The Ten ThousandYears

An Examination of the Imperial Systems in East Asia and TheirImportance

Justin Harris

In the 21st century, especially in the United States and most of Europe, take the ideas of republicanism and formal separation of church and state for granted. The sheer ubiquity of said concepts canand does give rise to the notion that these notions are inherently superior. In this cursory examination, I aim to show, using East Asiaas an example, that implementing secular republican systems may be detrimental, even harmful for some cultures. (Revision of a paper originally written for Dr. Yun Xia’s East Asian Culture class, which occurred during the Fall 2014 semester at Valparaiso University: If you represent a scholarly journal/publication and are seeking a copy of one of my papers for review and possible publication, please send an email with your name, the publication you represent, and the proper format for submission, and I will have a copy ready within a timely manner.)

1

Introduction

While it may seem odd to many in Europe and the Americas, in

East Asia, the rule and very presence of their imperial

governments was essential to their successes and holistic well-

being as nations. But how and why is this the case? Have

governments before the French Revolution of 1789 been more or

less interchangeable as far as the common people are concerned?

Unlike in (generally, but there have been exceptions) Europe and

the Near East, the emperors in East Asia serve(ed) not only as a

stabilizing influence as far as the body politic is concerned,

but an essential religious function as well; If one were to

travel to ancient Egypt, depose and possibly even murder the

reigning pharaoh and inform the Egyptian people that they were to

be a republic from that day forward, could one sincerely believe

that said people and their society would suffer no ill

consequences from said action? Any self-respecting Egyptologist,

let alone any layperson familiar with the pharaonic role in the

Egyptian society, would balk at this suggestion if put forth

seriously.

2

I aim to show that the role of the emperor in the East Asian

context (namely China, Japan, and Korea) had/has a tripartite and

essential role: Political, religious, and societal, acting as a

source for stability and order in their respective systems and

the possible (and even probable) negative repercussions of the

absence of said monarch. While this cannot account for every

societal ill in East Asia, it can and often does exacerbate the

ones already present. Additionally, a vital part of this thesis

is, using the examples of the People’s Republic of China and the

two Korean republics, elevation of certain individuals and/or

concepts as a sort of contrived substitute for their ancestral

throne’s occupant.

Religious

With one of the beloved values of contemporary Western

(defined as Europe, North America, and the former’s cultural and

genetic offspring in Latin America) society is an official

separation between religious and state authority, it may seem

3

odd, possibly even scandalous to propose to a contemporary

audience the intersection of sacral and secular power not

relegated to the pages of a history book. However, there were and

remain many cultures where these two authorities, if not one in

the same are closely tied, with East Asia having been one of the

most prominent and successful examples, especially those

influenced by Chinese religion and culture.

As far as any written or archeological records will tell,

monarchs have always played a key role in Chinese religion, the

earliest attested records being the oracle bones of the Shang

Dynasty (c.1600-1046 BC), pieces of ox bone or turtle shell

inscribed with characters used in pyromancy, a type of divination

making use of fire. Given the intricate, highly-structured

divination rituals which were almost the exclusive domain of the

king and arose by the middle of the Shang period, it stands to

reason that said rituals were actually successors to earlier

practices involving Chinese monarchs. After all, the fact that

the character 王(wáng) for king, seems to represent a figure

bringing heaven, earth, and man together, is very meaningful.1

1 (o. c. Several 1716)

4

Before diving into the realm of mythology and its importance

to history, one thing must be clarified, and it may (and often

does) sound baffling to modern ears: The historicity (or lack

thereof) of events described in mythology is actually subordinate

in importance to the symbolism and themes preserved in said

stories. China is no exception to this rule if we consider Yu the

Great and his founding of the semi-apocryphal Xia Dynasty: It is

very possible that Yu introduced the irrigation systems which

controlled the raging Yangtze and Yellow Rivers. After all, he

was, according to legend, a rough contemporary of the

civilizations of Sumer and pharaonic Egypt and good technology

does spread by nature. However, even more significant is the

control (or at least containment) of these natural forces by Yu;

control and/or containment of the destructive forces of nature

would later become symbolic of the Mandate of Heaven, such

control allowed Yu to near (but not exactly join in) the

prominence of the legendary Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors,

credited with the creation of the building blocks of Chinese

civilization (such as writing, fire, agriculture) and, according

5

to some accounts, the Chinese people, or even the human race as a

whole.2

Traditionally, the Tennō, the emperor of a polity on the

Japanese archipelago, while not always exercising political power

himself (more often than not said monarchs ended up as mere

figureheads of some powerful individual or faction), provided and

continues to provide an essential religious function as the high

priest of Shinto; quite appropriate for the supposed descendants

of the sun goddess Amaterasu. However, much like the Chinese

narrative, the reality of these grand claims is not nearly as

significant as the symbolism behind them and this is demonstrated

well by the legendary founder of House Yamato. The Emperor Jimmu,

(traditionally said to have reigned from 660-585 BC), was

explicitly stated in the earliest chronicle to be a successful

nomadic warrior king who subdued a great many tribes before

establishing his capital in the province of Yamato in modern-day

Nara. Two of the most important symbols associated with Jimmu are

the bow and the three-legged crow: Known in Japanese as the

2 (Ssuma Ch'ien's [Sima Qian's] Historical Records; translated by Herbert J. Allen c.109 BC/1894)

6

Yatagasaru, the bird represents a divine messenger, a guide for

Jimmu during his campaigns and the establishment of his lineage.

Appropriately enough, said crow is also intimately associated

with the sun in China and Korea as well. Secondly, the bow with

which Jimmu is closely associated with serves a twofold purpose:

It symbolizes the cultural and practical importance of the

weapon, as well as the possession and intersection of secular and

political power.3

Much as in Japan and China, the monarchs of the assorted

Korean kingdoms played a role in both sponsoring and suppressing

religious practices, especially Buddhism. Also very similarly to

that of its neighbors, Dangun, the legendary founder of the first

Korean kingdom of Gojoseon (c.2333? BC-108 BC), was said to be a

grandson of the god Hwanin. Hence, the Korean self-designation of

Cheonson (Korean: Posterity of Heaven), emphasizing the fatherly

role which Dangun’s successors on the throne were to play.

However, it is difficult to determine just how large a role the

Korean monarch played in the religious life of his people; there

is little evidence, especially in the later centuries, that

3 (Roberts 2009)

7

Korean kings played a role similar to the Japanese emperor,

perhaps suggesting a role similar to the post-Tang emperors in

China. However, many records do show considerable involvement by

the Phoenix Throne’s occupant in the traditional shamanistic

rituals and later practices influenced by them.4

Sociopolitical Such attention has been given to the influence of Confucian

ethics upon the societies of East Asia, that it is almost clichéd

to remark about said influence. Nonetheless, the doctrine has

been discussed such a great deal exactly because it is so

important to the East Asian social fabric; politics and

4 (J. Y. Lee 1981)

8

government are no exception to this rule. Closely related to this

focus has been the well-known “Five relationships” of Confucian

thought; as an aspiring minister, Confucius had a great deal to

say about how a government should be run, far too much to be

relayed here in the interest of time and space. However, there

are several very relevant passages from the Analects. Please note

that the bolded text indicates my own emphasis:

“2.20. Ji Kangju asked, To make the people respectful, loyal, andmotivated, what should one do? The Master [Confucius] said, Regard them with austerity, and they will be respectful. Be filial and kind, and they will be loyal. Raise up the good to teach their deficiencies, and they will be motivated.”

“3:19. Ding-gung asked, When a ruler employs a minister, when a minister serves a ruler – how should it be? Confucius answered, The ruler employs the minister with propriety; the minister serves the ruler with loyalty.”

“12:11. Chi Jing-gung asked Confucius about government. Confuciusreplied, The ruler is a ruler, the minister is a minister, the father is a father, the son is a son. The prince said, Good indeed! Truly, if the ruler is not a ruler, the minister is not aminister, the father is not a father, and the son is not a son, even if I have millet, will I be able to eat it?”

“12:19. Ji Kangju asked Confucius about government saying, If I kill those who have not the Way in order to uphold those who havethe Way, how would that be? Confucius replied, You are there to govern; what use have you for killing? If you desire the good, the people will be good. The virtue of the gentleman is the wind; thevirtue of the little people is the grass. The wind on the grass will surely bend it.”

9

“13:17. Dzu-xia was Steward of Jiu-Fu. He asked about government.He asked about government. The Master [Confucius] said, Do not bein a flurry, do not pay attention to petty advantages. If you arein a flurry, you will not get there. If you pay attention to petty advantages, then the great affairs will not come to completion.”

“16.2. Confucius said, When All Under Heaven has the Way, ritualsand music and military campaigns derive from the Son of Heaven. When All Under Heaven has not the Way, rituals and music and military campaigns will derive from the Lords. When they derive from the lords, it will be rare that all is not lost after ten generations. When subordinate officers are in charge of the mandates of state, it will be rare that all is not lost after three generations. When All Under Heaven has the Way, the government does not rest with great officers. When All Under Heaven has the Way, the ordinary people do not confer among themselves.5”

This is but a sample of the extensive Confucian thought on

the role of government in society, but many important points are

made vis-à-vis the role and character of the ruler and the

temptations for ministers to pursue narrow, provincial interests.

Being an aspiring government minister himself, Confucius would

have had a great deal of experience with human tendencies when

given power and his emphasis on conduct is significant: By the

very nature of overseeing a massive state composed of many

competing interests, the Chinese emperor, in addition to being a

father figure for his people, was also required to act as a

5 (Brooks 1998)

10

mediator between competing factions and interests, as well as

raising up worthy ministers whom would be less inclined to pursue

their own interests at the expense of the public good. Failure to

do this could not only damage or destroy the integrity of the

state and get many people killed, but endanger the emperor’s rule

and often his life at times.

In Japan, the reigning Tennō did not always play a political

role; some emperors played an active role in government, some

would resign and act as the Éminence grise during the reign of their

successors, while more than a few ended up as puppets themselves.

But his role as a stabilizing force in Japanese society and a

high priest for Shinto had and has equal importance as an

occupant of the Chrysanthemum Throne.

Throughout the centuries, the power of the Korean monarchs

ranged from that of an absolute monarch to those of a figurehead

controlled by a considerable noble and military bureaucracy.

While the occupant of the Phoenix Throne may not have been as

directly involved in religious affairs as the sovereign of their

Japanese cousins, upon examination of the patterns in post-1945

11

Korean nationalism, the very presence of their king provided the

Korean people with something just as important as social,

political, and religious stability; a sense of natural identity.

12

Defining Termsi

Before continuing, some extremely important terms and ideas

must be defined, especially those which are not given that great

deal of thought in the 21st century. First and foremost of these

is the concept of contrivance, or contrived behavior. As any

naturalist will attest the extended presence of contrived,

unnatural behavior in an animal is indicative of a problem,

whether with the creature itself, its surroundings, or both. In

that sense, human beings are no different, with a remarkable

innate ability to sense problems; people and societies behave in

a contrived manner precisely because they sense something wrong

with themselves and/or their surroundings, even if they are

unable or somehow forbidden from explaining it.

Secondly, is the notion of religion to human nature. One’s

opinion of a given religion or the institution of religion in

general is completely and utterly irrelevant, as literally every

human society has shown at least some semblance of religious

13

practice and belief Even those (almost always ideologically-

based) atheistic and/or anti-theistic societies revert to some

sort of quasi-religious behavior if it was not already promoted

by the societal structures. These essential religious

characteristics include, but are not necessarily limited to:

A narrative or series of rules illustrating how adherents

should live

A narrative designed to help adherents understand the past,

present, and future, as well as their role in relation to

society and the world in general

A vehicle for a sense of community for believers

There are also two of very important things about human

nature which must be addressed. As many, if not most living human

beings today have been, in contrast to our ancestors from as

recently as a couple of centuries ago, downright spoiled by

technological innovations and the resulting increases in quality

of life, we tend to view the actions of our predecessors as

quaint at best; at the very worst, we often sneer at their

practices as barbaric and oppressive. Like all human beings, they

14

were more than capable of boundless cruelty when the occasion

called for it, but the behaviors, norms, and institutions which

remained for centuries, even millennia endured for one of two

(often both) reasons:

To fulfill some deep-seated human need, be it social,

secular, or religious in nature

Simply because said practice just worked for them

With all this in mind, it must be finally noted that human

beings and their nature are much like a river: One can dam it,

pollute it, divert it, and even (attempt) to dry it up, but it

will inevitably, whether slowly or not, return to its original

course or at least get as close as possible. With this said, what

effects have the perversion of these natural socio-political

orders had?

15

Consequences

When we look at the 20th century history of the Middle

Kingdom, the very fact that there was and is something horribly

wrong is betrayed by the actions of the Dragon Throne’s usurpers.

Now literally every human being to ever live has noticed this

sense of inherent wrongness to some degree or another, but it was

almost always tempered by assorted societal relations and

institutions. With this said the almost ubiquitous presence of

extended warfare, generalized chaos, and brutal, repressive

governments which would have horrified even the Qin emperor,

almost all the parties involved, from the ruling classes down to

the common people behaved as though there was something

fundamentally wrong with their society. It is worth noting that

since the inception of a republican system in China, a

personality cult surrounding some figure or another has developed

16

alongside it. Whether surrounding Sun-yat Sen, his successor, or

(especially) Mao, the contrived presence of some semi-deified,

larger-than-life figure is no coincidence; clearly these

individuals were to be as substitutes of sorts for the emperor

and the fact that the Communist Party keeps alive (to a degree)

the cults of Sun and Mao is very significant indeed. It is also

worth noting the warnings of Confucius about individuals

motivated not by any sense of ancestral duty or duties as a

subject, but the triune lusts for power, status, and wealth

(which contrary to the protests of many in power, often

syncretize quite well) driving them. This vulnerability to said

homicidal arrogance also fits nicely within the context of a

post-Ming scholarly class which saw itself as increasingly not

merely as imperial servants, but in many ways, superior to the

throne.6

Religiously, the consequences of the absence of the

traditional leadership and Mao’s campaign against the “Four Olds”

of customs, culture, habits, and ideas are apparent in the

immense damage not only done to the material culture of the

6 (Chow 1994)

17

Chinese religious traditions but the spiritual element as well.

We must keep in mind that for his followers and promoted for the

country in general, Mao’s personality cult served (judging by the

criteria above) as a de facto state religion at the expense of all

others. While the CPC eventually somewhat relented regarding

state atheism (not to the point where their power would be in

danger of course), the damage was done, leaving many Chinese

completely adrift from the religious traditions of their

ancestors.7 In fact, the universal claims of the religion, not to

mention the sheer ubiquitousness of monarchical imagery and

language (in addition to being referred to as a king multiple

places in the liturgy, its main figure-slash-deity is very often

referred to by an ancient Hebrew term or its Greek equivalent

reserved for kings), is probably at the root of the appeal of

Christianity for many Chinese, to say nothing of the water-

related imagery recalling Yu the Great.8

Out of the states which proclaim themselves socialist, the

very name “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” betrays the

7 (Buruma 2001)8 (Anderlini 2014)

18

sheer contrivedness of the society’s existence. Pyongyang’s

abominable treatment of its own people needs little introduction;

were they able to see it, Dangun and his successors would be

outraged and horrified. However, observers in the West often

wonder why its people do not regularly rise up against such a

government.9 The answer likely lies with the very structure of

the republic which acts as a sort of profane parody of the

traditional Korean kingship. We must realize that, in the context

of political ideologies and the formal prohibition on almost all

religious practice (interestingly enough, Buddhism, while not

exactly applauded, is tolerated by Pyongyang to a degree), Juche

is not only an ideology, a “socialism with Korean

characteristics,” but, even more so than its Chinese cousin, a de

facto (possibly even official) state religion unto itself, even

possessing its own creation legend and a calendar beginning in

the year of its founder’s birth in 1912.10 On a related note, the

DPRK does not have a head of state in the traditional sense: That

post was and is currently held by the late Kim il-Sung, the

“Eternal President of the Republic.” The personality cult

9 (Piano, et al. 2011-12)10 (Proctor 2003)

19

surrounding the Kim patriarch goes far beyond the veneration of a

state’s founders usually found and into borderline deification,

Kim being credited with superhuman attributes and feats such as

single-handedly destroying the Empire of Japan. Unsurprisingly,

his successors have been more associated with the legendary first

Korean monarch, to serve the purpose of a socialist Dangun; his

successor and son’s place of birth was even attributed to the

legendary Mount Paekdu, the birthplace of the legendary king.

When one takes the historical context into account, the

footage of North Koreans in (some contrived, some genuine) tears

at the death of Kim Jong-il, a man who had perpetuated their

virtual slavery, becomes all the more clear and tragic: The

devotion to the Kim family is not so much a function of

indoctrination or ideological fervor (although these do play a

role), but as a contrived, perverted substitute for the devotion

and affection meant for a Korean king.11

While the Kim family institutionalized physical,

psychological, and (most insidiously of all) spiritual violence

against their own people, across the 38th Parallel, the political11 (Choe and Norimitsu 2011)

20

class there has also stoked and exploited symptoms of a very real

problem among their people for their own gain and political

benefit. It is understandable why many Koreans would be insecure

about their identity and place in the world: Perhaps this is an

inevitable result of spending millennia under the heavy influence

and/or outright rule of China, Japan, Manchuria, and (once

anyway) Mongolia.

However, expressions of insecurity may very well migrate

into the realm of contrivedness or even absurdity, as this

excerpt from Chizuko T. Allen makes clear:

“By arguing that Korea occupied the central position in this yet to be fully understood cultural sphere, he [Ch’oe Namson] portrayed Korea not only as an independent entity but as a nationthat had culturally dominated the vast region of East Asia. He particularly took pains to assert that Japan and China were merely elements of this Părk culture sphere, while Korea was at its center.”12

Despite the many problems with his assertions, Ch’oe Namson

and his equally bombastic contemporary Shin Chaeho became the

founding fathers of Korean nationalist historiography, with a

considerable influence on the wider discipline in Korea as well.

With this in mind, the (granted, it is impossible to get an exact

12 (Allen 1990)

21

measure of this data) relative popularity of grandiose, Korea-

centric claims is unsurprising. A few Korean historians have even

gone so far as to posit the literal existence of the legendary

urheimatii of the Korean people Hwanguk, claiming its influence over

and control of China and Siberia actually predated even the semi-

apocryphal Xia Dynasty, as well as making similar claims

regarding Mesopotamia and the Sumerians.13

If this all sounds horribly contrived, that is because it is

in fact, horribly contrived: Such wild theories, even the

(relatively) mild ones such as Ch’oe’s, simply do not gain any

sort of traction among a people with a healthy sense of their

identity and place in the world; in fact, taking the Cheonson

self-perception into account, this could even be seen as the

contrived veneration of the Korean race supplanting its kings.

Among western historians, it is common to place the blameiii

upon the Japanese for the emergence of said strains of thought,

but the Japanese formal control over the peninsula lasted only

thirty-five years, hardly enough time for a truly revolutionary

shift in Korean thoughts and attitudes to take place and be 13 (Hyung 2000)

22

cemented by the education system. Only a native Korean or

collection thereof would have such an intimate knowledge of these

tendencies and be able to exploit them so deftly. Whether they

were aware of it or not,iv the political class of the Republic of

Korea, from its very inception (in addition to being almost

entirely republican), made use of a Korean nationalist populism

in order to turn the people’s ire against an “other,” securing

their own power and to direct the their people’s ire and siege

mentality away from them, which had happened previously.14 After

all, a government which orchestrates what essentially amounts to

an extended tantrum over the internationally recognized name of a

body of water,15 storms and conducts an extended occupation of

islands which its patron-slash-defender explicitly said falls

under the administration of the defeated Japanese and using the

fallout for political gain,16 and promotes professional

complainers over the internet to “correct” foreign views about

these and other Korean-related topics17 comes off less as heroic

statesmen protecting their people against a rapacious, inherently

14 (Nahm 1996)15 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2003)16 (B. C. Lee 2011)17 (Card 008)

23

bloodthirsty invader and more of an extended, cynical act of

political theatre meant to play off of their populace’s anxieties

and neuroses in order to save their own skins.

With all of its problems, post-war Japan is, if for no other

reason than the presence of the Yamato dynasty, better off than

its neighbors. Although burdened by some American-enforced

reforms, its political system retains its distinctly Japanese

quality and the (apart from professional politicians of course)

power-hungry malcontents are fairly marginalized as far as

numbers and resources are concerned, in comparison to the PRC and

DPRK where they form an entire ruling class.18 However, some

related, but very Japanese attitudes towards religion make them

in others, far worse off. Despite upwards 80% of the population

technically being classified as members of Shinto or Buddhism (or

both on occasion) 19and even participating in traditional

ceremonies when the occasion calls for it, these numbers are

based on family records as opposed to personal affiliation or

sentiment, which remain far lower.20 18 (Unattributed 2014) Note: The JCP claims 320,000 active members as of 2014;a number which may or may not be inflated19 (United States Government/Central Intelligence Agency 2014)20 (McQuaid 2000-01)

24

So the question that continues to baffle most outside

observers is how a people, who a mere two or three generations

ago, were (in)famous the world over for their religious devotion,

become roughly half-to-two-thirds irreligious or atheist?21 The

answer, much like the political troubles of their Korean cousins,

lies in the structure of the post-war system. Almost all

religions have a figure who leads believers in some sort of

religious activity. Even the great Asian traditions, whether from

the Indian subcontinent or China, that do not place a high value

on worship or ceremony, have traditionally had learned masters to

provide spiritual and moral guidance to their students. In the

sense of the former, the Japanese, prior to 1945, were no

different, with their Tennō serving both in theory and practice as

the high priest of Shinto. It is of extreme significance that

many of the traditional Japanese holidays and festivals

originated, and remain to a degree, in Shinto rites and rituals;

especially the New Year, equinox, and harvest festivals, as the

emperor would as a rule (barring some extraordinary

circumstance), take part in these festivals as a very visible

21 ibid

25

symbol.22 As is well-known, the post-war constitution made many

changes to Japanese society. One of the clauses which would

ultimately become the most devastating to religious life in Japan

would be Article 20, which bars the government, and by extension,

the Imperial family, from having any public involvement in

religious life.23

While this may have appealed to the western victors

(particularly the United States) who wished to rebuild Japan in

their own image and had no love for Shinto, the abolition of

established religion, while a cherished western value, has proven

to be extremely damaging to the Japanese soul. In the post-war

context, the country’s spiritual malaise begins to become clear:

Especially in matters of religion and culture, the Japanese have

always had a remarkable ability to take other traditions and,

over time, make them into something distinctly Japanese.v Even

during times good and bad, ravaged by disasters both natural and

manmade across the centuries, both the commoners and the literati

alike were able to turn to the imperial capital for one of their

22 (Fridell 1976)23 (Several, The Constitution of Japan 1947)

26

major anchors for stability on earth and in the spiritual world,

knowing that their sovereign would always remain the symbol of

that stability.

With all of the (largely contrived) changes which have taken

place in that country since war, it perhaps unsurprising that the

spiritual lives of many, if not most Japanese would deteriorate

significantly. They would be far from the first people to suffer

from the loss or denial of a central earthly figure in their

traditional religion.vi Also unsurprising is the fact that any

attempts by foreign religions to fill this spiritual vacuum would

be unsuccessful. Lacking the spiritual dimension of the stability

provided by the Tennō and the fact that their country has been

flooded with an influx of foreign ideas and culture like never

before in the aftermath of the war, further erosion of their

cultural and religious identity could be and often is a very real

concern for many Japanese. Interestingly and appropriately

enough, Japanese religious life seems to resemble a solar system

lacking its star: Devoid of the warmth, light, and gravity of its

central figure, the bodies composing which were not destroyed in

the previous explosions gradually drift further and further into

27

the void. With this in mind, although he and his superiors had no

way of knowing it at the time, General Douglas MacArthur’s famous

call for Christian missionaries to Japan after the war was almost

certainly doomed even if he had received the men he had

requested.

I do not believe in writing/talking down to my readers: The

solution to reducing or eliminating the problems which I have

outlined is obvious and I have said/heavily implied it many

times. However, I must remain realistic: The governments in

Beijing and Pyongyang have, as of December 2014, about as much

intention of returning their thrones to their claimants as they

do of giving them to me. Seoul is perhaps not nearly as hopeless

a cause, but given that the DPRK’s southern counterpart is also

constitutionally defined as a republic and its political class

have gained much from demonizing the royal “traitorsvii,” I am not

optimistic at all.24

My causes for relative optimism about the Japanese are

twofold: Of course the fact that it is presently a monarchy, but

it is also the only of the four states which has a realistic 24 (Several, Constitution of the Republic of Korea 1987)

28

chance of amending its constitution to allow the Yamato dynasty

to take back its religious role. While Article 9 of said

constitution receives almost all of the foreign attention, if

this one can be altered or abolished, so can Article 20.

BibliographyAllen, Chizuko, T. "Northeast Asia Centered Around Korea: Ch'oe

Namson's View of History." The Journal of Asian Studies, 1990: 787-806.

Anderlini, Jamil. "The rise of Christianity in China." Financial Times, November 7, 2014.

Brooks, Bruce E, et.al/assorted disciples of Confucius. The Original Analects . New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.

Buruma, Ian. "Cult of the Chairman." The Guardian, March 1, 2001.

Card, James. "Korea's Cyber Vigilantes." Foreign Policy, October 8, 008.

Central Intelligence Agency. "East & Southeast Asia: Japan." Central Intelligence Agency. June 20, 2014. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html (accessed December 14, 2014).

Choe, Sang-hun, and Onishi Norimitsu. "North Korea's Tears: A Blend ofCult, Culture, and Coercion." New York Times, December 20, 2011: A5.

Chow, Kai-Wing. The Rise of Confucian Ritualism in Late Imperial China: Ethics, Classics, and Lineage Discourse. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994.

Fridell, Wilbur, M. "A Fresh Look at State Shinto." Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 1976: 547-561.

29

Hyung, Pai, Il. Constructing "Korean" Origins: A Critical Review of Archaeology, Historiography, and Racial Myth in Korean State-Formation Theories. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000.

Lee, Byong, Chul. "South Korea on the Fence: Nukes or No Nukes?" 38 North: A project of the US-Korea Institute at SIAS. September 30, 2011. http://38north.org/2011/09/bclee093011/ (accessed December 13, 2014).

Lee, Jung Young. Korean Shamanic Rituals. The Hauge, Netherlands: Mouton Publishers, 1981.

McQuaid, John. A View of Religion in Japan. New York, 2000-01.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Q&A on the Issue of the Name "Sea of Japan". Tokyo, February 2003.

Nahm, Andrew, C. A History of the Korean People 2nd Edition. Seoul: Hollym, 1996.

Piano, Aili, Arch Puddington, Tyler Rolance, and Eliza Young. Freedom in the World 2011. Survey, New York, Washington DC: Freedom House, 2011-12.

Proctor, M.S.G. Juche: The State Religion of North Korea: A Predictive Analysis of the Impact of Religion in the Korean Theater of Operations. Strategic analysis, United States Army, 2003.

Roberts, Jeremy. Japanese Mythology: A to Z. New York: Chelsea House Publishing , 2009.

Several. "Constitution of the Republic of Korea." Assembly of the Republic of Korea. October 29, 1987. http://korea.assembly.go.kr/res/low_01_read.jsp?boardid=1000000035 (accessed December 14, 2014).

—. "The Constitution of Japan." National Diet Library . May 3rd, 1947. http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html (accessed December 14, 2014).

Several, ordered compiled by the Kangxi Emperor. Kangxi Zìdiǎn. Beijing: n/a, 1716.

30

Ssuma Ch'ien's [Sima Qian's] Historical Records; translated by Herbert J. Allen. Unknown/London: n/a, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, c.109 BC/1894.

Unattributed. "Japanese Communist Party seeing sharp increase in new, young members." Mainichi Shimbun, January 7, 2014.

31

i I acknowledge that the placement of this section is awkward, but said informationis vital to my argument and did not fit anywhere else. ii German: “Original homeland.” Technically, this is a linguistic term, but may be used in ethnologyiii Although in cases like this, there is almost always more than enough blame to goaround for all involved parties.iv Equally likely is that they simply did not care as long as their own power and influence were secure.v Judging by the relative success of the Portuguese Jesuits, there is some evidencethat Christianity, like Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism before it was in the midst of this process before becoming the bête noir of the Tokugawa shoguns.vi Such as the Muslim world, whose problems have been written endlessly about or Protestant Christianity with its countless, wildly varying sects.vii It should be noted that the “reviled oppressor” in Tokyo did in fact, continue to honor the titles and privileges of the members of House Yi until the very end ofthe empire.