The Ten ThousandYears
An Examination of the Imperial Systems in East Asia and TheirImportance
Justin Harris
In the 21st century, especially in the United States and most of Europe, take the ideas of republicanism and formal separation of church and state for granted. The sheer ubiquity of said concepts canand does give rise to the notion that these notions are inherently superior. In this cursory examination, I aim to show, using East Asiaas an example, that implementing secular republican systems may be detrimental, even harmful for some cultures. (Revision of a paper originally written for Dr. Yun Xia’s East Asian Culture class, which occurred during the Fall 2014 semester at Valparaiso University: If you represent a scholarly journal/publication and are seeking a copy of one of my papers for review and possible publication, please send an email with your name, the publication you represent, and the proper format for submission, and I will have a copy ready within a timely manner.)
1
Introduction
While it may seem odd to many in Europe and the Americas, in
East Asia, the rule and very presence of their imperial
governments was essential to their successes and holistic well-
being as nations. But how and why is this the case? Have
governments before the French Revolution of 1789 been more or
less interchangeable as far as the common people are concerned?
Unlike in (generally, but there have been exceptions) Europe and
the Near East, the emperors in East Asia serve(ed) not only as a
stabilizing influence as far as the body politic is concerned,
but an essential religious function as well; If one were to
travel to ancient Egypt, depose and possibly even murder the
reigning pharaoh and inform the Egyptian people that they were to
be a republic from that day forward, could one sincerely believe
that said people and their society would suffer no ill
consequences from said action? Any self-respecting Egyptologist,
let alone any layperson familiar with the pharaonic role in the
Egyptian society, would balk at this suggestion if put forth
seriously.
2
I aim to show that the role of the emperor in the East Asian
context (namely China, Japan, and Korea) had/has a tripartite and
essential role: Political, religious, and societal, acting as a
source for stability and order in their respective systems and
the possible (and even probable) negative repercussions of the
absence of said monarch. While this cannot account for every
societal ill in East Asia, it can and often does exacerbate the
ones already present. Additionally, a vital part of this thesis
is, using the examples of the People’s Republic of China and the
two Korean republics, elevation of certain individuals and/or
concepts as a sort of contrived substitute for their ancestral
throne’s occupant.
Religious
With one of the beloved values of contemporary Western
(defined as Europe, North America, and the former’s cultural and
genetic offspring in Latin America) society is an official
separation between religious and state authority, it may seem
3
odd, possibly even scandalous to propose to a contemporary
audience the intersection of sacral and secular power not
relegated to the pages of a history book. However, there were and
remain many cultures where these two authorities, if not one in
the same are closely tied, with East Asia having been one of the
most prominent and successful examples, especially those
influenced by Chinese religion and culture.
As far as any written or archeological records will tell,
monarchs have always played a key role in Chinese religion, the
earliest attested records being the oracle bones of the Shang
Dynasty (c.1600-1046 BC), pieces of ox bone or turtle shell
inscribed with characters used in pyromancy, a type of divination
making use of fire. Given the intricate, highly-structured
divination rituals which were almost the exclusive domain of the
king and arose by the middle of the Shang period, it stands to
reason that said rituals were actually successors to earlier
practices involving Chinese monarchs. After all, the fact that
the character 王(wáng) for king, seems to represent a figure
bringing heaven, earth, and man together, is very meaningful.1
1 (o. c. Several 1716)
4
Before diving into the realm of mythology and its importance
to history, one thing must be clarified, and it may (and often
does) sound baffling to modern ears: The historicity (or lack
thereof) of events described in mythology is actually subordinate
in importance to the symbolism and themes preserved in said
stories. China is no exception to this rule if we consider Yu the
Great and his founding of the semi-apocryphal Xia Dynasty: It is
very possible that Yu introduced the irrigation systems which
controlled the raging Yangtze and Yellow Rivers. After all, he
was, according to legend, a rough contemporary of the
civilizations of Sumer and pharaonic Egypt and good technology
does spread by nature. However, even more significant is the
control (or at least containment) of these natural forces by Yu;
control and/or containment of the destructive forces of nature
would later become symbolic of the Mandate of Heaven, such
control allowed Yu to near (but not exactly join in) the
prominence of the legendary Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors,
credited with the creation of the building blocks of Chinese
civilization (such as writing, fire, agriculture) and, according
5
to some accounts, the Chinese people, or even the human race as a
whole.2
Traditionally, the Tennō, the emperor of a polity on the
Japanese archipelago, while not always exercising political power
himself (more often than not said monarchs ended up as mere
figureheads of some powerful individual or faction), provided and
continues to provide an essential religious function as the high
priest of Shinto; quite appropriate for the supposed descendants
of the sun goddess Amaterasu. However, much like the Chinese
narrative, the reality of these grand claims is not nearly as
significant as the symbolism behind them and this is demonstrated
well by the legendary founder of House Yamato. The Emperor Jimmu,
(traditionally said to have reigned from 660-585 BC), was
explicitly stated in the earliest chronicle to be a successful
nomadic warrior king who subdued a great many tribes before
establishing his capital in the province of Yamato in modern-day
Nara. Two of the most important symbols associated with Jimmu are
the bow and the three-legged crow: Known in Japanese as the
2 (Ssuma Ch'ien's [Sima Qian's] Historical Records; translated by Herbert J. Allen c.109 BC/1894)
6
Yatagasaru, the bird represents a divine messenger, a guide for
Jimmu during his campaigns and the establishment of his lineage.
Appropriately enough, said crow is also intimately associated
with the sun in China and Korea as well. Secondly, the bow with
which Jimmu is closely associated with serves a twofold purpose:
It symbolizes the cultural and practical importance of the
weapon, as well as the possession and intersection of secular and
political power.3
Much as in Japan and China, the monarchs of the assorted
Korean kingdoms played a role in both sponsoring and suppressing
religious practices, especially Buddhism. Also very similarly to
that of its neighbors, Dangun, the legendary founder of the first
Korean kingdom of Gojoseon (c.2333? BC-108 BC), was said to be a
grandson of the god Hwanin. Hence, the Korean self-designation of
Cheonson (Korean: Posterity of Heaven), emphasizing the fatherly
role which Dangun’s successors on the throne were to play.
However, it is difficult to determine just how large a role the
Korean monarch played in the religious life of his people; there
is little evidence, especially in the later centuries, that
3 (Roberts 2009)
7
Korean kings played a role similar to the Japanese emperor,
perhaps suggesting a role similar to the post-Tang emperors in
China. However, many records do show considerable involvement by
the Phoenix Throne’s occupant in the traditional shamanistic
rituals and later practices influenced by them.4
Sociopolitical Such attention has been given to the influence of Confucian
ethics upon the societies of East Asia, that it is almost clichéd
to remark about said influence. Nonetheless, the doctrine has
been discussed such a great deal exactly because it is so
important to the East Asian social fabric; politics and
4 (J. Y. Lee 1981)
8
government are no exception to this rule. Closely related to this
focus has been the well-known “Five relationships” of Confucian
thought; as an aspiring minister, Confucius had a great deal to
say about how a government should be run, far too much to be
relayed here in the interest of time and space. However, there
are several very relevant passages from the Analects. Please note
that the bolded text indicates my own emphasis:
“2.20. Ji Kangju asked, To make the people respectful, loyal, andmotivated, what should one do? The Master [Confucius] said, Regard them with austerity, and they will be respectful. Be filial and kind, and they will be loyal. Raise up the good to teach their deficiencies, and they will be motivated.”
“3:19. Ding-gung asked, When a ruler employs a minister, when a minister serves a ruler – how should it be? Confucius answered, The ruler employs the minister with propriety; the minister serves the ruler with loyalty.”
“12:11. Chi Jing-gung asked Confucius about government. Confuciusreplied, The ruler is a ruler, the minister is a minister, the father is a father, the son is a son. The prince said, Good indeed! Truly, if the ruler is not a ruler, the minister is not aminister, the father is not a father, and the son is not a son, even if I have millet, will I be able to eat it?”
“12:19. Ji Kangju asked Confucius about government saying, If I kill those who have not the Way in order to uphold those who havethe Way, how would that be? Confucius replied, You are there to govern; what use have you for killing? If you desire the good, the people will be good. The virtue of the gentleman is the wind; thevirtue of the little people is the grass. The wind on the grass will surely bend it.”
9
“13:17. Dzu-xia was Steward of Jiu-Fu. He asked about government.He asked about government. The Master [Confucius] said, Do not bein a flurry, do not pay attention to petty advantages. If you arein a flurry, you will not get there. If you pay attention to petty advantages, then the great affairs will not come to completion.”
“16.2. Confucius said, When All Under Heaven has the Way, ritualsand music and military campaigns derive from the Son of Heaven. When All Under Heaven has not the Way, rituals and music and military campaigns will derive from the Lords. When they derive from the lords, it will be rare that all is not lost after ten generations. When subordinate officers are in charge of the mandates of state, it will be rare that all is not lost after three generations. When All Under Heaven has the Way, the government does not rest with great officers. When All Under Heaven has the Way, the ordinary people do not confer among themselves.5”
This is but a sample of the extensive Confucian thought on
the role of government in society, but many important points are
made vis-à-vis the role and character of the ruler and the
temptations for ministers to pursue narrow, provincial interests.
Being an aspiring government minister himself, Confucius would
have had a great deal of experience with human tendencies when
given power and his emphasis on conduct is significant: By the
very nature of overseeing a massive state composed of many
competing interests, the Chinese emperor, in addition to being a
father figure for his people, was also required to act as a
5 (Brooks 1998)
10
mediator between competing factions and interests, as well as
raising up worthy ministers whom would be less inclined to pursue
their own interests at the expense of the public good. Failure to
do this could not only damage or destroy the integrity of the
state and get many people killed, but endanger the emperor’s rule
and often his life at times.
In Japan, the reigning Tennō did not always play a political
role; some emperors played an active role in government, some
would resign and act as the Éminence grise during the reign of their
successors, while more than a few ended up as puppets themselves.
But his role as a stabilizing force in Japanese society and a
high priest for Shinto had and has equal importance as an
occupant of the Chrysanthemum Throne.
Throughout the centuries, the power of the Korean monarchs
ranged from that of an absolute monarch to those of a figurehead
controlled by a considerable noble and military bureaucracy.
While the occupant of the Phoenix Throne may not have been as
directly involved in religious affairs as the sovereign of their
Japanese cousins, upon examination of the patterns in post-1945
11
Korean nationalism, the very presence of their king provided the
Korean people with something just as important as social,
political, and religious stability; a sense of natural identity.
12
Defining Termsi
Before continuing, some extremely important terms and ideas
must be defined, especially those which are not given that great
deal of thought in the 21st century. First and foremost of these
is the concept of contrivance, or contrived behavior. As any
naturalist will attest the extended presence of contrived,
unnatural behavior in an animal is indicative of a problem,
whether with the creature itself, its surroundings, or both. In
that sense, human beings are no different, with a remarkable
innate ability to sense problems; people and societies behave in
a contrived manner precisely because they sense something wrong
with themselves and/or their surroundings, even if they are
unable or somehow forbidden from explaining it.
Secondly, is the notion of religion to human nature. One’s
opinion of a given religion or the institution of religion in
general is completely and utterly irrelevant, as literally every
human society has shown at least some semblance of religious
13
practice and belief Even those (almost always ideologically-
based) atheistic and/or anti-theistic societies revert to some
sort of quasi-religious behavior if it was not already promoted
by the societal structures. These essential religious
characteristics include, but are not necessarily limited to:
A narrative or series of rules illustrating how adherents
should live
A narrative designed to help adherents understand the past,
present, and future, as well as their role in relation to
society and the world in general
A vehicle for a sense of community for believers
There are also two of very important things about human
nature which must be addressed. As many, if not most living human
beings today have been, in contrast to our ancestors from as
recently as a couple of centuries ago, downright spoiled by
technological innovations and the resulting increases in quality
of life, we tend to view the actions of our predecessors as
quaint at best; at the very worst, we often sneer at their
practices as barbaric and oppressive. Like all human beings, they
14
were more than capable of boundless cruelty when the occasion
called for it, but the behaviors, norms, and institutions which
remained for centuries, even millennia endured for one of two
(often both) reasons:
To fulfill some deep-seated human need, be it social,
secular, or religious in nature
Simply because said practice just worked for them
With all this in mind, it must be finally noted that human
beings and their nature are much like a river: One can dam it,
pollute it, divert it, and even (attempt) to dry it up, but it
will inevitably, whether slowly or not, return to its original
course or at least get as close as possible. With this said, what
effects have the perversion of these natural socio-political
orders had?
15
Consequences
When we look at the 20th century history of the Middle
Kingdom, the very fact that there was and is something horribly
wrong is betrayed by the actions of the Dragon Throne’s usurpers.
Now literally every human being to ever live has noticed this
sense of inherent wrongness to some degree or another, but it was
almost always tempered by assorted societal relations and
institutions. With this said the almost ubiquitous presence of
extended warfare, generalized chaos, and brutal, repressive
governments which would have horrified even the Qin emperor,
almost all the parties involved, from the ruling classes down to
the common people behaved as though there was something
fundamentally wrong with their society. It is worth noting that
since the inception of a republican system in China, a
personality cult surrounding some figure or another has developed
16
alongside it. Whether surrounding Sun-yat Sen, his successor, or
(especially) Mao, the contrived presence of some semi-deified,
larger-than-life figure is no coincidence; clearly these
individuals were to be as substitutes of sorts for the emperor
and the fact that the Communist Party keeps alive (to a degree)
the cults of Sun and Mao is very significant indeed. It is also
worth noting the warnings of Confucius about individuals
motivated not by any sense of ancestral duty or duties as a
subject, but the triune lusts for power, status, and wealth
(which contrary to the protests of many in power, often
syncretize quite well) driving them. This vulnerability to said
homicidal arrogance also fits nicely within the context of a
post-Ming scholarly class which saw itself as increasingly not
merely as imperial servants, but in many ways, superior to the
throne.6
Religiously, the consequences of the absence of the
traditional leadership and Mao’s campaign against the “Four Olds”
of customs, culture, habits, and ideas are apparent in the
immense damage not only done to the material culture of the
6 (Chow 1994)
17
Chinese religious traditions but the spiritual element as well.
We must keep in mind that for his followers and promoted for the
country in general, Mao’s personality cult served (judging by the
criteria above) as a de facto state religion at the expense of all
others. While the CPC eventually somewhat relented regarding
state atheism (not to the point where their power would be in
danger of course), the damage was done, leaving many Chinese
completely adrift from the religious traditions of their
ancestors.7 In fact, the universal claims of the religion, not to
mention the sheer ubiquitousness of monarchical imagery and
language (in addition to being referred to as a king multiple
places in the liturgy, its main figure-slash-deity is very often
referred to by an ancient Hebrew term or its Greek equivalent
reserved for kings), is probably at the root of the appeal of
Christianity for many Chinese, to say nothing of the water-
related imagery recalling Yu the Great.8
Out of the states which proclaim themselves socialist, the
very name “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” betrays the
7 (Buruma 2001)8 (Anderlini 2014)
18
sheer contrivedness of the society’s existence. Pyongyang’s
abominable treatment of its own people needs little introduction;
were they able to see it, Dangun and his successors would be
outraged and horrified. However, observers in the West often
wonder why its people do not regularly rise up against such a
government.9 The answer likely lies with the very structure of
the republic which acts as a sort of profane parody of the
traditional Korean kingship. We must realize that, in the context
of political ideologies and the formal prohibition on almost all
religious practice (interestingly enough, Buddhism, while not
exactly applauded, is tolerated by Pyongyang to a degree), Juche
is not only an ideology, a “socialism with Korean
characteristics,” but, even more so than its Chinese cousin, a de
facto (possibly even official) state religion unto itself, even
possessing its own creation legend and a calendar beginning in
the year of its founder’s birth in 1912.10 On a related note, the
DPRK does not have a head of state in the traditional sense: That
post was and is currently held by the late Kim il-Sung, the
“Eternal President of the Republic.” The personality cult
9 (Piano, et al. 2011-12)10 (Proctor 2003)
19
surrounding the Kim patriarch goes far beyond the veneration of a
state’s founders usually found and into borderline deification,
Kim being credited with superhuman attributes and feats such as
single-handedly destroying the Empire of Japan. Unsurprisingly,
his successors have been more associated with the legendary first
Korean monarch, to serve the purpose of a socialist Dangun; his
successor and son’s place of birth was even attributed to the
legendary Mount Paekdu, the birthplace of the legendary king.
When one takes the historical context into account, the
footage of North Koreans in (some contrived, some genuine) tears
at the death of Kim Jong-il, a man who had perpetuated their
virtual slavery, becomes all the more clear and tragic: The
devotion to the Kim family is not so much a function of
indoctrination or ideological fervor (although these do play a
role), but as a contrived, perverted substitute for the devotion
and affection meant for a Korean king.11
While the Kim family institutionalized physical,
psychological, and (most insidiously of all) spiritual violence
against their own people, across the 38th Parallel, the political11 (Choe and Norimitsu 2011)
20
class there has also stoked and exploited symptoms of a very real
problem among their people for their own gain and political
benefit. It is understandable why many Koreans would be insecure
about their identity and place in the world: Perhaps this is an
inevitable result of spending millennia under the heavy influence
and/or outright rule of China, Japan, Manchuria, and (once
anyway) Mongolia.
However, expressions of insecurity may very well migrate
into the realm of contrivedness or even absurdity, as this
excerpt from Chizuko T. Allen makes clear:
“By arguing that Korea occupied the central position in this yet to be fully understood cultural sphere, he [Ch’oe Namson] portrayed Korea not only as an independent entity but as a nationthat had culturally dominated the vast region of East Asia. He particularly took pains to assert that Japan and China were merely elements of this Părk culture sphere, while Korea was at its center.”12
Despite the many problems with his assertions, Ch’oe Namson
and his equally bombastic contemporary Shin Chaeho became the
founding fathers of Korean nationalist historiography, with a
considerable influence on the wider discipline in Korea as well.
With this in mind, the (granted, it is impossible to get an exact
12 (Allen 1990)
21
measure of this data) relative popularity of grandiose, Korea-
centric claims is unsurprising. A few Korean historians have even
gone so far as to posit the literal existence of the legendary
urheimatii of the Korean people Hwanguk, claiming its influence over
and control of China and Siberia actually predated even the semi-
apocryphal Xia Dynasty, as well as making similar claims
regarding Mesopotamia and the Sumerians.13
If this all sounds horribly contrived, that is because it is
in fact, horribly contrived: Such wild theories, even the
(relatively) mild ones such as Ch’oe’s, simply do not gain any
sort of traction among a people with a healthy sense of their
identity and place in the world; in fact, taking the Cheonson
self-perception into account, this could even be seen as the
contrived veneration of the Korean race supplanting its kings.
Among western historians, it is common to place the blameiii
upon the Japanese for the emergence of said strains of thought,
but the Japanese formal control over the peninsula lasted only
thirty-five years, hardly enough time for a truly revolutionary
shift in Korean thoughts and attitudes to take place and be 13 (Hyung 2000)
22
cemented by the education system. Only a native Korean or
collection thereof would have such an intimate knowledge of these
tendencies and be able to exploit them so deftly. Whether they
were aware of it or not,iv the political class of the Republic of
Korea, from its very inception (in addition to being almost
entirely republican), made use of a Korean nationalist populism
in order to turn the people’s ire against an “other,” securing
their own power and to direct the their people’s ire and siege
mentality away from them, which had happened previously.14 After
all, a government which orchestrates what essentially amounts to
an extended tantrum over the internationally recognized name of a
body of water,15 storms and conducts an extended occupation of
islands which its patron-slash-defender explicitly said falls
under the administration of the defeated Japanese and using the
fallout for political gain,16 and promotes professional
complainers over the internet to “correct” foreign views about
these and other Korean-related topics17 comes off less as heroic
statesmen protecting their people against a rapacious, inherently
14 (Nahm 1996)15 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2003)16 (B. C. Lee 2011)17 (Card 008)
23
bloodthirsty invader and more of an extended, cynical act of
political theatre meant to play off of their populace’s anxieties
and neuroses in order to save their own skins.
With all of its problems, post-war Japan is, if for no other
reason than the presence of the Yamato dynasty, better off than
its neighbors. Although burdened by some American-enforced
reforms, its political system retains its distinctly Japanese
quality and the (apart from professional politicians of course)
power-hungry malcontents are fairly marginalized as far as
numbers and resources are concerned, in comparison to the PRC and
DPRK where they form an entire ruling class.18 However, some
related, but very Japanese attitudes towards religion make them
in others, far worse off. Despite upwards 80% of the population
technically being classified as members of Shinto or Buddhism (or
both on occasion) 19and even participating in traditional
ceremonies when the occasion calls for it, these numbers are
based on family records as opposed to personal affiliation or
sentiment, which remain far lower.20 18 (Unattributed 2014) Note: The JCP claims 320,000 active members as of 2014;a number which may or may not be inflated19 (United States Government/Central Intelligence Agency 2014)20 (McQuaid 2000-01)
24
So the question that continues to baffle most outside
observers is how a people, who a mere two or three generations
ago, were (in)famous the world over for their religious devotion,
become roughly half-to-two-thirds irreligious or atheist?21 The
answer, much like the political troubles of their Korean cousins,
lies in the structure of the post-war system. Almost all
religions have a figure who leads believers in some sort of
religious activity. Even the great Asian traditions, whether from
the Indian subcontinent or China, that do not place a high value
on worship or ceremony, have traditionally had learned masters to
provide spiritual and moral guidance to their students. In the
sense of the former, the Japanese, prior to 1945, were no
different, with their Tennō serving both in theory and practice as
the high priest of Shinto. It is of extreme significance that
many of the traditional Japanese holidays and festivals
originated, and remain to a degree, in Shinto rites and rituals;
especially the New Year, equinox, and harvest festivals, as the
emperor would as a rule (barring some extraordinary
circumstance), take part in these festivals as a very visible
21 ibid
25
symbol.22 As is well-known, the post-war constitution made many
changes to Japanese society. One of the clauses which would
ultimately become the most devastating to religious life in Japan
would be Article 20, which bars the government, and by extension,
the Imperial family, from having any public involvement in
religious life.23
While this may have appealed to the western victors
(particularly the United States) who wished to rebuild Japan in
their own image and had no love for Shinto, the abolition of
established religion, while a cherished western value, has proven
to be extremely damaging to the Japanese soul. In the post-war
context, the country’s spiritual malaise begins to become clear:
Especially in matters of religion and culture, the Japanese have
always had a remarkable ability to take other traditions and,
over time, make them into something distinctly Japanese.v Even
during times good and bad, ravaged by disasters both natural and
manmade across the centuries, both the commoners and the literati
alike were able to turn to the imperial capital for one of their
22 (Fridell 1976)23 (Several, The Constitution of Japan 1947)
26
major anchors for stability on earth and in the spiritual world,
knowing that their sovereign would always remain the symbol of
that stability.
With all of the (largely contrived) changes which have taken
place in that country since war, it perhaps unsurprising that the
spiritual lives of many, if not most Japanese would deteriorate
significantly. They would be far from the first people to suffer
from the loss or denial of a central earthly figure in their
traditional religion.vi Also unsurprising is the fact that any
attempts by foreign religions to fill this spiritual vacuum would
be unsuccessful. Lacking the spiritual dimension of the stability
provided by the Tennō and the fact that their country has been
flooded with an influx of foreign ideas and culture like never
before in the aftermath of the war, further erosion of their
cultural and religious identity could be and often is a very real
concern for many Japanese. Interestingly and appropriately
enough, Japanese religious life seems to resemble a solar system
lacking its star: Devoid of the warmth, light, and gravity of its
central figure, the bodies composing which were not destroyed in
the previous explosions gradually drift further and further into
27
the void. With this in mind, although he and his superiors had no
way of knowing it at the time, General Douglas MacArthur’s famous
call for Christian missionaries to Japan after the war was almost
certainly doomed even if he had received the men he had
requested.
I do not believe in writing/talking down to my readers: The
solution to reducing or eliminating the problems which I have
outlined is obvious and I have said/heavily implied it many
times. However, I must remain realistic: The governments in
Beijing and Pyongyang have, as of December 2014, about as much
intention of returning their thrones to their claimants as they
do of giving them to me. Seoul is perhaps not nearly as hopeless
a cause, but given that the DPRK’s southern counterpart is also
constitutionally defined as a republic and its political class
have gained much from demonizing the royal “traitorsvii,” I am not
optimistic at all.24
My causes for relative optimism about the Japanese are
twofold: Of course the fact that it is presently a monarchy, but
it is also the only of the four states which has a realistic 24 (Several, Constitution of the Republic of Korea 1987)
28
chance of amending its constitution to allow the Yamato dynasty
to take back its religious role. While Article 9 of said
constitution receives almost all of the foreign attention, if
this one can be altered or abolished, so can Article 20.
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Buruma, Ian. "Cult of the Chairman." The Guardian, March 1, 2001.
Card, James. "Korea's Cyber Vigilantes." Foreign Policy, October 8, 008.
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Chow, Kai-Wing. The Rise of Confucian Ritualism in Late Imperial China: Ethics, Classics, and Lineage Discourse. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994.
Fridell, Wilbur, M. "A Fresh Look at State Shinto." Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 1976: 547-561.
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i I acknowledge that the placement of this section is awkward, but said informationis vital to my argument and did not fit anywhere else. ii German: “Original homeland.” Technically, this is a linguistic term, but may be used in ethnologyiii Although in cases like this, there is almost always more than enough blame to goaround for all involved parties.iv Equally likely is that they simply did not care as long as their own power and influence were secure.v Judging by the relative success of the Portuguese Jesuits, there is some evidencethat Christianity, like Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism before it was in the midst of this process before becoming the bête noir of the Tokugawa shoguns.vi Such as the Muslim world, whose problems have been written endlessly about or Protestant Christianity with its countless, wildly varying sects.vii It should be noted that the “reviled oppressor” in Tokyo did in fact, continue to honor the titles and privileges of the members of House Yi until the very end ofthe empire.
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