who assembled to take the exam, "only 150 or so were admitted to the Kriegsakademie [war academy]." Standing in the top 10 percent ofall candidates who qualified, von Mellenthin was ordered by the General Staffpersonnel director to report for training at the academy in Berlin on 1October 1935.8


By abolishing the General Staffand dosing the war academy, the ARies simply drove the functions underground, creating a mystique that is hard to describe. Mili

tary spark and creativity blossomed in secret Mystique fed on secrecy. The dysfunctional edicts ofVersailles made the General Staffan elite, almost masonic, order.

The goal of the Kriegsakademie was to train General Staff officers as advisers and assistants to commanders of larger fonnations and to provide officers for the anny staff. General Ludwig Beck, who oversaw the curriculum, concen~ trated instead on providing qualified staff officers for the new divisions being fonned. He also shortened the General Staffcourse in 1933 from three to two years to meet the increased demand for staffofficers caused by Hitler's rapid expansion of the anny.

The course began on 1 October 1935 and consisted of nine months of lectures and staff exercises. "The only break in the desk work was the weekly field exercise with maps, but without troops or equipment," said von Mellenthin. At the end ofJune, the candidates were sent on a three-month cross-training assignment with a branch of the combat anns other than their O\vn. Then came the autumn maneuvers and, said von Mellenthin; "Grey Ocrober again." The pattern of the second year was much like the first, only more grueling, as marginal candidates were harshly weeded out.9

The cream that remained was sent on probarionary IS-month assignments to selected General Staff slots and, only upon successful completion of those tours, were they awarded the tide of Generalsrabsoffizier.

Von Mellenthin qualified at the war academy in the aurumn of 1937 and was posted to the staffof the Third Corps in Berlin, where he was awarded the coveted silver collar patches and the crimson trouser stripes of a General

Staff officer. After IS years' hard work, he became F. W. von Mellenthin, Hauptmann, im GeneraLstab (Captain, in the General Stafi).to

"I have always been a lucky guy." What von Mellenthin failed to add was that it helped to be of noble birth. The enigmatic bond of bloodlines defied the simplicity of organization charts. A wann sense of colleagueship knit the nobility together. They knew each other from childhood, from private schools, from military academies, from adjacent regiments. Often, they were related.

Their aristocratic manners and easy intimacy caused the unschooled and insecure Hitler to fear and hate them. And he equated the General Staff with the nobility. In this, he was essentially right. Nobles, because of their superior educations and social graces, dominated the General Staff. It was, ironically, the Allies who made it so. By abolishing the General Staff and closing the war academy, the Allies simply drove the functions underground, creating a mystique that is hard to describe.

Military spark and creativity blossomed in secret. Mystique fed on secrecy. The dysfunctional edicts of Versailles made the General Staff an elite, almost masonic, order. Because officer commissions had become extremely rare, the army attracted an even higher proportion of nobles than it had under the Kaiser. In 1913, for example, only 27 percent of junior officers had the noble "von" before their last names. By 1928, when von Mellenthin was commissioned, 35 percent of lieutenants were von-something. In the politically confused Weimar Republic, the nobility saw military service as being "above politics,"1t was considered one of the few professions worthy of their station.11

Von Mellenthin's post as a staff captain of Berlin Corps was auspicious, as it involved him in intelligence work at the nationalleve!. While overtly working on the General Staff, he covertly maintained liaison with counterespionage personnel in the Berlin Military District who were guarding against penetration of secret armaments factories in the area. His


Rommel was wary ofthe General Staffcontingentsent from Berlin in]une 1941 to assist him. He snubbed von MeHenthin and other staffmembers, ignoring theirpre

sence for an uncomfortably long time, saying: "I don't needa staff" .. . [andl was all too aware ofthe dual reporting system, by which General Staffofficers reported

to him publicl}; andon him privately.

overt "cover," helping to organize the Fahrer parades, he denigrated as "the running ofa military circus." 12

Despite his designation as a General Staff officer, von Mellenthin continued to view himself as a cavalryman. He felt he had acquired a broader outloc.k than the infantryman and was able to think on a grander scale. He also felt his riding skills had trained him to take measured chances, without being foolhardy. [ncreasingly, he rankled at his parade duties in Berlin. He grew restless, but action soon came.13

The German army entered Poland at 0445 on 1September 1939. Waves of "scftening up" attacks by the Luftwaffe preceded the panzer columns. At the time of the invasion, von Mellenthin was still attached to Berlin Corps as staff intelligence officer. He was ordered to fly in an unarmed Fiesler Starch to the forward headquarters of Eighth Army near Lodz to prepare a situation report. En route, the Storch encountered engine trouble and crash-landed in what his maps showed as enemy territory. 14

Groups of men in unfamiliar green uniforms surrounded the aircraft as it staggered and stuttered to a stop. Just as FW and the pilot were about to fire on these green-clad scldiers with their machine pistols, they heard shouted commands in German. His pilot had landed right on top ofa German bridge-building unit, part of the quasi-military labor force under Dr. Fritz Tadt, minister of armament.!S

In his six years of World War II service, von Mellenthin had close working relationships with many of Germany's leading generals, including Rommel, Hermann Balek and Heinz Guderian. The list even included a few field marshals, like Albert Kesselring. But the mere mention of Rommel seemed to have a catalytic effect on von Mellenthin. With the ring of the old German General Staff officer in his voice, he was at once transported across space and time to North Africa and 1941. He recalled being in North Africa with Rommel from 1June 1941 to 15 September 1942, first as his intelligence officer and later as operations officer.!6


Rommel "I first met him in 1938 when I was serving at

Third Corps in Berlin. Little did I realize thar three short years later, I would be serving in North Africa under him. He was the toughest taskmaster I've ever known. He spared no one, least of all himself," von Mellenthin recalled. l ?

Rommel was wary of the General Staff contingent sent from Berlin in June 1941 to assist him. He snubbed von Mellenthin and other staff members, ignoring their presence for an uncomfortably long time, saying: "I don't need a staff." 18

Rommel's behavior is understandable. He was an officer of the middle class who had made his way without patronage. Despite his incredible achievements in World War I (he had won Germany's highest medal, Pour Ie Merite, as a company commander at the Battle of Caporetto during October 19 I7), he had never gained admission to the General Staff.l9 Had it not been for Hitler, who was quick at spotting talented young nonconfonmists, Rommel never would have been transferred from the infantry and given an armored command.

Rommel was all too aware of the dual reporting system, by which General Staff officers reported to him publicly, and on him privately to the chiefofthe General Staff in Berlin. "As a fighting soldier, he viewed us suspiciously. He thought we might attempt to supervise-even take over," said von Mellenthin.2o

"Hitler intended no major role for Rommel in the desert. His understrengrh expeditionary force was limited to one light infantry division, the 5th, to which later was added the 15th panzer. He was never given sufficient air cover or logistic support," rankled von Mellenthin. By Hitler's order, his mission was simply to act as a blocking force, or barrier to prevent the advancing British from destroying the Italian forces in North Africa.2l

"Rommel saw no future in such timid tactics," said von Mellenthin. "He, therefore, quickly and decisively took the offensive, before

the British could marshal sufficient forces to drive on Tripoli," he added. On I March 1941, Rommel's forces surprised the Brirish. Benghazi tell to German hands, and soon he was laying siege to Tobruk! "Rommel was correct in disregarding Hitler's instructions to 'stand and defend' because commanders should always exploit opportunities as they presenr themselves," emphasized von Mellenthin.22

On 21 March 1941, Rommel defeated the British at AI-Agheila, and advanced on Tobruk. He was promoted to full general in January 1942, caprured Tobruk in June and was made a field marshal. FW recalled joyously, "Tobruk was where we had really had a free hand. Hitler hadn't meddled. We were able to make purely military decisions." His eyes lir up and he smiled broadly as he remembered, "capturing tons and tons of English booty-nearly 1,000 fighting vehicles, 400 guns and over 45,000 prisoners."23

Winston Churchill, sensing the peril of a Panzer Annee so close to Suez exclaimed: "Rommel, Rommel, Rommel! What else matters but beating him!"24 Nor was the danger limited to Rommel's battlefield prowess; his charisma was infecting soldiers of all nationalities.

"His troops, both German and Italian, would literally do anything for him," reminisced von Mellenthin. Even British soldiers admired him so openly that their high command was forced to order its officers to quit discussing Rommel.

"But Rommel's mesmerizing chanms did not always extend to his staff," said von Mellenthin, regretfully. "He was never as nice or polite as James Mason portrayed him. To work for him, you had to have an iron constitution, and even stronger nerves, 11 he continued.

Often out of touch with his staff for days at a time, von Mellenthin recalls the rare occasions when Rommel would return to headquarters in time for the daily briefing: "He would arrive from the field covered with dust and grime, burst into the command post and gruffly demand, 'Wie ist die Lage?' [What is the situation?] To which [Siegfried] Westphal and I [operations


General Rommel during en attack on the 11th Indian Brigade which broke the defenses around Tobruk in June 1942.

"Rommelinsisted his officers eat troop rations, even though they were permitted to mess separately. This often amounted to only stale, wOl1llY bread, washed down with a cup ofbrackish water .•• Only when we capturedBrimh depots did theAfrika Korps eat weD. On those occasions, officers, enlisted men and POWs feasted equally," said von Mellenthin. The bully beef, so despised by British soldiers, became haute cuisine for the Desert

Fox and his troops. Some even packaged it andsent it horne to their relatives.

and intelligencel would instantly respond with a crisp 5-minute summary," said von Mellenthin. The Desert Fox would need no more than 30 seconds to analyze facts and act on them. claims von Mellenthin. "He would then sometimes issue standing orders for the entite week! Very seldom did these need to be modified," marveled FW.

Differences in breeding and temperament could easily have driven Rommel and his General Staff assistants apart. Rommel was, after all, a commoner, the son of a Wiirttemberg schoolmaster. He had been blooded in the charnel house of World War I. His main military virtues were physical courage, imagination and skill. He could be scathingly rude to his principal staffofficers, but never rude to his soldiers or to his prisoners of war (POWs), recalls von

Mellenthin. Von Mellenthin still admires Rommel's rela

tionship with his enlisted men and his POWs: "Rommel insisted his officers eat troop rations, even though they were pennitted to mess separately. This often amounted to only stale, wonny bread. washed down with a cup of brackish water." ([here might have been no water at all if Rommel, with his Schwabian shrewdness, had not brought along dowsing experts from Germany to search for water holes.) "Only when we captured British depots did the Afrika Kmps eat well. On those occasions, officers, enlisted men and POWs feasted equally," said von Mellenthin. The bully beef, so despised by British soldiers, became haute cuisine for the Desert Fox and his troops. Some even packaged it and sent it home to their relatives in Germany!'5


Even rhough he did not initially want the services of either Westphal or von Mellenthin, Rommel came increasingly to depend on them. They ran his headquarters, releasing him from the drudgery of staff work. They allowed him to

"His troops, both GelTIlan and Italian, wouldliterally do anything for him,"reminisced von Mellenthin. Even British soldiers admired him so openly that theirhigh com

mand was forced to order its officers to quit discussing Rommel. "But Rommel's

mesmerizing charms did not always extend to his staff. •. He was never as nice

or polite asJames Mason portrayed him. To work for him, you had to have an iron constitution, and even stronger nerves."

concentrate exclusively on operational n1atters. Tireless and talented, they possessed the qualities Rommel prized most highly, loy"lty and efficiency.

With the captllre ofTobruk, Rommel had hit the peak of his career. Von Mellenthin recalls: "After that, (lespite a shortage of gasoline, and the exhaustion of his troops, he set Ollt eastwards to capture the Suez, a venture which failed ... mainly due to lack of reinforcements. But Rommel felt it was worth a try, because that's the kind of general he was,ll26

"He did not care about politics, and that led to his downfall," von Mellenthin recalled. When Hitler discovered Rommel had been involved in the 20 July 1944 homb plot against his life, he gave him the option of taking poison or facing torture and hann to his fBmily and reputation. Rommel committed suicide on 14 October 1944.

If Rommel made impossible demands on his staff, FW's next commander, Balck, was the soul of tact and reason. "We had a harmonious working relationship ... as is customary between chief and helpmate," reminisced von Mellenthin.

Salek After leaving Rommel's staff in late 1942,

von Mellenthin became chief of staff of the 48th Panzer Corps, commanded by Balck. "Balck was steadfast, cool under fire, and inflexibly determined ... a highly gifted panzer general," recalled von Mellenthin. FW was with Balck almost continuously from December 1942 until the end of 1944, from rhe Battle of the Chir River near Stalingrad to Army Group G in France, near the West WaiL

In all these assignments, Balck commanded the entire force, while FW stood at his side as adviser, guide and confidante. Together they had amassed over 12 years ofcombat experience and operated on the basis of unlimited mutual confidence. Taking turns touring the forward edge of the battle area, they agreed that successful panzer tactics depended on the utmosr in streamlined communications. This meant jointly working out a battlefield appreciation every 12 hours. Von Mellenthin claims the enormous pressures of the Russian Front lefr him only 5 minutes for briefing BaIck. Based on jointly developed plans emanating from these twice-daily meetings, Bakk issued oral orders to FW, who in tum passed them to subordinate commands-to be completed orally. At no time did von Mellenthin's corps staff consist of more than three junior officers (operations. intelligence and quartermaster).Z7

Of Swedish-Finnish ancestry, Balck was nicknamed the "cool Nordic" by von Mellenthin. "He was one of the coolest commanders under fIre 1have ever seen-absolutely unshakable. He was also the supreme realist," said von Mellenthin. On 30 December 1941, while briefing Hitler on the situation at Stalingrad, he demonstrated this. Balck's briefing took 2 hours, during which time the Fahrer hardly interrupted. "He advised Hitler not to withdraw under any circumstances," continued the generaL "Bakk reasoned that, with snow two meters deep and the temperature at 50 degrees below zero celsius, it would be impossible to retreat or even prepare new positions," said von Mellenthin.


"Bakk and Hitler then got into an argument over tank losses, which Hitler had minimized. They compared nwnbers. Bakk told Hitler point-blank that his tank figures were Wtong: 'You are mistaken; I was there-my figures are the correct ones,'" he quoted Bakk as saying.28

The main value of Bakk's realistic analysis was twofold: it bolstered Hitler's decision to standfust at Stalingrad (some strategists say it was the only correct decision under the circumstances) and it forced Armaments Minister Albert Speer to increase tank prcduction.

"It was BaIck who stopped the Soviet breakthrough at the Chir River, wiping out Marshal Romanenko's 5th Russian Tank Army," reminisced von Mellenthin. "And it was Balck again at Tatsinskaya when German panzers wiped out entirely the Soviet 24th Tank Corps," the general continued. "Finally, it was the cool-headed Nordic who boldly artacked the entire Russian 5th Shock Army under Popov, destroying it. This was achieved despite superior Soviet combat ratios of I1-to-1 in infuntry, of7-to-l in tanks, and of 20-t0-1 in guns," declared von Mellenthin.29

When Balck took over the 48th Panzer Corps at Kiev in 1943, he insisted again on von MeIlenthin as his chief of staff, noting in his diary: "I have known him since the Chir River days. We understand each other completely. We never overload units with unnecessary paperwork. We often exchange places at the front ... to keep in closest contact with the men."

Von Mellenthin stayed with Ba1ck until late 1944, when both men were transferred to the Western Front. On arrival there, Bakk requesred von Mellenthin by name to be his chief of staff . . . this time of Army Group G in France. They stayed together until Guderian interrupted their working relationship.

Guderian Known affectionately to his men as "Papa

Heinz" or "Schneller Heinz" (fust-moving Heinz\ he was better known to the Allies as Germany's creator of blitzkrieg. It was Guderian's tanks

The enormous pressures ofthe Russian Front lefthim only 5 minutes for brie6ngBalck. Based onjoindy developed

plans emanating from these twice-daily meetings, Balck issued oral orders tu PH, who in tum passed them to subordinate

commands-to be completedorally. At no time did [his) corps staffconsist of more than three junior officers (operations, intelligence and quartermaster).

that made the motorized dash to Vienna in 1938, and his formations that slashed through Poland. Finally, it was his thrust to the coast at Abbeville in 1940 that cut the Allied armies in two. "There never would have been a 'miracle at Dunkirk' had Hitler not sent down the halt order," said von Mellenthin. "Guderian was brave, brash, bold-and difficult; he locked me up!" he exclaimed.

"He locked me up!" he repeated, this time laughing heartily. It was late 1944 on the West-

nMILITARY REVIEW' April 1990

In battle, Guderian continually reinforced the hard core ofannor, keeping firepower and mobility concentrated,

never dispersing them. Von MeHenthin insists that by so doing, Guderian

created notonly a new combat arm, but a new technique ofcommand: "I mean no disrespect toJ. E C. Fuller, LiddellHart, or Charles de Gaulle, as great theorists of annored warfare, but, . , [Guderian] took the

theory and made itpractice."

em Front, the Germans were in retreat, and von Mellenthin was chief of staff of Army Group G, again undet Balek. "Guderian, who was then head of the army, had sent one of his underlings to give us some gratuitous advice on how to employ our artillery, " said von Mellenthin.

"Our problem that late in the war was not how ro employ artillery, but where to get the

guns and ammunition with which to continue the war. We were critically short of everything. Some of our pamer divisions had only five tanks each," recalled von Mellenthin.3o

The Germans had hardly any assault guns. Most of their artillery consisted of captured pieces, with only a few rounds of ammunition. The personnel picture was even worse: "We in' herited a mixture of Luftwaffe personnel, old men and young boys who had virtually no training. We had special battalions of old men with stomach troubles or with hearing problems," recalled von Mellenthin ruefully.

"I suppose I spoke too bluntly to Guderian's emissary. I was, as you Americans put it, a 'naughty boy,''' grinned von Mellenthin. The German army was confronted with bigger problems than siting nonexistent artillery. The visiting dignitary went back disgruntled, telling Guderian that von Mellenthin had ignored him.

"Guderian ordered me to Army Headquarters at Zossen, near Berlin, and gave me a proper dressing down. I said nothing in my own defense, absolutely nothing," recalled von Mellenthin. Officers were not in the habit of talking back to the short-tempered and mercurial Guderian, especially not when they had insulted one of his personal emissaries. "He clapped me under house arrest for a week, then sacked me," chuckled von Mellenthin.

"Ironically, as I was at loose ends, I had the opportunity to visit my family-Christmas 1944. It was the only Christmas leave I ever got," recalled von Mellenthin. The furlough allowed FW to get his wife and children out of the East before it was overrun by the Russians. "Lucky once again. I've always been a lucky guy!" recollected von Mellenthin, happily.

"Pour it on! Pour it on! That's the kind of general he was," exclaimed FW. In battle, Guderian continually reinforced the hard core of armor, keeping firepower and mobility concentrated, never dispersing them.

Von Meller:chin insists that by so doing, Guderian created not only a new combat arm, but a new technique of command: "I mean no

AprtI1990. MILITARY REVIEW 78


disrespect to ]. F. C. Fuller, Liddell Hart, or Charles de Gaulle, as great theorists ofannored warfare, but it was Guderian; he was the doer. He took the theory and made it practice," he emphasized.3l

AftetField Marshal Erich von Manstein, FW considers Guderian one ofGennany's best strategists: "It was he who concurred with Manstein in launching Operation Sichelschnitt," he declared. Sichellchnitt was the daring scythe.like annored sweep of May 1940, which pushed Gennan tanks through the forested Ardennes, surprising the Allies who considered the area impenetrable.

It was Guderian, roo, who favored a Mediterranean strategy aimed at bottling up the British. In this, he was overruled by Hitler, who had already decided to attack Russia. And Guderian opposed, much to his own detriment, Hirler's constant course changes once in Russia.

"He wanted to drive right to Moscow, with· out all of Hitler's costly side trips. Guderian understood [Carl von] Clausewitz's advice regarding maintenance of objective," mused von Mellenthin. A well-thumbed, leather-bound copy of Yom Kriege lay on a shelf near the general's writing table.

"Guderian placed heavy burdens on his staff. He was virtually impossible to reach as he led from the" front," said on Mellenthin. He recalled an occasion when a General Staff colleague tried to reach Guderian during the French Campaign. At the area in which he thought the command post to be, he was pinned down by artillery fire. Taking cover in a ditch, he asked Gennan offkers already sheltering there, where he could find Guderian. Laughingly, they replied: "Ifyou want to speak to the Old Man, grab a ritle and belly-erawl up the next rise ... he's up on the crest with the soldiers, shooting at the French!"32

Guderian had a talent for falling out with colleagues, senior generals, field marshalseven Hitler. He was headstrong and opinionated." "This was because he had fonnulated a new method ofwarfare, and impatiently wanted

Guderian had a talent for falling out with colleagues, senior generals, /ield marshals-even Hider. He was headstrong

and opinionated. "This was because he had formulated a new method ofwarfare, and impatiently wanted to see it translated

into action. Like Rommel, he was a sol.dier's soldier, always ready to face danger

... to lead from the front!'

to see it translated into action. Like Rommel, he was a soldier's soldier, always ready to face danger ... to set a personal example, to lead from the front," explained von Mellenthin.

"Who knows? Had Hitler followed Guderian's advice, making an uninterrupted drive on Moscow while the Soviet annies were too weak to maneuver, and with the approaches relatively unguarded, we might have taken the Russian capital before winter 1941," speculated von Mellenthin.33

Hitler Von Mellenthin credited Hirler with back

ing Guderian in creating panzer fonnations at a time when many high-ranking generals were opposed. "He stimulated interest by attending trials of new tanks and did everything possible to build up our road network, which was in a sorry state," he recalled. It was upon seeing Guderian's latest tanks being tesred at the ordnance proving grounds at Kumersdorf in February 1935, that Hitler made his famous aside: "That's what I need. That's what I want to have!"34

FW did not share Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel's view that Hitler was "the greatest warlord of all time."35 Neither did he agree with Fuller, Britain's expert on annored warfare, who called Hitler, "One of the most original soldiers ofall time."36 Instead, von Mellenthin believes that heavier doses of caution, coupled with strict adherence to General Staffstrategy, would


"The Gennan generals ofthis war were the best6nished products oftheirprofession anywhere. They couldhave been better iftheir oudook had been wider and their understanding deeper. But ifthey had become philosophers, they would

have ceased to be soldiers." Uddell Hart

have served the German amlY better than following Hitler's inspired hunches.

Germany was ripe for Hitler. Defeat and unilateral disannament had left the Gemlans with a siege mentality. They felt preyed upon by hostile neighbors, a conviction reinforced by the French occupation of the Ruhr and Polish incursions into Silesia J near von Mellenthin's home. Indigenous communists, aided by Soviet Russia, very nearly overthrew the fragile Weimar Republic. With this as a background, von Mellenthin saw Hitler "as a bridge between the irreconcilable elements" in Gennany at the time ... capable of coping with the dangerous communist threat inside Gennany while concomitantly promoting national socialism.

As a General Staff officer, von Mellenthin could never envision that Hitler would totally reverse Clausewitz, turning the relationship between the politicians and the military upside down. The politician would order war; themili tary would counsel restmint. He would order attack; they would counsel delay. When General Staff officers tried to explain to Hitler the difficulties inherent in winter operations in Russia, the Fahrer reviled their timidity. His generals "should be like butchers' dogs who would attack anything in sight," he said.3?

Instead, they were mainly courteous, courtly men who acted more like cautious corporate directors. Hitler came to calling General Staff officers cowards, stating their "minds were fossilized in obsolete habits of thought."3s

Von Mellenthin never considered resisting Hitler's rise to power because of two decrees:

Paragraph 36 of the Defense Law which stated: "Soldiers may not engage in political activity," and the 30 June 1924 General Staff decree that specifically forbade involvement in politics. The second decree mandated that ".. . the officer does not become a politician; he remains a soldier ... he is the executive organ of the State, not of any Party or economic group."39

"Did you ever think of killing Hitler?" I asked.

UNo, assassination is not my style ... but for that matter, I never saw him at the front ... ever. One of my Kriegschu1e classmates tried to kill him," recollected von Mellenthin. On 21 March 1943, General Rudolf Freiherr von Gersdorff made an attempt during an exhibition of captured Soviet weapons in Berlin. He placed two bombs in a Soviet overcoat he was demonstrating, each with a delayed fuse set to explode in 20 minutes.

"His plan was to place himself in such close proximity to me FUhrer, mat they would both be destroyed by the blast. Unexplainably, Hider left the exhibition after only three minutes. He probably had a sixth sense," said von Mellenthin. The assassination attempt, held at the Zeughaus on Unter dem Linden, nearly ended in solo disaster for von Gersdorff, who had to flush the fully activated fuses down the toilet after Hitler left.40

The general had not read Mein KamPf. "None of us took it seriously," he explained. "Thousands of copies were available, but most General Staff officers considered it so much twaddle ... convoluted Bohemian Platdeut.sch [low German]." He considered Hitler's speeches to be pure propaganda and nothing else.

Spirit of the General Staff The idea that the General Staff had plotted

Hitler's aggressive course dominated the proceedings at Nuremberg. Von Mellenthin and 150 ofhis colleagues were locked up fat two and a half years while the Allies sought to prove them guilty of war crimes. Even von Gersdorff, who tried to kill Hitler, was locked up. The


tribunal finally condemned only Keitel and Alfred Jodi to death for specific crimes, The General Staff was acquitted, It was concluded that its officers were essentially technicians, brilliant in the pursuit of their profession, but politically naive,

Their political deficiencies were best noted by Liddell Hart, the British military historian, who said of them: "The German generals of this war were the best finished products of their profession anywhere, They could have been better if their outlook had been wider and their understanding deeper. But if they had become philosophers, they would have ceased to be soldiers,"41

Over 300 General Staff officers had been kiUed in combat, Many more had been murdered as a result of Hitler's purges. Wartime losses among generals had also been heavy.

Guderian had been dismissed by Hitler in the waning days of the war. Chief of the Genera! Staff, General Franz Halder, was in a concentration camp. The field marshals had been


sacked. Rommel had long since been driven to suicide. Over one-third of the general officers of the anny had been killed in action, probably a record for any country in modem times.42

Despite these appalling losses and his imprisonment, von Mellenthin's spirit is unbroken. He continues to ride his favorite horses 2 hours every morning, work at his writing desk 8 hours daily and act as an unpaid consultant to various charitable causes. Once a month, he presides over a formal dinner for his extended family of over 30 members. He goes on military maneuvers as often as possible and speaks at NATO and allied war colleges,

Once a year, he attends a Udining~in" at his old regiment, which now holds its meetings in Wiesbaden, West Germany, as Breslau has become Wroclaw, a Polish city, Most of the old Prussian aristocrats who dined with them in years past are gone. But their motto, emblazoned on the regimental flag saying "ich &en [I serve]" reminds those who remain of the spirit of the General Staff. "1..

NOTES

1. Personal interviews with Major Ganem! F. W, von Mellenthin, General StaN, German anny, retired, condJeted at Johannesburg, South Africa, during the period of 23 MmruSry 1987 10 4 April 1987 inclusive.

2. Ibid. 3.lbfd. 4. Ibid. 5. waner Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff (New 'lbrk: Pmeger.

1953), 14 and 127. 6. \tin Mellenthin interviewS. 7. Ibid. 8Abid. 9. Ibid.

to. Ibid. 11.lbid. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17, Ibid. 16, Ibid. 19. $aIooel Mitcham. Triumphant Fc;x, (New Ym: Stein and Day, 19M). 43. 20. \tin MellenthB1 interviews. 21.1bict

22, Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. Sibley, Roger, Fry and Michael, Rrolmel (Random House, 1974), 111). 25, \Ion Melkmthin interviews. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid, 28. Ibid. 29, !bid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid, 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34, Timothy B. Benford, The ¥\tlrld War 11 Quiz and Fact Book (~ York;

Harper and ~ 1982), 69, 35. \Ion Mellenthin interviews. 3EL Ibid. 37. Fabian \lOll SChklbrel'ldorff, Offziere qgqen Hitler (london: Eyte and

Spottiswood, 1948),60. 36. As quoted by General von Mellenthin cilrlng the interviews. 39. Ibid. 40. Von Metlenlhin interviews. 41.8. H. Liddell Hart, TheGBrman Gernmtls TaJIc (New York: Morrow Quill,

1979), 300. 42. \Ion Mellenlhin interviews.

Lieutenant Colonel \kmer R. Carlson. US A=y, Retired, is president of Finca Castilla, a consortium in Central America, He is agrad_ ofthe US Naw! A<:ademy and the Armed furees SUlf[College, A career intelligence op. he ,erved as a military attache "' the US embaSsies in Oslo, Nnway. and Swckrolm, Sweden; as senior intelligence offi<er, G2. N Corp, Taaical Zone (Mekong Delta1 Vrernam; and as G2, 1" Armored Division, Ansbach, West Germany,


Leadership, Management and Measures of Success By Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan K. Burns, US Army

Invariably, when discussing leadership with junior officers, I am confronted with the cynicism they have developed because of their unpleasant experiences with a few senior "leaders." Regrettably, t<XJ many of these young officers have been exposed to a battalion commanderl brigade commander or general officer who has apparently succeeded careerwise, but who has achieved high status despite questionable leadership and a lack of morivarional abilities.

Whar has happened is that our "less than perfect" promotion and command selection system has not actually rewarded effective "leadership, II but instead, has rewarded effective "management," The difference between the two is not always easy to distinguish, especially in peacetime. Most definitions of management include the concepts of planning, organizing, supervising and conrrolling of resources, including personnel resources. In this context, an effective leader must be an effective managerj hCMf.ever, the reverse is not always true. An effective manager does not necessarily need to be a good leader in order to meet the "bottom line." Unfortunately, our promotion boards cannot always recog~ nize this distinction.

Leadership, in contrast to management, includes the very critical concept of influeru..:ing others, both directly and indirectly, toward mission accomplishment. Managers do not worry about influencing others. They force subordinates' compliance and gain their tmenthusiastic cooperation. Leaders, on the other hand, are able to inspire willing commit~ ment from rheir followers.

Anorher way of looking at the difference between managemenr and leadership is to look ar the "leadership delta." The delta consists of those additional personal attributes that elevate a manager into an effective leader-sincerity, trustfulness, caring and empathy. Characteristics that, when present, allow leaders to move organizations beyond the manage-

LTC Bums, a graduate of the US Army Onnmand and General Staff College (USACGSCj is the executive of/iw. Center far Army Lw1e'rSIup. USACGSC, furt Lea"",warrh, Kansas.

rial bottom line to true, long-term effectiveness. This is a significantly different phenomenon compared to organizations that ostensibly appear to be "effective," but, in fact, lack real leadership.

An example of"ineffective" senior leadership can be found in rhe New York Yankees baseball organization. The Yankees appear to be effective on many levels. George Steinbrenner, the Yankees' principal owner, has consistently put together some of the best talent in major league baseball. On paper, the Yankees' talent exceeded thar of the Los Angeles Dodgers in 1988, yet the Dodgers won the 1988 World Series over the Oakland Athletics and the Yankees did not even make it to the playoffs. The Dodgers clearly had something that year thar the Yankees did not have- leadership!

What the Yankees and many other organizations that are "managed" rather than "led" lack is the special dynamics that occur when the characteristics of respect, loyalty, dignity and cohesion are a living and integral part of the organizational culture. When the leadership delta ~ present, all members of rhe organization feel they are part of an achieving climate; they are satisfied with their roles; they are actively communicating and contributing; and they are directed toward a common goal.

In contrast to the Yankees, the Dodgers' senior leadership leaves its manager, Tommy Lasorda, alone to flourish and work his motivational magic. Lasorda, in tum, creates a climate where other team leaders, such as Kirk Gibson and Ore! Hershiser, can also contribute to the leadership delta. The Dodgers had a dream season in 1988, not because of superior baseball talent, but because of an extraordinary leadership and organizational climate that made winning inevitable.

Meanwhile, with the Yankees, when team leadership does make a rare apPearance, it is seldom encouraged and, often, is traded away. One of the most respected team leaders of the Yankees, ream captain and probably the greatest second baseman in Yankee history, Willie Randolph, was released at the end of the 1988 season without so much as a "thank you." It was poetic justice that Randolph ended up in the 1989 season wearing Dodger blue.

April 1990 • MILITARY REVIEW82

Is Steinbrenner an effective senior "managed" Maybe. An effective seniot "leader?" Hardly. Then how do the Steinbrenners become so powerful? Is it really a mystery? Are we not seeing the same dilemma in the Army, where Army managers are achieving success, promotions and command? Unfortunately, in the Army's case, the cost of this is the frustration, discouragement and cynicism of those officers who see the system continue to reward not only effective leaders but bottom~line managers as well.

As professionals. then, how do we overcome this cynicism? Which senior officers should we look to as models! More important, how should we measure our own success as officers and leaders if the prorno~ tion and command selection system is not always a legitimate barometer?

If our professional goal is a position or promotion (battalion command, brigade command, general officer), rather than an opportunity to lead and serve, each one of us will eventually be disappointed. Reality tells us that every Army officer-except an occasional General o,lin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-will eventually be "passed over." That (Klint was vividly portrayed to me sl"Veral years ago while sitting through a lecture at Fort Leav~ enworth, Kansas. During his opening remarks, the Anny's senior fOUf"'Star general lamented his misfor~

tune of having been passed over again. A relatively junior, four-star general had just been announced as the new chief of staff of the Army and, while our senior general was obviously trying to be humorous and present a brave front, I am sure that deep inside he was birterly disappointed by his nonselection.

Certainly, good leaders are allowed to be ambitious and to strive for promotion and command. The distinction between leaders and managers is the different focus of their energy and their degree of selflessness. True leaders are more concerned about the climate they create for their organization than they are for their own careers. While they may be disappointed when they do not get promoted or gain the command they have sought, they are not devastated. In the 1984 study, "Excellence in the Combat Arms," wrirten by Major Jetry Simonsen, Captain

INSIGHTS

Hetbert Frandsen and Captain David Hoppengardner, one battalion commander expressed lead~ ership well when he said:

"My goal was never to make general officer, but to command a battalion. I want to be remembered as a teacher. The thing that would please me most is for one of my lieutenants to be able to think like me five to 10 years from now."

The chief of staff of the US Army, General Carl Vuono, tells every brigade and battalion PreCommand Qmrse student that "there is no greater legacy that we leave the Army than the development of our young officers." US Army Field Manual 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Leve~, goes on to state that "although those in senior posi~ tions who are developers possess many skills, they are foremost reachers of units and soldiers."

The leader as a teacher has been an especially meaningful concept to me. It is particularly signifi~

cant in our society when there are so few obvious rewards for being a good teacher. The good teacher and, thus, the good leader, must often look within to measure his or her success.

In their initial orientation, new instructors in the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, US Army Military Academy, West Point, New York, are referred to a scene from Richard Bolt's famous play, A Man far AU Seasons, that captures the true essence of a teacher's rewards. In Bolt's play, Sir Thomas More is confronted by the ambitious Richard Rich who begs him for a "position." However, SiT Thomas refuses Rich's request and recommends, instead, that he should become a teacher and, ful'ther, suggests that he might even become a very good teacher. The skeptical, career-hungry Rich responds, j'Yes, Sir Thomas, but, who would know?" Sir Thomas answers, "Why, Richard, you would know. And, SO would your friends. And, so would yout students. And God. Not a bad audience, that!"

Truly good leader-teachers may not receive general officer stars, but they are satisfied knowing, in theit own minds and hearts, they are good. And, that their friends know. And, more important, that their soldiers know. And, maybe best ofall, that God knows. Also, not a bad audience, that!

National Security Management Course Offering The National Security Management (NSM) Course, presented by the National

Defense University (NDl)), is open to qualified Active and Reserve officers as well as selected civilians from the public and private sectors. The course reflects the curricula of both the National Wat College and the Industrial o,llege of the Armed Forces with emphasis on the formulation of defense and foreign policy and the allocation of resources to achieve US strategic objectives. Interested parties should contact National Defense University, ATTN: NDU-IHOS, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, OC 20319-6000, AUTOVON 335-1850 or (202)475-1850.


A U.S. Code of Military Ethics By MajorJohn C. Buckingham Jr.,

US Marine Corps Proceedings,December1989

"The U.S. armed forces have been invaded by business erhics," says Marine Corps Major john C. Buckingham Jr. in rhe December 1989 issue of Pmceedings.

According to Buckingham, this invasion began in World War II with General Geurge C. Marshall. Buckingham quotes from Richard Gabriel's To S""", with HOt1Ot: "Faced with the necessity of pulling together the multiple centers of economic and social power ro fighr rhe conflict on a grand scale, Marshall turned to the only model available to him which had some experience in the field of organization and was consistent with the values of democracy and free enterprise-the embryonic business cot:p<Y ration."

Buckingham says that prior to World War II, the military was a closed society and had an ideal setting for a morality and ethics of its own. At that time, "the traditional ·duty, honor, cOlmtry' was a suffi, dent statement of the code of ethics." But the huge increase in the size of the Anned Forces at the be· ginning of the war and "the need to organize these forces and to draw all our war.fighting resources together caused us to look to industry."

After the war, "the United States maintained an expanded military establishment." And the estab· lishment maintained "the entrepreneurial approach to efficiency," The "entrepreneurial practices at the expense of" rhe prewar "traditional military values has proved disastrous," asserts Buckingham.

He says rhe military now parallels the civilian technological society's specialization and division of labor and "managerial expettise is glorified at the expense of heroism and leadership." He says, "Indi· cators of success for managers are often the biggest detractors from leadership." He uses, as an example, a commander who feels obligated to report inflated levels of readiness on his readiness report so he is in tune wirh the philosophy of his superiors. This "detracts from a commander's personal integrity as well as the unit's efficiency."

He says, "One danger of this ... is. . . the acceptance of institutional nonns at the expense of liberal thought." He contends this conservatism has stifled the military for years and that it can impact on professional competence. He dtes an example from David Halberstam's The Best and the Brightest. Gen· eral Earle G. Wheeler, then chainnan of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, "agreed with President Lyndon john· son's decision not to mobilize the reserves during the Viemam conflict even though it was public knowl· edge that General Wheeler thought mobilization was imperative to invoke the national will and to preclude the 'partial commitment' he feared most." Buckingham asks, "If the general or flag officer, who has the least to lose, is swayed by the institutional conservatism, what real hope exists for the young officer with innovative ideas and aspirations for the profession?"

Buckingham continues, liThe military's institu~ tionalization of business ethics has left the anned forces with no set ofethics at all." He contends it has created a spirit of «every man for himself." But "we are sworn to uphold the common good." The main~ terrance of the cultural values set furth in the Con· stitution "does not allow for enttepteneurial self· interest."

There is an existing basis for a code of ethics explains Buckingham. He cites various documents "such as the enlistment oath, the officer's commis~ sion, the Code of Conduct, and the Secretary of the Navy's Standards of Conduct" as alluding to ethical standards.

In a sidebar to his article, Buckingham says it would be presumptuous of him to propose a "Mili. tary OxIe of Ethics." He says no one person can postulate a code for a profession, but he does propose some elements that he thinks should be considered. They are:

• "We are repositories of the respect of our nation ... We must never presume any other en.. titlement."

• 'IWe receive the special trust and confidence of our country only through selfless service ... We must never allow self·interest to prevaiL"

• ;jOur word must be sacrosanct, such integrity goes to the heatt of our leadership."

• «We must strive constantly . . . to preserve


justice within our ranks." III "Above all, we must never forget that noble

ends are seldom, if ever, achieved through unethical means."

To conclude, he says, "Our duty requires per~ petual vigilance and commitment. Ethical breaches 'a mile from the flagpole' can no longer be condoned. Today, the flagpole is everywhere, all the time."-DGR

The Transnational Drug Trade and Regional Security

By Michael J. Dziedzic Survival, November-December 1989

Although the drug crisis that has afflicted this country has significant impact on the domestic policies of this nation, the author, an associate professor at the US Air Force Academy, states that the implications for our foreign policy are also significant.

Despite the dire threat to our domestic security, "the implications of illegal drug use extend well beyond the drug-consuming state, and certainly threaten the security of producing states,» says Dziedzic.

"Drug trafficking is a transnational phenomenon," he says. "While TOC Ithe drug cartels] are nationally based (as with the Medellfn 'Cartel' in Colombia~ their operations involve transactions that regularly flow across national boundaries."

The danger of the business is underscored by the potential threat to the security of the producing nations. "The TOC thus have the means to convert themselves into a state~within.-a.-stat:e," says Dziedzic.

The-author asserts, "In the Americas, the ravages of the drug trade have escalated to the point where they may now exceed Communist subversion as a regional security concern."

Latin America has several vulnerabilities to the drug trade. He notes the vulnerability threatening the nations' governments: "Much interpersonal and governmental interaction is perfonned on the basis of infonnal patron-client relations ... But the practice affords criminal elements an opening to employ the same techniques for their illicit ends."

This, with the coercive methods employed by the drug cartels, makes governing honestly difficult. "Understandably, many wish to avoid confronting the ruthlessness of the drug mafta; lacking other options, they co-operate."

Dziedzic discusses the situations in several Latin American countries. In Mexico, "this sttaregically vital country has the misfortune to be situated next

SUMMARIES

docr to the world's largest market for illegal narcotics."

Although cocaine is not produced in Mexico, this does not protect Mexico from the transnational nature of the trade. "In addition to the attraction of a porous 2,OOO-mile border, there was the potential to exploit the logistical infrastructure already established by indigenous marijuana and heroin traffickers." This has threatened the highest levels of the Mexican government, as demonstrated by the case of a murdered US Drug Enforcement Administration agent there and the uncooperative reac~ tion by the government, despite pressure from the United States, to solve the crime.

The Mexican military has also felt the impact of this corruption. "Press reports of a major drug raid in San Diego, California, in January 1988 indicate three of the 12 ringleaders were active or retired anny officers, ranging in rank from lieutenant colo-nel to general," says the author.

"President Carlos Salinas de Gortari has openly proclaimed the drug threat to be a crucial challenge to Mexico's national security, tl he says, "Illicit drugs pose a serious threat to Mexico's key institutions of law and order:' This situation is not unique.

In Colombia, the government is threatened by a powerful coalition of the cocaine drug cartels. "Events of recent years, however, suggest that they may effectively be above the law," says Dziedzic.

The murder of a political candidate in 1989 caused a reaction by the Colombian government that almost resulted in civil war. This event threatened the very institutions of the democracy there. "Indeed, the nation's judges threatened to bring the entire judicial process to a halt if the goverrunent could not provide them with adequate protection from retribution by the drug cartels," says the author.

Bolivia is another case to be examined. The 1980 coup that put General Luis Garda Meza in power was reportedly funded by drug kings. Although he has passed ftom the scene, it is important to remember the illustraUQ!1Q(the power of these groups.

"Until 1985, no Bolivian government bad even artempted to declare any form of coca production illegal, in large part because of the time-honoured acceptance of the practice ... The stark reality is that the Bolivian economy has got itself hooked on cocaine," he says.

"Bolivian public opinion would undoubtedly coalesce around the nationalist sentiment that it is totally unacceptable to place the burden of solving the drug problem on the backs of the Bolivian peasantry." He adds, "Rule by military strongmen with ties to the drug underworld could not be ruled out as


a potential alternative," «Peru is the world's leading source of coca leaf,

accounting for well over half of the global supply," notes Dziedzic. The difference ben\'cen Peru and Bolivia is that Peru is the horne to one of the world's most vicious insurgencies. The Sendero Luminoso garners an estimated $30 million a year in return for their protection in the drug-growing regions of the country. "The result has been the creation of a vir~

tual sanctuary for the illicit drug business and the fortification of a virulent threat to Perujs be~ leaguered democracy."

Dziedzic points out the political implications of this threat: "As a general proposition, the more in~ valved a governmental agency is in combating illegal drug tmfficking, the more likely it is to be compromised. , , In sum, the drug trade represents a tw()~pronged threat to govenlment authority; it pre~

sents a challenge to central control over the country, and it undemlines vital institutional pillars of the regime stability."

There are faNeaching implications for the re~ gion's security, that may cause a reexamination of US policy. "After four decades of exertion against the 'evil empire' of Communism, two states have fallen under firm OmlffiLUlist domination ... While it would be premature to consign the rhreat o£leftwing subversion to the historical dustbin (clearly El Salvador and Peru continue to face especially vir~ ulent threatsA the old 'evil empire' has probably been superseded in its potential to undennine re~ gional stability by the transnational drug empire." The author states, "Owing to the growth and per,

si,tence of the drug threat, it would not be prudent for policy,makers to subordinate eft-clfts to deal with this menace to policies aimed exclusively at counter' ing Communist expansionism."

Dziedzic asserts, "The drug trade is also a [Tans, national phenomenon. Drug syndicates have devel, oped the capacity to operate with complete disdain for national boundaries." He urges restraint in the use of military forces in the fight, stating that gov, emments may lose control of these organizations that are armed more for paramilitary operations than defense, "A more desirable course of action would be to train and equip specialized police forces in a manner adequate to deal with this security threat."

"To break the supply-demand relationship, it will be essential f()r the consuming nations to implement effective demand reduction progmmmes," he says, He also warns of the threat that the producer countries may be tumed into consuming countries. A variety of steps must be taken to counter the drug threat, all of rhem part of a carefully thought-our seCluity policy.

In order to fannulate this national and regional security policy, the author calls for more research on the strategic aspects of the drug trade and collection of more specific data on the drug cartels. He con, cludes, "While transnational drug trafficking is not likely ever to be rotally eradicated, a reasonable objective would be to reduce it to the point that TOC possess neither the finances nor the firepower to challenge state secutity."-JMP

Military Review Writing Contest Reminder Articles for the 1990 MiUrary Re<,",w writing contest will be accepted until 30

June 1990. This year's topic for entries is "The Post-Cold War Army." The author of the winning manuscripr will receive $500 and the article will be published in MiUrary Review in the fall of 1990. The award for second place will be $200; third place will earn $100. Omfine your essays to between 2,000 and 3,000 words and make them original manuscripts not previously offered elsewhere for publication. Send your articles to Military Review, US Army O>mmand and General Staff O>llege, Funston Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6910.

US Naval History Articles Needed The sixth annual competition for the US Navy prize in naval history is open.

Sponsored jointly by the US Naval Historical Center and the US Naval Historical Foundation, the competition is for the best scholarly article on US naval history published during 1989. The winner will receive $500 and a certificate. All nominations should include a copy of the nominated article and must be received no later than 30 June 1990. Nominations for articles should be sent ro: Director of Naval Hisrory, Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Building 57, Washington, DC 20374.


~ETTERS CAS Sorties Decided by Army

Lieutenant Colonel Victor F. Frysinger's letter in Military Review, December 1989, expressed a common, but erroneous, opinion held by many US Anny officers conceming dose air support (CAS). His premise is that if the US Air Force were to pro~ cure a CAS aircrafr capable ofperfonning orher missions, then the Air furce might reduce the number of CAS sorties available to the Anny group or corps commander. The decision of whether to use avail~ able sorties as air defense, interdiction or CAS rests with the joint force commander, who, in almost all imaginable scenarios, is an Army officer.

To obrain an aircraft that is only capable of perfanning CAS would unnecessarily restrict the theater commander's ability to counter the most severe and immediate threat to his forces. Air power, like all military capabilities. has inherent limitations such as those caused by poor weather and darkness. To undercut a primary strength-flexibility-based on a false perception is unsOlmd. Fortunately, our senior officers-starting with both chiefs of stafffully understand and support the concepts that: the joint force commander allocates sorties based on the perceived threat; the Anny designates the desired effect to be achieved by air power; and the Air Force detennines how best to accomplish thar effect.

Rather than waste time oecond-guessing the policies of a future joint task force commander, we junior officers should work hard to learn the doctrine, procedures and hardware that can best execute joint decisions. Some examples are:

• With the tough problem of target acqUisition and designation, how do we find the second echelon and give quality targeting data to the correct weapons system in a timely manner?

• How·do we execute joint suppression of en, emy air defenses?

• HoW do we integrate the increasing capa, bilities ofAnny systems such as jTACMS (Joint Tactical Missile System~ the Apache and MLRS (multiple launch rocket system) with the requirement for air.-space coordination for Air Force attack aircraft?

The hardware is coming for JSTARS (Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System~ GPS {Global Positioning System~ ATHS (Automatic Target Handoff System) and others. junior officers must


~ work together to develop the doctrine, procedures and training to employ these systems effectively.

COLA. Lee Hanell, USAF, Vice Commander, S07th Tactical AirConIrol Wmg, Shaw Air force Base, South Carolina

Shaping Public Opinion Not Military's Role

The Armed Forces do not have active roles in shaping American public opinion, contrary to what Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Angelle stated in his article, "US Anned Forces Public Affairs Roles in Low,Imensity Conflict," Military Review, January 1990. Public affairs officers and psychological operations officers cannot target the American public. P~blic opinion can sustain suppon for military oper' attOns, but shaping that opinion is not our job.

Our most important role concerning public infor, mation for l<JW-'intensity conflicts is to provide unfet· tered, independent media coverage while protecting operations security. We are required by constitu, tional guarantees and public law to provide coverage of US operations, irrespective of public opinion.

The unified commands often hamper media coverage of US crisis actions and contingencies because of le~itimate conce~ for operations security. Until we mtegrate operanons security.-conscious public affuirs planning with other operational planning, we Will fall short m our legal and moral responsibilities to the American public, as we did in Grenada, the Persian Gulf and, most recently, in Panama.

The Department of Defenoe public affairs professionals should concentrate on these legal and moral responsibilities of infonning the public and leave public opinion shaping to the feckless world of civilian public relations.

LTC John B. Head,VSA, Public AJI'iWlo 0f1ket; Fortl..etwwm.-tb, Kansas

Add These Movies To the List

1 enjoyed Brigadier General Richard A. Behrenhausen's "From My Bookshelf' (Military Review, january 1990) review of the movies he has.enjoyed, but I thought that there should have been some addi

87

tions to tbe list, He mCI1tions Red Badge of Courage for its P{)f

tra}'al of courage on the battlefield. Audie Murph}' starred in the movie, but he scored as well with his autobiogmphy, To Hell and Back. Another standout movie about courage is The Hanoi Hilum, the most faithful and realistic telling of the terrible ordeal suffered by American prisoners of war (POWs) in Hoa Lo prison, The POWs never lost their couragc f and they outlasted their captors,

The pressures of command arc Hlustrated, surprisingly well in T<,bruk, the story of an Allied commando raid on Gennan fuel supplies in LibYd in 1942. Nigel Green is quite good as the British commander who must conduct the mission while sup~

pressing (not entitely successfully) his intense dislike of a group of Gennan Jews who masquerade as Ger~ man soldiers transporting British POWs.

The pressures of nuclear command are dealt with very well in the film, FaiL-Safe. Primarily about the accidentaiiaullch of a nuclear bomber force against Moscow, the attempts by the Strategic Air C'..om~ mand and the president to stop the bombers and figure out how to appease the Russians, should the pR"Vcntive measures fail, give an excellent insight into the pressures of nuclear command. The per~

formances are excellent, especially those by tritz Weaver, Frank Overton, Larry Hagman and Sorrell Booke, early in their careers. It is the best of the nllclear~wardramas.

Tara! Tara! Tara!, as well as The Longest Day, is excellent in recounting the events that made the day in question so unique in history. It is a full.Jress re-creation of the attack on Pearl Harbor and the military and diplomatic maneuvering that took place before the attack. It captures both the look and the feel of 7 December 1941, and the rremen> dollS effort to make the film shows on the screen.

Hamburger Hill is by far the best of the Vietnam films in its realistic portrayal of combat and the pres' sures of command, The racial tensions that afflicted the Army are dealt with well and there is no pelitical axe to grind, as compared with Platoon or Born on the Fourth ofJuly.

The most politically appropriate film of the latter 19805 is hardly a realistic war film, but Rambo III puts "flesh and blood" to the widespread feelings about the "death" of communism. The battle scenes are spectacular~ and the desert settings ate beautiful.

These are some of the additions that could have been on Behrenhausen's movie list.

Mkhael DaI% Wake6eld, Massacb_


The Center 1m- Army Lessons Learned (CALL) provides combat-relevant lessons learned and acts as an agent of change f&r the Total Army. A .lulxm1inate agency of the Combined An!1S Training Activity and the OmWined Arms C..enter, CALL collects, analyzes and disseminates lessons learned from a ..."iety of sources, incluJing training exercises, combat training center mta!io!1S, historical source, and doctrinal research. CALL FORUM will assist in the dissemination process by periodically presenting recent lem",s learned in one or more of the seven battlefield operating systems.

RECONNAISSANCE: The Combat Training Center Experience

Reconnaissance is an intelligence mission, de~ signed to gather information upon which com~ manders may base plans, orders and decisions. Re~ connaissance is absolutely crucial to combat success, and there is little doubt that the opposing forces (OPFORs) at the combat training centers (LICs) (the National Tmining Center [NTC], Fort Irwin, California, the Joint Readines, Tmining Center URTC], Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; Combat Maneuver Tmining Center, Hohenfds, West Gennany, ,md the Bartle Command Tmining Program, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas) rely heavily upon their reconnaissance. It might be useful to review the OPFORs'

success at the CfCs in light of the importance they attach to reconnaissance: the OPFORs strive for 90 percent location of Blue force crew-served weapons and combat vehicles. Like the Soviers, they also attempt to put hwnan eyes on all critical objectives. They usually achieve hath of these goals. From the Blue force perspective, what follows are lessons learned.

Units must first learn to use and integrate all of their reconnaissance assets if they are to be sue.. cessful. The first and most important of these is the individual soldier. The soldier can conduct partals, man listening posts/observation posts or augment the reconnaissance unit. Every single soldier should be sensitive to the need for lnfonnation gathering and reporting. Soldiers in the unit trains need to report suspicious activity or vehicle tracks:


The mainstay of any reconnaissance effort is the scout platoon. This highly trained and motivated force is ideally suited for any reconnaissance mission, but is an extremely limited asset. Without care, it can literally be run into the ground, and scouts are difficult to teplace.

Pattols in both heavy and light units ate ctiticaL Heavy units are often slow to dismount, and light units need to refine their patrolling techniques and use them more often.

There are other reconnaissance as.-.:ets available, such as: ground surveillance radar (GSR\ engineers, the divisional chemical reconnaissance platoon and remote sensors (REMS). GSRs can be attached to any reconnaissance element. Engineers can qUickly and efficiently report, mark or breach any obstacles found. The divisional chemical reconnaissance pla~ toon can be an invaluable asset. Technology can be made to work for us in a reconnaissance role by use of REMS. The OH58D, a superb aircraft, is extremely effective at gathering information over a wide area.

All of these asset5 are useless without a solid rc; connaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan genetated by good intelligence preparation of the battlefield. The various reconnaissance elements must be combined into a single effort with unity of com" mand. Simple items, such as getting common graph.. ics to all elements concerned, cannot be ignored. The R&S plan is crucial in confirming Ot denying how the commander and stafI think the enemy will fight. When no guidance or priority intelligence requirements are given to the reconnaissance eIe; ment, the reconnaissance effort fails. The recon;

CALL FORUM

naissance effort fails 53 percent of the time at the N1C and 80 petcent of the time at the )R1C.

The scout platoon/reconnaissance elements must be assigned proper missions. They cannot be everywhere and do everything. Because of the importance of their reconnaissance tasks, they should be kept from any fighting or resource.-draining activity that is not mission essential. During continuous operations j the reconnaissance element is prone to suffer sevetely from lack of proper test.

A good reconnaissance plan has led to success (the unit took its objective) at the CTCs two-thirds of the time, while a poor one has led to mission failure (the unit failed to take its objective) 78 percent of the time. The effort must have clear pri; orities and achievable tasks.

Asking too much of the reconnaissance element is almost as bad as asking too little of it. Yet, despite the imporrance of good battlefield reconnaissance, few units do it well. With constant emphasis on an improved reconnaissance effort, this crucial link to battlefield success can become a US sttength. Reconnaissance pays big dividends when done COtrectly. Pay the price to do it right - the enemy does!

The Scout Platoon Leaders Course at Fort Knox, Kentucky, is an excellent course that teaches armor and mechanized infantry battalion scout platoon leaders the fundamentals of reconnaissance. Currently, only a small petcentage of scout platoon leaders have artended. Fiscal Year 1989 figures show no chemIcal reconnaissance platoon attendees and only 17 percent of the participants are armor and mechanized infantry scout platoon leaden;.

CPr Alan R. Hom, USA, CAll, Z-AnaI,oIoDMoion


SECRET SERVANT: My Life with the KGB & the Soviet Elite by Ilya Dzhirkvelov. 398 pages. Simon & Schuster Inc., New York. 1989. $10.95 paperback.

Secret Servant is a powerful account of the life of Ilya Dzhirkvelov, a World War II combat veteran and the recipient of many Soviet honors. Today, he is wanted as a Soviet traitor. For 37 years, until his defection in late March 1980, he served as a fulltime officer with the KGB, the Soviet secret pelice and intelligence agency. He insists that it was a per, senal injustice that prompted his defection. Had it been otherwise, he would· still be a "secret servant" of the regime he followed so long. He makes no

claim that the events he describes are historically decisive, but he does claim his story is true.

He unflinchingly recounts his undercover activities in Russia, Europe and Africa-from bug, ging embassies and recruiting journalists to eliminating Soviet enemies. His purpose is to explain the Soviet regime by providing a glimpse of life from the point of view of the guardians of the Soviet systern. He details his rise through the ranks under Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev and exposes the workings of the KGB, its command structure, operational techniques, its intrigues and corruptions.

During his career, he was privy to Stalin's outwit,


ting Roosevelt and ChutchiH at Yalta; he took part in the active constmction of socialism in the 1950s; he witnessed the pnwer struggle after Stalin's death; he saw the consequences of the liquidation of the. personality cult of Stalin during the Khrushchev era; and he became disillusioned with everything under Brezhnev, Throughout all of these episodes, he con, tinued to be faithful to a system that was decaying from the top. Dzhirkvelov sees the dilemma of the Soviet people as saying one thing and thinking another. He concludes they are totally indifferent and disillusioned by the many promises that have not been kept, by a difficult economic situation that never seems to improve and by the continued propaganda managed by the Central Committee that extols the quality and virtues of &wiet life.

Dzhirkvelov's ideas are lucid and clear. The book is well organized with a brief introduction and four major sections detailing the training of KGB agents, decision making at the upper levels of Soviet govem~

ment, KGB operations at home and abroad and media operations within and outside the Soviet Union. Each section describes Dzhirkvclov's role and activities and relates these to major occurrences in the Soviet Union. Many mysterious events are revealed in key intervals of Soviet history.

Secret Servant is recommended reading for military personnel, historians, political scientists and others interested in the Soviet system, espionage or subver~ sion. Intelligence personnel will find the presenta, tion enlightening on KGB operations, while the his~ torian or political scientist will find insight into the Soviet government and its role as a superpower. LTCJohn Po Farr, USAR, Retired, Chattanooga, Tennessee

RETREAT HELU We're Just F'llhting in Another Direction by Jim Wilson. 352 pages. William Morrow & Co., Inc., New York. 1988. $19.95 clothbound. Pocker Books, New York. 1988. $4.50 paperback.

It has been pepular for many years to view the Korean War as the most neglected of the modem US attned conflicts. In the past four years, hnwever, an avalanche of books on this war has descended on the reading market. A number of thesenewer works, as well as quite a few of the older histories, have given attention to the saga of the US 1st Marine Division in the Chasin Reservoir campaign of late autumn, 1950. Among the recent books, William Hopkin's One Bugle No Drums is notable on the 1st Marine Division, while Russell Spurr's Enter the Dragon is unique in presenting the Communist Chi, nese perspective of the action.

It seems strange, therefore, that another study of

the Chosin operation would appear so soon. What does Jim Wilson, a US Army veteran of the Korean War and, later, a distinguished journalist, purport to add that is original and worthwhile? Though Wilson makes no such claims in his text, the publisher's promotional statements declare that the Marines' Chusin saga "had never been properly told" and that uno one had ever interviewed the veterans of the 1st Marines." Serious researchers of that war will be sur~ prised to read this, for probably no post' I945 cam, paign has been more closely studied, and rightly so, in terms of the heights of violence, arduous condi~ tions and gallantry on the road from the Chosin Reservoir to the North Korean port of Hungnam.

What Wilson actually contributes is the most gripping account yet of the operation from the per~ spectives of Marine cornpany~grade officers, non~ commissioned officers and enlisted men. He may not have been the first to interview a considerable group of the survivors, but his text is loaded with so many vivid, first hand observations by the Chasin Marines that Wilson's book undoubtedly tops all the others in not only recording the remark., of hun~ dreds of the combat participants but also providing, through their words, a hellishly accurate and power, ful impression of the campaign. It is a good read, then, about a classic feat of tactics and heroism that deserves to be told again and again.

D. ClaytonJarnes, Virginia Military Instirure. Lexingtnn, Viqpnia

STRATEGIC PARTNERS: South Korea and the United States by Richard L. Detrio. 98 pages. US Gov' ernment Printing Office, Washington, DC. 1989. $3.25.

In this very brief analytical work, Richard L. Detrio accomplishes a notable feat-a complete, factual, authoritative and infonnative examination of bnth the background and constraints that South Korea and the United States share. The primary pur' pose of this wnrk is to present the issues and strategic positions of bnth sides and to adequately develop a viable consensus of the needs and resources for an effective US strategy in the near tettn and the long term.

Through examination ofthe important issues that face these two impettant allies, Strategic Partners aN'

ers a broad array of strategic issues as seen through South Korean and US eyes. By presenting an over, view of past. present and furure possibilities for pel, icy fannulation and PQtential courses of action of the two countries, the work examines many issues of importance-the political, economic and military dimensions of the efforts to implement an effective


strategy; the cuttent military balance of powet for all countries associated with the region (including North and South Korea, United States, Soviet Union and Communist China); possible future trends for policy formulation; potential US strategic optionsj and an overview ofSouth Korea'seconomic potential and power and what effect it would have on US decision making.

While Strategic Partners does not provide an in~

depth analysis, it does lend itself to the reader who desires to learn more about the overall issues and areas of strategic interest important to policy formulation of both countries. In as short a time span as possible, Detrio presents a thought,provoking, infonnative analysis that instructs and holds the reader's attention. This short investment in time would be well spent.

CPr Richard D. Koethe ID, Tennessee ARNG, Memphis, Tennessee

HAMBURGER HILL: May Eleventh-Twentieth, Nineteen Sixty~Nine by Samuel Zaffiri. 328 pages. Pre~

sidio Press, Novato, CA. 1988. $18.95 clothbound. Pocker Books, New York. 1989. $450 paperback.

The IO-day battle to take Dong AI' Bia in the northem A Shau Valley in South Vietnam in midMay 1969 was one of the bloodiest campaigns of the Vietnam War. The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) fought renaciously during the 1969 effort to clear the area, as the A Shau Valley was a major supply route into the northern I Corps ractical zone.

While the soldiers of the IOlst Airborne Division's 3d Brigade were successful in wrestling the mountain (nicknamed "Hamburger Hill" in recog~ nition of the manner in which casualties were churned out) from the resolute defenders of the NVA's 29th Regiment, theirs was a Pyrrhic victory. In the grim struggle for Hill 937, 70 US soldiers and an estimated 633 NVA soldiers died and 372 Americans and an unknown number of North Vietnamese were wounded. Media coverage of the battle stirred up a hornet's nest of protest at home, culmi.nating in an order issued from the White House to avoid large-scale ground operations against the enemy and to give battle only when US ttoops were threatened.

The central focus of Samuel Zaffiri's account is Lieutenant Colonel Weldon "Tiger" Honeycutt's 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry, which made initial contact with the NVA on Dong AI' Bia on 11 May and conducted repeated assaults on the dug.-in defenders over the next nine days, before finally driving them off on 20 May with the assistance of the 1st Bat-

BOOK REVIEWS

talion, 506th Infantry. Zaffiri describes the violent NVA sapper attack on Firebase Airbome on the night of 12 May. In this 9O-minute battle, 26 US soldiers died and 62 were wounded. Colonel Joseph Conmy, 3d Brigade commander, called it "the worst result from a sapper attack I have ever seen:'

Zaffiri provides a balanced assessment, based on both primary and secondary sources, that gives a carefully reasoned critique of the Anny's scarchand-destroy strategy without being overly critical of the executors of that Strdtegy. Battalion commanders and command sergeants major will find enough material, with detailed analysis of the terrain, packed into the pages of this tightly wrirten bock to keep officer and noncommissioned officer prafes.sional development classes busy for months with uwhat now?" scenarios, Hamburger Hill is a quick, compelling read. Zaffiri relied largely on personal interviews, correspondence and combat after.-action reports and skillfully blends his narrarive with anecdotal material. It is the manx'chilling, sometimes poignant, vigriettes that make the addition of this volume to any soldier's bockshelf a must. CPT Dale E. Wilson, USA, pepartment ofHisron; VSMA

THE MASKS OF WAR: American Military Styles in Strategy & Analysis by Qlrl H. Builder. 240 pages. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD. 1989. $28.00 clothbound. $10..95 paperback.

This fascinating bock rests on the premise that the three major military services each have distinct "institutional personalities" that account for their actions and behavior. By identifying these institutional personalities, the author attempts to see through "the masks of war" which are held up to screen many of the service actions and policies g0verned by institutional motives or self.-interest.

The author, Carl H. Builder, present' the service personalities through five "faces" thar highlight differences rather than similarities among services. These five faces include: altars for worship; concerns with self~measurement; preoccupation with toys ver.sus the arts; degrees or extent of branch distinctions; and insecurities'. about service legitimacy and rele, vancy. Builder· examines" the services' individual approaches to strat<:gy and "ll~lysis and then leads into his secti<lill' o"t);!plarming ilIlplications and prospects for thefuture'i'l'" ~

This bock i~ not a diatribe "ll!'inst any ofthe three services or th~. military;~rvice. in general.. On the contrary, military men'llre p~sented as dedicated individuals ".,po all' prljud of~the crafts and duties

MILITARY REVIEW· April 1990 91

they perfonn in service to the nation. The US Army wins pmise as "the most open and straightfiJrward of the American military institutions," that, "alone among the services, has the security and humility to tolerate, even encourage, what has been attempted here," And this "security" is needed when reading the book's assertions about the US Anny's "identity crisis" and "lmrealistic" plans for fighting a big war in Central Europe. The author claims that these plans are actually based on rhe US Anny's unusual experience as liberators during· the final years of World War llo "For the Anny, Europe is rhe only invitation that it will get to the prom of its fondest memories."

The author admits that service identities drawn from historical behavior may not be totally accurate in predicting future events. He supports his belief with some examples-fighter pilots superseding bomber pilots in control of the US Air Force; sub~ mariners rising in importance relative to aviators; and surface "-'3rfare officers in the Navy, However.

PASS IN REVIEW

the book does assert that the institutional identities-whether cortectly idenrified by the book or not - "are likely to be one of the most stable aspects of the nation's future security prospects."

MAJ Scott R. Gourley, tJSAR, Arcata, Califomia

CHEMICAL WEAPONRY, A Continuing Challenge by Edward M. Spien;. 217 pages. St. Martin', Press, Inc., New York. 1989. $45.00.

The use of toxic chemicals in the Iran;Iraq war, as well as the construction of a chemical weapons (acil~ itI' by one of the world's foremost sponsors of terrorism, Moamar alDaddafi of Libya, has once again raised the specter of chemical warfare. Soldien; and statesmen entrusted with the defense of this nation against external threats are·rnuch more interested in the chemical threat than they were a few years ago.

Chemical Weaponry deals with chemical agents and the munitions used to deliver them on the bat~

THE BERLIN AIRLIFT by Ano "od John Tusa. 445 pages. Atheneum Publishers, New YQd:.. 1988, $24.95.

UNGUIDED MISSILES, How America Buys Its Weapons by Fen Osler Hampson. 348 pages.W. W. Norton & Q)., Inc., New York. 1989. $19.95.

THE UNKNOWN CIA, My Three Decades with the Agency by Russell Jack Smith. 221 pages. Pergamon Brassey's International Defense Publishers, McLean, VA. 1989. $18.95.

With some recent headlines proclaiming that the Cold War is over, an accounting of its first major "battle" could not be more timely. This book details the airlift from its first days as a "cowboy operation" to a Ilrelief program without precedent or comparable sequel." The threat to Berlin gave Westem nations the impetus for a mutual defense pact. NAID went from drawing board to final draft in the middle six months of the blockade. This book is a primer on the Cold War's origins and integrates lessons that are sometimes forgotten in this age of Ilmediazed detente."CPT Robin Stod<Wd, USA, 162 1JK:tiaJFJg/IterGroup, Tucson, Arizona

This is the latest in a spate of books and articles about waste, fraud and inefficiency in the weapons systems acquisition process. Fen Osler Hampson has written several books on defense-related topics. He traces the history of the B-I bomber, the cruise missile, the Trident submarine, the Trident missile, the M I tank and the MX missile, and attempts to show the similarities in. the systems acquisition process. He asserts that successful weapons were procured almost by accident. His recommendations for refonn are by now familiar: multiyear budgeting, faster weapons development times and stteamlined bureaucracies. He does, however, offer some new theoretical insights as to why the process works the way it does. -Charles Dale, Booz, Allen & 1IJuni1too, Inc., 8etIJesJa, Maryt.nd

Russell Jack Smith, the former deputy director of intelligence, who retired in 1974. proposes to communicate the "vivid moments" of his 27 years in the "unknown" analysis and reporting area of the Cennallntelligence Agency (CIA). The largely dispassionate memories are detailed and enrertaining. The historical insight into the Office of National Esti-


tlefield. Edward M. Spiers makes the very valid point that although chemical and biological weap· ons by themselves may not be decisive, as is true of other weapons systems, such weapons have an lmpor~ tant role as '"force multipliers" that compound the effects ofother weapons and compel the adversary to fight while encumbeted by his ptotective gear.

Spiers surveys the developments in chemical de~ fense ftom World War I to today's detection, protec· tion and decontamination equipment and stresses that all the advances made have not yet solved the problems of "physiological, thermal, and psycholog· ical stresses" imposed on soldiers operating in full protective gear. The fact that temperatures over 77 degrees Fahrenheit preclude working more than 30 minutes must be sobering to anyone concemC\1 with the operational aspect of battle!

Spiers covers the use of chemicals in the trench warfare of World War I and the experiences in the Russian Civil War, Ethiopia, China and Yemen. There is a good discussion of the alleged use of

BOOK REVIEWS

chemical weapons in Afghanistan and Scutheast Asia that includes evidence that the lI yeltow rain" used there was a man~made mycotoxin.

The threat is presented on three levels - the con~ ventional threat from the Warsaw Pact, the pros-pects for use in the Third World or by terrorists. Spiers is not optimistic about the last two threats. Both have already occurred. Terrorists' use includes the cyanide poisoning of citrus from Israel by the Palestinians in 1978, the poisoning ofpineapples by Huk guerrillas in the Philippine insurgency and the attempted extortion of$15 million ITom Cyprus, backed by the threat of exploding canisters ofdioxin.

Spiers concludes by exploring the current problems of chemical w.:umre and discusses what the future might bring beth in the offensive use of such weapons and in defensive technology. He if> particu~ larly concerned with developments in biotech· nology for production of existing toxins on a large scale or invention of entirely new ones. Such devel~ oprnents favor the offensive over the defensive

DUNKIRK: The Complete Story of the Fint Step in the Defeat ofHider by Nonnan Gelb. 300 pages. William Morrow & Company, New York. 1989. $19.95.

RADIO WARFARE, OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda by Lawrence C. Soley. 264 pages. Praeger Publishers, New York. 1989. $24.95.

mates and the feeling for the critical role ofestimates in previous national polic.y decisions are useful. This is lightweight, we\\-crafted prose that gives as much "Smith" as as it does CIA.-cPr Michael R. Lewis, USA, Abenleen Proving Groumfs, Maryland

This entertaining book is writren for the popular market and the military buff. Norman Gelb's intention is to convey the human experience of the Dunkirk evacuation, something he does quite well. However, for the serious student of military history, Gelb's exclusive and uncritical reliance on British sources, his penchant for hypothetical conjecture and his neglect of French and German materials prevent this from being a major contribution. Although far better than most of its genre, it does not tell the "complete story" of the Dunkirk Campaign.-Ilrian M. Unn, Texas A&M University.; CoOege Station, reDS

Radio War/are "examines propaganda strategy of Hitler's Germany, Brit· ish responses to this strategy and the effect of British actions on U.S. psychwar techniques." The emphasis is on "U.S. subversive warfare." It implicitly raises important policy questions. How do public affairs programs differ from propaganda? Can we avoid de meto propagandizing of our citizens with govemment~fundedactivities? When is hiding the true source of a radio broadcast or conveying false information morally and strategically defensible? Radio War/are does not attempt to describe how one knows what will happen, when and why. If our understanding is to evolve, systematic analyses, field studies and controlled expetimentation must follow.-LTC IUclumI Iv. Bloom, USAF, OICS, Wa.ohin"ton, DC


because developing new weapons will be much easier than developing defenses against all possible challenges. A sobering thought, indeed!

After receiving his Ph.D. from Edinburgh Univer· sity in 1974, Spiers worked for several years with Imperial Chemical Industries and is currently a reader in Strategic Studies at the University of Leeds. This is a well-done, readable survey, backed by numerous notes and references and an excellent bibliography. It provides enough technical details to be interesting to those who are well read on chern, ical warfare but not too much to confuse the uninitiated.

Daniel E. Spector, Command Historian, Fort McClellan, Alabama

THE COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS: The U.S.. Marines Other War in Vietnam by Michael E. Peterson, 132 pages. Praeger Publishers, Nt-"\\' York. 1989. $39.95.

The US Marine Corps, with its long tradition of involvement in so-called banana wars in the first half of the 20th century, distilled these experiences into the Small Wars Manual, ,published in 1940. According to Michael E. Pererson, the 1962 version that superseded it resulted in an amalgamation of the wrong lessons being applied to the wrong war, and resulted in the US Army and th~ US Marine Corps waging a relatively constant battle over the proper tactics to defeat \he enemy during the Viet· namWar.

In this book, Peterson, a fdImer combined action platexJn (CAP) Marine, traces the development of the Marine Corps counterguerrilla docrrine and compares it to the type of war waged in South Viet· nam. US forces in Vietnam were fighting a partisan guerrilla war. when, in fact, the war at hand was a guerrilla insurgency. The author describes the dif· ferences in the two types of war and details why the methods and objectives in fighting the fonner were inappropriate to counter the latter. Although Marine Corps leaders tried valiantly to adopt the proper tacrics to fight the "right" war, they were stymied by Anny leaders. in Saigon and Washing· ton, DC. The best compromise solution the Marine Corps could find was the CAP program.

The author describes the, development of the CAP program from its humble beginnings in Au· gust 1965 when the first joint action platoons, with both Marine Corps'and Vietllamesepersonnel in the same platoon, were fonned. As the war expanded, so too did rhe number and involvement of the CAPs. After the Tet offensive of 1968, as

"Viemamization" became the byword, rhe CAPs and CACs (combined action companies) received even more attention, until the size of the US pres~ ence in South Vietnam began to be reduced and the number of CAPs and CACs diminished proportionally. The last combined action unit stood down in May 1971.

The author rides the thin line between a sterile, academic accounting of the CAP progrdm and the "I was there" war story memoir. He justifies this work by describing the CAP program as "perhaps the only long·tenn commitment of regular US rrocps to fight the war on the hamlet leveL" Peter· son adequately describes CAP's commendable rec· ord but also admits he has not done the research needed to give the subject total justice. However, the author's tantalizing interviews with the CAP veterans whets the reader's appetite for more. Hope~ fully, there will be more.

LTC Donald C. Snedeker. USA, O£6.re ofthe Cbainnan oftbeJoint Chiefs ofStaff, Washington,IX

HOYT S. VANDENBERG: A life ofa General by Phillip S. Meilinger. 320 pages. Indiana University Press, B1oomingron, IN. 1989. $27.50.

As with many military leaders of the early Cold War, the impottance of General Hoyt S. Vanden· berg, US Air Force (USAF) chief of staff from 1948 to 1953, has been largely overlooked. Lieutenant Colonel Phillip S. Meilinger, a history professor at the USAF Academy, remedies this oversight with an excellent biography of Vandenberg.

Meilinger traces Vandenberg's 30-year USAF career, emphasizing his five~year tenure as the Air Force's second chiefof staff. Building a foundation of professional and technical expertise, Vandenberg demonstrated considerable ability as both a staff officer and planner and gained valuable experience with both strategic and tactical air power during World War ll.

After D-Day, he commanded rhe Ninth Air Force-history's largest tactical air unit. Irnmedi~ ately after the war, Vandenberg was instrumental in the creation of the Strategic Air Command and later helped in the creation of the Central Intel· Iigence Agency. As USAF chief of staff, Vanden· berg conttibuted to the shaping of Cold War mili· tary policy and was deeply involved in its major events: the Berlin airlifr, the development of the hydrogen bomb, the B·36/supercarrier controversy and the Korean War. Throughout his career, Vandenberg maintained a balanced view of air powet; recognizing the primacy of straregic bombing but


the necessity of tactical air support for the ground forces.

In describing Vandenberg's renn as USAF chiefof staff, Meilinger gives an insightful view of the US military establishment as it struggled under severe budgetary constraints and an imperfect defense deci~ sion~making apparatus. Despite these obstacles, the military leadership made plans and set priorities; for Vandenberg, this meant strengthening the Air Force into the nation's first line of defense and a cornerstone of US military policy. In our current era of budgetary constraints, it would be profitable to reflect on the experiences of Vandenberg, who was perhaps the most successful of the military chiefs in achieving his goals.

This book is a first-rate biography that should interest both the general and specialized teadership. Well written and thoroughly researched, this biography sets Vandenberg and his career against the backdrop of the broader theme of the US military experience of the period and provides a better understanding of the growth of US air power and strategy and its place in America's Cold War military policy.

CPT Michael E. B;gdow, USA, Fort Huachuca, Arizona

A PERSONAL WAR IN VIE1NAM by Robert Flynn. 140 pag",. Texas A&M Univer>ity Press, College Station, TX. 1989. $2350 clothbound. $11.95 paperback.

LIte in 1970, Robert Flynn-novelist, univer>ity professor and former Marine-went to Vietnam as a correspondent. He spent almost two months with Oolf Company, Fifth Marines, a unit committed to the Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP).

When he returned to the United States, he encountered a wall of indifference to the war. The magazine that sent him never used any of his arti~

des. His longest story was a book-length piece, but his editor urged him not to publish it for fear of damaging his reputation with bookseller>. In 1972, no one wanted to hear about the Vietnam War, least of all from someone with firsthand information.

Flynn reluctantly shelved his manuscript; but 15 years later he decided to publish it in its original fonn, without rewriting or the benefit of hindsight. The result is a surprisingly different, personal account.

Flynn's work is a valuable piece ofmilitary history because of its detailed descriptions of the daily operations of the CUPP teams. A CUPP team was basically a rifle squad with a Navy corpsman, stationed in a remote Vietnamese village. Each CUPP team's mission was to help the villager> defend themselves

BOOK REVIEWS

and to help dc'Veinp and train the local Vietnamese Popular Forces. The CUPP teams worked and lived with the Vietnamese, day in, day out. For them it was a very personal war.

Flynn does not moralize on the Vietnam War but presents a vivid and compassionate picture of what the war was like for these men. He continually com~ pares the young Marines he met with their counter~ parts in American colleges. He notes that he saw more dL.~';;:;' on t~l~ I.-dilipuses of the period than he saw in the field in Vietnam. He also marvels at the awesome life and death responsibilities routinely shouldered by 20- and 2 I-year-old noncommissioned officers, contrasting it to the refusal of many college students to accept responsibility for even completing the next week's assignment. As one young Marine asked him, "If everyone who has a conscience runs and hides, who do you have making moral decisions?" That still remains the unanswered question of the Vietnam era.

MAJ DavUl T. Zahecld, VSAR, Bexbach, Federal Repubnc ofGermany

GENERAL MAXWELL TAYWR: The SwaM &: the Pen by john M. Taylor. 457 pag"'. Doubleday & ('..0., [nc., New York. 1989. $22.50.

With the rising tide of interest in Vietnam, Max~ well D. Taylor has received a great deal of criticism concerning his role in the United States' tortuous involvement in this conflict. John M. Taylor's book on his father thus comes as a breath offresh air in an otherwise stale cataloging of faults. One of the concerns some critics may have regarding a book writ~ ten by a son about his father is the question of balance. In this instance, the author is able to maintain a consistently even-handed approach to the subject.

Maxwell D. Taylor claimed that the main reaSOn he was appointed ambassador to Viemam was his expendability. As his son points out, the choice of Taylor was based on far more than that. Taylor was a fir>t-rate manager, and President John E Kennedy may have felt that with the combination of the retired general and U. Alexis johnson, a career diplomat, he would have a strong team that could bring order out of the chaos that characterized the US effott. Moreover, the president may have felt tha, with Taylor's military background, he would be effective in dealing with the kaleidoscopic military governments that were emerging following the assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem.

Some of the less favorable aspects of Taylor's involvement with the strategy of the war are dealt with as welL Taylor was a supporter of the policy of

MILITARY REVIEW. Aptill990 95

gradualism, and his son documents his initial back~ ing of that policy and his change of heart later. He IX>ints out that Taylor may have drawn an erroneous parallel between Vietnam in the 19605 and Korea in the 19505, In Korea , the \var brought with it an antiC()mmllnist consensus th;it never t::::tme to the same position of dominance in the political life of Viemam. This possibly prevented Taylor from fully grasping the intricacies of the war, Taylor's position on other controversial topics j such as the enclave strategy and increasing the US presence in Vlet~ nam, are thoroughly analyzed.

The author's writing style is fluid and makes fz)r enjoyable reading, Using a number of untapped sources, to include personal letters and memories of his father in unguarded moments, his son paints a broad~ranging picture of the general. This is a solid biography of one of America's most influential 20th century military figures. It would be worthwhile reading for the casual reader looking for a credible biography, as well as for the serious historian.

MAl Michael Cannon, USA, Tongduchon-Ni, Republic ofKorea

HEARTBREAK RIDGE: Korea, 1951 by Amed L. Hinsbaw. 163 page,. Praeger Publisher>, New York. 1989. $19.95.

This mastenuUy written, historical account of a turning point in the Korean War is one every mili~

t.ry history buff should read. Written in a style that is somewhere between textbook, novel .nd oral history, the author captures the inside story of the men and units that fought this bloody battle.

During the battle, Colonel Adams, the commander of the 23d Regiment, told a reporter, "To send battalion after battalion up this ridge only to have them slaughtered, with no reinforcements to back them up, is such a heattbreak for me:' Thus

was born the name, Heattbreak Ridge, This book tells the story of a war that, according to English historian Michael Langley, Hfor some strange reason, is already passing into military oblivion."

The soldiers of the 2d Infantry Division were tired after a summer of hard fighting. They moved to a new position where "they saw before them a mass of rock and rubble soon to be known as Heartbreak Ridge. Looming 3,000 feet into the gray skies, it menaced the barren landscape like a foreboding landlocked iceberg. Understandably, the men of the Second 'lndianhead' Division might ask, 'Of what possible worth is this naked mountain to me-to my country.'''

The soldiers just wanted a rest. The complex of rugged hills which became known as Heartbreak Ridge was sure to be taken in one day. When they were told that once they took the hill they would be given a well-deserved break, the soldiers mustered the strength to fight once again. And fight they did! This one-day battle lasted more than a month and was filted with unbelievable death, destruction and sacrifice. Adams finally received the call that his troops had taken the hilL "His voice breaking, the colonel hung up the phone, Tears streamed down both sides of his face. 'Finally, it is finished:"

Casualties have been estimated at 3,700 killed, wounded or missing for the 2d Infantry Division and 25,000 for the North Korean and Chinese forces. "No doubt their decisive defeat at Heartbreak Ridge had something to do with the communists sudden decision to resume the slL')pended truce talks. , . less than two weeks after. . , "

This detailed account, complete with maps and photographs, is spellbinding. It makes you proud to share a heritage with such brave soldiers who gave so much for their country. The book is so well written you will not be able to put it down!

MAJ Neil V. Lamont, USA, Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC

US Air Force Military History Symposium The Department of History, US Air Force Academy, will sponsor the 14th Mili

tary History Symposium, [7 to 19 October 1990 on "Vietnam, 1964-1973: An American Dilemma," The symposium will examine the disparate nature of the US combat involvement in Vietnam, focusing on the "dilemmas" caused by US participation in the war during rhe Lyndon B. johnson and Richard M. Nixon presidencies. For morc infonnation concerning the symposium, contact Captain Scott Elder, Derartment of History, USAF Academy, Colorado Springs, CO 80840-5701, or ~ cal (719)472-3232. o

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96 April 1990 • MILITARY REVIEW :> «

German Panzer Mark II during invasion of France.

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In Europe, the "phony" war evolved into a conflict of epic struggle. In April, Germany was successful in seizing Norway from the Allies. Then in May, the Germans eleCtrified the world with the blitzkrieg across France. Airborne units seized fortifications in· advance of fast-moving tank armies that swept across the European continent, leaving England alone to face the Nazis.

At Dunkirk, victory slipped away from the German army by a narrow margin; leaving the British defending against the onslaught of a new 20th century weapon: the airplane. The strategic air campaign against England marked not only the awesome destructive power of modern aircraft, but also the vulnerability of civilians in warfare,«

World War II was probably the most significant event of the 20th century,> Qver the course of the next five years, Military Review will periodically highlight the anniversaries of some of the momentous events of that conflict. The spring of 1940, only 50 years ago, signaled the beginning of one of the greatest storms in human history.

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