Download - The Diffusion of New Environmental Policy Instruments

569European Journal of Political Research 42 569ndash600 2003

The diffusion of new environmental policy instruments1

KERSTIN TEWS PER-OLOF BUSCH amp HELGE JOumlRGENSEnvironmental Policy Research Unit Free University of Berlin Germany

Abstract New Environmental Policy Instruments (NEPIs) are becoming increasinglyattractive From a global perspective there has been a rapid diffusion of these market-basedvoluntary or informational instruments This article examines the spread of four differentNEPIs ndash eco-labels energy or carbon taxes national environmental policy plans or strate-gies for sustainable development and free-access-of-information (FAI) provisions Theadoption of NEPIs by national policy makers is not simply a reaction to newly emergingenvironmental problems or to real or perceived deficits of traditional command and controlregulation rather the use of NEPIs can also be ascribed to the inner dynamics of interna-tional processes of policy transfer or policy diffusion These processes make it increasinglydifficult for national policy makers to ignore new approaches in environmental policy thathave already been put into practice in lsquoforerunnerrsquo countries

Introduction Global convergence of regulatory patterns inenvironmental policy

Recent comparative studies have revealed striking parallels in the develop-ment of national capacities for environmental protection across all OECDcountries often beyond the borders of the Western industrialised world(Jaumlnicke amp Weidner 1997a 1997b) Since the early 1950s almost all Organisa-tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Central 7and Eastern European (CEE) countries have progressively adopted similarlegislation in the areas of water and air protection as well as waste manage-ment (Weale 1992 Jaumlnicke amp Weidner 1997 1997b Kern Joumlrgens amp Jaumlnicke2001 see Figure 1) Additionally new government bodies for environmentalprotection have been set up by all industrialised countries beginning in thelate 1960s (Joumlrgens 1996)

However this more or less parallel development of national environmen-tal policies is not restricted to the initial establishment of specific institutionsand legislation in this comparatively new policy area A more recent shift inthe prevailing policy pattern is the move from a sectorally fragmented andlargely legally based regulatory approach to an integrated environmentalpolicy characterised by lsquosofterrsquo andor more flexible instruments such as

copy European Consortium for Political Research 2003Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd 9600 Garsington Road Oxford OX4 2DQ UK and 350 Main Street MaldenMA 02148 USA

570

voluntary agreements eco-labels or ecological tax reforms (see Figure 2) Gen-erally a global convergence of governance patterns in environmental policycan be observed In contrast to the widespread assumption that policy con-vergence takes place at the level of the lowest common denominator empir-ical data shows that global development in the field of environmentalprotection has to an important extent been guided by the developmentalstatus reached in lsquofrontrunnerrsquo countries (Kern 2000 Kern Joumlrgens amp Jaumlnicke2001)

How can this convergence of regulatory patterns in environmental policybe explained One possible explanation could be that governments through-out the world are reacting independently but similarly to similar envi-ronmental problem pressures Or states might simply be implementinginternational or multilateral environmental agreements However empiricaldata indicate that global convergence in environmental policy can take placein the absence of any international regime Moreover policy convergence goesfar beyond the transborder or global environmental problems that areaddressed by international environmental agreements It often occurs withregard to environmental problems that primarily need to be solved at theregional or national level such as surface and ground-water pollution urbanair pollution or waste management A third explanation therefore could be

kerstin tews per-olof busch amp helge joumlrgens

copy European Consortium for Political Research 2003

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s Waste Laws Soil Protection Laws Air Protection Laws Water Protection Laws

Figure 1 Spread of environmental laws in OECD countries and Central and EasternEuropeSource Busch amp Joumlrgens 2003

571

that governments orient their own environmental policies to what is alreadybeing practised in other countries The global convergence of environmentalpolicies then could to an important extent be explained as a result of the inter-national diffusion of ideas approaches institutions and instruments in the fieldof environmental protection

Policy diffusion ndash Mechanisms and driving forces

What are the principal mechanisms by which policy diffusion occurs and whatdrives it The growing body of literature on policy convergence as well aspolicy diffusion and policy transfer indicates that a complex interplay of dif-ferent factors influences the international spread of policies and the subse-quent convergence of national policies (see eg Gray 1973 1994 Rose 19911993 Bennett 1991 Dolowitz amp Marsh 1996 2000 Stone 1999 Kern 2000Kern Joumlrgens amp Jaumlnicke 2001 Evans amp Davies 1999) On the basis of thesestudies we define three groups of factors that can be expected to affect thepattern of diffusion the dynamics of the international system national factorsand the characteristics of the policy instrument (Tews 2002) We can set theseout in turn

diffusion of new environmental policy instruments


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1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

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EcolabelsNational Environmental PlansStrategies for Sustainable DevelopmentFree Access to (Environmental) InformationEnergyCarbon Taxes

Figure 2 Spread of new environmental policy instruments in OECD countries and Centraland Eastern EuropeSource Busch amp Joumlrgens 2003

572

Dynamics of the international system

Economic political and societal linkages between nation-states offer channelsfor the transfer of policies across countries These channels differ with regardto the dominant mechanism by which policy transfer occurs Economic inter-linkages are often perceived to create pressures to modify regulatory policiesin order to sustain or improve national competitiveness in a global economyHowever while the theoretical prediction of a downwards convergence oftenlacks empirical evidence (Vogel 1997 WTO 1999 Drezner 2001) the assump-tion that regulatory competition creates incentives to adopt innovative mea-sures at an early stage in order to gain lsquofirst mover advantagesrsquo (Porter amp Vander Linde 1995) begs the question of how the prospective advantages are iden-tified by those seeking to avail themselves of them

First mover advantages whether institutional (Heritier et al 1996) or eco-nomic (Porter amp Van der Linde 1995) can be identified only after the politicalor technological innovations have diffused beyond the national context wherethey were initiated Yet diffusion is not an automatic process The dynamicsof globalisation caution against simply assuming that policy convergence isdriven by a lsquorace to the toprsquo The degree of vertical integration in the inter-national system ndash the existence of transnational communication channels ndash iscrucial for the course of policy diffusion (Kern 2000 167) Such channelsincrease the prospects for policy diffusion Communication has to be seen asthe fundamental mechanism of diffusion (one of the original roots of diffu-sion research was communication research see Rogers 19621995) Theincreasing globalisation of communication via international organisationstransnational advocacy coalitions or global scientific discourse offers channelsfor the diffusion of knowledge best practice perceptions of problems or thecreation of common needs and beliefs

John Meyer et al (1997) pointed out that the global spread of environ-mental discourse and organisation ndash apart from the central role of non-gov-ernmental actors ndash was especially stimulated by the development of the UnitedNations (UN) The rise of this organisational system with an agenda broadenough to include environmental issues in conjunction with a more scientificperception of nature is considered to be the main driving force for the devel-opment of what has been labelled a lsquoWorld Environmental Regimersquo ndash lsquo apartially integrated collection of world-level organizations understandingsand assumptions that specify the relationship of human society to naturersquo(Meyer et al 1997 623) One of the first clearly visible results of internationalorganisation and discourse in the environmental field was the first UN Con-ference on Environment in Stockholm 1972 which in many countries set the



573

agenda for the development of environmental policy as a distinct policy area(Joumlrgens 1996)

Apart from the UN a large number of international organisations such asthe World Bank or the OECD have placed environmental issues on theiragendas and have been influential in the international dissemination of ideasapproaches and policy measures in this field Furthermore specific environ-mental networks exist like the International Council of Local EnvironmentalInitiatives the Global Eco-labelling Network or the International Network ofGreen Planners as well as various networks of environmental non-govern-mental organisations (NGOs) like Friends of the Earth the European Envi-ronmental Bureau the World Wildlife Fund and Greenpeace (Kern Joumlrgensamp Jaumlnicke 2001 9) They all communicate and disseminate ideas approachesand practices although they vary in power resources strategies and aims Aswell as disseminating information some international organisations (eg theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank) are able to enforceadjustments by using the lever of asymmetric power relations or structuraldependencies (see Dolowitz amp Marsh 2000 who have developed a continuumof types of policy transfer ranging from voluntary to coercion) By contrastNGOs and scientific communities provide and disseminate knowledge in orderto change perceptions ndash their main mode of communication is lsquopersuasionrsquo(Keck amp Sikkink 1999 Stone 2000)

A number of international institutions have aims other than solving col-lective-action problems (Martin amp Simmons 1998 Botcheva amp Martin 2001)Such lsquoaspirationalrsquo arrangements are weak international agreements withoutenforcement mechanisms Rather they set goals and standards for signatorystates and lsquo work through a long process of persuasion to encourage move-ment toward these standardsrsquo (Botcheva amp Martin 2001 12) Moreover theseaspirational institutions lsquotypically reflect the agenda-setting power of ambi-tious well organized private actors It therefore seems empirically accuratethat aspirational institutions adopt ldquohighrdquo standards of behaviour since thesegroups hope to use the persuasive power of institutions to ldquoimproverdquo the prac-tices of statesrsquo (Botcheva amp Martin 2001 13)

The 20 per cent reduction in the 1988 levels of CO2 emissions by 2005 asformulated in the final statement of the Toronto Conference on lsquoOur Chang-ing Atmospherersquo is a striking example for such an aspirational institutions Theprocess of formulating this numeric goal was mainly pushed forward by theNGO community and considerably facilitated by the prime ministers ofNorway and Canada ndash Gro Harlem Brundtland and Brian Mulroney ndash bothof whom called for a global convention on climate change The Toronto goalalthough only a recommendation not only focused public attention on the



574

climate issue but also stimulated national goal setting processes (eg inGermany in 1990) and political efforts to tackle the climate change problemby the development of national climate policies in the Netherlands GermanyCanada and Norway in the early 1990s (see Social Learning Group 2001 Kasa1999)

The observable effects of persuasion indicate that there is another sourceof convergence which is more ideational in nature lsquostates alter institutions andregulations because a set of beliefs has developed sufficient normative powerthat leaders fear looking like laggards if they do not adopt similar policiesrsquo(Drezner 2001 57) Such competitive dynamics are harnessed by internationalorganisations like the OECD and the UN They systematically encouragelsquobenchmarkingrsquo by regularly comparing national performance on specificissues such as the environment or education With its emphasis on mutuallyagreed targets aspirations and norms the information they provide serves asinstrument lsquoin the exercise of ldquoshamingrdquo and peer pressurersquo (Botcheva ampMartin 2001 15)

Moreover instrumental benchmarking activities shaped by aspirationalinstitutions or quasi-regimes (Ruggie 1998 see also Botcheva amp Martin 200115) are not only pursued by international organisations of nation-statesTransnational non-state actors facilitate national adoptions of policy innova-tions practised in other countries or modelled on internationally promotedlsquobest practicesrsquo Thus normative or ideational pressure for convergence mayresult from the fact that lsquostates are embedded in dense networks of transna-tional and international social relations that shape their perceptions of theworld and their role in that worldrsquo (Finnemore 1996 2) States or organisa-tions not only compete for resources but also for verifying their legitimacy(DiMaggio amp Powell 1991 66 Finnemore amp Sikkink 1998 902) as membersof a global community (Finnemore 1996 Meyer et al 1997 Katzenstein et al1998)

To sum up we can distinguish two main driving mechanisms of diffusionof innovative policy measures rooting in the growing economic and political-institutional interlinkages between nation-states Regulatory competition mayunder certain circumstances lead to an upward convergence instead of thetheoretically predicted lsquorace to the bottomrsquo (Scharpf 1999 83) National policymakers may be forced by considerations of competitiveness to adopt the inno-vative policy measures of pioneers in order to avoid significant economic oradministrative adjustment costs (Heritier et al 1996 Vogel 1997 Jaumlnicke ampWeidner 1997a Kern Joumlrgens amp Jaumlnicke 2001 4ndash5) Pioneer behaviour in turnmay be triggered by the same considerations ndash that is the expected globalspread of political andor technological innovations introduced by these countries



575

This expectation that innovations introduced by pioneer countries will sub-sequently be adopted by other countries is supported by a second competitivedynamic of the international system Ideational competition may become thedriving force of policy emulation following the establishment of environmen-tal protection as an internationally accepted and shared norm This may resultin lsquobandwagoningrsquo effects (Ikenberry 1990) or lsquonorm-cascadesrsquo (Finnemore ampSikkink 1998) where nation-states can no longer resist adopting certain mea-sures aims or strategies without threatening their image as legitimatemembers of an environmentally responsible global society (for this and relatedsociological institutionalist or world-society approaches see eg Ruggie 1998Katzenstein et al 1998 Schimmelfennig 1998)

National capacities for adopting innovative environmental policy measures

At the national level the political economic societal and institutional capac-ities of any particular country influence the demand for and the feasibility ofpolicy innovations (Kern Joumlrgens amp Jaumlnicke 2001 8) Similarly endogenousproblem perceptions and the power of pressure groups or public opinion havean effect on the demand for new solutions Different scholars of internationalrelations ascribe to those domestic factors contrary weights when accountingfor the effects of international institutionsorganisations which promoteknowledge goals and ideas As diffusion research is concerned with the effectsof precisely those institutions or organisations which engage in the lsquoidea gamersquolsquoformulating transferring selling and teaching not formal regulation but prin-cipled or causal beliefs helping to constrain or enable certain types of socialbehaviourrsquo (Marcussen 2001 3) this seemingly theoretical contradictionrequires attention Botcheva and Martin (2001 13) argue that cross-nationalvariations in the existence organisation and opportunities for access of domes-tic pressure groups may affect the impact of so-called lsquointernational aspira-tional institutionsrsquo In countries where well-organised interest groups andadequate opportunities for access exist those aspirational institutions matterbecause these groups may use international norms to put pressure on theirgovernments for policy change In other countries such aspirational interna-tional institutions will not matter By contrast Finnemore and Sikkink (1998902) concluded that states may adopt policies even though they face no domes-tic pressure to do so Instead international dynamics will become dominant atthe tipping point lsquowhen enough states and enough critical states endorse thenew norm to redefine appropriate behaviour for the identity called ldquostaterdquo orsome subset of statesrsquo

The divergent effect of institutions on state behaviour anticipated byBotcheva and Martin (2001) and the expected convergent effect of similar



576

institutions suggested by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) as well as the corre-sponding different weightings they give to domestic factors are in fact notmutually exclusive They only reveal differences in the kinds of effect theyintend to investigate and consequently in the conceptualisation of the termlsquoconvergencersquo The former look at state compliance with international lsquosoftrsquoagreements and discover divergent policy outcomes The latter focus on inter-national dynamics that cause convergent national policy adoptions Yet focus-ing on policy adoption alone does not allow one to distinguish betweenlsquosuperficialrsquo and lsquodeeprsquo policy adoption between cases where adoption islargely symbolic and cases where extensive commitment of resources isinvolved (Berry amp Berry 1999 189) We argue that this distinction will becomerelevant in another stage of research that goes far beyond the original focusof diffusion research and focuses on the governance potential of diffusion byinvestigating outcomes and impacts of what diffused (Joumlrgens 2001 125)2 Wecan expect domestic factors to play a significant role in policy adoption at leastin the early stage of the diffusion process3 but not necessarily for each policyadoption during the whole process as domestic factors may be overshadowedby international dynamics of the norms themselves

Among national factors attention has been directed especially to adminis-trative traditions regulatory structures policy styles and the legacy of pastpolicies The perceived administrative implications of adopting new policies orinstruments are often seen as essential factors influencing the decision to adoptor reject policy innovations from other countries This emphasis on lsquoadminis-trative fitrsquo or the lsquologic of appropriatenessrsquo (March amp Olsen 1989) is based onthe general assumption lsquothat institutionally grown structures and routinesprevent easy adaptation to exogenous pressurersquo (Knill amp Lenschow 1998 2)Sometimes they are emphasised as forces promoting divergence (Hoberg2001 127 Jordan 2001 20) We argue that national institutional arrangementsserve as filters to the adoption of innovations (Kern Joumlrgens amp Jaumlnicke 2001)They may delay or prevent the adoption of path-deviant policies but mainlythey will be responsible for variations in the degree of convergence affectingpolicy similarities with respect to policy ideas and approaches the utilizationof particular policy instruments or the qualitative level of regulation There-fore we argue that a global convergence of policies will never exclude diver-gent national adaptations as lsquowe would never expect a programme to transferfrom one government to another without history culture and institutions beingtaken into accountrsquo (Rose 1991 21)

To sum up we consider national factors as crucial for answering the ques-tion of why nation-states adopt policy innovations at an earlier stage at a laterstage or even resist them altogether Furthermore they help to explainnational variations in the design of policy innovations



577

Characteristics of specific policy innovations

Finally the specific characteristics of the policy innovation have to be takeninto account Surprisingly studies on policy diffusion and policy transfer oftentend systematically to ignore this group of factors (Rogers 19621995 204Dolowitz amp Marsh 2000 3) Nevertheless comparative studies show that thespeed and pattern of policy diffusion vary according to the specific features ofpolicy innovations (Bennett 1997 Burke 1999 Jaumlnicke amp Weidner 1997aJaumlnicke amp Joumlrgens 1998 Kern Joumlrgens amp Jaumlnicke 2001) Bennett (1997 229)even concludes that lsquothe major variable to consider when assessing the diffu-sion of an innovation is the inherent properties of the issuersquo (see also Rogers19621995 204)

On the basis of the findings in the relevant literature we argue that certainproperties of a policy innovation may influence its lsquodiffusabilityrsquo These prop-erties can be divided into three categories the underlying problem structurecompatibility (technical feasibility) and political feasibility It will be difficultto find general items for these raw categories without considering diversenational contexts that can significantly influence the technical and political fea-sibility of policy innovations We are aware that the administrative implica-tions of policy innovations pose distinct challenges to diverse nationalregulatory styles structures and logics (Knill amp Lenschow 1998 4) Howeverwe intend to define some minimum criteria that allow us to generalise aboutthe properties of policy innovations that affect the rate at which they areadopted in the international system

The underlying problem structure of a policy can be described in terms ofthe ease with which it is placed on the political agenda owing to the visibilityof a policy problem and the subsequent public pressure to solve the problemthe power of the relevant target groups to keep a political issue off the polit-ical agenda or to oppose new or stricter regulations and the availability oftechnical solutions to the problem (Jaumlnicke Kunig amp Stitzel 1999 82) Wherethe problem structure is unfavourable the diffusion of policy innovations maybe significantly hindered Empirically it has been observed that policies affect-ing issues where harmful effects only become apparent gradually over a longerterm and are not directly visible cannot easily be placed on the political agendaand thus diffuse rather slowly if at all The same can be said for problemswhere standard technical solutions do not apply such as land-use ground-water pollution or loss of biodiversity (Kern Joumlrgens amp Jaumlnicke 2001 Jaumlnickeamp Weidner 1997a Jaumlnicke amp Joumlrgens 2000 612ndash613) However the value ofthis category is limited to those innovations that address environmental prob-lems directly In contrast to traditional environmental legislation focusing onphysical environmental problems such as air soil or water protection much



578

innovation in environmental policy is not designed to address environmentalproblems directly Rather environmental institutions strategies and instru-ments often aim to improve effectiveness in the political management of envi-ronmental protection

With regard to the compatibility of policy innovations with existing regu-latory styles and structures the extent of policy change a regulatory innova-tion brings with it is likely to be decisive in its diffusion With the filteringeffect of national institutions it can be assumed that the diffusion will dependon how easily an innovation can pass through these filters For example it is easier to create a separate environmental ministry than to integrate effec-tively environmental concerns into the decision-making process of all rele-vant ministries The spread of innovations which only bring incrementalchanges and which can easily be added to existing structures can be expectedto be faster than the spread of innovations that are in conflict with tradi-tional regulatory structures and policy styles (Kern Joumlrgens amp Jaumlnicke 200111ndash13)

Furthermore the political feasibility of an innovation depends on its poten-tial to provoke conflict with powerful groups (Kern Joumlrgens amp Jaumlnicke 200124) The fiscal effects of policy instruments are crucial in this respectRedistributive policies that affect powerful interests especially internationallymobile interests are less likely to diffuse rapidly Therefore the exposure ofthe policy innovation to regulatory competition can be characterised as a rawcriterion for the prospect of its rate of adoption A more sophisticated dis-tinction of policy innovations exposed to regulatory competition states thatthe political feasibility depends on whether the underlying economic compe-tition concerns the quality of products or costs of production which cannot betransformed into product qualities (Scharpf 1999) Regulatory measures thataffect product qualities in terms of lower consumption and production exter-nalities may result in competitive advantages of domestic producers on inter-national market for high quality goods ndash the so-called lsquocertification effectrsquo ofnational regulative measures (Scharpf 1999 8) may foster the diffusion of aparticular policy innovation

In the following section the degree to which these factors can explain thediffusion of environmental policy innovations will be illustrated on the basisof four empirical examples of new environmental policy instruments nationalenvironmental policy plans and strategies for sustainable development eco-labels energycarbon taxes and legal provisions on the free access to (envi-ronmental) information



579

The global spread of new environmental approaches and instruments ndashFour examples

Although the effectiveness and efficiency of new environmental policy instru-ments in relation to traditional command-and-control regulation has not yetbeen proven by empirical research (for a critical review see Knill amp Lenschow2000) NEPIs are increasingly adopted across all industrialised countries (seeFigures 2 3 4 5 and 6) As these cumulative adoptions of softer and more flex-ible regulation cannot be adequately explained by greater effectiveness or effi-ciency of NEPIs additional explanatory factors have to be taken into accountWe will argue that the motivation of national policymakers to adopt NEPIs isto an important extent influenced by the increasing vertical integration of theinternational system and intensification of the efforts of international organi-sations to actively promote new approaches ideas aims and instruments in thefield of environmental policy



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1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

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Frequency Cumulative

Figure 3 Spread of national environmental policy plans and strategies for sustainable devel-opment in OECD countries and Central and Eastern EuropeSource Busch amp Joumlrgens 2003

580 kerstin tews per-olof busch amp helge joumlrgens


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1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 199 2 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

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Figure 4 Spread of eco-labels in OECD countries and Central and Eastern EuropeSource Busch amp Joumlrgens 2003

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1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

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Figure 5 Spread of energycarbon taxes in OECD countries and Central Eastern EuropeSource Busch amp Joumlrgens 2003

581

National environmental policy plans and strategies for sustainabledevelopment

Innovation profileNational environmental policy plans and strategies for sustainable develop-ment are governmental action plans adopted by cabinets andor parliamentsThey are drawn up with broad public participation and set long-term envi-ronmental policy goals and priorities for different parts of the physical environment and different sectors Strategic environmental planning is animportant shift from a highly fragmented primarily physically oriented andinstrumental environmental policy towards an integrated strategy guided bylong-term goals (Jaumlnicke amp Joumlrgens 1998) National environmental policyplans and strategies for sustainable development are among the most impor-tant attempts to implement the Agenda 21 sustainable development model atthe national level (Meadowcroft 2000) Their main characteristics are that theyinvolve (Jaumlnicke amp Joumlrgens 1998 2000) consensual long-term environmentalgoal-setting goals derived from the principle of sustainability the inclusion ofall relevant policy areas (policy integration) of agentspolluters in problem-solving (agent involvement) and of major different interests in goal and policy



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1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 198 2 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

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Figure 6 Spread of public-access-to-information provisions in OECD countries and Centraland Eastern EuropeSource Busch amp Joumlrgens 2003

582

formulation (participation) and the provision of mandatory reporting on goalimplementation (monitoring)

Spread profileThe strategic goal-oriented environmental planning approach has spread veryrapidly since the 1980s in both industrial countries and in newly industrialisedand developing countries Within a decade of the adoption of the first nationalenvironmental policy plans in Denmark (1988) and the Netherlands (1989)almost two-thirds of the OECD countries and about four-fifths of the moredeveloped CEE countries had adopted national environmental policy plans as well (Jaumlnicke amp Joumlrgens 2000 614ndash616) Although there are marked dif-ferences in these plans with regard to both the relevance and specificity ofgoals (Jaumlnicke Carius amp Joumlrgens 1997) all are based on the model of targetedcross-sectoral and ndash at least in intention ndash participatory environmental planning

The diffusion curve (see Figure 3) shows a sharp rise beginning at the endof the 1980s A number of factors have influenced the relatively rapid world-wide spread of this policy innovation Although a domestic impetus for strate-gic planning was apparent in some countries such as the Netherlands or theUnited Kingdom international processes including the Brundtland Report(1987) and Agenda 21 (1992) were most influential and accelerated nationaldevelopments (Jaumlnicke Carius amp Joumlrgens 1997) Probably the most importantinternational event was the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Devel-opment in Rio de Janeiro and its Agenda 21 action plan which called on allsignatories to formulate a lsquonational strategy of sustainable developmentrsquo In1997 at a special session of the UN Assembly in New York this resolution wasconfirmed and a 2002 deadline was set for developing the national strategies(Kern Joumlrgens amp Jaumlnicke 2001 18) Additionally since 1992 the OECD hassystematically included having a comprehensive environmental plan among itscriteria for assessing the environmental performance of its Member States andsometimes points this out sharply to lsquolaggardsrsquo4

In addition to these international driving forces a number of national orregional activities also affected the international diffusion of national envi-ronmental policy plans The most prominent example of this is the Dutch Envi-ronmental Policy Plan of 1989 which served as a model for similar initiativesin many other European countries as well as for the European Unionrsquos FifthEnvironmental Action Programme Furthermore the environmental organi-sation Friends of the Earth has presented its own draft strategy for sustain-able development for the Netherlands the European Union (EU) and forGermany (Jaumlnicke et al 2000 221ndash222) For transitional countries of Centraland Eastern Europe the Polish lsquoNational Environmental Policyrsquo adopted in



583

1991 served as a model (OECD 1995b 104) along the lines of the Dutch planfor the more developed and wealthier countries The Environment for Europeprocess decisively stipulated the development of national environmentalpolicy plans in that region At the first ministerial meeting in Dobris in 1991the decision was taken to develop an Environmental Action Plan for CEE Atask force managed by the OECD and the World Bank drafted this plan whichwas passed at the second conference in Lucerne in 1993 It was the blueprintfor the development of national environmental action plans in the region Atotal of 16 countries from the region ndash assisted by the OECD ndash have sincedeveloped such a programme or are in the process of doing so (OECD 19987) Finally the International Network of Green Planners a worldwide discus-sion forum and information exchange has contributed much to the spread ofstrategic environmental planning (see httpwwwingporg)

Overall it can be said that while in only a few countries (such as theNetherlands) has strategic environmental planning led to the introduction ofcompletely new and ambitious environmental policy goals or far-reachingchanges in the administrative organisation of environmental policy in themajority of cases such plans have been developed without drastic conse-quences for existing environmental policy (Jaumlnicke amp Joumlrgens 1998) Thedevelopment of national environmental policy plans has thus been a largelyadditive process (Kern Joumlrgens amp Jaumlnicke 2001 19)

Eco-labels

Innovation profileEco-labelling can be defined as lsquothe practice of labelling products based on awide range of environmental considerationsrsquo in order to make relevant envi-ronmental information available to consumers (EPA 1998 5) Eco-labelsenable consumers to include environmental considerations in their purchas-ing decisions Indirectly environmental labelling may also affect producers asthey design products that have to compete not only on price and quality butalso to some extent on environmental impacts (EPA 1998 5)

Two basic types of eco-labels can be distinguished The first type concernslabelling schemes relying predominantly on first-party verification (iecreated by individual producers in order to point out the positive environ-mental attributes of their products) This type of eco-label will not beaddressed in our study The second type concerns labelling systems where verification is carried out by an independent body that awards labels to prod-ucts based on a mandatory fixed set of criteria or standards (EPA 1998 9)Furthermore positive neutral and negative eco-labelling schemes can be distinguished While positive programmes usually point out one or more



584

environmentally friendly characteristics negative programmes warn con-sumers about harmful components of products Neutral programmes alsoprovide environmental data but leave the interpretation up to the consumer(EPA 1998 9)

Another distinction concerns the mandatory or voluntary character of eco-labelling programmes While mandatory labels usually warn about possiblehazards and have to be displayed by all producers of a certain type of productvoluntary labels are usually positive or neutral in nature and it is up to pro-ducers to decide whether or not they want to participate Finally eco-labellingschemes can vary according to the range and type of products they cover (egenergy labels applying only to electronic appliances or general eco-labels cov-ering potentially all product categories) In the following we will focus on thespread of nationwide voluntary eco-labelling schemes relying on third-partyverification using a mandatory set of criteria and not limited to one or a fewproduct groups

Spread profileThe first country to introduce a national eco-labelling programme wasGermany Although the German lsquoBlue Angelrsquo of 1978 has certainly served asa model for the development of similar initiatives in other countries and inthe EU it was not until 1988 that Canada followed the lead by introducing itsown national eco-label lsquoCanadarsquos Environmental Choicersquo The first big rise inthe curve (see Figure 2) occurred in 1989 when four Scandinavian countriesadopted the multinational eco-label lsquoNordic Swanrsquo and Japan and the UnitedStates developed their own national programmes While most eco-labellingprogrammes are public policies the lsquoGreen Sealrsquo in the United States by con-trast is not a government programme but privately funded and directed by anational non-profit organisation (OECD 1997 27) The international spreadof eco-labelling programmes accelerated even further in 1992 when the EUCouncil of Ministers introduced the lsquoEuropean Flowerrsquo as an EU-wide eco-label (Council Regulation (EEC) No 88092)5

In the short period from 1988 to 1992 there was a rapid spread of this envi-ronmental policy instrument driven mainly by regional cooperation within theNordic Council and in the EU This spread can only be classified as diffusionwith some qualification The process leading to the development of the lsquoEuro-pean Flowerrsquo can be characterised as a vertical and lsquobottom-uprsquo diffusionmechanism (Kern Kissling-Naumlf et al 2001) Vertical policy diffusion is acommon phenomenon in multilevel systems such as the United States or theEU Vertical bottom-up diffusion characterises the transfer of a policy inno-vation from the national (or sub-national) level to the superior policy level(Kern 1998 3) The European eco-label was strongly inspired by already exist-



585

ing European national eco-labelling programmes such as the German French(1991) and Austrian (1991) systems as well as by the multinational lsquoNordicSwanrsquo (see Landmann 1998 113) However the introduction of the EU-eco-label transforms the vertical diffusion process into the development and appli-cation of supranational law Policymaking within the EU has to be describedas a specific case of multilevel governance (see eg Scharpf 1993 1994Jachtenfuchs amp Kohler-Koch 1996) where processes of policy diffusion minglewith supranational decision-making

While most European countries refrained from introducing their ownnational eco-labels and confined themselves to implementing the EuropeanCouncilrsquos regulation the development of national eco-labelling programmescontinued worldwide Outside the EU national eco-label programmes wereadopted in New Zealand (1990) Australia (1991) Korea (1992) Croatia theCzech Republic Hungary (1993) Lithuania (1995) Slovakia (1996) and Latvia(1997) In addition two EU Member States (the Netherlands in 1992 andSpain in 1993) introduced their own national label in addition to the existingsupranational one The development and adoption of eco-labels in CEE coun-tries was partly influenced by the German Federal Agency of the Environmentorganising eco-labelling workshops for CEE countries and promoting theGerman Blue Angel scheme (see Landmann 1998 101)

By the end of 2000 eco-labelling programmes were in place in 23 OECDcountries and six CEE countries However due to the significant differencesbetween national eco-labelling programmes there is considerable need forinternational harmonisation Against this background international organisa-tions and networks (such as the issue-specific lsquoGlobal Eco-labelling Networkrsquoor the International Standard Organisation (ISO) as well as the OECD andthe UN Environment Programme) that were hardly involved in the initialspread of eco-labels increasingly try to play a part Their efforts are especiallydirected at an international harmonisation of eco-labels (Kern Joumlrgens ampJaumlnicke 2000 526) andor their mutual recognition (UN Commission on Sustainable Development 1995 6ndash8)

Energycarbon taxes

Innovation profileEnergycarbon taxes are tariffs on the use of energy By increasing the marketprice for energy they aim to set incentives for energy savings and in some caseson increases in energy production from renewable sources The overarchinggoal of energy-related taxes is preventing climate change by reducing CO2

emissions from the use of fossil fuel in energy production and transport Exist-ing taxation models differ with respect to the tax base which can be related



586

to the carbon content andor energy content of fossil fuels or to the final con-sumption of energy products or a combination of both Since different taxbases may influence ecological outcomes (OECD 2001a 59) we decided toconcentrate (in the first run) on the diffusion of the general approach to taxenergy use which is ecologically motivated and aims at climate protection andthe reduction of CO2 emissions

Spread profileThe first country to introduce a carbon tax on fossil fuels was Finland in 1990However Finland lsquohas hardly perceived itself as a ldquogood examplerdquo that othercountries could learn fromrsquo (Andersen amp Liefferink 1997 25) It was followedby Norway (1991) Sweden (1991) Denmark (1992) and the Netherlands(1992)

The discussion surrounding the European Commissionrsquos proposal to intro-duce a common energycarbon tax in 1992 (COM (92) 226 30061992) accel-erated at least three of these national carbon tax adoptions Denmark pursueda pusher-by-example strategy (Liefferink amp Andersen 1998) and unilaterallyintroduced a national energycarbon tax in order to influence Europeanpolicy-making In July 1992 the Netherlands introduced an energycarbon tax modelled on the Commissionrsquos proposal (Schlegelmilch 1999 19) Con-sidering the early efforts (1988 fuel charge) and later developments (1996 regulating energy tax) lsquothe Netherlands provides an interesting example of progressive transformation of earmarked charges into unrequited taxesrsquo(Barde 1999 34) Sweden ndash at that time not a member of the EU ndash introduceda national carbon tax with the intention of setting an example soon to be fol-lowed by other countries This combination of domestic policy innovation andinternational leadership has a certain tradition in the Swedish environmentalpioneer strategy (Andersen amp Liefferink 1997 22) This first wave ofenergycarbon tax adoptions in the early 1990s can be ascribed to pusherstrategies typical of European pioneer countries which adopt innovative poli-cies at the national level as examples to be followed by other countries or inorder to accelerate international policy development

As the curve in Figure 5 illustrates the spread of energycarbon taxesslowed down significantly after this first wave of diffusion However at thesame time information transfer at the international level increased and wasessentially stimulated by OECD benchmarking activities (OECD 1993 1995a1999 2001a) and those of the European Environment Agency (EEA 19962000) Both organisations increasingly promote energycarbon taxes withinthe context of broader green tax reforms With the adoption of energy taxesin Germany and Italy in 1999 and the introduction of the British Climate



587

Change Levy in 2001 three influential countries have recently adopted thispolicy innovation6

The diffusion of energycarbon taxes as shown in Figure 5 is interesting fora number of reasons First it is worth noting that despite demands raised backin the 1970s (Baumol amp Oates 1989 Hohmeyer 1995) comprehensive taxeson energy over and above charges on mineral oil were imposed only after1990 Since the beginning of the 1980s a comprehensive ecological tax reformhad come under increasing discussion (Koschel amp Weinreich 1995 10) Despitea generally favourable estimate of their potential in the literature it was notuntil the international climate protection debate which put pressure on coun-tries to markedly reduce CO2 emissions that green taxes (especially carbonand energy taxes) gained in importance in environmental policy practice aswell This time lag between demand and reality is seen throughout the entirefield of market-based instruments in environmental protection (Jaumlnicke ampWeidner 1997a 1997b Zittel 1996) The introduction of effective economicinstruments regularly fails where powerful well-organised economic interestsare the potential losers in such a strategy This is particularly true in the keyfields for applying eco-taxes ndash energy and transport (Mez 1998) Most of thepolicy analysis confirms these observations and assumes that redistributivepolicies are difficult to implement It is also striking that ndash following the jointfrontrunner policy of the Nordic countries ndash apart from Slovenia (1997) onlywealthy northern and western European states have so far begun introducingenergycarbon taxes

Taxes lsquoimposed on products or key factors of production where the goodsare traded widely in the international marketrsquo (OECD 2001a 72) are exposedto regulatory competition The concern with competitiveness in sectors mostaffected is the key point at issue in opposition to the introduction ofenergycarbon taxes The perceived link between eco-taxes and decreasedinternational competitiveness lowers the political feasibility of energy taxes(Barde 1999 OECD 2001a 71) This can be shown by the Clinton adminis-trationrsquos effort to introduce the BTU (energy) tax in 1993 as well as by theAustralian Greenhouse Levy (1994) ndash both collapsed when energy-intensiveindustries complained that they would be disadvantaged in the global mar-ketplace (Hoerner amp Muller 1996) Loss of competitiveness was also a con-sideration in European cases of energycarbon tax adoptions In order toincrease the acceptability of energy taxes and to avoid economically harmfuleffects all governments that adopted energy taxes provided exemptionsandor rebates for energy-intensive industries (Ekins 1996 17 OECD 2001a72) Furthermore energycarbon taxes mostly are embedded in a more or lessgeneral tax reform focusing on the so-called lsquodouble dividendrsquo which in fact



588

holds the tax burden constant (Barde 1999 34) Finland which first adopteda tax on fossil fuels according to their carbon content was until 1997 lsquothe onlycountry that did not grant reductions in energy taxation for industryrsquo (Teir1999 305) However it was forced not only to change the approach in elec-tricity taxation from fuels to end-products (OECD 2001a 59) but also to intro-duce some lower tax rates for industry These changes were necessary in orderto cope with competitive pressure and competition rules within the EU result-ing from the Finnish entry into the EU and the liberalisation of European elec-tricity markets (see Teir 1999 305 ff) Additionally the Finnish reform (1996)now likewise focuses strongly on the lsquodouble dividendrsquo ndash compensating forincreased green taxes by reducing the tax on labour (Barde 1999 34)

The diffusion of energy taxes provides a good example of the fact thatalthough the perceived threat of competitive disadvantages may considerablyrestrict national environmental policy making and stifle the international diffusion dynamic it does not in all cases prevent unilateral adoptions of those policies by international forerunner countries The dynamics behind thisspread within the European context can be described as a process of lesson-drawing on how to reconcile the global climate protection issue with nationaleconomic and public policy objectives On the other hand the spread ofenergycarbon taxes reveals aspects of both ideational competition (to providethe nation-statersquos stake for global climate protection) as well as regulatorycompetition (to ensure competitive advantages for domestic industry) as thespread of similar mitigation strategies such as exemptions and rebates forsome sectors indicates Furthermore where energycarbon taxes are embed-ded in comprehensive tax reforms this reveals the impact of other policyobjectives and political attempts to gain additional benefits from this reformas revenues raised from energy-related taxes are lsquochannelled to reduce themarginal tax rates of other distortionary taxationrsquo (OECD 2001a 123)

Legal provisions on the free access to (environmental) information (FAI)

Innovation profileFAI provisions are regulations granting all citizens free access to informationheld by public authorities With regard to FAI provisions one has to differ-entiate between regulations concerning access to information in general andspecific regulations concerning access to environmental information in partic-ular Both types of transparency laws aim to increase general public account-ability control of bureaucratic action and both include free access toenvironmental information

FAI provisions are cross-cutting instruments covering all environmentallyrelevant issues They aim to ensure the availability comparability and public



589

accessibility of any kind of environmentally relevant information They obligepublic bodies to gather and disseminate information and to keep the publicinformed about relevant environmental developments (active obligation) andto respond within a given time frame to specific requests for information fromthe public (passive obligation) FAI provisions cover environmental data andstatistics as well as information about activities of private entrepreneurs heldby the authorities Essential elements are a provision for free access to infor-mation for all citizens regardless of their interests or legal standing a defini-tion of the types of information covered by the regulation and a list of clearlydefined exemptions Differences between national regulations can be foundfor example with respect to fees for providing information time frames therange of public authorities which are required to make information availableand complaint procedures

Spread profilePublic access to information is a longstanding tradition (eg Sweden has hadtransparency laws since 1766) (FoE 1995 5 Kloepfer amp Mast 1995 143) By2000 FAI provisions had been adopted by about 80 per cent of all OECD andCEE countries (see Figure 6) Since there are two types of FAI provisions ndashgeneral and issue-specific ndash it is difficult to identify the source of their globaldiffusion Although general provisions for public access to information in prin-ciple also include environmental matters it can be argued that environmentalprotection only started to become an important area of public policy in thesecond half of the twentieth century Therefore in our analysis we will lookat FAI provisions that have been adopted in the second half of the twentiethcentury

A first phase of policy development which we classify as the developmentand spread of general provisions for public access to official documents startedin 1949 with the transformation of the Swedish constitutional provision of 1766into the Act on Free Public Access to Government and Official Files withinthe frame of the Freedom of Press Law (Kloepfer amp Mast 1995 143) Shortlythereafter in 1951 Finland adopted the Act on Publicity of Official Docu-ments These adoptions can be traced back to the historic and deep connec-tion between Finland and Sweden Such interrelations of regions are oftenperceived as structural determinants of diffusion (for the network-analyticalapproach used in political geography see eg Lutz 1987)

The next adoption of FAI legislation took place in the United States 15years later The 1966 Freedom of Information Act (FOI) (and its later amend-ments) is predominantly quoted by environmental organisations worldwide asthe model to emulate All national adoptions of this first phase concern generalFAI provisions The relatively slow rise in the curve (see Figure 6) suggests



590

that it was driven by bilateral relations between the adopting states ratherthan by organised dissemination and or promotion at the international levelRegional cooperation between several geographically linked countriesexplains to some extent the diffusion among Scandinavian countries (in addi-tion to Sweden and Finland Norway and Denmark adopted legislation onpublic access to information in 1970)

A second phase during the 1970s and 1980s was characterised by asequence of mainly sporadic adoptions causing a continuous but still ratherslow rise in the diffusion curve Finally after 1991 the rate of adoption sud-denly accelerates and interestingly most schemes now cover specifically envi-ronmental information With its comprehensive environmental framework lawof 1991 the Resource Management Act New Zealand was the first country tointroduce a national provision for free access to environmental informationfollowed by Latvia later the same year as the first country from CEE Theincreased frequency of adoption of public access laws from 1991 until 1999compared with the earlier phases has been influenced by a number of factorsIn June 1990 the EU passed a directive on free access to environmental infor-mation (Directive 90313EEC) At the international level the Rio Declara-tion of 1992 (Principle 10) made explicit reference to public participation andfree access to information

After the collapse of the CEE communist systems in 1989ndash1990 the newgovernments and societal actors started to realign predominantly with theWestern model of democracy ndash in a couple of these countries environmentalgroups even constituted a bearing part of the anti-regime opposition An addi-tional motivation of some of the CEE countries in adopting FAI provisionswas the prospect of EU membership The adoption of the whole acquis com-munautaire ndash including the EU Directive on free access to environmentalinformation ndash was a prerequisite for integration (for further considerationsabout this type of more or less imposed policy transfer in the EU enlargementprocess see Tews 2000 2001) In 1992 four out of six countries introducingFAI provisions were in CEE The Ukraine and Hungary adopted FAI provisions as a general act on free access to information held by public author-ities Bulgaria and the Czech Republic included FAI provisions in their new environmental framework legislation The Bulgarian and especiallythe Hungarian legislation have been quoted as being very progressive (FoE1995 10)

In 1993 the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) ndash within theEnvironment for Europe process ndash was called upon by the participating envi-ronmental ministers to set up a task force on environmental rights and oblig-ations ndash culminating in 1998 with the adoption of the UNECE Convention on



591

Access to Information Public Participation and Justice at the Fourth Minis-terial Conference in the Environment for Europe series ndash the so-called lsquoAarhusConventionrsquo At the beginning of the twenty-first century the issue of freeaccess to environmental information has captured the political agenda ofalmost all international organisations7

Summarising we can observe that the diffusion of FAI provisions startedto accelerate when the issue entered the agendas of supranational bodies andinternational organisations They served as international platforms for theoriginal promoters of these legal provisions ndash citizensrsquo and environmentalorganisations The process can partly be referred to as a lsquobottom-uprsquo mecha-nism of convergence driven mainly by non-governmental actors and actor-networks which effectively used international platforms as catalysts andmultipliers Later it turned to a more lsquotop-down drivenrsquo mechanism

As in the case of the eco-labels the transposition of the EU Directive intonational law of the Member States should not be equated to diffusion Nev-ertheless prior to the adoption of the Directive experiences from the Scandi-navian countries the Netherlands France and the United States were exploredand used by European environmental NGOs the European Parliament andthe EU Commission to develop a draft directive In spite of the importanceof the EU Directive a reduction of the international spread of FAI provisionsto EU policy-making would ignore the fact that only 8 out of 25 countries thatadopted the FAI provision between 1991 and 1999 did so in order to complywith EC law7 The remaining national adoptions can be attributed to processesof diffusion meaning the adoption of policy models developed by other coun-tries or (and this is increasingly important especially with respect to this inno-vation) developed and disseminated by actor networks cooperating closelywith strong international organisations

It is interesting to note that FAI provisions were adopted even by coun-tries (eg Albania in 1998 and Macedonia in 1996) with little public capacityto gather organise or provide these types of information and where NGOswere very weak This leads to the assumption that policy adoption may notalways be motivated by the expected impact of policy instruments (ie moreefficient participatory environmental management) but rather by the relativeimportance of an innovative policy instrument on the global environmentalagenda The latter seems to be a decisive factor for explaining the interna-tional spread of FAI provisions ndash in any case sufficient to motivate the adop-tion of FAI provisions as they are suitable to be communicated as anappropriate response to a norm within an international and environmentallyresponsible society within which the respective adopter intends to be a legit-imate member With respect to the perspective of global convergence in FAI



592

provisions it can be assumed that the high prominence of that issue as it isrepresented in international declarations and conventions may facilitate afuture international policy output UN Secretary Kofi Annan interpreted theadoption of the Aarhus Convention as lsquoa giant step forward in the develop-ment of international law in this fieldrsquo (OECD 2000 13)

Conclusion

The still very preliminary findings suggest that the adoption of environmentalpolicy innovations is more likely if these policy innovations figure prominentlyon the global political agenda Political and societal interlinkages betweennation-states and actors within and across states offer channels of diffusionwhich enable the transfer of problem perceptions ideas and policy innovationsacross countries and to the level of international organisations These mayfunction as multipliers of knowledge dissemination andor ideational catalystsof policy convergence

At first sight international organisations in their role as transnational advo-cates or promoting agencies for policy innovations crucially affect the speedof policy diffusion As an overall statement the assumption holds true pro-motion at the international level does matter However this statement remainstoo superficial and the data in fact suggests an additional differentiation Fora deeper and better understanding our concluding remarks consider the fol-lowing questions Why does promotion by international agents turn into moti-vation on the part of national policy makers to adopt a policy innovation Whyis it that some innovations do not spread even though they are actively pro-moted at the international level Why do some innovations spread withoutactive international promotion

The above mentioned specific characteristics of a policy innovation offerpreliminary answers to the last two questions The special features of a policyinnovation can either facilitate or hinder its widespread adoption The case ofenergycarbon taxes reveals that policy innovations with a high conflict poten-tial due to their redistributive effects are less likely to rapidly diffuse More-over the exposure of eco-taxes to competitiveness concerns considerablyaffects their political feasibility even in adopting European countries that allapply exemptions for industry to mitigate the perceived but uncertain nega-tive impacts on domestic industryrsquos competitiveness This is true in spite of thefact that the environmental effectiveness of eco-taxes is widely recognisedamong scientists as well as policymakers and these instruments have activelybeen promoted by many of the most influential international organisationssuch as the OECD the UN and the EU for many years



593

Furthermore the case of energycarbon taxes reveals another interestingfinding for diffusion research Political entrepreneurship at the supranationallevel in multi-level systems like the EU may (even without having a realisticprospect of immediate success to reach a common policy solution) incitepioneer behaviour at the national level Member State competition for influ-ence on the shape and administrative design of future community policies mayinduce such first-mover strategies

A comparison of the diffusion of energycarbon taxes with the crossna-tional adoption of green plans and strategies for sustainable developmentboth of which became an issue at the international level in the late 1980sclearly reveals that the characteristics of the innovation determine to a greatextent the speed of its diffusion National environmental policy plans andstrategies for sustainable development ndash as they have been developed in mostindustrialised countries ndash can easily be added to existing environmental poli-cies and do not necessarily induce any fundamental policy change The sameis true for eco-labels which spread relatively quickly as well

Another preliminary conclusion that can be drawn from the eco-labels caseis that being a predominantly product-related measure the spread of eco-labels is promoted by the dynamics of international trade If consumer behav-iour is at least to some extent influenced by environmental considerations(which can be assumed in most OECD Member States and increasingly withinthe CEE region) then participation in some type of eco-labelling scheme canbe seen as a rationale for ensuring sales opportunities and market sharesHence the potential of trade as a conduit for policy diffusion may offer anadditional explanation for the rapid spread of eco-labels

In accordance with the insights of organisational sociology that an organ-isationrsquos propensity to innovate depends on the strength of obstacles the avail-able resources to overcome these obstacles and the motivation to innovate(Mohr 1969 114) we can conclude that with respect to energycarbon taxesmost of the OECD and almost all CEE countries experienced overwhelmingobstacles to adopt such a tax In contrast the relatively rapid spread of theother three innovations suggests that policy makers could overcome moreeasily the obstacles ndash if they existed at all However the question about theconcrete motivations of policy makers to adopt environmental policy innova-tions is still unanswered Apparently the frequency of national adoptions risesas policy transfer becomes more strongly institutionalised at the internationallevel Yet how does promotion at the international level influence the moti-vation of policy makers to adopt these instruments

One possible answer might be that the politiciansrsquo needs and the provi-sions of international organisation may complement each other Concerningthe politiciansrsquo needs the main reason for policy makers to look at what others



594

do is uncertainty which forces mimetism (DiMaggio amp Powell 1991 69) Inthis situation international organisations provide and promote lsquomodelsrsquo basedon national lsquobest practicesrsquo Models are an essential prerequisite for mimetismHowever a national policy innovation does not automatically become amodel Here the promotion and information activities of international organ-isations and to a lesser extent of pioneer countries play a decisive role

Addressing the question of the motivation of policy makers to adopt policyinnovations that are promoted the essential link between promotion andmotivation is that the orientation towards models provides legitimacy forpolicy maker decisions (Radaelli 2000 28) The attempts of national policymakers to cope with uncertainty may account for their orientation towardinternationally promoted policy innovations or models This orientation offersadditional political advantages because it may serve as an external source oflegitimacy in the national context as well as an attempt to verify the nation-statesrsquo legitimacy within the global community which socialises its membersas environmentally responsible

The empirical finding that the frequency of national adoption regularlyrises as transfer becomes institutionalised at an international level suggeststhat policy convergence by diffusion may not only be motivated by consider-ations of efficiency improvement but instead or additionally by considerationsof generating legitimacy

Notes

1 This article is based on findings from a research project on lsquoThe diffusion of environ-mental policy innovations as an aspect of the globalisation of environmental policyrsquo whichhas been financed by the Volkswagen Foundation The authors would like to thank MartinJaumlnicke and Kristine Kern as well as three anonymous reviewers for their helpful com-ments on earlier versions of this article

2 An interesting study by Kern and her colleagues pursues this approach focusing not onlyon factors influencing policy adoption but also factors which cause success or failure indiffusion Kern et al state that lsquoWhile the global diffusion of policy innovations isstrongly influenced by global transfer institutions national policy change and nationalperformance is primarily determined by national factorsrsquo (Kern Kissling-Naumlf et al2001 2)

3 Considering that policy innovations often are very flexible by their nature and thereforenot necessarily an invariant quality during the whole diffusion process (Rogers 1962199517) a high probability of re-invention in later stages of the diffusion process reveals thevulnerability of the argument that domestic factors in general lose their importance formotivating adoptions in later stages of the diffusion process (Finnemore amp Sikkink 1998)The empirical studies from which they draw their conclusions were concerned with thespread of relatively inflexible innovations such as womenrsquos suffrage or the banning ofland mine use



595

4 The 2001 Environmental Performance Review for Germany states in emphasized cursiveletters lsquoGermany does not yet have an agreed national strategy for promoting sustainabledevelopmentrsquo (OECD 2001b 109) Furthermore since 1998 at the demand of theMember Statesrsquo ministers the OECD has strengthened its efforts to promote sustainabledevelopment among its Member States Only recently the OECD published assessmentreports on the progress of formulation andor implementation of national strategies forsustainable development in Canada Germany and the United Kingdom (httpwwwoecdorgoecdpageshomedisplaygeneral03380EN-about-21-nodirectorate-no-no-no-21FFhtml)

5 The EU eco-label is run by the EC and administered by competent bodies in all MemberStates as well as Norway and Iceland (EPA 1998 B-31) Product groups are chosen andcriteria are developed by the EC in close collaboration with the Committee of Compe-tent Bodies as well as stakeholder organisations Eco-labels are awarded by the compe-tent bodies within their country National authorities are in charge of monitoring thateco-labels are properly used The EU-wide eco-labelling procedure does not replacenational eco-labelling programmes and the lsquoNordic Swanrsquo which continue to exist

6 The planned extension of the French General Tax on Pollution to taxing industrial energyuse was to take effect 1 January 2001 but was rejected by the French ConstitutionalCourt The proposal was judged to be lsquocontrary to the principle of equalityrsquo because itwould tax different energy users differently The second basis for rejection was that anapplication of the energy tax fell beyond the statersquos aim to reduce greenhouse gas emis-sions because electricity in France comes primarily from nuclear power (CSE 2001 No2) However both the former Minister for Environment Dominique Voynet and the newone Yves Cochet continue efforts to extend the General Tax on Pollution as it was abasic requirement of Green participation in the French coalition government (CSE 2001Nos 2 amp 4)

7 See eg OECD Council Recommendation on Environmental Information adopted inParis by the Environmental Ministers and the OECD Council in 1998 or the Free AccessProvisions within the Environmental Side-Agreement to the North American Free TradeAgreement from August 1993

8 1992 United Kingdom Luxembourg 1993 Ireland Portugal 1994 Belgium Germany1995 Spain 1997 Italy

References

Andersen MS amp Liefferink D (eds) (1997) European environmental policyThe pioneersManchesterNew York Manchester University Press

Barde J-P (1999) Environmental taxes in OECD countries An overview in OECD Envi-ronmental taxes Recent developments in China and OECD countries Paris OECD pp19ndash50

Baumol WJ amp Oates WE (1989) The theory of environmental policy Cambridge Cam-bridge University Press

Bennett CJ (1991) What is policy convergence and what causes it British Journal of Polit-ical Science 21 215ndash233

Bennett CJ (1997) Understanding ripple effects The cross-national adoption of policyinstruments for bureaucratic accountability Governance 10(3) 213ndash233



596

Berry FS amp Berry W (1999) Innovation and diffusion models in policy research in PASabatier (ed) Theories of the policy process Boulder COOxford Westview Press pp169ndash200

Botcheva L amp Martin LL (2001) Institutional effects on state behavior Convergence anddivergence International Studies Quarterly 45 1ndash26

Burke B (1999) Diffusion of regulatory and distributive innovations across the Americanstate Different paths Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Politi-cal Science Association Atlanta Georgia September

Busch P-O amp Joumlrgens H (2003) Globale Diffusionsmuster umweltpolitischer Innovatio-nen FFU-report (forthcoming)

CSE (Center for a Sustainable Economy) (2001) Tax News Update Available online athttpwwwsustainableeconomyorgtnu

DiMaggio P amp Powell WW (1991) The iron cage revisited Institutional isomorphism andcollective rationality in organizational fields in P DiMaggio amp WW Powell (eds) Thenew institutionalism in organizational analysis Chicago IL University of Chicago Presspp 63ndash82

Dolowitz DP amp Marsh D (1996) Who learns what from whom A review of the policytransfer literature Political Studies 44 343ndash357

Dolowitz D amp Marsh D (2000) Learning form abroad The role of policy transfer in con-temporary policy making Governance 13(1) 5ndash24

Drezner DW (2001) Globalization and policy convergence International Studies Review3 53ndash78

EEA (European Environmental Authority) (1996) Environmental taxes Implementationand environmental effectiveness (Environmental Issues Series No 1) CopenhagenEEA

EEA (European Environmental Authority) (2000) Environmental taxes Recent develop-ments in tools for integration (Environmental Issue Series No 18) CopenhagenEEA

Ekins P (1996) Environmental taxes and charges National experiences and plans Reportof the European Workshop held at the Foundation Dublin Ireland 7ndash8 February

EPA (United States Environmental Protection Agency) (1998) Environmental labelingIssues policies and practices worldwide Washington DC EPA

Evans M amp Davies J (1999) Understanding policy transfer A multi-level multidiscipli-nary perspective Public Administration 77(2) 361ndash385

Finnemore M (1996) National interests and international society Ithaca NY Cornell University Press

Finnemore M amp Sikkink K (1998) International norm dynamics and political changeInternational Organization 52(4) 887ndash917

FoE (Friends of the Earth Europe) (1995) A practical guide on improving public access toenvironmental information New items for Central and Eastern Europe 8 BrusselsFriends of the Earth Europe

Gray V (1973) Innovations in the state A diffusion study American Political ScienceReview 67 1174ndash1185

Gray V (1994) Competition emulation and policy innovation in LC Dodd amp C Jillson(eds) New perspectives on American politics Washington DC Congressional QuarterlyPress pp 230ndash248

Heritier A Knill C amp Mingers S (1996) Ringing the changes in europe Regulatory com-petition and the transformation of the state Berlin Walter de Gruyter



597

Hoerner A J amp Muller F (1996) Carbon taxes for climate protection in a competitiveworld Paper prepared for the Swiss Federal Office for Foreign Economic Affairs by theEnvironmental Tax Program of the Center for Global Change University of MarylandCollege Park

Hoberg G (2001a) Trade harmonization and domestic autonomy in environmental policyJournal of Comparative Policy Analysis Research and Practice 3 191ndash217

Hoberg G (2001b) Globalization and policy convergence Symposium overview Journalof Comparative Policy Analysis Research and Practice 3 127ndash132

Hohmeyer O (ed) (1995) Oumlkologische Steuerreform Baden-Baden NomosIkenberry GJ (1990) The international spread of privatization policies Inducement learn-

ing and policy-bandwagoning in E Suleiman amp J Waterbury (eds) The politicaleconomy of public sector reform and privatization Boulder CO Westview Press

Jachtenfuchs M amp Kohler-Koch B (1996) Regieren in dynamischen Mehrebenensystemenin M Jachtenfuchs amp B Kohler-Koch (eds) Europaumlische Integration Opladen Leske +Budrich pp 15ndash44

Jaumlnicke M amp Joumlrgens H (1998) National environmental policy planning in OECD coun-tries Preliminary lessons from cross-national comparisons Environmental Politics 727ndash54

Jaumlnicke M amp Joumlrgens H (2000) Strategic environmental planning and uncertaintyA cross-national comparison of Green plans in industrialised countries Policy Studies Journal28(3) 612ndash632

Jaumlnicke M amp Weidner H (eds) (1997a) National environmental policies A comparativestudy of capacity-building Berlin Springer

Jaumlnicke M amp Weidner H (1997b) Zum aktuellen Stand der Umweltpolitik im interna-tionalen Vergleich ndash Tendenzen zu einer globalen Konvergenz Aus Politik und Zeit-geschichte B2797 15ndash24

Jaumlnicke M CariusA amp Joumlrgens H (unter Mitarbeit von C Koll) (1997) Nationale Umwelt-plaumlne in ausgewaumlhlten Industrielaumlndern Berlin Springer

Jaumlnicke M Joumlrgens H amp Koll C (2000) Elemente einer deutschen Nach-haltigkeitsstrategie ndash Einige Schlussfolgerungen aus dem internationalen Vergleich inM Jaumlnicke amp H Joumlrgens (eds) Umweltplanung im internationalen Vergleich Strategiender Nachhaltigkeit BerlinHeidelbergNew York Springer pp 221ndash230

Jaumlnicke M Kunig P amp Stitzel M (1999) Umweltpolitik Lern- und Arbeitsbuch BonnDietz

Joumlrgens H (1996) Die Institutionalisierung von Umweltpolitik im internationalen Vergle-ich in M Jaumlnicke (ed) Umweltpolitik der Industrielaumlnder Entwicklung ndash Bilanz ndash Erfol-gsbedingungen Berlin Edition Sigma pp 59ndash111

Joumlrgens H (2001) The diffusion of environmental policy innovations Findings from aninternational workshop Environmental Politics 10(2) 122ndash127

Jordan A (2001) lsquoNewrsquo environmental policy instruments in the UK Policy innovation orlsquomuddling throughrsquo Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops Greno-ble France April

Kasa S (1999) Social and political barriers to green tax reform The case of CO2 taxes inNorway Cicero Policy Note 5

Katzenstein PJ Keohane RO amp Krasner SD (1998) International organization and thestudy of world politics International Organization 52(4) 654ndash685

Keck ME amp Sikkink K (1999) Trans-national advocacy networks in international andregional politics International Social Science Journal 159 89ndash101



598

Kern K (1998) Horizontale und Vertikale Politikdiffusion in Mehrebenensystemen FFU-report 98ndash6

Kern K (2000) Die Diffusion von Politikinnovationen Umweltpolitische Innovationen imMehrebenensystem der USA Opladen Leske + Budrich

Kern K Joumlrgens H amp Jaumlnicke M (2000) Die Diffusion umweltpolitischer InnovationenEin Beitrag zur Globalisierung von Umweltpolitik Zeitschrift fuumlr Umweltpolitik ampUmweltrecht 4 507ndash546

Kern K Joumlrgens H amp Jaumlnicke M (2001) The diffusion of environmental policy innova-tions A contribution to the globalisation of environmental policy (Discussion Paper FSII 01-302) Berlin Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fuumlr Sozialforschung

Kern K Kissling-Naumlf I et al (2001) Policy convergence and policy diffusion by govern-mental and non-governmental institutions An international comparison of eco-labelingsystems (Discussion Paper FS II 01-305) Berlin Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fuumlr Sozialforschung

Kloepfer M amp Mast E (1995) Das Umweltrecht des Auslands Berlin Duncker ampHumblot

Knill C amp Lenschow A (1998) Change as lsquoappropriate adaptationrsquo Administrative adjustment to European environmental policy in Britain and Germany European Inte-gration Online Papers (EioP) 2(1) Available online at httpeioporateioptexte1998ndash001htm

Knill C amp Lenschow A (eds) (2000) Implementing EU environmental policy New direc-tions and old problems ManchesterNew York Manchester University Press

Koschel H amp Weinreich S (1995) Oumlkologische Steuerreform auf dem Pruumlfstand ndash ist dieZeit reif zum Handeln in O Hohmeyer (ed) Oumlkologische Steuerreform Baden-BadenNomos pp 9ndash38

Landmann U (1998) Nationale Umweltzeichen im Zuge der Globalisierung von Wirtschafts- Umwelt- und Sozialpolitik Analyse und Perspektiven von Umweltzeichen-programmen Digitale Dissertation Available online at httpwwwdissfu-berlinde199922index html

Liefferink D amp Andersen MS (1998) Strategies of lsquogreenrsquo Member States in EU envi-ronmental policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 5(2) 254ndash270

Lutz J (1987) Regional leadership patterns in the diffusion of public policies AmericanPolitics Quarterly 15 387ndash398

March JG amp Olsen JP (1989) Rediscovering institutions New York Free PressMarcussen M (2001) The OECD in search of a role Playing the idea game Paper pre-

pared for the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops Grenoble France AprilMartin LL amp Simmons BA (1998) Theories and empirical studies of international insti-

tutions International Organization 52(4) 729ndash757Meadowcroft J (2000) Nationale Plaumlne und Strategien zur Nachhaltigen Entwicklung in

M Jaumlnicke amp H Joumlrgens (eds) Umweltplanung im Internationalen Vergleich Strategiender Nachhaltigkeit Berlin Springer pp 113ndash129

Meyer JW et al (1997) The structuring of a world environmental regime 1870ndash1990 Inter-national Organization 51(4) 623ndash651

Mez L (1998) Die Verflechtung von Umwelt- und Energiepolitik in Deutschland in G Breit (ed) Neue Wege in der Umweltpolitik SchwalbachTs Wochenschau Verlagpp 24ndash39

Mohr L (1969) Determinants of innovation in organizations American Political ScienceReview 75 963ndash974



599

OECD (1993) A comparison of carbon taxes in selected OECD countries (OECD Envi-ronment Monograph No 78) [OECDGD(93) 120] Paris OECD

OECD (1995a) Environmental taxes in OECD countries Paris OECDOECD (1995b) Environmental performance review Poland Paris OECDOECD (1997) Eco-labeling Actual effects of selected programmes [OCDEGD(97)105]

Paris OECDOECD (1998) Evaluation of progress in developing and implementing national environ-

mental action programmes in Central and Eastern Europe and the new independent statesFinal report Paris OECD

OECD 1999 Environmental taxes Recent developments in China and OECD countriesParis OECD

OECD (2000) Seminar Public Access to Environmental Information Proceedings Athens5ndash7 June [ENVEPOCGEP(2000)8] Paris OECD

OECD (2001a) Environmentally related taxes in OECD countries Issues and strategiesParis OECD

OECD (2001b) Environmental performance review Germany Paris OECDPorter ME amp Van der Linde C (1995) Green and competitive Ending the stalement

Harvard Business Review (SeptemberndashOctober) 120ndash134Radaelli CM (2000) Policy-transfer in the European Union Institutional isomorphism as

a source of legitimacy Governance 13(1) 25ndash43Rogers EM (19621995) Diffusion of innovations New York Free PressRose R (1991) What is lesson-drawing Journal of Public Policy 11 3ndash30Rose R (1993) Lesson drawing in public policy A guide to learning across time and space

Chatham MA Chatham HouseRuggie JG (1998) What makes the world hang together Neo-utilitarianism and the social

constructivist challenge International Organization 52(4) 855ndash885Scharpf FW (1993) Positive und negative Koordination in Verhandlungssystemen in A

Heritier (ed) Policy-Analyse Kritik und Neuorientierung (Politische VierteljahrsschriftSonderheft 24) Opladen Westdeutscher Verlag pp 57ndash83

Scharpf FW (1994) Optionen des Foumlrderalismus in Deutschland und Europa Frank-furtMainNew York Campus

Scharpf FW (1999) Regieren in Europa Effektiv und demokratisch FrankfurtNew YorkCampus

Schimmelfennig F (1998) Liberal norms and the eastern enlargement of the EuropeanUnion A case for sociological institutionalism Oumlsterreichische Zeitschrift fuumlr Politik-wissenschaft 27(4) 459ndash472

Schlegelmilch K (1999) Energiesteuern in Europa ndash Uumlberblick und Perspektiven in Bun-destagsfraktion Buumlndnis 980Die Gruumlnen (ed) Blick nach Vorn Anforderungen an dieweiteren Stufen der Oumlkologischen Steuerreform Bonn Tagungsbericht pp 10ndash29

Social Learning Group (2001) Learning to manage global environmental risks A compara-tive history of social response to climate change ozone depletion and acid rain Cam-bridge Social Learning Group

Stone D (1999) Learning lessons and transferring policy across time space and disciplinesPolitics 19(1) 51ndash59

Stone D (2000) Non-governmental policy-transfer The strategies of independent policyinstitutes Governance 13(1) 45ndash62

UN Commission on Sustainable Development (1995) General discussion of progress in theimplementation of Agenda 21 focusing on cross-sectoral issues and the critical elements



600

of sustainability Report of the SecretaryndashGeneral Available online at httpwwwunorgdocumentsecosoccn171995ecn171995-12htm

Teir G (1999) Environmental energy taxes The experience of Finland in OECD Envi-ronmental taxes Recent developments in China and OECD countries Paris OECDpp 303ndash308

Tews K (2000) Umweltpolitik per Oktroi in RH Hasse amp C Kunze (eds) Die Oster-weiterung der EU Reformerfordernisse und Anpassungsleistungen Leipzig LeipzigerUniversitaumltsverlag pp 85ndash113

Tews K (2001) Politiktransfer Phaumlnomen zwischen Policy-Lernen und Oktroi Uumlber-legungen zu unfreiwilligen Umweltpolitikimporten am Beispiel der EU-OsterweiterungFFU-report 01-07 Available online at httpwwwfu-berlindeffuPublikationenindexhtm

Tews K (2002) Der Diffusionsansatz fuumlr die Vergleichende Policy-Analyse Wurzeln undPotenziale eines Konzepts Eine Literaturstudie FFU-report 02-2002 Available onlineat httpwwwfu-berlindeffuPublikationenindexhtm

Vogel D (1997) Trading up and governing across Transnational governance and environ-mental protection Journal of European Public Policy 4 556ndash571

Weale A (1992) The new politics of pollution ManchesterNew York Manchester University Press

WTO (World Trade Organisation) (1999) Trade and environment (Special Studies 4)Geneva WTO

Zittel T (1996) Marktwirtschaftliche Instrumente in der Umweltpolitik Zur Auswahl poli-tischer Loumlsungsstrategien in der Bundesrepublik Opladen Leske + Budrich

Address for correspondence Kerstin Tews Free University of Berlin Environmental PolicyResearch Unit Ihnestrasse 22 D-14195 Berlin GermanyTel +49 30 838 54494 Fax +49 30 838 52276 E-mail ktewszedatfu-berlinde



570

voluntary agreements eco-labels or ecological tax reforms (see Figure 2) Gen-erally a global convergence of governance patterns in environmental policycan be observed In contrast to the widespread assumption that policy con-vergence takes place at the level of the lowest common denominator empir-ical data shows that global development in the field of environmentalprotection has to an important extent been guided by the developmentalstatus reached in lsquofrontrunnerrsquo countries (Kern 2000 Kern Joumlrgens amp Jaumlnicke2001)

How can this convergence of regulatory patterns in environmental policybe explained One possible explanation could be that governments through-out the world are reacting independently but similarly to similar envi-ronmental problem pressures Or states might simply be implementinginternational or multilateral environmental agreements However empiricaldata indicate that global convergence in environmental policy can take placein the absence of any international regime Moreover policy convergence goesfar beyond the transborder or global environmental problems that areaddressed by international environmental agreements It often occurs withregard to environmental problems that primarily need to be solved at theregional or national level such as surface and ground-water pollution urbanair pollution or waste management A third explanation therefore could be



0

2

4

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8

10

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34

36

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44

46

48

1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie

s Waste Laws Soil Protection Laws Air Protection Laws Water Protection Laws

Figure 1 Spread of environmental laws in OECD countries and Central and EasternEuropeSource Busch amp Joumlrgens 2003

571






0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

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48

1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

E

aste

rn E

uro

pea

n c

ou

ntr

ies



572







573







574







575







576






577







578







579





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

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16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

E

aste

rn E

uro

pea

n c

ou

ntr

ies





0

2

4

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8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 199 2 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie



0

2

4

6

8

10

12

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16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie

s



581





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 198 2 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie

s



582







583



Eco-labels





584







585




Energycarbon taxes





586







587






588








589







590







591







592


Conclusion






593








594




Notes






595






References








596























597






















598






















599
























600













571






0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

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18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

E

aste

rn E

uro

pea

n c

ou

ntr

ies



572







573







574







575







576






577







578







579





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

E

aste

rn E

uro

pea

n c

ou

ntr

ies





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 199 2 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie



0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie

s



581





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 198 2 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie

s



582







583



Eco-labels





584







585




Energycarbon taxes





586







587






588








589







590







591







592


Conclusion






593








594




Notes






595






References








596























597






















598






















599
























600













572







573







574







575







576






577







578







579





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

E

aste

rn E

uro

pea

n c

ou

ntr

ies





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 199 2 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie



0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie

s



581





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 198 2 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie

s



582







583



Eco-labels





584







585




Energycarbon taxes





586







587






588








589







590







591







592


Conclusion






593








594




Notes






595






References








596























597






















598






















599
























600













573







574







575







576






577







578







579





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

E

aste

rn E

uro

pea

n c

ou

ntr

ies





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 199 2 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie



0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie

s



581





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 198 2 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie

s



582







583



Eco-labels





584







585




Energycarbon taxes





586







587






588








589







590







591







592


Conclusion






593








594




Notes






595






References








596























597






















598






















599
























600













574







575







576






577







578







579





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

E

aste

rn E

uro

pea

n c

ou

ntr

ies





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 199 2 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie



0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie

s



581





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 198 2 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie

s



582







583



Eco-labels





584







585




Energycarbon taxes





586







587






588








589







590







591







592


Conclusion






593








594




Notes






595






References








596























597






















598






















599
























600













575







576






577







578







579





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

E

aste

rn E

uro

pea

n c

ou

ntr

ies





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 199 2 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie



0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie

s



581





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 198 2 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie

s



582







583



Eco-labels





584







585




Energycarbon taxes





586







587






588








589







590







591







592


Conclusion






593








594




Notes






595






References








596























597






















598






















599
























600













576






577







578







579





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

E

aste

rn E

uro

pea

n c

ou

ntr

ies





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 199 2 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie



0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie

s



581





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 198 2 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie

s



582







583



Eco-labels





584







585




Energycarbon taxes





586







587






588








589







590







591







592


Conclusion






593








594




Notes






595






References








596























597






















598






















599
























600













577







578







579





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

E

aste

rn E

uro

pea

n c

ou

ntr

ies





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 199 2 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie



0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie

s



581





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 198 2 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie

s



582







583



Eco-labels





584







585




Energycarbon taxes





586







587






588








589







590







591







592


Conclusion






593








594




Notes






595






References








596























597






















598






















599
























600













578







579





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

E

aste

rn E

uro

pea

n c

ou

ntr

ies





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 199 2 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie



0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie

s



581





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 198 2 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie

s



582







583



Eco-labels





584







585




Energycarbon taxes





586







587






588








589







590







591







592


Conclusion






593








594




Notes






595






References








596























597






















598






















599
























600













579





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

E

aste

rn E

uro

pea

n c

ou

ntr

ies





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 199 2 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie



0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie

s



581





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 198 2 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie

s



582







583



Eco-labels





584







585




Energycarbon taxes





586







587






588








589







590







591







592


Conclusion






593








594




Notes






595






References








596























597






















598






















599
























600















0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 199 2 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie



0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie

s



581





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 198 2 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie

s



582







583



Eco-labels





584







585




Energycarbon taxes





586







587






588








589







590







591







592


Conclusion






593








594




Notes






595






References








596























597






















598






















599
























600













581





0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 198 2 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Year of Adoption

To

tal n

um

ber

of

OE

CD

an

d C

entr

al a

nd

Eas

tern

Eu

rop

ean

co

un

trie

s



582







583



Eco-labels





584







585




Energycarbon taxes





586







587






588








589







590







591







592


Conclusion






593








594




Notes






595






References








596























597






















598






















599
























600













582







583



Eco-labels





584







585




Energycarbon taxes





586







587






588








589







590







591







592


Conclusion






593








594




Notes






595






References








596























597






















598






















599
























600













583



Eco-labels





584







585




Energycarbon taxes





586







587






588








589







590







591







592


Conclusion






593








594




Notes






595






References








596























597






















598






















599
























600













584







585




Energycarbon taxes





586







587






588








589







590







591







592


Conclusion






593








594




Notes






595






References








596























597






















598






















599
























600













585




Energycarbon taxes





586







587






588








589







590







591







592


Conclusion






593








594




Notes






595






References








596























597






















598






















599
























600













586







587






588








589







590







591







592


Conclusion






593








594




Notes






595






References








596























597






















598






















599
























600













587






588








589







590







591







592


Conclusion






593








594




Notes






595






References








596























597






















598






















599
























600













588








589







590







591







592


Conclusion






593








594




Notes






595






References








596























597






















598






















599
























600













589







590







591







592


Conclusion






593








594




Notes






595






References








596























597






















598






















599
























600













590







591







592


Conclusion






593








594




Notes






595






References








596























597






















598






















599
























600













591







592


Conclusion






593








594




Notes






595






References








596























597






















598






















599
























600













592


Conclusion






593








594




Notes






595






References








596























597






















598






















599
























600













593








594




Notes






595






References








596























597






















598






















599
























600













594




Notes






595






References








596























597






















598






















599
























600













595






References








596























597






















598






















599
























600













596























597






















598






















599
























600













597






















598






















599
























600













598






















599
























600













599
























600













600











