SHELTERING SOCIETY: CIVIL DEFENSE IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1963
by
KREGG MICHAEL FEHR, B.S., M.A.
A DISSERTATION
IN
HISTORY
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Approved
Accepted
August, 1999
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
One name appears on the cover of this text, but dozens should be added to it.
Many caring and generous friends, relatives, colleagues, and associates have offered their
advice and their support throughout my course work and the dissertation. I am indebted
to them all, and a number merit particular recognition.
I respect and admire the members of my doctoral committee, and I am gratefiil for
their guidance. Besides serving as the chairperson of my committee. Dr. Ronald Rainger
has acted as my mentor and my friend. A man of great professional and personal
propriety, he is my example. In addition, both inside and outside the classroom, during
formal lectures and during informal meetings at one of Lubbock's burger stands, Dr.
Rainger has labored to teach me the skill most essential to a historian. He has taught me
how to formulate, shape, and ask valuable questions. I cannot express my gratitude. The
other members of my committee also have my most sincere appreciation. Dr. George
Flynn further honed my approach to writing. Dr. Donald Walker challenged me and
encouraged me to publish. The positive comments made by Dr. Idris Traylor sustained my
drive. And the courteous and confident mannerisms of Dr. Allan Kuethe first convinced
me to enroU at Texas Tech University in pursuit of a Ph.D, in history.
The staff members of several organizations and institutions also deserve my thanks.
First, I wish to recognize the efforts of Barbi Dickensheet and the Texas Tech Graduate
School Office. Second, my thanks to the research room employees at the Harry S Tnmian
Library, the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, the National Archives Branch Depository in
ii
Fort Worth, Texas, and the National Archives and Records Administration in College
Park, Maryland. Third, I wish to express my appreciation for the research grant awarded
to me by the Harry S Truman Library.
With thoughts, prayers, and gifts, many fiiends and femily members have
supported my scholastic career. Special thanks to my family—William, Barbara, and Kathy
Fehr, Tim and Susan Ebelthite, Kent Fehr and family, the Curtises, the Bells, and Aaron
Flowers. Also, I am grateful for the aid and the comic relief provided by my fiiends "El
Jefe," "Nimiber One," and "Nasaboy." I appreciate "El Jefe," a fiiend and colleague who
postponed many a border raid in order to call me and offer words of advice and
encouragement. I value highly the fiiendship of'*Nimiber One," and my education is more
complete because of his lunch-time book reviews. And I am indebted to "Nasaboy" for
his willingness to engage in brainstorming sessions and for devoting almost as much
attention to my topic as to his own.
Last in these acknowledgments, but first in my heart, thank you to Jane and Katie.
I thank you, Katie, for insisting that I take some time off from my projects to play "Candy
Land" or "Turkey." And I thank you, Jane. Thank you for feigning interest when I
bombarded you—daily—wdth my "latest thoughts" on civil defense. Thank you for
watching "Bert the Turtle" fihns with me and for incorporating the phrase "Duck and
Cover" into the Fehr-family vocabulary. Thank you for your limitless patience, your self-
sacrifice, and your optimism. I could not have completed this work without you.
m
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii
CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION 1
n. CLOUDS OVER WASHINGTON: CRISES AND THE RESURRECTION OF CIVIL DEFENSE 13
m. ALERTING AMERICA: MILLARD CALDWELL AND THE POLITICS OFPERSUASION 48
IV. THE BUCK NEVER STOPPED HERE: BLAME, VALUES, AND THE END OF THE CALDWELL ADMINISTRATION . . . 101
V. "FROM DUCK AND COVER TO RUN LIKE HELL": MASS EVACUATION, VAL PETERSON AND THE FCDA 132
VI. THE SKY IS FALLING: CHICKEN LITTLE, THE LUCKY DRAGON, AND THE HOLMELD INVESTIGATIONS 178
Vn. GOD, APPLE PIE, AND CIVIL DEFENSE: INFLATING THE RHETORIC FOR A DEFLATING PROGRAM 227
Vm. SHELTERS FOR CAMELOT: KENNEDY AND CIVILDEFENSE 295
DC. CONCLUSION: BETWEEN THE BOMB AND A SHELTERED SPACE 340
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 358
IV
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the 1990s, as in the 1950s and 1960s, nuclear weapons captured headlines. At
the end of the decade, India and Pakistan engaged in a regional arms race that featured a
nimiber of imdergroimd detonations. In the spring of 1999, intelligence sources learned
that the Chinese had been stealing nuclear secrets from the United States. And,
throughout the Nineties, military theorists warned that the cnmibling of the Soviet Empire,
the economic difficulties of the Russian Republic, and the resultant sale of military
hardware ensured that it was only a matter of time before a terrorist organization acquired
a warhead and threatened the world with nuclear blackmail. Most Americans did not msh
out to purchase bomb shelters at the end of the millennium or at midcentury. The
apparent lack of concern for civilian preparedness measures during a nuclear era raises
questions about the value of civil defense strategies, and the government and popular
response to preparedness initiatives. In 1999, a few studies on civilian defense existed, but
a new and more complete reassessment of American civil defense was needed.
The time frame 1945-1963 is logical for a book-length study of U.S. civilian
preparedness initiatives. The year 1945 marked a turning point in the history of the United
States. World War II ended. The Cold War began. Some scholars argue that U.S.
Soviet tensions were rising even before 1945, that World War II and the Cold War
overlap. Such an argument has merit, but the evolution of early-modem civil defense
policy is in many ways a social history, and, for the American people as a whole, the Cold
War began in eamest after the Second World War. Until the Axis powers were defeated,
the U.S. government was generally successfiil in its attempts to focus American hatreds on
Germany, Italy, and Japan. The Soviet Union was the United States' aUy, and it was
recognized as a necessary partner in the world conflict. Its strength, its desire to replace
the United States as the dominant global power, its political ideology, and a host of other
factors brought the U.S.S.R. into open confrontation with the U.S.A. after the war. The
U.S. federal government, an entity with a long-standing and accomplished record of
successfiil propaganda campaigns, now encouraged its people to adopt a paternalistic
attitude toward the defeated Germans and Japanese and direct their animosity toward the
Soviet Union. The American people responded admirably. Public support enabled the
Cold War to become a heated conflict.'
In 1945, the American people identified Stalin's Soviet Union as the foreign
power to loathe and fear. The hatred and worries produced by U.S.-Soviet competition
contributed to the shaping of American society in the post-war years. So did a
technology, the atomic bomb. The simimer of 1945 saw the introduction of the
superweapon into the United States' military arsenal, and four years later the Soviets
acquired atomic capabilities. With its ability to increase himdred-fold the potential hazards
of warfare, "the bomb" itself generated much anxiety, increased the price of a Cold War
turned "hot," and acted as a defining influence on society. Atomic bombs and the rocket-
' Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1984 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 8-28; John Lewis Gaddis, Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 3-47; and William E. Leuchtenberg, A Troubled Feast: American Society Since 1945 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1973).
propelled thermonuclear devices that followed carried the world into an era of less
security, the "Atomic Age."^
Like 1945, the year 1963 marked another turning point in U.S. history. The
Atomic Age did not come to an end, but President John F. Kennedy's detente initiatives
did represent a step toward a safer, more sane world. Even after an assassin's bullet cut
down Kennedy in Dallas and the hurriedly swom-in Lyndon Johnson sponsored a massive
expansion of the U.S. military and increased American involvement in the Vietnam
Conflict, communist and capitalist rivals relied upon conventional weapons and
negotiation to settle their differences, instead of moving toward a nuclear exchange. The
threat of an atomic or thermonuclear war subsided until the Election of 1980 sent Ronald
Reagan to the White House.
In addition to its significance for Kennedy's strategy shift away from nuclear
posturing, 1963 is important because it serves as a line of demarcation for American social
behavior. Although the postwar social phenomenon labeled simply "the generation gap"
sank its roots in the late 1940s and began to grow in the 1950s, it was during the Johnson
years that the gap became a fissure and threatened the cohesion of the United States.
Both LBJ's aggressive foreign policy and his "War on Poverty," his domestic policy,
widened the generation gap. By the latter Sbrties mature, conservative. Cold War
The best account of Americans' fears of world-ending catastrophes is found in Spencer Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988).
^Allan M. Winkler, Life Under a Cloud: American Anxiety About the Atom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 165-208.
warriors were clashing in open and sometimes violent confrontations with a generation of
identity-seeking, idealistic, yoimg people. The Fifties society was bom in 1945 with the
Cold War and expired in 1963 when Johnson became president.
The golden age of federal sponsorship for civil defense also came to an end in
1963. Today, the phrase "civil defense" conjures up images of fallout shelters and school-
conducted "duck and cover" drills, but it was much more. Modem, post-World War II
civil defense initiatives were a response to the development of a technology, atomic
weaponry. Civil defense measures were intended to discourage a nuclear strike against the
United States, guarantee the nation's survival by protecting the citizens and resources of
the country if attack should occur, and enable the U.S.A. to recover from an atomic
assault and retum quickly to a position of global power. To achieve success, federal civil
defense agencies employed a host of technologies and strategies, including: bomb
shelters, fallout shelters, dispersal, mass evacuation, and the stockpiling of supplies. Civil
defense strategies shifted in response to foreign and domestic crises, advances in offensive
weapons capabilities, and changes in presidential and agency leadership. Of the United
States' presidents, John F. Kennedy was the most vocal and active proponent of civilian
preparedness measures. In 1961 and 1962, he carried American civil defense efforts to
new heights when he proposed and worked toward the creation of a national network of
public fallout shelters. In 1963, when he distanced himself from preparedness initiatives.
''Milton Viorst, Fire in the Streets: America in the 1960s (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), 55-231, 383-420, 464-543; William L. O'Neill, Coming Apart: An Informal History of America in the 1960's (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 128-146; and Godfrey Hodgson, America in Our Time (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1976), 353-398.
civil defense dried up. Those parts of the plan dedicated to meeting the challenges of
natural disasters managed to weather the drought of support, and eventually the agencies
responsible—such as the Federal Emergency Management Administration—accmed quite a
bit of power. Those civil defense initiatives devoted to surviving nuclear strikes by foreign
aggressors never recovered.
Few book-length works take the United States' civil defense program as their
central subject, and those which do are flawed because of their narrow focus. Several
policy studies exist. Nehemiah Jordan's U.S. Civil Defense Before 1950 and Lyon G.
Tyler, Jr.'s dissertation, "Civil Defense: The Impact of the Planning Years, 1945-1950,"
analyze the events which led to the creation of the Federal Civil Defense Administration.
Civil Defense in the U.S.: Band-Aid for a Holocaust?, by Thomas J. Kerr, concentrates
on the political and legislative history of civilian preparedness in the twentieth century.
Tyler and Kerr's works in particular are weU-written and well-reasoned. Both examine
the effect of political leadership and international affairs on the congressional support
mustered for civil defense initiatives. Their studies, and Jordan's, show a clear connection
between foreign crises and legislative support for civilian defense. Nonetheless, all three
books—even Kerr's, which covers a much broader period of time—provide an incon:q)lete
picture of American civil defense because they ignore the social dynamics of preparedness.
Civil defense was directed at all civilians, not just at government officials. The program's
success was dependent on the volimtary bureaucratization of the coimtry's entire
population. A study that attempts to explain the history of U.S. civil defense, but fails to
discuss the characteristics of the society targeted, decontextualizes the subject and
produces misconceptions about the program. The works by Kerr, Tyler, and Jordan lead
one to the conclusion that the public response to civil defense must have followed the
same trends as were evident in the behavior of the men and women on Capitol Hill. Such
a conclusion is incorrect. Civil defense never became an accepted responsibility,
integrated into the everyday lives of Americans. Crises may have led to public criticism of
civilian defense agencies and may have precipitated greater congressional interest in
preparedness, but they did not yield notable increases in the level of public participation in
civil defense initiatives.
Guy Oakes's The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War
Culture offers a different, much more personalized, view of the United States'
preparedness measures, but in some ways, his work is as narrow as those written by
Jordan, Kerr, and Tyler. Oakes portrays the civil defense of the late Forties and Fifties as
one gigantic federal hoax. Indulging the public in its penchant for conspiracy theories,
Oakes asserts that presidents Harry S. Tnmian and Dwight D. Eisenhower, their advisers,
and even the heads of the United States' preparedness agencies personaUy did not believe
civil defense initiatives would protect the country or its citizens if a nuclear exchange
occurred. Still, during the early years of the Cold War, federal leaders developed
^Nehemiah Jordan, U.S. Civil Defense Before 1950 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Defense Analysis, 1966); Lyon G. Tyler, Jr., "Civil Defense: The Impact of the Planning Years, 1945-1950" (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1967); and Thomas J. Kerr, Civil Defense in the U.S.: Band-Aid for a Holocaust? (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983).
elaborate civilian defense can^aigns to prevent the people from giving themselves over to
panic or despair.
Oakes's work provides some insights into the habits of the Fifties society, and he
marshals some of the strategies and devices that the government used to attract the
attention of the average American, but his book, like the policy studies, is of limited value.
Tyler, Kerr, and Jordan's works were narrow because they focused on one facet of civil
defense. Oakes's work is narrow because the author seems to have gathered evidence to
support a preconceived thesis. Although Oakes offers as proof of his argimient's validity
some very damning statements that Eisenhower made about civil defense, he either did not
locate or chose to ignore other positive, private statements made by the former president.
Thorough research shows that the picture presented by Robert Divine in Blowing on the
Wind, a picture of a president who manifested the same confusion about the effects of
nuclear weapons as that shown by both the scientific commimity and the public in general,
is more accurate. Moreover, Eisenhower's attitudes toward civil defense and public
shelters in particular appear to have been influenced greatly by his fiscal conservatism.
To establish his argimient, it was necessary for Oakes to limit strictly the focus of
his work. His conspiracy theory would have been most appealing if he could have traced a
federal policy of deceit in civil defense from the FCDA's inception in 1950 through the
end of the Cold War. The evidence does not support such an argument. There is no
^Guy Oakes, The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 3-9.
^Oakes, Imaginary War, 152-163; and Robert A. Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).
question that Kennedy was committed to civilian defense when he entered the presidency.
Hence, Oakes was forced to concentrate on the history of civil defense from 1945 to
1961. Even within that narrow time-fi:"ame he encoimters serious challenges to his thesis.
He offers little authoritative evidence to prove that either early preparedness planners or
President Harry S Tnmian were participants in an official campaign of deceit. Further, as
with his assertions about Eisenhower, Oakes's claims that Tnmian was a conspirator are
not substantiated by the records available at the Harry S Truman Library or elsewhere.
The works that come closest to identifying the tme nature of civil defense, 1945
to 1963, are cultural and social studies of the Atomic Age and the Cold War Era. Paul
Boyer's By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the
Atomic Age, Spencer Weart's Nuclear Fear: A History of Images, Allan Winkler's Life
Under A Cloud: American Anxiety About the Atom, Margot Henriksen's Dr.
Strangelove 's America: Society and Culture in the Atomic Age, and Elaine Tyler May's
Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era all fell into this category.
While these studies do consider the social side of civil defense, civilian preparedness
comprises only one in a myriad of subjects discussed. On average each author devotes one
chapter, or sometimes two, to an analysis of civil defense. Such a limited examination of
the topic further underscores the need for a book-length work. Moreover, somewhat
understandably, these precursory attempts at explaining the phenomenon of civilian
8
defense and the population's reactions to preparedness initiatives are often misleading or
inaccurate because the authors draw overly simplistic conclusions.*
Boyer, Weart, Winkler, and, to a lesser extent. May, infer that civil defense was
an accepted part of American society for close to a decade, and most contend that events
such as the Cuban Missile Crisis led to increased, if temporary, public participation in
civilian defense programs. If such an assertion was tme, imdoubtedly it would have been
made by the federal agencies responsible for civil defense from 1945 to 1963. If those
agencies could offer proof of an upsurge in public involvement, they would increase their
chance of obtaining greater allocations from Congress. The records of the various federal
civil defense agencies show, however, that they could make no claim to widespread
popular support. Henriksen is not duped as often as the other authors of Fifties-era social
and cultural studies, but reliance on an imscholarly secondary source does bring her to the
false assimiption that the Berlin Crisis precipitated a "bomb-shelter craze" in the United
States.
While limited analysis and the use of weak sources can lead an investigator to an
erroneous conclusion, the misuse of cultural artifacts also can steer the researcher toward
an inaccurate supposition. Social history, with its emphasis on population demographics
*Paul Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (New York: Pantheon, 1985); Weart, Nuclear Fear; Winkler, Under a Cloud; Margot Henriksen, Dr. Strangelove's America: Society and Culture in the Atomic Age (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1997); and Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, 1988).
^oyer. By the Bomb's Early Light; Weart, Nuclear Fear; Winkler, Under a Cloud; May, Homeward Bound; and Henriksen, Dr. Strangelove's America.
and individual and community behavior is more easily quantified than cultural history,
which focuses more on artifects and the inferences that can be drawn from them. The
most reliable cultural histories are those which are groimded in solid, quantitative, social
analysis. After establishing the social patterns of a people, the historian may choose to
present artifacts that reflect the characteristics and values of the society. Less reliable
cultural studies "place the horse before the cart." Without first investigating the statistical
data available on a society, the researcher examines an artifact and formulates hypotheses
about the people's beliefe and character. Cultural studies are most effective when used to
compliment, rather than to create, a social analysis.
Paul Boyer, Margot Henriksen, and other social-cultural historians that study the
Atomic Age seem to make inaccurate assertions about civil defense because they give
greater consideration to artifects—films, toys, or advertisements—and to individuals and
small groups that are not necessarily representative of the whole society. After the Berlin
Crisis an increased number of advertisements for fallout shelters and articles with do-it-
yourself shelter blueprints may have appeared in newspapers and magazines, but that does
not prove every American bought or constmcted a shelter. It also cannot be used as
authoritative proof of increased public enthusiasm for civil defense.
Sheltering Society takes as its thesis the following argimient: despite federal
leadership and a series of elaborate publicity campaigns, civil defense never became an
accepted and valued part of the Fifties society that characterized the United States from
1945 to 1963. A thorough analysis of the goeds established by the federal civil defense
agencies, their attempts to realize, or meet, those goals, and the public response to
10
preparedness initiatives provide the basis for the argument. Quantitative data compiled by
government employees and private citizens substantiate the thesis. No single, simple
explanation for the difficulties experienced by civil defense initiatives—such as a
widespread sense of doom or ultimacy—is presented. Rather, a host of contributing
factors, including politics, advances in technology, bureaucratic mistakes and
inconsistencies, and social perceptions and behavior are offered. Although federal
preparedness initiatives were less than successful, an examination of civil defense history
provides valuable insights into the society of the Fifties. Detailed description and analysis
of the strategies that federal agencies enq)loyed to win popular support, and an assessment
of the public's response, yield an image of a conservative people that were confused about
the threat posed by nuclear weapons and distrustful of ever-changing civil defense policies.
As it progresses, the work becomes more focused on an analysis of American
society. By necessity, however, it begins with a policy sketch that carries the reader from
early planning in 1945 to the creation of the Federal Civil Defense Administration and to
President Harry S Truman's signing of the Civil Defense Act of 1951. The study then
evaluates the first attempts to build grassroots support for civil defense and offers
explanations for the limited public response. The advent of the hydrogen bomb, the
swearing in of Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and the resultant changes in
civil defense policy comprise the next focus of the book. Lastly, the work looks at the
Kennedy years and concludes with the assertion that civil defense fell between the gaps in
American society. The author hopes Sheltering Society: Civil Defense in the United
11
States, 1945-1963 will add to the corpus of Atomic Age studies by tendering a more
complete and accurate accoimt of civilian preparedness in America.
12
CHAPTER n
CLOUDS OVER WASHINGTON: CRISES AND
THE RESURRECTION OF CIVIL DEFENSE
The world entered the "Atomic Age" on a Monday morning. On July 16, 1945,
at 5:29 a.m., a plutonium inqjlosion bomb detonated over the desert region known as the
Jornada del Muerto—the Journey of Death—in southem New Mexico. A blinding flash, a
deep rumble, a blast wave of tremendous power rushing out from the site of the explosion,
an immense, expanding, purple-hued cloud rising above the desert floor—these were the
first signs that the "Trinity" test was a success. Subsequent studies revealed that the bomb
had released a force equal to the detonation of 18,600 tons of TNT.'°
Witnessing the test were military and scientific personnel of the U.S. Army's
Manhattan Engineer District, the body responsible for developing an atomic device. Many
recorded what they saw, heard, and felt on that summer dawn, but Robert Oppenheimer, a
physicist and science director of the Manhattan Project, provided perhaps the most
striking and oft quoted observation. "We waited until the blast had passed, walked out of
the shelter and then it was extremely solemn. We knew the world would not be the same.
A few people laughed, a few people cried. Most people were silent. I remembered the
' Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), 670-77.
13
line from the Hindu scripture, the Bhagavad-Gita... *Now I am become Death, the
destroyer of worlds.'"''
Even as one branch of the U.S. military was devising weapons to destroy
mankind, another was developing strategies to protect it. The same day that the Trinity
test took place in New Mexico, the Deputy Chief of Staff ordered the Army Service
Forces (ASF) to formulate a plan for post-World War II civilian defense. Ironically, the
United States' wartime "preparedness" agency, the Office of Civil Defense (OCD), had
been disbanded just over two weeks earlier. In May, 1945, when the defeat of Germany
was assured. President Harry S Truman ordered the OCD to cease all functions on Jime
30. The office closed as directed, but elements of the military believed that civil defense
should be included in a general assessment of possible, post-World War II, defense
problems. The order passed down to the ASF, and, on August 4, that body delegated the
responsibility to the Office of the Provost Marshall General (OPMG). When the OPMG
received the assignment, its officers knew nothing of the secret testing of an atomic device
in the Jornada del Muerto. Two days later, however, they learned that the atomic bomb
was a reality—one which increased the importance and vastly compoimded the difficulty of
their project.'
''Quoted in Rhodes, Atomic Bomb, 676.
' Lyon G. Tyler, Jr., "Civil Defense: The Impact of the Planning Years, 1945-1950,"(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1967), 13-15; President's Press Releases, 2 May 1945 and 5 June 1945, President's Secretary's Files, Box 227, Folder Civil Defense, Papers of Harry S Tnmian [hereafter HST], Harry S Truman Library [hereafter HSTL], and Harry S Tnmian, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S Truman, 1945-52/53, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1961), 30-31.
14
On August 6, 1945, the United States became the first and, thus fer, the only
nation to employ an atomic device against a human populatioa At approximately 7:20
a.nL Japan's early warning radar system detected aircraft approaching from the south. Air
raid alerts soimded in many cities in southem J^an, including Hiroshima, but when the
radar operator determined that no more than three planes were heading toward the city, he
canceled the alarm. The people of Japan had suffered attacks by himdreds of American
bombers; three lone planes seemed little cause for concem. Besides, Hiroshima had been
left virtually imtouched by enemy bombing raids in the past. Its citizens went about their
daily morning routines as the planes closed in on the city. At 8:15 a.m. "Little Boy," a
uraniimi-based atomic bomb, detonated over Hiroshima. The force imleashed combined
with secondary fires to produce a scene of tremendous devastation. Two-thirds (60,000)
of the buildings in the city collapsed in min or were damaged beyond repair, and more
than half of Hiroshima's 255,000 inhabitants were killed or injured. President Harry S
Tnmian informed Americans of "the bomb's" existence and its use against the Japanese
sixteen hours after the attack took place. Three days later, on August 9, another
American B-29 dropped "Fat Man," a plutoniimi bomb, onto Nagasaki. The second
atomic bomb crippled 20,000 stmctures and left 60,000 people dead or injured. The next
day, the Japanese requested that they be allowed to surrender, prompting representatives
of the Manhattan Project to contend that the use of the use of the atomic bombs had
ended the war in the Pacific.'
' U.S. Army, Manhattan Engineer District, The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, (n.p.: Manhattan Engineer District, n.d.), 1-34; and Truman, Public Papers, 1: 197-99.
15
Even without the appearance and proliferation of atomic weapons, the Office of
the Provost Marshall General feced a difficult task in planning post-war civilian defense.
Later, when the Federal Civil Defense Administration became a reality, spokespersons for
the new agency claimed that civil defense was a time-honored tradition in the United
States, as old as the nation itself The minutemen, ready to repel the British on a
moment's notice, pioneer men and women, protecting their farms from marauding bands
of natives-these were civilians, defending themselves and the American home front.'"
A further cited proof of the United States' tradition of civil defense was the
federal government's creation of the office of Civilian Defense (OCD) in 1941. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt had established the agency largely in response to pressure from
mimicipal leaders—in particular, Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia of New York and Director of
the United States Conference of Mayors, Paul V. Betters—and public concerns over the
German air raids in Europe. FDR appointed LaGuardia to head the office, but the mayor
resigned after a short term. He claimed he foimd it too difficult to run both the OCD and
the city of New York. The ranks of the volunteer corps swelled to some ten million
persons when John Landis took control, but the Harvard Law School dean called for the
termination of the OCD in 1943. Landis noted that the real preparedness took place at the
mimicipal and individual level, and he maintained that local civil defense organizations
were sufficiently sound to ensure a state of national civilian readiness. By 1943 it was also
'"Federal Civil Defense Administration, Civil Defense: An American Tradition (Washington, D.C.: GPO, n.d.); and Guy Oakes, The Imaginiary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 130-31.
16
apparent to most defense planners that sustained attacks against the American homeland
were unlikely. Nonetheless, President Roosevelt and, later. President Harry S Truman
refused to disband the OCD until victory in Europe was assured. When Truman and the
members of Congress resurrected civil defense in 1950, preparedness advocates could
claim, tmthfully, that the concept of a U.S. civilian defense force was not without
precedent, but the nature of American civil defense changed dramatically after World War
Postwar crises precipitated both the retum of civil defense and the modification
of preparedness strategies. Crises arose when Americans believed their lives, their
country, or their national ideals were at risk. In the years following World War II, crises
most often resulted from American confrontations with communist rivals, and especially
vdth its arch-rival, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Americans of the post-war era
soon discovered that even though the Second World War had ended, their nation was not
at peace. The United States had survived its "hot war" with Germany and Japan only to
enter into a "cold" one with the Soviet Union. In the decades following World War II's
conclusion, the two nations—one the self-proclaimed champion of democracy, the other of
communism—competed for superiority in politics, in economics, and in science and
technology. For most Americans, each Soviet challenge precipitated a period of crisis.
Each Soviet advance, each communist victory, represented a setback for democracy, a
defeat for the United States-a period of even greater crisis.
' Thomas J. Kerr, Civil Defense in the U.S.: Band-Aid for a Holocaust? (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), 14-19.
17
The mere possibility of a future war with the Soviet Union produced a crisis for
civil defense planners. The United States had never before confronted an enemy that
possessed the ability to launch a heavy bomb-strike against the American homefront.
Prior to the Cold War era, American civilian lookouts had often kept their eyes trained on
land and on the seas, but rarely on the skies. In the nineteenth-century American West,
pioneers watched for an enemy approaching on foot or on horseback. Throughout the
Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, civilians looked out at the Atlantic Ocean and
strained to catch sight of a mast, a wooden hull, something that would reveal the approach
of forces from across the sea.
Amphibious assault and attacks on U.S. ships in harbor remained an important
concem for civilian "spotters" during World War II. Along the Atlantic Coast, volunteers
now watched the ocean for the dull-gray hull of steel ships, and, more importantly, for the
periscopes and the cigar-shaped outlines of prowling German U-boats. Rumors persisted
that German scientists were working toward the development of a trans-Atlantic bomber
and an intercontinental missile, the V-4, but these *Svonder weapons" failed to materialize
during the war. The threat posed by Nazi submarines was real and immediate. Civilian
lookouts trained their eyes on the waves. On the West Coast, Americans stared out at
another ocean, the Pacific, and worried that a Japanese task force would appear on the
horizon. Like their German allies, the Japanese did not possess long-range bombers that
could strike at the continental United States. Unlike the Germans, however, the Japanese
had allocated resources to the building of aircraft carriers which could accommodate light
bombers. With the memory of Pearl Harbor fresh in American minds, spotters did scan
18
the skies west of California, Oregon, and Washington for enemy planes. As the war
ground on, the expected enemy aircraft failed to appear, but Japanese subs occasionally
did probe the Pacific Coast. As on the eastem seaboard, spotters on the West Coast
found their eyes drawn to the ocean.'^
For its part, especially during the last few years of its existence, the Office of
Civilian Defense did not seem to indicate that an aerial attack on the American home front
was probable, much less inevitable. It sponsored a number of air-raid drills and organized
bands of civilian lookouts, but the absence of enemy planes in American air-space
prompted many state and municipal affiliates to place their protective services on
"standby." The OCD did not protest. A full sixty percent of its projects were not even
oriented toward protecting the populace. The agency concentrated most of its energies on
promoting morale-building activities such as victory gardens, salvage operations, and war
bond drives. The office's preference for growing vegetables rather than watching for the
enemy is perhaps an indicator of how seriously the threat of an attack against the
continental United States was taken.'
During the Cold War, members of the defense establishment argued that a future
conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States was a distinct probability. They
believed, further, that if a war empted the Soviets would possess both the capabilities and
' Allan M. Winkler, Home Front U.S.A.: America During World War II(Arlington Heights, lU.: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1986), 30-31.
' Elwyn A. Mauck, "History of Civil Defense in the United States," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 6, no. 8-9 (1950): 268-69; and Office of the Secretary of Defense, War Department Civil Defense Board, A Study of Civil Defense (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1948), 8.
19
the resolve to strike at the American homeland. As a result of Alaska's proximity to the
fer eastem reaches of the U.S.S.R., invasion was a concern, thus mandating a close watch
on the Soviet Union's Navy. In general, however, the focus of American civil defense
shifted from the coastal seas to the skies. According to a number of officers within the
defense establishment, an expanding, maturing Soviet Air Force posed the greatest threat
to the United States. The scenario that they sketched was one in which long-range, heavy
bombers scrambled from bases in Russia, flew north over the Arctic Ocean, over the Pole,
over Canada, and then descended on U.S. industrial centers—not just those that dotted the
Pacific coastline, but also those in the Great Lakes region, the densely-packed industrial
belt of the East Coast, and, perhaps, those in the southem United States. American
fighters and ground fire would down some of the raiders, but many would slip through and
would rain devastation on the cities below.'*
The atomic bomb added a new dimension to the Soviet air threat and the crisis
faced by American plaimers of civilian defense. The United States was the only power
that possessed "the bomb" in 1945, but personnel in the Office of the Provost Marshall
General believed that Russian scientists and engineers would one day succeed in
producing their own atomic weapons. Seconding this opinion was major General Leslie
'*"Top Military Leaders Say CD is a Co-Partner," The Civil Defense Alert 1, no. 1 (1951): 1-4; and Office of the President, Air Policy Committee, Survival in the Air Age (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1948).
20
R. Groves, military commander of the Manhattan Project, who predicted that the U.S.S.R.
would possess atomic capabilities in ten to twenty years.'
OPMG planners did not appear to doubt that once the Soviets had developed an
atomic device, they would employ it in a confrontation with the United States. Economic
considerations made its use a logical choice. Advocates contended that the bomb saved
lives; the bomb saved time; the bomb saved money. It was the atomic bomb that rendered
an aerial attack preferable to an amphibious assault. President Truman maintained that his
decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had prevented the deaths of
thousands of American soldiers who otherwise would have been ordered first, to effect an
amphibious landing on the islands of Japan and then, to wage a costly campaign to subdue
the inhabitants. Truman believed that the damage wrought by the detonations of "Little
Boy" and Fat Man" had forced an early Japanese surrender. For those who accepted his
pronouncements, atomic weapons offered tempting prospects. Armed with this new
technology, diplomats could bully adversaries or, when conflict was unavoidable, they
could wage short, cost-efficient wars. °
The eventual reality of a Soviet Union armed with atomic weapons presented
substantial difficulties for civil defense plaimers. Since the United States cast itself as a
' William Lawrence, The General and the Bomb: A Biography of General Leslie R. Groves, Director of the Manhattan Project (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company. 1988), 267.
^ Truman, Public Papers, 1: 362; David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 458-59; Monte N. Poen, ed.. Strictly Personal and Confidential: The Letters Harry Truman Never Mailed {Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1982), 35-35; and Oakes, Imaginary War, 14-16.
21
global policeman—a respondent to, rather than an initiator o^ aggression, members of the
defense establishment had to devise a plan that would enable the United States to survive
an enemy attack and then mobilize to mount a counterattack. The ability to deliver such a
coimterstrike necessitated more than the protection of industrial centers and military
materials; it required preventing panic and widespread loss of morale in the civilian sector.
The atomic bomb was a weapon capable of inflicting massive psychological, as well as
physical, damage. '
An investigating team from the Manhattan Engineer District conducted postwar
studies on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and recorded the psychological trauma induced by the
August 1945 atomic assaults. The survey noted that, immediately following the attacks,
the inhabitants of the two cities fled in panic. The civilians' desire to remove themselves
from harm's way was understandable; what surprised the team was the absence of
significant remigration to the cities once the crisis had passed. The American observers
wrote that even after three months of peace "their [the Japanese's] paralysis was still
remarkable." ^ The members of the survey also reported that although many Japanese
civilians had grown accustomed to mass air raids during the war, after the atomic
bombings *the appearance of a single plane caused more dismption of nonnal life than the
appearance of many hundreds of planes had ever caused before." ^ The text went on to
'Oakes, The Imaginary War, takes for its theme civil defense as a mechanism for preventing panic during the Atomic Age.
^ Manhattan Engineer District, Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 34.
^^bid.
22
state, "[T]he effect of this terrible fear of the potential danger from even a single plane on
the lives of the peoples of the world in the event of any future war can easily be
conjectured."^"
American defense planners both appreciated and worried about the "paralysis,"
the "terrible fear," and the panic that an atomic assault could produce. Breaking the
morale of the Japanese people was a hoped-for result of the bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, but officers of the Manhattan Engineer District claimed that the United States
had targeted the production centers of the two cities. They contended that it was the lack
of zoning in Hiroshima that had resulted in high civilian casualties. Three-fourths of
Hiroshima's inhabitants lived in the heavily industrialized center of the city; residences
were clustered around fectories. In Nagasaki, homes and production centers were more
segregated. The bomb had exploded, "as intended," over the industrial valley that held the
Mitsubishi Steel and Arms works and the Mitsubishi-Urakami Ordnance works. If the
weapon had detonated farther south, it would have been over the city's main residential
areas, and a greater number of civilians would have been killed. Defense personnel were
concemed that the United States' rivals would not limit their objectives to the destmction
of production facilities. Indeed, they feared that an enemy might specifically target U.S.
civilian populations as well as industrial centers in an attempt to cmsh American morale
with a single, heavy, atomic bombardment. To the Office of the Provost MarshaU General
fell the responsibility for devising a plan to reduce the psychological and physical damage
that a bombardment of the American homeland would produce. To the OPMG fell the
"Manhattan Engineer District, Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 34.
23
responsibility for creating a civil defense program and tailoring it to meet the challenges of
the Atomic Age. ^
The office wasted no time in launching its project, but little headway was made
until the spring of 1946. Upon receiving the assignment in early August, 1945, Colonel
Alton C. Miller, Director of the Provost Division, created a Civilian Defense Branch
within the OPMG. Miller then sent out a questionnaire to former officers of the now-
defimct Office of Civilian Defense. The document solicited responses on a number of
issues, including the lessons leamed from World War U, the desirability of a permanent
civil defense agency, the in jact of atomic weapons on civil defense strategies, and the role
of the military and local, state, and federal governments in civilian defense. Miller also
looked to the future. He asked survey participants to consider the possibility of rocket-
propelled atomic weapons. What changes to civil defense strategies were required to
counter the threat of atomic missiles? Completed questionnaires trickled into Miller's
office, but the colonel and his staff were disappointed with the responses. Most of the
individuals that retumed the provost surveys refused to speculate about atomic bombs and
missile warfere. Instead, they acted as if future wars would be fought with conventional
bombs. They suggested the United States employ the blackout, evacuation, and shelter
strategies used by the British during the Wecond World War. Frustrated by the
unimaginative responses and uncertain as to what strategies postwar civil defense agencies
should adopt. Miller and the members of the Provost Division's Civilian Defense Branch
^ Oakes, Imaginary War, 34-36; and Manhattan Engineer District, Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 6-7, 14.
24
lost some of their drive. More than a year after the OPMG had begun to consider the
subject of civil defense, it had yet to issue a report. The project failed to move forward
again until February, 1946, when Colonel Miller asked Lt. Colonel Bamet W. Beers, of
the Strategic Bombing Survey (SBS), to head the OPMG's Civilian Defense Branch. ^
Colonel Beers brought to the committee years of experience in civil defense-
related activities, and he had visited Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the "Little Boy" and
"Fat Man" detonations. Before joining the Bombing Survey, he had been stationed at
Govemor's Island, New York. There he had supervised the Army personnel that worked
in the Office of Civilian Defense's regional center. Indeed, it was his duties on Govemor's
Island that landed him a position with the Strategic Bombing Survey. Survey Chair
Franklin D'Olier was a regional director for the OCD. The presidential directive which
spawned the SBS ordered the Secretary of War to establish the survey for the purpose of
evaluating the impact of Allied air attacks on Germany. D'Olier added a civil defense
team and placed Beers in charge. Beers subsequently traveled to Germany and, after
President Harry S Truman expanded the SBS's mission, to Japan. While in the two
countries, he studied their civil defense systems of World War 11. ^
Colonel Beers's investigations convinced him that civil defense measures could
protect a population from an aerial assault—even if the aggressors were armed with atomic
bombs. Like the Manhattan Engineer District investigators that surveyed the damage
^ Tyler, "Planning Years," 16-18, 26.
^ Tyler, "Planning Years," 26; and Nehemiah Jordan, U.S. Civil Defense Before 1950: The Roots of Public Law 920 (n.p.: Institute for Defense Analyses, Economic and Political Studies Division, 1966), 58.
25
done to Hiroshima by "Little Boy," Beers' team blamed crowded, flammable housing and
the lack of zoning for the devastating civilian losses in that city. Their published findings
also reported, however, that prior to the August 6 attack, Hiroshima's inhabitants had
evinced a general attitude of apathy toward civil defense. Further, the few neighborhood
shelters that had been constmcted had not withstood the destmctive force of the bomb
because they had been modified until they were no longer practical, protective stmctures. *
From Hiroshima, Beers's Civil Defense Division headed to Nagasaki. There, his
team sought out survivors of the August 9 attack. Beers claimed that he personally
interviewed about two hundred people who had been within a hundred yards of Ground
Zero-the ground-level point directly below the explosion's epicenter-at the time of "Fat
Man's" detonation. When Beers left Nagasaki, he was certain that the United States
could identify and adopt defensive measures that would save lives during an atomic
assault. He accepted the appointment offered by Miller. ^
Throughout March and April of 1946, Lt. Colonel Beers and the handful of men
assigned to the OPMG's Civil Defense Branch gathered information and quickly pieced
together a report. They sifted through responses to the Miller questionnaire. They drew
on the Strategic Bombing Survey's studies of civil defense in Germany and Japan. While
civil defense in those two countries was only a marginal success, it was part of England's
"finest hour" during World War II. The members of Beers' group therefore also examined
^*U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Civilian Defense Division, Target Report of Civilian Defense Division Field Team No. 1, Covering Air Raid Protection Facilities and Allied Subjects in the Town of Hiroshima, Japan, 15 November 1945, 11-13, 29.
'Tyler, "Planning Years," 26.
26
the civilian preparedness measures enq)loyed by Great Britain. They were especially
inq)ressed with the British government's foresight. England had begun to formulate a
system of civilian defenses shortly after World War I. Years of peacetime preparation
paid off during World War II when civil defense measures saved thousands of lives. The
British experience convinced Beers that the United States should launch a civil defense
program immediately, not wait for an emergency before taking action. ''
On April 30, the Civil Defense Branch issued its findings in a work entitled
Defense Against Enemy Action Directed at Civilians. The classified report, referred to as
"Study 3B-1," laid the foundation for civil defense in Cold War America. The document
provided a core of ideas, comments, and suggestions that other defense planners repeated
and which legislators eventually implemented. Identifying civil defense as an attempt both
to preserve civilian lives and property from an enemy assault and guarantee the rapid
resumption of normal conditions after an attack, the authors of Study 3B-1 asserted that
the primary responsibility for civilian defense devolved upon the civilian, the individual.
To insure an effective civil defense program, they believed it was necessary to indoctrinate
the country's entire population.
It was to be a program that was built on the principle of self-help. An
information campaign would teach Americans to protect themselves. Trained to react,
civilians would seek shelter or evacuate a threatened area before an attack took place.
Then, once the bombardment had ended, civilians would again take the initiative-
^ Tyler, "Planning Years," 27.
27
administering first aid to the wounded, putting out fires, clearing away wreckage and the
dead. '
Local and state government bodies would recruit volunteers and channel
information to the public, but they would be subordinate to a federal office that formulated
policy and held ultimate authority over all personnel. Believing civil defense to be a
natured extension of the War Department's responsibilities. Beers and his assistants argued
that a permanent, federal, military and civilian-staffed agency should be established and
placed under the direction of the Secretary of War. Japan, Germany, and Great Britain
had boasted similar systems during World War II, and the centralization of power had
proved useful. Yet, Study 3B-1 called for the creation of such an entity in peacetime, and
in a country whose citizens coveted their state's rights and the autonomy of their local
governments, ^
How the people would respond to the proposed program remained open to
speculation, for the War Department did not act on the suggestions of the OPMG's
Civilian Defense Branch. The department's heads did not appear convinced that civil
defense was necessary. Though the Russians rejected Bernard Bamch's June 1946
proposal that the United Nations control the world's atomic energy, this did not produce
an atmosphere of fear in America. The United States remained the only country that
possessed atomic weapons. Defense personnel estimated it would be years before the
Soviets developed atomic capabilities. Despite Study 3B-rs recommendation that the
''Tyler, "Planning Years," 28, 33-37.
'2 Jordan, Civil Defense Before 1950, 60-61,
28
U.S. government create a civilian defense body immediately and prepare for the
eventuality of an aggressive, atom bomb-armed U.S.S.R., the country's military leaders
decided civil defense was not an urgent need. Defense agencies did not have unlimited
resources. Disarmament and reconversion initiatives had followed the end of the Second
World War. Restricted by postwar cuts in appropriations, the military was finding it
difficult enough to maintain established programs. Accepting new missions, such as civil
defense, would further strain the defense establishment's budget. Members of the War
Department's Plans and Operations Division opposed saddling the U.S. military with the
added expense of civilian defense. '
In July, acting on the advice of the Plans and Operations Division, Secretary of
War Robert Patterson asked the Bureau of the Budget to investigate the question of
postwar civil defense. Besides compiling the budget, the bureau analyzes and coordinates
the functions of the various federal agencies. Patterson suggested that the bureau
determine which department should assume responsibility for civil defense. It appears that
he hoped the budget office would absolve the War Department of civil defense duties.
Bureau leaders punted the ball back to the military, however, telling the War Department
'Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 211; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972), 103-09; and Jordan A. Schwarz, The Speculator: Bernard M. Baruch in Washington, 1914-1965 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 490-507.
29
to continue its investigations until the Bureau of the Budget decided to initiate its own
study.^
After a few more exchanges between the two offices, the War Department
launched another examination of civil defense. On November 25, 1946, Secretary
Patterson created the War Department Civil Defense Board. Actually comprised of two
bodies—a senior board staffed with high-ranking officers and a junior committee that
included representatives from all of the military's General Staff division-it was to identify
the War Department's role in civilian preparedness and propose an organizational
stmcture for civil defense. Of all the board's members, only one had any experience with
civil defense matters—Lt. Colonel Beers sat on the junior committee. Beers's expertise
was essential in the deliberations of what became known as the "Bull Board," nicknamed
after the group's chairman. Major General Harold C. Bull.'
Given the circumstances that precipitated the creation of the Bull Board, it
should have surprised no one when its members minimized the Army's civil defense
responsibilities. The board completed its report, A Study of Civil Defense, more
commonly referred to as the "Bull Report," on February 28, 1947. Recognizing civilian
preparedness as part of the country's line of defense, the study suggested the
establishment of a federal civil defense agency, subordinate to the Secretary of War, but
independent of the existing armed services branches. The members of the board also
'"Tyler, "Planning Years," 43-45.
' Carey Brewer, Civil Defense in the United States: Federal State, and Local (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, 1951), 12; and Tyler, "Planning Years," 48.
30
contended that the federal organization should not extend below the regional level. They
asserted that most civil defense requirements could be met quite easily by expanding the
services offered by local and state governments. Echoing the findings of Study 3B-1, the
Bull Report argued that civilians and the governments that dealt most directly with them
should bear the majority of the civil defense burden. As for the federal agency, it would
formulate policy, offer guidance, and, if an attack occurred, it would supplement civilian
volunteer divisions by dispatching a few mobile reserves to bomb-stmck cities.'^
Despite the work of the War Department Civil Defense Board and the OPMG's
Civilian Defense Branch, civil defense remained in the planning stage. In July 1947,
Congress passed the National Security Act. Besides creating the Central Intelligence
Agency and the National Security Resources Board, the act made the Air Force an equal
partner with the Army and the Navy and placed all three bodies under the direction of
James Forrestal, the man named to the new position of Secretary of Defense. Throughout
the late 1940s, Forrestal appeared as reluctant as Secretary of War Patterson had been to
push for a civil defense program that might force a redistribution of the monies available
to the armed forces. He expressed his concem that the federal government would expect
the military to carry out civil defense responsibilities without the benefit of additional
appropriations or personnel. It was nearly a year after the Bull Board had submitted its
' War Department Civil Defense Board, Study of Civil Defense, 3, 9-18, 20-24.
31
report before Forrestal moved on the issue of civil defense, and crises seemed to force his
hand.'"
Relations between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
continued to deteriorate during 1947. Two years earlier at Fuhon, Missouri, Great
Britain's Winston Churchill had delivered his femous "iron curtain" speech, in which he
decried the Soviet Union's creation of communist puppet-states in Eastem Europe. Still,
the presence of an immense Soviet army in Europe and the desire of most Americans to
"bring the boys home" once World War U had ended combined to reduce the possibility of
armed conflict over states such as Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. Eighteen days before
the BuU Board issued its report on civil defense, the aforementioned countries and Italy
signed peace treaties—drawn-up by the Allies' Council of foreign Ministers—that
effectively acknowledged Soviet control in Eastem Europe.'*
It was one thing to send American troops into Bulgaria and Romania to confront
entrenched battalions of the U.S.S.R.'s Red Army. It was another to allow communism to
continue to spread. Even as the February 10 treaties were being signed, American
statesmen were formulating strategies that came to epitomize American Cold War policy.
Early in 1947, representatives from war-weakened Great Britain notified their American
counterparts that the United Kingdom could no longer extend financial aid to Greece and
"U.S. Public Law 253, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (26 July 1947), National Security Act of 1947; and James Forrestal to Harry S Truman, 27 January 1949, Official File document. Folder 10, Box 2, Civil Defense, B File, HST.
*"U.S. Sends 2 Protests to Russia on Manchuria and Iran Actions: Churchill Assails Soviet Policy," New York Times, 6 March 1946, sec. 1, p. 1, col. 4; and "5 Treaties Signed in Paris Ceremony," New York Times, 11 February 1947, sec. 1, p. 1, col. 2.
32
Turkey, both of which were besieged by communist insurrections. In response. President
Truman went before the members of Congress and presented what became known as the
"Truman Doctrine." He argued that "it must be the policy of the Untied States to support
free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."'
Congress appropriated $400 million for aid to Turkey and Greece. In July, George F.
Kennan, former counselor to the American embassy in Moscow, anonymously published
"The Sources of Soviet Conduct" in Foreign Affairs. In the article Kennan called for the
"containment" of Soviet aggression. It was also the summer of 1947 when Secretary of
State George Marshall proposed offering aid to the war-torn countries of Europe in order
to stimulate their recovery."^
Soviet statesmen were wary of American initiatives. Though the Marshall Plan
was open to Russian and Eastem European participation, Soviet officials denounced it as
an attempt to expand the United States' economic empire, and refused aid for themselves
and their Eastem European satellites. Fearful of a revitalized, pro-American Westem
Europe, the Soviet Union then supported a communist takeover that felled a
Czechoslovakian coalition government in February 1948. The coup brought the last non-
communist Eastem European country into the sphere of Russian influence and completed
' Truman, Public Papers, 2; 178-79.
"^"X"[George F. Kennan], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs (25 July 1947): 566-82; and Kolko, Limits of Power, 359-61.
33
the division of Europe between the Soviets and the Americans. The players had been
choseiL The two teams now feced one another."'
Days before Czechoslovakia was absorbed into the eastem Bloc, and nearly a
year after the War Department Civil Defense Board had completed its study. Secretary
Forrestal released the Bull Report to the public and announced that he planned to create a
civilian-dominated committee to draw-up a comprehensive civil defense program.
Uneasiness bom of the Czechoslovakian crisis helped propel his plans forward. Realizing
that a sound communications system was vital to civil defense, Forrestal asked the
president of the Northwestem Bell Telephone Company, Russell J. Hopley, to head the
proposed civilian planning body. Hopley accepted and took control of the newly-
established Office of Civil Defense Planning (OCDP) in late March. The ever-present and
experienced Lt. Colonel Beers transferred to the office at Hopley's request."^
As the OCDP swung into action, another international crisis arose, bringing a
sense of urgency to the committee's work. Hoping to force England, France, and the
United States to relinquish control of West Berlin, the Soviet Union began to impede
Westem traffic to the city in April 1948. In June, communist Russia stopped all Western,
over-land transportation into West Berlin, making the blockade complete. President
Truman and the United States' allies responded by "airlifting" supplies to the besieged
city. Though Soviet fighters did not scramble into the air to down the Westem supply-
planes, the crisis convinced many Americans—including those in the Office of Civil
"'Kolko, Limits of Power, 361-65.
" Tyler, "Planning Years," 86-87.
34
Defense Planning-that war might empt soon. The OCDP staff hurriedly conducted their
investigations and con^iled their report."'
Civil Defense for National Security, the "Hopley Report," went to press in
September 1948. Although its authors agreed v ith the Bull Board's assertion that the
state and municipal governments should shoulder the majority of the responsibility for civil
defense, the two studies differed somewhat. The Hopley Report proposed a more
decentralized system, one in which state leaders controlled civil defense. It designated the
chief executives of the states as the primary directors of civilian preparedness operations.
Each state would enact its own civil defense laws, though the Hopley Report did include a
ready-made model piece of legislation for the states to use if they so chose. Each
govemor would control civil defense operations within his state. Local preparedness
organizations would report to the state offices.""
Federal responsibilities would be minimal. The state executives would be under
the ultimate authority of the secretary of defense, but the report seemed to suggest that he
would leave the states to their own devices. The federal civil defense administration
would be restricted to offering advice, guidance, and, perhaps, some financial assistance.
The Hopley Report even declared against committing federal mobile reserves to civil
"'Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1982 (New York: McGraw HiU, Inc., 1993), 75-76.
""Office of Civil Defense Planning, Civil Defense for National Security (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1948), 47-48, 280-85.
35
defense. Instead, the study's authors proposed that the states and municipalities develop
their own mobile reserves and negotiate mutual-aid agreements with their neighbors."^
Like the Bull Board, however, the members of the Office of Civil Defense
Planning found their work ignored. The Berlin Crisis lasted close to a year, but as
American and British airlifts proved successful, the "storm-clouds" over Washington,
D.C., seemed to disappear, and with them, enthusiasm for civil defense. President Harry S
Truman announced that the current foreign policy situation did not justify the creation of a
permanent civil defense program. He insisted that preparedness issues remain in the
planning stage. Since the Security Act of 1947 had established the National Security
Resources Board (NSRB) to supervise and coordinate civilian and military mobilization, in
a March 1949 memorandum Truman ordered the NSRB to assume responsibility for civil
defense policy suggestions. Secretary Forrestal disbanded the Office of Civil Defense
Planning a few months later."
Despite its mandate, the board accomplished little until the appearance of another
crisis forced it to act. It delegated its civilian disaster relief responsibilities to the General
Services Administration. Those areas involving military defense-air raid warning systems.
" Office of Civil Defense Planning, Civil Defense for Security, 18-24.
"^U.S. Public Law 253. 80th Cong., 1st sess. (26 July 1947), National Security Act of 1947; Truman, Public Papers, 4:146; President Harry S Truman to Chariman, National Security Resources Board, memorandum, 4 March 1949, Official File document. Folder 10, Box 2, B File, Civil Defense, HST; and Mauck, History of Civil Defense, 269.
36
civilian air patrols, protective shelter constmction projects-it assigned to the Department
of Defense."^
Then, in August, a radioactive cloud rose into the air above the Soviet Union.
Not wanting to believe reports that the Soviets now possessed "the bomb," and afraid of
the way Americans would respond to the news. President Truman did not go public with
the information until September 23. His announcement triggered some panic among the
people and caused a storm to break in the capitol. Faced with a U.S.S.R. armed with
atomic weapons, Bernard Bamch, Representative John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts, and
other members of Congress demanded information on the present state of U.S. civil
defense. Upon discovering that it continued to languish in the planning stage, they lashed
out at the administration, criticizing its lack of initiative."*
The NSRB responded to the political pressure. The board's temporary chairman,
John R. Steelman, dispatched a letter to the govemor of each state. It indicated that the
NSRB was and had been formulating a national policy of civil defense. Nonetheless, since
its investigations were incomplete, the board urged the individual states to enact
temporary legislation, as outlined in the Hopley Report. In addition to the letters, the
NSRB began to distribute information on both the medical dangers to humans and the
stmctural damage to buildings that would result from an atomic explosion. The Atomic
" Mauck, History of Civil Defense, 269.
"*Trunian, Public Papers, 5:435, 509; Jordan, Civil Defense, 95-96; and Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1949, 95, pt. 16: A6024.
37
Energy Commission (AEC) provided the data for the reports. Itself the victim of political
attacks, the AEC was hastily compiling a work on the effects of nuclear weapons."^
Before Americans could recover from the shock of Truman's announcement,
they were hit with another crisis. On October 1, 1949, the world witnessed the
inauguration of the People's Republic of China, an event which formally shifted more than
500 million people-about one-fifth of the Earth's human population-into the communist
camp. In the midst of the furor created by the Soviet atomic test and the fell of nationalist
China, Senator Brien McMahon (D., Connecticut), Chairman of the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, announced his board's decision to hold public hearings on the question of
civil defense. Senator Estes Kefeuver (D., Tennessee), chairman of a special
subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, also directed his board to scmtinize
U.S. civil defense initiatives. ^
The committees opened their hearings in March 1950 and continued them
throughout April of the same year. With the exception of NSRB personnel, most of the
witnesses called before the committees charged the federal government with neglecting the
creation and implementation of a national civil defense program. The members of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the special subcommittee of the Committee on
Armed Services agreed, yet they failed to press for an immediate civil defense policy. By
"National Security Resources Board, "Document 121," "Medical Aspects of Atomic Weapons," and "Damage from Atomic Explosions and Design of Protective Stmctures," in U.S. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings on Civil Defense Against Atomic Attack, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950, 9-10, 36-47, and 47-61.
^^New York Times, October 1, 1949, p. 1:1; Jordan, Civil Defense, 97; and Tyler, "Planning Years," 221-222.
38
the time the hearings had ended, the People's Republic of China had been established for
sbc months. The Soviet A-bomb also was old news. The committees had spent their
venom on the NSRB, now Congress itself became apathetic toward civil defense. '
Though it was no longer the object of intense, congressional scmtiny, the NSRB
retumed to its planning with renewed vigor. The board had been energized by the
additions of Paul Larson and Stuart Symington. On March 1, Larson became director of
the NSRB's Civilian Mobilization Office (later renamed the Civil Defense Office). An
atomic research management expert, Larson had served as director of the Sandia Atomic
Laboratory in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Also during March, the NSRB received
Symington, the Secretary of the Air Force and a civil defense advocate, as its permanent
chairman. Under the prodding of these two men, the board began to produce a civil
defense plan. ^
Yet another crisis contributed to the sense of urgency surrounding the NSRB's
assignment. On June 25, North Korean forces crossed over the 38th parallel into South
Korea in an attempt to unite the two countries under communist control. In the weeks
that followed, the invaders steadily pushed the South Korean troops and their American
allies back, into the peninsula's southeastem comer. The Allies were still in that
'Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings; and Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Civil Defense, Preliminary Report of the Subcommittee on Civil Defense, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950.
^%rdan. Civil Defense, 83, 88, 97.
39
precarious position on September 8, 1950, the day on which Symington submitted the
NSRB's report to President Truman. '
United States Civil Defense, often called *the Blue Book," after the color of its
cover, drew heavily from the Hopley Report, but there were differences that set the two
documents apart. First, the Blue Book suggested that the director of a federal civil
defense administration report directly to the president, not to the secretary of defense.
Second, though the Blue Book's authors agreed with Hopley that the primary
responsibility for civil defense fell to the states and the municipalities, they prescribed a
larger role for the federal government. They suggested that it stockpile medical supplies
and provide an undisclosed amount of fimding for shelters, control centers, and for
communication and air-raid warning systems. In addition, the federal civil defense office
would establish training fecilities and would organize a nation-wide education and
information campaign. "
Shortly after receiving the booklet, Truman passed it on to the members of the
national legislature. He requested that they use the document as a model and enact civil
defense legislation in the near fiiture, but Congress adjourned before considering civil
defense. The military reverses in Korea had inspired President Truman to endorse civil
defense. Less than a week after the president received the NSRB's report, however, the
Korean Conflict began to turn in favor of the United States. On September 14, United
"Galium A. MacDonald, Korea, The War Before Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 3, 37-39.
"National Security Resources Board, United States Civil Defense (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1950), 1-27.
40
Nations forces-consisting mostly of American and South Korean troops-under the
command of General Douglas MacArthur had counterattacked. Mac Arthur had ordered
an amphibious landing at Inchon, behind enemy lines. The maneuver had retumed U.N.
forces to the offensive, and, since then, they had driven steadily northward. When the
Korean crisis began to stabilize, the urgent need for civil defense legislation seemed to
disappear. ^
On October 1, U.N. troops reached the thirty-eighth parallel. They had
accomplished their mission. They had retaken South Korea, but State officials were
tempted to pursue a new objective, the reunification of Korea under the South's
leadership. Chou En-lai, foreign minister for the People's Republic of China, wamed that
his country would not remain idle if U.N. forces crossed into North Korea, but decision
makers in Washington and American commanders in the field ignored the warnings. They
"called" what they believed was a bluff. MacArthur's troops pressed on and pushed the
North Korean forces back, toward the Chinese border. By late November an Allied
victory, and a unified Korea, seemed assured. United Nations forces had seized all but the
northernmost parts of the Korean peninsula, and MacArthur was preparing for a final
assault. Then on November 26, the unexpected occurred. Thousands of Chinese soldiers
poured across the Yalu River into North Korea. The sudden onslaught caught the
Americans and their allies by surprise; they reeled back to the thirty-eighth parallel, and
"Truman, Public Papers, 6: 641; and MacDonald, Korea, 48-50.
41
beyond. This change in events represented a new crisis, and it forced Truman into a press
conference on November 30,1950.^
The Indian Treaty Room was filled with reporters on that Thursday morning.
President Truman stood before the press, his countenance serious. The recent setback in
Korea was not the first blow suffered by Truman's administratioiL As the United States'
chief executive in 1945, President Harry S. Truman had shared in the glory and acclaim
when the Allies stood victorious at the end of World War U. The United States' chief
executive, Truman was also the chief target for those Americans who sought to assign
blame when things went wrong."
Leading the throng of assailants were political adversaries. Republicans and
conservative Democrats who had argued that Franklin D. Roosevelt's **New Deal" was
too liberal and too expensive, now opposed Truman's "Fair Deal," which they identified as
an extension of his predecessor's policies. Truman's critics did not restrict their
comments to his domestic programs. Determined to undermine his presidency and his
chances for reelection, Truman's enemies also seized upon every Cold War defeat. After
each setback they claimed that the president was not fully prosecuting the war against
communism. He was, they asserted, "soft on communism." These charges rang out
loudly in the fall of 1949 when China, with its one-half billion person population entered
the communist camp. Now, a year later, the scales threatened to tilt even further in favor
' MacDonald, Korea, 57-78.
"McCullough, Truman, 820.
42
of communism, and no doubt Truman feared again hearing that his foreign policy was
"soft."'*
The president seemed determined to forestall these charges at his press
conference on November 30, 1950. As usual, his attire was in^ccable-a well-tailored
suit, a crisp shirt, polished shoes. From the days of his youth, Harry S. Truman had paid
meticulous care to his appearance, a fact attested to by the state of his dress even then.'
On this morning, however, the president seemed most concemed that his administration
not appear slovenly, especially with regard to foreign policy. He opened with a short,
prepared statement in which he assured the American people that the recent reverses in
Korea would not cause the United States and its U.N. allies to abandon their mission in
that war-tom peninsula. He then announced that the United States would bolster its
military strength in order to confront communist aggression throughout the world. As
questions began to pour from the assembled reporters, Truman further "proved" that he
was not "soft." He asserted that, in Korea, the United States would "take whatever steps
are necessary to meet the military situation."^ The members of the press caught his hint,
but they wanted verification. A reporter asked the president if he was suggesting that the
'*Robert J. Donovan, Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1949-1953 (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982), 82-87; Alonzo Hamby, Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 518-20; and McCullough, Truman, 742-44.
'McCullough, Truman, 45.
^Truman, Public Papers, 6: 641.
43
U.S. might use the atomic bomb to resolve the conflict. Truman replied, "There has
always been active consideration of its use." '
Before the day's end, word of President Truman's **bomb threat" had sped
throughout the United States and across the Atlantic Ocean. His statements precipitated a
storm of anxiety and protest in England. In the House of Commons, Mr. Edgar Granville
of Eye, requested that Prime Minister Atlee go immediately to the United States to confer
with the president. After Granville expressed his anxiety, others took to the floor and
criticized what they perceived to be rash and irresponsible behavior on the part of the
United States' chief executive. Later that day, representatives of the Labor Party
presented the prime minister with a letter that detailed their concerns and which contained
the signatures of more than one hundred members of Parliament. Atlee contacted the U.S.
State Department and prepared to leave for Washington."
To prevent any further panic, abroad or at home, on Thursday afternoon White
House Press Secretary Charlie Ross issued another statement—one that was intended to
clarify the president's morning remarks. Ross told the press that the mere possession of a
weapon implied that it might one day be used, but he stressed that the president, alone,
was authorized to order the use of atomic weapons, and President Truman had not issued
such an order. Ross's announcement produced little effect in England or in the United
States. The British government was stOl concemed. Atlee flew to Washington for a series
61 Truman, Public Papers, 6: 641,
^^Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., vol. 481 (1950), cols. 1403-1439; and New York Times, December 1, 1950, p. 1:1.
44
of conferences with President Truman. In the United States, summaries of Ross's press
release went into the Friday morning newspaper articles that covered Truman's stated
"atomic policy." Gallup surveys showed, however, that a majority of Americans fevored
employing atomic weapons against the Chinese. Many adult Americans believed that the
United States' use of *the bomb" had brought victory in World War II, and they now
looked to it as a solution for the present crisis. '
To the population-at-large the answer to the expanding Korean conflict might
have appeared that single: use the bomb; China will succumb to America's superior
technology; and the United States and its allies will win. To those individuals actually
responsible for U.S. defense, the solution did not appear so clear-cut. The world had
changed since President Truman had ordered "Little Boy" and "Fat Man" dropped on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. No longer was the United States the sole possessor of the
atomic bomb. The Soviets now had their own atomic weapons, and in 1950 communist
China and the U.S.S.R. were closely allied. The Sino-Soviet rift that later allowed the
United States to '*play-ofi" the Soviet Union and China against one another had not yet
occurred. If President Truman employed atomic devices against the Chinese, his actions
might precipitate a further expansion of the Korean conflict into another world war—one
with Soviet Russia, and its atomic capabilities, pitted against the United States. Such a
possibility was not lost on Truman or on the members of Congress. Finally, after five
years of planning, they began to resurrect civil defense.
'McCullough, Truman, 822; American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1971, vol. 2 (New York: Random House, 1972), 950.
45
Congress acted first. The national legislature had been in recess when the
Chinese launched their offensive in North Korea. Because of the crisis. Congress
reconvened in special sessioiL On November 30, the same day that President Truman
shook the bomb at the Chinese, Representative Carl Durham (D., North Carolina)
submitted H.R. 9798 to the House. Durham served on both the House Armed Services
Committee and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The congressman was well aware
of the horrors that an atomic explosion could unleash on military or civilian persoimel, and
especially on a people who were uninformed about the power of atomic weapons and who
were not trained to react to an atomic attack. Durham's bill was a step toward educating
and preparing the American people; it proposed the creation of a federally-administered
program of civilian defense. Two days later, on Saturday, December 1, 1950, Senators
Brien McMahon, Estes Kefeuver, and Harry P. Cain (R., Washington) offered similar bills
to the Senate. President Truman also showed his support for civil defense on the first day
of December. Recognizing that the legislative process of bill introduction, compromise,
reintroduction, and, perhaps, eventual acceptance would delay the creation of a body for
directing the country's civil defense, he issued Executive order 10186, which established a
temporary Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) in the Office of the President.
The reverses in Korea had prompted the president and the members of Congress to act.
Just as international crises had pushed forward civil defense planning, the eventual
resurrection of civil defense in the United States also was a response to a crisis.^
^Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950, 96 pt. 12; 16007. 16009, 16043; and President, Executive Order 10186, Federal Register 15, no. 235 (5 December 1950): 8557-
46
Congress displayed unusual speed in its passage of the federal civil defense act.
The hearings before the House's subcommittee took place on Tuesday, December 5. The
Senate hearings began the next day and lasted until December 12. Few witnesses opposed
the establishment of a federal civil defense agency. Illustrating the consensus on the
question, when the House passed H.R. 9798 on December 20, 1950, only Clare Hof&nan
(R.) of Michigan dissented. Two days later, the Senate passed its bill, S. 4268. Select
delegates from the House and from the Senate then hammered out a compromise biU,
which Senator McMahon proposed on the first day of the new year. '
On January 12, President Harry S Truman signed the Civil Defense Act of 1951
into law, and the FCDA became a permanent body. The act was a near replica of the
NSRB's United States Civil Defense. The delegation of civil defense responsibilities
remained much the same as the NSRB had recommended. The long-sought civil defense
law was now a reality, but it remained for the federal, state, and local governments to take
the act and translate it into an effective, national program. As their first step, they had to
convince the public that civil defense was necessary, that it was an integral part of life in
the Atomic Age.^
^^Congressional Record, 16824, 16979, 17120; U.S. House Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on H.R. 9798 to Authorize a Federal Civil Defense Program, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950; and U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Armed Services, Hearings on S. 4217 and S. 4219 to Authorize a Federal Civil Defense Program, and for other Purposes, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950.
^Truman, Public Papers, 7: 26-7; and Public law 920, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (12 January 1950), 1262-73.
47
CHAPTER m
ALERTING AMERICA: MILLARD CALDWELL
AND THE POLITICS OF PERSUASION
The crowd lined both sides of Constitution Avenue. As they watched for the
parade's lead vehicles, some of the spectators fought the chill of the brisk January morning
by huddling together. Others simply sank further into their coats. They waited. The wail
of police sirens indicated that the approaching motorcade was close, and drawing nearer.
Finally, vydth lights flashing, a police escort tumed from Twelfth Street onto Constitution
Avenue, the last street on the parade route. The policemen guided their motorcycles
toward the procession's final destination, the Departmental Auditorium. ^
Stretching out behind the escort was the main body of the motorcade, thirty
tractor-trailers, brightly painted in white and red. On the sides of the trailers, in letters
over a foot tall, were the words "Alert America"—the name of the civil defense exhibit that
the convoy had brought to Washington, D.C., and which it was scheduled to carry to
cities throughout the United States. The day of the parade, a number of the tmcks were
empty. Alert America staff members had earlier transferred the vehicles' contents to the
^ "The Alert America Convoy Comes to Washington," 3, Files of Spencer R. Quick document, Folder 17, Box 2, Civil Defense, B File, Papers of Harry S Truman [hereafter HST], Hany S Truman Library [hereafter HSTL].
48
auditorium, where the exhibit was to nm for a week, from January 7 to Januaiy 13,
1952.'*
When the last of the tmcks had slowed to a stop at the Departmental Auditorium,
opening ceremonies began in eamest. In front of the building, a color guard con^rised of
representatives from the different armed services stood at attention, and the Second
Army's drum and bugle corps played martial airs for the crowd. The music eventually
gave way to key-note speeches by Major General Roger M. Rainey, Director of
Operations for the U.S. Air Force, and John E. Fondahl, civil defense director for the
District of Columbia. By the time the introductions, speeches, and "thank yous" had
ended, and the Alert America exhibit was officially opened to the public, it was one
o'clock in the aftemoon.'^
The crowd surged forward. Pushing through the auditorium's doors, citizens of
Washington and visitors to the capital found themselves confronted with a series of
displays designed to promote civil defense awareness and to attract civilian volunteers to
the program. In the foyer stood an artist's rendition of Paul Revere who, according to the
creators of the exhibit was a symbol of the United States' long-established tradition of
civil defense and the perfect example of an "alert American." Passing through the foyer,
visitors entered a U-shaped exhibit hall. Here they encountered montage boards that
projected the industrial and medical benefits of "Atomic Power in a World of Peace."
'*"Convoy Comes to Washington," 14, HST; and Valley Forge Foundation, The Alert America Convoys (n.p.: Valley Forge Foundation, n.d.), 7.
' "Convoy Comes to Washington," 3, 14, HST.
49
Farther down the passageway, stood a series of displays that depicted the possible
"horrors of modem warfere."^
The "horrors" section of the hall did not immediately focus on the destmctive
power of an atomic attack. Instead, it examined a number of other 'Veapons" that an
enemy might en:q)loy against the American home front. Repeating flashes of light
contributed to the illusion of an exploding fectory in the sabotage display. A giant walkie-
talkie surrounded by socialist newspapers wamed Americans to guard themselves against
psychological warfare. A backdrop of simulated flames lit up the remains of a building
destroyed by an incendiary bomb. In the biological warfere display, a trenchcoat-clad
enemy agent prepared to empty a germ-filled vial onto a crop of wheat. A large bubbling
container and an image of a choking man called attention to the dangers of chemical
warfare. '
Only one of the modem war displays emphasized atomic attack. The last in the
series of "horrors" displays, it was a diorama entitled "This Could Be Your City."
Surrounded by the sounds of air raid sirens and an actual recording of an atomic blast,
visitors to the exhibit watched a miniature metropolitan area crumble to the ground, the
victim of an atomic strike.'
^^alley Forge Foundation, Alert America Convoys, 3, 5-6; and "What you will see in the...Civil Defense Alert America Exhibit," Files of Spencer R. Quick document in Folder 18, Box 2, Civil Defense, B FDe, HST.
""What you will see," HST.
' Ibid.
50
Having bombarded their guests with a series of depressing and disheartening
scenes. Alert America's creators now offered a ray of hope. Moving past the destroyed
city, visitors noticed a softly-lit, life-sized image of a woman, one arm clutching an infant
to her chest, the other protectively encircling the shoulders of an injured, young boy.
War-battered, she stood on a pile of mbble in the middle of a mined city, but there was a
determined, defiant look in her eyes. While viewers gazed on this scene, the rich, soothing
voice of CBS correspondent Edward R. Murrow assured them that through civil defense
"'we can beat this menace.'" The "voice of America" during the Forties and Fifties,
Murrow had stood on the streets of London, covering the Battle of Britain while bombs
burst around him. Americans tmsted him. He had witnessed first-hand the German
bombing raids on England's crown city, and he had seen the effectiveness of the British
civil defense system. He was the ideal spokesperson for U.S. civil defense. '
The sections of the exhibit hall beyond the Murrow recording seemed intended to
substantiate Murrow's statement and to convince visitors to volunteer for civil defense.
Large placards outlined civil defense strategies, and animated models illustrated the United
States' attack warning system. Farther down the hallway, patriotic music beckoned to the
visitors, leading them to an area where the walls were hung with pictures of ordinary
Americans exercising their freedoms—a citizen expressing his concerns at a town meeting;
a little girl, hands clasped in prayer. Toward the ceiling, in capital letters, the phrases
"LOVE YOUR FREEDOMS," "LIVE YOUR FREEDOMS," "GUARD YOUR
'"What you will see," HST; and Joseph Persico, Edward R. Murrow: An American Original (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988) 172-74.
51
FREEDOMS," called Americans to duty. Moving past these patriotic slogans and images,
visitors entered the last room in the exhibit, the ''payoff room"—an area filled with free
FCDA booklets and with Alert America staff members waiting to sign up recruits for first-
aid, rescue, and warden training. "
The exhibit's creators considered the Washington show a success. Everyday,
January 7-13, the doors of the Departmental Auditorium opened at one o'clock in the
aftemoon and closed nine hours later, at ten. And everyday, thousands of Americans
crowded into the exhibit hall. During its week-long stay in the capital, 32,000 people
viewed the Alert America displays. Some 3,500, including President Harry S Truman,
pledged their support by signing "Count Me In" cards, which committed the signers to
take civil defense training classes.^' The president's tour of the show and his registration
as a civil defense volunteer were symbolic actions, but according to FCDA officials,
necessary for promoting preparedness. Deputy Administrator James J. Wadsworth had
tried to impress upon the president's aides the need for the chief executive's presence. A
show of support from Truman was essential to the display's success, Wadsworth insisted.
He continued, arguing, "As the Nation's top civilian, the country would expect him to
take a personal interest in this exhibit and its work on behalf of Civil Defense." '
""What you will see," HST; and Valley Forge Foundation, Alert America Convoys, 1.
'"Convoy Comes to Washington," 3, HST.
'James J. Wadsworth to David Stowe, memorandum, 22 December 1951, Official File document, Folder 6, Box 2, B File, Civil Defense, HST.
52
Other fectors besides President Truman's example brought visitors to the exhibit.
No doubt the free admission drew many individuals. A saturation campaign also ensured
that the people of the Washington, D.C. area would know of the event. The FCDA sent
out a thousand announcements over the radio. Twenty-five different stations broadcast
Alert America ads. Television programing also carried stories on the exhibit. Newspapers
devoted more than 11,000 lines to the event. On each day of the exhibit's stay in the
capitol, civil defense spokespersons advertised the event using the metropolitan area's air
raid warning system—it could send voice messages as well as siren blasts.
Advertisements for the exhibit appealed to each Americans' patriotism and to
their self-preservation instinct. Posters of Paul Revere went up a week before the displays
came to Washington. According to legend, the patriot's cries of "The British are
coming!" had attracted the attention of Americans during the Revolutionary War. In 1952
Paul Revere rode ahead of the Alert America exhibit and announced that the convoy was
coming to Washington, D.C. Where the hero of the American Revolution feiled to inspire
the people to attend, "the bomb" might succeed. In addition to the Paul Revere posters,
other placards went up. ^ Many of these boasted a drawing of a mushroom-shaped cloud
and the disturbing, yet hope-filled message, "SEE THE SHOW THAT MAY SAVE
YOUR LIFE!'"*
Edward H. Burdick, the man who designed the Alert America displays, also
deserved much of the credit for the exhibit's success. Burdick had worked with public
^ "Convoy Comes to Washington," 4, HST.
*Ibid.
53
displays before. He was responsible for the design of many of the displays at the 1939
New York World's Fair.^
Such experience was invaluable. For decades, countless thousands of Americans
had sought a few hours of escape from the back-breaking strain of agricultural labor and
from the long hours and mind-numbing routine of blue-collar jobs, by visiting fairs and
expositions. Americans attended fairs in large numbers even during the lean years of the
Great Depression. Burdick capitalized on this social trend. The informative, yet eye
catching displays found in the Alert America shows were reminiscent of exhibit halls found
in state and world feirs. They projected a feir-like atmosphere, and they drew large
crowds of visitors.*^
By the end of the year, hundreds of thousands had seen the Alert America
displays. The stay in Washington had been only the beginning of a long tour-of-duty for
the Alert America staff. On January 14, 1952, the exhibit left the capital. The fleet of
tractor-trailers which had transported the displays to Washington split into three, ten-tmck
convoys, each of which carried the gospel of civil defense to a different section of the
country. They worked their way across the United States, stopping in major cities and
^% alley Forge Foundation, Alert America Convoys, 1; and "Convoy Comes to Washington," 14, HST.
*^obert W. Rydell, World of Fairs: The Century of Progress Expositions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993)1-11, 24-26, 115-156; and Valley Forge Foundation, Alert America Convoys, 7.
54
county seats, opening to the public for a few days, and then moving on to the next city on
their route.*'
The Alert America tours were well-planned and well-executed. In its annual
report to Congress, the Federal Civil Defense Administration boasted of the exhibits'
success. But the hundreds of thousands of Americans that the exhibits educated, and the
tens of thousands that volunteered for "preparedness" training, represented only a fraction
of the total number of people that the FCDA hoped to inform and enlist. Agency
publications stated that the FCDA needed to recmit between 15 and 17.5 million people
and educate the entire population of the United States—some 150 million people—in order
to build an effective civil defense program. The Alert America convoys were just one
small part of a huge can^aign to draw the American public's attention to civil defense.*^
Millard Caldwell, the FCDA's first administrator, was the person ultimately
responsible for ensuring that the agency met its goals. When the Alert America exhibit
opened in Washington, D.C, Caldwell had been directing the FCDA for just over a year.
On December 1, 1950, the same day that President Truman had created a temporary
Federal Civil Defense Administration, he had selected Millard Caldwell to head the body.
Several factors made Caldwell an attractive candidate for the post. First, he was a former
*'"Convoy Comes to Washington," 19, HST; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, Annual Report for 1952, (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1953), 47-9.
* Federal Civil Defense Administration, Report for 1952, 1; Federal Civil Defense Administration, Annual Report for 1951 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1952), be, 6, 19, 21: and Advisory Bulletin 85, Advisory Bulletins Binder, OCDM Publications, 1950-60, Box 1, RG 396, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Md. [hereafter NARACP].
55
govemor. State officials had voiced some concem over the creation of a new civil defense
agency, because of the actions taken by the old Office of Civil Defense. Since the OCD
had been hurriedly created as the United States entered World War U, its leaders were
most concemed with the speed at which the program grew. In addition, Fiorello La
Guardia, the office's first director and mayor of New York City, favored municipal civil
defense organizations. In the name of expediency, but influenced by its director's bias, the
office often bypassed the logiced organization of the United States' federalized system.
The agency endorsed civil defense plans that the states submitted for approval, but it also
gave the nod to independent programs devised by municipal governments and those
offered by privately-organized civil defense associations. The result was a crazy patch
work quilt of authority in which state plans did not always agree with municipal programs,
and in which private organizations could sometimes flout the civilian preparedness
guidelines drawn-up by city governments. Hence, when Tnmian created the FCDA, state
officials demanded a system that reserved to the states the rights to guide, monitor, and
coordinate civil defense initiatives within their boundaries.*'
By naming Millard Caldwell director of the FCDA, President Truman allayed the
fears of many state officers. From 1945 to 1949 CaldweU had served as govemor of
Florida. Moreover, he was a recognized leader and spokesperson for the state
*'U.S. Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on Nomination of Millard Frank Caldwell, Jr. to be Federal Civil Defense Administrator, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951, 10; Nehemiah Jordan, U.S. Civil Defense Before 1950: The Roots of Public Law 920 (n.p.: Institute for Defense Analyses, Economic and Political Studies Division, 1966), 40-43; and War Department Civil Defense Board, A Study of Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1948), 9.
56
governments. While chief executive of Florida, he had chaired both the National
Govemor's Conference and presided over the deliberations of the Council of State
Governments.
Less a fector than the positions he held, but of some importance in his receiving
the FCDA post, was the state in which Caldwell govemed. While most states had
dismantled their civil defense programs once the OCD had shut down in 1945, Florida was
one of only four states whose civil defense policies remained intact and in effect after
World War II. Commentary—negative or positive—on Caldwell's handling of Florida's
civil defense program is lacking. Nonetheless, if critics challenged Truman's decision to
appoint him FCDA director, the president could argue that Caldwell was one of a mere
handful of individuals who possessed experience in administering a large-scale, postwar
civil defense program.*"
The last fector that weighed in Caldwell's fevor was his political affiliation. He,
like Truman, was a Democrat. Truman gave a fellow party-member the reins to the
FCDA. Members of the Republican Party evinced little concem when Caldwell accepted
control of the temporary FCDA. And they remained quiet in January 1951, when the Civil
Defense Act of 1950 perpetuated the FCDA, and President Truman promptly nominated
Caldwell for the office of agency administrator.*^
*"Dorothy C Tompkins, comp.. Civil Defense in the United States: A Bibliography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), 9.
* Senate Subcommittee, Hearing on Nomination of Caldwell.
57
Once confirmed by the Senate, Caldwell lost little time executing his
responsibilities. Citing the need for a strong, grass-roots base of support for civil defense,
he focused his energies and those of his agency on educating the American people and
attracting civilian volunteers. Defense planners had long argued that the ultimate
responsibility for civil defense devolved upon the individual. Caldwell agreed. He
believed that a tmly effective civil defense required the indoctrination of the entire
American populace. Each citizen needed to know the facts about the possibility of an
enemy attack, the effects of an atomic explosion, what precautions the government was
taking to ensure the survival of the country and its people, and what private citizens could
do to protect themselves and their property.*'
Caldwell also wanted a core of Americans to volunteer for further training in civil
defense. Just as an educated populace was imperative to ensure the success of the United
State's civil defense system, so too was a trained civilian auxiliary that could spring into
action once an emergency arose. Caldwell's FCDA sought recmits for eleven service
categories: police, fire, warden, communications, rescue, health, welfare, supply,
transportation, engineering, and headquarters staff When referring to the recruitment
program, Caldwell often claimed that the FCDA required 15 million volunteers. Breaking
down the need for so many recmits, Caldwell reported that for every 1,000 people in
*'Lyon G. Tyler, Jr., "Civil Defense: The Impact of the Planning Years, 1945-1950," (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1967), 33-37; NSRB, U.S. National Security Resources Board, United States Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1950), 3, 9-18, 20-24; "Proofs of 12 Articles, MiUard Caldwell," PubUc History Files, 1950-62, Box 14, RG 396,; "Govemor Caldwell-April 17, 1952, 'Society of Newspaper Editors Speech,'" Public History Files, 1950-62, Box 8, RG 396; and Federal Civil Defense Administration, Report for 1951, vii-bc, 19-21.
58
target areas-industrial centers, cities near military installations-nearly 150 trained civilian
defenders were required. Non-target, or support, areas had to produce only seventy-two
volunteers per 1,000 inhabitants. On other occasions. Administrator Caldwell argued that
even more Americans—17.5 million rather than 15 million-were needed. Since he tended
to submit the second, larger estimate when he was transmitting information to the
members of Congress, it is likely that he was exaggerating in an attempt to secure more
appropriations for his agency.*^
Through massive publicity cetmpsdgns, the federal agency intended to awaken
Americans to the need for participation in civil defense, but organizing an army of civilian
defenders required cooperation from all levels of government. Most individuals that
volunteered would not sign-on with the FCDA; rather, they would join local civil defense
organizations. These local bodies were subject to the authority of state directors, and the
state directors, or their appointed special liaisons, reported to the FCDA's Field
Administration Division.**
To ensure uniformity in the nation's federal, state, and local civil defense
programs, and thus avoid the confusion that had been a hallmark of the World War II
Office of Civil Defense, the FCDA inaugurated an advisory bulletin series on March 6,
1951. Issued to the state directors, who then disseminated the information to local
"preparedness" associations, the bulletins kept the United States' civil defense network
*'"Proofs of Articles, Caldwell," RG 396; and Federal Civil Defense Administration, Report for 1951, be, 19-21.
**Federal Civil Defense Administration, Civil Defense Training and Education (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951), 8-11, 14-15, 17, 19; and Idem, Report for 1951, 71-72.
59
apprised of revisions to national strategies and changes in the authority granted to the
FCDA and to its state and municipal partners. Having established a system for channeling
information to the lower governments, the Federal Civil Defense Administration and its
director tumed their attention to educating the public.*
An experienced public relations team assisted Caldwell in the coordination of the
agency's education and recmitment campaigns. John DeChant, FCDA Director of Public
Affairs, seemed tailor-made for his job. He was a skilled writer, the author of Devilbirds
and the coauthor of Flying Leathernecks. Before World War II he had worked as an
editor for newspapers, trade magazines, and The New World—a. Chicago-based Catholic
newsletter. During the war, he served with the Marines, working his way up to the
position of senior Marine public relations officer in the Pacific theater. While with the
Marines, he devoted special attention to the air war in the Pacific, making him a valuable
find for the FCDA. After World War II, DeChant managed a national public relations
campaign for the aircraft industry. °
At the Federal Civil Defense Administration headquarters in Washington, D.C,
DeChant was assisted by Harold Goodwin, Deputy Director of Public Affairs, and Donald
T. Sheehan, Program Consultant to the Public Affeirs Office. During WWII Goodwin had
worked with DeChant in the Marine Corps, and, like DeChant, one of his interests was
aviation. A more prolific writer than his boss, Goodwin had published twelve books and
* "Advisory Bulletin Series Includes All Prior Memos," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 1 (1951): 3; and Advisory BuUetin 23, Advisory Bulletin Binder, RG 396.
^"John DeChant, Director of Public Affairs," President's Secretary's Files document. Folder 11, Box 2, Civil Defense, B File, HST.
60
more than two hundred magazine articles by 1951. In addition to his contacts with the
producers of U.S. serials, Goodwin had ties to the radio industry. For five years he
worked the New England area, organizing a regional radio news service. Further
bolstering his resume and his potential value for the FCDA were Goodwin's stints as an
advertising agent and, after World War H, as a member of the U.S. Information Service.
While affiliated with the Information Service Goodwin headed a mass media program in
the Philippines. '
Donald Sheehan's record of pre-FCDA experiences was just as impressive as
either DeChant's or Goodwin's. A lieutenant colonel in the Air Force Reserve, Sheehan
had served as a public relations officer for the U.S. Air Force during World War II.
Without doubt his contact with that branch of the military made him attractive to the
FCDA, but of potentially greater value was his experience with religion and educational
programs. In the early 1940s Sheehan had served as the National Catholic Welfare
Conference's Bureau of Information director, and for a short time he ran the National
Conference of Christians and Jews office in Washington, D.C. Sheehan became involved
in educational concerns after the war when he accepted an assignment as a special
consultant for United States Commissioner of Education John W. Studebaker. A team of
able, veteran, public relations specialists, John DeChant, Harold Goodwin, and Donald
Sheehan were essential for the promotion of the FCDA's objectives. ^
'"Harold L. Goodwin, Deputy Director of Public Affairs," President's Secretary's Files document. Folder 11, Box 2, Civil Defense, B File, HST.
' "Donald T. Sheehan, Program Consuhant, Public Affairs Office," President's Secretary's Files document. Folder 11, Box 2, Civil Defense, B File, HST.
61
Under Caldwell's direction, the FCDA public affairs office saturated the
American public with the details of civil defense. During the three-month period, April-
June 1951, the agency scheduled the release of twenty-four different manuals. Other, new
publications were to follow later in the year. In addition, the office reprinted civil defense
booklets that the National Security Resources Board had commissioned, works such as
Survival Under Atomic Attack. By the end of 1951, the FCDA had distributed more than
55 million pamphlets to the public. '
In tone, the Caldwell-era publications were more dry, informative, and clinical
than those published later in the decade. FCDA appeals to Americans' patriotism and,
more often, their self-preservation instinct were not uncommon while he was in office, but
it was subsequent FCDA leadership which portrayed civil defense as a moral issue..
Caldwell was proud that his pamphlets simply stated "the facts." Among the points
presented were reminders that the United States and the Soviet Union were embroiled in a
Cold War which might tum "hot" at any moment. Further, the world had entered the
Atomic Age, and a war between the United States and its arch-rival could result in the use
of weapons of mass destmction against the American people. " Caldwell considered the
possibility of death a great motivational tool for the public. Later critics of CaldweU's
administration claimed that it employed "scare tactics" in order to promote civil defense.
Pamphlets such as This is Civil Defense decried the inadequacy of traditional military
'Advisory BuUetin 27, Advisory BuUetin Binder, RG 396.
"Federal CivU Defense Administration, This is Civil Defense (Washington, D.C 1951).
62
defenses, for example, anti-aircraft guns and American fighter planes, against a massed
raid by Soviet bombers. "Right now enemy planes can reach every city in the United
States."^^ "There is no way of preventing most enemy bombers from reaching their
targets."^ According to the FCDA, those targets were not simply the United States'
industrial centers, mUitary bases, and seats of government. They included the American
nuclear famUy-men, women and chUdren. To improve their odds of surviving an attack,
Americans needed to learn more about civU defense.
Many CaldweU-era pamphlets did appeal to Americans' self-preservation instinct,
but they did not portray civU defense as one hundred percent effective against an atomic
attack-it was not. The text of This is Civil Defense stated that readers who foUowed the
advice of the FCDA would improve their chances of survival, but it reminded them that
there were no guarantees even for the most dedicated civiUan defenders.' The FCDA
reissues of Survival Under Atomic Attack wamed, "Should you happen to be one of the
unlucky people right under the [atomic] bomb, there is practicaUy no hope of Uving
through it. In fact, anywhere within one-half mUe of the center of the explosion, your
chances of escaping are about 1 out of 10." * Such negative statements seem almost
calculated to discourage, rather than encourage, pubUc support for civU defense. But, to
^ Federal CivU Defense Administration, This is Civil Defense, 4
^Ibid., 5.
"'Ibid., 10.
*National Security Resources Board, Survival Under Atomic Attack (Washington. D.C: GPO, 1950), 4-5.
63
the CaldweU administration, educating Americans about many of the ugly aspects of
atomic warfere was an integral step in the creation of an effective civU defense program.
Asserting that a Soviet strike would target the national wiU as weU as people and fecUities,
CaldweU's FCDA argued that the American people must be prepared to face the horrifying
reaUties of nuclear warfere. If unprepared for the loss of Ufe and scenes of carnage that
an atomic bomb, or bombs, would produce, the civUian population of the United States
might panic, thus making it difficult—if not impossible—for the nation to recover and fight
back.^
Alhough combating panic was a pressing concem for civU defense planners, so
was the need to reduce the number of casualties that an attack would produce. Neither
civiUan recruits nor sizeable congressional appropriations would be forthcoming unless the
FCDA could present civU defense as a Ufe-saving strategy. Why volunteer to participate
in civU defense if it would do nothing to improve one's chances of survival? Why aUocate
monies for reinforced civU defense headquarters or shelters if they were useless against
atomic weapons?
FCDA officials recognized the interrelationship between civU defense's Ufe-
saving capabUities, recruitment and Congressional support. FCDA pubUcations and
federal CivU Defense Administration, This is Civil Defense, 7-10; MUlard CaldweU, "If Soviet A-Bombs Come," interview in U.S. News & World Report, 12 October 1951, 36-41; MUlard CaldweU, "Can Americans Take It," Civil Defense Alert 1, no. 8 (1952): 4; "Medical CivU Defense Conference," PubUc History FUes, 1950-62, Box 11, RG 396; "Proofs of (12) Articles," RG 396; and Guy Oakes, The Imaginary War-Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 8, 33-51.
64
spokespersons often boasted, "Casualties can be cut at least in half "'^ The statement
should have been quaUfied. The authors should have added that the higher survival rate
appUed only to those individuals more than one-half mUe away from ground zero. They
also should have told their audience that "cut at least in half' was a "guesstimate." Before
a meeting of medical professionals. Administrator CaldweU scaled down his assessment of
civU defense's Ufe-saving potential. He told Usteners that casualties could be reduced
"perhaps by fifty percent."' ' The members of Congress zeroed in on the confusion and
the inconsistencies in the statistics quoted by top officials. When considering budget
requests, the men and women on Capitol HiU expressed their reluctance to funnel large
sums of money into an agency that could not offer uniform data, backed by quantitative
studies, which proved its value.' ^
The FCDA was in fact attempting to gather information which would
substantiate the importance of the office's mission and its need for a larger budget. In
1951 the civU defense agency funded a number of research projects on shelter design and
the stockpUing of emergency materials, but its leaders refused to wait for the results before
initiating contact with the pubUc. Since civU defense was aimed at society, it was essential
for the FCDA to attract popular support, and quickly. The members of the national
'federal CivU Defense Administration, This is Civil Defense, 9; "Proofs of (12) Articles," RG 396; and "Govemor CaldweU-AprU 17, 1952, 'Society of Newspapers Editors Speech,'" PubUc History FUes, 1950-62, Box 8, RG 396, NABDCP.
'°'"Medical Conference," RG 396.
' Harry P. Yoshpe, Our Missing Shield: The US Civil Defense Program in Historical Perspective, Final Report for Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C, Contract no. DCPA 01-79-C-0294, April 1981.
65
legislature might be reluctant to aUocate resources to an agency that had yet to complete
basic research projects, but they would be equaUy hesitant to give money to a civU defense
office that lacked civUian support. On the other hand, if the FCDA could demonstrate that
it was backed by the people. Congress would be forced to give greater consideration to
the agency's financial requests.'^'
CaldweU and his staff took whatever actions they deemed necessary to win
popular approval. They told the people of the great Ufe-saving potential of civUian
preparedness. They fed crowds numbers and percentages that were based on speculation.
They informed the pubUc that without civU defense in general, and shelters in particular,
many would needlessly die in a war, victims of the blast and fire produced by atomic
detonations. Noticeably absent from most speeches was any discussion of the lingering
radiation hazards produced by atomic detonations. When spokespersons for civU defense
did address the subject, they told the people that there was Uttle to fear.
The Federal CivU Defense Administration was not the first government office to
announce that the long-term threat of radiation poisoning from atomic bursts was minimal.
The misinformation originated with those bodies responsible for the development of
atomic weapons and atomic power. It was in their best interest to defuse Americans'
concerns over radiatioiL Too much pubUc outcry could result in less appropriations,
increasing security costs, and perhaps the closing of research facUities. Persoimel from the
Manhattan Engineer District, the organization which had developed the atomic bomb,
were quick to deny atomic weapons' radioactive effects. In The Atomic Bombings of
' 'Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, 46-48.
66
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, on-site investigators from the district contended that
"mechanical injuries" from flying debris and crumbUng buUdings, and bums caused by the
atomic explosions' initial blast and "flash," were responsible for the large numbers of
casualties in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.'^
When the Atomic Energy Commission was created in 1946, its staff members
reinforced the claims made by the Manhattan Engineer District. The legislation which
created the AEC charged the agency with conflicting missions. It was to promote the
development of atomic power and devise weapons, but it was to make decisions on
radiation safety standards, as weU. Run by Cold War warriors, the AEC devoted most of
its attention to weapons development. Safety never constituted as high a priority as
staying ahead of the Russians in the arms race. The AEC closely guarded the United
States' atomic secrets, only aUowing fragments of information to make their way to the
pubUc or to other government agencies.' ^
In the late 1940s, the Atomic Energy Commission, the leading authority on
atomic matters, began to provide technical expertise to civU defense planners, but its
directors seem to have tmsted civUian defense workers Uttle more than the general pubUc.
In 1949 the AEC offered assistance to the National Security Resource Board's civU
defense planning committee. InitiaUy, the AEC produced a couple of short tracts on
'^U.S. Army, Manhattan Engineer District, The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (n.p.: Manhattan Engineer District, n.d.), 28-33.
'"^George T. Mazuzun and Samuel J. WaUcer, Controlling the Atom: The Beginnings of Nuclear Regulation, 1946-1962 (Berkeley: University of CaUfomia Press. 1985), 6, 37-38.
67
radiation hazards and medical treatment for victims. In 1950 it handed over a lengthy,
detaUed con^ndium of atomic "fects" entitled The Effects of Atomic Weapons. The
NSRB received an uncut, highly technical version of the work. The AEC and DOD issued
a shorter version to the pubUc.'^
The tone of both works was highly optimistic. Each time the authors addressed a
subject that might cause concem they inserted reassuring, positive statements. The
document noted that aU atomic weapons lifted and irradiated surfece debris, and those
radioactive particles could prove hazardous when they feU out of the bomb's cloud. The
experts comforted civU defense persoimel and the pubUc, however, by telling them that
most atomic weapons would explode high above the ground and therefore would generate
only smaU amounts of feUout.'^^ "It would probably rarely be enough to prevent passage
across an area, although it might necessitate suspension of operations for a few days
within the area [contaminated]," the authors contended.' * Ground-level bursts and
underwater detonations would generate more faUout, and it would be of a higher
radioactive intensity, but only those individuals "directly downwind from the explosion"
' ^Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Vol. 2, Atomic Shield, 1947/1952 (University Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1969), 487; and Paul Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 315-316.
' Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, The Effects of Atomic Weapons: Prepared for and in cooperation with the U.S. Dept. Of Defense and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (New York: McGraw-HUl Book Co., 1950), 271-74.
'°*Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Effects of Atomic Weapons, 274.
68
would be at great risk.'^ The writers of The Effects of Atomic Weapons stated also that
the natural decay of radioactive elements would render even the most heavUy
contaminated areas safe for "short time access" after two weeks, and decontamination
processes would soon render bomb sites habitable."° Lastly, even though the book's
authors considered the effects of radiation, they placed the greatest emphasis on the
dangers of blast and fire.
Using the information that the AEC had provided, the NSRB pubUshed a booklet
entitled Survival Under Atomic Attack. When the FCDA assumed responsibUity for the
country's civU defense, it adopted the pubUcation and distributed two milUon copies in
1951. The text of the Survival booklet asserted that the radiation produced by an atomic
bomb was a secondary concem.'" "High-level explosions definitely wUl not create 'areas
of doom' where no man dares enter and no plant can grow. In fact, they wiU leave very
Uttle radioactivity on the ground, even near the point of explosion.""^ The work then
stated that "not one" of the deaths in Hiroshima or Nagasaki had resulted from "Ungering
radioactivity [faUout]." Those that had died from exposure to radiation were victims of
"explosive radioactivity [flashbum victims]" produced by the bombs' detonations.'"
According to the booklet, even if, by some strange circumstance, large quantities of
' Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Effects of Atomic Weapons, 275.
"%id., 313-322.
'"National Security Resources Board, Survival, 6, 9-11, 15, 20-23.
" Ibid.,
"'Ibid., 22.
69
radioactive particles did faU on a person, it was possible to escape injury by quickly
shedding contaminated clothing and taking a bath or a shower.""
The booklet suggested, further, that any house would provide suitable shelter.
"Keep aU vsindows and doors closed for at least several hours after an atomic bombing.""^
And, "Should you get an official report that there is serious contamination in the vicinity,
better cover aU broken windows with blankets or cardboard," it warned."^ Tme, when
Survival was written, the world was stUl learning about the effects-especiaUy the long-
term effects—of exposure to radiation. Moreover, atomic bombs were less powerful and
did not produce as much Ungering radioactivity as the later hydrogen bombs, but the off
handed manner in which Survival addressed radiation dangers seems a calculated attempt
to make atomic bombs less threatening. The Atomic Energy Commission had suppUed
preparedness agencies with positive, "sanitized" reports that made civU defense more
manageable for the NSRB and the FCDA and more palatable for the pubUc. Residual, or
lingering, radiation was scary. It was invisible, tasteless, scentless, and sometimes
exceptionaUy difficult to remove. Blast and fire were more easUy defined and less difficult
to contend against. Reinforced shelters on the periphery of an explosion could withstand
blast waves. Civilians could leam to "fireproof their houses and fight the secondary fires
that a bomb would produce. They could leam first-aid techniques.
""National Security Resources Board, Survival, 25-26.
'"Ibid., 26.
"^bid.
70
In 1951, the FCDA eagerly embraced the "good news" that the AEC had
provided. During its first year of existence, the civU defense agency feUed to produce one
pamphlet that was devoted exclusively to the issue of atomic radiation, but it pubUshed
many that examined the hazards of ^e-Atomic Blast Creates FIRE, Firefightingfor
Householders, Fire Effects of Bombing Attacks. Throughout CaldweU's tenure as
administrator, the agency chumed out booklet after booklet that foUowed the AEC
formula; they portrayed atomic weapons Uke other, conventional, bombs-bigger, yes, but
stUl manageable and therefore less Ukely to produce panic or despair. There is Uttle
evidence that CaldweU ever questioned the vaUdity of the AEC information. It was to his
and the civU defense agency's advantage to accept the reports at face value. Nor is it
Ukely that he could have thwarted the AEC's misinformation campaign. Later, after the
hydrogen bomb was developed, civU defense leaders wanted to update their educational
campaigns, but the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense resisted
FCDA requests for the declassification of reports."'
The CaldweU Administration adopted a single, narrow, optimistic view of the
radiation hazards produced by atomic weapons, but it had to seU civU defense to a diverse
"'Federal CivU Defense Administration, Atomic Blast Creates FIRE (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951); Idem., Firefightingfor Householders (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951); Idem, Fire Effects of Bombing Attacks (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951); Idem., Report for 1951, 11, 46; Idem., This is Civil Defense; JoAnne Brown, '"A is for Atom, B is for Bomb:' CivU Defense in American PubUc Education, 1948-1963," Journal of American History 75, no. 1 (1988): 74, 84; Val Peterson to General Robert Cutler, 22 May 1953, Folder White House Correspondence, Box 2, Correspondence of Administrator Val Peterson, 1953-1957, RG 396; and Katherine Howard to CD. Jackson, 16 September 1953, Folder CivU Defense (1), Box 16, Subject Series, White House Central FUes (Condifential FUe) 1953-61, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, AbUene, Kansas.
71
populatioa Many of the booklets it pubUshed were written for a general adult readership.
Three of the pamphlets that feU into this category accounted for more than half of the 55
mUUon pubUcations produced by the FCDA in 1951. The agency printed over 29 mUUon
copies of Atomic Blast Creates FIRE, The Civil Defense Household First-Aid Kit, and
Emergency Action to Save Lives.^^^
The distribution numbers actuaUy are somewhat misleading, because the FCDA
permitted state and local civU defense authorities to reprint federal materials. In 1951
more copies of Survival Under Atomic Attack made it into press than any other federal
pubUcation. Most concemed with the blast, fire, and first-aid, the FCDA issued only two
miUion copies of the booklet, but the pubUc appears to have desired aU the detaUs about an
atomic assault—including the dangers of radiation. Survival Under Atomic Attack offered
more information—positive information—about radioactivity and radiation sickness than
did other FCDA pamphlets. In addition to the two miUion booklets distributed by the
federal government, the states and municipaUties reproduced and disseminated another
eighteen milUon copies of Survival to the people of the United States."^
WhUe many of the CaldweU-era pamphlets targeted the general adult population,
others were more specific. 1951 saw the pubUcation of handbooks for most of the
FCDA's eleven service categories. The booklets outUned volunteers' pre- and post-attack
responsibUities. The Warden's Handbook, for instance, instmcted recmits to keep
records on the residents and stmctural features of their neighborhood before an attack.
"*Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, 11.
"^bid., 10-11.
72
After an enemy strike, wardens were to report damage and casualties, direct people to
emergency centers and mobUize neighborhood groups to fight fires and administer first aid
to the wounded.' °
Other pan^hlets appealed to institutions whose aid could prove invaluable in
preparing for a fiiture war. The FCDA recognized that manufacturing centers would
constitute a prime target for enemy bombs because "[o]ur abUity to wage war rests largely
on our industrial plants and their skiUed workers."' ' For their own protection and to
insure that the country could retum fire and sustain a war effort, it was essential that blue-
coUar Americans be weU educated in civU defense techniques. Comprising some sixty
pages. Civil Defense in Industry and Institutions, was one of the FCDA's longest pubUc
booklets. It detaUed a step-by-step plan for organizing a plant's workers for "self-
protection." UntU the FCDA issued speciaUzed guides for hospitals and schools, those
faciUties were also to foUow the guideUnes set forth in the booklet.' ^
In August, the FCDA pubUshed its first handbook for the United States' school
systems. Interim Instructions for Schools and Colleges. The guide served the civU
defense administration in a number of ways. Because of their size, facUities, and pubUc
awareness of their location, schools are often employed as emergency centers during times
of natural disasters. It was only natural for the FCDA to suggest that they be used for
'^^ederal CivU Defense Administration, The Warden's Handbook (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951), 2; and Idem., Report for 1951, be, 45-46.
' 'Federal CivU Defense Administration, Civil Defense in Industry and Institutions (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951), 1.
' Ibid.
73
simUar purposes after an attack. In addition to the schools' post-attack value as shelters
for the homeless, during times of peace, for seven or eight hours a day, nine months each
year, they housed future generations of American citizens. Teachers were responsible for
equipping young Americans with the skUls that they needed to survive and succeed in the
world. In 1951 that responsibUity expanded. To the "three r's" of reading, writing, and
arithmetic, a fourth was added, "readiness." Survival now entaUed coping with the threat
of atomic weapons, and the FCDA expected the pubUc education system to "prepare," or
indoctrinate, the nation's chUdren.' '
Teaching the youngsters about civU defense would also help "get the word out"
to their parents. Teachers would driU into the chUdren what their famUies could do to
protect themselves—buUd home shelters, stockpUe canned goods and bottled water, leam
first-aid, drop to the ground if they happened to get caught outside during an atomic blast.
Then, when Mom or Dad—in the Fifties, usuaUy Mom-picked up the kids from school and
asked them about their day, the chUdren would bombard them with civU defense "facts."
With the enthusiasm of their age, chUdren would pressure their parents to join a growing
army of civiUan defenders who would tum their homes into American strongholds. That
was the way it was intended to work, at least. It is a strategy that the schools and
emergency services stiU employ today. Teachers discuss fire prevention and invite
firemen—who wUl hopefuUy bring with them a fire tmck—to the school to reinforce the
learning. They then send their students home to pressure parents into running fire drUls
'""Education Urged to Lead in CD," Civil Defense Alert 1. no. 5 (1951): 2; Brown, "A is for Atom," 70; Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, 96; and Idem, Interim Instructions for Schools and Colleges (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951).
74
and purchasing smoke alarms. In the 1950s, when one of the social "ideals" was the
emphasis on femUy, few people should have been surprised when the FCDA targeted
parents through their chUdren.' "
To help teachers generate student enthusiasm for civU defense, the FCDA
released a chUdren's pamphlet. Duck and Cover, late in 1951. It was this booklet—the
filmstrip came later—that first introduced American chUdren to the original cartoon
character and civU defense mascot, "Bert the Turtle." Bert showed young people how to
react when they heard an air raid siren or saw the flash of an atomic explosion. Upon
hearing the waU of an alarm or witnessing the glare of an atomic blast, Bert dropped to the
ground and puUed his head, legs and taU into his sheU for protection. Noting that people
do not have their own buUt-in shelter on their back, the booklet instmcted chUdren to
"duck" under a desk or crouch against a waU-utUize any sturdy stmcture that might
afford protection. Then, the chUdren were to "cover" their heads vsith schoolbooks, a
jacket, their arms. These simple strategies would, supposedly, help America's youth to
survive an atomic attack. Though the FCDA retired Duck and Cover-and Bert-after
1952, the booklet and the film-short left a definite imprint on the minds of many
Americans. Decades later, adult "baby-boomers" stUl quote the work's catch-phrase title
' "Federal CivU Defense Administration, Interim Instructions, and Idem C/v/7 Defense in Schools (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1952), 2-3; and Brown, "A is for Atom,' 70.
75
at the mention of civU defense, and Bert remains a weU-known "pop" icon of the Atomic
Age.'25
A number of youth organizations joined teachers and Bert the Turtle in the effort
to buUd enthusiasm for civU defense. Boasting the motto, "Be prepared," the Boy Scouts
of America could not escape the issue of civU defense and its caU for preparedness training
for aU Americans. The organization issued its own C/v/7 Defense Guide for troop leaders.
Boy Scouts administrators added something new to the usual regimen of camping
techniques and survival training that scouts leamed-the boys began to receive instmction
on survival during and after an atomic assault. Besides learning the basics of self-
protection, the Boy Scouts of America volunteered its charges for assistance in emergency
services before and after an attack. Scouts watched the skies for enemy planes. They
leamed how to treat bums. They readied their coraps to accommodate evacuees from
bomb-stmck areas. Perhaps most important for the FCDA, however, boy scouts helped
disseminate civU defense information in the form of pamphlets, advisory buUetins, and air
raid warning cards. One of the Ulustrations in the C/v/7 Defense Guide showed a young
boy pulling a wagon fiUed with civU defense Uterature, intent on doing his good deed for
the day. The Federal CivU Defense Administration gained many tens of thousands of such
patriotic devotees, and an invaluable advertising tool, when it acquired the Boy Scouts of
' Federal CivU Defense Administration, Duck and Cover (Washington, D.C. GPO, 1951).
76
America's support. The Scouts' sister organization. Girl Scouts of America, and
Can^fire Girls volunteered their aid as weU.' ^
CaldweU and the FCDA attempted to enUst the assistance of as many associations
as possible, regardless of the age or professional background of their members. The
Fifties was a decade during which record numbers of Americans joined social and
professional organizations. Americans were trying to "fit in." It was not a safe time to be
different, to "stick out." At a meeting of a RepubUcan women's club, less than a year
before the creation of the FCDA, Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin had announced
that he possessed a list of 205 Communist Party members who worked in the U.S.
Department of State. Federal government-sponsored witch-hunts foUowed. Anti-
communist hysteria rose, as did the fear of being accused. Many people sought to "prove"
that they were no different from the next person, that they were 100% American. By
joining a club, they accomplished the first goal. If it was a civics-minded organization, they
also accomplished the second. With a total membership of 100 miUion people in 1951,
clubs and associations could help indoctrinate nearly two-thirds of the coimtry's
population and could assist in recmiting civU defense volunteers. By December 31, 1951,
more than 200 organizations had offered their support, including such diverse groups as
' Boy Scouts of America, C/v/7 Defense Guide for Council and District Planning (New York: Boy Scouts of America, 1951), 6, 9-18; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, 84-85.
77
the Association of Junior Leagues of America, the American Chemical Society, and the
Loyal Order of the Moose.' ^
CaldweU's staff recognized that reUgious institutions also provided an ideal
mechanism for disseminating information. During the Fifties the United States
experienced a reUgious revival. By the end of the decade, church memberships had grown
by nearly thirty percent, from 86 mUUon people to more than 110 mUUon. Ninety-sbc
percent of the population identified itself as Protestant, CathoUc, or Jew. Bible sales
skyrocketed. The Revised Standard Version was the best-seUing book of 1952. Ben Hur
and The Ten Commandments were two of the most popular movies of the decade.
Congress responded to the growing reUgiosity by adding "In God We Trust" to U.S.
monies and "under God" to the pledge. The Federal CivU Defense Administration
responded by incorporating reUgious institutions into its education and recmiting
campaigns.
Some critics of the decade's heightened reUgiosity argued that, like other
organizations, churches were profiting from the same pressure-prompted "joining mania"
that had benefitted secular organizations. Others contended that the sudden popularity of
' For a more complete treatment of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, see David M. Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy (New York: Free Press, 1983) and Edwin R. BaUey, Joe McCarthy and the Press (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982); Paul A. Carter, Another Part of the Fifties (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 93-94; J. Ronald Oakley, God's Country: America in the Fifties (New York: Dembner Books, 1986), 45; Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, 16-17, 83-88; Advisory BuUetin 105, Advisory BuUetins Binder, OCDM PubUcations, 1950-60, Box 1, RG 396; "Leaders Plan Campaign Against PubUc Apathy," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 2 (1951): 1,4; and "Conference CaUs CD Vital to Preparedness," Civil Defense Alert 1, no. 3 (1951): 1, 3.
78
reUgion was a natural response to the anxiety produced by the threat of an atomic war.
No doubt both suggestions pleased FCDA educators. If church congregations were
comprised of "joining" Americans seeking to dispel their atomic fears, they were a
potentiaUy invaluable target audience. Ministering on a regular basis to the people who
con^rised that group, the clergy—trusted members of every American community—could
serve as most effective aUies to the civU defense authorities. Hence, the FCDA actively
sought the cooperation of church leaders.' *
As one of his first acts. Administrator CaldweU contacted representatives of
large reUgious groups in the United States and asked that they form a committee to assist
in the civU defense effort. In February 1951, delegates from the Churches of Christ, the
CathoUc Welfare Conference, the Synagogue CouncU of America, the Southem Baptist
Convention and the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod responded favorably to CaldweU's
appeal and formed the ReUgious Advisory Committee to the FCDA. It was a conservative
bastion. Noticeably absent from the advisory body were representatives of the more
progressive Christian denominations—such as the Methodists—or of reUgious groups that
opposed war—the Quakers, the Meimonites.' ^
' *Douglas T. MUler and Marion Nowak, The Fifties: The Way We Really Were (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975), 84-92; Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 82-91; Oakley, God's Country, 319-24; and George M. Marsden, Religion and American Culture (New York: Harcourt Brace CoUege PubUshers, 1990), 207-15.
'^^ederal CivU Defense Administration, The Clergy in Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951),m-iv.
79
Besides contending that an effective civU defense program would save Uves
during an attack, FCDA leaders had stated that it would serve as a deterrent to war. Not
everyone beUeved them. A number of individuals and groups contended that civU defense
could produce the opposite result. Spokespersons for some of the denominations not
represented on the ReUgious Advisory Board argued that a nation which could withstand a
nuclear assault might be less incUned to compromise or seek an alternative to war. The
security offered by a sound civU defense program could encourage U.S. diplomats to
assume a more aggressive and mUitant stance when negotiating disputes. It might also add
momentum to the arms race. If the United States or another country developed and
implemented civU defense initiatives that completely negated the threat of the atomic
bomb, it would almost certainly prompt foreign rivals to develop new weapons of even
greater destmctive power."°
Though they provided thought-provoking arguments, civU defense's reUgious
critics were a minority in the early 1950s. Ignoring them, the FCDA Training and
Education Division and the ReUgious Advisory Committee worked together to create an
information pamphlet for ministers. They finished the first draft of the booklet in late
spring. CaldweU then invited dozens of reUgious leaders to the capitol for a June 1951
"^General Conference, Mennonite Church, Minutes, Reports and Findings of the Church and Society Conference (Newton, Kansas: General Conference Mennonite Church, 1961); and Herman WUl, Jr. to Sidney R. Yates, 25 April 1962, "CivU Defense" Folder, Box 75, Papers of Sidney R. Yates, HST.
80
conference on reUgion and civU defense. At the meeting, FCDA employees distributed
copies of the civU defense booklet and invited comments and suggestions for revisions."'
The final version of the pan^hlet. The Clergy in Civil Defense, went into
pubUcation in October 1951. Much of the work focused on the post-attack role of the
clergy. The text stated that by continuing normal reUgious practices, such as holding
worship services, performing reUgious rites, and offering comfort to congregants,
ministers would provide "security and spiritual composure" and therefore would help to
prevent panic and despair. FCDA Training and Education Division personnel did not
question the potential value of the clergy in restoring order after an atomic assault, but, for
them, the more immediate concem was disseminating information and attracting
volunteers. On page three of The Clergy in Civil Defense, the ReUgious Advisory
Committee recommended "that churches and synagogues be encouraged to cooperate in
the pubUc education, recmitment, and training plans of the local civU defense programs."
Clearly, the FCDA's attention to social and professional organizations, and to reUgious
institutions, was an attempt to tum the social trends of the Fifties to its advantage.
Another "institution," or characteristic feature, of the decade that the agency sought to
exploit was the suburban housewife."^
During World War II and the postwar years, the retum of economic prosperity to
the United States had brought with it a longing for the mythical "Good Old Days" of
'"Federal CivU Defense Administration, Clergy in Civil Defense, ui-iv, 1; and Idem, Conference of Religious Leaders in Civil Defense: Report of Meeting on June 13, 1951 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951), 40-43.
"^Federal CivU Defense Administration, Clergy in Civil Defense, m, 3.
81
strong, "traditional" femUies. World War H had boosted the economy and had puUed the
country out of the Great DepressioiL During the war, the armed services drafted miUions
of men for the war, but the federal government stiU looked to its factories to run at fliU
productioiL The reduced size of the nation's available labor supply, manufecturing plants
producing more war goods and less consumer goods, and rationing drove prices and
wages higher. In the postwar years of the late Forties and early Fifties, increased federal
spending, exports to the war-ravaged countries of Westem Europe, and the mass
production of the television and other consumer goods, combined with a domestic
population that wanted to spend its wartime savings, sustained the economic boom-
Financial security also brought on a "Baby Boom." By the early Fifties, a growing number
of couples were marrying young, buying homes and cars, and raising large famiUes.
People could again achieve these American dreams, and often on a single income."'
Gone, but not forgotten, were the Depression years and the perceived tragedies
of nontraditional, matriarchal famUies. Suicide and desertion rates were high during the
Thirties. BeUeving that their presence was just one more burden, unemployed husbands
and fathers often left their famUies for another place in this world, or, sometimes, the next.
Other unemployed men remained at home, but often they were broken, dispirited-mere
phantoms. The end result was the same. Many women assumed the "traditional
responsibUities" of their male counterparts in an effort to ensure the survival of their
'"Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, Inc., PubUshers, 1988), 9, 11, 20; and John Patrick Diggins, The Proud Decades: America in War and Peace, 1941-1960 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988), 177-88, 212.
82
chUdren, their femiUes. Women remained in their expanded dual roles of mothers and
fethers, homemakers and breadwinners when World War II caUed American men away.""
In the Fifties, years removed from the war's end, with mUUons of discharged
servicemen back home, and the economy thriving, the popular press tried to "tum back the
clock" to an earUer, more "normal" era. Magazines, movies and television shows
portrayed the ideal femUy as one in which the woman was a doting wife and homemaker
and the man was an independent, but supportive, husband and father. Each weekday
morning he kissed his wife, scruflfed his chUd's hair, and went to the office to eam the
famUy's income. She worked in the modest suburban home, did the shopping, was active
in civic-minded organizations, and raised the chUdren to be model citizens. Many
Americans bought into the idea; the Federal CivU Defense Administration did also."^
The recruitment of middle-class, suburban housewives held a special appeal for
the FCDA. The agency needed patriotic wardens that not only knew their neighborhoods
weU, but were also home much of the day. If warden responsibUities were reserved for
males, and a bomb stmck between the hours of 8 a.m. and 5 p.m, many neighborhoods
would be without leadership. A large number of wardens would be working at their
""Robert S. McElvaine, The Great Depression: America, 1929-1941 (New YorK: Times Books, 1984), 174-75, 180-84, 339-40; John A. Garraty, The Great Depression: An Inquiry into the causes, course, and consequences of the Worldwide Depression of the Nineteen-Thirties, as seen by contemporaries and in the Light of History (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, PubUshers, 1986), 108-116; MUler and Nowak, 149; and Michael E. Parrish, Anxious Decades: America in Prosperity and Depression, 1920-1941 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1992), 414-15.
"^May, Homeward Bound, 11-23, 136-42; RosaUnd Rosenberg, Divided Lives: American Women in the Twentieth Century (New York: HUl and Wang, 1992), 138-57; and Diggins, Proud Decades, 212.
83
regular jobs in the city, adhering to the role that society had assigned them Even if they
survived the attack, they probably would find themselves stranded, unable to retum home.
On a more macabre note, many areas might be permanently deprived of their wardens if
the enemy scored a direct hit on the city and successfiiUy destroyed its industrial and
financial centers—and the male wardens working there. By recmiting suburban
homemakers the FCDA could buUd a network of "prepared" citizens that was in place
almost 24 hours a day, not one that would function oiUy if an atomic assault occurred after
J p.m.
The agency also appears to have assumed that women would be weU-acquainted
with the outlay and the residents of their neighborhood. The model women, the "June
Cleavers" of the United States, would be perfect hostesses and helpful neighbors. They
would know everything about the other people and houses on their blocks, because they
took cakes to newly-settled neighbors and introduced themselves, and they regularly
visited with the women of the other, estabUshed famiUes. WhUe the FCDA could make
good use of the Mrs. Cleavers, it could also profit from enlisting the aid of another female
stereotype, "Bewitched's" Gladys Cravitts- the binocular-wielding, professional "busy
body" who knew everything that occurred in her neighborhood. FCDA Administrator
"^Federal CivU Defense Administration, C/v/7 Defense in Outline: A Study Guide for the National Civil Defense Program (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951), 13; and Idem, Warden's Handbook, 3.
84
CaldweU reported that, of the 17 mUUon volunteers required for effective, national civUian
defense, a majority, some 9 mUUon, should be female."^
That women would volunteer for service, the FCDA did not seem to doubt.
Suburban housewives were supposed to be patriotic, responsible citizens and caring
mothers. For centuries, in the United States and in Europe, women had been revered as
the nurturers, the keepers and teachers of spiritual, moral, and national values. The
tradition was perpetuated in the civic and chUd-rearing responsibUities expected of post-
World War II American homemakers. It is apparent that FCDA leaders beUeved that the
protective, mothering instinct then attributed to aU women would push them to leam
about civU defense and join local preparedness agencies. By volunteering for civU defense
training, women could leam how to equip their husbands and chUdren to Uve in the
Atomic Age. They could better ensure their femUy's survival in case of attack. Moreover,
the American system had "worked" for middle-class suburbanites. The FCDA counted on
them to defend not only their famiUes, but the system that had brought them success"*
'"Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, 19-20; and CaldweU, "If A-Bombs Come," 40.
"*May, Homeward Bound, 13-23, 137-149; and "Proofs of [12] Articles," RG 396; for additional sources on the social constraints placed on men and women in the postwar era, consult Benita Eisler, Private Lives: Men and Women of the Fifties (New York: Franklin Watts, 1986); Carol A. B. Warren, Madwives: Schizophrenic Women in the 1950s (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1987); Mary Dinnerstein, Women Between Two Worlds: Midlife Reflections on Work and the Family (PhUadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992); Brett Harvey, The Fifties: A Women's Oral History (New York: Harper CoUins, 1993). For a Ust of sources and authors who dispute the victimization model of the Fifties, consult June Meyerowitz, ed.. Not June Cleaver-Women and Gender in Postwar America, 1945-1960 (PhUadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994).
85
In recognition of women's importance to civU defense, MUlard CaldweU
increased the number and visibUity of females in administrative posts. In early 1951 he
appointed Mrs. John L. Whitehurst to head a women's activities office within the FCDA.
Whitehurst already possessed years of experience as a civilian defender. A resident of
Baltimore, she organized Maryland's female volunteers into a civiUan auxiUary during
World War II. In 1942, the British government issued her a special invitation to visit the
United Kingdom and observe the activities of female civU defense personnel in England.
She accepted, studied the U.K.'s civU defense system, and then retumed to her duties in
Maryland's preparedness organization. Whitehurst was dedicated to preparedness and
increasing pubUc involvement in civU defense. Toward the end of 1951, when CaldweU
decided to create an Office of Volunteer Manpower to handle recmiting efforts, he
appointed Whitehurst head of the new intra-agency office and made her an assistant
administrator within the FCDA."^
A few months prior to Whitehurst's appointment, the administration selected
women as assistant directors for each of nine new regional offices. The FCDA created the
regional centers in October 1950 in an attempt to coordinate better federal and state
activities. Located in Boston, Richmond, Atlanta, Cleveland, Chicago, DaUas (later
moved to Denton), Denver, San Francisco, and Atlanta, the regional offices served as
clearing houses, gathering and channeUng information to and from the state directors and
FCDA headquarters in Washington, D.C. WhUe the women appointed to the assistant
" "FCDA EstabUshes Manpower Office to Spur Recmiting," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 8(1952): 1,3.
86
directorates included a DaUas attomey, Mrs. Margaret Brand Smith, and a former member
of the U.S. House of Representatives, Miss Catherine EUzabeth Falvey, of Boston, most
came from more traditional "female" professions-they were homemakers, teachers,
columnists. AU boasted distinguished records of service to women's organizations.'"°
Thirty-five more women received appointments to a new FCDA Advisory
CouncU for Women's Participation. Just as the agency had created a ReUgious Advisory
Board in order to capitaUze on the growing reUgiosity of the American people, it seems to
have created the women's advisory board in an attempt to refine its targeting of the
coimtry's female population. LUce the women appointed assistant regional directors, the
members of the advisory councU had been active in women's organizations. Many
formerly or concurrently held offices in professional, civic, and/or social associations for
women.'"'
The FCDA tried to tum social trends to its advantage, but the administration's
grand stratagem for persuading the American people to leam about and become involved
in civU defense was much more simple. Figuratively and, on occasion, UteraUy, the FCDA
simply bombarded Americans with the detaUs of civU defense. There was no escape.
Americans heard about civU defense at work, at church, at school, at their club meetings,
and at home. The information found in official pamphlets made its way into the
'" "Nine Women Named to Regional Offices," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 8 (1952): 3; and "Regional Offices Now in Operation for CivU Defense," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 6(1951): 1,5.
'"'"Nine Women Named," 3; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, 83.
87
newspapers and into magazines v^th a wide and varied readership. Time, Life, Look, U.S.
News and World Report, People Today, Cosmopolitan, McCall 's Magazine, Redbook,
Farm Journal aU ran articles on civU defense. In Washington, D.C, even those Americans
that refiised to pick up a magazine or a newspaper could not avoid civU defense Uterature.
Planes from the U.S. Air Force flew over the city and "bombed" the people below with
civU defense leaflets.'"^
To reach those individuals who either could not or simply would not read, the
FCDA tumed many of its pamphlets into movies, television shows, and radio transcripts.
This is Civil Defense, Emergency Action to Save Lives, and a seven-part Survival series
appeared on the major television networks. Survival Under Atomic Attack, narrated by
Edward R. Murrow made it onto "the big screen." Bert the Turtle made radio
appearances across the country whUe the FCDA readied the movie version of Duck and
Cover.''^
The mass media undertaking was staggering in scale, but it cost the FCDA Uttle.
First of all, the Federal Communications Commission required television and radio stations
to run pubUc service announcements. Second, Millard CaldweU and John DeChant
convinced the film industry to produce short civU defense films free of charge. The FCDA
'"^"Convoy Comes to Washington," 17, HST; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, 12.
'"'"Atomic Survival Film Released This Month First of Series," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 1 (1951): 7; "The Federal CivU Defense Audio Visual Program," B FUe, CivU Defense, Box 2, Folder 16, HST; "CivU Defense Offers 'Survival,'" Folder "CivU Defense Campaign-General," Box 5, FUes of Spencer R. Quick, 1952-53, HST; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, 13-15.
88
assured the movie makers that demand from the pubUc and from local governments would
enable them to recover the costs of production. Lastly, the FCDA's pubUc relations team
secured free space for newspaper and magazine articles. In an interview given to U.S.
News and World Report, CaldweU claimed that the administration had saved weU over
twenty miUion doUars.'"" Deputy Administrator James J. Wadsworth praised the film,
newspaper and magazine industries, calling their contributions "the most heartening thing"
in the FCDA's pubUc awareness campgiigns.'"^
In addition to the articles and films, a misceUany of events carried the gospel of
civU defense to the people. A prime target for an enemy strike, the state of New York
appears to have posted the greatest number of civU defense-related activities, but simUar
exercises occurred throughout the country. Months before the people of Washington,
D.C held a parade to welcome the Alert America convoys, some five thousand residents
in Rochester, New York, marched to show their support for civU defense. To the
northwest, in the Niagara FaUs area, nine thousand volunteers from seven counties staged
fire-fighting and rescue missions after a mock attack. And the usuaUy crowded streets of
New York City were deserted and quiet when officials conducted a test exercise on the
morning of November 28. Residents and commuters began to disappear into the city's
'"""Wadsworth Praises Cooperation of FUm Industry," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 2 (1951): 5; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, 15.
'"'CaldweU, "If A-bombs Come," 41.
89
designated shelter areas when they heard the 10:33 a.m alert; they remained there untU
the "aU-clear" sounded ten minutes later.'"^
The driUs, parades, and leaflet bombing of civiUans had as their goal not only an
increased pubUc awareness, but greater pubUc participation in civU defense. E.G. Gerbic,
Director of Merchandising and Advertising for Johnson & Johnson, and CiviUan Defense
Coordinator for the Advertising CouncU, Inc., designed a recmiting kit for the Federal
CivU Defense Administration. The kit included radio and television transcripts, newspaper
and magazine ads, registration forms, and ready-made speeches. This is Civil Defense, the
speaker's kit, came with presentations for a variety of audiences—city, smaU town, even
rural community. The speeches for urban residents pointed out that city-dweUers would
be prime targets in the next war. For the less-threatened Americans Uving in rural areas,
the kit appealed to the farmer's sense of tradition and patriotism'"^ "On these shores,
farm famiUes have been practicing the basic principle of civU defense since long before
there was a United States. Soon after the landing of PUgrims at Massachusetts, pioneer
farmers were practicing mutual aid."'"* "Farm famUies worked together; they planned
'" "Five Thousand Parade," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 5 (1951): 3; "Niagara FaUs Conducts Big CivU Defense Test," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 5 (1951), 5; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, 69.
'"'Theodore S. ReppUer to Charles W. Jackson, 9 April 1951, Folder "CivU Defense Program," Box 1, FUes of Spencer Quick, 1952-53, HST; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, Speakers Kit: This is Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951).
'"*"Suggested Speech on Rural Communities and CivU Defense," 1, in Federal CivU Defense Administration, Speakers Kit: This is Civil Defense.
90
together. Their only safety lay in joint effort for the common defense."'"^ "Perhaps you
have never thought of civU defense in these terms, but, my fiiends, the good neighbor
poUcy and spirit is an important part of it.""° Recruiters were ever-present fixtures at civU
defense speeches and exercises across the country.
Despite aU the presentations, drUls, movies, articles and pamphlets, 1951 did not
yield the results that CaldweU had hoped for and anticipated. In his first annual report to
the members of Congress, CaldweU boasted that eighty-seven percent of the people Uving
in the United States' major industrial centers had leamed the basics of self-protection. His
statement was not factual—he based his estimate on a survey of only eleven cities—yet it
suggested that the FCDA had nearly achieved its goal of educating aU Americans as to the
importance of civU defense. The agency could make no simUar claim with regard to its
recmiting program. WhUe many Americans might have known something about civU
defense, widespread enthusiasm for the project seems to have been lacking. The recmiting
drives netted only 1,870,199 volunteers, or just over 1/10th the number that CaldweU had
told Congress were necessary for a sound, national civU defense program.'''
'"'"Suggested Speech on CivU Defense," 2.
"°Ibid., 4.
1S1( 'Survey Research Center, A Preliminary Report on Public Attitudes Toward Civil Defense...Based on Personal Interviews by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, President's Secretary's FUes Document in Folder 11, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST; Survey Research Center, Defense of Our Cities: A Study of Public Attitudes on Civil Defense (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Survey Research Center, 1951), 1-3; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, xi, 9.
91
In 1952, the FCDA and its sister organizations at the state and municipal levels
expanded their education and recruiting campaigns, and waited for civU defense to "take
root" in the United States. From Wyoming to Texas to Massachusetts, state and local
civU defense bodies held some two thousand operational exercises, conq)lete with
simulated explosions, mass evacuations, and rescues. In April, five milUon New Jersey
residents participated in the nation's first state-wide alert driU. Connecticut and
Pennsylvania conducted state-wide exercises later in the year.'"
CivU defense films, TV spots, and radio announcements multipUed. NBC, CBS,
and ABC frequently showed "Take Cover" and other 1-4 minute television shorts
produced by the FCDA. Twenty-nine hundred radio stations broadcast pubUc
information announcements from FCDA radio kits-the radio spot, "Bert the Turtle," won
an Ohio State University award for "best educational show" for chUdren. Also in 1952,
Bert made his sUver-screen debut. Duck and Cover was just one of four 10-minute films
that the agency released that year. Paramount Pictures produced its own civU defense
newsreel and sent copies to five thousand theatres.'''
The Federal CivU Defense Administration stepped up its assault on the reading
populace, as weU. Newspaper articles on civU defense appeared with more regularity than
in 1951, and the number of magazine articles that covered the topic increased by more
'"Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1952, 5.
'"Federal CivU Defense Administration, "Bert the Turtle Script for Radio Transcription, ChUdren's Program" (Washington, D.C: Federal CivU Defense Administration, n.d.); and Idem, Report for 1952, 45.
92
than sbcty-five percent. In addition, the FCDA released dozens of new technical guides
and pubUc information handbooks.''"
Four of the works addressed a subject that, to many people, was and stUl is
synonymous with civU defense-bomb shelters. Shelter from Atomic Attack in Existing
Buildings, parts I and II, explained how to identify suitable shelter areas in stmctures
raised before 1952 and how to reinforce portions of those buUdings. Interim Guide for
the Design of Buildings Exposed to Atomic Attack proposed "bomb-proof designs for
architects to employ when drawing plans for a new stmcture. Besides writing that the
buUdings should contain a shelter area, at least eighty percent of which was below ground
level, the booklet's authors argued that new industrial faciUties and government buUdings
should be "earthquake-proofed" with concrete and steel reinforcing. The authors reported
that the stmctures in Hiroshima and Nagasaki designed to withstand the effects of an
earthquake had survived the force produced by atomic blasts.' ^
The Federal CivU Defense Administration attracted more than two miUion
recruits in 1952. Many registered during a nation-wide, November recmiting drive. On
November 11, Armistice Day, the Federal CivU Defense Administration kicked off the
"Pledge for Home Defense." From the 11th to the 27th of November, Thanksgiving Day,
' "Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1952, 42.
'"Federal CivU Defense Administration, Shelter from Atomic Attack in Existing Buildings, Part I-Methodfor Determining Shelter Needs and Shelter Areas (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951); Idem, Shelter from Atomic Attack in Existing Buildings, Part II-Improvement of Shelter Areas (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1952); Idem, Interim Guide for the Design of Buildings Exposed to Atomic Blast (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1952); and Idem, Report for 1952, 77.
93
preparedness agencies attenq)ted to convince Americans to volunteer for service. The
FCDA and its state and municipal partners employed aU the weapons avaUable to them-
handbooks, posters, radio and television ads, movies, speeches, raUies.' * Once again, the
Air Force bombed civUians with leaflets. Those people who picked up and examined the
papers that rained down on them read, "This could have been a bomb-Pledge for Home
Defense—Register Today."'"
The massive recruiting canq)aign contributed to the agency's success, but the
refining of another strategy seems, in part, responsible for increased pubUc support. The
FCDA began to place greater emphasis on the value of civU defense auxiUaries in coping
with peacetime disasters—especiaUy natural disasters such as floods, tornadoes, and
hurricanes. Educating Americans in self-protection and first-aid was practical; it could
save Uves even if World War IH never occurred.''*
Today, although the Cold War is over, students in many parts of the United
States continue to participate in civU defense drills. An alarm beU sounds. Teachers
march their charges into the halls, teU them to kneel against a waU and cover their heads
with their hands. The teachers and students perform a "tornado drill," not a bomb driU,
but it is a legacy of the civU defense "duck and cover" years of the 1950s. There were
'' "Kit, Pledge for Home Defense," PubUc History FUes, 1950-62, Folder 3, Box 29, RG 396, NABDCP; and "The Federal CivU Defense Administration presents Signs of Our Time," Folder "CD Campaign-general," Box 5, FUes of Spencer R. Quick, 1952-53, HST.
'"Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1952, 54.
•'*Ibid., 19-22.
94
other practical uses for civU defense. Wardens could assist in the evacuation of flood or
hurricane-threatened areas. PoUce and fire auxUiaries could help restore order after a
natural disaster hit a community. The Federal Emergency Management Administration,
the successor of the civU defense agencies of the Fifties and Sbcties, today concerns itself
almost exclusively with natural disasters.
As early as 1951, the Bureau of the Budget had argued that the FCDA should be
responsible for coordinating the federal response to natural disasters. The FCDA refused,
however, because it was a new agency, and its leaders did not want the added duties. The
Housing and Home Finance Agency accepted the job.'''
Later, CaldweU seems to have realized that he could increase pubUc support for
"readiness" if he demonstrated the practical uses of civU defense during peacetime
emergencies. In the FCDA's first annual report to Congress, he noted that auxiUary
poUcemen assisted in traffic direction and crowd control when a large fire broke out in
Bath, New York. Floods in Missouri and Kansas "furnished hundreds of opportunities for
using civU defense."'^ But CaldweU submitted only a few examples of civU defense in
action. In 1951 there was no measurable response to his weak claim that civU defense was
of much benefit during times of peace as weU as war.
It took the great midwestem floods of 1952 to awaken Americans to the
practical, peacetime value of civiUan defense. For more than a week during mid-April,
' 'James J. Wadsworth to Harry S Truman, 9 January 1953, President's Secretary FUes document in Folder 11, Box 1, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST.
'federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, 70.
95
flood reports occupied the front page of the New York Times. More than one hundred
thousand people in nine states-Montana, North and South Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin,
Kansas, Missouri, Iowa, and Nebraska fled their homes as the Mississippi and Missouri
rivers broke out of their channels and rushed over surrounding flood plains. Fed by the
spring thaw of extremely heavy snow accumulations in the Dakotas and Montana, the
Missouri River posed the biggest threat to midwestem communities. For a thousand mUes
"Muddy Mo" overran its banks. In some areas, the great river sweUed to a width often
mUes, and Army engineers calculated that it blanketed 1.25 miUion acres of fermland."*'
For days, national attention focused on the battle that raged between the
Missouri and flood-fighters at CouncU Bluffs, Iowa, and across the river at Omaha,
Nebraska. Fearing that the river would rise above levees and flood walls, 35,000 of
CouncU Bluffs' 45,000 residents abandoned the city. Another 5,000 people evacuated
Omaha. A force of some 24,000 men—Army engineers, regular Army troops, national
guardsmen, and 9000 civilian volunteers-remained behind to fight the river. They worked
franticaUy along a twenty-three mUe front, pUing sandbags on top of levees which were
five feet short of the anticipated 31.5 foot river crest. The greatest danger to the two
'^'"74,000 Homeless as Floods Expand 'Ghost Town' List," New York Times, 14 April 1952, sec. 1, p. 1, col. 3; "Flood Crest Hits Sioux City Hard, Moves on Omaha," New York Times, 15 April 1952, sec. 1, p. 1, col. 8; "Floods Sweep On: President to Fly to 7-State Parley,: New York Times, 16 April 1952, sec. 1, p. 1, col. 1; "Truman Demands Flood Action Now After Aerial Tour," New York Times, 17 April 1952, sec. 1, p. 1, col. 1; "Rain Turns Levees to Mud as Omaha Awaits Flood Peak," New York Times, 18 AprU 1952, sec. 1, p. 1, col. 1; "Omaha DUces Hold but Sewer Break Poses new Danger," New York Times, 19 AprU 1952, sec. 1, p. 1, col. 3; "Floods Spread Out on Rich Farmland: Crest Past Omaha," New York Times, 20 AprU 1952, sec. 1, p. 1, col. 4; "Floods Rush down on St. Joseph, Mo., and Huge Air Base," New York Times, 21 AprU 1952, sec. 1, p. 1, col. 6.
96
cities came on AprU 18. As the river squeezed through the narrow channel between
CouncU Blufife and Omaha, it rose to a record crest of more than thirty feet. CivUian
volunteers and soldiers manned the levees, plugging weak spots, beating back a river that
poured forth more than 380,000 cubic feet of water by per second. "Muddy Mo" did not
break through or wash over the hastUy raised walls. The floods remained front page news
for several days, but the worst was over. By AprU 21, the river crest had begun to flatten
out, and Army engineers predicted that the crest would "dissipate almost entirely" when
the Missouri merged with the Mississippi River.' ^
New York Times reporters ^plauded the efforts of civiUan volunteers in
containing the flood waters, but they never directly mentioned the importance of civU
defense.'" Once again, it was the "voice of America," Edward R. Murrow, who praised
civilian defense activities. "Everyone I taUted to has said that the key to this whole
business, the reason we raised 13 mUes of levees 3 feet in 6 days, the reason we evacuated
people so smoothly, the reason there was no declaration of martial law, the reason for
almost everything came back to civU defense organization."'^ He continued, "The civU
defense people here did not just make plans to deal with a bombing attack. They trained
'""Crest Hits Sioux City," sec. 1, p. 1, col 8; "Floods Sweep On," sec. 1, p. 1, col. 1; "Missouri Strives to Engulf Omaha," New York Times, 17 AprU 1952, sec. 1, p. 8, col. 1; "Rain Turns Levees to Mud," sec. 1, p. 1, col. 1, and p. 8, col. 3; and "Floods Rush Down," sec. 1, p.l, col. 6.
'""Battle of the Inch Fought With Flood," New York Times, 16 AprU 1952, sec. 1, p. 18, col. 1; and "Thousands in Mud Hold 'Mighty Mo,'" New York Times, 19 April 1952, sec. l ,p . 16, col. 3.
'^Quoted in Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1952, 19.
97
four battaUons of auxUiary firemen....They trained 400 auxUiaiy poUce...." "CivU defense
tried to train at least one person in each home in...first aid...."'"
The floods and other natural disasters provided perfect opportunities for
practicing civU defense. Whether a bomb or a hurricane stmck a community, many of the
results were the same-the destmction of buUdings and fields, large numbers of homeless
and injured people, the need for medical stockpUes and aid from nearby communities. The
April floods and the increased coverage given to the peacetime benefits of civU defense led
to new duties for some state officers and for the FCDA. A number of governors assigned
to their civU defense directors the responsibUity for coordinating flood disaster operations.
The Federal CivU Defense Administration requested the action that the Bureau of the
Budget had suggested a year earUer, namely, that the FCDA assume responsibUity for
coordinating the federal government's responses to natural disasters. In 1952 the Bureau
of the Budget endorsed the proposal, and on January 15, 1953, President Harry S. Truman
confirmed the FCDA's new responsibiUties by issuing Executive Order 10427.'^
It is probable that the focus on the peacetime value of civU defense was a
significant factor in the number of recmits enlisted in 1952. CivU defense organizations
registered more than two miUion volunteers, bringing the grand total to nearly four
miUion. That sum stiU feU fer short of the FCDA's 15-17.5 milUon person goal, but at
least the numbers were on the rise. Agency personnel could not have known that their
' 'Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1952, 21.
'^Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1952, 23; and President, Executive Order 10427, Federal Register, (15 January 1953).
98
yearly recruitment rettims, Uke the "Muddy Mo," had crested, and would never again rise
so high.
The FCDA and its state and municipal counterparts' battle plans had been weU-
laid. The various elements of the education and recruitment campaigns had one common
denominator-they focused on "Americanisms." The FCDA held up American heroes that
epitomized the spirit of civU defense, such as Paul Revere and pioneers on the westem
frontier. It attempted to tie civU defense to "norms" that characterized Fifties America,
for instance, the joining of secular and reUgious institutions, the housewife/mother ideal
for women. Even the FCDA's saturation campaign and the media it used reflected
American values. Employing television, movies, radio, magazines, and newspapers, the
agency mass-produced civU defense for a mass-media and mass-consumption-oriented
society. Lastly, since the nineteenth century, when Alexis de TocqueviUe penned
Democracy in America, Americans had been considered a practical-minded people. The
midwestem floods of 1952 iUustrated the practical value of civU defense during peacetime.
A superficial examination of the FCDA's strategies might convince some observers that
CaldweU should have obtained his 15-17.5 miUion volunteers, but he did not. The
recruiting returns showed a much smaUer number.
Millard CaldweU achieved more in his two years as the FCDA's administrator
than many who foUowed him accomplished during longer terms of office. He was
disappointed with civU defense's progress, however, and he was disenchanted with his
position. Though the FCDA had steadUy expanded under his direction, CaldweU was
99
looking to blame someone for the agency's slow rate of growth, and, by the end of 1952,
he was determined to resign.
100
CHAPTER IV
THE BUCK NEVER STOPPED HERE: BLAME, VALUES,
AND THE END OF THE CALDWELL ADMINISTRATION
"It is idle to complain of pubUc apathy in civU defense so long as official apathy is
obvious. The pubUc looks to its leadership for the cue."' ^ With those words, MUlard
CaldweU placed the blame for civU defense's shortcomings squarely upon the shoulders of
governing officials. Although he argued that municipal, state, and federal governments
shared the blame for civU defense's inadequacies, CaldweU held the men and women on
Capitol HUl most responsible.
CaldweU claimed to understand the initial reluctance to approve large sums for
civU defense. He beUeved representatives and senators were reacting to the apathy shown
by their constituents. But once the Federal CivU Defense Administration's education
campaigns were in fuU swing, and a majority of Americans had leamed what civU defense
was and why its proponents said it was needed, CaldweU no longer understood why the
members of Congress withheld support. During Harry Truman's presidency, the national
legislature faUed to appropriate more than a tenth of the funds requested for civU defense.
" Federal CivU Defense Administration, Annual Report for 1951 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1952), V.
101
CaldweU asserted that the constant slashing of budget proposals undermined the FCDA in
the pubUc mind and crippled the preparedness efforts of the lower governments.'^*
His charges were correct, in part. Congress's parsimony does seem both a
reaction and a contributor to pubUc apathy. CaldweU contended, however, that the
FCDA's promotional efforts convinced a majority of Americans that civU defense was a
necessary part of Ufe in the Atomic Age. Then, more Congressional butchering of civU
defense funding requests began to undo what the FCDA had accompUshed. His assertion
was not home out by the people's habits. In their daily routines and activities Americans
showed their elected officials what they beUeved was most important. CivU defense was
not at the top of the list. CivU defense was present during the Fifties, but it feUed to win
pubUc acceptance. Even after a majority of the people knew the definition and the goals
of civU defense, most faUed to respond to its caU. CaldweU blamed Congress, but some of
the fault feU to the FCDA and its administrator. A large portion of the blame belonged to
no one—civU defense simply did not "fit-in" with the time-honored traditions and
prejudices held by many Americans Uving in the early Fifties.' ^
' *MUlard CaldweU, "If Soviet A-Bombs Come," interview in US News & World Report, 12 October 1951, 38; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, v-vi, xi, 6, 8-9.
'^^niversity of Michigan Survey Research Center, C/v/7 Defense in the United States, 1952 (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Survey Research Center, 1952), 13, 17, 43-44; Federal CivU Defense Administration Press Release, 29 June 1952, Folder: CivU Defense Campaign-General (2), Box 5: Ch-CivU D, FUes of Spencer R. Quick, Papers of Harry S Truman [hereafter HST], Harry S Truman Library [hereafter HSTL], and Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, v-vi, xi, 6, 8-9.
102
StUl, MUlard CaldweU could not see beyond Congress. Time and again the
national legislature hamstrung civU defense initiatives by withholding appropriations. In
March 1951 President Truman requested $403 miUion for civU defense, designating $250
miUion of the sum for shelter constmction. The federal government had pledged it would
match state and municipal expenditures for the creation of blast-resistant areas in new or
existing buUdings. The FCDA was unable to keep its promise, however, because
Congress aUocated a scant $31.75 milUon for civU defense. As a consequence of the
dearth in fimding, the only parts of the shelter program that the agency acted upon were
research into home and pubUc shelter constmction, and the identification of existing
stmctures that could withstand—or could be modified to withstand—the force of an atomic
explosion.'^°
CivU defense's fimding problems did not improve greatly throughout Truman's
tenure as president. Congress apportioned approximately ten percent of the total that the
president requested. Toward the end of June 1951, when Truman submitted his budget
proposal for fiscal year 1952, he asked $535 mUUon for civU defense. The members of
Congress reduced that amount to $75 mUUon, and they earmarked $56 mUUon for
emergency stockpUes of medicine, medical and firefighting equipment, and other suppUes.
Again, the shelter program was put on hold. With each financial postponement of civU
defense initiatives, Truman raised his budget demands. For fiscal 1953 he requested $600
' ' President's Press Release, 1 March 1951, President's Secretary's FUes document in Folder 13, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST; Congressional Quarterly Service, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964 (Washington, D.C: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1965) 267; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, 50-52.
103
mUUon for civU defense, but Congress remained opposed to spending such large amounts
on "passive" defense. It granted the FCDA a mere $43 mUUon. Besides delaying the
shelter program, the reductions in federal appropriations forced the FCDA to discharge
350ofll50en^loyees.'^'
Administrator CaldweU was fiirious with the lack of congressional support. In
press releases, speeches, and reports, he and other leading officials within the Federal CivU
Defense Administration lashed out at the members of the national legislature. Congress
had passed the CivU Defense Act in January 1951, but only two months later it
appropriated less than one-eighth of the FCDA's fimding requests. The House and the
Senate began gutting civU defense before it was a weU-estabUshed program whose
effectiveness could be gauged. CaldweU argued that the members of Congress were
making his job inqjossible. How could he successfiiUy buUd a program that required the
cooperation of the states, the municipaUties—the cooperation of every citizen in the
country—when the federal government was not united in its support of civU defense
poUcy? The national legislature's actions influenced the lower governments' and the
people's responses to civU defense.' ^
'^'President's Press Releases, 21 June 1951 and 2 November 1951, President's Secretary's FUes documents in Folder 14, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST; President's Press Releases, 24 AprU 1952 and 15 July 1952, President's Secretary's FUes documents in Folder 13, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST; Congressional Quarterly Service, Congress and Nation, ll^, and J. J. Wadsworth to employees, 18 July 1952, Folder: Letters, MisceUaneous, Box 11, Alphabetical Section: Leaflets to Materials, PubUc History FUes, 1950-62, RG 396, National Archives and Records Administration, CoUege Park, Md.
'^Federal CivU Defense Administration Press Release, 29 June 1952, and FCDA DaUy News Digest, 30 July 1952, Folder: CivU Defense Canpaign-General (2), Box 5,
104
CaldweU had powerful aUies who echoed his arguments. Independently and
through the Governors' CouncU, the states' chief executives ejq^ressed their
disappointtnent.'^' City leaders added their voices to the storm of criticism''" In a letter
penned July 20, 1951, Mayor WUUam F. Devin of Seattle, president of the American
Municipal Association, detaUed the concerns of some forty mayors. Devin sent copies of
the letter to President Truman and to the members of the Senate, the House of
Representatives, and the National Security CouncU. Expressing the views of many
municipal leaders he wrote, "The people who would be kUled or injured by an atomic
attack Uve in the cities we represent. They look to us for protection. We have to see
them daUy. We would Uke to teU them that our cities are weU prepared in case of an
enemy attack and that our state and national resources are behind them in any fight for
survival. We can not [sic] teU them so at this time." He continued, writing that the
$31.75 mUUon Congress appropriated in the spring of 1951 "was almost a death blow to
the entire civU defense program." He argued that the wholesale slashing of the proposed
budget had led taxpayers to wonder why their local governments demanded more money
Ch-CivU D., FUes of Spencer R. Quick, HST, HSTL; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, v-vi, xi, 6.
'^'"Dewey Appeals to People to Support CivU Defense," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 4 (1951): 4; and MUlard CaldweU to Frank J. Lausche, 13 April 1951, Folder: Letters, Miscellaneous, Box 11, PubUc History FUes, RG 396.
' ""Mayors CaU for Stronger Support of CivU Defense," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 4 (1951): 3.
105
for civU defense, since the behavior of the federal government indicated it was
nonessential.'^'
President Truman dashed off a response to Devin. He agreed that Congress had
neglected its responsibUities to the cities and to the American people. "We cannot afford
to gamble with the Uves of our citizens," he wrote. Truman assured Mayor Devin that he,
at least, was and would remain a staunch supporter of civU defense.' *
He did. The man who had signed the CivU Defense Act into law in January of
1951 was one of civU defense's most visible—and vocal—champions. His praise for civiUan
"readiness" provided the FCDA with an endless string of quotes. He attended civU
defense exhibits. He recorded messages to be played for volunteers. He met with state
and municipal civU defense directors. He offered encouragement to those individuals
laboring to constmct a viable, national, civU defense program, and he chastised the people
and government bodies that he beUeved were undermining "preparedness" efforts.'^
President Truman recognized that grass-roots support for civU defense was
lacking. In a speech given on the first anniversary of his signing of the CivU Defense Act,
' 'WUUam F. Devin to the President of the United States [Harry S Truman], 20 July 1951, Official FUe document. Folder 4, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST.
' ^Harry S. Truman to WUUam F. Devin, 2 August 1951, Official FUe document. Folder 4, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST.
'^John T. Gibson to Mr. Perlmetter, memorandum, 23 July 1951, Official FUe document. Folder 8, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST; John DeChant to Joseph Short, 22 October 1951, Folder 5, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST; MUlard CaldweU to Matthew ConnaUy, 1 January 1952, Folder 8, Box 2, CivU Defense B FUe, HST; "Conference CaUs CD Vital to Preparedness," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 3 (1951): 1, 3; President's Press Release, 21 June 1951, HST; and President's Press Release, 24 AprU 1952, HST.
106
he compUmented the FCDA on its promotional activities and the nearly two mUUon
recmits that it had attracted in 1951. But that was not enough, he wamed. He chaUenged
civU defense personnel to redouble their efforts to stimulate interest among the masses. It
would not be an easy task, the president remarked. Theirs was a "tough, unpleasant, but
grimly necessary job."' *
Truman, Uke Administrator CaldweU, argued that the greatest obstacle to nation
wide preparedness, that the stumbUng block which made the responsibiUties of civU
defense promoters so "tough" and "unpleasant," was Congress. He contended that the
constant slashing of the Federal CivU Defense Administrations's budget proposals
constituted an "indirect nuUification of our laws."' ^ In less strident tones. President
Truman repeated this assertion on the day he sent the FCDA's first annual report to
Congress, AprU 24, 1952. Addressing the members of the national legislature he said, "In
January 1951, the Congress passed the basic legislation under which our civU defense
program has been set up. It is good legislation...But ever since this law was enacted, the
program has been starved for lack of adequate appropriations."'**^ Truman contended that
the refiisal to aUocate the necessary funding also posed a threat to national security. "I
want to be as clear about this as I can," he stated. "We simply cannot afford a penny-
wise-pound-fooUsh attitude about the cost of adequate civU defense...Every weakness in
' *PwZ>//c Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S Truman, 1945-1953, vol. 8 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1966), 26.
"President's Press Release, 21 June 1951, HST.
'*^resident's Press Release, 24 AprU 1952, HST.
107
civU defense increases an aggressors' temptation to attack us. Every weakness in our civU
defense adds to the strength of a potential enemy's stockpUe of atomic bombs.'"*'
As evidenced by the consistent, extreme reductions in federal funding for civU
defense, the members of Congress ignored the criticisms leveled at them They had their
reasons for strictly Umiting civU defense appropriations. Congress offered a number of
sound arguments. When civU defense spokespersons demanded aUocations for shelter,
StockpUe, or emergency services appropriations, the doUar amounts proffered often
seemed to be spur-of-the-moment estimates, rather than the result of carefiU studies.
FCDA officials stated that their agency was in the midst of researching the country's
shelter and stockpUe needs. DetaUed reports were forthcoming, they noted, but they
required money to continue the studies and to begin stockpUing suppUes and modifying
existing buUdings for attack. Congress was reluctant to hand over the amounts requested
without hard evidence of the need for the money. They feared that civU defense would
become an unjustified money-pit that would absorb bUUons of doUars and would serve
Uttle purpose. CaldweU himself recognized that the members of the national legislature
saw the possibUity of another, ever-expanding federal bureaucracy, and insatiable
constmction projects.'*^
'*'President's Press Release, 24 AprU 1952, HST.
'* Harry P. Yoshpe, "Our Missing Shield: The U.S. CivU Defense Program in Historical Perspective, Final Report for Federal Emergency Management Agency," Washington, D.C, Contract No. DCPA 01-79-C-0294, April 1981; and CaldweU, "If A-Bombs Come," 39.
108
FCDA Administrator CaldweU was partiaUy responsible for Congress' concerns.
Although he usuaUy requested only a couple hundred miUion doUars for shelter projects,
and though he did not advocate buUding enough protective fecUities to house every person
in the United States, CaldweU once stated that a complete shelter program—one that
would cover the needs of aU U.S. citizens-would cost $300 bUUon. It was a fooUiardy
statement, largely based on personal conjecture, but Congress did not forget.'*'
WeU might Congress balk at the thought of paying out $300 bUUon for shelters,
or contributing to the exponential growth of yet another federal bureaucracy, but some of
its excuses for denying federal funds to the FCDA were less sound. In June of 1952
Congressional leaders declared that one reason they were withholding support was the
FCDA had not spent aU of the monies previously aUocated to civU defense. Administrator
CaldweU argued that Congress had ignored FCDA contracts for research and equipment.
The Federal CivU Defense Administration was waiting to pay for services and suppUes that
had yet to be deUvered, but the agency had obUgated its entire budget, he noted.'
Perhaps even more distressing to the administrator were earUer deUberations by
the House Appropriations Committee. In the spring of 1951, the committee's members
suggested withholding mUUons of doUars because, even with the money, civU defense
protective measures probably would not be in place by the end of the year. The
committee report stated that "leaders in Government" had testified that the country feced
184
'*'CaldweU, "If A-Bombs Come," 41; and Yoshpe, "Our Missing Shield."
'*"Federal CivU Defense Administration Press Release, 29 June 1952, FUes of Spencer R. Quick, HST.
109
"its greatest danger from enemy action during the present year." The House
Appropriations Committee recommended denying funds to the FCDA since "they could
not be expended in time to meet the present emergency.'"*' The committee then proposed
the creation of a $100 mUUon Emergency Fund that the FCDA could tap after the United
States entered a period of emergency.'*^
FCDA officials were Uvid. The House would not approve civU defense funding
because readiness initiatives would not be whoUy completed by December 31, 1951? In a
point-by-point analysis of the House Appropriations Committee report, the FCDA caUed
the committee's recommendation "an amazing statement" and asked why, if Congress was
in tmth taking such a "fetaUstic approach" to U.S. defense, bUUons of doUars had been
aUocated for "fer-reaching" mUitary projects that would not be completed during the
calendar year.'*^ Addressing the Emergency Fund proposal, the FCDA analysis stressed
that the main purpose behind the creation of the national civU defense program was the
need to equip the United States with the information and tools necessary to prepare for,
and recover from, a future attack. CivU defense focused on "preparedness" and
"readiness." The FCDA's report said of the Emergency Fund, "This is the phUosophy
which would lock the bam door after the horse is stolen.'"**
'*'Quoted in "Federal CivU Defense Administration Point by Point Analysis, House Appropriations Committee Report," p. 2, Folder: Letters: MisceUaneous, Box 11, Alphabetical Section: Leaflets to Materials, PubUc History FUes, 1950-62, RG 396.
'*'"Point by Point Analysis," 5, RG 396.
'* Ibid., 2.
'**Ibid., 5.
110
In its later budget deUberations, Congress dumped the Emergency Fund, but its
mere suggestion is important for interpreting Congressional attitudes toward civU defense.
Refijsing fimds untU a period of national emergency foUowed the estabUshed pattem of
attention to civU defense only during moments of crisis. The House had claimed that 1951
was the year in which the United States would face the greatest possibiUty of attack, but
by spring the Korean Conflict had once again stabUized, with United Nations forces
entrenched south and communist troops north of the 38th paraUel. Moreover, officers
within both the Department of State and the Department of Defense showed a willingness
to accept a stalemate, rather than once again attenq)t to subjugate aU of North Korea and
risk further expansion of the conflict. The aura of crisis which had surrounded the passage
of the CivU Defense Act of 1950 had abated. The members of Congress and their
constituents could relax a bit and tum their attention to other matters.'*'
The vast majority of Americans were not focusing on the Korean War and the
possible "need" for civU defense; they were attempting to capitaUze on the economic
opportunities and the comforts that the Fifties offered. They were earning and spending
money. During the 1950s, Americans set new records for personal consumption. Annual
rates cUmbed to $218 bUUon in 1952. In an era when conformity and "fitting-in" were at a
premium, middle-class Americans and those striving to appear middle class found it
essential to "have" what everyone else had, just as it was necessary to act Uke the rest of
the crowd. Americans packed their homes with televisions, record players, appUances,
'*'CaUum A. MacDonald, Korea: The War Before Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1982), 90-92.
I l l
and new furniture, and to keep up personal appearances they purchased new clothes,
mouthwash, and cologne. The people spent the more than $150 bUUon that they had
saved during World War H, and they increased their buying power by making purchases
on the instaUment plan and applying for the latest consumption tool-the credit card.
Diners Club was introduced in 1950, and American Express appeared a few years later.'^
Business promoters added to the spending frenzy by equating one's purchases
with one's patriotism. They proclaimed the growing rates of consumption an Ulustration
of Americans' beUef in, and support o^ the capitalistic system. This rationale suggested
that the famiUes that spent the most were least Ukely to be communist. Spending was
American. Spending was moral. Be a patriot. Do what is right. Consume more, business
prompted.'''
Many Americans were quite susceptible to the "pressure pitches" of
advertisements and, just as importantly, to group pressure. David Riesman, author of The
Lonely Crowd, posited that middle-class Americans were no longer self-reUant and
independent in their thinking. They were no longer "inner directed." Instead, most were
now "other directed," their ideas and standards formulated by the group or the
organization. Americans strove for consensus and harmony. They "fit-in," they showed
they were part of a larger, feceless whole of "Americans" by foUowing the prescribed
habits of marrying young and accepting the roles assigned to their gender—the men taking
'^Survey Research Center, C/v/7 Defense, 13; and Douglas T. MUler and Marion Nowak, The Fifties: The Way We Really Were (Garden City, New York: Double Day & Company, Inc., 1977), 116, 119.
' 'MUler and Nowak, The Fifties, 119.
112
corporate jobs, the women becoming model housewives. They bought modest homes in
the suburbs and fiUed them with modem conveniences and with chUdren. The "typical"
nuclear age femUy attended church regularly, and each femUy member "belonged" to other
groups or associations—such as the Boy and Girl Scouts, the Junior League, and the
KiwanisClub.'^^
If Americans were so fixated on conformity and a consensus that was predicated
on one's "Americanism," why then did civU defense organizations experience so many
difficulties with their recruiting efforts? One possible explanation can be extrapolated
from Paul Carter's study of Fifties culture. Carter argued that the record numbers of
people who joined clubs in the 1950s did so in an attempt to extend their private Uves.
EUcs and Junior Leaguers, V.F.W.'s and Daughters of the American Revolution, they were
most interested in expanding their social circles. They cared Uttle for their clubs "as
vehicles for pubUc action," he contended. CivU defense offered some opportunities for
socializing, especiaUy for neighborhood wardens, but it required training, work, and taking
a stand on the "preparedness" issue. To volunteer for civU defense was to become a civU
defense advocate.'''
Douglas T. MUler and Marion Nowak offered another possible explanation in
The Fifties: The Way We Really Were. MUler and Nowak stated simply that the emphasis
on conformity and consensus produced a people that "seemed smothered in a blanket of
' ^David Reisman, The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), 3-31.
'''Paul Carter, Another Part of the Fifties (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 94-95.
113
inertia, apathy..." "Apathy" was one of the words civU defense leaders employed most
when they assessed the pubUc's attitudes toward preparedness.""
In addition, the mere passing of time worked against civU defense in the Fifties.
The longer the ranks of the preparedness agencies remained only partiaUy fiUed, the less
their chance of ever meeting their recruitment goals, because civU defense would be
perceived by more and more individuals as feUing outside the consensus. To volunteer for
civU defense would be to leave the safety of the group; it would draw attention. The
FCDA and its sister organizations at the lower levels of government needed to "seU" civU
defense quickly.
Although the Federal CivU Defense Administration saturated the pubUc with the
details of civU defense and portrayed it as an American tradition, only 4 miUion people had
volunteered by the end of 1952. The civU defense education campaigns themselves were
partiaUy responsible for the lack of recruits! Numerous civU defense pamphlets and
announcements minimized the danger of an atomic attack. Down-playing the seriousness
of radiation sickness and portraying atomic bombs as Uttle more than "big" conventional
bombs curbed the fear and the sense of urgency that would yield volunteers for civU
defense."^
No doubt some members of the American pubUc found the FCDA's
nonconfrontational strategies difficult to accept. To some people, it must have appeared
""MUler and Nowak, The Fifties, 131.
" AUan M. Winkler, Life Under a Cloud: American Anxiety About the Atom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 114-116; and National Security Resources Board, Survival Under Atomic Attack {"^ostmi^on, D.C: GPO, 1950), 20-26.
114
cowardly. CivU defense offered two responses to the sudden appearance of enemy planes.
Americans could "duck and cover,"—hide under desks and in shelters—or they could effect
a mass evacuation—run away from the danger. These options were no doubt inconsistent
with what most citizens perceived as the United States' traditional response to an
aggressor. Though a majority of Americans Uving in the Fifties would have contended
that the United States did not start wars, they would have asserted that neither did their
country lose wars, because Americans did not back down or cower when threatened. The
image of mUUons of Americans scurrying underground, huddling together, praying,
trembUng, and crying must have been much less palatable than the thought of remaining
above-ground, defiant, whUe the might of the U.S. armed forces swatted the aggressors
from the skies. "
Indeed, a major concem for civU defense officials was the pubUc's faith in the
United States mUitary. To convince Americans that civU defense was an urgent need,
FCDA pubUcations and advertisements quoted defense leaders who had announced that
the mUitary, alone, could not offer sufficient protection from an atomic attack. The names
and statements that the FCDA produced were impressive. Secretary of Defense Robert A.
Lovett caUed civU defense a co-equal partner with the mUitary. Generals Omar Bradley
and George C MarshaU agreed. U.S. Air Force Secretary Thomas K. Finletter and
General Hoyt Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, stated that a majority of the planes in
"^Rupert WUkinson, American Tough: The Tough-Guy Tradition and American Culture (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984), 3-10; and "Training Imperative to CivU Defense, Leaders Hear," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 3 (1951): 4.
115
a Soviet bombing offensive would make it to their targets.'" The FCDA quoted General
Vandenberg's declaration that, "Even if we had many more interceptor planes and anti
aircraft guns, and a radar screen that blanketed aU approaches to our boundaries, a
predictable 70% of the enemy's planes would penetrate our defenses, despite the
extraordinary skiU and valor of our pUots.""*
CivU defense personnel constantly repeated Vandenberg's warning, but to Uttle
effect. The pubUc must have written off Pearl Harbor as an aberration. The continental
United States had never suffered a serious air-assault. Besides, there existed the attitude
that the United States' armed forces were invincible. In 1951, a study produced by the
University of Michigan's Survey Research Center showed that sbcty-nine percent of the
survey participants beUeved the U.S. military able to "completely protect" or at least
"prevent heavy damage" to American cities."' In his comments on the report, MUlard
CaldweU wrote, "This type of bUnd faith in miUtary protection is perhaps the most serious
road-block to pubUc action and participation in civU defense that has yet been
"^"Top MUitary Leaders Say CD is a Co-Partner," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 6 (1951), 1-5; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, This is Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951), 5.
"*Hoyt Vandenberg quoted in Federal CivU Defense Administration advertisement, C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 10 (1952), 4.
'""A PreUminary Report on PubUc Attitudes Toward CivU Defense...Based on Personal Interviews by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigaa 1950-1951," President's Secretary's FUes document. Folder 11, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST.
116
encountered."^^ President Truman caUed it an "alarming trend" and asked Secretary of
Defense Robert Lovett to meet with him so they could "plan an immediate course of
action" to counter pubUc misconceptions.^^' The information indicating this "alarming
trend" was deleted from the copies of the research center's survey that were released to
the pubUc. ^ The FCDA staff also continued to hammer away at what they beUeved was
an incorrect assessment of the country's defensive capabUities, but CaldweU's old nemesis,
Congress, reinforced the popular opinion by aUocating bUUons for the mUitary and only a
few miUions for civU defense. In a critique of the House Appropriations Committee's
proposed reduction of the civU defense budget for Fiscal Year 1953, CaldweU charged the
committee members' actions showed a "a ridiculous disregard of reaUty." °'
The members of Congress were not the only ones to disregard reaUty. The 1951-
52 civU defense campaigns refused to recognize that the majority of Americans were not
white, middle-class suburbanites. In his monumental work. The Invisible Man, Ralph
Ellison teUs the story of an Afiican American who strives to discover his self-worth in a
society that fails to recognize the value of its minority citizens. The story begins with the
^ ' MUlard CaldweU to Robert A. Lovett, n. d.. President's Secretary's FUes document. Folder 11, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST.
2°'Harry S Truman to Robert A. Lovett, 7 February 1952, President's Secretary's FUes document, Folder 11, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST.
" MUlard CaldweU to Robert A. Lovett, n.d., HST.
^ 'Federal CivU Defense Administration Press Release, 29 June 1952, HST.
117
Unes, "I am an invisible man....I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to
see me."^^
Black Americans were "invisible" to the Federal CivU Defense Administratioa
On pamphlet covers and in agency photos and films the feces were Caucasian, the fashions
middle class, and the houses suburban. Each issue of the FCDA's news serial. The Civil
Defense Alert, contained numerous photographs of white, middle-class Americans
engaged in preparing for attack. The July-August 1951 edition included a photo of FCDA
secretary Pat Searles—wearing pearls and an evening gown, her hair perfectly coifed—
packing soap into a household first aid kit. An Ulustration on the cover page of The
Warden's Handbook showed twenty-one prospective wardens, eight women and thirteen
men, aU of whom were white. The artist depicted a few in civU defense helmets, but
others—including a doctor, a farmer, and a coUege graduate—wore clothes that indicated
their professional status. A stethoscope hung around the doctor's neck, and a graduation
cap and tassel identified the coUege student. The actors in the "Survival" series and Paul
and Patty, two of Bert the Turtle's human co-stars in "Duck and Cover" also conformed
to the stereotype projected by FCDA pubUcations. Throughout the 1950s, when Blacks
appeared in civU defense pamphlets or posters, usuaUy they were hidden behind the feces
of whites, or they were portrayed as attack victims, being attended by trained, paternalistic
Caucasian Americans. "^
^^Ralph EUison, Invisible Man (1947; reprint. New York: Random House, 1952), 3.
2° Photo insert, C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 4 (1951): 3; Federal CivU Defense Administration, The Warden's Handbook (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951); Federal CivU
118
Once again, the Federal CivU Defense Administration's actions reflected the
cultural and social trends of Fifties America. The FCDA was not alone in its exclusion of
Afiican-Americans from pubUcations and films. "I Love Lucy" starred Cuba-bom Desi
Amaz, and "The Honeymooners" focused on the Uves of working-class Americans, but
most television shows featured "Uly-white," middle-class famUies Uke those found in
"Father Knows Best," "Leave it to Beaver," and "Ozzie and Harriet." Black Americans
did not appear on "the tube." Caucasian, male Americans owned aU of the television
broadcast stations throughout the Fifties and on into the Seventies. It was 1970 before
Congress and the judiciary sought to diversify programming and pressured the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) to give preference to minorities that appUed for
broadcast Ucenses. Black Americans were almost as rare on the sUver screen as they were
on television in the Fifties. When they did manage to secure roles in movies, they often
found themselves playing loveable, but semi-inteUigent domestics. Afiican-Americans did
not fit in with the image that the FCDA or the majority of television and movie
broadcasters wished to project, so they were either excluded or marginaUzed. ^
Defense Administration and National Education Association Safety Commission, Duck and Cover (n.p.: Archer Productions, Incorporated, 1952), filmstrip; and "The Federal CivU Defense Administt-ation Presents Signs of Our Times," Folder: CivU Defense Campaign-General (2), Box 5, FUes of Spencer R. Quick, HST.
^^Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Regulating Broadcast Programming (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press and AEI Press, 1995), 89; and Joel Spring, Images of American Life: A History of Ideological Management in Schools, Movies, Radio, and Television (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), 184.
119
Many Afiican-Americans anticipated that the FCDA would manifest the
traditional prejudices of southem whites-especiaUy with MUlard CaldweU heading the
agency. When President Truman nominated CaldweU to the position of FCDA
administrator, spokespersons for the nation's Black community opposed the appointment.
Hundreds of protest letters poured into the White House. Chapters of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) authored and dispatched
most of the communications, but other organizations-such as the Brotherhood of
Sleeping Car Porters and the Congress of Racial EquaUty-and individual private citizens
sent many. °
Besides petitioning the president, the NAACP contested the nomination by
appeaUng to another branch of the federal government. On January 15, a subcommittee of
the Senate's Armed Services Committee held a hearing on the subject of CaldweU's
nomination. Clarence MitcheU, director of the NAACP's Washington Bureau, testified on
behalf of his organization and Afiican-Americans throughout the United States. MitcheU
charged that CaldweU was a racist. He quoted the former govemor's pubUc indictments
of the Supreme Court's decision to open the Democratic primaries to Black voter
participation. "* He claimed that CaldweU had refused to remove from office a sheriff
^"^Folders: 2965-MisceUaneous (1945-1950), 2965-MisceUaneous (Jan.-March 1951), and 2965-MisceUaneous (April 1951-53), Box 1743, Official FUes, HST.
®*U.S. Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on Nomination of Millard Frank Caldwell, Jr. to be Federal Civil Defense Administrator, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951, 1-3.
120
"who was a central figure in a terrible lynching."^"' MitcheU even contended that
CaldweU, Uke other southem whites, refused to address Blacks as "mister" in written
correspondence in order "to remind them forever that they are inferior...." '°
CaldweU did not deny the charges, but he did respond. He admitted that he
disagreed with the Supreme Court's mUng, and he refused to apologize for his views. "I
happen to beUeve that a group of people voluntarily in an association have the right to
select the membership of that association," he stated.^" With regard to the "lynching"
sheriff, CaldweU said a person was kUled, but no "lynching" took place. He then asserted
that he had not dismissed the sheriff in question because the people would have
proclaimed the official a martyr and would have reelected him to office. Instead of firing
him, CaldweU told the members of the subcommittee, "I castigated him, and as a result of
that castigation, the people of the county defeated him and a better sheriff was elected." '
When CaldweU spoke on the issue of written salutations, he again refused to deny the
charge or to apologize for his actions. "I reserve the right to address any person...in such
manner as I please and in accordance with my own views," he said. He continued, "There
are many white people for whom I do not reserve the title of'mister'."^"
^ ^ . S . Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on Caldwell, 3.
^'%id.
2"Ibid., 11.
' Ibid.
2"lbid.
121
Clarence MitcheU argued that President Truman had made a grave mistake when
he nominated CaldweU to the post of FCDA administrator. He asserted that Truman's
decision was not based on any particular merits that CaldweU possessed. The nomination
was an attentat, rather, to appease the Dbdecrats-white, racist, southem Democrats who
had broken with the party in 1948 because of its endorsement of mUd civU rights reform
Such an appointment was wrong, MitcheU contended. Since the FCDA administrator
would be responsible for protecting the Uves of aU American citizens, he or she had to be
bUnd to race, social status and party affiUations. '" MitcheU stated, "...his [CaldweU's]
record shows that he would not avoid dual standards on the basis of race." He continued,
"If a bomb drops we do not want regulations that require citizens to nm 10 blocks to a
separate racial shelter when one marked for 'whites only' is just around the comer." '
Despite CaldweU's obvious racial bias and the wit, eloquence, and tmth of
MitcheU's statements, the members of the subcommittee asked few questions and offered
Uttle opposition to CaldweU's appointment. Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon pressed
CaldweU on the issue of addressing blacks as "mister," but he dropped the subject when
CaldweU noted that the FCDA was already foUowing a manual on correspondence
formatting which required "a uniform type of salutation" for aU agency letters. ' Senator
Estes Kefeuver of Tennessee then asked CaldweU if he harbored any views which would
'"U.S. Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on Caldwell, 2.
2'%id., 6.
2'%id., 12-13.
122
prevent him from "fairly administering the law." CaldweU responded, "Senator, I see
nothing." ' The hearing ended shortly thereafter, and the Senate confirmed MUlard
CaldweU as administrator of the FCDA.
In an attempt, seemingly, to pacify Afiican Americans, President Truman later
appointed Mary McLeod Bethune to the thirteen-person CivU Defense Advisory CouncU.
Bethune, Uke CaldweU, was a staunch Democrat and a resident of Florida. The founder
and president-emeritus of Bethune-Cookman CoUege in Daytona Beach, she also boasted
the distinctions of having served as vice-president of the NAACP, director of minority
affairs for the National Youth Administration, and as an advisor to former president
Franklin D. Roosevelt. When Bethune resigned from the FCDA Advisory CouncU in
1952, President Truman fiUed the vacancy with Dr. Margaret Just Butcher, an associate
professor of EngUsh at Howard University, the daughter of renowned biologist Dr. Emest
E. Just.2'*
Both Bethune and Butcher were highly-respected and competent women, but it is
apparent that they served only as window-dressing for the Federal CivU Defense
Administration. The tme power of the FCDA did not rest v^th the advisory councU; it
was wielded by the administrator-MUlard CaldweU. PubUc Law 920, the CivU Defense
' U.S. Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on Caldwell, 13.
"*"Advisory CouncU CaUs for FuU Support of CD," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 5 (1951):4; Federal CivU Defense Administration Press Release, n.d.. Folder: CD Campaign-General (1), Box 5, Ch-CivU D, FUes of Spencer R. Quick, HST; Mary McLeod Bethune to Harry S. Truman, 24 November 1951, Official FUe document. Folder 10, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST; and Donald S. Dawson to WUUam J. Hopkins, memorandum, 5 May 1951, Official FUe document. Folder 9, Box 2, CivU Defense B FUe, HST.
123
Act of 1950, stated that the members of the councU were to "advise and consult with the
Administrator with regard to general or basic poUcy matters." This was easUy
accompUshed, since PubUc Law 920 also declared the administrator chairperson of the
advisory councU. The law further Umited the councU's power by requiring it to convene
only once each year. The administrator, alone, could caU additional meetings of the body.
Lastly, the CivU Defense Act of 1950 permitted the FCDA's administrator to create other,
more speciaUzed, advisory bodies as he or she saw fit.^"
In his pubUc addresses, CaldweU spoke of the need for a color-bUnd, non-partisan
civU defense program. In a speech that he made to several hundred representatives from
different civics groups, CaldweU said, "The Federal CivU Defense Administration must
work with people without regard to poUtical parties, reUgion and races. We must work
with Democratic and RepubUcan Govemors alike. It has been our purpose, and in that we
have succeeded, to keep FCDA on a nonpoUtical basis." " The reaUty of the FCDA's
pubUc education and recmitment campaigns faUed to conform, however, to CaldweU's
lofty rhetoric. African-Americans were invisible to the Federal CivU Defense
Administration.
So were lower-income Caucasians. They too feU outside the economic and
social class targeted by the FCDA. The poor did not grace the covers of agency
pamphlets or appear in the organization's news serials. The FCDA appealed to suburban
^^^U.S Statutes at Large 64 (1950-1951): 1247-48.
22°MUlard CaldweU to Joseph Short, 7 May 1952, Official FUe Document, Folder 9, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST.
124
housewives to volunteer. It ignored lower income women-tenement housewives as weU
as those women whose financial need forced them to work outside the home. The FCDA
even touted middle-class values as essential to civU defense. Suburban housewives were
supposed to keep their homes weU-ordered and clean; the Federal CivU Defense
Administration reinforced this behavior. In bold print, the text of Atomic Blast Creates
Fire stated: "Housewives have a saying that: 'A New Broom Sweeps Clean.' Firemen
have a saying that: 'A Clean BuUding Seldom Bums.' GOOD, CLEAN,
HOUSEKEEPING IS CIVIL DEFENSE HOUSEKEEPING." "Closets, attics, and
ceUars are the main source of home fires, and plain ordinary good housekeeping is a
strong Une of defense against them."^ '
Nonetheless, in their zeal to promote "middle-America," FCDA leaders may have
damaged other agency objectives. Lower-income Americans comprised the largest block
of the country's population. A demographic breakdown of civU defense volunteers'
incomes is nonexistent, but it is Ukely that the FCDA would have attracted more
volunteers if its leaders had paid closer attention to the most basic of the agency's stated
objectives—the participation of the country's entire population. Yet instead of targeting
the poorer classes, the agency pubUshed images that suggested one requirement for civU
defense volunteers was middle-class status.
The Federal CivU Defense Administration sent out mked signals. It caUed for
everyone in the United States to integrate civU defense into their daUy Uves, but it focused
^ 'Federal CivU Defense Administration, Atomic Blast Creates Fire (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951).
125
on middle-class whites. Even in its courting of middle-income Americans, the agency's
strategies appear confiised. One of the disappointments of 1951 and 1952 was the
relatively smaU number of women that volunteered for civU defense. They accounted for
less than half of the four milUon recruits that preparedness organizations had attracted by
the end of 1952. Time and again CaldweU and other FCDA spokespersons had stated that
women must form the majority core of civU defense volunteers. The FCDA appealed to
women's sense of domestic responsibiUty and tradition. Learning about civU defense
would help American women to better care for their femiUes and protect them if an attack
occurred. By volunteering for civU defense duties women could extend their sphere of
care. They could put their maternal instincts to work for the benefit of an entire
neighborhood or community. ^^
Pondering the traditional care-giving roles of middle-class, suburban women in
the Fifties conjures up images of moms tending sick chUdren—taking them bowls of
chicken soup, checking their temperatures, giving them a kiss and tucking them into bed.
One also pictures mom administering Ught first-aid-some antiseptic, a bandage, and
another kiss for a scraped-up chUd. Yet another image that comes to mind is that of
suburban wives and mothers preparing and serving wholesome, nutritious meals for their
femUies and then Ustening sympatheticaUy as each chUd, and dad, recount the events of
their day. When asked which civU defense service branch they would join, more than
222/ ^CaldweU, "If A-Bombs Come," 40; "Women Expected to Form Major Part of CD Force," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 10 (1952): and "Pledge for Home Defense," Folder: Kit, Pledge for Home Defense, Box 29, alphabetical Section: Kit, Press Kit for DaUy Newspaper to Kit, K-1, PubUc History FUes, 1950-62, RG 396.
126
skty-three percent of the women surveyed answered they would prefer to volunteer for
the first-aid services or the health and welfere division. Another thirteen percent
responded that they wouU volunteer for "traditional" women's jobs-they offered to work
as records keepers, as office assistants. The responses were in keeping with the accepted
gender roles of the Fifties.^'
The FCDA promoted confiision by appealing to women's sense of tradition, even
as it asked them to assume new roles and new responsibiUties. One of the primary reasons
for targeting women was the FCDA needed reUable wardens in the suburbs from 8 a.m. to
5 p.m., but the title "warden" carried with it an aura of authority. Most American women
of the 1950s had been raised to submit, to attend, and to care, not to order. Health and
welfere, first-aid, in these areas women could remain safe and secure in their traditional
roles as care-givers, as auxiliaries in a male-dominated society. They were mere
extensions of women's traditional responsibUities at home. To become a warden meant
crossing the lines, breaking the accepted mles that dictated the extent of men and
women's separate spheres of authority. To break the mles was to leave the safety of the
consensus and become a nonconformist and, perhaps, a social outcast. "
""PreUminary Report on PubUc Attitudes," HST.
^ "Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, Inc., PubUshers, 1988), 104-5, 112-13; Federal CivU Defense Administration, C/v/7 Defense in Outline: A Study Guide for the National Civil Defense Program (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951), 13; and Idem, Warden's Handbook, 3. For additional sources on the social constraints placed on men and women in the postwar era, consult Benita Eisler, Private Lives: Men and Women of the Fifties (New York: FrankUn Watts, 1986); Carol A. B. Warren, Madwives: Schizophrenic Women in the 1950s (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University press, 1987); Mary Dinnerstein, Women Between Two Worlds: Midlife Reflections on Work and the Family (PhUadelphia: Temple
127
In its attempts to attract female recruits, the FCDA's emphasis on women's
"traditional" roles had produced unexpected results. In its larger campaign which aimed at
aU Americans, its focus on patriotism and the supposed American "tradition" of civU
defense resulted in a pubUc response that was just as fiiistrating for agency leaders.
Urban residents, the most Ukely victims of an attack, expressed less wUUngness to
volunteer than did rural Americans. One explanation that the Survey Research Center
offered for this phenomenon was individuals Uving in rural communities and smaU towns
possessed more "community spirit" than did Americans engaged in the rat-race of the big
cities.^'
Again, however, FCDA marketing seems partiaUy at fault. Since rural, smaU-
town America is typicaUy conservative, its inhabitants would be more susceptible to the
patriotic imagery—Paul Revere, hero, "alert American"—and language that the FCDA
employed. In addition, agency spokespersons and pamphlets often pointed to pioneer
farmers as examples of the nation's tradition of civU defense. No doubt many rural
Americans considered themselves the inheritors of that early pioneer spirit. It was only
natural that they would identify more fiiUy with nineteenth-century civU defenders fighting
aggressive Native Americans and stmggling against Nature. ^^
university Press, 1992); Brett Harvey, The Fifties: A Women's Oral History (New York: Harper CoUins, 1993); and Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (New York: W.W. Norton, 1963).
225 Survey Research Center, C/v/7 Defense, 1952, 44.
^Federal CivU Defense Administration, Speakers Kit: This is Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951).
128
When considering its urban audience the Federal CivU Defense Administration
might have been better advised to Unk civU defense more forcefiUly to images of progress
and the fiiture. In the Fifties, automobUes sprouted large taU fins. AppUances became
more stt-eamUned. Toward the end of the decade, architects were drawing-up plans for
gas stations and other buUdings that, once buUt, sported curved, saucer-Uke designs that
made the structures look as if they had been plucked straight out of a "Jetsons" cartoon.
Residents of rural communities may have thought of themselves as keepers of tradition,
but the city was where the United States rushed to meet the fiiture. The FCDA could use
Daniel Boone to attract the support of rural Americans, but it should have tempted city-
dweUers with images of Buck Rogers. ^^
By the end of 1952, the combination of social trends. Congress's parsimony, and
FCDA mistakes and miscalculations had resulted in a limping civU defense program that
lacked nation-wide acceptance. MiUard CaldweU prepared to resign. In his official letter
of resignation, the FCDA's administrator claimed that civU defense was "now a cohesive
and moving part of the national security program." He observed, "Much remains to be
done," but he reminded President Truman that he had always intended to reUnquish his
appointment once he had civU defense up and running. *
^ For the history of "seUing" progress and the future, consult Roland Marchand, Advertising the American Dream: Making the Way for Modernity, 1920-1940 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); and Pamela WaUcer Laird, Advertising Progress: American Business and the Rise of Consumer Marketing (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
^ *Mmard CaldweU to Harry S Truman, 7 November 1952, Folder: White House Correspondence, 1953, Box 2, Correspondence of Administrator Val Peterson, 1953-1957, RG 396.
129
Other issues must have influenced CaldweU's decision to resign. Despite his
claims to the contrary, the evidence indicates that civU defense was not a great success
with the American people by the end of 1952. For two years CaldweU had stmggled
against Congressional and pubUc apathy. Congress had cut regularly his funding requests,
speUing doom for the shelter program and curtaUing other FCDA initiatives. CaldweU had
orchestrated a massive education and recruiting campaign, but the tangible results had
been minimal. It seems likely that CaldweU's decision to resign was more a product of
FCDA feUures than successes.
Another factor in his resignation was CaldweU's anticipation of a RepubUcan
victory in the upcoming presidential election between RepubUcan candidate Dwight D.
Eisenhower and Democrat Adlai Stevenson. Accepted tradition in Washington, D.C,
mandated that department heads submit their resignations upon the election of a new
president. Eisenhower might wish to reward one of his supporters with the post of FCDA
administrator. '
Lastly, Caldwell, himself was itching to retum to a poUticaUy-charged
atmosphere. In private communications to President Truman, CaldweU stated that he had
tired of the poUtical evenhandedness which his job as administrator required. Since his
post made him responsible for the safety of aU American Uves, he could not engage in
partisan poUtics. In an early draft of his letter of resignation, but omitted from his later
official letter, CaldweU made the statement that it was time for him to show his feUow-
^ 'MUlard CaldweU to Matthew ConneUy, 4 October 1952 and 15 October 1952, Official FUe documents. Folder 9, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUes, HST.
130
party members that he was committed to the goals of the Democratic Party. "I wish to be
free of the nonpartisanship which is and must be a part of CivU Defense and to exercise the
privUege of expressing my views poUticaUy," he wrote. "My fiiends are entitled to know
that my loyalty to the Democratic party and its nominees is of a steady non-wavering
quaUty." ' For an individual with poUtical aspirations, spending too much time in the
non-partisan job of FCDA administrator would constitute poUtical suicide. MUlard
CaldweU resigned from the Federal CivU Defense Administration on November 7,1952,
just after the presidential election. Deputy Administrator James J. Wadsworth, a
RepubUcan and the grandson of former Secretary of State John Hay, became acting
administrator of the FCDA."'
For the next eight years RepubUcans guided the actions of the Federal CivU
Defense Administration. The presidential election of 1952 transpired as CaldweU had
anticipated. The war hero, Dwight D. Eisenhower, easUy defeated the lUinois govemor,
Adlai Stevenson. Four years later, Eisenhower trounced Stevenson at the poUs again. As
CaldweU had predicted, one of the poUtical spoils with which the new president rewarded
his foUowers was the post of FCDA administt-ator. In 1953 the Federal CivU Defense
Administration introduced new faces and new strategies to the pubUc. '
""MUlard CaldweU to Harry S Truman, 14 October 1952, Official FUe document. Folder 9, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST.
"'CaldweU to Tmman, 7 November 1952, RG 396.
"^Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: Volume Two, The President (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 369-70.
131
CHAPTER V
'FROM DUCK AND COVER TO RUN LIKE HELL": MASS
EVACUATION , VAL PETERSON, AND THE FCDA"'
The warning went out at 11:30 a.m. on May 13, 1955. Soviet bombers had
violated U.S. air space. Spotters reported that enemy planes had penetrated the United
States' northem defenses and were continuing southward on a course that would take
them over Memphis, Tennessee.^'"
Approximately forty-five mUes west of Memphis, civUian defenders in Forrest
City, Arkansas, prepared to receive evacuees from the target area. CivU defense officers
moved into a second-floor courtroom in the town courthouse and estabUshed a control
center. "Ham operators" set up their radios, began to monitor aU incoming messages, and
issued briefs on Forrest City's preparations to meet the emergency. Two radiation-
detection teams assembled and tested their equipment. Other members of the town's civU
defense organization readied the churches and schools that were designated reception
235
areas.
^"Phrase first employed by Mary M. Simpson in "A Long Hard Look at CivU Defense," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 12, no. 9 (1956): 346.
'"Mattie Treadwell, Acting Regional Administrator, Region 5, to Director, PubUc Affeirs Office, Federal CivU Defense Administration, 24 May 1955, Folder: I. E. 1, Test Exercises (Various), Book 8,1. D. 17 to 1.1. A. 2, Office FUes of the Director, RG 396 [In June 1997, many FCDA documents that were scheduled for transfer to RG 396 were stUl located under RG 304 at the depository cited]. National Archives Branch Depository, Fort Worth, Texas, [hereafter cited as NABDFW].
"'Mattie TreadweU to Director, PubUc Affairs Office, 24 May 1955, RG 396.
132
In Little Rock, just over ninety-mUes west of Forrest City, Govemor Orval
Faubus worked to ensure that order would be preserved before, during, and after the
attack. Shortly after the warning sounded, he declared a state of martial law and caUed
out the Arkansas National Guard. Two units of guards and a medical supply convoy
headed to Forrest City. '
Concurrently, Arkansas State PoUce officers secured the primary evacuation
route from Memphis to Forrest City. They closed off U.S. Highway 70 to east-bound
traffic. They erected road-blocks and checkpoints. Then they waited for the expected
flood of refugees."^
The deep rumble of diesel engines announced the approach of the first busload of
evacuees. In the cities of Wheatley, West Memphis, Parkin, Hughes, Haynes,
CrawfordviUe, and Clarendon, teachers had shepherded their students onto buses after air
raid sirens sounded. To guarantee an orderly and safe flow of traffic, state poUce rode out
to meet the buses and convoyed them to the "Cabin in the Cotton" checkpoint, a spot
some eight mUes outside of Forrest City. At the checkpoint, boy scouts boarded the
buses-Afiican-American scouts for the buses carrying black students and Caucasian boy
scouts for the "whites-only" buses-and directed the drivers to the Forrest City reception
Tift
areas.
"^Mattie TreadweU to Director, PubUc Affairs Office, 24 May 1955, RG 396.
"^Ibid.
"*Ibid.
133
Mean^^Me, the enemy bombers continued to head south. At 1:10 p.m an atomic
bomb detonated over Memphis. In Forrest City, civU defense personnel ordered everyone
to take cover and remain indoors untU one of the radiation teams made certain that the
atmospheric radiation was at acceptable levels. For thirty minutes after the explosion
occurred, one of the four-man teams swept through the downtown area. It gave the "aU-
clear"atl:40p.m"'
The other team was posted at the "Cabin in the Cotton" station. Its members
checked the radiation level of the buses and cars that arrived after the atomic bomb had
detonated. Checkpoint officials routed the post-attack refugees to the Forrest City High
School, where medical personnel treated minor wounds and marched the radioactive into
the school showers. Attendants placed the seriously injured on stretchers, loaded them
into ambulances, and sent them on to hospitals in Little Rock. For the 6,700 citizens of
Forrest City, it promised to be a busy day and night. A steady stream of refugees was
expected. ""
No one in Memphis died from an atomic blast on May 13, 1955. No bomb
actuaUy feU. Air-raid warnings sounded in Arkansas. State poUce cleared an evacuation
route to Forrest City. The govemor sent in the National Guard, and civU defense units
sprang into action, but it was aU part of a mock attack, a civU defense exercise code-
named "Operation Able." The 5,000 school chUdren "evacuated" from the Memphis area
found civU defense instmctors waiting for them at the Forrest City reception sites. The
"'Mattie TreadweU to Director, PubUc Affairs Office, 24 May 1955, RG 396.
^"^id.
134
sttidents spent the aftemoon listening to lectures and watching films and first-aid
demonstrations. "'
In addition to its value as an educational tool for the young, "Operation Able"
provided Forrest City's civU defense organization, the Arkansas National Guard, and the
Arkansas State PoUce with an opportunity to test their plans for coping with a nuclear
assault. Making the exercise aU the more in^ortant was the Federal CivU Defense
Administration's shift in preparedness strategies. Val Peterson, the new agency
administrator, had discarded the shelter-centered strategies of 1951 and 1952 and had
endorsed instead a poUcy of mass evacuation for target areas. Mass evacuation required
increased participation from the rural communities and smaU towns that surrounded
metropoUtan areas. The FCDA's earUer focus on pubUc shelter constmction was,
foremost, a plan for urban Americans. They were the most Ukely victims of an enemy
attack. Why should the residents of distant smaU towns worry? The Soviets could find
more important targets than the sparsely-populated "Mayberrys" that dotted the
countryside. CaldweU's FCDA had tried to impress on rural Americans that they would
have to offer aid and suppUes to survivors in bombed-out cities, but Peterson's mass-
evacuation initiatives more fliUy incorporated rural America into the country's program of
civU defense. Not only would rural communities serve as points of egress for dispatching
suppUes to bomb victims, they would serve as points of ingress for pre- and post-attack
evacuees. In order to leam how to anticipate and accommodate the needs of thousands of
refugees, traffic officers and smaU-town civU defense organizations, Uke the one in Forrest
^"'Mattie TreadweU to Director, PubUc Affairs Office, 24 May 1955, RG 396.
135
City, Arkansas, had to practice responding to mass migrations from metropoUtan target
242
areas.
In the cities, local preparedness agencies practiced effecting the mass migrations
in an orderly manner. In June 1954, a year before the Operation Able exercise, civUian
defenders in Houston, Texas, held an evacuation drUl. In a letter to Administrator
Peterson, French Robertson, regional administrator for New Mexico, Texas, Louisiana,
Arkansas, and Oklahoma (FCDA Region 5), boasted that Houston's civU defense
organization "conq)letely cleared" the automobUes from hundreds of blocks in the
downtown area in only eight minutes. "'
In Shreveport, Louisiana, that same month, civU defense personnel held an
equaUy significant exercise—one that considered the evacuation of pedestrians. Important
considerations prompted the planning of "Operation Hotfoot" and other simUar drills.
First, not aU of the people who worked in city business and industrial districts owned cars.
Some took pubUc transportation or waDced to work. Second, there might be so many cars
in a downtown metropoUtan area that an automobUe evacuation would prove impractical.
" Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1954 Annual Report (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1955), 8-10, 31; Ralph Lapp, "An Interview With Govemor Val Peterson," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 10, no. 10 (1954): 375; Federal CivU Defense Administration, Facts About the H-Bomb...that could save your life! (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1953); Idem, "CivU Defense-Keystone of National Defense" in C/v/7 Defense Facts: Speaker's Kit, 1955-1956 (Battle Creek, Michigan: Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1955), 5; Idem, The States, Counties, and Cities, and Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1955), 12-14. In addition, in 1955 the FCDA produced a short motion picture entitled Operation Welcome.
^"'Regional Administrator, Region 5 [French Robertson] to Val Peterson, 12 November 1954, Folder: I. C 2, Reports, Annual, 1954-1955, Box 1:1. A. 1 to I. D. 8, Office FUes of the Director, RG 396.
136
Third, the threat of an aerial assault might trigger a panic that would render a mass
automotive exodus impossible. Upon learning that enemy planes were headed toward
them, people might jump into their cars and, in their haste to escape death, drive recklessly
to get out of the city-ignoring traffic Ughts, signs, and poUcemen. The end result would
be a number of accidents and car-jams that would prevent successful evacuation by
automobUe. Ignoring the probabUity that pedestrians would be just as, if not more, prone
to panic than automobUe owners, "Operation Hotfoot's" organizers intended to show that
evacuees could escape a bomb by calmly walking out of the city. Of the exercise's five
hundred participants, three hundred fifty—including the mayor of Shreveport and
Louisiana's state director—put more than four mUes between themselves and the
downtown area in an hour. ""
Such mass evacuation drills were common during Val Peterson's term as FCDA
administrator. In a cabinet meeting on July 29, 1955 Peterson told President Eisenhower
and the executive department heads that thirty cities had held evacuation exercises since
the beginning of the year. "Duck and Cover" was out. "Run LUce HeU" was in. As an
unmistakable sign of the shift in strategy, Peterson's FCDA retired the slow, plodding,
shelter-centered "Bert the Turtle." "
Technological advances in mUitary hardware, poUtical and social agendas, and
personal bias aU contributed to the Federal CivU Defense Administration's decision to
^""Regional Administrator to Val Peterson, 12 November 1954, RG 396.
245/ 'C-25-(2), Box 3, Cabinet Series, Office of the Staff Secretary, White House Office FUes, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
137
encourage mass evacuations instead of shelter constmction. The development of "the
Super," or the hydrogen bomb suppUed the agency with its soundest arguments for
fevoring an evacuation poUcy. The H-bomb exploded with a force equal to that produced
by hundreds, even thousands, of atomic bombs.
It was the Hungarian expatriate and theoretical physicist, Edward TeUer, who
coined the term, "the Super," for the hydrogen bomb. TeUer was one of the most
outspoken proponents for its development. TeUer became consumed with the idea whUe
working at the Manhattan Project's Los Alamos fecUities. Even before the teams at Los
Alamos had successfiiUy constmcted the first atomic bomb, TeUer began studying the
possibiUty of buUding a thermonuclear device. The atomic bomb was a fission bomb. The
power it released was produced by the spUtting of atoms. The hydrogen bomb was a
fusion, or more properly, a fission-fiision-fission device. In the H-bomb, an atomic
explosion (fission) heats deuterium to the point necessary to begin a thermonuclear
reaction in which hydrogen fuses to heUum. The energy produced by fiision then triggers
more fission in an outer sheU of uranium. Atomic explosions are measured in terms of
thousands of tons of TNT. Thermonuclear explosions are measured in terms of mUUons of
tons of TNT. The hydrogen bomb would be a nuclear "super-bomb." "*
Although TeUer and others were thinking about the hydrogen bomb before the
Cold War began, there was opposition to its development and the United States did not
launch a "crash program" to buUd the Super untU 1950. Many of the scientists responsible
" Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), 106, 374; and Idem, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 117.
138
for producing the first atomic devices, such as Robert Oppenheimer, expressed feeUngs of
remorse after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They opposed the buUd-up of a large atomic
arsenal after World War II. In November 1945, a number of scientists from the Los
Alamos Laboratory formed the Federation of Atomic Scientists, later renamed the
Federation of American Scientists. Within a few months, they had written and pubUshed
One World or None. The best-seUer's authors detaUed the horrors of atomic warfere, then
proposed the sharing and international control of the atom as an alternative to an atomic
arms race and, possibly, nuclear war. MeanwhUe, scientists from the Manhattan Project's
MetaUurgical Lab in Chicago started their own journal. With an initial grant often
thousand doUars from University of Chicago ChanceUor Robert Hutchins, biochemist
Eugene Rabinowitch and others created The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. The
Bulletin's first issue appeared in December 1945. This new forum for discussion of
atomic poUcy by some of the United States' most prominent physicists, chemists, and
engineers attracted an international audience. Despite the scientists' opposition, the
United States began to buUd more atomic weapons. In the late 1940s, many of the same
scientists who had earUer opposed the American monopoly and stockpiling of the atomic
bomb voiced their concerns that a crash program to develop the even more powerfel
hydrogen bomb, and the arms race that would surely foUow, ultimately could lead to the
destmction of the civilized world. Others, such as TeUer, argued that the United States
139
must develop the Super because the Soviets would buUd one even if the United States did
not.2"^
In 1949 the Soviets exploded an atomic device, and the debate over the launching
of a crash program to buUd a hydrogen bomb intensified. The Atomic Energy
Commission [AEC] was at the forefront of these discussions. On October 29, 1949, the
AEC's General Advisory Committee [GAC] met to discuss whether they should
recommend the accelerated development of the hydrogen bomb. The Atomic Energy Act,
signed by President Truman on August 1,1946, had authorized the creation of the GAC.
The scientists that the president appointed to the committee were to offer their technical
expertise and guidance to the AEC's commissioners. Among the GAC members present
at the meeting were some of the United States' most notable scientists, scholars, and
engineers: James Conant, chemist, president of Harvard, and a member of the National
Defense Research Committee during World War II; OUver Buckley, president of the BeU
Telephone Laboratories; Caltech President Lee DuBridge; theoretical physicist and Nobel
prize-winner Enrico Fermi, who had played a prominent role in the development of the
first nuclear reactor; experimental physicist and associate director of the Los Alamos
Laboratories from 1947-1951, John Manley; theoretical physicist, GAC chair, and
scientific director of the Los Alamos facUities during WWII, Robert Oppenheimer; 1.1.
" AUce KimbaU Smith, A Peril and a Hope: The Scientists' Movement in America, 1945-1947 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 41-48, 77, 79-80, 109, 128, 203, 235-38, 294-96; Masters, Dexter and Katherine Way, eds. One World or None (New York: McGraw-HUl, 1946); Rhodes, Dark Sun, 203-5, 513-14, 402; and AUan Winkler, Life Under a Cloud: American Anxiety About the Atom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 39.
140
Rabi, experimental physicist and Nobel laureate; Hartley Rowe, an engineer who had
helped buUd the Panama Canal; and Cyril Smith, who had directed metaUurgy studies at
Los Alamos. "*
On that Saturday morning in October, the GAC conducted a round-table
discussion of the proposed crash program. Only Rabi and Fermi favored recommending
high priority for the development of a hydrogen bomb. Conant was the most outspoken
against such a plan, arguing that the creation of a weapon with such destmctive potential
was immoral. Hartley Rowe said, "We buUt one Frankenstein," and agreed with Conant
that it would be a monstrous act to develop and use H-bombs. After the GAC's initial
discussions, four of the AEC's five commissioners-David LiUenthal, Lewis Strauss,
Gordon Dean, and Henry Smyth—joined them. The Joint Chiefe of Staff also put in an
appearance at the meeting. According to LUienthal, the JCS delegates stated that war
with the U.S.S.R. was likely to occur within four or five years. They claimed that
negotiations would not forestaU the coming conflict. The Joint Chiefs favored developing
the H-bomb as quickly as possfcle because it might act as a deterrent to what they
perceived as an otherwise inevitable war. "'
The Joint Chiefs of Staff left shortly after noon, their arguments having made
Uttle impact on the General Advisory Committee. AEC commissioners Henry Smyth and
Gordon Dean thought the members of the GAC had made up their minds before the
meeting ever got underway. Many of the GAC scientists had helped develop the atomic
2"*f/.5. Statutes at Large 60 (1946), 755-775; and Rhodes, Dark Sun, 395-96
^"'Rhodes, Dark Sun, 397-98.
141
bomb, but that was during wartime. Dean and Smyth beUeved that these same scientists
could not bring themselves to recommend the development of an even more powerful
weapon in the absence of world war; the threat of war was not enough. ^"
Saturday evening and into Sunday, Oppenheimer and Manly wrote the GAC
report; Conant and DuBridge drew up the "majority annex." The report announced, "No
member of this Committee was willing to endorse this proposal [a crash program to buUd
a hydrogen bomb]."^'' Conant and the others who opposed the Super's development
convinced Fermi and Rabi to stand with them. The report went on to state that the
members of the GAC saw no ceUing for the potential power of H-bombs. Simply adding
more deuterium to the fusion chamber and more uranium to the sheU would increase the
explosive force. It was clear that the Super would not be a weapon for destroying
industrial fecUities and mUitary targets only. The GAC would not endorse a high-priority
program to develop such a device, because they argued that it would be used for "the
poUcy of exterminating civiUan populations." '
The majority annex, signed by Conant, DuBridge, Buckley, Oppenheimer, Rowe,
and Smith took the scientists' objections further. It voiced their fears that the weapon
might be used to eUminate entire races of people. It also stated that the radioactivity
released from H-bomb detonations could adversely affect the entire population of the
world. The authors and the signers of the annex argued that "a super bomb should never
^'"^odes. Dark Sun, 399.
"'Ibid.
2"Ibid.,401.
142
be produced."^'' Oppenheimer later testified that he and other members of the GAC had
beUeved that their suggestions could Umit the arms race. They beUeved if the United
States refused to develop the hydrogen bomb, the Soviet Union also would refrain from
buUding "Supers."""
The AEC commissioners divided on the issue of an aU-out effort to buUd the H-
bomb. Senator Brien McMahon (D.-Conn.), chairperson of the Atomic Energy
Commission, along with Lewis Strauss and Gordon fevored the program. David
LUienthal, Henry Smyth, and Sumner PUce agreed with the GAC's report; they opposed
the crash-development of thermonuclear weapons. In December, the GAC met again and
reiterated its opposition to the buUding of super bombs '
WhUe the members of the AEC debated the moraUty of the hydrogen bomb, the
mUitary worked to insure that the Super would be added to the United States' arsenal, and
quickly. On January 13, 1950, the Joint Chiefe of Staff issued a memorandum in response
to the GAC's conclusions. The JCS document offered a number of arguments for the
msh-development of the H-bomb. It would be the most powerful weapon known to man.
It could serve as a deterrent to war, as weU as an offensive and defensive weapon during a
war. Perhaps most important, the Joint Chiefs noted "the United States would be in an
intolerable position if a possible enemy possessed the bomb and the United States did
^''Rhodes, Dark Sun, 401.
""Ibid., 403.
"%id., 404-5.
143
not." ' That was enough for President Truman. At the end of January, he ordered a
crash program to develop the Super. '
More than two years passed before the United States detonated its first
thermonuclear device. Three thousand mUes west of HawaU, the Eniwetok atoU—a series
of coral islands that lined the rim of a submerged volcano—provided the testing site. The
"Ivy" test series included two nuclear devices: the hydrogen device "MUce" ("M" for
megaton), and a backup, super-sized fission bomb, "King" ("K" for kUoton), just in case
the MUce shot feUed. Releasing the force often miUion tons of TNT, MUce exploded at
7:15 on the morning of November 1, 1952. A bUnding firebaU three mUes across, thirty
times the size of the one produced by the detonation of "Little Boy" over Hiroshima,
ascended into the air above Eniwetok. The explosion vaporized the island Eleugelab,
gouging out a crater that was more than a mUe across and two hundred feet deep. The
mushroom cloud that rose over the test site expanded untU its stem was thirty mUes
across; its cap was more than three times that width. Inside the cloud, drafts Ufted eighty
mUUon tons of pulverized, irradiated coral and other debris, "faUout" that would blow aU
over the world. '*
The United States introduced the H-bomb into the world, but its monopoly of
thermonuclear weapons was short-Uved. The Union of Soviet SociaUst RepubUcs required
four years to equal the Americans' feat at Trinity. It took less than a year for the Soviet
"<^Rhodes, Dark Sun, 406.
"%id., 407-
"*Ibid., 487, 504-9.
144
Union to catch up to the U.S. in the thermonuclear race. On August 12, 1953, communist
Russia detonated its own thermonuclear device."'
It was into this new world, a world filling up with weapons of such power that
they dwarfed "Little Boy" and "Fat Man," that Val Peterson led the Federal CivU Defense
Administration. For Administrator Peterson there was no confronting an H-bomb. A
hydrogen bomb that possessed the energy of the MUce device could level New York City.
The firebaU alone would cover an area the size of Manhattan. Temperatures within the
mass of boiling gases would reach sbc thousand degrees centigrade, or nine thousand
degrees Celsius—the temperature of the sun's surfece. The cloud would rise, eventuaUy,
but for some twenty seconds, as the gases surged outward and upward, the firebaU would,
in Peterson's words, "kiss the earth." For twenty seconds it would be as if the Sun were
sitting on Manhattan. "[I]n that kind of heat, you wUl join your ancestors rapidly without
any remains," Peterson told a group of industriaUsts. ^ According to the FCDA's new
administrator, the only practical strategy in the face of such devastating weapons was mass
evacuation of target areas. '
Getting out of the path of a nuclear bomb was by no means a new idea in 1953.
Since the advent of the atomic bomb in 1945, scientists, defense planners, and federal
agencies had considered the value of both dispersion and mass evacuation. Dispersion
"'Rhodes, Dark Sun, 524-25.
' ' C/v/7 Defense in Industry, Alphabetical Section, checkUst, to Alphabetical Section, Comparison of State CD, Box 4, PubUcation FUes, RG 397; National Archives and Records Administration, CoUege Park, Md.
261 Lapp, "Interview with Peterson," 376.
145
was, simply, city planning for atomic attack. As evidenced by the United States'
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the concentration of fectories in metropoUtan areas
offered tempting targets for an enemy armed with atomic weapons. In American cities,
production fecUities were often crowded into designated industrial zones. A direct hit by a
single atomic bomb on one of these centers could wipe-out a city's industrial capacity. If
a Soviet first-strike completely destroyed the United States' industrial strength, there
would be Uttle chance of prosecuting, much less winning, the ensuing war. Less than a
year after the bombing of Hiroshima, in an AprU 1946 issue of The Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, Edward TeUer and two coUeagues fretted about the country's industrial
congestion along the north Atlantic Coast and caUed for the dispersal of manufacturing
and population centers. The Bulletin later devoted an entire issue to the subject of
dispersion. ^^
Even before TeUer pubUshed his article in the Bulletin, President Harry S.
Truman tried to force the dispersal of government offices and private industry. On August
30, 1950, the same day that he submitted the NSRB CivU Defense Office's report. United
States Civil Defense, to the members of Congress and asked them to pass a civU defense
act. President Truman requested funding for the dispersal of federal offices. Congress
refused, and the pyramiding of federal en^loyees in the Washington, D.C, area continued.
He experienced more success when he pushed for the dispersal of private industrial
facUities. In 1951 Truman issued an executive order that made federal assistance for
^ J. Marshak, E. TeUer, and L.R. Klein, "Dispersal of Cities and Industries,' Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 1, no. 9 (1946), 267-69; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Sept. {\95\).
146
fectory constmction projects dependent on the aid recq)ient's wUUngness to locate its
plant in an uncongested area. In accordance with the directive, the Office of Defense
MobUization promoted the dispersion poUcy, granting tax breaks, administering defense
loans, and caUing for voluntary cooperation from the various federal agencies and from aU
Americans. A 1953 report indicated the program had proved effective only in the
scattering of subsidized defense plants.^"
The Federal CivU Defense Administration joined with the president and the Office
of Defense MobUization in promoting dispersion. In speeches and pamphlets, agency
spokespersons lectured the pubUc, but they also led by exanq)le. In 1954 the FCDA
vacated its office in Gelmarc Towers, Washington, D.C Leaving only a smaU Uaison staff
in the capitol, the agency transferred its main headquarters to what had been the Percy
Jones Army Hospital, in Battle Creek, Michigan. In addition, the FCDA began removing
its regional offices from major metropoUtan areas to smaUer cities.^^
FCDA Administrator Val Peterson orchestrated the move to Battle Creek and,
through his agency's example, tried to influence the rest of the country. Nonetheless,
dispersion was not his top priority. He favored the program, but it required time, much
^ 'Congressional Quarterly Service, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964 (Washington, D.C: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1965), 263; Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 113; Federal CivU Defense Administration, Basic Course for Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1956), 22; and President's Press Release, 30 August 1950, National Defense-Civil Defense, Assistant to the President FUe: MisceUaneous, general-speeches. Papers of Stephen J. Springam, Harry S Truman Library (hereafter HSTL).
' 'C/v/7 Defense in Industry, RG 396; Federal CivU Defense Administration, FCDA Moves to Battle Creek-1954 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1955), 1-2; and Idem, 1954 Annual Report (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1955), 153.
147
time. To fiiUy disperse the United States' industrial centers would take years, decades,
perhaps longer. Industrial isolation would raise the cost of transporting goods to markets,
a deterrent to any corporate body. Further, despite their personal views on the
effectiveness of dispersion, congressmen and women from heavUy industriaUzed areas or
growing manufacturing centers would be reluctant to support a program that would
suggest that new fectories—and the jobs they offered-should be buUt in less populated
areas, perhaps in another district or another state. When confronted by the editors of the
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut said.
There is nobody more keenly aUve to the dangers of atomic bombardment than I am and yet you wiU not hear me advocating the decentralization of industry out of Connecticut. The first job of a feUow in Congress, you know, is to stay there; out of it, he is no good. For an elected official from New England, endorsement of dispersal would constitute poUtical suicide. '
Fmstrated by the resistance he and the Office of Defense MobUization
encountered, Peterson nevertheless continued to harangue industrial leaders. He reminded
them that dispersion had saved the Soviet Union during World War II. StaUn's pre-war
buUd-up of industrial centers east of the Ural Mountains had enabled the U.S.S.R. to
continue to produce war materials after the Germans had knifed through the Soviet
Union's westem sateUites and into the westem portions of the motherland. Peterson's
assessment was correct, but logisticaUy dispersal was more difficult to effect in the United
2651 ^Mary M. Simpson, "A Long Hard Look at CivU Defense: A Review of the HoUfield Committee Hearings," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 12, No. 9 (1956), 348.
148
States than in the Soviet Union. StaUn ordered dispersal; U.S. officials encouraged,
suggested, and attempted to persuade.^^
Dispersal in the United States progressed haltingly, and it was never fiiUy
accompUshed. MetropoUtan areas, large cities, with their masses of humanity, remained
prime targets for a nuclear strike. Peterson could not wait for dispersion to occur. He
could not wait for a planned America with an equaUy distributed population and industrial
base. He had to propose a plan that would save some Uves if the enemy stmck tomorrow.
The emergency dispersing of populations from crowded target areas, mass evacuation,
seemed to offer a quick, economical solution to the problem of surviving a limited nuclear
war. ^
As with industrial dispersion, mass evacuation was hardly a new idea when Val
Peterson assumed control of the FCDA, but 1953 did mark the first year that a U.S. civU
defense agency openly endorsed "running away" from the bomb. Prior to Peterson's
administration, the federal agencies and personnel charged with formulating civU defense
poUcy either expressed doubts about the efficacy of mass evacuation or they condemned it
completely. United States Civil Defense, the NSRB document that buUt on the BuU and
Hopley reports and which Congress used as a guide for developing the CivU Defense Act
of 1950, clearly outUned federal officers' early views on the subject. The NSRB's CivU
Defense Office concluded that mass evacuations would produce "a dismptive effect upon
organized communities and upon the morale of the people." Hence, "evacuation... should
' ' C/v/7 Defense in Industry, RG 397.
"^Simpson, "Long Hard Look," 348; and Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 113
149
be considered only after aU other means of insuring mass safety have been evaluated."
The document's authors announced that they were "not planning for widespread use of
this method."^ *
On November 30, 1950, in a speech that he deUvered to the American PubUc
Welfare Association, James J. Wadsworth expanded on the National Security Resources
Board's misgivings about mass evacuation. ' Although he was never named
administrator of the Federal CivU Defense Administration, Wadsworth possessed more
experience in civUian defense matters than did either MUlard CaldweU or Val Peterson.
Prior to his service as assistant administrator under CaldweU, Wadsworth worked in the
NSRB's CivU Defense Office. He was instrumental in the preparation of United States
Civil Defense, and he knew weU the reasons the NSRB did not favor mass evacuation. ^^
Before the members of the American PubUc Welfare Association, Wadsworth denounced
what he caUed the "take-to-the-hills mentaUty." First, he argued that mass evacuation was
contrary to human nature. He agreed that when confronted with the threat of a bomb
strike "at first there is a very human impulse to flee," but he contended that the initial
response was quickly overridden by another "much more stronger urge to retum to
^ *National Security Resources Board, United States Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1950), 37.
2^'MemorandumNo. 6, Binder, Advisory BuUetins, 1-49, Box No. 1, OCDM PubUcations, 1950-60, RG 396, NARACP.
"°James J. Wadsworth, Jr., interview by John T. Mason, Columbia Oral History Project, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, vol 2 (24 April 1967), 55-56.
150
femUiar surroundings and the comforting presence of relatives and fiiends...."^^' The
NSRB feared that the anxiety produced by separation from famUy members would prevent
orderly evacuation and would damage American morale even if evacuation was
successfiiUy effected.^^
Wadsworth then charged that mass evacuation was physicaUy impossible for
many metropoUtan areas. He claimed there were so many cars in San Francisco that "if aU
but one major outlet were blocked, the first automobUe in Une would be in Salt Lake City -
950 mUes away - before the last car had crossed the Golden Gate Bridge." Even with
drivers fleeing San Francisco in aU directions, civU defense personnel would face a difficult
task in trying to get aU of them safely out of the city before an attack. Wadsworth noted,
"...the rigors of Sunday driving produce impossible traffic jams in our metropoUtan
centers....Emergency evacuation on a mass scale would be far worse."^"
As an officer of the National Security Resources Board, Wadsworth also had to
consider the impact of mass evacuations on national security. He appealed to his audience
to forget about evacuation. If everyone fled to the countryside, no one would be left to
man the factories, to help the United States fight back. Con^aring city-dweUers under
aerial attack to officers on a ship engaged in battle, he said, "The Navy skipper... 'fights
his ship' to the last...We...must 'fight our cities' in the same way." Wadsworth's message
"'Memorandum No. 6, RG 396.
"^Ibid.
^"Ibid.
151
was clear. Only the "rats" would jump ship when warning sounded. Only the rats would
forsake their femiUes, homes, and their country by running away. "
The CivU Defense Act of 1950 included mass evacuation in its Ust of possible
protective measures, but, under the guidance of CaldweU and Wadsworth, the FCDA
adopted the NSRB's views on evacuating urban populations. The CaldweU administration
concentrated on identifying and constmcting blast-resistant shelters, a plan of defense
which would keep metropoUtan populations in the city, ready to return to work in the
factories that remained standing after an attack. In spite of the agency's stance on
evacuation, a few city leaders insisted they would relocate their civiUans to the
surrounding countryside if a red alert sounded. In the summer of 1952, the FCDA
considered outUning specific regulations for mass evacuations in order to provide the
"maverick" city leaders with a uniform plan of action, but CaldweU's administration never
displayed enthusiasm for evacuation poUcy. Mass evacuation did not become the FCDA's
"official poUcy" untU Val Peterson's administration. '
The Federal CivU Defense Administration lost the benefit of Wadsworth's
experience in the first months of 1953, when President Eisenhower appointed Peterson
administrator. When Ike was deUberating whom to appoint, Wadsworth expressed hope
that he would receive the appointment. He had been passed over once before. He was the
""Memorandum No. 6, RG 396.
^"^^A Report to the National Security Council by the Federal Civil Defense Administration on Evacuation of Civilian Populations in Civil Defense, President's Secretary's FUes document. Folder 11, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST; National Security CouncU Agenda, 13 June 1952, President's Secretary's FUes document. Folder 11, Box 1, CivU Defiise, B FUe, HST; and Memorandum No. 6, RG 396.
152
acting director of the NSRB's CivU Defense Office when Truman created the Federal CivU
Defense Administration. Wadsworth wanted to be named the agency's first administrator,
but he reaUzed his party affiUation-he was a RepubUcan-reduced his chances for the
position. He was right. President Truman chose feUow-Democrat MUlard CaldweU.
Needing Wadsworth's experience and advice, CaldweU brought him into the FCDA as
assistant administrator. When CaldweU resigned in November 1952, Wadsorth became
acting administrator and he told some of his poUtical contacts that he wanted Eisenhower
to confirm him as FCDA administrator. His wish was not reaUzed. When the new
president entered office early in 1953, he foUowed Truman's precedent and appointed a
former govemor, Val Peterson (R-Nebraska), to the post. Seeing no chance for further
advancement, Wadsworth left the Federal CivU Defense Administration. ^^
Wadsworth's experience would be missed, but, unlUce CaldweU, Val Peterson
was already a veteran civilian defender when he accepted the FCDA administrator
appointment. During the CaldweU years, Govemor Peterson had served on the FCDA's
Advisory CouncU. He was weU acquainted with the agency's goals and projects. In
addition, Peterson had witnessed first-hand the value of civU defense in peacetime
emergencies and the importance of seUing preparedness as a practical measure. He was
Nebraska's chief executive in 1952, when "Muddy Mo" overspUled its banks and
threatened Sioux City, CouncU Bluffs, and Omaha. ^
"^Mason, interview, vol 2, 56-58, 64-65.
"^FCDA Press Release No. 249, Folder CD Cam-Genl. (1), Box 5, Ch-CivU D., Quick FUes, 1952-53, HST; and Proceedings of Medical Civil Defense Conference, New York-May 31, 1953 (New York: American Medical Association CouncU on National
153
When Peterson became the FCDA's director, he brought with him weU-defined
views on civU defense poUcy. He had never supported shelter-buUding. As early as 1950,
when the members of Congress were writing the CivU Defense Act and were debating the
FCDA's responsibUities, Peterson spoke against a pubUc shelter program He continued
to oppose federal and state-financed shelter constmction after he became FCDA
administrator. ^*
The buUding of the H-bomb helped justify Peterson's animosity toward the duck
and cover program. Government leaders wanted to buUd most shelters in urban areas, the
primary targets for enemy attack, but the explosive force of a MUce-sized bomb would
level almost every stmcture—including above-ground shelters—and would vaporize most
people within a three mUe radius of ground zero. Directly below the explosion, it would
dig a crater deep enough to destroy the shelters lying close to the surface. It would
destroy a majority of the buUdings and kiU large numbers of people up to thirteen mUes
from the explosion's epicenter. Outside the inner, three-mUe zone, the blast itself probably
would not kiU those Americans who had taken cover in underground shelters. Peterson
noted, however, that the buUdings in most metropoUtan areas rose high and were packed
closely together. When the bomb's blast wave ripped through the city, crumbUng
skyscrapers and the other stmctures m its path, it could bury the area under thirty or forty
Emergency Medical Service, 1953), 64, 67.
"*Congressional Quarterly Service, CONGRESS and the NATION, 263; Thomas J. Kerr, C/v/7 Defense in the U.S.: Band-Aid for a Holocaust (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), 44, 60-61; Simpson, "Long Hard Look," 347; Ralph Lapp, "An Interview with Govemor Val Peterson," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 9, No. 7 (1953), 238; and Idem, "Interview with Peterson," (1954), 375-76.
154
feet of mbble. The shelters below the detritus would become death traps. Shelter
occupants might survive the initial explosion and stUl never see dayUght again. ^
The monetary cost of undertaking a national shelter program was another of the
fectors that pushed Administrator Peterson toward an endorsement of mass evacuation.
Peterson was a budget-conscious RepubUcan, which may partiaUy explain why
Eisenhower chose him for the head post in the FCDA. Peterson knew that a shelter
program would require tens of bUUons of doUars. The great cost of such a program was
what triggered his early outbursts against federaUy-financed shelters. With the
development of the hydrogen bomb, his opposition to shelter constmction seemed to
increase. He opposed spending so much money on faciUties which he beUeved offered no
guarantees of survival. It was impractical. Nor was there any guarantee that the FCDA
would receive funding for shelter constmction even if Peterson asked for it. The members
of Congress had ignored CaldweU's pleas. There was Uttle reason for Peterson to beUeve
his administration would fare any better. With the pubUc shelter program as with
industrial dispersal, time was a cmcial factor. CaldweU's FCDA stuck with the idea of
pubUc shelters for two years, even though it did not receive the money to implement the
program. The administration had waited for Congress to act, whUe the United States'
arch-rival developed bigger and better bombs. *"
"'Lapp, "Interview with Peterson," (1954), 376; Federal CivU Defense Administration, Facts About the H Bomb; and Proceedings of Medical Civil Defense Conference, 69-70.
^*^en-, C/v/7 Defense Band-Aid, 59-61; and Lapp, "Interview with Peterson," (1953), 238.
155
Val Peterson was unwUUng to commit large outlays of money or time for pubUc
shelter constmction. Mass evacuation offered a more immediate and economical solution
to the FCDA's problems. CaldweU's successor contended that the training of civUian
populations to evacuate target areas could begin at once. If spotters detected enemy
bombers, city poUce and civU defense personnel could do more than throw up their hands
in despair over the shelters that had never been buUt. They could do more than teU people
to duck down, cover their heads, and pray. They could atten^t to effect mass evacuations
and save Uves. *'
Granted, untU the United States developed better systems for detecting the
enemy there might not be time to evacuate everyone from the target cities. Peterson told
Americans that ducking and covering might be their only option if enemy aircraft
approached undetected. He also endorsed the buUding of shelters by private citizens on
the periphery of a target area, and inner-city shelters constmcted by private businesses that
insisted on keeping personnel in their factories—even if a nuclear assault was imminent.
But shelter-seeking was to be at most a secondary measure in the Peterson
administration's plans. The best defense against the hydrogen bomb was great distance
between the explosion and people. Whether cities received half an hour or four hours of
281i 'Lapp, "Interview with Peterson," (1953), 238; Idem, "Interview with Peterson," (1954), 375-76; Ken, C/v/7 Defense Band-Aid, 62-64; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1954 Annual Report {"^asYm^on, D.C: GPO, 1955), 1, 8-9, 31-33.
156
waming, by immediately effecting a mass evacuation, civU defense personnel would save
Uves.'*2
Another mark in mass evacuation's fevor was its relatively low expense when
compared with a pubUc shelter program. Mass evacuation was not cost-free, but it was
cost-effective and practical. The defense measures required for improving the new
programs' chances of success would have been necessary even if the FCDA had gone
forward with its pubUc shelter plan. Early waming constittited an essential component of
both civUian defense strategies. The Federal CivU Defense Administration required
advance waming of an enemy air raid in order to mobUize personnel and begin moving
people to safety. The greater the waming time, the more civUians could be ushered into
shelters or evacuated from a target area. *'
In speeches, interviews, and official pubUcations, Peterson stressed the need for
improving the United States' aircraft detection system At a Cabinet meeting on May 1,
1953, Peterson told President Eisenhower that early waming offered the only hope for
survival in an atomic attack. The greatest problem lay with the United States' radar net.
GraduaUy, the Eisenhower Administration strengthened the country's early detection
system. The miUtary employed a miscellany of devices to detect incoming bombers.
Scattered throughout the United States and Canada, radar instaUations probed the skies.
To supplement the land-based stations on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, picket Unes of
* Lapp, "Interview with Peterson," (1953), 237; Idem, "Interview with Peterson," (1954), 375-76.
"'Federal CivU Defense Administration, Annual Report for 1952 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1953), 79; and Idem, 1954 Annual Report, 57.
157
radar-equipped ships and aircraft "pinged" the horizon for enemy planes. "Texas towers"-
-ofifehore radar instaUations dotted the tidelands in the Gulf of Mexico. In each state,
civilian volunteers in the Ground Observer Corps stared into the sky and reported every
aircraft they thought might prove hostUe. Lastly, one of the great defense projects of the
Eisenhower Administration was DEW, the distant early waming system, a joint-Canadian-
U.S. project to constmct an impenetrable radar web across the northem portion of North
America—the enemy's most Ukely point of ingress. *"
The raising of a protective radar barrier around the United States continued
throughout Eisenhower's two terms as president, but mechanisms for transmitting an alert
were largely in place by the time Val Peterson became the FCDA's administrator. In each
of the U.S. Air Force's eleven divisional Continental Air Defense Command centers, the
Federal CivU Defense Administration stationed Attack Warning Officers. Once the Air
Force confirmed the approach of enemy aircraft, the FCDA's attack warning personnel
would transmit an alert via CADW, the CivU Air Defense Waming System, a
communications network that deUvered the waming to some two hundred substations
nationwide. From these secondary warning centers, the alert passed on to the various
local civU defense headquarters, which then sounded waming devices to alert the
populace. In 1953, the waming system was mostly con^lete, but the area in which it was
lacking was one that was essential for guaranteeing a "prepared" population. CADW
*"Federal CivU Defense Administration, Safe because some American looked to the SKY! (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1953); Idem, 1954 Report, 57; Lapp, "Interview with Peterson," (1953), 237; Proceedings of Medical Civil Defense Conference, 72; and 1 May 1953, Folder c-4 (2), Box 1, Cabinet Series, Assistant Secretary Records, 1952-61, White House Office, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (hereafter DDEL), AbUene, Kans.
158
could disseminate an alert to every area of the United States in fifteen minutes, but less
than fifty percent of the nation's cities possessed waming sirens in 1953. By the end of
the next year, that number rose to just over fifty percent, and it continued to cUmb, but
slowly."'
Those Americans who were fortunate enough to hear waming sirens and who
fled from the city, or descended into shelters, would want to know what was happening in
the target areas and they would need to be notified when the danger had passed. Sirens
sounded to alert the people to an impending attack, and again when the FCDA issued an
aU-clear. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) developed the "Plan for the
Control of Electromagnetic Radiation," or "CONELRAD," to keep the people informed
during a period of emergency. Under the CONELRAD system, Americans were to tune
to either 640 or 1240 on their AM radios. CivU defense staff members would use those
frequencies to broadcast news briefs and emergency action instmctions. The FCC
considered AM broadcasts safe, but it ordered television and FM radio companies off the
air during a mUitary emergency, arguing "their broadcasting beams could be used as
direction finders by enemy bombers." *
Once the FCDA and the FCC introduced CONELRAD, Westinghouse, PhUco,
RCA and other firms showed their patriotism by manufacturing CONELRAD-ready
radios. The sets boasted a triangle over 640 AM and another over 1240 AM. The pubUc
"'Federal CivU Defense Administration, Annual Report for 1953 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1954), 107-9; and Idem, 1954 Annual Report, 61.
"^Federal CivU Defense Administration, In Case of Attack! CONELRAD (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1953); and Idem, Annual Report for 1953, 112.
159
did not have to memorize the civU defense frequencies and then try to recaU them during a
nuclear apocalypse. Private industry was doing its part to ensure that the United States
and the free enterprise system survived. *^
In addition to waming and communications, an improved highway network was
an essential component for effective civU defense. The importance of constmcting a
reliable system of roads is obvious when considering mass evacuation, but it would have
been necessary even if the agency had continued to focus on a shelter-buUding program.
From the earUest post-war deUberations on preparedness, through the CaldweU and
Peterson administrations, and beyond, civU defense planners had concluded that cities
which feU victim to an atomic assault would require aid from surrounding communities.
"Mutual aid" was one of the topics discussed by each of the major civU defense planning
boards. Without a dependable transportation network, emergency suppUes and volunteers
would not make it to the survivors in a bombed city."*
* A triangle within a circle served as the official civU defense emblem during both World War II and the Cold War years. Throughout the Second World War, a helmet or an arm band boasting a red and white striped triangle within a blue circle denoted its wearer as an air raid warden. Many of the old WWII civU defense items were employed by civU defense bodies during the Cold War years. Nonetheless, the official symbol for Cold War civU defenders was a blue circle surrounding a white triangle that contained the letters "C" and "D" in red.
"*War Department CivU Defense Board, A Study of Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: National MUitary EstabUshment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1948), 16; Office of CivU Defense Planning, C/v/7 Defense for National Security (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1948), 191-94; National Security Resources Board, United States Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1950), 45-47; Federal CivU Defense Administration, Annual Report for 1951 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1952), be, xi; Idem, Annual Report for 1952, 12, 22; Idem, Annual Report for 1953, 14.
160
Peterson's endorsement of mass evacuation made iiiq)roved roadways even more
essential for civU defense. Mutual aid considerations required the highways connecting the
cities to be wide and sound in their constmction. Mass evacuation poUcy placed the same
demands on the streets within the cities. With enemy bombers streaking toward their
targets, traffic jams would speU certain death for thousands of urban Americans. To
ensure a population's quick, orderly evacuation before the bombs feU—to save as many
Uves as possible—the United States had to buUd new roads and strengthen and modify
those in existence.
The National Security Resources Board and the Department of Defense
submitted their own reasons for updating the country's highway system. The enemy might
foUow an air strike with troop landings. Improved highways would better facUitate the
mass movement of American soldiers to meet an invading army. *'
More than a plan for coping with a possible future war, an expanded road
network was a necessity that offered immediate and ongoing benefits. The automotive
industry boomed in the 1950s. Manufecturers in Detroit sold almost eight mUUon cars in
1955 alone. Between 1952 and 1955, the percentage of American famUies that owned
automobUes increased from sbcty to seventy percent. The country's roadways were not
keeping pace with the expanded needs of the growing "car culture." Most metropoUtan
areas possessed no high-speed expressways, and the Pennsylvania TumpUce comprised one
of a mere handful of four-lane highways that connected American cities. The roads were
"'Jack Gorrie to Dr. Steelman, 9 June 1952, Memorandum, Folder 10, Box 28, National Security Resources Board, White House Central FUes, HST.
161
too narrow, the traffic too congested, the risks of driving too great. By 1955 automobUe
accidents were kUUng more than 36,000 people annuaUy in the United States. The
appropriation of more federal monies to improve the road network could aUeviate such
problems. It was a practical measure. '®
In their final report to the Federal CivU Defense Administration, the scientists and
experts assigned to Project East River stressed the need for advertising the practical value
of civU defense initiatives. MUlard CaldweU had launched Project East River whUe serving
as the FCDA's administrator. With financial assistance from the NSRB and the
Department of Defense, the FCDA contracted with Associated Universities, Inc. to
determine the measures necessary for creating an effective civU defense program. More
than one hundred physicists, chemists, engineers, and other experts participated in the
project. Associated Universities , Inc. submitted the final multi-volume Project East River
report to Peterson's administration early in 1953."' The FCDA claimed the study had
proved "invaluable...in developing civU defense plans..." ' Peterson took the experts'
advice. Mass evacuation was practical and multipurpose. It necessitated better roads, and
every time Americans traveled to work or to play, to church or to Grandma's house on
' Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 250; and President's Press Release, 22 February 1955, Advisory Committee to Industry FUe: CivU Defense-AiinapoUs, Box 25, Papers of John M. Redding, HSTL.
"'"Summary and CheckUst of Recommendations" and "Historical Summary of Project East River Operations," app. IA of Report of the Project East River: General Report, Part I (New York: Associated Universities, 1952),
"^Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1953, 60.
162
those wide, quick, safe highways, they would be reminded that civU defense was indeed
practical. CivU defense was beneficial. CivU defense was progressive.
Progress, the theme separated Peterson's mass evacuation program from
CaldweU's shelter initiatives. Peterson could appeal to Americans' fescination with
progress. CaldweU could not. Peterson could declare that the road requirements of mass
evacuation poUcy would carry the United States into the fiiture, into a new and better era.
The FCDA would sponsor an ever-growing, ever-improving transportation network.
Four-lane highways and better ferm-to-market roads would criss-cross the country,
faciUtating mass evacuation and mutual aid, but also encouraging economic growth by
providing easier, faster transport between supply and demand centers. Wider, more
numerous streets in the cities and suburbs would reUeve traffic congestion and would
reduce the risk of accident and injury. Highways that ran through the downtown areas of
large cities would contribute to urban renewal. Peterson could use mass evacuation to
conjure images of a future era in which Americans were richer, their transportation faster,
their cities cleaner, and their Uves safer. CaldweU's shelter poUcy evoked less appeaUng
images of an earUer, harsher age in which humans dweUed in caves. Mass evacuation
conveyed a sense of movement, action, a migration to a better place. It was active.
Shelter programs were passive. Americans were to remain where they were, sit quietly,
and wait for the horror of an attack to end. The progressive nature of mass evacuation
requirements suppUed Peterson with a valuable tool for promoting civU defense."'
293i *For more detaUs on highways as a tool for urban renewal consult Richard O. Davies, The Age of Asphalt: The Automobile, the Freeway, and the Condition of Metropolitan America (PhUadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1975), 4-20.
163
In President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the FCDA found strong support for a better
highway system LUce former President Harry S Truman and leaders within the FCDA,
Eisenhower worried about the vulnerabUity of the United States government. With
governmental dispersal a bust, and with the number of federal officials in Washington
multiplying each year, Eisenhower saw the development of better roads and mass
evacuation procedures as an essential element in maintaining continuity of government
fimctions during a crisis. He also recognized that the needs of the country's expanding
economy and the escalating number of vehicles on the roads rendered the United States'
present system of highways obsolete. Lastly, he favored a comprehensive, federaUy-
fimded roads project because it would put miUions of people to work and would hush or
quiet many of the administration's critics who were calling him a do-nothing, or "Whig,"
president. '"
Eisenhower instmcted Vice President Richard Nbcon to introduce the subject of
road improvements at the July 1954 Govemors' Conference. The states' chief executives
were stunned by the breadth of the program that the Eisenhower Administration
submitted. The proposal included such things as the constmction of uniform interstate
highways with more lanes and broad shoulders, higher, sturdier overpasses and bridges,
additional and better ferm-to-market roads. The plan proposed a ten-year federal outlay
of $50 bUUon, over and above the $700 mUUon that the government was then spending
each year."'
'"Ambrose, Eisenhower, 250.
"'Ibid., 251.
164
Having briefed the state's leaders, Eisenhower worked to transform his plan from
pen and chaUc statistics to actual concrete and asphalt roadways. In the faU the president
appointed a special committee to research funding options for the program Early in 1955,
the committee submitted its report. It downsized federal responsibUities to $31.225 bUUon
over ten years, and it suggested paying for the project through special bond issues that the
federal government would retire with gasoUne and tire taxes. ' On February 22, 1955,
President Eisenhower gave Congress the report and a patriotic speech intended to move
senators and representatives to an endorsement of the plan. "Our unity as a nation is
sustained by free communication of thought and by easy transport of people and goods.
The ceaseless flow of information throughout the RepubUc is matched by individual and
commercial movement over a vast system of inter-connected highways....But, in large
part, the network is inadequate for the nation's growing needs." '
After a brief discussion of the various groups which had looked into the United
States' road requirements, the president Usted the reasons that "quick and forward-
looking" action was needed. He taUced of the opportunity to decrease traffic congestion
and the number of fataUties caused by automobUe accidents. He spoke of the high cost of
vehicle maintenance that stemmed from old and iU-repaired roadways. And he taUced
about civU defense. "In case of an atomic attack on our key cities, the road net must
permit quick evacuation of target areas, mobUization of defense forces and maintenance of
' Ambrose, Eisenhower, 251.
"^President's Press Release, 22 February 1955, Papers of John M. Redding.
165
every essential economic function. But the present system in critical areas would be the
breeder of a deadly congestion within hours of an attack." '*
More than a year elapsed before Congress passed the Federal Aid Highway Act,
commonly refened to as the Interstate Highway Act. Democrats in the House refused the
initial proposal because of the fimding issue—they wanted to raise the money for the
highways by taxing the tmcking industry more heavUy. The plan languished in a
legislative purgatory for close to a year, whUe the Eisenhower Administration and the
Democrats in Congress wrestled over funding mechanisms. Determined to see the
highways buUt, but unable to budge the Democrats, Eisenhower finaUy acquiesced to their
demands in January of 1956. The president sent word to the RepubUcans in Congress,
teUing them to agreed to the Democrats' proposal that the system be financed through
users' taxes. Congressional leaders of the country's two dominant poUtical parties then
worked on the bUl throughout the spring and early summer, and President Eisenhower
signed the Federal Aid Highway Act into law on June 29, 1956.^"
Eisenhower took much pride in the new interstate highway system. In his
memoirs he bragged that "it was the biggest peacetime constmction project of any
description ever undertaken by the United States or any other country."'^ The president
then offered dramatic examples of the project's "bigness." "The amount of concrete
"*Press Release, 22 February 1955, Redding Papers.
^"Ambrose, Eisenhower, 251, 301, 306.
'^vsight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), 548.
166
poured to form these roadways would buUd eight Hoover Dams or sbc sidewaUcs to the
moon. To buUd them, buUdozers and shovels would move enough dirt and rock to bury
aU of Connecticut two feet deep."'"' Eisenhower did not forget to mention the defensive
value of the in^roved highways. "And motorists by the mUUons would read a primary
purpose in the signs that would sprout up alongside the pavement: 'In the event of an
enemy attack, this road wiU be closed....'"'"^
The Federal CivU Defense Administration had announced its endorsement of
mass evacuation strategies more than two years before President Eisenhower penned his
name on the highway bUl. During his first year as FCDA administrator, Val Peterson had
often discussed the merits of target evacuation, but the agency did not give official notice
of a poUcy shift untU it released Advisory BuUetin No. 158 in January 1954. The Peterson
Administration noted that the advent of the hydrogen bomb had rendered previous shelter-
centered strategies obsolete. Scientists and engineers had made great leaps in weapons
technology but only smaU steps in the development of protective stmctures. Mass
evacuation of bomb targets offered the best, the only, chance of surviving a nuclear attack.
Dispatched to regional, state, and local preparedness leaders. Advisory BuUetin No. 158
heralded the FCDA's change in strategy, and it recommended that civU defense directors
initiate studies of their urban areas and begin formulating evacuation plans.'^'
'"'Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 548.
'"'Ibid., 549.
'"'Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1954 Annual Report, 31
167
Achieving universal acceptance of mass evacuation strategies by the thousands of
civU defense organizations scattered across the country constituted a major chaUenge for
the Federal CivU Defense Administration, yet a bigger problem confronted the agency.
The shift in federal strategies necessitated the reeducation of the entire population of the
United States. Peterson plugged the FCDA's new reUgion whenever he had an
opportunity. Mass evacuation became the main topic in his speeches and interviews, and
in newly-released agency pubUcations and FCDA-sponsored exercises.'""
Since automobUes played such a cmcial role in the new civU defense poUcy, the
FCDA issued a panqihlet that dealt exclusively with Americans' favorite form of
transportation—- Wheels to Survival: Your Car and Civil Defense. Paternalistic in tone,
the 1955 leaflet opened with a series of "common sense" admonitions that young drivers
StUl hear from their parents today. "Keep your tires properly inflated....Keep your gas
tank more than half-fiiU at aU times...." The leaflet's authors condensed the remaining
myriad of parental commands—get the oU changed, check the water, the transmission fluid,
the antifreeze—into one general suggestion: "Keep your car in the best possible
mechanical condition."'"'
^ C/v/7 Defense in Industry, RG 397; Federal CivU Defense Administration, Basic Course, 22-23; Idem, Report for 1953, 2, 5-6, 65-66; \954 Annual Report, 8-9, 30; Idem Facts about H-Bomb; Proceedings of Medical Civil Defense Conference, 68-72; Lapp, "Interview with Peterson," (1953), 277; and Idem, "Interview with Peterson," (1954), 365-66.
'"'Federal CivU Defense Administration, 4 Wheels to Survival: Your Car and Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1955), n.p.
168
Upon conq)leting the maintenance advice section of the work, 4 Wheels' writers
focused on the specific benefits of the car in a civU defense emergency. Besides pointing
to its obvious usefulness as a get away vehicle in a mass evacuation, the FCDA touted the
car as a miniature shelter, a home away from home, and a supply center. "Shelter in an
unexpected blast is a bonus you get from your car. More importantly, the car provides a
smaU movable house. You can get away in it-then Uve, eat, and sleep in it in almost any
cUmatic conditions...." "Your car can be a shopping center....Keep...emergency rations in
a carton, ready to be put in the trunk...Know what would be needed in the way of water
containers, first aid kit, clothing, and blankets...see that no item is forgotten if an
emergency arises."'"^
Lastly, the pamphlet emphasized the mles of poUte driving during an evacuation.
The booklet told drivers to use their vehicles to push or puU disabled cars, and stated that
it would result in "Uttle increase in your own gasoUne consumption." Other mles included
picking up as many waUcing evacuees as one's car could cany, obeying traffic authorities,
not crowding or racing other cars, and avoiding the temptation to "honk" if the traffic
slowed. "...[D]on't lean on the hom. Your impatience may become someone else's panic.
That can cost Uves!"'"^ There was no need for hysteria or fiiistration during an atomic
attack. If Americans would foUow the recommendations in 4 Wheels to Survival they
could move quickly and safely—even cheerfuUy—to a semi-rural haven far away from the
nuclear bombs that were plummeting toward their city.
'"^Federal CivU Defense Administration, 4 Wheels to Survival.
'" Ibid.
169
The FCDA tumed its back on the CaldweU and Wadsworth era arguments which
said evacuation was a physical inpossibUity in many metropoUtan areas. With motorists'
cooperation and the proper planning, the speedy, safe evacuation of most cities was
possible, the Peterson Administration claimed. Peterson's FCDA noted that large
numbers of cars and people made their way out of the cities at the end of every work day.
In support of its assertions, the FCDA offered a study of Chicago traffic. In 1955, at 4:30
p.m the single square-mUe population of the "Loop area" usuaUy stood at 910,000. By 6
o'clock only 85,000 remained. The FCDA noted even more people could move to safety
during a weU-effected evacuation, because civU defense personnel would not permit
incoming or cross traffic. The automobUes would aU be heading out.'"*
The agency submitted the conclusions of Dr. John BaUock as further evidence in
support of the efficacy of mass evacuation. BaUock, who worked in the Johns Hopkins
University Office of Research Operations, compUed a detaUed report on the number of
Uves that could be saved by a mass evacuation of the Washington, D.C, area. His studies
showed that a ten megaton hydrogen bomb would kiU close to a miUion people if the
metro's population only had time to duck and cover, but with an hour of waming and
prompt, orderly evacuation, the number of fataUties could be reduced by sbcty percent.'"'
Still, theories and reports alone would not convince everyone that mass
evacuations were practical. Peterson needed to point to actual evacuations in which
people had been relocated successfiiUy. He encouraged pro-dispersal, local civU defense
'"*Federal CivU Defense Administration, States, Counties, Cities, 9.
'"^^^,9-10.
170
organizations to stage mass evacuations in their cities. These multi-purpose exercises
would provide opportunities to train and test civU defense personnel and would bring the
FCDA needed pubUcity and statistics for its latest Ufe-saving strategy. A growing number
of urban preparedness organizations heeded the FCDA's caU. Many of them held their
practice drUls during the annual Operation Alert exercises-national civU defense driUs-
that Administrator Peterson initiated.""
The Federal CivU Defense Administration sponsored its first Operation Alert in
June of 1954, only months after Advisory BuUetin No. 158 announced mass evacuation as
the agency's official poUcy. PubUc booklets on mass evacuation were stiU in various
stages of completion. The general populace was not yet fliUy acquainted with the specifics
of emergency dispersion, and, in fact, many local civU defense bodies were stUl debating
the merits of evacuation strategy. Since U.S. civU defense was in the midst of a major
transformation, the first Operation Alert focused primarily on the outdated CaldweU-era
strategies.'"
The twenty-four hour exercise got underway at 11:00 a.m. on June 11. The
FCDA issued an alert; enemy bombers had violated American air space and were heading
toward targets in Canada and the United States. For the most part, pubUc participation
was Umited to a brief shelter driU. In twenty states, most of them in the industrial
northeast, the waU of sirens announced "Waming Red." People left their cars and offices
and took cover. Ten minutes later the sirens sounded "Waming White," and shelter
""Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1954 Annual Report, 1, 6-9, 27, 32-45.
'"Ibid., 32-45.
171
occupants emerged, fresh, unharmed, some no doubt smiUng at the game they had played,
and retumed to their daUy routines."'
With few exceptions, the rest of the exercise was conducted on paper and over
the phone by local, state, and regional civU defense authorities. The FCDA reported that
atomic, not hydrogen, bombs had detonated over forty-two metropoUtan areas in the
United States. SmaUer cities and towns had suffered incendiary raids and had been
victimized by saboteurs. Nearly twenty-five hundred "poUtical subdivisions" of the
country's civU defense networks worked through the logistics of dispatching emergency
personnel and suppUes to the stricken areas, providing care for the injured and homeless,
and, in general, setting the country back on the road to recovery. Although the exercise
was predicated upon the civU defense of the atomic, rather than the thermonuclear, age, in
its report to Congress the FCDA made special mention of the many civU defense
organizations that had discussed enacting mass plans and had proposed future evacuation
driUs.'"
It was the 1955 Operation Alert, a more grandiose undertaking than its 1954
predecessor, which pubUcized the FCDA's commitment to the strategy of mass
evacuation. Hypothetical hydrogen bombs replaced the imaginary atomic weapons of the
1953 drUl. For those areas that received advance waming of the attack, mass evacuation
offered the best chances of survival. Operation Alert, 1955, began on June 15 and ran
through June 18. On the first day of the exercise, the CivUian Air Defense Waming
'"Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1954 Annual Report, 34.
"'Ibid., 34-45.
172
System alerted fifty of ninety-two "critical target" cities of the approach of Soviet
bombers. Local civU defense groups sprang into action, many evacuating civUians from
the target areas. CD personnel outside the threat of a thermonuclear blast readied
reception areas for pre-attack evacuees and the wounded and homeless that would arrive
in the aftermath of an explosion. As alerted metropoUtan areas prepared for
thermonuclear war, the FCDA announced an enemy surprise attack against seven
additional cities. The people in these zero-warning areas had no choice but to "duck and
cover." Projected casualty rates for evacuated target areas were lower than for the cities
that received no waming. The message was clear, greater waming time and mass
evacuations saved Uves. Those people who remained in a target area would die.""
The local evacuations received some press coverage, but Val Peterson's main
pubUcity stunt for ensuring that Americans leamed the primacy of mass evacuation was
conducted with the cooperation of President Eisenhower, the members of the Cabinet and
Congress. In order to guarantee the continuing operation of the United States'
government, 15,000 federal employees, mcluding the nation's chief executive and
legislative officers, evacuated Washington, D.C. and set up temporary headquarters at
more than thirty undisclosed sites in Virginia. After the FCDA announced that an H-bomb
reduced the White House, the Capitol BuUding, and most of Washington to a pUe of
smoking mbble, television stations broadcast a message from the president. Seated in one
of his emergency compound's tents, unmffled by the devastation that had rained down on
""Guy Oakes, The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 85-86.
173
the country, Eisenhower reassured Americans that their government and their nation had
survived the (simulated) attack. The American way of Ufe would continue-thanks to
mass evacuation, Peterson could have added.'"
The FCDA's administrator aUowed the president and the press to speak for him.
They cooperated. Eisenhower's participation ki the exercise ensured widespread media
coverage of the event. In the name of national security. Administrator Peterson then
manipulated the members of the press. Insisting that the president's whereabouts would
have to remain secret during an actual attack, Peterson refused to grant reporters access
to Eisenhower's compound. Instead, the administrator confined the press to
"NEWPOINT," a media center located in a Richmond, Virginia, office buUding. They
were a captive audience, starved for information. The FCDA fed them exactly what
Administrator Peterson wanted the pubUc to see. The image that the press passed on to
the pubUc was one of a renewed and thriving civU defense agency, whose mass evacuation
strategy was accepted at the highest levels of government."^
The Federal CivU Defense Administration's campaign to seU the evacuation
concept appealed to the characteristic values of the American people. Mass evacuation
was practical. Scientists and the president of United States had demonstrated that it could
save Uves. It was cost effective; it was much less expensive than a pubUc shelter program.
Evacuation was progressive; by mandating a better network of roads, it pushed the
country toward a future America of great wealth, safety, and speed. Yes, speed
'"Oakes, Imaginary War, 86, 89.
"%id., 87-88.
174
constituted another seUing point for mass evacuation. Americans had a love-affair with
speed and the sense of racing into the future that it conveyed. In the fable of the tortoise
and the hare, American society is better represented by the speed-conscious hare."^
The FCDA retired Bert the Turtle because he embodied the shelter-centered
poUcies of the CaldweU Administration, but he also did not fit in with the images of speed
and progress that mass evacuation conveyed. In the fikn version of Duck and Cover, Bert
creeps along at a snaU's pace. There is no chance he is going to be able to put enough
distance between himself and an atomic detonation. He has no choice but to "duck and
cover" when a bomb explodes. Under Peterson, the FCDA predicated its defense strategy
on speed—fast waming, fast evacuation, fast recovery. Bert had Uttle chance of surviving
an H-bomb. His slow gait and his last-minute ducking would not save him. If a hydrogen
bomb feU, an empty, smoking sheU would be aU that was left of the now Ul-prepared turtle.
The FCDA's Training and Education Division could have put Bert in a sleek, fast car,
modified his civU defense hardhat to resemble a racing helmet, slapped some goggles and
gloves on him, and placed him at the head of a mass evacuation motorcade. Yet, as long
"^Richard O. Davies, The Age of Asphalt: The Automobile, the Freeway, and the Condition of Metropolitan America (PhUadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1975) 4-8; Mark H. Rose, Instertate: Express Highway Politics, 1941-1956 (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1979), 97-98. For information on the "seUing" of progress in the United States consult Roland Marchand, Advertising the American Dream: Making the Way for Modernity, 1920-1940 (Berkeley: University of CaUfomia Press, 1985); and Pamela WaUcer Laird, Advertising Progress: American Business and the Rise of Consumer Marketing (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
175
as the FCDA's mascot was a turtle, the agency would project unwanted images of a civU
defense that was slow, plodding, half-asleep, and backwards."*
The civU defense poUcies that Val Peterson initiated seemed destined to succeed
because the FCDA developed strategies that in many ways embodied American values.
Peterson's Administration tapped into more than Americans' fascination with progress and
speed. The new civU defense poUcies appealed to Americans' sense of individualism.
Peterson criticized spending money on pubUc shelters—taxing the rich to pay for stmctures
to protect the poor, cramming people into communal shelters. In an age of anti-
communist hysteria, Peterson moved the FCDA away from a poUcy which many feUow
RepubUcans and conservative Democrats could charge was sociaUstic in nature.
Peterson's FCDA endorsed a plan that celebrated capitaUsm and the individual.
Americans would escape harm by sheUing out money for private shelters or by cUmbing
into their private vehicles and evacuating the target areas. This privatization of civU
defense accompUshed two objectives: it tied FCDA initiatives more closely to dearly-held
pubUc values, and it placed the burden for civU defense where the authors of the early
preparedness reports had intended—on the shoulders of the individual.
Val Peterson was at the apex of his glory in 1955. He had launched a weU-
planned campaign to win support for his civU defense plans, and the president himself had
participated in a mass evacuation. LUce MUlard CaldweU, however, Peterson made
mistakes whUe serving as administrator of the Federal CivU Defense Administration.
"*Federal CivU Defense Administration and National Education Association Safety Commission, Duck and Cover (n.p.: Archer Productions, Incorporated, 1952), filmstrip; and Laird, Advertising Progress.
176
Years earUer, CaldweU had resigned. In 1956 Peterson found himself besieged with
charges of ineptitude, and came close to being forcefliUy removed from office.
It was a tiny enemy, armed with an invisible weapon, which made Peterson and
his poUcies vulnerable to attack. The FCDA's administrator was slow to recognize
pubUcly the danger this new enemy posed and slow to move the FCDA to deal with the
threat. As evidence accumulated which proved the enemy—though smaU-was great in
number, and the weapon—though invisible—was real and dangerous, the outcry against
Peterson and the FCDA's inactivity grew. "FaUout," tiny particles of matter swept into
the air by the detonation of an atomic device, was the enemy, and radiation its weapon,
which unseated the Peterson Administration and forced yet another reevaluation of civU
defense strategies.
177
CHAPTER VI
THE SKY IS FALLING: CHICKEN LITTLE, THE LUCKY
DRAGON, AND THE HOLIHELD INVESTIGATIONS
Now, I am not a psychologist...but...I am famUiar with a famous treatise on the anatomy of fear...The principal character in this case history was Chicken Licken [sic] whose obsession it was...that the sky was faUing. Now, this Chicken Licken [sic] was a leader—of a sort—though the fear of disaster from above seemed to have paralyzed her abiUty to reason. And so, when a single acorn feU on her head, she was able to convince herself that This Was It! As she had long expected, the sky was reaUy falling; the world reaUy was coming to an end, and there was nothing she could do to save herself but run and teU the king. Unfortunately, Chicken Licken [sic] was able to convince others of the same thing, and so her fiiends Henny Penny, and Cocky Locky, and Drakey Lakey, and aU the rest, joined her in a headlong msh to the Capitol—I mean the castle—looking for aid. But on the way they met a very, very smart fox, and what did Foxy Loxy do? Taking advantage of their panic-stricken desire to be saved by someone else—anyone else but themselves—he steered them smoothly into his hole, and ate them aU up...And so it seems to me that the moral of this tale is not that the sky didn't faU-for it might, in our time...The real moral is that there must be some stabUizing influence in every home, and in every neighborhood, to lead the Chicken Lickens [sic] of our world away from imagined dangers.'"
Standing before the National Board of Directors of the General Federation of
Women's Clubs, FCDA Deputy Administrator Katherine G. Howard continued her speech
by charging the "housevsives and homemakers of the land" with the responsibUity of
learning the facts of civU defense and disseminating them to their famiUes and fiiends.
Howard told women to arm themselves with knowledge and strike back at the naysayers
and fataUsts. The most powerful weapon in the enemy's arsenal was not the atomic or the
'""The Distaff Side of CivU Defense," Folder Board of Directors of the General Federation of Women's Clubs, Box 10, Katherine G. Howard Papers, 1917-74, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (DDEL). The chUdren's Uterature character to which Katherine Howard refers is more commonly caUed "Chicken Little."
178
hydrogen bomb, it was the hysteria, despair, and apathy that had infected many Americans
and which spread to others everyday. Howard caUed upon housewives, the keepers and
nurturers of patriotic values to act as antibodies to this paralyzing contagion, and destroy
the disease that would so weaken Americans' resolve it would guarantee the nation's
defeat in a future war. The FCDA's deputy administrator voiced her certainty that the
United States would survive a nuclear war and would emerge victorious if women puUed
together and acted as a moral, stabUizing influence for the country's 160 mUUon citizens, if
they ensured that "aU of them [were] dedicated to the freedom of their nation."'"
Howard's was an "isms" speech, with individuaUsm, voluntarism, optimism, and
patriotism occupying center stage, but a careful observer wUl notice that Mrs. Howard
also engineered a subtle attack against the CaldweU-era shelter poUcy. When Howard
deUvered her address in October of 1953, Val Peterson had been running the FCDA for
close to a year, and already the agency was reflecting the new boss's bias toward pubUc
shelters. Howard utUized the story of Chicken Little to teach women the importance of
resisting panic. At the same time, however, the fable offered a criticism of pubUc shelter
initiatives. Chicken Little ran to the government for help, instead of helping herself The
Peterson Administration focused its attention on mass evacuation poUcy-citizens' use of
private transportation to escape an atomic attack. The agency also reserved some praise
for concemed, shelter-centered, private citizens who took the initiative and either
purchased or constmcted shelters for their suburban homes. Peterson reserved most of his
criticisms for federaUy-fimded pubUc shelters-they were expensive, their Ufe-saving
'""Distaff Side of CivU Defense," Howard Papers.
179
potential uncertain, and they transferred the responsibUity for civU defense from the
individual to the government.'^'
When she recited the detaUs of Chicken Little's demise, Howard aimed a
subUminal knockout punch at the shelter strategy. Chicken Little and her fiiends
franticaUy sought someone to save them as their world was coming to an end. Dreaded
A-bombs-in this case, "a" for acom-were falling from the sky! The deceitful Foxy Loxy
opened his spacious underground shelter to the pubUc and invited them to take cover.
Chicken Little and her fiiends accepted, descended into the shelter, and there they died.
No doubt if Peterson could have tacked an epUogue onto the end of the story, he would
have noted that the inteUigent animals stayed calm and above ground. They watched for
waming of an acom-bomb attack, avoided bumps and bmises by evacuating the area when
an alert sounded, and Uved long, productive, happy Uves.
When Katherine Howard stated that the sky indeed might faU during her Ufetime,
she was referring to the possibiUty of enemy planes dropping bombs on the United States.
In the years that foUowed Howard's presentation, however, a growing number of
Americans became preoccupied with another danger that rained down from the sky,
"faUout"-irradiated dust and droplets of water that were by-products of nuclear test
detonations. The initial explosion of a nuclear device would lift tons of radioactively-
charged, pulverized debris into the air. The heavier particles and those not caught by wind
'""Distaff Side of CivU Defense," Howard Papers; Ralph Lapp, "An Interview with Govemor Val Peterson," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 10, no. 10 (1954): 375-76; and Proceedings of Medical Civil Defense Conference, New York-May 31, 1953 (New York: American Medical Association CouncU on National Emergency Medical Service, 1953), 69-70.
180
currents would quickly faU back to the earth, creating an area of high radioactive
contamination in the immediate vicinity of the atomic or thermonuclear burst. The Ughter
matter would "feU-out" more graduaUy as it drifted on the winds tens, even hundreds, of
mUes from the bomb site. The concentrations of irradiated feUout would diminish with
distance from ground zero, but the fact remained that nuclear tests produced huge,
eUiptical swaths of "dirty," or radiation poisoned, land and water on their windward sides.
Debates over the danger posed by nuclear testing and the Ungering radioactivity it
produced raged within the scientific community and spread to the pubUc at large. The
advent of the hydrogen bomb and the visible effect that contact with radioactive debris
produced in humans brought a new intensity to the arguments between nuclear tests'
advocates and critics.'"
The Federal CivU Defense Administration was one of the agencies caught in the
middle of the debate. The FCDA had downplayed consistently the danger of radiation,
and it continued in its "see no evU" poUcy. Val Peterson hoped to shift civU defense
strategies from bomb shelters to mass evacuation; faUout threatened to unseat his plan.
Americans could drive fifteen or twenty mUes from a target area and escape the blast and
fire produced by an H-bomb, but recognition of faUout as a Ufe-threatening enemy would
necessitate sending evacuees to areas fifty, one hundred, or more mUes away. Peterson's
'"Robert A. Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 35, 321; and Howard BaU, Justice Downwind: America's Atomic Testing Program in the 1950s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), vU-bc.
181
only other option was to retum the FCDA to a poUcy of shelter constmction, a poUcy
which he had opposed since before Congress passed the CivU Defense Act of 1950.'"
The story of Chicken Little developed new overtones and held a special meaning
for the FCDA in the mid-1950s. Indeed, the sky was faUing, and Chicken Little raUied
others to petition the government to protect them from death and/or disfigurement. In her
speech Howard said, "...fear of disaster from above seemed to have paralyzed her
[Chicken Little's] abUity to reason."' " Peterson's FCDA appUed this statement to the
faUout-fearing pubUc at large. The Federal CivU Defense Administration reacted to taUc of
radiation dangers as it had in the past. It acknowledged that nuclear bombs produced
some radioactivity, but it contended lingering radiation would cause few deaths.
According to the FCDA, blast and fire remained the most dangerous threats in a nuclear
strike, and mass evacuation was a viable strategy for escape. The Peterson Administration
refused to retum to a shelter-oriented civU defense poUcy. Val Peterson remained
steadfest in his conviction that mbble from crumbUng buUdings would make the shelters
death traps-Chicken Little, Henny Penny, and the rest would die underground.'"
Unfortunately for Peterson, shelters led to his-not Chicken Little's-downfaU.
For the tale of Chicken Little to Ulustrate the history of civU defense in the Fifties, the
'"Thomas J. Ken, C/v/7 Defense in the U.S.: Band-Aid for a Holocaust? (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), 44.
'""Distaff Side of CivU Defense," Howard Papers.
^^^Medical Conference, 69-70; Federal CivU Defense Administration, Facts About the H-Bomb (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1953); and Idem, Facts About Fallout (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1955).
182
story's ending requires modification. In the updated version. Chicken Little enUsts the
support of prominent scientists and poUtical lobbyists, as weU as other concemed citizens,
and she attracts the attention of the government. The country's legislative body then
holds an inquiry to determine what action has been taken to meet the threat of faUout from
the sky, finds the nation's civU defense leadership and poUcies inept, and caUs for a change
in personnel and preparedness strategies. The head of the civU defense agency resigns. A
new director steps in and advocates the constmction of faUout shelters. Foxy Loxy stops
eating his feUow citizens and, instead, tries to strike it rich by buUding underground
shelters which he claims provide safe, fun, and cozy Uving for any famUy.
Although fear of radiation's adverse effects on the Uving increased dramaticaUy in
the mid-Fifties, concem first appeared decades earUer, shortly after the discovery of X-
rays and radioactive elements. The earUest studies of radiation focused on X-rays, which
the German physicist WUhelm Roentgen found in 1895. WhUe conducting experiments
with cathode-ray tubes—electricaUy-charged vacuum tubes which glowed because of the
heat-induced movement of negatively-charged particles, electrons-Roentgen noted that a
fluorescent screen some distance from the tube also glowed. The effect was not reduced
when he covered the cathode tube v^th black paper, and the glow's intensity weakened
only sUghtly when Roentgen placed his wife's hand between the tube and the screen.
Upon looking at the hand, the physicist reaUzed that he could see the faint outUne of the
bones, and he reaUzed what was occurring. The charged cathode-ray tube was radiating
183
energy in the form of an electromagnetic wave, or ray, through the paper, the air, and the
hand, onto the screen. Roentgen named the waves "X-rays", "X" for unknown.'"
FoUowing hard on the heels of Roentgen's find was the discovery by other
scientists that certain naturaUy-occurring elements released radiant energy. Early in 1896
Henry Becquerel, a physicist from France, proved that uranium was one such element.
Two years later, Piene and Marie Curie, who coined the term "radioactivity" for the
spontaneous emission of radiation, separated a new radioactive element, radium, from a
uranium-rich pitchblende ore.' ^
InitiaUy, scientists and the pubUc aUke entertained great hopes for the medical
uses of radiation. The X-ray's abUity to serve as a photographic tool for bones and
internal organs advanced diagnostic medicine and benefitted the surgical fields. Doctors
also employed X-rays to treat skin blemishes and discussed the possibiUty of using the
electromagnetic waves to determine pregnancy and, perhaps, photograph the soul.' *
Americans welcomed the practical uses of radium, as weU. The radioactive
element was a key ingredient in Dr. W. J. Morton's "Liquid Sunshine," which appeared on
the market in the first decade of the twentieth century. Morton claimed that those who
'"Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon &, Schuster, 1986), 41. Radio waves, microwaves, gamma waves, cosmic waves, and visible, infrared, and ultraviolet Ught are other members of the electromagnetic spectrum.
'"AUan M. Winkler, Life Under A Cloud: American Anxiety About the Atom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 85.
'"Winkler, Under a Cloud, 86; and Stephen HUgartner, Richard C BeU, and Rory O'Connor, Nukespeak: The Selling of Nuclear Technology in America (Fairfield, Penn.: Penguin Books, 1983), 2-3.
184
drank the glowing eUxir would be healed of any internal disorder. When introducing
Liquid Sunshine to a meeting of Massachusetts Institute of Technology alumni, he praised
his tonic's quaUties, stating "it wUl be possible to bathe a patient's entire interior in violet
or ultraviolet Ught....We know of the value of sunshine on the outside...and we beUeve it
wUl have a simUar effect on the inside."'^' His product sold. At a later banquet, the MIT
alums ended their dinner with a Liquid Sunshine toast. With gusto, people in the
Northeast downed radioactive cocktaUs and waited for physical regeneration.""
In addition to their manifested enthusiasm for radium's supposed therapeutic
vgdue, Americans prized the substance for its luminous quaUty. The watches produced by
the United States Radium Corporation boasted glow-in-the-dark faces. The company
hired young women to paint numbers on the dials, usuig oU paints with a high radium
content. During the course of the workday, as their camel-hair bmshes became frayed, the
women would smooth them back to a point by twirUng the bmsh tips between their Ups.
Sometimes, to reUeve the tedium of their work, they would paint their naUs or their teeth
and flash glowing smUes at their coworkers.'"
The initial euphoric celebration of aU-things radioactive ended abmptly as the
dangerous side affects of radiation began to appear. People that worked closely with X-
rays developed bums and cancer. As high energy electromagnetic rays penetrate the body,
they produce an ionizing effect. The waves' force separates electrons from atoms,
'^'Quoted in HUgartner et al., Nukespeak, 5.
""Ibid.
"'Winkler, Cloud, 87-88.
185
creatuig atomic fragments, or ions. Ionization dismpts a ceU's stmctural integrity and can
lead to the mutation or death of the ceU. The blood and blood-producing tissues are
especiaUy vulnerable to the effects of radiation. Besides killing large numbers of red blood
cells, radiation dismpts ceUular division and reduces the production of white blood cells
and anticoagulants, thus lowering the body's resistance to disease."^
Radioactive materials such as radium and the entire varied spectrum of fission
products released by an atomic or hydrogen bomb's detonation, generate both particle and
wave radiation and constitute an even greater health hazard than X-rays. NaturaUy-
occurring and synthetic radioactive elements spontaneously undergo nuclear decay. As a
byproduct of decomposition, they emit radiant energy in the form of alpha and beta
particles, and gamma rays. Alpha particles are positively-charged HeUum atoms; beta
particles, high-energy electrons. Gamma rays are electromagnetic waves, Uke X-rays, but
characterized by a higher energy value and shorter wavelength. Of alpha, beta, and
gamma radiation, the last is the most dangerous. Gamma rays penetrate non-dense
substances—including flesh and bone—more readUy than do alpha or beta particles.
Nonetheless, if particle radiation is inhaled or ingested and becomes lodged in the internal
organs, it can prove just as deadly as its wave counterparts. The dangers posed by the
ingestion of radioactive materials were made pubUc when the female en^loyees of the
"^Rhodes, Atomic Bomb, 731; George T. Mazuzun and Samuel J. WaUcer, Controlling the Atom: The Beginnings of Nuclear Regulation, 1946-1962 (Berkeley: University of CaUfomia Press, 1985), 33; and Ruth Adams and Susan CuUen, eds., The Final Epidemic: Physicians and Scientists on Nuclear War (Chicago, lU.: Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, 1981), 151-223.
186
United States Radium Corporation, suffering and dying from a number of diseases, sued
their employers.'"
A number of variables, including the length of exposure to radioactive materials
and the level of radioactivity, determine the path that radiation sickness takes. Many of
radiation's pioneering scientists, such as Marie and Piene Curie, experienced hair loss,
graduaUy developed red or purple radiation "bums,"and then succumbed to diseases such
as cancer as a result of their prolonged exposure to relatively low-level radiation. Many of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki's inhabitants who received massive doses of gamma radiation
when an atomic bomb detonated exhibited more extreme symptoms. Thousands died
almost instantly, their bodies covered with third degree radiation bums. Others survived
the external bums but not the internal damage. These "Uving dead" often first complained
of headaches and fetigue, and ran fevers. They experienced inflammation of the mucus
membranes. Then they began to suffer from dianhea, its blood content high. As tissues
and organs died, the bleeding became more pronounced, blood flowing out of the mouth,
the rectum, and the urinary tract. Most died from the hemonhaging. The people who did
not sustain as much internal damage and who managed to recover from the initial violent
trauma stUl inclined a greater risk of future disease because of the mutation of ionized
cells and damage to the immune system.""
'"Mazuzun and WaUcer, Controlling the Atom, 33-34; and HUgartner et al., Nukespeak, 9-11.
""Rhodes, Atomic Bomb, 731-32; and Adams and CuUen, Final Epidemic, 195-96.
187
With the recognition of radiation hazards came attempts to minimize the risk of
injury. During the 1910s, radiation advisory bodies sprang up in England and Germany.
As awareness increased so did the number of advisory committees abroad. The European
organizations created an International Congress of Radiology to coordinate the various
boards' findings. In 1928, at its second meeting, the Congress estabUshed the
International X-Ray and Radium Protection Committee v^ose task it was to recommend
guideUnes for radiation use. The foUowing year, a group of U.S. businessmen and
radiological experts formed the American Advisory Committee on X-Ray and Radium
Protection. Eight people, half of them representatives from the country's X-ray
equipment manufacturers and the other four taken from professional societies, comprised
the board's membership.'"
The strong presence of businessmen on the American Advisory Committee
guaranteed that the board would not denounce the use of radioactive substances
altogether, but would try to determine how much radiation the human body could absorb
before showing signs of Ul effects. It should have surprised no one when the committee
adopted standards proposed by physicist Arthur MutscheUer, an employee of an X-ray
equipment con^any. German-bom, but an American emigre, MutscheUer proposed
tolerance Umits for exposure to radiation. Since the harmful effects of radiation first
manifest extemaUy as red blotches, bums, on the skin, MutscheUer attempted to determine
the maximum daUy dose of radiation a person could receive and not develop a skin
initation. In 1934, the American Committee on X-Ray and Radium Protection and the
'"Mazuzun and WaUcer, Controlling the Atom, 34.
188
intemational advisory body used MutscheUer's studies to derive tolerance Umits for
exposure to radiation. The unit of measurement employed was the roentgen (r), its name
taken from the X-ray's discoverer. The United States' advisory committee recommended
levels of. 1 r per day for whole body exposure and 5 r per day for workers' fingers. The
intemational group set Umits that were sUghtly higher. WhUe significant, MutscheUer's
investigations were far from exhaustive. Decades passed before scientists developed a
thorough understanding of radiation's effects on Uving organisms."^
In the 1930s the American and the intemational radiation committees endorsed
the idea of a radiation threshold. They did not fliUy recognize the potential danger of
exposure to high-energy electromagnetic waves and particles. They observed no teU-tale
characteristics of sickness in workers who were exposed daUy to smaU doses of radiation.
Early in their history, therefore, the advisory bodies based their recommendations on the
notion that below a certain level of exposure, radiation produced a less toxic reaction in
humans."^
The threshold theory's opposite, the cumulative-effect argument, gained
acceptance in the 1940s. According to those who championed the cumulative hypothesis,
absorption of any radiation was dangerous because it dismpted normal ceU stmcture and
behavior. Individuals exposed to low level radiation on a regular basis suffered a constant
energy-bombardment of their ceUs, and the cumulative effect of smaU radiation doses
could prove injurious or even lethal. Working from this new premise, the American
"^Mazuzun and WaUcer, Controlling the Atom, 34.
'"Ibid., 35.
189
advisory body, which had changed its name to the National Committee on Radiation
Protection (NCRP), modified its suggestions on radiation exposure. In the years
foUowing World War II, as scientists amassed more information on the effects of
radiation, the NCRP dropped the term "tolerance dose," adopted "maximum permissible
dose," and lowered whole-body Umits from .1 r per day to .3 r per week. StUl, the word
"permissible" impUed that the committee's members beUeved certain considerations-such
as profit for the X-ray equipment manufacturers or research for the scientists-justified the
limited absorption of ionizing particles and rays."*
For officers of the federal government, it was the defense of the "free world" that
relegated concerns over radiation poisoning to a position of secondary importance. The
Manhattan Project's development of the atomic fission bomb during World War II raised
new questions about radioactivity. In the aftermath of the bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, medical doctors and other scientists gathered volumes of data on the causes of
death in the two cities. As mentioned previously, most studies concluded that the bomb's
blast and secondary fires accounted for the majority of deaths. Yet the investigating teams
could not whoUy disregard the effects of radiation. They could not ignore the thousands
of people who died from "flash bums" received when the Little Boy and Fat Man
explosions released banages of gamma radiation. The most penetrating rays in the
electromagnetic spectrum, the high-intensity beams sped through the cities, ripping
through buUdings, through humans, through aU but the most dense substances, Uke lead.
"*Maziizim and WaUcer, Controlling the Atom, 37-39.
190
Smashing electrons off the atoms they encountered, the rays left behind a traU of dead and
dying Japanese.'"
The research teams could not overlook the devastation wrought by gamma
radiation, but they did contend that the dangers posed by "Ungering radiation" were
negUgible. FaUout was bom with the detonation of the first atomic device; nonetheless,
the term "faUout" did not become a household word in the United States untU the mid-
Fifties. Lingering radioactivity was not recognized as Ufe threatening. After Little Boy
and Fat Man exploded, particles of inadiated matter hung in the atomic clouds over
Hiroshima and Nagasaki and graduaUy feU out onto the land and the people below. But in
their official reports to the U.S. government, civilian and miUtary investigators claimed
that no one had died from the residual radiation.'""
Perhaps their assertions were conect, although the lack of understanding about
radiation's biological effects, in general, and the first-time encounter with the biological
effects of an atomic bomb, cast a paU of uncertainty over the reports. The atomic bombs
detonated high in the air, not at ground level, Umiting the load of inadiated debris Ufted
into the stem and cap of the mushroom-shaped clouds. The force of the bombs'
explosions further restricted the amount of faUout; Little Boy weighed in at only 12.5
kUotons and Fat Man at 22 kUotons. Hydrogen bombs measured at the megaton level.
'"Rhodes, Atomic Bomb, 731-34; and U.S. Army, Manhattan Engineer District, The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, undated, 1-34.
'""U.S. Army, Manhattan Engineer District, The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (n.p.: Manhattan Engineer District, n.d.), 1-34.
191
Lastly, in 1945 it was known that most radioactive isotopes decayed quickly-some took
only seconds, others hours or a couple of days.'"'
It required the detonation of future, bigger atomic and hydrogen bombs to trigger
concem over faUout. Americans worried a Uttle after the 1946 Operation Crossroads tests
at BUcini, one of thirty-four atolls that comprise the MarshaU Islands in the West Pacific.
The second atomic bomb detonated during the exercise generated much higher levels of
initial and residual radiation than anticipated. The device exploded underwater and
inadiated more debris than had the atmospheric detonations of Little Boy and Fat Man.
Radiation poisoned the water in the atoU's lagoon, and faUout, in the form of radioactive
dusts and drops of water, blanketed the region. Ships entering the test area became
contaminated. Fish absorbed so much radiation that they left images of their internal
physiology when placed on photographic plates.'"^
David Bradley, a medical doctor and a member of the Operation Crossroads
radiological team, recorded the tests' effects and his own worry about the uncertainty of
Ufe in the Atomic Age. His book's title. No Place to Hide (1948), reflected the author's
fear of the radiation released by atomic bombs. No Place to Hide made the New York
Times bestseUer Ust for ten weeks, and by the end of the decade more than 250,000
Americans had purchased a copy. If each buyer shared the book with ten people, and they
aU were persuaded by Bradley's arguments, they would stUl represent less than two
'"'Rhodes, Atomic Bomb, 711, 740.
'"^David Bradley, No Place to Hide (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1948), 103-4, 125.
192
percent of the country's total population. Bradley's work merits attention because it is an
early attempt to raise pubUc awareness on the issue of atomic radiation and feUout, but its
intact on pubUc opinion should not be exaggerated.'"'
In 1950, widespread fear of faUout was stUl four years distant, even though
Americans were suddenly placed in much closer proximity to atomic tests. The Atomic
Energy Commission had petitioned for a domestic atomic test range to supplement the
Pacific site, and to insure that the United States could continue its exercises unintermpted
if an enemy interfered with the isolated testing area in the Pacific Ocean. After examining
potential sites in New Mexico, Utah, and North CaroUna, the Truman Administration
decided the Nevada Desert would become home to the new testing range. From 1950 to
1963 the United States detonated dozens of atomic and hydrogen bombs at the Las
Vegas-Tonopah Bombing and Gunnery Range. Many produced large, "dirty" clouds fiUed
with radioactive debris. The faUout from a May 1953 atomic shot, designated "Harry,"
but which came to be caUed "Dirty Harry," exposed the inhabitants of St. George, Utah,
to more radioactivity than the yearly aUowances that the National Committee on Radiation
Protection recommended for people who worked with radiation. In its wake, Harry's
inadiated cloud left a number of sick people and more than four thousand dead sheep.'""
"Dirty Harry" was one of the few pre-1954 detonations that brought complaints
from private citizens and the press. A carnival atmosphere generaUy sunounded the
atomic tests. The Las Vegas-Tonopah Bombing and Gunnery Range became a tourist
'"'Bradley, No Place, xiv; and Winkler, Under a Cloud, 91.
'""BaU, Justice Downwind, 28-29, 43-44; and Winkler, Under a Cloud, 92-93.
193
attraction- With the site a mere hour's drive from Las Vegas, Americans could travel to
the range and "ooh" and "aah" over the biggest "fireworks" displays known to man. Area
newspapers pubUshed the scheduled detonations of nuclear devices and pointed out the
best vantage points for those who wanted to watch the show.'"'
The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was in large part responsible both for the
overwhelming amount of early pubUc enthusiasm over atomic weapons and the low levels
of criticism. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 which created the AEC charged the body
with conflicting duties. The commission was to promote the use of atomic energy, but it
was responsible also for ensuring pubUc safety. The AEC made the official decisions on
radiation safety measures. Although the NCRP continued to pubUsh its own findings and
recommendations, it remained an advisory body without official recognition or power.
Determined to maintain American superiority in nuclear power and the arms race, and
recognizing the relationship between pubUc support and federal appropriations, the AEC
focused on its promotional campaigns and often neglected its responsibUity to protect the
people from radiation hazards. On occasion the commission tried to buUy the NCRP,
pressuring the advisory body to release information to the AEC before informing the
pubUc. With advance waming, the AEC could prepare reactive strategies that either
upheld the NCRP findings or attempted to discredit them. '"
'"'Winkler, Under a Cloud, 92
'" BaU, Justice Downwind, 37-39; and Mazuzun and WaUcer, Controlling the Atom, 6, 37-38.
194
In addition, AEC employees later testified that their superiors had ordered them
to give vague answers when questioned about tests Uke the Dirty Harry shot that
jeopardized the pubUc's health. In official statements and pubUcations, agency personnel
contended that the threat of injury from residual radiation was minimal. Although reUable,
quantitative data on the chronic dangers was lacking, AEC en^loyees knew that exposure
to large amounts of highly-radioactive particulate faUout was dangerous. A former AEC
PubUc Health Service Radiation Safety Monitor, Frank Butrico, testified that his superiors
ordered him to distort the tmth when residents of St. George, Utah, caUed him after Dirty
Harry's cloud dumped tons of uradiated dust on their city. Butrico told AEC officers that
his radiation-detection instruments had jumped off the scale. PersonaUy, he took several
showers and bumed the clothes that he had been wearing when the test occuned, but the
radiation monitor foUowed his orders and told concemed private citizens that area
radiation had not risen to dangerous levels. Radio stations in the St. George area passed
on the AEC's pubUc recommendation that people simply shut their windows, remain
indoors for a few hours, and perhaps take a shower if they had been outside. The
radioactivity persisted much longer than the AEC's waming impUed, but radiation was
invisible, and the commission's most important considerations were keeping the American
pubUc calm, optimistic, and in favor of fiiture testing.'"^
As a result of its conflicting mandates and its bias toward the development of
nuclear hardware, the AEC withheld information and misled the pubUc for decades. In the
late 1950s, at the height of the faUout controversy, the commission's FaUout Studies
'" BaU, Justice Downwind, 43-44; and Winkler, Under a Cloud, 93.
195
Branch in its Biology and Medicine Division discovered that radioactive iodine traveled
straight to the thyroid gland when ingested, leading to thyroid cancer. The AEC buried
the report. The American pubUc did not leam of the iodine/thyroid study and others that
would have proved equaUy damaging to the AEC's Cold War mission, untU the late
1970s, when Freedom of Information Act requests to the Department of Energy forced
their release.'"*
For years, the Federal CivU Defense Administration served as a conduit for
distributing the AEC's misinformation to the people. The AEC was the official authority
on nuclear hazards. It was the body responsible for issuing reports on the effects of
radiation. It was the agency which possessed a General Advisory CouncU staffed with
atomic scientists. The FCDA boasted no simUar panel of scientific experts; rather, it was
staffed with poUticians, businessmen, promotional speciaUsts, and tme beUevers who had
worked as civU defense personnel during World War II. The FCDA looked to the AEC's
experts for information on radiation hazards. Then, through miUions of civU defense
pamphlets, news articles, and pubUc announcements, it disseminated the AEC's "official
line," the message that the commission wanted the American pubUc to hear.'"'
The AEC/FCDA relationship raises obvious questions. Were FCDA leaders
privy to aU of the AEC's data on radiation hazards? Was the FCDA an innocent or a
willing "dupe" of the Atomic Energy Commission? The evidence indicates that members
of the Peterson Administration knew the AEC was withholding facts from the pubUc, and,
'"*BaU, Justice Downwind, 44.
'"'Ken, C/v/7 Defense Band-Aid, 76.
196
when in 1954 "feUout" became a primary concem for the average American, the FCDA
coUaborated with the AEC in restricting the flow of information to the pubUc. In
particular, the result of AEC/FCDA exchanges during Eisenhower's brief affair with a
federal "poUcy of candor" show that the Federal CivU Defense Administration compUed
with the Atomic Energy Commission's demands for secrecy.""
Physicist Robert Oppenheimer began the crusade for governmental candor. In
the July 1953 issue of Foreign Affairs, Oppenheimer wamed against the disastrous
consequences of an arms race. He feared nuclear annUiUation of the United States and the
Soviet Union and compared the two atomic powers to "two scorpions in a bottle, each
capable of killing the other, but only at the risk of his own Ufe." Oppenheimer voiced his
opinion that the people would support his caU for a halt to the arms race if the country's
leaders would reveal the tme size and power of the United States' nuclear stockpUe.'"
President Eisenhower was taken with Oppenheimer's "candor poUcy" proposal.
LUce the former science director of the Manhattan Project, the United States' chief
executive fevored an end to the arms race and possibly nuclear disarmament, but he knew
the American pubUc would frown upon such a suggestion. Eisenhower saw a ray of hope
in Oppenheimer's suggestion. Perhaps if the people leamed the fiightening detaUs of the
H-bomb's destmctive power it would shock them into supporting a disarmament initiative.
Accordingly, the president instmcted one of his executive assistants, CD. Jackson, to
""Ken, C/v/7 Defense Band-Aid, 71-73.
'"J. Robert Oppenheimer, "Atomic Weapons and American Foreign PoUcy," Foreign Affairs (July 1953), 528-31.
197
write a speech that would candidly and in graphic detaU reveal the power of fusion
weapons."^
Admiral Lev^ Strauss, chairperson of the Atomic Energy Commission, opposed
the proposed "poUcy of candor." Strauss's commission had withheld information from the
pubUc precisely because he did not want Americans to strike for nuclear disarmament.
Moreover, the AEC chair realized that once the government revealed the size and power
of the U.S. arsenal to the American people, the information would make its way to the
Soviets. Strauss was a Cold War warrior. He beUeved U.S. security hinged on the
country's atomic strength. He contended that Soviet interest in disarmament or a testing
moratorium was a calculated strategy to further communist expansion—a propaganda tool
for convincing third world nations that the U.S.S.R. was the "good guy" and a mse for
stripping the westem European countries of their detenent force and lulling them into a
state of bUssfiil ignorance. If the leaders of Russia knew the exact dimensions of the
American detenent stockpUe, they would not rest untU their own was equal or greater in
force and number. They might outwardly pretend to comply with disarmament, but
secretly they would intensify their efforts to overtake the United States in nuclear
technology. Secretary of State John Foster DuUes voiced the same objections.'"
WhUe the AEC mounted an offensive against the proposed candor poUcy, the
FCDA pledged its support for the program. Val Peterson dashed off a letter to General
"^Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 132.
'"Ibid., 132-33.
198
Robert Cutler, the chair of the National Security CouncU's Planning Board. Peterson
fevored a poUcy of candor, because he beUeved the absence of official, authoritative pubUc
releases jeopardized the FCDA's mission. The people had noticed the federal
government's sUence, its close censorship and screening of reports, the lag between its
knowledge of Soviet tests and pubUc announcements confirming the events. Peterson
contended that the absence of candor encouraged the spread of rumors that were always
either more fiightening or much more optimistic than the tmth. If Americans came to
beUeve in the existence of super-weapons which could completely destroy the world,
bombs from which there was no escape, they would not join a civU defense organization.
There would be no point. Similarly if Americans did not beUeve that the United States and
the Soviet Union were developing weapons of mass destmction, there would be no
impetus for enrollment in civilian defense. Peterson contended that a lack of candor "has
resulted in uncertainty and an unwillingness to support these [civU defense] programs."
The FCDA's administrator blamed the government's hush poUcy for the pubUc's
increasing apathy toward civU defense.""
Peterson singled out no specific federal entity for criticism, but a September 16,
1953 letter from Deputy Administrator Katherine Howard to CD. Jackson identified the
Atomic Energy Commission as one of the agencies that was throwing roadblocks in front
of the FCDA. In her petition to Jackson, the deputy administrator identified one of the
FCDA's immediate reasons for supporting the candor poUcy. CivU defense officials
""Val Peterson to General Robert Cutler, 22 May 1953, Folder White House Conespondence, Box 2, Conespondence of Administrator Val Peterson, 1953-1957, RG 396, National Archives and Records Administration, CoUege Park [hereafter NARACP].
199
wanted to give the pubUc more infomiation on the H-bomb, but the Atomic Energy
Commission and the Department of Defense had vetoed the idea. Howard contended that
the lack of specific detaUs and "the expected fluny of speculation in print and over the air
appears to be having the usual result. When a problem, or a threat, looms so
overwhelmingly that it seems to have no answer, the human mind tends to reject it and
take refiige in escapism" Howard stated that the FCDA had confronted successfoUy a
simUar problem with pubUc fear of the Soviets' atomic capabUities. To fight despair and
resignation, the agency had bombarded the people with information on "what it [the
atomic bomb] can do, what it probably cannot do - and what action they can take to
minimize its effects." The FCDA took pride in the "progress...made in preparing the
American pubUc psychologicaUy against the A-bomb." Howard argued that her agency
could ready the people to meet the threat of the hydrogen bomb if the Atomic Energy
Commission and the Department of Defense would cooperate and declassify materials
relating to the 1952 MIKE test at Eniwetok.'"
In particular, Howard wanted access to a fUm that the AEC and DOD had made.
The movie cataloged the events of the Operation Ivy test, from the MIKE explosion to the
after-effects of high-level radioactivity. In her letter to Jackson, Howard contended that
Operation Ivy footage would act as a counter to wUd "unofficial speculation" about the
power of the H-bomb. The FCDA would buUd an education campaign around the film
and would supply the pubUc with a calm, unemotional, and authoritative exposition of the
'"Katherine Howard to CD. Jackson, 16 September 1953, Folder CivU Defense (1), Box 16, Subject Series, White House Central FUes (Confidential FUe) 1953-61, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, DDEL.
200
essential fects about thermonuclear weapons, their probable effects, and civU defense
measures to minimize those effects. According to Howard, whUe the tme measure of an
H-bomb's force was sobering, felse rumors of its apocalyptic power were much more
fiightening. She asked the government to tum on the Ughts for the American people.
Monsters always seem bigger and scarier in the dark."*
The Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense officiaUy
opposed the poUcy of candor, because they claimed it would compromise national
security. According to the two bodies, the United States could release neither the tme
size and power of the country's nuclear arsenal nor the Operation Ivy film. Both verbaUy
and visuaUy, the movie revealed the dimensions of the MIKE blast. The AEC and the
DOD did not want that information to filter to the Soviets. Further, the tmth might not
reassure the American pubUc; it might scare them kito opposing nuclear armament.
Admiral Strauss made it clear to President Eisenhower that he opposed any slowdown in
the United States' development and production of bigger, better bombs."^
By the closing months of 1953, Eisenhower had abandoned his hopes for a poUcy
of candor. Jackson had drafted several speeches that detaUed the honors of nuclear
warfere, but the president's assistant secretary had faUen prey to the same rumors whose
pubUc influence civU defense authorities so greatly feared. The president complained that
Jackson's descriptions of a nuclear conflict always ended with "everybody dead on both
"^Howard to Jackson, 16 September 1953, Eisenhower Papers.
'"Howard to Cutler, Eisenhower Papers; and Ambrose, Eisenhower, 132-33.
201
sides with no hope anywhere," and he pointedly asked his secretary, "Can't we find some
hope?' Jackson cUd not beUeve that there was any to be found."*
Eisenhower feced a dUemma. If he presented one of what came to be caUed
Jackson's "Bang! Bang! papers," it could produce disastrous results. Most Ukely, the
American people would demand disarmament initiatives, but what if the plans feU
through? Americans would either despair or they would demand lavish spending on
survival projects, such as community shelters, underground cities. Eisenhower opposed
sinking bUUons of dollars into pubUc shelter projects. He was a budget-conscious
RepubUcan, and a veteran of war. Later, when approached with recommendations for a
national pubUc shelter program, the exasperated president exclaimed that the people's
morale, their spiritual strength, not expensive gadgets, would ensure the country's
survival. Rather than risk breaking the pubUc's spirit with predictions of nuclear
aiinihUation, the president discarded his plans for a poUcy of candor.'"
The Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense could claim
victory, but so could the Federal CivU Defense Administration. Howard and Peterson
secured footage from the miUtary's Operation Ivy film and produced a movie of their own,
but the FCDA version was far from candid. Administrator Peterson assured Strauss that
the AEC wold be invited to assist the PubUc Affau-s Office in the creation of the movie.
The end result was a piece which, in the language of the film industry, had been "edited for
content." Entitled Operation Ivy, the twenty-eight minute movie showed the preparations
"*Quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower, 133.
^^^AirtorosQ, Eisenhower, 133-35.
202
for the MIKE test, the awe-inspiring firebaU and mushroom cloud, and reported the power
of the hydrogen device's blast. The document excluded aU information relating to the
radioactive feUout that had blanketed the test area. When confronting the pubUc, the
FCDA "sanitized" the hydrogen bomb as it had the atomic bomb. It minimized the danger
of lingering radioactivity and treated fission and fusion devices aUke as more powerfel, yet
StUl conventional, weapons.'^
Scientists argued about the chronic effects of radioactive feUout for years after
the advent of the H-bomb. Often experts on opposite sides used the same studies to
support their claims. Nonetheless, Peterson's FCDA deceived the people intentionaUy by
ignoring or minimizing the known risks of faUout. At stake was the new civU defense
poUcy of mass evacuation. Getting out ofthe way of an explosion was feasible. Running
from an invisible enemy carried by the wind was more difficult. In 1953 Peterson canied
out the decision to change the FCDA's survival strategies. An experienced poUtician, he
knew the pubUc outcry and distmst that would accompany another about-face, so he hid
the facts from the people and refused to modify the agency's Ufe-saving strategies imtU his
career was in a shambles, and the agency's poUcies had been discredited.'*'
He did not have long to wait. In March 1954, a month before the civU defense
administration made Operation Ivy avaUable to the pubUc, and only two months after the
FCDA officiaUy embraced mass evacuation as its primary strategy, events transpired which
'*"Guy Oakes, The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 59.
'*'Ken, C/v/7 Defense Band-Aid, 71; and Winkler, Under a Cloud, 95.
203
brought the word "feUout" an accepted place in the EngUsh language and in most
Americans' vocabulary. On the morning of March 1, the Atomic Energy Commission
detonated its first tme hydrogen bomb over the BUcini atoU, in the MarshaU Islands.
Code-named BRAVO, the fission-flision-fission explosion was the first shot in the
CASTLE series of tests. The AEC had cordoned off a large danger zone before
proceeding with the detonation, but the radiation that the bomb released exceeded the
experts' estimates. Ignoring the contamination boundaries that the AEC had drawn, tons
of highly radioactive faUout spread outward from the test site, forming a poisonous eUipse
two hundred mUes long and forty mUes wide. A secret AEC report later estimated that
one hundred sbcty mUes off the windward side of BUcini, radiation levels were high enough
to kiU. Some one hundred mUes east ofthe atoU, the eighty-sbc inhabitants ofthe island
Rongelap absorbed enough radiation to cause Ulness, surfece bums, and hair loss. The
United States evacuated the people of Rongelap and another one hundred fiffy MarshaU
Islanders threatened by the spreading radiation.'*^
The faUout from BRAVO endangered hundreds of people, but in the weeks after
the test, intemational attention focused on a few Japanese fishermen, the crew ofthe
Fukuryu Maru, the Lucky Dragon. The smaU fishing boat had been more than ninety
mUes west of BUcini, weU outside the official danger zone, when BRAVO Ut up the sky.
The boat's crew marveled at the bomb's firebaU and watched the radioactive cloud rise
over the ocean's surfece and fen out toward them The cloud brought with it a powdery
white ash which feU Uke a heavy snow on the Lucky Dragon and the men standing on its
'"Oakes, Imaginary War, 61.
204
deck. They were fishermen, not atomic scientists, radiological experts, or physicians.
They did not know what they had taken on board their ship. Then they feU Ul. They
experienced headaches, nausea, and hair loss. They suffered from skin bums, vomiting,
and dianhea. Its crew the victim of radiation sickness, the Lucky Dragon Umped home to
Japan. Doctors treated the men, but several remained sick for weeks. One, radio operator
AUcichi Kuboyama, died after a prolonged battle with the Ulness. His internal organs were
a mess, devastated by the ionizing effects of radiation.'*'
The outcry from Japan was great, and the concem in the United States grew
steadUy. Both the AEC and the FCDA had assured the people repeatedly that nuclear
weapons were much Uke conventional bombs, that the danger from Ungering radioactivity
was exaggerated. The experiences ofthe Lucky Dragon's crew told a different story.'^
The Executive Office, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal CivU
Defense Administration aU took steps to ensure damage control. During his March 24
press meeting. President Eisenhower said that the radiation released by Bravo had
"surprised and astonished the scientists." He posited, "...something must have happened
that we never experienced before."'*' WhUe continuing to absolve the AEC scientists of
any responsibUity, the president tried to reassure the American people by teUing them that
'^'Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 4-5, 7, 30-31.
'*"lbid., 7, 29-35.
365i 'Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953-1961, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1960), 346.
205
the AEC would begin "to take precautions that never occuned to them before."'**
Eisenhower's statements did not reUeve the tensions produced by the Bravo detonation. If
anything, they increased the pubUc's fears. Reporters interpreted the president's remarks
as an admission that the AEC had lost control ofthe nuclear weapons that it was
developing. The hydrogen bomb was some sort of nuclear Frankenstein that could end up
destroying its creator—the United States.'*^
Chairman Strauss atteiiq)ted to end the pubUc speculation, but his miscues only
added fuel to the fire. He acknowledged that the Japanese fishermen had suffered
radiation poisoning, and he reluctantly admitted that the Lucky Dragon had been outside
the danger zone deUneated by the AEC. He denied, however, that the test had gotten out
of hand. Rather, he contended that shifting winds had resulted in the contamination ofthe
Lucky Dragon and its crew. Straus took the AEC's usual stand on the issue of lingering
radiation. The AEC chairman stated that the dangers of faUout had been exaggerated by
the press. He noted that most radioactive isotopes degraded quickly, and he ridiculed the
notion that a radioactive death cloud was going to descend on Japan and wipe out the
people of that island nation.'**
Strauss told Americans to "rejoice" over the success ofthe CASTLE tests; the
United States had leamed much and had strengthened its defensive position. Reporters
pressed him, asking just how much destmction an H-bomb produced. How powerful an
'**Eisenhower, Public Papers, 2: 346.
'*^Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 8.
'**Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 12; and Ken, C/v/7 Defense Band-Aid, 69.
206
H-bomb could be buUt? Up to that point, Americans had known that the United States
possessed fesion devices, but they stUl remained ignorant ofthe vast energy discharged by
thermonuclear weapons. Strauss's answer staggered the members ofthe press. The
hydrogen bomb "can be made to be as large as you wish—large enough to take out a
city."'*' Reporters fired questions at the chairman. They wanted him to name a city that
the bomb could destroy. Strauss gave them New York. He beUeved the country's
offensive nuclear capabUities constituted the AEC's number one priority, and he was
proud ofthe H-bomb's power. Strauss could not resist the opportunity to boast of its
destmctive potential. Yet instead of calming the pubUc, his comments contributed to the
growing unease in the country.' "
UnUke the post held by Lewis Strauss, Val Peterson's job did not entaU the
development of offensive weapons. As director ofthe Federal CivU Defense
administration, his one, his only, concem was the protection ofthe American people from
nuclear or natural disaster. He would be the scapegoat if the feUout panic did not
dissipate. Both the president and Strauss could claim they had fevored the continued
development and testing ofthe Super to counter the Soviet threat. Russia possessed
thermonuclear devices. But Peterson had to teU the people what his agency had
accompUshed in securing pubUc protection from H-bombs and the faUout they produced.
He had no ready answer. Mass evacuation solved the problem of evading thermonuclear
'*'Quoted in Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 13.
' "Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 13; and Ambrose, Eisenhower, 169.
207
blast, but the FCDA had cooperated with the AEC and had closed its eyes and ears and
those ofthe American people to the threat of Ungering radiation.
The Peterson Administration initiaUy stuck with its bUnd and deaf strategy.
Peterson repeated the AEC's assertions that rumors of persistent death clouds were false;
most radioactivity dissipated in a few hours. FCDA pamphlets continued to ignore the
threat of faUout. A year passed before agency pubUcations began to address the issue. To
further reduce the pubUc unease over faUout, Peterson released Operation Ivy in AprU
1954, a month after the BRAVO detonation. LUce the FCDA's pamphlets, the film
described the blast effects of thermonuclear weapons but completely excluded any mention
of radioactive feUout.'^'
Administrator Peterson's strategy backfired. The close media tracking ofthe
Lucky Dragon's ailing crew had shown the world that faUout could cause sickness and
death. A number of scientists in the United States had begun to rebuke the government's
attenq)ts to hide the tmth from the pubUc. Americans started to doubt. They began to
distrust the neatly packaged statements proffered by the AEC and the FCDA. Physicist
Ralph Lapp, who usuaUy lavished praise on Administrator Peterson, criticized the decision
to release the misleading film. Operation Ivy, to the pubUc. The frequent contributor to
the Bulletin ofthe Atomic Scientists caUed for official candor. He argued that the AEC
and FCDA's reluctance to supply the people with cmcial facts such as the exact size and
power of a hydrogen blast was contributing to the growth of nuclear fear and the sense of
impending doom pervading the United States. Lapp contended that copies ofthe
'^'Oakes, Imaginary War, 58-59.
208
Operation Ivy movie 'Vere anything but reassuring. In feet, they hurt the basic concept of
civU defense-in this regard the films may now be dubbed POISON IVY."'^
PubUc speculation on the "real" dangers posed by nuclear weapons ran wUd and
influenced popular culture, especiaUy the movies.'" The film industry found the pulse of
American society and capitaUzed on the people's nuclear fears by unleashing a host of
Atomic-Age monsters. Radiation-spawned genetic mutants played title roles in THEM!,
The Blob, and Attack ofthe Crab Monsters. In the cult-classic THEM!, an army of giant
ants crawl out ofthe New Mexico desert and threaten man's existence. A scientist
theorizes that the mutant creatures were a product of "Ungering radiation from the first
atomic bomb."' "
No doubt screenwriters received their inspiration for THEM! and the other
mutant "creature features" from scientific studies that showed radiation could precipitate
genetic mutations. In 1946, geneticist Herman MuUer won a Nobel prize for his work
with radiation-induced fly mutations. MuUer faUed to engineer elephant-sized insects, but
he did produce flies with odd numbers of wings and other defects. The Nobel laureate
added to the radiation fears ofthe Fifties when he supported a statement by Cal-Tech
geneticist A. H. Sturtevant that radioactive faUout was causing eighteen hundred
" "CivU Defense and the H-Bomb," Folder "L," Box 1, Conespondence of Val Peterson, RG 396, NARACP.
'""How Fatal is FaUout?," Time (22 November 1954), 79; and Winkler, Under a Cloud, 98.
""Quoted in Winkler, Under a Cloud, 98.
209
mutations in humans every year. But the scientific community was not uniform in its
response to Sturtevant's assertions. Many distinguished scientists disputed his claims.'"
In a country whose people had looked to the scientific community as the font of
aU knowledge, the lack of a consensus on the feUout issue increased pubUc concem.
Faced with the pubUc and professional dUemma, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS)
created a number of panels to investigate the problem The committees' findings were
heartening for those who beUeved in their vaUdity. Sturtevant and MuUer, who had voiced
their convictions that the faUout was producing birth defects, modified their positions.
Both served on the NAS's Genetics Committee. Its 1956 report stated that the faUout
generated by the U.S.S.R.'s and the United States' nuclear tests had exposed Americans
to some radiation, but the amount was less than one would receive from many common
medical procedures. StUl, the Genetics Committee counseled caution, because the
national and intemational advisory boards on radiology had long deemed any exposure to
racUation as potentiaUy harmful. The Genetics Committee's report seemed tmstworthy. It
had been endorsed by two scientists who had earUer led the charge against faUout, and it
quaUfied its findings with a waming that revealed scientists remained uncertain about the
chronic effects of low-level radiation. If aU ofthe NAS committees had retumed simUar
report, the pubUc's fears might have subsided.' *
The NAS's Pathology Committee produced a study that inspired more distmst
and anxiety. A number ofthe Pathology Committee's members were Atomic Energy
'"Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 51-53; and Winkler, Under a Cloud, 95.
"*Winkler, Under a Cloud, 96,
210
Commission scientists, and the report they submitted sounded as if Admiral Strauss had
written it himself One ofthe committee's investigations centered on Strontium-90, a
particularly hardy radioactive isotope. Concem had risen over the probabUity that Sr-90
was traveUng up the food chain, accumulating in humans, and causing mutation, sickness,
and disease. After feUing onto the grass, the isotope was ingested by cattle. It then
passed on to people through mUk and became lodged in the bones-the blood producing
part ofthe body, an area extremely sensitive to radiation. In the late 1950s, the
Committee for Nuclear Information, based at Washington University in St. Louis,
coUected tens of thousands of chUdren's baby teeth and showed that, whUe stUl below
NCRP recommended levels, the Sr-90 content in the teeth had increased dramaticaUy
during the years of unUmited atmospheric testing.' ^
The National Academy of Science's Pathology Committee made simUar
discoveries in 1956. People were ingesting Strontiiim-90, yet not in great quantities.
UnUke the Genetics Committee report, however, the pathology study did not warn that
any radiation could prove harmful. Instead, the committee harked back to the days when
radiological advisory bodies had endorsed the concept of a threshold level for radiation
absorption. The NRA's Pathology Committee announced an "unequivocaUy safe amount"
of Strontium-90 that Americans could consume. The report's antiquated language and its
unrestrained optimism pronqjted criticism from the press and from other scientists. Ralph
Lapp denounced the study for ignoring the radiological protocols estabUshed decades
earUer, and for failing to consider that the arms race would cause the amount of Sr-90 in
'"Winkler, Under a Cloud, 96, 102.
211
the atmosphere, in cows' mUk, and in people's bodies to rise. Americans did not know
whom to trust. Influenced by the poUtical and moral considerations of nuclear weapons,
scientists appeared in uhra-Uberal and ultra-conservative camps, and everywhere in
between. The radiation issue sent wave after wave of discordant ripples through a society
mled by the law of conformity.'"
The dissent and uncertainty itself generated fear. Unsure ofthe tme threat posed
by low-level radiation, the rumors spread and gained more acceptance. Americans began
to demand protection from the invisible enemy that threatened them. They asked which
agency was responsible for saving them from a radioactive plague, and what had been
done to secure their welfare. The eyes ofthe country slowly turned to focus on Val
Peterson and the Federal CivU Defense Administration.
Peterson tried to weather the storm in a boat that was sinking rapidly. Adopting
a poUcy of candor would have necessitated a restmcturing of civU defense poUcies. If the
FCDA recognized the feUout threat, it would have to replace or at least supplement mass
evacuation with a feUout shelter program. Peterson responded to the pubUc criticisms and
demands much as President Herbert Hoover had responded to the pubUc clamor during
the early years ofthe Great Depression. He inaugurated a campaign of deiual and
optimism He blamed others. He refused to modify civU defense strategies untU his career
was close to an end, and by then it was too late.
When fingers began to point at Peterson, he aimed his at MUlard CaldweU.
Peterson charged the CaldweU Administration with using "scare tactics" to buUd support
'"Winkler, Under a Cloud, 96; and Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 34-35, 43.
212
for civU defense. The impUcation was that CaldweU had encouraged or at least tolerated
overblown rumors o f the bomb's" destmctive potential, and therefore was somewhat
responsible for the wUd speculation and grovmig unease over feUout. Peterson's remarks
come across as a criticism of CaldweU's atten^ts to be more candid with the pubUc.
CaldweU's FCDA told the people that they would die if a bomb went off and they were
close to ground zero. CaldweU did misinform the pubUc as to the radiation hazard
produced by nuclear weapons, but he seems to have simply passed on the information the
AEC gave him, without questioning its vaUdity. The Peterson Administration regularly
and knowingly deceived the people ofthe United States.
In his efforts to reUeve pubUc concerns, Peterson launched a campaign of
optimism which ignored or minimized the danger of radioactive faUout and the power of
the United States' enemies. With its AprU 1954 release of Operation Ivy the FCDA
attempted to tranquUize Americans who had become panicky over the feUout issue. When
pubUc concem continued to increase, Peterson recaUed FCDA materials that might further
scare the people. Among the items retired in the closing months of 1954 were a series of
"negative" posters. Once featuring a giant maUed fist faUing from the sky and smashing
into a residential area canied the caption, "CIVILIANS: ENEMY TARGET NO. 1."
Another showed a head-on view of an enemy plane and deUvered the solemn message,
"NO MILITARY DEFENSE CAN PREVENT ATTACK ON OUR CITIES." A third
213
poster boasted an Ulustration of an explosion flinging a man's enqjty hat high into the air
and wamed, "make no mistake...CIVILIANS ean be bombed!"'"
Peterson continued the FCDA's campaign of optimism into the new year.
Besides removing negative materials from the education packets it distributed, the civU
defense administration introduced a number of new, positive pamphlets and films,
including some that finaUy discussed radioactive feUout. PubUc concerns had not
subsided, forcing the FCDA to offer some information on the issue of Ungering
radioactivity from bomb debris. Facts About the H-Bomb... that could save your life!
purported to give the "fects" about the 1952 MIKE shot. The pamphlet passed on to its
readers the exact dimensions ofthe crater, firebaU, and cloud produced by the blast, but
only twice did the authors of Facts About the H-Bomb employ the word "faUout" in their
leaflet. They suggested that injury from radioactive debris would be relatively minor, yet
they admitted that faUout from the MIKE test had posed a danger to aU Uving creatures
within a 300 square mUe area ofthe explosion. WhUe continuing to plug mass evacuation.
Facts About the H-bomb urged Americans to "equip the most protected place you can
find...for an air-raid shelter."'*"
'^'Folder Administrative Media and PubUcations, 1952-54, Box 1, Alphabetical Section, Acquiring Surplus to Alphabetical Section, Alert Signal, PubUcation History FUes, 1950-62, Distribution Branch, PubUcations office. Office of CivU Defense, RG 397, NARACP; and "THE FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION presents SIGNS of our TIME," Folder CD Campaign-general [2], Box 5, FUes of Spencer R. Quick, HST.
'*"Federal CivU Defense Administration, Facts About the H-Bomb... that could save your life! (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1953).
214
Despite its description ofthe MIKE device's power and reach. Facts About the
H-Bomb's text was upbeat, fiUed with positive statements. Recognizing that much ofthe
fear of thermonuclear devices centered on the feet that they were hundreds or thousands
of times as powerful as atomic weapons, staff writers tried to dispel a popular
misconception. "A bomb 1,000 times as powerfel as the Hiroshima bomb wUl not cause
damage 1,000 times as fer away-only 10 times as far."'*' A bomb's explosion is spherical
in form, not Unear, so the area of destmction on the ground would not double every time a
bomb's power was increased twofold. For those dispirited Americans who equated
nuclear war with the end ofthe world or at least the end ofthe United States, the
pamphlet stated, "...[T]he H-bomb, despite the wider range ofthe destmctive force, wUl
not destroy the earth. There wiU always be much more of America undamaged and many
more miUions of our people aUve and eager to fight back and win, than there wiU be death
and destmction."'*^ The abUity ofthe United States and its people to survive a
thermonuclear assault constituted the central theme of Facts About the H-Bomb.
Other works offered more detaUed accounts of how Americans would avoid
injury and harm from blast, fire, and radiation. When the clamor over faUout refused to
die down, the AEC and the FCDA had no choice but to address the issue of Ungering
radioactivity. Forced into a comer, in February 1955 the Atomic Energy Commission
acknowledged that the BRAVO test had produced massive quantities of radioactive
faUout. A simUar detonation in Maryland would blanket the entire state with potentiaUy
'*'Federal CivU Defense Administration, Facts About the H-Bomb.
'*2lbid.
215
Ufe-threatening debris. StUl, the AEC reassured Americans by teUing them the feUout
produced by a fusion bomb would threaten oiUy a Umited area for a brief interval of time,
because most radioactive isotopes would degenerate quickly, and the others would spread
out in the stratosphere, becoming less concentrated as winds swept them away from
ground zero. The AEC further assured the pubUc that the peacetime thermonuclear tests
conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union had not caused the world's radiation
level to rise significantly. In addition, the commission addressed pubUc concerns about the
unthinkable—nuclear war. Once again the agency soothed Americans' fears by arguing
that even if the United States feU victim to a thermonuclear bomb strike, the people within
the faUout danger zones could take precautions to protect themselves from radiation.'*'
The FCDA continued to second the AEC's pronouncements. After the Atomic
Energy Commission made its pubUc statements about feUout, the civU defense
administration released Facts about Fallout, which reiterated some AEC claims and
expanded on others. The FCDA employed two forms of media, a film and a pamphlet, to
teU the same "facts." FinaUy, Americans heard from the FCDA that their suspicions were
conect; faUout was dangerous. It could cause sickness or death. LUce Facts About the H-
Bomb, however, Facts About Fallout projected optimism and confidence. Both the
booklet and the film assured the people that they did not have to be numbered among
feUout's victims. They could survive the threat from the sky if they would foUow the
FCDA's rules. After an attack Americans should tune in to faUout advisories on their TVs
'*'Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 38-39; Ken, C/v/7 Defense Band-Aid, 70-71; and "H-Bomb Tests, They're Safe," US News and World Report (25 February 1955), 128-35.
216
or radios. By studying prevaUing winds, meteorologists would be able to predict the paths
that the radioactive debris would take and the areas that would suffer the greatest
contamination. Upon learning that they were in the danger zone, individuals should seek
shelter. An ordinary house would halve the amount of radiation its occupants received. A
shelter covered with three feet of packed dirt or shielded with other dense materials would
drop the level of exposure to nU. Many ofthe "fects" presented were tme, but the agency
indulged in some exaggeration to further its, and the AEC's, goal of projecting positivism.
Conqjaring radioactive dust to ordinary household dust. Facts About Fallout told
Americans that if they were caught in a shower of inadiated debris, the discarding of
contaminated clothing and a good scmbbing with soap and water would rid them ofthe
pesky radioactive particles. There was no reason to worry. The contaminated could
survive. Further, people locked tight in their home shelters would have to remain there no
longer than a week. Between the natural decay of radioactive isotopes and the efforts of
decontamination crews, the country would be clean and safe in no time.'*"
It had taken much puUing and pushing, but by 1956 the FCDA had
acknowledged the dangers posed by radioactive faUout and had modified its strategies to
meet the new threat. One of the main shifts occuned in official terminology. In the past,
Peterson and the FCDA had encouraged Americans to buUd private "bomb shelters" to
protect them from blast. By 1956 the agency was advocating "faUout shelters" to
minimize the danger from radioactive debris. The shift was most notable in the FCDA
'*"Federal CivU Defense Administration, Facts About Fallout; and Oakes, Imaginary War, 121-23.
217
booklet Home Protection Exercises. The 1953 and 1954 editions told the pubUc to stash
three day's worth of emergency suppUes either in a blast resistant shelter or in a reinforced
area in their homes. With feUout an officiaUy acknowledged threat in 1955, the third
edition of Home Protection Exercises caUed for the buUding of a stockpUe that could last
for a week. The next year, yet another version ofthe booklet discussed the differences
between a "feUout shelter" and a "bomb shelter," and advised femUies to make sure they
had adequate radiation shielding.'*'
Despite the official recognition of faUout as a radiation hazard, the FCDA refused
to abandon its mass evacuation poUcy or to push for a pubUc shelter initiative. In feet,
Peterson made few adjustments to the FCDA's Ufe-saving strategies. He continued to
support mass evacuation because he did not beUeve the people in an industrial center
would survive a direct hit by an H-bomb. His administration had offered encouragement
to individual Americans, especiaUy those on the periphery of target areas, who wished to
buUd or purchase home shelters. And in 1955 and 1956, Peterson and the FCDA began to
suggest that everyone needed a feUout shelter, but the agency and its administrator
continued to push for private initiative rather than a program of federaUy-flmded pubUc
shelters. It was a mistake that subjected Peterson's agency to ridicule and criticism. With
pubUc concerns over the feUout issue continuing to mount and with the FCDA seemingly
'*'Oakes, Imaginary War, 118-20.
218
disinterested and slow to react, the House of Representatives launched an investigation of
the United States' civUian preparedness program'**
On the morning of January 31, 1956, a Tuesday, Representative Chet HoUfield
(R.-CaUfomia) caUed to order the MUitary Operations Subcommittee ofthe House
Committee on Government Operations and opened a series of hearings on civU defense.
Over the course ofthe next five months, dozens of mUitary leaders, engineers, scientists,
and civU defense personnel entered room 1501 ofthe House Office BuUding, testified, and
answered the questions directed at them by HoUfield and the other members ofthe
subcommittee. Ostensibly, the purpose ofthe hearings was to strengthen the United
States' civU defense program. An outspoken proponent of civU defense, HoUfield had
introduced House Joint Resolution 98 to Congress earUer in the month. HoUfield's
resolution advocated the reconstitution ofthe FCDA as an independent executive
department. Other Congressmen offered simUar bills; one by MiUtary Operations
Subcommittee member R. Walter Riehlman (D.-New York) caUed for the FCDA to be
organized as an executive department, but within the Department of Defense. HoUfield
stated for the record that his subcommittee had convened to consider the merit ofthe
proposed civU defense legislation.'*^
HoUfield wanted to see the FCDA strengthened, because he was a tme beUever in
the power of civiUan defense to save Uves during a nuclear war, but he also was upset with
'**U.S. Congress, House, Government Operations Committee, MUitary Operations Subcommittee [hereafter GOCMOS], Hearings: Civil Defense for National Survival, 84th Cong., 2d sess., 1956.
'*'GOCMOS, C/v/7 Defense, 2.
219
the present state of civU defense and desired a change in poUcy. Before the subcommittee
heard from a single witness, HoUfield had decided that the FCDA had accompUshed Uttle
during its five years of existence, and especiaUy since Peterson had assumed control.
HoUfield was a pubUc shelter advocate. He chided the pubUc for its apathy and Congress
for its indifference toward civU defense; nonetheless, he and the other members ofthe
subcommittee centered their attack on the Peterson Administration and its refusal to
endorse a pubUc shelter poUcy. In his opening statement, HoUfield said, 'There is a
widespread beUef in this country that civU defense is either fetUc.or hopelessly inadequate
under the present anangements...it is about time...an inteUigent course of action [was]
formulated." HoUfield disagreed with Peterson's strategies, and the people needed
someone or some agency to pay for the fear and uncertainty that the faUout debate had
engendered. The hearings on civU defense offered an opportunity to satisfy both HoUfield
and the pubUc. It was open season on Peterson and the FCDA.'**
The witnesses that appeared before the subcommittee tended to reinforce
HoUfield's opinion that the FCDA lacked effective leadership and sound poUcies for
ensuring the people and the country's survival. Personnel from the Atomic Energy
Commission tried to deflect attention and blame away from their own agency. They
testified that the AEC maintained Uaisons v ith the FCDA and kept the civU defense
administt-ation informed of their findings. The HoUfield Committee foUowed up by asking
why, then, with a steady flow of information between the two agencies, had the FCDA
accompUshed so Uttle in the areas of civUian protection? AEC witnesses were quick to
'**GOCMOS, Civil Defense, 1.
220
point out that their agency merely provided the FCDA v dth briefe on the nature of nuclear
weapons. They told the members ofthe subcommittee that civU defense was not an AEC
responsibUity and stated that their experts had not presumed to teU FCDA leaders how
they should nm their agency. After raising a protective shield around their own
commission, witnesses from the AEC sometimes attempted to stem the subcommittee's
attacks on the civU defense administration. AEC scientists noted that the FCDA's
scientific and technical staff was virtuaUy nonexistent. But instead of accepting the
FCDA's staff deficiencies as an excuse, the HoUfield Committee used the information to
support its assertion that the Peterson Administtation was ineffective and poorly led.'*'
Many witnesses whole-heartedly agreed with the subcommittee's assessment of
the FCDA's record of achievement. Some ofthe most bUstering criticism came from Dr.
Merle A. Tuve, director ofthe Camegie Institute's Research Laboratory in Washington,
D.C, and chairman of both the National Academy of Science's and the National Research
CouncU's (NRC) committees on civU defense. He contended that "the present sad state of
civU defense needs Uttle comment. The whole country knows of it with devastating
conviction. Govemor Peterson is a devoted pubUc servant and a personaUy Ukeable man,
but he and his top Ueutenants seem to have no conception of what should constitute an
acceptable performance by their organization.""" Tuve pointed to the "total inadequacy
ofthe technical guidance which FCDA has given to individuals and local communities."
'*'GOCMOS, Civil Defense, 8-43.
""Ibid., 200
"'Ibid.
221
CaUing for a variety of preparedness initiatives, including more emphasis on industrial
dispersal, better waming systems, and the constmction of blast and feUout shelters, the
NAS/NRC spokesperson noted that a nuclear attack against the United States would
cause "the dismption ofthe entire febric of our society...unless we make perhaps a
hundred times more preparation than we have to date in the area of civU defense.""^
FCDA Administrator Val Peterson did not receive an opportunity to respond to
the criticisms leveled at himself and his agency untU AprU 17, 1956. Peterson appeared
before the committee five times over the next month. Representative HoUfield assured the
administrator that he was before a "friendly committee," but the written record ofthe
proceedings shows that the exchanges between Peterson and the subcommittee became
increasingly tense and more heated with each day of testimony and intenogatioiL'" From
the begmning, Peterson was on the defensive, and with good reason. Early on the first day
ofthe FCDA director's testimony, HoUfield launched into a somewhat rambUng discourse
ofthe subcommittee's concerns. He told Peterson, "[W]e wUl want to explore with you
what has been done by your Department in the shelter field, what you have advocated in
the sheUer field.""" Continuing, he stated, "We wonder why with the knowledge that you
have on hand and the knowledge that the Atomic Energy Commission has developed...the
American people have not been given a more effective program in the shelter
"^GOCMOS, Civil Defense,l93.
'"Ibid., 1230.
""Ibid., 1168.
222
field....Words have been spoken, but no effective program is now in being...."'"
Summarizing his and the subcommittee members' feeUngs about the FCDA's
"accompUshments," HoUfield charged, "[T]he civU defense that does exist is inadequate,
and I don't think that even any ofthe most enthusiastic members of your [Peterson's]
department would say that we have any way near adequate, even 5 percent adequate
[defense].""*
Peterson had Uttle chance of convincing the HoUfield Committee that the FCDA
had accon:q)Ushed anything productive since the resignation of Administrator Millard
CaldweU. The committee's members equated civU defense with a pubUc shelter program.
Val Peterson had fevored mass evacuation over shelter poUcy. In day after day of
hearings, HoUfield and his coUeagues griUed Peterson for his endorsement of evacuation
and his faUure to request money for pubUc shelters."^
Peterson tried to fend off his attackers with a variety of arguments and excuses.
According to the FCDA's administrator, after the development of fusion weapons, but
before the recognition ofthe danger from faUout, the pre-attack evacuation of target zones
seemed the most reasonable civU defense strategy. He argued that mass evacuation
continued to have merit in 1956. People within three or four mUes of a thermonuclear
blast would not survive. Before the bomb feU, Americans in metropoUtan areas should
relocate to shelters outside the city. HoUfield scoffed, "I don't want to evacuate my femUy
'"GOCMOS, Civil Defense, 1169.
"*Ibid.
'"Ibid., 1169-1402.
223
out in the Mojave Desert outside of Los Angeles... when it is 125 to 130 degrees out there.
I would rather take a chance in a scientificaUy devised shelter." Peterson responded, "You
and I differ. I would rather be in the desert when the bomb goes off.""* Peterson made a
mistake, however, when he admitted that the foture development ofthe intercontinental
baUistic missUe (ICBM) would render evacuation obsolete. Functional ICBMs would
reduce waming time and, therefore, the time avaUable for effecting mass evacuations.
Some Soviet missUes would strike the United States half an hour after lifting off from the
U.S.S.R. Peterson's assertions that the FCDA should continue its mass evacuation
strategies untU the ICBM's development were less convincing than HoUfield's arguments
that the civU defense agency needed to prepare for the foture.'"
Although Peterson defended his administration's decision to proceed with its
evacuation strategies, he contended that the FCDA had never completely abandoned its
shelter poUcies. He noted that the FCDA had continued to urge the private constmction
and purchase of shelters throughout his years as administrator, and he announced that the
real threat of faUout had convinced him that the there should be a compUmentary
relationship, a 50/50 balance, between shelters and evacuations. When the members ofthe
subcommittee pressed Peterson for the detaUs of his shelter program, however, he had to
admit that the FCDA had given the pubUc some advice, but no comprehensive plans, no
blueprints for buUding home shelters. Peterson stated that the FCDA was stUl
investigating, stUl conducting studies to determine the best and most economical
'''GOCMOS, Civil Defense, 1178.
'"Ibid., 1166-67, 1179,1216-17,1340.
224
sttiictures. He offered the same excuses when committee members questioned him about
pubUc shelters. Why had he feUed to request money for a pubUc shelter program?
Peterson said the studies were not complete and suggested that the penny-pinchers in
Congress would insist on a bargain plan. The subcommittee counterattacked, presenting
transcripts of Peterson's testimony during hearings over supplemental appropriations in
1954. Not only had the FCDA administrator faUed to request funding for pubUc shelters,
he had praised Congress for denying shelter aUocations for the CaldweU Administration.
Peterson dismissed the statement as having no bearing on the HoUfield inquiry. He
contended that the FCDA stiU had much to leam about thermonuclear weapons and feUout
when he had addressed Congress in 1954."""
Val Peterson's testimony consumed a month, but, at the end, the members ofthe
House Subcommittee on MiUtary Operations remained unswayed by his arguments and
unaccepting of his excuses. Perhaps HoUfield summed up their feelings best when he
commented that four years had passed since the United States had tested its first
thermonuclear device; more should have been accompUshed in guaranteeing civUian
protection. The subcommittee's final report recommended greater powers for the Federal
CivU Defense Administration and the elevation ofthe FCDA's director to a cabinet-level
office, but it also caUed for an aggressive pubUc shelter constmction program and was
relentless in its criticism ofthe Peterson Administration.""'
400 'GOCMOS, Civil Defense, 1336-1345.
""'GOCMOS, Civil Defense, 1213; and U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, MUitary Operations Subcommittee, C/v/7 Defense for National Security: Twenty-Fourth Intermediate Report, Report no. 2946, 84th Cong., 2d sess.,
225
The pubUc ridicule had humUiated and embittered Val Peterson. After the
hearings concluded he began to look for a different job, preferably one that would take
him out ofthe pubUc eye and one that would afford him some measure of peace.
President Eisenhower also must have recognized that a change in FCDA leadership was
necessary if there was to be any hope of restoring pubUc confidence in civU defense. Ike
found a job for Peterson—in Denmark. The president secured the FCDA's director a
position as ambassador to the smaU northem European nation. Val Peterson officiaUy
resigned from the Federal CivU Defense Administration on May 31, 1957 and fled the
country. Radioactive faUout and Peterson's rigid adherence to evacuation strategies had
mined him.""
The next FCDA administrator, Leo Hoegh, updated the agency's Ufe-saving
strategies. He shifted the focus of federal civU defense initiatives away from mass
evacuation and toward faUout shelters, but in some ways the legacy of Val Peterson Uved
on within the FCDA. When Peterson had noticed that recmitment returns had begun to
slump, he had raised the emotional content ofthe civU defense administration's pamphlets
and pubUc announcements. Hoegh adopted this practice during his term of office, but
technological, poUtical, and social factors contributed to the fiirther decUne of civU defense
in the Uiuted States.
1956.
"" Val Peterson to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 31 May 1957, Folder White House Conespondence, Box 2, Conespondence of Administrator Val Peterson, 1953-1957, RG 396, NARACP.
226
CHAPTER v n
GOD, APPLE PIE, AND CFVIL DEFENSE: INFLATING
THE RHETORIC FOR A DEFLATING PROGRAM
Across the United States church beUs pealed, ringing out the message, "God
favors civU defense." BeU-ringing soon gave way to sermons that deUvered the charge,
"God wants YOU in civU defense." In Ross County, Ohio, the pastor ofthe Seventh Day
Adventist church preached on the inqx)rtance of "preparedness" in the Nuclear Age.
Throughout the state of Maine, ministers from aU denominations incorporated civilian
defense topics into their sermons. To the south, in New Jersey, members ofthe clergy
praised the state's emergency civiUan volunteers. The beU-ringing and the sermons
"kicked-ofiP' National CivU Defense Week, September 9-15, 1956. The Federal CivU
Defense Administration had requested church participation, and, once again, the United
States' reUgious community had gone to bat for civU defense. According to FCDA
reports, the church activities served "as a dramatic reminder that CD is a barrier against
any invader who would rob the citizens of their reUgious freedom"""'
CivU defense was moral. The wiU of God and the actions ofthe FCDA were in
harmony. It was neither the first nor the last time that civilian defense leaders made such
claims. Months before the church beU-ringing campaign, codenamed "Operation Ding
Dong," launched National CivU Defense Week, the Federal CivU Defense Administration
403 f ^"Roundup of National CD Week" (Sept. 9-15, 1956), Box 15, Alphabetical Section "Reports" to Alphabetical Section "Standards," RG 396, National Archives and Record Administration, CoUege Park [hereafter NARACP].
227
released The Church in Civil Defense, a panq)hlet intended to tie civU defense more
closely to reUgion."""
The panqjhlet was the product of Val Peterson's request that the ReUgious
Affairs Office, successor to the Advisory CouncU on ReUgion, revise and regenerate the
1951 pubUcation, The Clergy in Civil Defense. The members ofthe ReUgious A f ^ s
Office took the CaldweU-era booklet and infosed it with new Ufe, reworking its dry
statements into impassioned arguments and pleas. The revised work's text contended that
democracy and civU defense were approved by God. Indeed, the authors of The Church
in Civil Defense came close to asserting that the United States' government and the
Federal CivU Defense Administration were divinely inspired. Yet able leadership was not
enough, the paper wamed. Even God's elect could suffer if they faUed to prepare for life
in the Nuclear Age. Americans must fortify their spirits, thek minds, and yes, even their
homes in order to face an enemy, an ungodly communist monster, that was watching for
any sign of weakness in the countries ofthe westem world. According to the authors of
The Church in Civil Defense, communist Russia was hoping for an opportunity to destroy
the values held dear by many mUUons of Americans. The booklet's authors wrote, "The
very existence of Westem civUization is endangered...not only democratic government, the
highest form of poUtical order yet evolved...but reUgion itself is chaUenged by a godless,
totaUtarian tyranny."""' Continuing, the text stated, "Communism is a substitute reUgron.
""""Roundup of National CivU Defense Week," RG 396; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, The Church in Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1957).
""'Federal CivU Defense Administration, Church in Defense, 2.
228
At its deepest level, the conflict between Soviet communism and the free world is a
reUgious conflict....The Party tries to usurp the place ofthe church and to give the writings
of Marx and Lenin the status of sacred scriptures."""*
The authors of The Church in Civil Defense told Americans not to underestimate
the threat posed by communism "[T]his godless, new reUgion has a fanatic missionary
zeaL An apathetic church...could not stand up against the sweep of communism. The old
Marxian charge that reUgion is the opiate used to oppress the people can be dispeUed only
by an alert and positive church, a church motivated by its tenets of love of God and love
of man, and therefore, a church actively interested in any program of human welfare."""
The writers then played their trump card, a phrase that bound together reUgious concerns
and civU defense. "CivU defense is a program of human welfare devoted to saving and
sustaining Ufe."""* Having identified a common goal for churches and preparedness
agencies, the ReUgious Affairs Office suggested church leaders act as pubUc educators and
recmitment officers for civUian defense. "The Church should explain civU defense to its
members....Church members should be urged to volunteer for local civU defense.""'
In its content and style The Church in Civil Defense was a departure from a
majority ofthe pamphlets produced during MUlard CaldweU's administration. The
language and the phrasing used in most pubUcations from the earUer era were more
""*Federal CivU Defense Administration, Church in Defense, 2.
""%id., 3.
""*Ibid.
""'Ibid, 9.
229
concise and more dry. Con^ared to the emotionaUy-charged booklets ofthe Peterson and
Hoegh administrations the CaldweU-era pamphlets seem quite stale. CaldweU's The
Clergy in Civil Defense and Peterson's The Church in Civil Defense both worked toward
a common goal. Both sought to inspire the nation's reUgious community to support the
FCDA in its campaign for an effective national program of civUian defense. But The
Clergy in Civil Defense merely told reUgious leaders that they could perform a service to
their congregants and to the FCDA by supporting civU defense initiatives. The Church in
Civil Defense triggered passionate responses with its images of a palpable evU, bent on
enslaving the world, yet opposed by a church and FCDA-led crusade to push back the
darkness."'" Bonowing a passage from the apostle Paul's epistle to the church at
Ephesus, the authors of The Church in Civil Defense wrote ofthe fight against
communism, "[W]e wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principaUties, against
powers, against the mlers of darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high
places.""" Such emotionaUy-charged language was rarely employed during the CaldweU
administration.
When CaldweU took the FCDA's reins, the civU defense agency was new, its
appeal untested. His administration focused first on simply getting the information out to
the people. His agency inundated the country with pamphlets. His pubUc affairs office
targeted specific groups within society and attempted to capitaUze on the social trends of
"'"Federal CivU Defense Administration, The Clergy in Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951); and Idem, Church in Defense.
""Ephesians 6.12 KJV, quoted in Federal CivU Defense Administration, Church in Defense, 3.
230
the Fifties. On occasion, the administration appealed to Americans' feeUngs-especiaUy
their patriotism That the displays in the Alert America convoys were intended to
manipulate Americans' emotions cannot be denied, but the convoy's exlubits were the
exception to the mle. Primarily, CaldweU tried to reason with the people. He presented
them with the facts that he beUeved would grab their attention and would compel them to
participate in civU defense."'
The emotional content ofthe FCDA pubUcity campaigns increased dramaticaUy
during Val Peterson and Leo Hoegh's terms. Already in 1953, when Interim
Administrator James Wadsworth passed control ofthe FCDA to Peterson, civU defense
was tired and ready to be put to pasture. Peterson's shift in preparedness strategies not
only faUed to revive civilian defense, it further depressed it. His refesal to embrace a
pubUc shelter program during the faUout scare mined his career and encouraged more
apathy toward, and distmst of, civU defense initiatives. CiviUan recmitment dropped
during the Peterson years. As volunteer totals fell, the language in FCDA pubUcations
became more urgent, more charged with emotion. Despite the inflated rhetoric, however,
returns on the FCDA's recmiting campaigns continued to plummet.""
"' VaUey Forge Foundation, The Alert America Convoys (n.p.:VaUey Forge Foundation, n.d.); "What you wUl see in the...CivU Defense Alert America Exhibit", FUes of Spencer R. Quick, Papers of Harry S Truman, Harry S Truman Library; Federal CivU Defense Administration, Annual Report for 1951 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1952), 84-88; Federal CivU Defense Administration, Annual Report for 1952 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1953), 41-54; and Idem, This is Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO), 4-5, 10.
""Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1954), 101; Idem, Annual Statistical Report (Battle Creek, Michigan: Federal CivU Defense Administration, 30 June 1956), 93-96 [hereafter cited as 1956 Statistical Report]: Idem, Leadership Guide: National Civil Defense Week, Sept. 9-15 1956 (Washington,
231
By the time Leo Hoegh assumed control in 1957, civU defense was near death, if
not already dead. Hoegh inherited the pubUc mistrust generated by the Peterson
Administration. He tried to dispel it. He threw himself into his work. He and his staff
modified the FCDA's commitment to mass evacuation, endorsing, instead, a more-
balanced plan that placed greater emphasis on the need for feUout shelters. Hoegh and his
Ueutenants were more candid with the people about the risks of nuclear war, and , Uke
Peterson, they continued to appeal to Americans' emotions. Again Uke Peterson,
however, Hoegh did not fare weU. Trends in poUtics, pubUc opinion, and technological
innovations combined to ensure that civU defense remained in a deflated state throughout
Eisenhower's two terms as president ofthe United States."'"
Although the Peterson and Hoegh administrations saw a steady decUne in pubUc
support for civUian defense, Val Peterson's first few months as director ofthe Federal
CivU Defense Administration were fiUed with excitement and a sense of optimism. In
March 1953, Peterson and other national, state, and local civU defense leaders attended
the "Operation Doorstep" atomic test series in Nevada. The Atomic Energy Commission
had agreed to devote a portion ofthe program to civU defense matters. The FCDA
wanted to know what types of stmctures could survive an atomic blast. At the test site.
D.C: GPO, 1956); and Idem, C/v/7 Defense Facts: Speakers Kit, 1955-1956 (Battle Creek, Michigan: Federal CivU Defense Administration, n.d.).
"'"Office of Defense and CivU MobUization, THE NATIONAL PLAN for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization (Washington, D.C: GPO, October 1958), Annex 10; and Executive Office ofthe President, Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, ANNUAL REPORT ofthe Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization for FISCAL YEAR 1961 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1962), 12-15.
232
agency personnel constmcted two-story, wooden-framed houses that boasted basement
"lean-to" shelters. The FCDA also ananged the buUding of underground shelters outside
the homes and near the projected "ground zero." As a final touch federal employees
ananged mannequins in reaUstic poses throughout the homes and shelters-the Ufe-Uke
dummies had been donated by the L. A. DarUng Company of Bronson, Michigan.""
Hours of work went into readying the site; seconds were sufficient to destroy it.
On March 17, an atomic bomb detonated over the civU defense test area. Heat from the
explosion scorched the houses. Then the blast wave hit, scattering fragments of wood and
mannequin limbs over the desert plain."'*
Americans witnessed the devastation. The FCDA caUed Operation Doorstep
"the first pubUc atomic test." The AEC had invited newspeople to the bomb site.
Broadcasting companies relayed images ofthe civU defense test to televisions throughout
the country, and movie-goers saw the scenes replayed in sUver screen news shorts."'
The most enduring images showed the destmction of a house that was only 3500
feet away from ground zero when the atomic device exploded. The bomb's blast
destroyed the house in less than three seconds. Film crews slowed their tapes and, frame-
by-frame, showed the pubUc the destmctive force ofthe atomic bomb. The power ofthe
bomb's blast smashed through the house, leveling it. Although the blast wave canied
most ofthe debris far from the home's foundation, some ofthe shattered buUding
""Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 58-60.
"'*Ibid., 58.
"'%id., 58-59,70-71.
233
materials coUapsed in upon the basement. Jagged boards thrust down into the
underground area, but the femUy's basement lean-to shelter held. Inside, a mannequin sat,
plastic smUe intact, its body untouched by the destmction around it. The FCDA made
posters using sbc "stUls" that showed the house being blown apart and a seventh picture of
the unharmed mannequin. Operation Doorstep was a success, a pubUc relations coup for
the FCDA."'*
When Val Peterson left the testing grounds and returned to his office he was
optimistic about the foture of American civU defense. Waiting on the administrator's desk
was a letter from a concemed citizen who worried that the preparedness program had not
attracted enough civilian recruits. A. S. Trew of California suggested a civU defense draft
to flesh out the ranks. Peterson assured Mr. Trew that forced participation was not
necessary, and told him that the country's civU defense program would soon "have aU the
volunteers it needs...."""
The FCDA's administrator was already working to ensure pubUc participation in
civU defense. The govemor of Nebraska during the floods of 1952, Peterson, Uke MUlard
CaldweU before him, recognized the importance of emphasizing the practical worth of civU
defense. A practical program would encourage pubUc and Congressional support. The
Operation Doorstep tests supposedly showed that the agency's wartime strategies were
sound. Peterson also set out to iUustrate the value of civU defense in times of peace. In
"'*Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 58.
""Val Peterson to A. S. Trew, 14 April 1953, Folder "T", Box 1, Conespondence of Val Peterson, 1953-1957, RG 396, NARACP.
234
1953 he attenpted to focus national attention on civU defense as a mechanism for coping
with natural disasters. The FCDA's 1953 Annual Report devoted more pages to the issue
than did any ofthe agency's previous or foture yearly reviews."^"
Occupying the spotUght were the stories of two tornadoes, one that descended
on Waco, Texas, and one which ripped through Worcester, Massachusetts. The people of
Waco were completely unprepared when a "twister" hit their city on May 11, 1953. Most
ofthe city's inhabitants knew of an Indian legend which said the area had never been
stmck by a tornado. They beUeved that they would remain safe, immune to the funnel
clouds that aU too often ravaged other Texas cities." ' Waco authorities also beUeved their
city an unlikely target for atomic attack. Much smaUer than Houston, Dallas, or Fort
Worth, surely it would not attract the enemy's attention. FCDA staff members recorded,
"[T]he mayor admitted a general impression that CivU Defense and ABC warfare were too
compUcated and 'too highfalutin' for the average town.""" Waco's civU defense program
plodded along haltingly, plagued by rapid tumover in its leadership and widespread apathy
in the general populace.
As a result, the civUian defense organization was unable to offer significant levels
of aid in the aftermath ofthe disaster. The tornado sttiick Waco's major downtown
" "Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 14-22, 26-27, 36, 43-47, 64.
""Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 15, 26-27, 36; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, DaUas Regional Office, The Waco Disaster, May 11, 1953 (DaUas: Federal CivU Defense Administration, DaUas Regional Office, 1953), 1.
""FCDA DaUas Regional Office, Waco Disaster, 3.
235
intersection, 5th and Austin, earUer designated by civU defense authorities as the
"Assumed Aiming Point" of an enemy bomb strike, during rush hour. Moving south to
northeast at a speed of thirty to thirty-sbc mUes per hour, the raging winds clawed their
way through the city, leaving behind a two block wide swath of destmction that stretched
from the heart ofthe city to its northem boundaries. BuUdings lay in heaps. Buried in the
mbble, held captive by tons of bricks, plaster, and wood, were dozens of people. Ofthe
many who died that day, a substantial number were lost because of inadequate
preparation. A weU-organized civU defense agency would have fielded trained rescue
teams immediately. With adequate civU defense many ofthe tornado's victims could have
been saved. Instead, they bled to death in the debris, waiting for a rescue which never
came. The FCDA's annual report observed, "The tornado which stmck Waco on May 11
brought understanding of [the importance of] civU defense not only to Texas but to the
entire region.
As a counterbalance to the Waco story, the FCDA pointed to the response of
civU defense personnel in Worcester, Massachusetts, when a simUar disaster befeU their
city. On June 9, a month after the Waco tornado, a fimnel cloud touched down in central
Massachusetts. As in Texas, the tv^er hit a population center during rush hour. The
death toU was high, ninety-four, but it would have been much higher without pron^t
action by the local preparedness organization. UnUke the Texans in Waco, the people of
Worcester were serious about civU defense. Worcester boasted a weU-staffed and highly-
trained emergency body. At its head were leaders in local government who had taken on
""FCDA DaUas Regional Office, Waco Disaster, 36.
236
the additional responsibUities of disaster planning."^" As soon as the tornado swept
through the city, the local civU defense agency initiated "speedy, efficient, rescue
efforts.""" By midnight, civiUan defenders had restored a measure of order to the stricken
city. Rescue crews had freed aU ofthe surviving injured from the wreckage and had
placed them under medical care. In addition, civU defense personnel opened temporary
shelters for the 10,000 homeless and provided the refogees with food and blankets. The
FCDA praised the organization in Worcester, stating, "The operation there was a model of
effective civU defense disaster recovery action.""^*
The Waco and Worcester tornadoes showed Americans that civU defense was
indeed practical. Training for a wartime emergency could prepare a population to meet
peacetime disasters, and vice-versa. In deaUng with the devastation wrought by natural
disasters, emergency personnel gained experience which they could draw upon if an enemy
launched a bomb strike against American cities. The editors ofthe Waco News-Tribune
perhaps summed it up best when they wrote, "Waco's misfortune may ultimately have
been someone's salvation. The Waco tomado is the nearest thing to an atomic bomb
disaster that nature has planted in these United States....Waco's tomado is a 'dry run' for
atomic disaster planning in every municipaUty in the U.S. and for Uncle Sam too."" '
""Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 27.
""Ibid., 15.
""Ibid.
^^^Waco News-Tribune quoted in FCDA DaUas Regional Office, Waco Disaster, 1.
237
Val Peterson's focus on the peacetime value of civU defense merely constituted
an expansion ofthe FCDA strategies formulated by MUlard CaldweU's team In many of
his attempts to buUd pubUc support for civU defense, Peterson foUowed the example of his
predecessor. Peterson continued CaldweU's saturation canpaign. The reading populace
was hard pressed to escape the subject of civiUan preparedness. During 1953, the Federal
CivU Defense Administration pubUshed and disseminated more than 12 miUion booklets
and leaflets. In 365 days the agency issued more than 600 press releases to media
representatives. The FCDA boasted that magazines and newspapers pubUshed over a
milUon articles, editorials, advertisements and other items that featured civU defense. In
addition, members ofthe FCDA's Training and Education Office composed entries for the
Americana, Britannica, and Collier's National encyclopedia series." *
Peterson's Administration also zeroed in on radio and television audiences.
Radio coverage in 1953 exceeded that ofthe previous two years. The FCDA distributed
new "dramatic" programs and spot announcements to the major networks and to local
broadcasting fecUities. In July, ABC affiUates inaugurated a weekly series on
preparedness. Federal civU defense personnel suppUed the American Broadcasting
Company vyith a Une often-minute programs that covered every fecet of civU defense.
FCDA spokespersons also put in guest appearances on prime-time shows such as "Meet
the Press," "Crossfire," and "Arthur Godfrey." Seemingly impressed with the need for a
strong civUian defense program, nationaUy-recognized newsman Arthur Godfi^y permitted
the FCDA and Air Force-sponsored Ground Observer Corps to plaster his fece and the
""Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 68-69.
238
statement "OUR COUNTRY NEEDS CrVILL\N PLANE SPOTTERS" on a series of
"car cards." Placed behind the windshield of parked cars, the cards served the dual
purpose of advertising civU defense and providing electtomagnetic shielding-they
protected automobUes' interiors from the sun's rays." '
FCDA leaders courted the estabUshed audiences of radio, but they also
recognized that television was the country's festest growing media outlet and potentiaUy
the agency's most valuable contact with the pubUc. The Peterson Administration paid
close attention to the television market, supplying civU defense film kits to each new
station that went on the air. The number of broadcasting stations increased by close to
three hundred percent in 1953 alone. By the end ofthe year more than 75 percent ofthe
United States' 160 milUon inhabitants were within range of one or more stations. The
agency capitaUzed on the pubUc fascination with T.V. and the visual component that
television offered. Networks broadcast the images ofthe Operation Doorstep tests and
showed FCDA-produced shorts such as Disaster on Main Street, Trapped, and This is
Civil Defense.'^^^
The Training and Education Office invaded Americans' Uves. CivU defense ads
and news briefs found their way into the magazines and newspapers which the people
read, and the radio and television programs which the pubUc heard and watched.
Additional civU defense propaganda awaited Americans outside the home, especiaUy at the
" 'Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 71; and Godfrey Car Cards, Component of Kit #2, "Volunteer in the CivUian Ground Observer Corps", Box 26, PubUc History FUes, 1950-62, RG 396, NARACP.
"'"Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 70.
239
more popular spots where Americans sought to reduce the accumulated pressures and
strains ofthe work week and the tensions of Ufe in the Nuclear Age. At cinemas across
the country, newsreel "traUers" replayed in stop-motion photography the destmction of
the home in the Operation Doorstep test. And at fairs and convention centers, civU
defense exhibits figured prominently. UntU August 1953 the Alert America convoys
continued to tour the United States. The FCDA then recommissioned elements ofthe
traveUng display as an "On Guard, Canada" convoy and sent it north, charged with the
mission of spreading the civU defense gospel and making new converts in the neighboring
country.""
Besides employing the same mechanisms for disseminating civU defense
information, Peterson's FCDA adopted many ofthe CaldweU administration's strategies
for capitalizing on social trends. With Americans' mass participation in professional and
social clubs stiU on the rise, the federal preparedness agency increased its targeting of
organizations that boasted large, national memberships. Peterson and his staff expanded
on the CaldweU poUcy of asking national associations to pressure their members into
volunteering for civU defense. On September 22, 1953, the FCDA issued Advisory
BuUetin No. 152 to its regional offices and state affiUates. The buUetin declared it agency
poUcy to accept "gifts of suppUes, equipment and fecUities" from organized groups.
ImpUcit in the buUetin's massage was the soUcitation of gifts by civU defense leaders. In
addition to petitioning reUgious, social, and professional associations for suppUes and use
of their facUities, FCDA officials began encouraging clubs to organize their members into
""Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 70-75.
240
civU defense teams, equip them, ttain them, and offer them to state or local preparedness
agencies."'^
In 1954, the Federal CivU Defense Administration issued a twenty-page C/v/7
Defense Registration Kit to dozens of organizations across the country. The packets
suppUed clubs and associations with everything they would need to hold an "R-Day"
(Registration Day). Included in the kit were pages of justifications for an organization's
involvement in civU defense, detaUs on promoting civUian preparedness among the club's
rank and file members, sample registration cards, and ready-made speeches that only
lacked the insertion ofthe speaker's, organization's, and host city's names into three or
four blanks. Even as the FCDA pushed national associations to participate in the civUian
defense program, the agency carefoUy promoted the idea that the professional and social
organizations had initiated cooperation. In the speeches found in the registration kit
certain words, such as "our" and "responsibUity" were underUned for emphasis. Not only
was the word "voluntarily" underscored in one sample speech, each letter was
capitalized.""
In particular, Peterson and the Federal CivU Defense Administration wanted more
participation from women's groups. During Peterson's administration as weU as the
CaldweU years, women ranked high on the FCDA's list of prospective recmits, because
the "Fifties woman" was stereotyped as nurturing, civic-minded, patriotic, and at home in
"' Advisory BuUetin No. 152, 20 September 1953, Binder, Advisory BuUetins, 50-199, Box 1, OCDM PubUcations, 1950-60, RG 396, NARACP.
""Federal CivU Defense Administration, C/v/7 Defense Registration Kit (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1954), 1-19.
241
suburban America from 9 am to 5 pm Targeting women for civU defense recruitment
seemed a sensible and sound strategy for boosting enroUment. Hence, in the feU of 1953
the FCDA's Women's Advisory Committee invited leaders from national women's
organizations to a conference on women and civU defense. Forty-sbc officers representing
groups with a coUective membership totaUng more than twenty-five mUUon women
attended the two-day session at the FCDA's National Training Center in Olney, Maryland.
There, federal spokespersons from the Women's Advisory Committee urged the
assembled leaders to preach civU defense to their constituents and urge them to volunteer.
Many women's associations cooperated with the FCDA's requests. They passed civU
defense resolutions. They plugged civU defense in their club buUetins. They invited
FCDA personnel to speak at meetings, luncheons, and at banquets."'"
WhUe Peterson's focus on women and women's groups merely represented an
extension ofthe FCDA's practices during the CaldweU years, the former govemor of
Nebraska did introduce a new slant to the persuasion campaign; he pushed for the
portrayal of civU defense as a famUy undertaking. Today, the mention of civU defense
brings to mind two images that have endured since the early Fifties. One mental picture
features schoolchUdren ducking under their desks or crouching in haUways. The other
centers on a femUy in a bomb shelter. Dad, Mom, and the kids are craiiq)ed, crowded into
tight quarters, but they are smiUng, and often they are playing a board game or Ustening to
a radio. The first image is a legacy ofthe CaldweU administration. Despite Val Peterson's
"'"Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 79-80.
242
preference for mass evacuation over shelters, the second image, with its en^hasis on the
femUy as a civU defense unit, is primarily a product ofthe Peterson era.""
From the compUing ofthe earUest Atomic Age reports on preparedness, such as
Study 3B-1 and the BuU committee investigations, civU defense planners and
spokespersons had consistently maintained that preparedness was the responsibUity ofthe
individual. Although much ofthe language remained the same-ultimate responsibUity stUl
rested upon the individual-during Peterson's term as administrator the emphasis began to
shift. The FCDA began to focus more and more on the femUy as the base unit in the
civilian defense army. The Federal CivU Defense Administration's goal was the
bureaucratization ofthe American people, the creation of a federalized system of home
defense that utilized the skills of every man, woman, and chUd in the United States. The
agency wamed that the advent ofthe Atomic Age had placed American civilians on the
front Unes, and they must prepare for the unthinkable—a nuclear strike against the
heartland. The mere expression "home defense," so often employed by the Peterson
Administtation, suggested the importance ofthe famUy in civU defense. According to the
FCDA, the defense ofthe homeland began in the home. "'*
""Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 67; and Idem, Home Protection Exercises (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1953).
"'*Lyon G. Tyler, Jr., "CivU Defense: The Impact ofthe Planning Years, 1945-1950," (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1967), 27, 33-37; War Department CivU Defense Board, A Study of Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: National MUitary EstabUshment, Office ofthe Secretary of Defense, 1948), 9; Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 67; Federal CivU Defense Administration, Home Protection Exercises; Idem, The Home Defense Action Program (n.p.: Federal CivU Defense Administration, September 1953); Idem, Home Preparedness Workshop: A Guide for Group Leaders, (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1953); and Idem, Rural Family Defense (Washington, D.C:
243
Of course some households received more attention from the FCDA than did
others. In the 1950s, the stereotypical American home, the ideal portrayed in movies, on
television, in books and magazines, and even in advertisements was represented as a
modest house in a middle-class, white, suburban neighborhood. It was a "Father Knows
Best" kind of home complete with a tidy lawn, perhaps a white picket fence out front, a
smaU vegetable garden in the back, and, inside, a "nuclear" famUy-Dad, Mom, and two or
three weU-groomed and weU-mannered chUdren. These were the households that the
FCDA featured in its fikns and pubUcations. These were the households that the agency
seemed most intent on preparing for a nuclear strike."'
Modem and educated, it was Ukely that the parents in these "picture perfect"
households had read Dr. Benjamin Spock's perennial bestseUer, The Common Sense Book
of Baby and Child Care, an instmction manual that showed Mom and Dad how to forge
sttonger femUy ties and mold their chUcfren into better adults. Presumably, many of them
had acted upon Dr. Spock's suggestion that they abandon the old mother/father autocracy
model for their famUy. Rather, make the family a bastion of democracy. Do not simply
dictate behavior and expect the chUdren to act Uke obedient, but mindless, automatons.
Gather the chUdren together and hold orderly famUy discussions. Include them in the
decision making process. Grant them power over their own Uves. Permit them to be
GPO, 1956)
437 The artwork on FCDA pamphlets provides much insight into the federal office's agenda and target audiences. The drawings in Home Preparedness Workshop and Home Protection Exercises are typical of FCDA artwork throughout the Fifties and early Sbrties.
244
thinking, contributing, and independent members ofthe femUy, and aU-the chUd, the
parents, the community, the country-would reap the benefit."'*
Peterson's FCDA echoed Spock's ideas and suggested that the members of a
famUy sit down together, discuss civU defense responsibUities, and divide them. Yet, whUe
many ofthe agency's mechanisms for achieving its goals were the same as those posited
by Dr. Spock, the measurement of success, the results anticipated by Spock and the
FCDA, were polar opposites. UnUke the author of Baby and Child Care, FCDA
admmistrators wanted to create a society of trained and weU-rehearsed automatons that
would react instantly, unflinchingly, when a civU defense emergency arose. Valuable time
would be lost if Americans had to stop, think, and deUberate what course of action to
foUow when the air raid sirens sounded.""
FCDA plans suggested that each individual in the famUy, chUdren included,
assume primary and secondary civiUan defense responsibiUties and then ttaui and driU
regularly to guarantee optimum performance during an attack. Dad might act as primary
house warden and communications expert. During an emergency he would oversee the
loading of suppUes and his household troops into the shelter or, if time permitted an
evacuation, into the famUy car. Once the escape vehicle or the shelter had been
provisioned, fiUed with famUy members and secured, Dad would attempt simultaneously to
"'*Benjamin Spock, The Common Sense Book of Baby and Child Care (New York: DueU, Sloan and Pearce, 1945).
""Federal CivU Defense Administration, Home Protection Exercises, 3-4.
245
keep the femUy calm and Usten for CONELRAD updates. As chief communications
officer he would exercise complete control over the radio's tuning and volume dials.
Mom might act in a dual capacity as chief medical officer and as quartermaster
general. Although the FCDA encouraged women to serve as neighborhood wardens,
many civU defense pubUcations presupposed that most women would volunteer for those
duties associated with the traditional "female" responsibUities of care giver, cook, and
maid. Within the microcosm ofthe nuclear home. Mom patched up her chUdren's
everyday scrapes and bmises; she would also tend to the injuries caused by an enemy
bomb strike. Mom kept the suburban house clean, neat, and weU-stocked with food; she
would do the same for her femUy's bomb shelter and car. Lastly, Mom would be ready to
prepare wholesome and nutritious meals either in the house's kitchen or in the shelter. In
the latter her skUls would be put to the test, but surely, aided by the innate creative
abUities attributed to her gender, she would succeed in making attractive and appetizing
dishes from canned and dehydrated foods."""
"Grandma's Pantry," a program launched in the Peterson Administration, but one
which gained momentum and greater attention during Leo Hoegh's term of office, focused
on Mom's quartermaster/cook responsibUities. FCDA pubUcations that popularized the
program boasted a picture of an older, quaint kitchen, complete with a weU-stocked
larder, a pot-beUied stove, and a pan of homemade roUs just out ofthe oven. The caption
below the picture recaUed images from adult Americans' chUdhood. "Remember
GRANDMA'S PANTRY with its shelves loaded with food, ready for any emergenc)
"""Federal CivU Defense Administration, Home Protection Exercises, 4-6.
246
whether it be unexpected con^any or roads blocked for days by a winter's storm?*""' The
text then informed its audience that the rigors and uncertainty of Ufe in the Atomic Age
necessitated "the recreation of GRANDMA'S PANTRY in a sheltered area ofthe modem
home.""" Peterson and Hoegh's personnel bombarded women with the program's catch
phrase: "Grandma's Pantry was Ready-Is Your Pantry Ready in Event of Emergency?'""'
Just Uke Mom and Dad, the chUdren also were to have civU defense
responsibUities. Theirs were the lesser tasks. Often they acted as assistants to the adults.
They helped Dad carry last-minute suppUes to the famUy shelter or the car. They assisted
Mom in meal preparation and cleaning. If Grandma or some other older person were
Uving at the house, the chUdren might bear the responsibiUty of escorting them to safety,
closely watching to make sure they did not stumble. In addition, the chUdren might be in
charge of gathering and taking to the shelter a couple of games, decks of cards, and/or a
few favorite books. IdeaUy, the presence of such diversions would keep the chUdren
content and quietly occupied whUe hydrogen bombs leveled their neighborhood and whUe
Dad and Mom Ustened to CONELRAD briefs. Moreover, the games and books would
provide the entire famUy with entertainment and a temporary escape from harsh reaUty if
""'Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, Inc., PubUshers, 1988), 103; and "Grandma's Pantry Belongs in Your Kitchen," quoted in Newsletter by, for, and about Women in Civil Defense (May 1958), 1.
""'Ibid.
^'^^ Grandma's Pantry, 1.
247
staggered enemy attacks or concentrated radioactive faUout mandated an extended stay in
the shelter."""
The chUdren's role in the femUy's civU defense program may seem minimal, but
theb- parents were to assure them that they were valued contributors to the famUy's and
the country's system of civU defense. The chUdren ofthe 1950s were being readied for the
chaUenges ofthe 1960s. Trained and routinely drUled in civU defense techniques, informed
ofthe Unportance of civilian preparedness, taught to accept with pride the duties thrust on
them by the FCDA, and witness to their parents' example, the chUdren should cUck
smoothly into positions of greater responsibUity once they reached adulthood. A
particularly devastating enemy attack might even prematurely force more responsibUity on
the chUdren.
Each femUy member, regardless of age, was considered an expert, the authority
for the primary tasks aUotted to them Workmg together, this team of experts hopefoUy
would function as an efficient base unit in the United States' civU defense corps. Yet
unless the enemy scheduled his attacks after 5 pm it was unUkely that aU members ofthe
unit would be assembled at home when an emergency stmck. Nor was there any
guarantee that each individual on the team would survive a nuclear assault. It was
therefore imperative for Mom, Dad, and the chUdren to famUiarize themselves with each
others' responsibUities. Each famUy member would have primary duties, but they would
"""Federal CivU Defense Administration, Home Protection Exercises, 3-4; and Idem, Between You and Disaster (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1956). May, Homeward Bound, 93-94, 103-9.
248
also cross-train in secondary fields. Mom might weU be the primary care giver, but an
older chUd and Dad too might take first aid courses, just in case.""'
Although many FCDA pubUcations suggested American famUies participate in
civU defense, the single pamphlet most responsible for detaUing the division of tasks was
Home Protection Exercises, part ofthe agency's 'TamUy Action Program" Boasting a
caricature of Dad, Mom, the kids, and Grandma gathered around a coffee table and
discussing their assigned duties, the booklet Usted "eight important famUy exercises," such
as "preparation of your shelter, home nursing, and provision of safe food and water in
emergencies."""* The work then gave a more detaUed analysis of each exercise or
responsibiUty and, below each explanation, provided two blanks. One famUy member was
to affix their signature to the blank marked "To direct famUy action." Another was to sign
his or her name on the line above "helper or alternate."""^
By training and drilling for a civU defense emergency, each famUy, each base unit
in the country's civU defense network, increased its chances of surviving an atomic attack.
The FCDA thus could tout civU defense as a measure for ensuring self-preservation.
Further, if aU or nearly aU American fariiiUes saw to their own safety by foUowing FCDA
guideUnes, the result would be the creation of a formidable civU defense army, one capable
of ensuring not only the survival of many of its individual units, but the survival ofthe
""'Federal CivU Defense Administration, Home Protection Exercises (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1953), 3-6.
""*Ibid., 3.
""%id.,4-16.
249
country as weU. StUl fiirther, spokespersons for civU defense-including President Dwight
D. Eisenhower-argued that the buUding of a truly effective national civU defense program
at the grass-roots level could possibly deter an aggressor from launching a nuclear
strike.""*
No doubt some famUies performed just as FCDA personnel wished, but most did
not. Agency plans for a United States in which each person, each famUy was aware and
supportive of civU defense goals never became a reaUty. Indeed, the FCDA even feUed to
attract the whole-hearted support ofthe middle-class suburbanites on which it focused its
energies. Recmitment returns dropped whUe Val Peterson was in office, and they did not
recover when Leo Hoegh took control in 1957.""'
Gains in volunteer recmitment might have bolstered the FCDA's position in
Washington. Through 1953, the Federal CivU Defense Administration regularly pubUshed
its recmitment totals in its annual report to Congress. Evidence that indicated a lack of
civiUan participation could cause the FCDA's appropriations to dry up. On the other
hand, large classes of recmits, and especiaUy a record of escalating pubUc involvement,
would help justify past and foture funding by showing legislators that the American people
""*Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 6; Dwight D. Eisenhower to Val Peterson, 17 July 1956, "White House Conespondence, 1956," Box 2, Conespondence of Administrator Val Peterson, 1953-1957, RG 396; and "A Critical Problem," President Eisenhower Press Conference, 14 March 1956, "White House Conespondence, 1956" Box 2, Conespondence of Administrator Val Peterson, 1953-1957, RG 396.
""'Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 101; Idem, 1956 Statistical Report, 93-96; and Idem, Annual Statistical Report (Battle Creek, Michigan: Federal CivU Defense Administration, 30 June 1958), 50-52 [hereafter cited as 1958 Statistical Report].
250
were supportive of civU defense, and the FCDA was using its monies to good effect.
Besides sending the book-length annual reports to the members ofthe House and the
Senate, FCDA officials made the document avaUable to their regional offices, state and
local affiUates, and to the pubUc at large. There, the report's optimistic tone was expected
to generate an enthusiasm in estabUshed preparedness offices and among the general
populace. Together with other civU defense campaigns, this enthusiasm hopefoUy would
translate into greater recmitment returns the next year and thus would place more pressure
on Congress to increase FCDA aUocations. This strategy was less than successfol."'"
Volunteer totals that had tapered off during MUlard CaldweU's last year in office
began to drop radicaUy whUe Val Peterson served as administrator. In 1953
approximately 500,000 volunteered for training as civU defense auxUiaries. That number
was misleading, however, because it represented a compUation of enrollment totals for aU
civU defense service classes—first aid, warden, and a number of others—yet there is no
indication that FCDA staff members counted only once a preparedness enthusiast who
took more than one class. It seems, instead, that each civU defense training facUity simply
reported its annual totals. Since Peterson's FCDA pushed a program of cross training, as
outUned in Home Protection Exercises, it is aUnost certain that the actual number of
civUians involved in preparedness training was lower than the 500,000 reported. Despite
the severely Umited success of his 1953 recruitment campaign, Peterson stUl could argue
that civU defense had attracted a sum of 4.5 mUUon volunteers since the FCDA's inception
in 1950. Yet again the numbers misrepresent the reaUty, because the agency did not
"'"Federal CivU Defense Admmistration, 1953 Annual Report, 101,
251
report how many trained civUian defenders either became inactive or conq)letely forsook
their duties each year.""
Peterson's FCDA dealt with the recruitment crisis by hiding from Congress the
diminishing returns. In 1954 and in subsequent years the Federal CivU Defense
Administration excluded volunteer totals from its annual report to the men and women on
Capitol HUl. Only those Senators and Representatives that located and carefliUy read one
of a very limited number of agency statistical reports would know approximately how
many individuals had taken preparedness courses or had volunteered for civU defense
responsibUities. The FCDA did not include volunteer totals in its report to Congress,
because the number of recruits was dropping. In its Annual Statistical Report for fiscal
year 1956, the agency recorded a total pubUc enroUment of 4,471,000 people in civil
defense-the FCDA had claimed 4,500,000 recruits two years earUer, at the end of 1953.
By June 30, 1957, the number of individuals cataloged for state and local civU defense
responsibUities had faUen to 3,344,941."''
When it came to recruitment totals official deceit, or inadequate measures for
reporting and calculating the actual pubUc involvement in civU defense, or both seem to
have been endemic to the Federal CivU Defense Administration. When French Robertson
announced his intent to resign as administrator of FCDA Region 5, he praised state,
county, and city directors for "furthering the progress of civU defense," but he quoted no
""Federal CivU Defense Administtation, 1953 Annual Report, 101.
"' Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1956 Statistical Report, 17: and Idem 1958 Statistical Report, 15.
252
specific number of volunteers to substantiate his claim that progress had been made.
Grouped with Robertson's typewritten speech is a hand-drawn chart detaUing the
"Tabulation of tt^ining reported by states." Ofthe five states in his region, only Texas,
the home state for Region 5's headquarters, showed substantial gains-68,477 trained
civUian defenders-for the year. Arkansas placed second v^h some 5,700 trainees, but
more than half were volunteer firemen, and only 6 people out ofthe reported 5,700 had
taken a course in "Basic CivU Defense" measures. Trainee totals for Oklahoma and
Louisiana were even smaUer than in Arkansas, and New Mexico, never a sttong supporter
of civU defense, had yet to report any statistics whatsoever. On the bottom ofthe chart, in
capital letters, the hand-written message "DO NOT PUT IN FORMAL RECORD" glares
at the reader.""
Val Peterson tried to shore up the FCDA's crumbling foundation with gadgets,
gimmicks, and especiaUy with emotionaUy-charged appeals to the pubUc. CivU defense
was American. Peterson's staff pricked the conscience of each patriot by pairing symbols
of freedom with civU defense goals. Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin,
George Washington, and the other founding fathers ofthe United States, they were aU
committed to the idea of civU defense if the FCDA's pubUc relations experts were to be
beUeved. The authors ofthe U.S. Constitution opened the document with the words "We,
the people." Popular opinion held that it was through the determination and the
"""Statement of French M. Robertson, Regional FCDA Administrator, Region 5, Denton, Texas", Folder V.A.I, Speeches by Key Regional Officials, Box 8, Office FUes of the Director, RG 396 [In June 1997, many FCDA documents that were scheduled for transfer to RG 396 were stUl located under RG 304 at the depository cited]. National Archives Branch Depository, Fort Worth, Texas.
253
cooperation of Americans from every class, trade, and age that this country was bom In
the 1950s the Federal CivU Defense Administration attempted to use that idea to its
advantage. The agency told Americans that, once again, it was time for "we, the people"
to do their duty—this time by preparing for a nuclear exchange. One kit that the FCDA
distributed to spokespersons for civU defense included the passage, "CivU defense is 'We,
the people'...and it's now up to us to preserve...this nation.""'"
For those Americans who associated patriotism with the spirit ofthe pioneer,
federal pubUc relations speciaUsts conjured up images of a nineteenth-century homestead
under Indian attack. Inside the home were "women and chUdren moulding buUets, loading
muskets, putting out fires from flaming anows and tending the wounded whUe their
husbands and fathers did the fighting to protect them""" The mental picture produced
was one that suggested continuity in U.S. civU defense throughout the country's history.
Neither the concept of civUian defense nor the Peterson Administration's focus on a
femUy-oriented program was new, the FCDA argued. Pioneer famUies had been ready to
defend their homes. Nuclear famUies must be prepared to do the same. FCDA speech
writers reminded their readers that whUe most ofthe physical violence in World War I and
World War II had occuned far from home, advances in aircraft design and development
placed modem Americans in the same situation as nineteenth-century pioneers on the
Westem frontier; their homes were within range of an enemy attack. In the words of one
"'"Quoted in "CivU Defense-Keystone of National Defense", in Federal CivU Defense Administration, C/v/7 Defense Facts: Speakers Kit, 1955-1956 (Battle Creek, Michigan: Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1954), n.p.
""Ibid.
254
agency pubUcation, "[W]e've run the fiiU cycle, and civU defense is right back on our
Uteral doorstep., [sic] because that's right where a war ofthe Atom Age would be.""'*
Besides parading time-honored examples ofthe American spirit before the
people, the FCDA used contemporary American icons to seU civU defense. Since most
Americans recognized the names of popular actors and singers, the FCDA habituaUy
enlisted the aid of stars such as Tony Bennett, Andy Griffith, and others when recording
radio spots. The stars increased the agency's visibUity and hopefoUy convinced the artists'
devoted foUowers that the entertainment industry's eUte considered civU defense
worthwhUe.
The wholesome, aU-American image that Andy Griffith and his TV personas
projected made him an invaluable commodity for civU defense promoters, but
Administrator Val Peterson located another individual that many would have considered
even "more American." Her name was Ramona Deitmeyer, and she Uved in Lincoln,
Nebraska, with her husband and their five chUdren. Praised as "the country's outstanding
homemaker," she also boasted a title that identified her as a champion of American ideals.
She was American to the core. She was "Mrs. America" for 1955. White, middle-class,
married with chUdren, Mrs. America was an even better fit for the FCDA than 1955's Miss
America would have been, because Peterson wanted a famUy-based program of civU
defense. Working in conjunction with the Federal CivU Defense Administration, the local
civU defense agency in Lincoln contacted Mrs. Dietmeyer, took pictures, and wrote a story
"'*Quoted in "CivU Defense-Keystone of National Defense," in Federal CivU Defense Administration, C/v/7 Defense Facts, n.p.
255
which told "how 'Mrs. America' makes certain of civU defense protection in her home.""'
MeanwhUe, Bert Nevins, president and managing director of Mrs. America, Inc. pressured
Nebraska Senator Carl Curtis to schedule a photo shoot of Mrs. America and her femUy
signing up for civU defense at the White House, in the presence of President
Eisenhower."'*
By incorporating the country's founding fethers, westem pioneers, and Mrs.
America into its pubUcity can:q)aigns, the FCDA hoped to prove to the people that civU
defense was indeed American. The agency also sought to convince the pubUc that civU
defense was moral, that it was the right thing to do. Peterson and the FCDA reminded the
people that peace and the safeguarding of human Ufe constituted the two primary goals of
the civU defense program. HopefliUy, the creation of a strong preparedness network
supported at every level—from the grassroots up—would deter an enemy from launching a
nuclear strike against the Uiuted States. Nonetheless, if an aggressor did go forward with
its attack, civU defense could reduce the number of casualties sustained. Lastly, civU
defense could save Uves even if a potential aggressor chose not to attack, even if the peace
were maintained. Both Peterson and CaldweU had argued that civUian defense planning
""Bert Nevins to Mrs. Jean FuUer, 24 May 1955, Folder "D", Box 1, Conespondence of Val Peterson, RG 396, NARACP.
"'*Bert Nevins to Carl Curtis, 24 May 1955, Folder "D", Box 1, Conespondence of Val Peterson, RG 396, NARACP.
256
and manpower could be employed to combat natural disasters and cope with the
destmction they left behind.""
CivU defense was American. CivU defense was moral. CivU defense was the wUl
of God. It was the last supposition that afforded the Peterson Administration its greatest
opportunity to raise the emotional content of its pubUcity campaigns. The ttappings of
reUgion were omnipresent in the United States ofthe Fifties. Americans' enthusiasm for
reUgion, so apparent during Hany S. Truman's years as president, did not diminish during
Eisenhower's two terms. If anything, the pubUc's reUgiosity increased, driven perhaps in
part by the fear of ever "bigger" bombs, the desire for conformity, and an administration
that openly spoke ofthe need for spiritual sttength in the Nuclear Age."*"
In pubUc before the press, and in private, sequestered with the members of his
Cabinet, President Dwight David Eisenhower caUed for a more spiritual America. He
argued that through hope, feith, and determination, through strength of wiU and spirit, the
American people would see their way of Ufe defeat communism, and the United States
would win the Cold War. Eisenhower's expressed beUefs were based upon his
experiences in World War II. He had seen firsthand the physical and emotional
devastation that saturation bombing had produced in Europe, and he told the men and
""Federal CivU Defense Administration, Annual Report for 1952 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1953), 19-22; Idem, 1953 Annual Report, 6, 14-22; and Idem, Church in Defense, 3.
"*"Douglas T. MUler and Marion Nowak, The Fifties: The Way We Really Were (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975), 84-92; J. Ronald Oakley, God's Country: America in the Fifties (New York: Dembner Books, 1986), 319-24; and George M. Marsden, Religion and American Culture (New York: Harcourt Brace CoUege PubUshers, 1990), 207-215.
257
women of his Cabinet that Americans could not imagine the honor that awaited them if
the world was destmed for nuclear war. MUitary hardware, civU defense shelters and
evacuation routes, these would be of Uttle value unless the people possessed deep reserves
of spiritual strength to sustain them during and after a nuclear holocaust.
Eisenhower's references to a spiritual America, though numerous, were often
vague in their definition. His speeches held appeal both for reUgious Usteners that equated
spiritual strength with feith in God and for agnostics and atheists who measured spiritual
strength in terms of wUl power and self control. Yet, whUe Eisenhower may have issued
guarded pronouncements on spirituaUty, others in his administration were more direct,
speaking openly of theu* hope for an America that was fortified by strong reUgious
beUefe."*'
Echoing the charges ofthe Roman CathoUc Church and many Protestant
reUgious leaders, as well. Secretary of State John Foster DuUes contended that
communism was a reUgion in itself—a dangerous, aggressive reUgion. It should therefore
be opposed by organized reUgious bodies, and Americans should sign up for the jUiad. A
layman in the Presbyterian Church and the former head ofthe Federal CouncU of
Churches' Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, DuUes stated that Soviet Communist
Party members were fanatical beUevers, missionaries driven to spread their creed
"*'Federal CivU Defense Administtation, Federal Civil Defense Administration Announces a Special Course for Clergymen (Battle Creek, Michigan: Federal CivU Defense Admmistraiton, 1956), n.p.; Mark SUk, Spiritual Politics: Religion and America Since World War II (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), 23, 40, 44, 68, 91 -92, 98; and Ambrose, Eisenhower, 38.
258
throughout the world. The only way to withstand them, he argued, was to ground
Democracy in a "righteous and dynamic feith. ""*
An Eisenhower appointee, Val Peterson foUowed the example ofthe president
and his leading advisors. From the moment he took control ofthe Federal CivU Defense
Administration, Peterson began to Unk civU defense to reUgion and spirituaUty. He
repeated Eisenhower's and DuUes's warnings and arguments. He appropriated key
phrases and incorporated them into his own discourses on reUgion and civU defense."*' In
A Message to Clergymen, an inttoduction to a 1956 FCDA pubUcation, Peterson wrote,
"A righteous and dynamic feith in god and injustice can restore to us a measure
of ..security... in the midst of material insecurity. CivU defense rests on persons, and
reUgion makes persons strong.""*"
It was natural for Peterson to second the views of his president and benefector,
but it is evident that the FCDA's administrator also recognized and seized an opportunity
to bolster popular support for civU defense. Throughout the United States' history, and
perhaps even more in the 1950s when popular reUgiosity peaked, Americans have been
fiercely protective of their constitutional guarantee to freedom of reUgion. If Peterson and
the FCDA could convince the pubUc that communism posed a threat to reUgion, and civU
defense was a viable means of protecting the country, the people, and their freedoms,
Americans might be persuaded to enroU in preparedness programs. Accordingly, the
"*'SUk, Spiritual Politics, 23, 91-92.
"*'Federal CivU Defense Adnunisttation, 1953 Annual Report, 6.
"*"Federal CivU Defense Administration, Special Course for Clergymen, n.p.
259
presence of reUgious phraseology in FCDA authored pamphlets and speeches increased
dramaticaUy during Peterson's tenure as administtator.
As Deputy Administtator Katherine Howard worked her way across the country,
trying to mobUize women's clubs in support of civU defense, she popularized the
connection between civU defense and reUgion. Howard wove bibUcal scripture into her
speeches and peppered them with homespun Christian proverbs. Addressing the members
ofthe Raleigh, North CaroUna, Women's Club, she spoke of feith and works-women's
faith in their own abUities and the value of a good work ethic in preparing for a civU
defense emergency. Reminding her audience of an old saying, "The Lord helps those who
help themselves," Howard told her Usteners to get involved and strongly hinted that God
would approve of their actions."*'
Katherine Howard suggested to the women of Raleigh that God would want
them to support civU defense. Val Peterson made similar claims, but he also took the
FCDA's logic a step farther. In a speech entitled C/v/7 Defense in Industry, Peterson
argued that civU defense in fact acted as a shield to reUgion. Of course God favored
civiUan preparedness; civU defense constituted a detenent to war. Without it, a nuclear
exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union was more Ukely to occur.
Without civU defense the U.S. might not be able to recover from a Soviet strUce. Further,
if the United States lost a war to its hated communist rival, the Soviets would revoke
Americans' freedom of worship. With an undisguised appeal to his Usteners' emotions.
"*'"Something Attempted, Something Done," Raleigh Women's Club, Box 10, Papers of Katherine G. Howard, 1917-74, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library [hereafter cited as DDEL].
260
Peterson closed his presentation by saying, "If a war occurs we must never forget that
those people wUl be coming over here to destroy our freedom of reUgion. Communism in
the final analysis cannot stand the existence office churches in the world.""**
The charged language found in the speeches deUvered by Peterson and Howard
made its way into FCDA pamphlets as weU. The text of one booklet stated, "CivU defense
is essentiaUy a welfere program. It makes plans and provides means so that in time of
disaster every American can put into practice the divine injunction to 'Love thy
Neighbor.'""*^ Another argued ministers should support preparedness measures because
"[t]he church, in consonance with the wiU of God, is anxious to preserve Ufe, physicaUy as
weU as spirituaUy.""** Bringing to mmd the Declaration of Independence's assertion that
an individual had the right to Ufe, Uberty, and the pursuit of happiness, the text continued,
"ReUgion upholds the proposition that man has worth and dignity in the sight of God.
Freedom is one of man's inaUenable rights. The world is now in an imcon^romising
contest between those who defend freedom...and those who deny that man has any
inaUenable rights at aU, between those who look upon man as a chUd of God and those
who look upon him as a thing.""*' Yet another pubUcation, one that advertised itself as a
"**"CivU Defense in Industry," Alphabetical Section CheckUst to Alphabetical Section Comparison of State CD, Box 4, PubUcation FUes, RG 397, NARACP.
"* Federal CivU Defense Administration, Special Course for Clergymen, n.p.
"**Federal CivU Defense Administration, Church in Defense, 2.
"*1bid., 3.
261
conq)endium of "civU defense fects" Usted the three things that the Soviets most wished to
destroy in the United States; reUgious freedom occupied the top spot on the Ust." "
There is nothing unusual in Peterson's attempt to capitaUze on Americans'
emotions. He headed a federal agency, and most governments fen the flames of patriotism
and reUgion to achieve their ends. Nor is it surprising that when Peterson's
Administration began smking, the FCDA tried to baU itself out of trouble by winning
popular support. The agency's pubUcation record provides a Ust of figures that chart
Peterson's growing concerns for, and reactions to, a decUning civU defense program.
Although the FCDA released mUUons of pamphlets between 1953 and 1955, 1956 marked
a watershed year for the dissemination of civU defense pubUcations. The sum of booklets,
guides, and posters distributed since the FCDA's creation totaled 145,078,401 by June
1956. Of that number nearly fifty miUion made their way into the pubUc domain during
the last fiscal year. The quantity of civU defense pubUcations distributed had steadUy
grown since 1954, when Val Peterson had committed the FCDA to mass evacuation and
the pubUc was beginning to worry about the hazards of radioactive faUout. Americans
received 8,529,874 pubUshed materials on civU defense during fiscal year 1954. A year
later, civU defense bodies distributed 23,382,325 informational booklets. In 1956 pubUc
disenchantment with the Peterson Administration had grown so great Senator Chet
HoUfield directed a congressional inquiry into the civUian defense program The same
year, seemingly in an attempt to win approval from the pubUc and deflect the criticisms of
"'"Federal CivU Defense Admmistration, C/v/7 Defense Facts, 3.
262
the HoUfield Committee, the FCDA and its state and local auxUiaries saturated the country
with 48,936, 460 pubUcations.""
Not only the number, but the language and oft times the subject matter ofthe
pamphlets released in 1956 by the Federal CivU Defense Administration show the agency's
desperate attempts to attract attention. It was in 1956 that the FCDA issued the
emotional tract The Church and Civil Defense and an equaUy potent booklet entitled
Federal Civil Defense Administration Announces A Special Course for Clergymen. The
second pamphlet began with a personal note from Val Peterson to the members ofthe
clergy. "We [the FCDA] covet your partnership in the great humanitarian effort of
providing for the safety and health of our people," he wrote."" Next, the FCDA's staff of
writers assured reUgious leaders that the nation's statesmen agreed that "mankind has
gotten itself into a situation where men must open their hearts and minds to divine tmth or
be obUterated by the material monsters that they have created.""" The work's authors
then paraded a few Eisenhower and DuUes quotes intended to substantiate the assertion
that American statesmen recognized the Cold War as an economic, poUtical, and spiritual
stmggle. At the end ofthe text the leaflet Usted the topics that FCDA instmctors would
address in the course. Many, such as "The Church and Emergency Mass Care" and
"Spiritual Ministtations in Disaster Situations" involved practical appUcations, but others,
for example "The Nature and Characteristics of Our Adversary" and "Christianity and
" 'Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1956 Statistical Report, 100.
"' Federal CivU Defense Achninistration, Special Course for Clergymen, n.p.
""Ibid.
263
Communism Conttasted," seem designed to inspire a heightened sense of patriotism
toward the United States and a holy wrath toward the Union of Soviet SociaUst
RepubUcs."'"
The FCDA released dozens of pan^hlets in the months before the HoUfield
Committee began its hearings in January 1956, but the agency continued its accelerated
efforts to win popular approval even after the House MUitary Operations Subcommittee
ended its deUberations in June. If the FCDA could have shown evidence of increased
pubUc support before or during the hearings, the agency might have been able to better
defend itself against HoUfield's attacks. The Federal CivU Defense Administration faUed
to produce any such statistics, however, and the members ofthe HoUfield Committee
issued a bUstering appraisal ofthe Peterson Administtation and the country's state of
civUian preparedness. For the FCDA credibUity after the release ofthe report was just as
important as trying to fend off criticism when the HoUfield investigations first got
underway. Hence, the publishing frenzy and the campaigns for acceptance that
characterized the FCDA throughout the first half of 1956 continued unabated-and
possibly even intensified—during the last sbc months ofthe year. The agency released The
Church in Civil Defense in the faU.""
On September 9, 1956, the Federal CivU Defense Administration kicked off
National CivU Defense Week, a campaign which agency pubUcists caUed the "FCDA's
most extensive pubUc education program...to develop awareness, motivation and
"'"Federal CivU Defense Administtation, Special Course for Clergymen, n.p.
""Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1958 Statistical Report, 15-1%.
264
participation in CD activities....""'* Agency officials made the event difficult to ignore.
Those that orchestrated the undertaking employed saturation tactics, gimmicks, and
emotionaUy-charged language to awaken and mobUize the people. To pubUcize the event
and stimulate interest, the FCDA and its sister organizations at the state and local levels
dissemmated over a mUUon civU defense guides, comic books, and leaflets.""
The week's catch phrase-Alert Today, AUve Tomonow-headUned most ofthe
pubUcations, and it was almost always accompanied by a caricature of Mr. CivU Defense,
the FCDA's first mascot since Val Peterson had retired Bert the Turtle in 1953.
Cartoonist Al Capp, best knovm for his L'U Abner series, created Mr. CivU Defense.
There was no mistaking Mr. CivU Defense's affiliation; his torso was comprised ofthe two
capital letters "C" and "D." Yet in spite of his alphabet body, Mr. CivU Defense looked
neither as siUy nor as sluggish as Bert the Turtle. The pose most favored by the new
mascot was one in which he was standing with his legs set wide apart, his arms akimbo, a
FCDA "steel-pot" helmet strapped to his head and jauntUy puUed down over the left eye,
his right eye alert and peering out from under the hat's brim, his mouth fixed in a
determined and confident grin. UnlUce the Bert character which always looked scared,
tentative, searching for an excuse to duck into his shell, Mr. CivU Defense appeared
"'*"Roundup of National CD Week," RG 396.
""Ibid.
265
prepared, aware, eager to spring into action and save Uves. He was also eager to teU the
pubUc about civU defense measures. "'*
Al Capp did not simply draw a figure for the FCDA to stamp on its posters and
leaflets, he Ulustrated an agency comic book entitled Mr. Civil Defense Tells about
Natural Disasters!. The cover and the first page ofthe comic reveal that L'U Abner and
Mr. CivU Defense are acquaintances. L'U Abner remains around long enough to introduce
the pubUc to Mr. CivU Defense, but he cannot tarry, perhaps because he has his own
Atomic Age issues to address in Dogpatch. The same year that Al Capp created Mr. CivU
Defense, "L'U Abner," the play, hit Broadway. The show's story centered on a decision
by the U.S. government to tum Dogpatch into an Atomic proving grounds. In the FCDA
comic, Al Capp does not teU his audience whether L'U Abner is anxious to save his home
or simply ready to get back to courting Daisy Mae, but on the first page L'U Abner
mounts a mule and rides out ofthe picture, leaving Mr. CivU Defense to explain the
importance of civiUan preparedness in natural disasters. Appearing in comic books and
leaflets, on posters and placards, Mr. CivU Defense drew attention to the FCDA and
National CivU Defense Week. The Capp-created character served as a spokesperson for
the federal agency and as a herald for the awareness campaign.""
"'*"Roundup of National CD Week," RG 396; and "Press Kit for Weekly Newspapers," and "Leadership Guide," Binder, CivU Defense Week, 1956, Box 3, OCDM PubUcations 1950-60, RG 396, NARACP.
""Al Capp, Mr. Civil Defense Tells about Natural Disasters! (New York: Graphic Infomiation Service, Inc., 1956); "Press Kit for Weekly Newspapers," RG 396; and "Leadership Guide," RG 396.
266
National CivU Defense Week began on a Sunday. The National Broadcasting
Company officiaUy launched the event by televising a recorded message from the
president. CaUing civU defense "a good investment," Eisenhower contended that a
prepared people would be "more self-reUant in the Uttle emergencies of every day [sic]
Ufe," better equipped "to meet any natural disaster," and would "help deter aggression and
constitute...a positive force for peace.' President Eisenhower encouraged "every
American famUy' to support the FCDA and participate in its readiness crusade."*"
The president's speech had signaled the beginning ofthe week-long observance.
Now others took up the cry of "Alert Today, AUve Tomonow" and swept into action.
Govemors and mayors seconded the president's remarks and caUed upon their people to
back local, state, and national civiUan defense initiatives. At Fort Myer in ArUngton,
Virginia, the U.S. Army held a special ceremony to honor the FCDA and its director, Val
Peterson. The Army's Third Infantry Regiment paraded before some 3,000 spectators and
saluted Administrator Peterson whUe the regiment's band and chorus honored him with
the first performance of "Heads Up America," a civU defense march. Secretary ofthe
Army Bmcker commended Val Peterson for his dedication to civUian preparedness.
Bmcker declared, "[I]n this Nationv^ide[sic] CD effort you are contributing significantly to
the security and safety of America.""*'
If the people remained unmoved by the praise and affirmation that governing
officials and the Army had offered to the FCDA, if patriotism did not weU up within them
"*""Roundup of National CD Week", RG 396.
"*'Ibid.
267
and push them to sign up for civUian defense, perhaps God would work a change in their
hearts. CivU defense had the approval and endorsement ofthe largest organized reUgious
faiths in America. With such visible displays of support as the beU-ringing campaign-
Operation Ding-Dong-and sermons on civUian preparedness, the country's spiritual
leaders threw the protective mantle of reUgion around civU defense. To ignore the FCDA
and National CivU Defense Week was to ignore the wiU of God."*
Each day ofthe week brought new attempts to focus the pubUc's attention on
civU defense. There were drills, parades, and speeches. The U.S. Weather Bureau tracked
and reported feUout patterns after a simulated attack. There were civU defense movies and
documentaries. NBC showed "Survival Stteet," a Uve docudrama broadcast from the
FCDA's National Rescue School in Olney, Maryland. There was must-have, civU defense
paraphernalia. The FCDA introduced a blue dress-suit uniform for its women volunteers,
and the Bendbc company plugged its new pen-Ught-shaped radiation detector, the pocket
dosimeter."*'
According to the FCDA, the saturation campaign paid dividends. The agency's
pubUshed "Roundup" ofthe event declared National CivU Defense Week "highly
successful," but the FCDA feUed to back its statement with substantive proof Despite
mentioning more than a dozen cities that organized for, and participated in. National CivU
Defense Week, the "Roundup" newsletter itself noted that a number of municipaUties
either had ignored the observance completely or had reported unsatisfactory levels of
"*2"Roundup of National CD Week," RG 396.
"*'Ibid.
268
pubUc and official participation. In addition, the "Roundup" did not Ust any concrete gains
for civU defense. The members ofthe FCDA's PubUc Affeirs Office wrote of parades and
evacuation drills, yet not once did they reveal how many, or how few, Americans signed
up for preparedness training during National CivU Defense Week."*"
Perhaps the agency's pubUc relations personnel were sUent, because the news
was discouraging. Even though the FCDA stepped up its pubUcity programs in 1956, the
office did not see a marked mcrease in the number of civUian defense volunteers. During
Millard CaldweU's two-year term as administrator, the Federal CivU Defense
Administtation attracted some four milUon volunteers. Val Peterson served as agency
head for more than three years, but, with regard to pubUc recmitment, his record of
accompUshment feU short ofthe standards estabUshed by CaldweU. When Peterson
resigned from the FCDA in July of 1957, cumulative volunteer totals had faUen below 3.5
mUUon. EnroUment had slowed so much, the number of recmits was exceeded by the
number of people who were dropping out of civUian defense."*'
A variety of factors contributed to the decUne of civUian defense, but there is no
escaping the conclusion that Val Peterson and the poUcies he initiated were in large part
responsible. Once in office Peterson took an FCDA that had been shelter centered and
focused it instead on mass evacuation. This shift in poUcy represented a one hundred
eighty degree tum for the agency. Its early leaders had been adamantly opposed to what
they caUed the "take to the hUls" mentaUty. Such a radical shift in Ufe-saving strategies
"*""Roundup of National CD Week," RG 396.
"*'Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1958 Statistical Report, 15.
269
was bound to confuse the pubUc. It did. Uncertainty and distrust grew when the feUout
issue emerged. The Atomic Energy Commission, the Armed Services, and the Federal
CivU Defense Administtation misled the people, and the covemp generated speculation
and exaggerated rumors about the potential hazards from radioactive debris. When Chet
HoUfield and others began to investigate civU defense and demand faUout shelters, the
FCDA again seemed to reconsider its battle plans. During Peterson's last eighteen
months, the agency kept mass evacuation plans, yet assigned shelters a larger role in
civilian protection. Future administrators aU but abandoned mass evacuation, returning
the FCDA to the shelter orientation ofthe CaldweU years. As civU defense poUcy evolved
during the Fifties, preparedness officers altematingly told Americans to "duck and cover,"
"nm Uke heU," "nm Uke heU to a shelter far away," and, finaUy, again suggested that
people simply "duck and cover." To many the FCDA must have looked clueless, and the
HoUfield hearings and report only served to reinforce negative opinion."**
Peterson was aware ofthe problem, though he did Uttle to solve it. In his
personal papers he kept a cUpping from a Pittsburgh newspaper. Dated march 31, 1955,
and entitled "YeUing 'Wolf Too Often," the editorial attacked the FCDA and its
administrator first for constantly harping on the possibUity of a nuclear holocaust, and
second for faUing to present a consistent, sound strategy for survival. The author wrote.
"**Mary M. Simpson, "A Long Hard Look at CivU Defense," Bulletin ofthe Atomic Scientists 12, no. 9 (1956): 346; National Security Resources Board, United States Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1950), 37; Memorandum No. 6, Binder, Advisory BuUetins, 1-49, Box No. 1, OCDM PubUcations, 1950-60, RG 396; Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1954 Annual Report (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1955), 31: Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, Annual Report ofthe Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization for Fiscal Year 1960 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1961), 13-15.
270
"These excited [civU defense] officials never have been able to clear up for most of us the
perplexing question of what to do when we get the eight-minute waming. First, we were
told to hide. Then...we were advised to run. Then the poUcy Une shifted to hide again and
then to run." The editor's letter exaggerated the fects and was somewhat inaccurate in its
description of agency changes in strategy, but in tone and content the message it
transmitted encapsulated the attitudes of many Americans toward civU defense in the mid-
Fifties."*'
Without doubt Val Peterson contributed to the decUne ofthe FCDA and civU
defense, but the man who appointed him to office. President Dwight D. Eisenhower,
deserves a portion ofthe blame. Others have written of Eisenhower's indifference and
skepticism toward civU defense and have speculated that the few concessions he made to
the FCDA were intended to satisfy preparedness advocates and to prevent panic. Guy
Oakes's The Imaginary War is the best received ofthe conspiracy theory works. Oakes
depicts Eisenhower as a world leader who never beUeved in, or even seriously considered,
the value of civU defense. He contends that the president's participation in civilian defense
exercises was nothing more than posturing for the pubUc. If the people thought, as Oakes
states Eisenhower did, that no country and its population could withstand and quickly
recover from a nuclear assault, it would undermine pubUc morale. The people would be
paralyzed with fear. They would panic, and the instabUity generated would cause the
United States to faU behind in the Cold War and might even encourage Soviet aggression.
"*'"YeUing 'Wolf Too Often," Folder "Ho," Box 1, Conespondence of Val Peterson, 1953-1957, RG 396, NARACP.
271
An elaborate scheme of government Ues and posttiring was preferable to internal turmoU
that could lead to a Soviet Cold War victory and, possibly, to foreign domination.
Oakes's work is weU-crafted, and his argument is fascinating and especiaUy appeaUng to
those Americans who see federal "men in black" behind every event-from the Kennedy
assassination to UFO sightings-but a broader and deeper examination of Eisenhower and
civUian preparedness reveals that a variety of factors influenced the president's civU
defense poUcy."**
Expense seems to have been the foremost consideration for Eisenhower. When
he ascended to the presidency "Ike" promised the American electorate a "dynamic
conservatism" that was Uberal toward people, but tight with the purse strings. He kept his
promise. His administration did not dismantle the New Deal programs already in place,
but it did find ways to cut federal costs, and one way was to give the Army a new look.
Recognizing the detenent value of a large nuclear stockpUe, Eisenhower got more "bang
for the buck" by downsizing the Armed Services and scaling back on aUocations for
contemporary weapons, whUe simultaneously flinneling more money into nuclear
armaments. During his two terms as president, Eisenhower requested more than 5 bilUon
doUars for nuclear weapons. Although he refened to civU defense as another means of
discouraging aggression, Eisenhower no doubt saw that hydrogen bombs, with their
offensive capabUities, constituted a greater force for detenence and therefore were a
better investment than civUian preparedness, which was purely defensive. In eight years
President Dwight David Eisenhower petitioned Congress for a total of 832 mUUon doUars
"**Oakes, Imaginary War, 3-9, 152-63.
272
for civU defense, sUghtly more than half the amount, 1.5 bUUon doUars, that President
Harry S. Truman had requested from 1951 to 1953."*'
In addition, Eisenhower appointed Val Peterson to the FCDA, and Peterson was
known for his anti-shelter stance. Projected costs for a system of pubUc shelters ran to
tens of bUUons of doUars, and the shelters themselves would serve only one purpose.
Mass evacuation was less expensive, and the suggested highway and road constmction
necessary for creating viable avenues of escape would benefit the United States even if
war never came. WhUe no evidence has surfeced that indicates Eisenhower selected
Peterson because ofthe Nebraska govemor's opinions on shelters and evacuations, the
lower cost and multiple-use nature of a mass evacuation poUcy would have appealed to
the president's fiscal conservatism."'"
Placed within the context of his poUtical theory, Eisenhower's Umited budget
requests for civU defense are logical and easUy understood. Nonetheless, to the general
pubUc and to Congress Eisenhower's parsimony represented more than dynamic
conservatism at work; it was an indictment of civilian preparedness. If civU defense reaUy
would save Uves and prevent war, surely the president would demand more fimding for the
"*'Stephen Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 (New York: Penguin Books, 1985), 137-38. Budget ofthe United States Government for Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1951 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1950), M 34 [hereafter cited as BUSG]; BUSG, 1952, M 14; BUSG, 1953, M 18; BUSG, 1954, M 18; BUSG, 1955, M 37; BUSG, 1956, M 22; BUSG, 1957, M 20; BUSG, 1958, M 20; BUSG, 1959, M 37-38; BUSG, 1960, M 22; and BUSG, 1961, M 20.
"'"Congressional Quarterly Service, CONGRESS and the NATION, 263; and Thomas J. Ken, C/v/7 Defense in the US: Band-Aid for a Holocaust (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), 44, 60-61.
273
FCDA. The people foUowed the lead ofthe commander in chie^ a veteran of war. They
placed their feith in the United States' nuclear arsenal rather than in civU defense. With his
domestic poUcy, of which civU defense was a part, Eisenhower raised doubts about the
need for civUian preparedness. He did the same with his foreign poUcy.
Under Truman, the United States was always close to, or actuaUy engaged in, a
firefight. President Truman mtervened in Turkey and Greece when communist rebels
threatened to take over after World War II. He refused to back down when StaUn closed
off the roads to BerUn. He sent American soldiers to defend South Koreans and to strike
back at the North. Truman projected a warhawk attitude throughout his years as
president. He did not singly rattle the saber of American wealth and might; he drew it,
and he used it. During Truman's last two fliU years as president, 1951 and 1952, the
FCDA enroUed approximately four mUUon recmits. There is Uttle doubt that Truman's
aggression and the very real threat of another world war prompted some Americans to
volunteer for civU defense training.""
In the spring of 1953, when Dwight D. Eisenhower was sworn in as president, he
took the United States down a different foreign poUcy path. Eisenhower attempted to
reduce the tensions between the United States, the Soviet Union, and other communist
nations. During his first year in office, he negotiated a cease fire with North Korea. In
1954 Eisenhower defosed the Chinese Crisis. The United States entered a mutual defense
pact with Chiang Kai-Shek, the leader ofthe nationaUst Chinese in Taiwan, but only after
Chiang agreed to halt guerUla raids against the mainland, Mao Tse Tung's "Red China."
""Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, 83-131; and Oakley, God's Country, 214-216.
274
In his deaUngs with the Soviet Union Eisenhower was aided by the death of Joseph StaUn
and the rise to power ofthe more moderate and, Uke Eisenhower, less mUitarUy aggressive
NUcita Khrushchev. The cold War continued to rage, but the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R
fought each other in the factories and the laboratory, in economics and science, rather than
in the field."'^
The two superpowers did vie for advantage in "neutral" countries. Eisenhower
encouraged Secretary of State John Foster DuUes to further "contain" communism by
negotiating mutual protection treaties with states not yet behind the Soviet curtain, but the
president did not try to wrestle estabUshed sateUites away from Russia. In 1956 when
Hungary attempted to break away from Soviet domination, the United States refosed to
aid the rebels. America stood icUy by whUe Russian tanks roUed into Budapest and put
down the insunection. Eisenhower's diplomacy diminished the possibiUty of a third world
war and, with it, the perceived need for civilian defense.""
President Dwight D. Eisenhower even tried to reduce the nuclear threat. In his
first year as president Ike proposed an "Atoms for Peace" program Presented to the
United Nations, the project caUed for the creation of an intemational agency to Umit and
guide the use of atomic energy. Although Eisenhower's speech drew a standing ovation
from the members ofthe U.N., the Soviets refosed the plan. StUl, the president's project
was newsworthy, and it received much press. In 1953 Americans beUeved their president
wished to avoid a nuclear war at aU costs, even to the point of sunendering some ofthe
""Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, 148-49, 169-75.
""Ibid., 162-63..
275
countty's autonomy over the development of atomic weapons and power. Who needed
civU defense?"'"
Eisenhower further undermined civUian preparedness by appearing confused,
uncertain, and at times antagonistic when confronted with civU defense matters. Although
Guy Oakes argues that the president always beUeved civU defense fotUe and only put on a
show for preparedness enthusiasts and to prevent panic, a close examination of
Eisenhower's behavior indicates that Ike, Uke so many other Americans, was not sure
what he should beUeve. EspeciaUy during his last few years in the Oval Office,
Eisenhower made some damning statements about nuclear war in general and civU defense
in particular. Yet, m a number of his Cabinet meetings, Eisenhower expressed a keen
interest in shelters and other civU defense strategies, and appeared hopefol that
preparedness initiatives might indeed save Uves if a nuclear holocaust occurred. The
scientific community itself was divided on the immediate and lasting effects of a nuclear
exchange and the efficacy of civUian defense poUcies. It is reasonable to conclude that
Eisenhower also had to wrestle with uncertainty.""
"'"Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. HoU, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley: University of CaUfomia Press, 1989), 113-43..
""Oakes, Imaginary War, 3-9, 152-163; Notes on Cabinet Meeting, 1 May 1953, Folder C-4 (2), Box 1, and Notes on Cabinet Meeting, 18 October 1957, Folder C-39 (3), Box 4, Cabinet Series, Office ofthe Staff Secretary, Reports 1952-61, White House Office, DDEL; and Supplementary Legislative Meeting-CivU Defense Shelters, 14 November 1958, Legislative Meeting-CivU Defense, 28 July 1959, and Cabinet Meeting-Funding of Delegate Agencies' CivU Defense and Defense MobUization Functions, 31 JuK 1959, Cabinet and Legislative Meeting Index-CH-DED, Box 19, Arthur Minnich Series, White House Office, Office ofthe Staff Secretary: Records, 1952-61, DDEL.
276
President Eisenhower did in feet consider the implementation of a national system
of pubUc feUout shelters. The press given to the HoUfield inquiries left him Uttle choice.
The 1956 HoUfield hearings desttoyed the credibUity of Val Peterson, the FCDA, and
mass evacuation poUcy. As a direct result ofthe proceedings, Peterson agreed to stay on
with the Federal CivU Defense Administration only untU July of 1957. It was natural for
Congress and the pubUc to conclude that civU defense strategy would soon shift back to
the shelter-orientation ofthe CaldweU years."'*
Peterson himself began the process of modifying FCDA poUcy. Although he
refused to abandon mass evacuation conq)letely, he more fliUy incorporated faUout
shelters into the agency's survival strategies, and he told the president that a national
shelter system could be constmcted for a cost of twenty to forty bUUon doUars. HoUfield
and others urged Eisenhower to adopt such a plan, but the president baUced; the expense
was too great.
Hoping to find a more economical solution to the country's civU defense
dUemma, President Eisenhower created the Security Resources Panel. Composed of
private citizens and more commonly known as the Gaither Committee, after Rand
Corporation and Ford Foundation chakman H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., the Security
Resources Panel set out to answer the question posed to them by Eisenhower, "If you
"'*AUan M. Winkler, Life under a Cloud: American Anxiety About the Atom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 118-19; and Val Peterson to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 31 May 1947, White House Conespondence, Box 2, Conespondence of Administtator Val Peterson, 1953-1957, RG 396, NARACP.
""Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 119.
277
make the assumption that there is going to be a nuclear war, what should I do?*"'* The
Gaither panel did not submit its report. Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age, to
the president untU the end of 1957. The committee had expanded its mandate and its staff;
and eventuaUy consulted close to one hundred individuals with expertise not only in civU
defense, but in offensive devices—bombers and rocketry-as weU.""
The report was neither what President Dwight D. Eisenhower expected nor what
he desired, especiaUy with regard to civU defense. The Gaither Committee recommended
that the government embark immediately on a pubUc shelter-buUding program, projected
cost, fifty bUUon doUars. The Gaither Committee members considered this precaution
necessary. Americans were growing more concemed about feUout daUy, and the Soviets
had made great strides in their nuclear capabiUties.'""
The report was released in the aftermath ofthe Sputnik debacle. On October 4,
1957, a Soviet rocket canied the first man-made sateUite into space. Sputnik, a sphere
twenty-two inches in diameter orbited the Earth. Americans panicked. Not only had the
U.S.S.R. won the first round in the space race, it had demonstrated visibly the power and
advancement of its rocketry program. The Soviets had earUer claimed they possessed a
working intercontinental baUistic missUe (ICBM). The Sputnik feat lent credence to their
assertions and increased American fears of nuclear attack. A missUe fired from a platform
"'*Quoted in Gregg Herken, Counsels of War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 112-13.
""Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 119; and Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1993), 35-39.
'""Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 119.
278
in Siberia could reach the United States in thirty minutes. If the Soviets managed to
develop a submarine deUvery system, the waming time would be further reduced, because
rockets could be fired just off the eastem or westem seaboards. Americans along the
coasts, and many of those further to the interior would not have time to effect a mass
evacuation; they would have no choice but to duck, cover, and hope for the best. The
need for shelters had never seemed so urgent.'"'
Nonetheless, a national system of pubUc shelters was not forthcoming. President
Eisenhower had commissioned the Gaither study after Peterson had proposed a quite
expensive shelter program. When the members ofthe Gaither committee attached an even
higher price tag to the shelter project, they ensured it would be refosed. It was. The
budget-conscious Eisenhower was not about to aUocate fifty bUUon doUars to a project of
questionable detenent value and Ufe-saving potential, when he spent only five bUUon on
nuclear weaponry—which he considered much more essential. In addition, though the
Democrats were pubUcizing the supposed "missUe gap" in order to increase their party's
chances for a presidential victory in 1960, Eisenhower knew that no such gap actually
existed. Tme, Soviet rockets were more powerfel than those developed by the United
States, but photos from U-2 spy planes showed the president that the Russians had not
erected missUe platforms aU over Siberia. Unfortunately, though Ike reassured Americans
that there was no missUe gap, he could not reveal the source of his information. The
'"'Divine, Sputnik Challenge, xUi-xvUi, 7-8; and Margot A. Henriksen, Z)r. Strangelove's America: Society and Culture in the Atomic Age (Berkeley: University of CaUfomia Press, 1997), 105-6.
279
United States was supposed to be the "good guy" in the Cold War conflict. It would not
stoop so low as to spy on its enemies.'"^
It was with little or no hesitation that Eisenhower refused the Gaither
Committee's proposals. Secretary of State John Foster DuUes led the attack against a
national shelter system, arguing that it would be resented by the United States' aUies and
misunderstood by its enemies. America's financiaUy-dependent sateUites in Europe were
on the front Unes of defense, a stone's throw from the nuclear capabiUties ofthe Soviet
Bloc. They would be angry over such lavish expenditure to protect the people ofthe
United States, who already had two oceans separating them from the U.S.S.R., unless the
Americans were also willing to pay for shelter constmction in westem Europe. For their
part, the Soviets would teU the world that the frenzied digging and pouring of concrete in
either Europe or America was evidence that the United States was no longer looking for
diplomatic solutions to the Cold War. It was preparing to hide its people underground,
launch its missUes, and emerge from a nuclear exchange victorious and with most of its
population intact.'"'
Eisenhower seconded DuUes' assertions. The president had heard these and
other persuasive arguments before from Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs (NSA). In the spring of 1957 Cutler had completed a fairly
"^D'Yvine, Sputnik Challenge, 116-17, 172-83.
'"'James R. KUUan, Jr., Sputnik, Scientists and Eisenhower: A Memoir ofthe First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977), 96-101; and Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), 221-23.
280
in-depth investigation of shelters. After consulting AEC and InteUigence records. Cutler
submitted his conclusions to the president. The NSA special assistant recommended that
the Eisenhower Administtation not undertake a shelter program that would cost tens of
bUUons of doUars. Cutler Usted five reasons for refiising the suggestions that the Gaither
Committee later made. He argued that the two most in )ortant considerations were: first,
the scientific community's division on the efficacy of shelters; more studies needed to be
conducted to determine if they actuaUy would save Uves; and second, the expense would
place an incredible strain on the government and the economy. According to Special
Assistant Cutler, DuUes' foreign poUcy concerns were tertiary. Cutler's voice was not
heard only once by Eisenhower and then forgotten. He continued to brief the president on
shelters throughout 1957, even in the weeks after the Sputnik launch.'""
Although Eisenhower ignored the Security Resource Panel's impassioned pleas
for a federaUy-sponsored national system of feUout shelters. Congress and the people
barely flinched. They reacted to the ICBM threat in much the same way as they had
earUer reacted to the news that the Soviets had developed an atomic bomb. There was an
initial period of panic, but as the days cUcked by and no Soviet strike occuned, concem
diminished. Besides, Lyndon Johnson and most ofthe other Democrats that exploited the
Sputnik debacle did not ask for shelters so Americans could hide from superior Soviet
weapons. They demanded, instead, that the federal government close the gap between
U.S.S.R. and U.S. rocket technology. After the initial shock ofthe Soviet's feat had worn
'"""CivU Defense" (1) and (2), Box 4, Briefing Notes Subseries, NSC Series, Office of Special Assistant for NSA Recommendations, 1952-61, White House Office, DDEL.
281
505
off; the pubUc only cast an occasional glance at civU defense. The people's attention was
riveted on the space race, the creation of NASA, the progress ofthe United States'
Explorer sateUite program. The vast majority of Americans Ufted their eyes and looked
toward the heavens, toward outer space, toward the foture; few looked down at the
ground and seriously pondered a step backward, a retum to the cave.
There were exceptions. In an AprU 1958 issue of Bulletin ofthe Atomic
Scientists, Senator Chet HoUfield, perennial chan^)ion ofthe stUl-disgruntled, die-hard
shelter advocates, blasted President Eisenhower for rejecting the Gaither Committee's
suggestions. HoUfield admonished the president to carry out his ConstittitionaUy-assigned
duties, especiaUy the one that charged him with the "responsibUity of protecting our nation
against a foreign foe." The Senator from CaUfomia continued to push for a national
system of shelters.'"*
A month after HoUfield's tirade, the Eisenhower Administration announced its
endorsement of a national shelter poUcy, to be overseen by the FCDA and Administrator
Leo Hoegh. Despite the timing of its unveUing, the National Shelter PoUcy does not seem
to have been a concUiatory gesture directed at HoUfield. Rather, the plan represented
merely the first in a series of steps that Eisenhower and the FCDA took so they could
deflect criticism The National Shelter PoUcy actuaUy accompUshed very Uttle in the
erection of an American shelter network, but it projected an image of governmental
'"'Divine, Sputnik Challenge.
'"*Ralph Lapp, "CivU Defense Shelters: An Interview with Congressman Chet HoUfield," Bulletin ofthe Atomic Scientists 14, no. 4 (1958): 134.
282
concem and action, and it afforded both Eisenhower and Hoegh the opportunity to claim
tmthfoUy, that they were reacting to the demand for feUout shelters.'"'
In essence, Eisenhower's National Shelter PoUcy was an every-person-for-
themselves type of program. Ike took the burden of shelter constmction and dumped it
into each American's backyard. According to the program's guideUnes, the Federal CivU
Defense Admmistration would continue its canq)aigns to acquaint the pubUc with the
dangers posed by feUout and the measures a person could take to reduce their risk of
injury. FCDA en^loyees also undertook the identification of available shelter in existing
buUdings. Lastly, the federal government funded research on femUy shelter designs and
buUt prototype feUout stmctures. If the people wanted immediate access to a reUable
faUout shelter, if they were unwUUng to wait for the FCDA to designate shelters in their
community, or if they distrusted the wholesale labeUng of every church basement and
court house break room as a "safe" haven from radioactive faUout, they would have to put
in their own shelter. In fact, as part ofthe National Shelter Plan, FCDA leaders
encouraged the head of every household in America to buUd or purchase a shelter for their
home. Eisenhower reminded the people that responsibUity for civU defense ultimately
rested upon the individual, not the government.'"* Leo Hoegh stated bluntly that the new
'"'Office of Defense and CivUian MobUization, National Plan, Annex 10; and Idem, Annual Report for 1961, 12-15.
'"*Infonnation BuUetin No. 68, Infomiation BuUetins, 1958-1961, VirgU L. Couch Papers, 1951-80. DDEL.
283
"poUcy was based on the oldest American tradition-that every man wUl protect his
femUy.'""'
During the summer, the Eisenhower Administration took a second step to defiise
tensions over the FCDA's handUng of civU defense matters. The president made the
Federal CivU Defense Administration disappear. On July 1, 1958, Congress approved
Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan I, which gave the president more authority over civU
defense and merged the FCDA and the Office of Defense MobUization (ODM) into one
unit, the Office of Defense and CivU MobUization, later renamed the Office of CivU and
Defense MobUization (OCDM).""
Leo Hoegh had suggested the office consoUdation months earUer. Hoegh, a
fiscal conservative who prided himself on his record of cutting back civU defense costs and
personnel even fiirther than Eisenhower demanded, had noticed that both the Federal CivU
Defense Administration and the Office of Defense MobUization were charged with
responding to disasters in the United States. Some dupUcation of effort therefore
occuned. For instance, both ODM and the FCDA stockpUed emergency suppUes. Also,
both agencies estabUshed plans for maintaining government continuity during an
emergency. Seeing an opportunity to reduce federal expenses and confusion, Hoegh
caUed for the unification ofthe two agencies. Reorganization Plan I, which led to the
creation ofthe OCDM, was primarily an economic action. It saved money, but the
'"'Information BuUetin No. 68, Couch Papers..
""Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953-60/61, vol. 6 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1960), 61.
284
reorganization also conveyed the message that the discredited and defimct FCDA had
been laid to rest.'"
ActtiaUy, the FCDA sinq)ly adopted a new name. WhUe some ODM en^loyees
lost their jobs, the vast majority ofthe FCDA hierarchy, including Leo Hoegh, whom
Eisenhower named director ofthe new office, were absorbed into the OCDM. The federal
body responsible for civU defense was now caUed the Office of CivU and Defense
Mobilization, but it looked, sounded, and acted Uke the FCDA of yesterday."^
In late July, three weeks after the founding ofthe OCDM, Dwight D. Eisenhower
took a third step toward sUencing civU defense's critics. He signed into law an act that
declared the federal, state, and local governments "joint partners" in civiUan preparedness.
The federal government was to shoulder more ofthe financial burden for providing
radiological equipment and was granted permission, but not required, to help pay the
states' civU defense personnel and administtative costs. To the average civU defense
advocate, the law sounded favorable, but federal budget requests and aUotted
appropriations for civU defense did not rise dramaticaUy the next year, or in any ofthe
years remaining to the Eisenhower presidency. In the OCDM, money-conscious Hoegh,
'"Notes on Legislative Meeting, 22 April 1958, Folder L-47 (2), Box 5, Legislative Meetings Series, Office of Staff Secretary, Records 1952-1961, White House Office, DDEL; and Notes on Cabinet Meetings, 18 and 25 April 1958, Folder C-44 (2), Box 5, Cabinet Series, Office of Staff Secretary, Reports 1952-1961, White House Office, DDEL.
"^Infomiation BuUetin No. 4, Infomiation BuUetins, 1958-1959, Box 3, OCDM PubUcations, 1950-1960, RG 396, NARACP.
285
who had fevored the bUl's passage, sttipped other FCDA projects to pay for the increased
StockpUe costs.'"
Guy Oakes's assertion that civU defense was one great charade during the
Eisenhower Administtation is more convincing when one examines Ike's actions during
his last few years in office. In cabinet meetings the president stUl displayed mbced
emotions toward civU defense. As late as the summer of 1959 he told the members of his
Cabinet that civU defense was as vital to national security as armor on a tank.
Nonetheless, an examination ofthe official poUcies that he approved for the OCDM
indicate that he had decided against a costly civUian preparedness program. The poUcies
enacted from 1958 to 1960 seem designed to placate the few remaining civU defense
enthusiasts and to prevent the fearfol from panicking or sinking into despair. Eisenhower
often characterized the national wiU as much more essential to the health, and even the
survival, ofthe country.""
Yet another factor must be considered when looking at the way Eisenhower, the
members of Congress, and the pubUc responded to civU defense from the spring of 1958
through the winter of 1960. On the surfece, the UkeUhood of nuclear war seemed to
decrease. Americans were hiUed into a felse sense of security in the spring of'58 when
the Soviets finished a series of thermonuclear exercises and then shocked the world by
declaring they would stop testing thermonuclear weapons. The United States was caught
'"SR 552 and SR 594, "Operation Alert 1957," SR 520-664, Box 3, OCDM PubUcations, 1950-60, RG 396, NARACP.
""Cabinet Meeting, 1 May 1953, DDEL; and Cabinet Meeting-Funding of Delegate Agencies' Functions, 31 July 1959, DDEL.
286
off guard by the announcement, which occuned just before a slate of U.S. tests were
scheduled to begin. Recognizing that the U.S.S.R. had already scored a pubUc relations
victory, Eisenhower saw the American exercises through to their conclusion before
announcing in the feU that the United States would also suspend further nuclear weapons
tests. The U.S.-Soviet moratorium on testing lasted untU the U.S.S.R. resumed their
atmospheric detonations in 1961. For three years nuclear testing ranges were sUent. It is
no wonder that congressional and pubUc support feU off in the late Fifties.'"
Despite executive, legislative, and pubUc apathy, OCDM Director Leo Hoegh at
least "went through the motions" for civU defense. Hoegh continued the promotional and
recmitment campaigns fevored by his predecessor, Val Peterson. LUce the FCDA before
it, the OCDM flooded the pubUc with leaflets and pamphlets, radio and television
announcements, movie shorts and traveUng displays. In addition, appeals to the people's
sense of patriotism, reUgion, and moraUty continued."*
The events sunounding CivU Defense Day, 1958, were representative ofthe
Hoegh Administtation's tactics of persuasion throughout the late 1950s. OCDM
personnel tried to buUd pubUc support by stirring the people into an emotional frenzy.
President Eisenhower declared December 7 National CivU Defense Day. The date itself
was intended to stir Americans' passions, for exactly seventeen years earUer, the Japanese
had dealt a devastating blow to the U.S. Navy at Pearl Harbor. Besides appeaUng to the
'"Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 107.
"*Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1958 Statistical Report, 45-75; and Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, 1960 Annual Report, 9-12;
287
people's patriotism, the OCDM used the image ofthe defeat at Pearl Harbor to remind the
pubUc ofthe need for vigUance. CivU defense pubUcists said the 1941 surprise attack had
been "unprovoked," and moraUy wrong, but they reminded the American people that
another moraUy bankmpt country now possessed the abUity to strike the United States.
The only way to deter attack was to ready the country's mUitary and civUian population
for war. One OCDM pubUcation stated, "...Pearl Harbor should be a stark reminder to
every American ofthe tremendous prize a Nation has to pay for unpreparedness." The
official slogan for CivU Defense Day, 1958, was 'Teace Through Preparedness.'""
The preparations for National CivU Defense Day also saw the continuation ofthe
Peterson tradition of focusing on Americans' reUgious values. OCDM staff writers
suggested Bible passages for mayors, ministers, and other city leaders to incorporate into
their speeches and sermons. First on the list of target scriptures was I Samuel, chapter
seventeen, verses forty-one to forty-seven, which told the story of David and GoUath-
Goliath representing a huUcing, but godless, Soviet Union, and David representing a
smaUer, less physicaUy powerful, but moraUy strong, and approved-by-God United States.
A second suggested passage seemed taUor-made for a civU defense agency that was trying
to convince Americans to get more involved."* The thirty-third chapter of Ezekiel, verses
two through four state, "When I bring a sword upon a land, if the people ofthe land take a
man of their coasts, and set him for their watchman: if when he seeth the sword come
'"Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, 1958 Radio and TV Kit for Dec. 7 National Civil Defense Day (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1958), n.p.
"*Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, 1958 Newspaper Kit for Dec. 7 National Civil Defense Day (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1958), n.p.
288
upon the land, he blow the tmn^t , and wam the people; then whosoever heareth the
sound ofthe tmn^t , and taketh not waming; if the sword come, and take him away, his
blood shaU be upon his own head."'" The OCDM was sounding the caU for civU defense.
The people had no right to complain if they refused to act on the agency's suggestions.
Notwithstanding its use of inflated rhetoric, Hoegh's Office of CivU and Defense
MobUization faUed to attract large numbers of volunteers during the last three years of
Eisenhower's presidency. By the end of 1960, the federal civU defense agency claimed to
have added 2.5 mUUon recmits to the 4 mUUon that enroUed whUe MUlard CaldweU was
administrator ofthe FCDA, but that sum probably was an exaggeration Even if it was
accurate, in CaldweU's two years as administrator he attracted more recmits than Val
Peterson and Leo Hoegh enUsted during their eight. With recmitment returns continuing
to plummet, Hoegh rescinded the quotas estabUshed by CaldweU. Suddenly the federal
civU defense office was no longer determined to enroU 15 mUUon or 17.5 mUUon
vohmteers. Hoegh declared those quotas "no longer consistent with OCDM poUcy," but
offered no fiirther elaboration.' "
The National Shelter PoUcy also was faltering. Many people ordered copies of
the blueprint designs pubUshed by the OCDH but only a handfol sunk shelters in their
backyards. In 1959 a federal planning board suggested that no more than a few thousand
private citizens had purchased or buUt faUout shehers. Such minimal results were
'"Ezekiel 23.2-4 KJV.
' "Advisory BuUetin No. 227, Binder Advisory BuUetins, 200-228, Box 2, OCDM
PubUcations, 1950-60, RG 396, NARACP.
289
unacceptable. A year later, the OCDM claimed that approximately one mUUon American
femUies possessed faUout shelters. The tremendous leap in the figures quoted suggested
wild exaggeration on the part ofthe federal agency. A spokesperson for civU defense
attempted to explain the ttemendous increase in shelters by stating that many Americans
were putting in shelters every day-they had simply been too embanassed to admit it.' '
LUce Val Peterson before him, Leo Hoegh was unable to attract pubUc support,
and the federal civU defense office continued to spiral downward. Too often federal
preparedness bodies had changed strategies, changed leaders, and changed names. Too
often federal leaders, from the president to the members of Congress to Peterson and
Hoegh, had shown such conservatism when demanding or aUocating money for civU
defense that it seemed they did not beUeve in the efficacy ofthe preparedness projects. In
addition, the moratorium on testing encouraged apathy, because it projected an Ulusion of
a world without H-bombs, a world that had left behind the age of nuclear peril.
There was yet another reason for the decUne of civU defense during the last years
ofthe Fifties. The anti-nuclear movement was growing, and with it, pubUc opposition to
civU defense measures. EarUer in the decade, FCDA personnel had argued that the federal
government must teU the pubUc the tmth about thermonuclear war. They contended that
withholding information would only lead many Americans to beUeve sensationalized
articles that claimed the government was evasive on atomic matters because the tmth was
'2'"OCDM Presentation on CivUian Readiness Base, CivU Defense and Defense MobUization [1957-1960], Box 4, Brief Notes Subseries, NSC Series, Records 1952-61. Office of Special Assistant for NSA, White House Office, DDEL; Winkler, Under a Cloud, 122; and Henriksen, Dr. Strangelove's America, 203.
290
too homble to contemplate. The pubUc would become convinced that a nuclear war
would end CivUization and, perhaps, aU Ufe on the planet Earth. The FCDA's prophecies
came tme. As the United States entered the late 1950s, an ever-increasing proportion of
the population began to caU for an end to nuclear proUferation. According to the "no
nuke" demonstrators, shelters would not save humankind from destmction. The only
certain way to ensure humanity's survival was to prevent a nuclear war from occurring.'^
Arguably, the best-organized and the most vocal anti-nuclear organization ofthe
latter Fifties was the national Committee for a Sane Nuclear PoUcy, more commonly
refened to simply as "SANE." During the summer of 1957, close to the time Val
Peterson was leaving the FCDA's top administrative office and Leo Hoegh was entering,
Saturday Review editor Norman Cousins and secretary emeritus ofthe American Friends
(Quaker) Service Committee Clarence Picket convened the meeting that led to the
formation of SANE. With the statement, "Something should be done to bring out the
latent sensitivity ofthe American people to the poisoning effect of nuclear bombs on
international relations and humanity," Picket introduced the topic of deUberation for the
conference and the mandate for the organization it birthed.' ' To fulfil its mission, SANE
pubUshed leaflets decrying the dangers of faUout, ran anti-nuclear ads in widely-circulated
newspapers, and produced film shorts for television. By the end of its first year of
existence, the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear PoUcy boasted weU over one
' ^Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 18-19, 71-77, 95-96, 160-205, 227-247.
'^'Quoted in Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 105.
291
hundred chapters across the country and had attracted some twenty-five thousand
members. Its pubUc messages had reached mUUons.' "
WhUe SANE's members massed for the attack, prominent authors, such as NevU
Shute, launched individual forays against nuclear armament. The year of SANE's
founding, 1957, NevU Shute pubUshed On the Beach. In Shute's Cold War classic, the
northem powers, presumably the Soviet Union and the United States, have engaged in a
nuclear war. Thermonuclear-cobalt bombs have thrown so much radiation into the air aU
animal Ufe on the Earth is doomed to extinction. When the book opens, the northem
hemisphere is already devoid of Uving creatures, and the people ofthe southem continents
are waiting quietly for wind cunents to carry the faUout, and death, to them. No one
survives. Some die from the radiatioa Most take government-distributed suicide tablets,
so they can end their Uves before experiencing the agonies of prolonged exposure to
radiation.'^'
Shute's book was a bestseUer, and the story reached a larger audience in 1959,
when On the Beach, the movie, was released. The CathoUc Church condemned both the
book and the movie as apologetics for suicide, a mortal sin. The members of
Eisenhower's Cabmet also considered censuring the movie. On more than one occasion.
' "Robert A. Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 167-68, 196, 203, 214, 236, 277; and Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 106.
' 'NevU Shute, On the Beach (New York: WUUam Monow, 1957).
292
On the Beach was discussed during Cabinet sessions.'^ Leo Hoegh, whom Eisenhower
included in the meetings, said, 'To me and OCDM it strikes almost a subversive blow,"
then voiced his concem that the movie could prove disasttous for civU defense.'" In
Shute's story, there is no escape from feUout. By promoting feeUngs of despair and
hopelessness. On the Beach might increase pubUc apathy toward civU defense. A number
of cabinet officers agreed with Hoegh, but eventuaUy they decided that it would be best
simply to ignore the movie. A pubUc condemnation ofthe show might produce a result
the Eisenhower Administration did not want; it might inspire more people to watch the
movie just so they could see what had the government so worried.' *
In one sense, the concerns expressed by Leo Hoegh and the members of
Eisenhower's Cabinet had merit. Although the anti-nuclear protestors were few in number
during the latter Fifties, they were laying the groundwork for the expanded movement of
the Sbcties. Yet, m another way Hoegh's worry seems sUly, because civU defense was
already dead when he began complaining about NevU Shute's agenda. OfficiaUy, Hoegh
did not recognize that fact. He was quite vocal in praise for himself and his OCDM staff,
because they pubUshed the first comprehensive guide to the coimtry's civU defense
program. Entitled The National Plan for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization, the
' *Notes on Cabinet Meetings, 6 November 1959, 27 November 1959, and 11 December 1959, Folder C-52 (4), Box 5, Cabinet Series, Office of Staff Secretary, Reports 1952-61, White House Office, DDEL.
'2'Notes on Cabinet Meeting, 11 December 1959, DDEL.
'2*Ibid.
293
tome ran to several hundred pages, detaUing federal, state, and local government
responsibUities during peace and every imaginable emergency-domestic or foreign.'^'
On paper Hoegh's accompUshments looked in^ressive: a codified national civU
defense plan, a national shelter poUcy, national civU defense drUls, but in reaUty the
country's civU defense was a paper sheU. Few Americans were volunteering for civU
defense training and responsibUities. Few Americans were buying or buUding faUout
shelters. The relaxation of U.S.-Soviet tensions, the instabUity within the federal civU
defense programs, the cries of anti-nuclear protesters, the cost of a national shelter
program, and the seemingly anti-civU defense actions of President Eisenhower had kiUed
an already-ailing civU defense. CivU defense was dead by 1960, but in the faU of that year
a new president, John F. Kennedy was elected, and Kennedy was committed to civiUan
preparedness. From the date of his inauguration, John F. Kennedy would try to breathe
fresh life into the nation's civU defense program.
' 'Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, National Plan; and OH #480, "Oral History Interview with Leo A. Hoegh on March 19, 1976," DDEL.
294
CHAPTER v m
SHELTERS FOR CAMELOT: KENNEDY
AND CIVIL DEFENSE
On May 25, 1961, President John F. Kennedy deUvered a "Special Message to
the Congress on Urgent National Needs." CivUian defense was one ofthe items he
discussed. Addressing the men and women of both the Senate and the House of
Representatives the president declared, "One major element ofthe national security
program which this nation has never squarely faced up to is civU defense. The problem
arises not from present trends but from national inaction in which most of us have
participated. In the past decade we have intermittently considered a variety of programs,
but we have never adopted a consistent poUcy. PubUc considerations have been largely
characterized by apathy, indifference and skepticism; whUe, at the same time, many ofthe
civU defense plans have been so far-reaching and unrealistic that they have not gained
essential support."""
No longer would the executive office accept a weak and ineffective civU defense
program. President Kennedy hoped to launch a new era in American civUian
preparedness. He told the members of Congress that he was planning to redistribute civU
defense responsibUities, resuscitate shelter initiatives, and demand much more money than
""John F. Kennedy, Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961-63, vol 1 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1962), 402.
295
had his predecessor, Dwight D. Eisenhower. Kennedy kept his promises. Actions soon
foUowed his words.'"
President John F, Kennedy attempted to make civU defense an accepted and
valued part of each American citizen's Ufe, but he did not succeed. Although he conectly
identified many ofthe enors that had prevented civU defense from winning pubUc support
in the past, he made the same mistakes during his presidency. Kennedy criticized the lack
of continuity in civU defense, yet he changed the Office of CivU and Defense
MobUization's mandate, its duties, and its name. He caUed past civUian defense programs
"fer-reaching and unrealistic," but he suggested a shelter plan that would require bUUons
of dollars and years of work to implement. In addition, many Americans considered the
program "unreaUstic," because they beUeved shelters would afford Uttle protection from
thermonuclear weapons, or they were ofthe opinion that a nuclear exchange would make
the Earth so inhospitable, survivors would envy the dead."^
"Jack" Kennedy's grandiose plans for civU defense had tarnished by 1963, but in
1961 they were bright, shiny, new, and-according to the recently inaugurated chief
executive-essential. WhUe Kennedy was president the possibUity of nuclear war did not
seem as remote as during the Eisenhower years. "Ike" had sought a reduction of tensions
between the United States and its communist rivals. He was largely successfol throughout
'"Kennedy, Public Papers, 1: 402-3.
'"Kennedy, Public Papers, 1: 402-3; and Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, Documents on Reorganization of Civil Defense: The President's Message of May 25, 1961 the Director's memorandum of July 7, 1961, the President's Executive Order of July 7, 1961, and the White House Press Release, the Director s Statement and the Secretary of Defense's Statement Thereon (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1961), 6-10.
296
most ofthe Fifties, but toward the end ofthe decade the loosely-knit febric of concUiation
began to unravel. In 1959 and 1960 the United States absorbed heavy blows from the
opposition. On New Year's Day, 1959, Fidel Castro's rebels took Havana and placed
their leader at the head ofthe Cuban government. When President Eisenhower withdrew
economic aid from Cuba, Castro tumed to the Union of Soviet SociaUst RepubUcs.
Americans shuddered at the reaUzation that the Soviet Union had broken through the
United States' carefliUy constmcted waU of containment and had reached across Westem
Europe and the Atlantic Ocean to estabUsh a sateUite ninety mUes off the Florida coast.'"
The people ofthe United States received another joh in May of 1960 when the
U.S.S.R. announced its mUitary had shot down a high altitude American aircraft that had
been photographing—spying on—Soviet defense instaUations. When Eisenhower denied
the charges, the Soviets produced wreckage from the downed U-2 and, more importantly,
the plane's pUot, Francis Gary Powers, who spUled out a confession before camera crews.
The U-2 debacle occuned on the eve of a scheduled East-West summit in Geneva.
Representatives from the United States and the Union of Soviet SociaUst RepubUcs were
to have discussed nuclear armament reductions and controls, but the summit never took
place. When Eisenhower refiised to apologize for spying and would not promise to halt
the U-2 flights over Russia, the Soviets refosed to attend the meeting.""
'"Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1981), 152-53..
""Ibid., 146-151.
297
As relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. deteriorated, pubUc demands for
a stronger America escalated. Foreign poUcy setbacks, technological embanassments, and
the Democrats' charge that Soviet rocket and nuclear weapons programs had sprinted
ahead of U.S. initiatives-that a "missUe gap" existed between the two countries, and it
fevored the Soviet Union-led to pubUc demands for increased defense spending.
Eisenhower worried that the people's sense of near panic and their cries for an expansion
of U.S. mUitary power would lead to an aU-consuming arms race and an aU-powerfol
mUitary-industrial combination that might "endanger our Uberties or democratic
processes." In his January 1961 fereweU address, Eisenhower urged Americans to resist
the puU ofthe mUitary-industrial complex, but his warnings went unheeded.'"
John F. Kennedy and the Democrats' constant pronouncements on the supposed
missUe gap helped them to defeat Richard Nbcon and the RepubUcans in the Election of
1960. When Kennedy entered the Oval Office in the spring of 1961 he canied with him a
pubUc mandate for an expanded miUtary. Shortly after his swearing in, the new chief
executive ofthe United States leamed the tmth about the missUe gap. American rocketry
and nuclear weapons development were ahead of, not lagging behind, Soviet technologies.
The missUe gap was in America's fevor. Nonetheless, Kennedy-who was a veteran of
World War II and, at least in the first two years of his presidency, a Cold War warrior-
yielded to his own personal incUnations and to pressure from the pubUc and the Pentagon.
He requested money for a massive mUitary buUdup. Discarding the stripped and nuclear-
'"Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Papers ofthe Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953-1961, vol. 8 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1961), 1035-1040.
298
weapon dependent "new look" that Eisenhower had given the U.S. mUitary, JFK
inttoduced his plans for a mUitary with "flexible response" capabUities. He caUed for a
strengthening ofthe conventional forces which had been pared down by the Eisenhower
Administration, and he requested an increase in funding for the nuclear weapons
programs. The flexible response sttategy broadened the United States' miUtary options.
The country could deUver a sttong blow either with tanks and men or with bombers and
rockets."*
Kennedy's push for stronger conventional forces and accelerated nuclear
weapons development may have partiaUy aUayed pubUc fears of anruhUation at the hands
ofthe Soviets, but the self-assurance which Americans had displayed during the early
years ofthe Cold War did not retum. In the spring of 1961 the United States continued to
suffer one humUiation after another in the foreign poUcy and the science and technology
arenas. AprU was a bad month for Americans. On the twelfth, Soviet cosmonaut Yuri
Alekseyevich Gagarin became the first man in space. His capsule hurled into orbit by a
modified ICBM, Gagarin circled the Earth in an hour and a half, reentered the atmosphere,
and safely parachuted back to Mother Russia. A week later, the Bay of Pigs fiasco
occuned. Fifteen hundred CL\-trained Cuban exUes landed at la Bahia de Cochinas (the
Bay of Pigs) in the hopes of inspiring a popular uprising against Castro's regime. The plan
"*Richard Walton, Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John
F Kennedy (New York: The VUcing Press, 1972), 60-74.
299
feUed miserably. There was no spontaneous revolt on the island. Castto's troops smashed
the mvading force in three days, capttiring 1,200 ofthe expatriate rebels.'"
During the first few months of Kennedy's presidency, the United States seemed
to sttimble, and the Soviets noticed. Seeing an America that appeared Ul-led and perhaps
weakening in its resolve to "win" the Cold War, and under pressure from mUitarists within
the U.S.S.R. that desu-ed a more aggressive stance against the U.S., Soviet Premier NUcita
Khrushchev attempted to buUy Kennedy. Two months after the feUure at the Bay of Pigs,
the two leaders met in Vienna. Khmshchev went on the offensive, broadsiding his young
opponent with a demand for American ttoop withdrawal from West BerUn, and with a
threat to close off Westem access to the divided city. Khmshchev's concerns over BerUn
were the same as those voiced by StaUn more than a decade earUer. Too many wealthy
and influential East Germans and individuals from other Soviet-controUed European states
were defecting to the West through this hole in the "Iron Curtain.""*
President Kennedy refosed to bow to Khmshchev's demands. His decision to
resist was both ideological and pragmatic. First, Kennedy was determined to fight and to
win the Cold War. Second, to back down, to accept another foreign poUcy defeat, would
have seriously jeopardized his poUtical career. It was a nanow victory that he had won in
'"Walter A. McDougaU, ...the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History ofthe Space Age (New York: Basic Books, Inc., PubUshers, 1985), 243-46; Walton, Cold War and Counterrevolution, 34-59; and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1965), 233-297.
"*Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 379-405; and Thomas G. Paterson, ed., Kennedy s Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy 1961-63 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 37-47.
300
the election of 1960. His supposed UberaUsm and his Roman CathoUc heritage had been
UabUities, particularly in the usuaUy soUd-Democratic South. To give himself a chance for
reelection in 1964, Kennedy had to waUc a poUtical tightrope. He had to ingress the
people, yet if he leaned too fer to the left or to the right, or if he sustained too many hits in
his foreign or domestic poUcy, he would feU from his position of power. Tensions
between the United States and the Union of Soviet SociaUst RepubUcs increased, but
President Kennedy remained firm in his resolve to keep West BerUn open and free from
Soviet domination.'"
To many Americans, war—nuclear war-appeared a distinct possibUity in the
summer of 1961. It did not come as a surprise to aU. Some had anticipated a return to
mUitancy and to a "hotter" Cold War even before Kennedy took office. In July 1960,
when a Chicago Tribune reporter asked Pete Davis if he would rather have a bomb shelter
or a swimming pool, the eighteen-year-old student responded, "There's a probabiUty that
the Democrats are going to get in in November....I think we are going to need bomb
shelters. Their record always has been war." Twelve months later, Davis's comments
must have seemed the words of an inspired prophet.'""
Pete Davis wanted a shelter to protect him from a nuclear attack. Others hedged
their bets, coupUng their faith in shelters with prayers to a higher power. When the BerUn
Crisis sprang up in the summer months of 1961, the Women's Advisory CouncU for
'"Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 379-405.
'""Information BuUetin No. 230, Information BuUetins, 1958-1961 (2), Box 27, VirgU L. Couch Papers, 1951-80, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
301
Defense and Disaster ReUef Executive Committee held a meeting in San Antonio, Texas.
Bess Beeman, one ofthe committee members present, offered a resolution that
recommended "a re-wording in aU panq)hlets being distributed...locaUy, State-wide, or
NationaUy, so that, HEADING THE LIST OF ESSENHAL SUPPLIES to be taken into
shelter...the foUowing be printed: 'Each person wUl bring his or her Bible of whatever
reUgion it may represent, and keep the Bible ever near...."""' The Women's Advisory
CouncU unanimously adopted Ms. Beeman's resolution on June 30.'"^ Without question,
the members ofthe councU were shaken by the events in BerUn, and Khrushchev did Uttle
to aUay their fears. As the crisis deepened, the Soviet premier told American diplomats
that the U.S.S.R. possessed a 100-megaton hydrogen bomb which it would use if war
empted. One cannot help wondering if Khrushchev's threat sent Ms. Beeman scurrying to
her shelter, Bible m hand.
For his part, Kennedy remained above ground, but he did initiate a retrenchment
in civU defense poUcy. In his May 25, 1961 speech before Congress, President Kennedy
had revealed his plans for a redistribution of civU defense responsibiUties. On July 20 the
president issued the executive order which effected the reorganization. Executive Order
No. 10952 ttansfened most civU defense duties from the Office of CivU and Defense
MobUization to the regular executive departments. The Department of Agriculture's
'"'"A RESOLUTION by Bess Beeman," www.pubUc shelter.coni/maiii/cdrom.htnil. A number of interesting civU defense documents are avaUable on this web site. The site is maintained by Jayne Loader et al., who produced the award-winning Atomic Cafe documentary.
'" Ibid.
302
assignment was to gather food for a national reserve. The Department of Health,
Education, and Welfere was to stockpUe medical suppUes.'"'
It was the Department of Defense (DOD), however, that became the biggest
player in civUian defense. In a move that fiirther enq)hasized the Kennedy
Administtation's commitment to an expanded mUitary, the president passed on to DOD
the majority ofthe preparedness responsibUities which the OCDM had shouldered.
Executive Order 10952 charged DOD with the development of a faUout shelter program,
the creation of a communications network for waming civilians of impending attack, the
continuation of pubUc education efforts, and other various duties for estabUshing and
maintaining an effective defense network. To carry out its orders, the Department of
Defense created an Office of CivU Defense. Kennedy nominated Steuart Pittman, a Yale-
law graduate and investment consultant, to head the body.'""
Executive Order 10952 reconstituted the Office of CivU and Defense
Mobilization as a smaUer, advisory and coordinating body, which was later renamed the
Office of Emergency Planning (OEP). Reduced from a staff of hundreds to a select few—a
director and some auxiliaries—OCDM, or OEP, acted as civU defense watchdog. It kept
the president informed on the nation's state of civiUan readiness and helped him to
coordinate the cd-related actions of each executive department. In addition, OEP acted as
'"'Kennedy, Public Papers, 1: 402-3; and Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, Documents on Reorganization, 3-10.
'""Office of CivU and Defense MobiUzation, Documents on Reorganization, 3-10, 12; "Department of Defense (Biography) Steuart Lansing Pittman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (CivU Defense)," Information Kit K-14, FaUout Shelter Program, 1961-63 (2), Box 34, Couch Papers, DDEL.
303
a presidential advisor and assistant in matters of disaster reUef; emergency resource
management, continuity of government, and strategic stockpUing.'"'
Spokespersons maintained that the reorganization was necessary to move civU
defense forward from the "paper plans" ofthe Fifties to a visftle, concrete poUcy in the
Sbcties. Some ofthe earUest post-World War U advisory boards on civU defense had
stated that preparedness issues feU within the domain ofthe mUitary, and should therefore
be directed by defense personnel. Assigning civU defense to DOD was logical. Moreover,
it was hoped that making DOD-an estabUshed, pubUcly-respected, and even admired
branch ofthe government-responsible for civU defense initiatives would bring the
program greater approval from the pubUc and more money from Congress.'"*
There was yet another reason for the reorganization. When it discarded the
name. Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, and created an Office of Emergency
Planning and an Office of CivU Defense, the Kennedy Administtation gave civU defense a
new look, but the division of tasks was a retum to a previous federal plan. The OEP, with
'"'Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, Documents on Reorganization, 3-10; and PubUc Law 296, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (22 September 1961), 630.
'"*SR 880, "Address by Edward A. McDennott, Deputy Director, Office of CivU and Defense Mobilization Before the Department of Commerce BDSA Executive Reserve, Washington, D.C, May 24, 1961," and SR 916, "Address by Edward A. McDermott, Deputy Director, Office of CivU and Defense MobiUzation, Before the 1961 Summer Seminar on Survival in the Nuclear Age—Executive Management, the Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania, August 16, 1961," Box 3, OCDM PubUcations, RG 396, National Archives and Records Administration, CoUege Park, Md.; Nehemiah Jordan, U.S. Civil Defense Before 1950: The Roots of Public Law 920 (n.p.: Institute for Defense Analyses, Economic and PoUtical Studies Division, 1966), 58; and War Department CivU Defense Board, A Study of Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: National MUitary EstabUshment, Office ofthe Secretary of Defense, 1948), 15.
304
its disaster and emergency management responsibUities, was in fact a recreation ofthe old
Office of Defense MobUization (ODM). Kennedy's OCD and OEP were a retum to the
Truman years when the United States possessed both the FCDA and the ODM. Edward
A. McDermott, OEP director, admitted as much on more than one occasion. McDermott
told audiences that Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan I, which had fijsed the Office of
Defense MobUization and the Federal CivU Defense Administration into one body, the
Office of CivU and Defense Mobilization, had faUed. CivU defense agencies witnessed no
upsurge m popular support, and Congress was able to reduce dramaticaUy its aUocations
for passive defense because two preparedness offices had been melded into one. Even
though the reduction of government spending had been one of Eisenhower's primary
concerns throughout his two terms as president, McDermott caUed Reorganization Plan I
unsuccessfol, a mistake. The OEP director stated, however, that Kennedy's E. O. 10952,
with its redivision of civU defense responsibUities had conected the enors ofthe previous
administration.'"'
Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan I might have been a mistake, but Kennedy's
reassignment of civU defense tasks was not the answer for an aUing preparedness program
In his May 25 speech to Congress, President Kennedy had criticized civU defense for being
inconsistent. With Executive Order 10952 Kennedy himself contributed to the confosion
and to the lack of continuity in the United States' preparedness program In the space of a
decade, the American pubUc had been introduced to the Federal CivU Defense
'"'Edward A. McDennott, The Office of Emergency Planning in National Security Planning (Washington, D.C: Industrial CoUege ofthe Armed Services, 1963), 3-4; and SR 916, RG 396, NARACP.
305
Administration, the Office of Defense and CivU MobUization, the Office of CivU and
Defense MobUization, the Office of CivU Defense, and the Office of Emergency Planning,
aU of which were responsible for civU defense at one time or another. CivUian defense
agencies had been created, disbanded, renamed, and reorganized. Changes in leadership
often accompaiued the appearance of "new" civU defense agencies, and, usuaUy, the
modification of existmg preparedness strategies soon foUowed.'"*
President Kennedy initiaUy retained the concepts ofthe National Shelter Plan
formulated during the Eisenhower years, but he ordered an accelerated and more dUigently
executed program. Supposedly, the OCDM had been identifying shelter areas in existmg
stmctures sUice Eisenhower approved the shelter plan in July 1958, but Uttle had been
accomplished. Few sheltered areas had been identified; fewer had been stocked, and stUl
fewer had been marked. In the summer of 1961, Steuart Pittman marshaled the DOD's
Office of CivU Defense forces and sent them out to locate sheltered areas in existing
buUdings.'"'
OCD staff persons employed a strict formula. They required each potential
shelter fecUity's shielding to reduce radiation to 1/100th the level outside the buUding.
The standard thickness for shielding varied according to the material used as a barrier.
For instance, eight inches of concrete or three feet of dirt would folfiU the requirement. It
was a community shelter program, so guideUnes also stipulated that each shelter facUity
548 Kennedy, Public Papers, 1: 402.
'"'Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1961 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1962), 12-15; and SR 880 and SR 916, RG 396, NARACP.
306
must be of sufficient size to hold fifty individuals, with ten square feet of Uving space per
person and another square foot per person for storage space. OCD workers planned to fiU
the storage areas with radiation measuring equipment, first aid kits, sanitation packets,
steel water containers that converted to chemical toUets, and a two-week supply of food
and water-14 quarts of water and 10,000 calories of crackers and carbohydrate
supplements per person.""
The BerUn Crisis assisted Kennedy in his push for an accelerated shelter program.
Bess Beeman ofthe Women's Advisory CouncU for Defense and Disaster ReUef was not
the orUy private citizen who was worried, and Kennedy was in part responsible for her and
others' fears. On July 25, 1961, five days after he reorganized the country's civU defense,
Kennedy deUvered an address on pubUc television. It was a dangerous speech, so charged
and potentiaUy inflammatory that it seemed calculated to promote panic rather than to
offer assurances. After calling BerUn "the great testing place of Westem courage and
will," Kennedy ticked off the measures that he beUeved necessary to meet the chaUenge.
He advocated calling up reserves and increasing the miUtary's total strength to more than
two hundred thousand men. He petitioned Congress for defense aUocations of $3 biUion
plus. In addition, he spoke of civU defense. He discussed the reorganization, the shelter
plan, and he requested a supplemental appropriation of $207.6 mUUon for civU defense.'"
""Information BuUetin No. 9, Information BuUetins, 1961-1963, Box 34, Couch Papers, DDEL; Office of CivU Defense, Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1962 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1963), 14-30; and Idem, Highlights ofthe US Civil Defense Program (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1963), 9.
'"Kennedy, Public Papers, 1: 534-537.
307
Congress granted the entire sum, and Kennedy handed the money over to OCD director
Steuart Pittman, who used the funds to further the shelter initiative."^
As the United States mobilized its resources to meet the growing crisis,
Khrushchev opted for a waU instead of a war. On the night of August 13, 1961, East
German forces erected a barbed-wire barrier to prevent defection to the westem side of
the city. In the months that foUowed, stacked cinder blocks supplemented, then replaced,
the v^e fence. East-West tensions over BerUn began to ease, but the process was
gradual.'"
For a few months after the raising ofthe waU, Americans remained nervous. On
August 18, five days after the East Germans strung barbed wire across the city. Time
pubUshed its infemous "Gun Thy Neighbor?' article. In the United States, the Cold War-
with its government sponsored anti-communist hysteria and the daUy threat of atomic
attack-encouraged and contributed to the rise of radicaUzed survivaUsts, forerunners of
the fiercely independent, heavUy armed, and sometimes violent mUitia groups ofthe 1990s.
"Better Dead Than Red" became the raUying cry of these individuals m the early 1960s.
They considered themselves best prepared for the coming World War III, and they were
detennined to do anything, even fight to the death, in order to preserve their way of Ufe.
"2pubUc Law 141, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (17 August 1961), 342-3; PubUc Law 144, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (17 August 1961), 374; and PubUc Law 33, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (30 September 1961), 737.
'"Patterson, Kennedy's Quest, 42-47.
308
Time's "Gun Thy Neighbor?' article showed that survivaUst values had contaminated the
"bunker mentaUty" of more than a few shelter-centered Americans.""
In the late summer and early faU of 1961, most ofthe U.S. population was
without access to faUout shelters. Steuart Pittman and the Office of CivU Defense were
conducting surveys to locate available shelter space, but it would be months before shelter
faciUties would be marked for pubUc use. Moreover, in early estimates, spokespersons for
the OCD anticipated finding sufficient space for only fifty miUion people, less than one-
third the country's population. Both the OCD and the OCDM recommended that
Americans not wait for a community shelter to pop up next to them. Each femUy unit
should constmct or buy their own shelter. Most Americans did not act on the advice.
Those who did were acutely aware ofthe fact that their shelterless neighbors might panic
and demand admission or force their entry after a nuclear strike.'"
"Gun Thy Neighbor" featured survivaUst shelter owners who were wUUng to use
deadly force to protect their bunkers from desperate refogees-whether the person outside
was a stranger, a casual acquaintance, or a close fiiend. It was a nonissue, some ofthe
shelter owners argued. To overcrowd one's shelter would jeopardize the health and the
chances of survival for aU inside. Moreover, a gun might be necessary to protect shelter
occupants from vandals, rapists, and other criminal elements after a nuclear strike. The
article opened with a quote from a Chicago resident who stated, "When I get my shelter
"""Gun Thy Neighbor?' Time, 18 August 1961, 58.
'"Infomiation BuUetin No. 9, Information BuUetins, 1961-1963, Box 34, Couch Papers, DDEL; "Survival: Are Shelters the Answer?' Newsweek, 6 November 1961, 21; and Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, Report for 1961, 12-14.
309
finished, I'm going to mount a machine gun at the hatch to keep the neighbors out if the
bomb falls. I'm deadly serious about this....I'm not going to run the risk of not being able
to use the shelter I've taken the ttouble to provide my own femUy.""*
The image of feUout shelters with machine guns posted at their entrances eUcited
mixed responses. A number of individuals, including reUgious leaders from traditionaUy
conservative denominations, sided with survivaUsts. One civU defense officer fevored the
idea of armed shelter owners. He contended that it was the head of a household's
Christian duty to protect its famUy. Just as many Americans, however, voiced their
outrage at the idea of machine gun-equipped shelters that perhaps bore a greater
resemblance to fortified "pUl boxes" than to simple, peaceful, havens from radiation."'
Afiican-American comedian Dick Gregory poked fun at the issue. As part of his
stand-up routine, Gregory would reflect, "This intemational situation raises some
interesting ethical problems. LUce, if Faubus [Orval] is driving through one of our
neighborhoods when they drop the bomb, would he go into a colored shelter?... And if he
did-should we let him in?... 'Orval, stop pounding on that door! Don't you know it's
three o'clock in the morning?'""* Gregory would then offer his own personal
"*"Gun Thy Neighbor?," 58.
'""Gun Thy Neighbor?," 58; "Letters," Time, 25 August 1961, 3; and "Letters," Time, 1 September 1961, 4.
"*Dick Gregory, From the Back ofthe Bus (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc.,
1962), 63.
310
commentary. "But I'm only kidding. My type of person is the one who buUds a faUout
shelter with a doorbeU."'"
Even television programming engaged in the debate over the "Gun Thy
Neighbor?' article. On September 29, \96\ The Twilight Zone aired a show entitled
simply "The Shelter." The episode opens with a neighborhood party thrown for Doc
Stockton, the story's anti-hero. Stockton is mmgUng with fiiends, and the image
projected is one of a content, close-knit community, imtU a radio broadcast intermpts the
gathering. Radar have detected unidentified flying objects headed for the area, the
announcer warns. Residents should take shelter immediately. The party atmosphere
disappears abmptly as Doc Stockton acts on the announcement's advice and leads his wife
and son to the safety ofthe femily shelter. His neighbors, who have not been so
foresighted as to have purchased or buUt their own shelters, ask dear Doc Stockton, their
close fiiend, to admit them into his. But a change has come over Stockton. He refoses,
and a change comes over his fiiends too. They break down the shelter's door, even as
another radio announcement declares that the earUer waming was a false alarm. Doc
Stockton and his neighbors look at each other in bare-feced shame, acutely aware of what
they had become in that brief period of crisis.'*" In his concluding message to the show's
viewing audience, nanator Rod SerUng temporized, "[F]or civUization to survive, the
559 Gregory, From the Back, 63.
'*"Margot A. Henriksen, Dr. Strangelove's America: Society and Culture in the Atomic Age (Berkeley: University of CaUfomia Press, 1997), 213-14.
311
human race has to remain civiUzed. Tonight's very smaU exercise in logic from The
Twilight Zone:'''''
During the Fifties, with pan:q)hlets such as The Clergy in Civil Defense and The
Church in Civil Defense, the Federal CivU Defense Administration and the Office of CivU
and Defense Mobilization had tried to convince the pubUc that civiUan defense was a
moral responsibUity. In the early Sbcties that federal ttend continued. In 1961 OCDM
offered the foUowing booklets on the godliness of civiUan preparedness initiatives: An
Introduction to Civil Defense for Churches, The Church as a Shelter, The Religious
Affairs Service, and Excerpts From Sermons on Civil Defense.'^^ The text of «
Introduction to Civil Defense for Churches closed with a section subtitled "THE
HIGHER MEANING OF CIVIL DEFENSE." Below the bold-typed, capitaUzed heading
was the foUowing statement: "At ReUgious Affairs conferences in the OCDM Staff
CoUege, individual clergymen often remark that there are many facets of civU defense
which provide practical opportunities for the exercise ofthe moral virtues taught by the
Church. Strengthening famUy ties...and love of neighbor through community disaster
planning are two examples that are often cited.'"*' Time's "Gun Thy Neighbor?' article
raised questions about the vaUdity ofthe OCDM's assertions. Increasingly during the
'*'Quoted in Henriksen, Strangelove's America, 214.
'*2Federal CivU Defense Administration, The Clergy in Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951); Idem, The Church in Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1957); Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, Introduction to Civil Defense for Churches (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1961); and Idem, The Church as a Shelter (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1961).
'*'Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, C/v/7 Defense for Churches, 6.
312
Kennedy Administtation, shelters became a moral issue, but not in the sense anticipated
and hoped for by civU defense officials. "Gun Thy Neighbor?' led Americans to consider
the possible immoral ramifications of civU defense and the proUferation of feUout
shelters.'*"
Moral or immoral, open to aU or closed, locked, and guarded by gun-toting
survivaUsts, faUout shelters remained a topic of discussion throughout the feU of 1961.
The constmction ofthe BerUn WaU might have been the first step toward defosing the
crisis atmosphere that sunounded the divided city, but in the weeks after the waU first
went up tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States did not subside; they
rose. In September the Soviets broke their self-imposed moratorium on nuclear weapons
testing and detonated a series of thermonuclear devices, including a 58-megaton hydrogen
bomb—at that tune, the largest weapon of its type ever exploded.'*'
The retum to testing reawakened in some Americans the need for assurances that
they could survive a nuclear war. Shelters came with no guarantees. A bunker at ground-
zero afforded Uttle protection from an H-bomb. In theory, however, shelters outside the
zone of total destmction increased one's chances of Uving through the residual radiation
produced by a nuclear detonation.
Herman Kahn's On Thermonuclear War considered, among other things, the Ufe-
saving potential of an effective civU defense program-one that would include faUout
'*""Gun Thy Neighbor?," 58; "Letters," Time, 25 August 1961, 3; and 'Tetters,' Time, 1 September 1961, 4.
'*'Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 379-405.
313
shelters. Kahn was a mUitary theorist for the RAND Corporation, which, in ttim, was a
think-tank sponsored by the U.S. Air Force. Taken from a series of lecttires which Kahn
presented to his coUeagues at Princeton University's Center of Intemational Sttidies, On
Thermonuclear War became an instant and perennial best-seUer. Its subject, the seemingly
exhaustive analysis in the sbc hundred fifty-one page book, and the author's quantitative
approach-the work is fiUed with statistical charts-brought On Thermonuclear War
renewed attention during the BerUn Crisis.'**
In the text, Kahn spoke ofthe mUUons who would forfeit their Uves if a nuclear
exchange were to occur between the Soviet Union and the United States. Yet despite the
dark focus of its subject, Kahn's work engendered in the reader a sense of positivism. It is
an optimistic look at nuclear war. Kahn notee that a nuclear assault would produce an
unprecedented level of carnage, perhaps leaving tens of mUUons dead and dying, but he
admonished his audience not to abandon aU hope. He wrote, "[A]n 'unprecedented'
catastrophe can be a far cry from an unlimited one."'*' Later, he further encouraged his
readers by offering the foUowing statement, "We [Kahn and other research associates]
concluded that for at least the next decade or so, any picture of total world annihilation
appears to be wrong, urespective ofthe miUtary course of events."'** Lastly, he addressed
another topic of popular debate, "WiU the survivors envy the dead?' Kahn had this to say.
'**Hemian Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960).
'*'lbid., 10.
'**Ibid., 22.
314
"Despite a widespread beUef to the conttary, objective sttidies indicate that even though
the amount of human ttagedy would be greatly increased in the postwar world, the
increase would not preclude normal and happy Uves for the majority ofthe survivors and
their descendants.'"*'
Kahn also contended that the number of casualties could be lowered by
implementing civUian defense measures. Early in his text he noted that "the Umits on the
magnitude ofthe catasttophe seem to be closely dependent on what kinds of preparations
have been made....""" In a subsequent chapter Kahn produced tables that showed the
approximate number of Uves that could be saved if the United States was weU prepared for
attack. He asserted that the coupUng of a plan for the protection ofthe Strategic Air
Command (SAC) with a comprehensive civU defense program that included industrial
dispersal, strategic evacuation, and faUout shelters could dramaticeUly reduce the casualty
Ust. According to his data, a Soviet first strike against SAC and fifty urban areas could
result in ninety milUon casualties if the U.S. was without civU defense, but a complete civU
defense initiative could reduce the casualty level to between five mUUon and twenty-five
mUUon. A foUow-up attack aimed at SAC and one hundred fifty-seven cities could leave
one hundred sbcty mUUon Americans dead, wounded, and missing, but again, effective
civUian defense could bring these numbers down to the stUl appaUing but more acceptable
range of eight mUUon to twenty-five mUUon.'" For those people who considered even the
'*'Kahn, Thermonuclear War, 21.
""Ibid., 10-11.
'"Ibid., 113.
315
lower casualty totals too great, Kahn offered, "[W]ith a conplete civU defense program,
adequate waming, and a relatively Umited Soviet strike (Umited because ofthe
unpremeditated character ofthe war or because the Soviet strike was blunted by the U.S.
attack), U.S. casualties would probably be in the three to ten mUUon range.""^
Kahn dedicated his book "to the goal of anticipating, avoiding, and aUeviating
crises."'" He urged support for civilian defense initiatives because he beUeved
preparedness could save Uves. The purpose behind many of his tables and charts was to
buUd support for civU defense. Clearly, Kahn opposed what he caUed the theory of
"ultimacy"—the idea that a nuclear war would destroy aU life on the planet. Lashing out at
popular Uterature for promoting the concept, Kahn labeled NevU Shute's On the Beach
"an interestuig, but badly researched book.""" Yet Kahn also opposed those ideaUsts who
dismissed the possibiUty of thermonuclear war or who beUeved most Americans would
survive with or without preparedness initiatives.'"
It was a fine Une that the mUitary strategist from the RAND Corporation
attempted to waUc. He had to offer hope to the people to stimulate support for civU
defense, but too much hope, too many assurances, might convince the pubUc that the
danger posed by thermonuclear weapons was not that great, or that the Ufe-saving
capabUities of civU defense were without Umit. Articles in the popular press-one in
"^Kahn, Thermonuclear War, 114.
'"Ibid., X.
""Ibid., 9.
'"Ibid.,7-8, 12, 16-17,97-98.
316
particular-suggest that Kahn was not whoUy successful in his attenpts to maintain
balance."*
In September of 1961, the Kennedy Administration was thrown into disanay
when the Soviets resumed the testing of nuclear weapons. It received another jolt in the
middle ofthe month when Life magazine sent to press an issue headUned, "How You Can
Survive FaUout." On the cover ofthe September 15 instaUment of Life a man in a plastic
"civUian faUout suit" ducked his head and raised his hand, presumably to shield his eyes
from the glare of an explosion that had cast an eerie reddish paU over him. The image was
one that seemed intended to generate concem. The short teases on the cover touted the
issue as a must-have survival manual, and, in effect promised to reUeve Americans' nuclear
fears. Beneath the large-print "How You Can Survive FaUout" headmg came other eye
catching prompts: "97 out of 100 people can be saved...DetaU plans for buUding a
shelter...and a letter to you from President Kennedy."'" Inside, readers did indeed find a
letter from President John F. Kennedy. Dated September 7, 1961, the note urged the
people ofthe United States "to read and consider seriously the contents of this issue of
Z//e.""*
The next thirteen pages covered a wide variety of civU defense topics and boasted
subtitles such as "A New Urgency, Big Things to Do- and What You Must Leam," and
"Rundown of things to remember in case attack should come." WhUe the article discussed
"*"FaUout Shelters," Z//e, 15 September 1961, 95-108.
'"Ibid., cover.
"*Ibid., 95.
317
ConeU-ad frequencies and first aid techniques for treating radiation sickness, the focus was
on feUout shelters. Featured were photographs of shelters and their owners.'" A double-
paged spread showed Art Carlson and Claude, his son, assembUng a $700 Kelsey-Hayes
prefebricated basement shelter. The constmction and provisioning ofthe shelter took the
Carlson femUy oiUy four hours. The last picture in the photo spread showed the "FamUy
m the Shelter, Snug, Equipped and WeU Organized." OiUy Mrs. Carlson sat smUing in the
shelter. Art and the three chUdren—even young Judy who was stationed behind a stack of
books and the games Clue, Scrabble, and, of course. Life—looked serious, determined to
survive Armageddon.'*" The dour Carlsons were the exception; however, other featured
femiUes appeared to enjoy their shelters. In Orlando, Florida, a smiling Doug Bartholow
reclined m a lounge chair outside his concrete-block shelter, seemingly pleased with what
Life reporters caUed an "attractive addition" to his home.'*' A photo from Vega, Texas,
showed the teenaged AmeUa WUson lying on a wooden-plank bunk in a faUout shelter.
Coca-cola in one hand, phone in the other, she was completely at home in the famUy
bunker. Another photo featured the Pederson femUy and their cattle, aU of whom-
humans and animals aUke-were quite content to spend time in their "above-ground
cormgated steel shelter.'"*^
'""FaUout Shelters," 95-108
'*"Ibid., 104-5.
'*'Ibid., 106.
'*2lbid., 106-7.
318
The Life article also kept its promise to provide detaUed plans for buUding a
shelter. Two shelter types were presented. The more economical ofthe two was the "Big
Pipe in the Backyard under Three Feet of Earth," a claustrophobe's nightmare. The
second more-spacious and more expensive shelter was labeled "A Double-waUed Bunker
for Safety above Ground."'*'
It was not the article's photographs, but rather its content that triggered concem
among the members ofthe Kennedy Administration. Jerome B. Weisner, JFK's science
advisor, wrote, "[I]n the article are statements implying that faUout shelters are aU the
preparations needed for the average femUy to have '97 chances out of 100 to survive' an
enemy attack....CivU defense sttidies by ...WSEG, RAND, ORO and SRI show quite
clearly that mortaUties would be restricted to 45 milUon people without shelters and five
miUion with complete sheltering only in the event that the USSR was extremely
discrimmating m its targeting."'*" Weisner noted, "Attacks directed purely at population
targets could result in 140-150 milUon mortaUties without shelters, and 60-80 mUUon with
complete faUout shehers."'*' BristUng over Life's nanow focus and exaggerated claims,
Kennedy's science advisor wrote, "In my opinion, this article gives the American people
an entirely felse and misleading estimate ofthe protection that would be provided by
'*'"FaUout Shelters," 100-3.
'*"Memorandum, Jerome B. Weisner to President, 27 September 1961, "Staff Memorandum, Jerome B. Weisner" folder. President's Office FUes, box 67, John F. Kennedy Library.
'*'Ibid.
319
feUout shelters, and of potential mortaUties in the event of large-scale thermonuclear
attack on this country.'"**
Weisner also expressed concem over the president's affiUation with the article.
He worried that Kennedy's letter of introduction would convince the people that the
president agreed with the exaggerated claims found in the article. Immediately below its
reprint ofthe letter from Kennedy, Life repeated again its assertion that shelters could
almost guarantee their owner's survival in a nuclear holocaust. "You could be among the
97% to survive if you foUow the advice on these pages...."'*' Weisner caUed the quote a
"grossly misleading statement.'"**
It was too late for Keimedy to retract his letter. It had akeady gone to press.
Moreover, it is not a certainty that President Kennedy agreed with the criticisms voiced by
his science advisor. The evidence is sketchy on whether or not Kennedy knew the
contents ofthe Life article before he dispatched the letter. It could have simply been a
mistake, an oversight, but it is possible that the president knew ofthe article's exaggerated
claims and decided to write a positive introductory letter anyway. The tone ofthe issue
was wUdly optimistic. The article presented shelters as such a sound investment it might
help precipitate a feUout shelter buying and buUding frenzy among the pubUc. Even if the
American people were deceived as to the efficacy of sheUers, the proUferation of private
shelters would have furthered Kennedy's plans for civU defense.
'**Weisner to President, 27 September 1961, JFKL
'*'"FaUout Shelters," 95.
'**Weisner to President, 27 September 1961, JFKL.
320
Despite Kennedy's hopes and the claims of some weU-respected, scholarly works
on CivUian defense in the Atomic Age, no mass movement to constmct or purchase bomb
shelters occuned in the late summer and feU of 1961. Even those federal agencies
responsible for civU defense recognized that Kennedy's shelter initiative was not
producing the hoped-for results at the grass-roots level. In November, Newsweek
reported that federal spokespersons for civU defense were backing away from earUer
clauns that the inhabitants of one mUUon households could take refoge in their own,
private, home shehers.'*'
There were many reasons for the difficulties Kennedy experienced when he
attempted to resuscitate civU defense. First, by the time young "Jack" became president in
1961, Americans had been largely ignoring civU defense for ten years. Starting as a trend
m behavior, pubUc apathy toward preparedness issues had become an estabUshed ttadition,
a part ofthe national character. A poUce state could force an instant reversal of pubUc
attitudes. In a country that granted its people broad civU Uberties, however, any official,
even one as charismatic as JFK, would find it difficult to effect a rapid change in pubUc
behavior.
Second, the continued absence of continuity in civU defense hurt Kennedy's
preparedness initiatives. He reorganized, renamed, and restaffed the federal agencies
responsible for civiUan defense. Moreover, he reworded the purpose ofthe faUout shelter
poUcy begun during the Eisenhower years. President Dwight D. Eisenhower had harped
on the detenent value of civU defense. Kennedy said that was nonsense. In order to be
'*'"Are Shelters the Answer?," 19.
321
susceptible to detenence an enemy must be rational, he argued. Continuing, he asserted
that a rational enemy would never consider the use of nuclear weapons against the United
States, because they would recognize that such an act would result in the mutual
destmction of both the victim's and the aggressor's countries. FaUout shelters would not
serve as part ofthe United States' detenent force, Kennedy contended. They were
msurance agamst an attack by an inational enemy. Kennedy's assessment had merit, but it
nanowed the focus and Umited the value of a sheher program even as he asked Congress
and the people to appropriate more money for his civU defense initiatives.""
Khrushchev's aggressive stance in BerUn and his resumption of nuclear testing
might have led many people to beUeve that an inational enemy had appeared.
Nonetheless, Time's "Gun Thy Neighbor?' article prompted some Americans to consider
their feUow citizens that were taking cover just as hostUe, inational, and "immoral" as
Soviet Russia. The growing attention given to the moraUty of civU defense, a trend which
strengthened the ranks of protest organizations such as SANE, should not be neglected for
its impact on the continuing decline of preparedness in the United States.'"
Lastly, the optimistic tone of works Uke Herman Kahn's On Thermonuclear War
and the Life article on faUout shelters may have produced an unexpected result. Instead of
encouraging popular support, they may have undermined Kennedy's shelter poUcy.
Kahn's quantitative study placed restrictions on the devastating effect of nuclear weapons
""Kennedy, Public Papers, 1: 402.
"'"Gun Thy Neighbor?," 58; "Letters," Time, August 1961, 3; and "Letters," Time, 1 September 1961, 4.
322
and nuclear assaults. His book estabUshed Umits for weapons and wars that many people
had hitherto considered Umitless in their destmctive capabUities. Psychological studies
indicate that, as the bombs got bigger, people were tempted to dismiss them, to put them
out of thek mmds because the weapons were too horrible to consider. UnintentionaUy,
Kahn's work also encouraged Americans to ignore H-bombs because he described them as
weapons with finite capabiUties. This would encourage others to minimize the power of
thermonuclear devices. The Life article serves as one exan^le. Without citing a single
authoritative source, the author further Umited the destmctive capabUities of hydrogen
bombs. The popular press with its optimistic accounts pushed Americans toward the
concept that nuclear warheads were not that different from conventional weapons. Both
could be survived. Europeans had Uved through bombing raids during World War II.
This minimaUst redefinmg ofthe destmctive capabiUties of nuclear weapons may have
encouraged the people to dismiss civU defense, because it was unnecessary—just as the
idea of nuclear ultimacy prompted Americans to ignore preparedness, because it was
fotUe."^
There is no question that John F. Kennedy's plan for civU defense was feltering
by the end of 1961. The crisis atmosphere produced by Khrushchev's demands for a
Soviet-controUed BerUn had subsided into an uneasy peace after the raising ofthe waU in
that city. War no longer seemed as immediate a possibUity as it had in the late summer
and early faU months. Nonetheless, even though the pubUc response to his shelter
initiative had been Umited, Kennedy refosed to abandon his plans. Instead, against the
"'Kahn, Thermonuclear War, 10-11, 21-22, 113-14; and "FaUout Shelters," 95.
323
advice of confidante and speech writer Theodore Sorensen, he broadened the scope of his
sheher poUcy.'"
Phase I of Kennedy's sheher iiutiative came to an end with the closing months of
1961. The first part of his program netted the administtation sufficient sheltered space in
existmg stmctures for some fifty mUUon Americans. The number, though substantial, was
less than one-third the total population ofthe United States. Steuart Pittman and the
OCD had tried to convince the people to buUd or purchase femUy shelters, and President
Kennedy had tried to lead by example. He asked that shelters be incorporated into the
plans for any new federal buUdings, and he pushed for the modification of older federal
faciUties that did not possess sheltered areas. His plan was less than successfol. The
OCD's reluctance to discuss what percentage ofthe pubUc owned home shelters, and the
administtation's refusal and inabUity to acknowledge earUer claims that one-milUon famUy
shelters sat m Americans' backyards or basements indicated a lack of pubUc support.""
In the early months of 1962, the Office of CivU Defense launched Phase II of
Kennedy's sheher initiative. Parts ofthe plan were simply an extension ofthe Phase I
activities. OCD personnel continued to identify sheltered areas in existing stmctures and
began to mark and stock the spaces previously located. It was Phase II that first brought
the pubUc into contact with the now-famUiar black and yeUow "FaUout Shelter" signs.
'"Memorandum, Theodore Sorensen to the President, 23 November 1961, "CivU Defense" folder. Subject FUes, 1961-64, Personal Papers, Box 30, JFKL.
""Kennedy, Public Papers, 1: 402; Information BuUetin No. 40, Infomiation Kit K-14, FaUout Shelter Program, 1961-1963 (2), Box 34, Couch Papers, DDEL; and "Are Shehers the Answer?," 19.
324
Pittman and the OCD also redoubled their efforts to stimulate individuals and private
business to produce their own shekered fecUities. The Office of CivU Defense launched a
massive pubUcity campaign that employed the same mechanisms and strategies formulated
and used by civU defense leaders MUlard CaldweU, Val Peterson, and Leo Hoegh.'"
The Office of CivU Defense flooded the pubUc with wave after wave of new
pamphlets. Two ofthe most widely disseminated pubUcations were Fallout Protection:
What to Know and Do About Nuclear Attack and Family Shelter Designs. In less than a
year, Pittman's OCD distributed thirty mUUon copies ofthe first booklet and eight mUUon
copies ofthe second. Fallout Protection told Americans to equip their homes with
shehers."* Family Shelter Designs provided detaUed plans for the do-it-yourself home
improver who wanted a sheher, but did not wish to buy a prefebricated bunker.
Blueprints for eight different shehers were squeezed between the covers ofthe booklet.
For the civU defense enthusiast with Uttle money. Family Shelter Designs proposed the
small, economical, but functional "Basement Sand-FUled Lumber Lean-To Sheher," the
"Outside Semimoimded Steel Igloo Shelter," or the "Belowground Cormgated Steel
Culvert Sheher,"—which bore a remarkable resemblance to Life's "Big Pipe in the
Backyard Under Three Feet of Earth." For the more affluent civU defender. Family
'"News Release No. 91-62, Press Releases, 1962-1963, Box 34, Couch Papers, DDEL; and Office of CivU Defense, Report for 1962,15-1%.
"*Office of CivU Defense, Report for 1962, 75-78; and Idem, Family Shelter Designs (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1962).
325
Shelter Designs suggested the Waldorf-Astoria of shehers, the "Belowground New
Constmction Clay Masonry Shelter.'""
The pubUcity campaigns and the identification, marking, and stocking of
shehered areas requu-ed federal expenditures, but they were not opposed by the members
of Congress. The men and women on Caphol HUl focused their attention on the other
part of Phase II, the shelter incentive plan. On February 8, 1962, Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara asked the members ofthe national legislature to amend civU defense
legislation to authorize subsidies for community shelter constmctioa The subsidies would
go to those nonprofit organizations involved in health, education, or welfare that were
willing to buUd pubUc sheher fecUities. The subsidy program was to be an integral part of
Kennedy's shelter initiative. The OCD wanted to provide the pubUc with shehered areas
sufficient for two hundred forty milUon people. Pittman's staff anticipated that the surveys
of existing buUdings would yield ninety milUon spaces. Another five miUion would be
located in federal buUdings. It was hoped that private initiative by famiUes and businesses
would generate shehered fecUities adequate for housing fifty-five nuUion Americans.
Kennedy, McNamara, and Pittman asked Congress to subsidize the constmction of pubUc
shehers for the remaining ninety miUion spaces needed."*
After McNamara requested the subsidies, the MUitary Operations Subcommittee
ofthe House Government Operations Committee began hearings on the subject. Chet
HoUfield was once again investigating and promoting a matter sacred to him—a national
'"Office of CivU Defense, Shelter Designs, 3-30; and "FaUout Shelters," 100-101,
"*Office of CivU Defense, Highlights; and Infomiation BuUetin No. 40, DDEL.
326
network of pubUc shelters. For once, HoUfield and his coUeagues voiced their approval
for the federal civU defense agencies, leadership, and the proposed shelter initiatives. The
subcommittee issued a fevorable report.'"
WhUe OCD and OCDM officials might have been heartened by the HoUfield
subcommittee's voiced approbation, there was no cause for celebration. The MUitary
Operations Subcommittee wielded no influence over the fate of McNamara's proposed
amendment to civU defense legislation. The board with jurisdiction over the subsidy
program was the House Armed Services Committee, chaired by Carl Vinson. A first
glance at Vinson would lead one to beUeve that Kennedy's initiative was sure to pass.
Vinson was a staunch Democrat. For more than fifty years the people of Georgia selected
him as one of their representatives to Congress. He was a pUlar ofthe soUd Democratic
South, but perhaps that was the origin of part ofthe problem he posed for Kennedy. The
South distrusted the CathoUc, "Uberal," young president from Massachusetts. Both
Kennedy and Vinson were Democrats, but Vinson was Protestant, conservative, a miUtary
enthusiast who fevored the expansion ofthe Navy and the other active armed services, yet
a man who was uncertain about the expensive and passive civU defense program. Vinson
refused to hold hearings on McNamara's proposed amendment. When Congress aUocated
'"House Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Government Operations, Hearings Before a Subcommittee ofthe Committee on Government Operations, 87th Cong., 2d. sess., 1962.
327
fimds for CivU defense, none ofthe $460 mUUon requested for shelter subsidies was
forthcoming.*""
Theodore C Sorensen, speech writer and adviser to President Kennedy, had
predicted Program II would meet with difficulties. More than a month before the Office
of CivU Defense launched the second phase of Kennedy's shelter initiative, Sorensen urged
the president to reconsider. Sorensen opened his memorandum to JFK with the statement,
"CivU defense is blossoming into our number one poUtical headache, aUenating those who
beUeve we are doing too much or too Uttle, or with too much confosion."*"' Sorensen
then voiced his opinion that Phase II would not increase the pubUc's confidence in, or its
satisfection with, civU defense. Since the subsidies would be used to buUd shehers in
urbanized areas, rural Americans would feel ignored by their government and would
"insist that Federal subsidies, if justified for some, were justified for aU. Thus the
program, the cost and the poUtical handicaps wiU grow even greater."*"^ He also argued
that subsidizing feUout shelter constmction in cities made Uttle sense, because those areas
would constitute the primary focus of an enemy attack. A faUout sheher would not save
an urbanite from an H-bomb's blast or heat. The more sensible location for faUout shehers
was outside major metropoUtan areas, in rural regions where evacuees would arrive and
*""Thomas J. Ken C/v/7 Defense in the U.S.: Band-Aid for a Holocaust? (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), 130-31; and PubUc Law 741, 87th Cong., 2d sess. (3 October 1962), 717.
*"'Sorensen to President, 23 November 1961, JFKL.
*"2lbid.
328
where the people would be contendmg only whh feUout, not with firestorms and blast
603
waves.
Sorensen also enq)loyed the same reasoning that later would influence Carl
Vinson's decision to ignore the subsidy proposal. The speech writer for the president
caUed Phase n "a ttemendous waste of funds at a cost greater than our education or other
domestic programs."*"" Sorenson asserted that the people should be encouraged to ready
their homes for a nuclear war, but the decision should be left to the mdividual. Each
homeowner had to decide what precautions to take if they Uved in an area that was subject
to natural disasters; they should make the same decisions about a possible nuclear disaster.
Sorensen stated, "The resources ofthe Federal or National Government should be devoted
to strengthening national objectives—deterring a nuclear war, preparing to win h,
protectmg our retaliatory forces, establishing an air defense network, and, as soon as
possible, an anti-missUe defense."*"'
Sorensen advised the president to remain with Phase I and drop the subsidy
proposal. He recognized that Phase I would not "satisfy the HoUfields who want to do
more," but he also maintamed that Phase II, once in effect, would not satisfy them*"*
*"'Sorensento President, 23 November 1961, JFKL.
*""Ibid.
*"'Ibid..
*"*Ibid.
329
Phase II was unjustified, he insisted, unless "pubUc sentiment for a Federal sheher program
is too overwhehning to be persuaded that Program I [sic] is enough."*"'
No pubUc mandate for Phase II existed. In fact, there was less support for civU
defense in 1962 than in 1961. Congress dealt Kennedy's civU defense plan some stunning
blows. Carl Vinson's refiisal to consider the subsidy proposal was not the OCD's only
concern. In addkion to the $460 miUion that he requested for sheher subsidies, Kennedy
had asked for another $235 miUion for other federal civU defense responsibUities. He
received only $120 mUUon.*"* A year earUer, with the BerUn Crisis and the possibUity of
war loommg over the country. Congress had granted the entire sum that JFK had
requested for civUian defense. By the summer of 1962, the Berlin WaU was in place, and
the missUes had not been fired. The crisis had ended, and congressional support for civU
defense had evaporated. Kennedy gave a conect assessment ofthe national legislature's
behavior when he noted that people appeared interested in preparechiess issues only "when
the clouds come...."*"'
The "clouds" of crisis retumed to cover Washington, D.C in October 1962. U-2
flights over Cuba had produced photographs that showed Soviet missUe platforms under
constmction. After the Bay of Pigs incident, spokespersons for the U.S.S.R. had
announced that their countty would protect Cuba from fiirther U.S. attempts to overthrow
the island-state's government. Khrushchev was keeping the Soviet Union's promise.
*"'Sorensento President, 23 November 1961, JFKL.
*"*PubUc Law 741, 87th Cong., 2d sess. (3 October 1962), 717.
*"'Kennedy, Public Papers, 2: 543.
330
Kennedy was not concemed because the rockets in Cuba suddenly opened the Umted
States to a nuclear assault. They did not. Soviet missUes in other locations could reach
the American mainland. JFK looked at the Cuban MissUe Crisis as one more Khrushchev-
issued chaUenge to his and the American people's resolve. President Kennedy refused to
back down. He mobUized ttoops and sent them to Florida to prepare for an invasion of
the island nation. He ordered a naval "quarantine" of Cuba-semantics was important; a
blockade was considered an act of war. He told Khrushchev that he would not permit
Soviet ships, presumably carrying nuclear warheads, to pass through the U.S. Navy's
quarantine and unload their cargo in Cuba. For thirteen days the world stood poised on
the brink of war and, perhaps, nuclear Armageddon.
Khmshchev bUnked first. He offered to order the disassembly ofthe platforms in
Cuba if the United States promised never to attenqjt invasion again. He later amended his
offer, demanding also that the U.S. government remove hs missUes from Turkey. Acting
on the advice of his brother, Robert Kennedy, the president accepted Khrushchev's first
proposal and ignored the second. Khrushchev acquiesced. The platforms and the missUes
were removed. The Cuban MissUe Crisis came to an end.*'"
If ever a single event stood a chance of reviving the country's civU defense
program and mobUizing Americans to demand an expanded sheher poUcy, that event was
the Cuban MissUe Crisis. The stand-off with Cuba and the Soviet Union had brought the
*'"Robert A. Divine, ed.. The Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Markos Weiner PubUshing, 1988), 9-59; and for the other side ofthe story see James G. BUght, Bmce J. AUyn, andDavid Welch, Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993).
331
United States closer to a nuclear war than h had ever been in the past, and for a short time
h appeared that civU defense might receive a boost from the crisis. Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara continued to ask for sheher subsidies, and Carl Vinson, earUer opposed
to the plan, ordered hearings. House Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee No. 3,
chaired by F. Edward Hebert of Louisiana conducted the hearings sessions in May and
June 1963.*"
Hebert later admitted that he and the other eleven members ofthe subcommittee
were opposed to the sheher incentive plan when the hearings convened. To discredit the
program, Hebert caUed for testimony from witnesses opposed to shehers or civU defense
in general. There were plenty of individuals and groups from whom to choose. The
protest movement had contmued to gain momentum. CoUege professors, engineers,
psychologists, and delegates from the American Friends Service Committee and the
National Committee for a Sane Nuclear PoUcy offered their views on the dangers or
absurdhies of attempting to unplement a national shelter program*'
WhUe some objected to the expense ofthe project or contended shehers would
afford Umited protection, most opponents ofthe incentive program criticized it for hs
*"Information BuUetin No. 58, Infomiation Kit K-14, FaUout Sheher Program, 1961-1963 (2), Box 34, Couch Papers, DDEL; and House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee No. 3, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services Pursuant to H.R. 8042 and H.R. 8200 to Further Amend the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 as Amended, to Provide for Shelter in Federal Structures, to Authorize Payment Toward the Construction or Modification of Approved Public Shelter Space and for Other Purposes, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963.
*' House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee No. 3, Hearings, 3034-52, 4560-4956, 5298-5303, 5600-5601.
332
moral deficiencies. Dredging up the images projected by Time's "Gun Thy Neighbor?'
article, they argued that not oiUy had the sheher issue encouraged some people to behave
Uke insenshive savages, it had weakened the Uiuted States' defensive posture by
preciphating the deterioration of national unity. Americans with shehers were turning
agamst those without. Critics ofthe sheher program theorized that the situation would
only worsen with time and the expansion of civU defense. They hypothesized that to shore
up its feUing preparedness poUcy and to restore pubUc unity, the federal government
would force its people to buUd shelters and tram for preparedness. Some would refuse,
the critics wamed, and they predicted that the stigma attached to "draft dodgers" would
soon also apply to "shelter dodgers." In addhion, those opposed to civU defense asserted
that the adoption of a large-scale sheher constmction poUcy would make Americans feel
too secure. As a consequence, neither civUians nor governmental officials would
recognize the need for disarmament or for ahematives to nuclear warfare when settUng
disputes. CivU defense would increase the possibUity of thermonuclear war by
encouraging the devolution of Americans into aggressive, unthinking beings.
After the naysayers and prophets of doom testified, Steuart Pittman received an
opportunity to rebut the arguments against a sheher incentive poUcy. The testimony ofthe
OCD director contrasted starkly to the emotional appeals issued by the sheher program's
detractors. With charts, statistical reports, and pamphlets, Pittman attempted to tum back
the criticism leveled at the project. His charts and graphs showed that faUout shelters
613
*"House Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee No. 3, Hearings, 3034-52,
4560-4956, 5298-5303.
333
could prevent 25 to 65 mUUon casualties if the Soviets launched a nuclear strike agamst
the United States, but he insisted that whhout a subsidy poUcy the nation would lack the
shehers necessary to protect many of hs chizens. Comparing civU defense without
shehers to armed forces without weapons, he maintained that proper equipment was
essential for an army of soldiers or for an army of civUian defenders.*'"
The members ofthe Hebert subcommittee, so opposed to the project when the
hearings began, found Pittman's arguments persuasive and retumed a fevorable report to
the Armed Services Committee. On August 27,1963, the fliU committee released HR
8200 for House consideration. The biU authorized $15.6 milUon for the constmction of
shehers m federal buUdmgs and another $175 milUon for subsidizing sheher projects
undertaken by nonprofit histitutions. The members ofthe House passed the bUl
September 17.*"
If Pittman and other OCD staff persons celebrated, they did so prematurely. The
Senate Armed Services Subcommittee faUed to refer a sheher subsidy bUl to the national
legislature's higher house. Congress therefore appropriated none ofthe $195 mUUon that
McNamara had requested for sheher constmction.*'*
There were a number of reasons for the faUure of Kennedy's shelter initiative.
Fh-st of aU, the decision by the Senate's Armed Services Committee to ignore the subsidy
*'"House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee No. 3, Hearings, 3053-3177.
'^'^Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, 10a, pt. 21, D 446.
*'*PubUc Law 25, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (17 May 1963), 37; and PubUc Law 215, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (17 May 1963), 425-26.
334
plan more accurately reflected pubUc sentunent than cUd the pro-sheher stance taken by
the House. At the height ofthe BerUn Crisis only five percent ofthe nation's populace
reported that they had made any changes m theu- homes m order to prepare for a nuclear
strike. A survey conducted m 1962, the year ofthe Cuban MissUe Crisis, showed that five
percent ofthe pubUc possessed blueprints or had investigated the possibUity of adding a
shelter to their homes, but less than two percent ofthe nation's heads of households had
actuaUy buUt or purchased a feUout shelters. In the aftermath ofthe Cuban Crisis a 1963
survey reported that the number of shelter owners had increased only sUghtly, to 2.2
percent.*"
The results ofthe OCDM and OCD volunteer recmitment drives of 1961-1963
fiirther attested to the lack of civUian interest in preparedness. By mid-1961, 100,000
adults had graduated from training courses offered by OCDM and hs sister organizations
at the state and local levels. Assuming responsibiUty for civU defense education programs
in the summer of 1961, OCD had trained 261,000 more volunteers by the end of 1962.
Another 263,000 trainees graduated in 1963. Adding the 624,000 mdividuals recmhed
during the Kennedy Administtation to the 6.5 miUion people that civU defense agencies
clakned had volunteered during the Truman and Eisenhower years produced a grand, and
probably exaggerated, total of 7.1 mUUon trained American civU defenders by 1963. In
1951, the Federal CivU Defense Achninistration had estimated h needed 17.5 mUUon
*"American Insthute of PubUc Opinion, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1971, vol. 3 (New York: Random House, 1972), 1732; David K Berle et al.. The Fallout Protection Booklet: A Report of Public Attitudes Toward and Information About Civil Defense (East Lansmg: Michigan State University, 1963), 16; and Jiri Nehnevajsa, C/v/7 Defense and Society (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1964), 89.
335
volunteers out of a nation of approximately 155 mUUon Americans. Twelve years later,
federal civU defense agencies stUl had not recruited 17.5 mUUon individuals, and the
population had sweUed to 189 mUUon people.*'*
John F. Kennedy hmiself was in part responsible for civU defense's inabUhy to
take advantage ofthe Cuban MissUe Crisis. It was not the buUet of an assassin in DaUas,
Texas that deprived U.S. civU defense of hs benefector and hs most powerful poUtical aUy.
Although he had begun his presidency committed to resuscitating civU defense, by 1963
John F. Kennedy was no longer the fiery advocate of preparedness measures that he had
been m 1961. Kennedy, Uke many Americans, had been alarmed by the reaUzation that
nuclear war had been only nanowly averted during the Cuban MissUe Crisis. When the
storm passed, the president's actions reveal that he had adopted at least some ofthe views
espoused by the members of SANE and other protest organizations.*"
Kennedy decided to work toward reducmg the possibUity of a nuclear conflict,
mstead of focusmg on the acquishion of technologies that might or might not enable a
portion ofthe country's civiUan population to survive a thermonuclear strike. In June
1963, John F. Kennedy deUvered a speech at American University in Washington, D.C.
Noting that the Soviet Union and the United States had been "caught up in a vicious and a
dangerous cycle in which suspicion on one side breeds suspicion on the other, and new
weapons beget counterweapons," the president chaUenged Americans as weU as Russians
*'*Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, Report for 1961, 75, 78; Office of CivU Defense, Report for 1962, 62; Idem, Report for 1963, 71; and Bureau ofthe Census, Statistical Abstract: 1964, 5.
*"Walton, Cold War and Counterrevolution, 143-161.
336
er
to reexamme theu- atthudes toward one another. The people ofthe two countries did not
have to love each other, he contended, but to ensure world peace they must "Uve togeth
m mutual tolerance, submhtmg their disputes to a just and peaceful settlement." They
must leam "not to see only a desperate and distorted view ofthe other side, not to see
conflict as inevitable, accommodation as impossible, and communication as nothing more
than an exchange of threats." Sounding very much Uke a spokesperson for SANE,
Kennedy stated, "[I]f we cannot now end our differences, at least we can help make the
world safe for diversity. For, m the final analysis, our most basic common Unk is that we
aU mhabh this smaU planet. We aU breathe the same air. We aU cherish our chUdren's
foture. And we are aU mortal."* "
Kennedy's speech was an offer to reduce tensions between the United States and
the Soviet Union, to promote a detente between the two countries. In June, the same
month as Kennedy's American University presentation, officials in the U.S.A. and the
U.S.S.R. agreed to instaU a direct teletype Unk between the White House in Washington,
D.C, and the Kremlin m Moscow. Dubbed the "Hot Line," the network made possible
instant communication between Soviet and American diplomats. It was a step toward
arbhrating disputes with words instead of miUtary posturing that could lead, mtentionaUy
or accidentally, to a nuclear war. Kennedy's detente initiative was furthered in September
1963 when Soviet and American diplomats signed the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
Now a chanpion of sttategic arms Umitation, President Kennedy had caUed for the
suspension of aU nuclear tests, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not agree. Hence, in its
* "Kennedy, Public Papers, 3: 459-64.
337
final form the Lmiited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty prohibhed weapons testing m the
atmosphere, m space, and underwater. Both nations could stUl detonate devices
underground.* '
CivU defense had lost hs strongest and most charismatic supporter. Kennedy's
actions m 1963 suggest that he had embraced open negotiations and more diplomatic
mteraction with the Soviet Uiuon as the soundest strategies for preserving his people from
a nuclear strike. Instead of preparing for war he tried to duninish the possibUity of violent
confrontation. As the United States retumed to the more concUiatory approach that h had
taken under Eisenhower, civU defense lost some ofthe Uttle appeal that remained to h. In
addhion, by removing testmg from sight the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty enabled
Americans to more easUy ignore the existence of mass destmction weqx)ns. The tteaty
drove support for civU defense, as weU as nuclear testing, underground.
By the tune of President John Fhzgerald Kennedy's death m 1963, pubUc demand
for civU defense measures was mostly confined to the die-hard sheher advocates— "the
HoUfields," as Theodore Sorensen had caUed them-and to radical survivaUsts. StUl, the
federal government did not completely discard hs civUian preparechiess programs. The
civU defense agencies ofthe Fifties and Sbcties eventuaUy gave rise to Congress's creation
ofthe Federal Emergency Management Admmistration m 1979. A few years later, civU
defense experienced a Umited and brief resurgence in popularity when President Ronald
Reagan adopted a more aggressive posture toward the Soviet states. Nonetheless, the
* 'Walton, Cold War and Counterrevolution, 143-161; and Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 893-899.
338
golden age of government-sponsored civU defense initiatives came to a hah m 1963, the
same year that the assassination of John F. Kennedy drew to a close the first chapter ofthe
Cold War and an end to the Fifties culture that had been shaped by h.* ^
*2 AUan M. Wmkler, Life Under A Cloud (New York: Oxford Univershy Press, 1993), 132-33.
339
CHAPTER DC
CONCLUSION: BETWEEN THE BOMB
AND A SHELTERED SPACE
Young, blonde, and on the cuttmg edge of fashion, Lmda Bromley of New
RocheUe, New York was ready for anythmg—a party, a night on the town, or a nuclear
disaster. It was her "atomic chic" look that won her a spot on the front page ofthe
Saturday, September 30, 1961 issue of The Houston Post. In place ofthe usual string of
pearls fevored by so many women of her era, Ms. Bromley wore what the Post caUed
"nuclear neckwear," a cham with a dosuneter pendant. Conq)act and Ught, approximately
the same size as a Kennedy half doUar and weighmg less than two ounces, the dosuneter
could be carried or wom without uiconvenience to hs owner. It was a must-have hem for
the serious civiUan defender. If faUout rained from the sky, Ms. Bromley's dosuneter
would be of far greater value than jewehy. It would measure the uitensity ofthe radiation
and would record the level of exposure suffered by hs owner. The Post reported that the
nifty device's manufacturer contended "h could be the next thmg in ladies neckwear...."*"
Lmda Bromley represented the ideal for civU defense planners and promoters.
She had mcorporated civUian preparedness uito her daUy routine. The uhunate goal for
the Federal CivU Defense Admmistration and the agencies that succeeded h was the
creation of a society whose members accepted civU defense as an uitegral part of everyday
Ufe. The elaborate pubUcity campaigns, with theh television and radio advertisements.
*""Nuclear Neckwear," The Houston Post, sec. 1, p. 1
340
parades, and gimmicks would no longer be necessary. Without even thinking about civU
defense, Americans would put dosimeters and identification tags m theh pockets or
around their necks. They would look upon such hems as orduiary accessories, as
deshable and necessary as a watch, a waUet, or a purse. The feUout sheher would become
a standard feature of American homes, considered as essential for humans as were garages
for cars. ChUdren at school and adults at the office or at home would react
mstantaneously, knowing exactly where to go and what to do if wammg shens sounded.
Few people would panic even when feced with an unminent strike by an enemy with
nuclear capabiUties. The knowledge that aU Americans had access to shelters and aU had
been thoroughly trained for an emergency would reassure and calm them. CivU defense
would help buUd a society that was more secure, more homogenous, and, supposedly,
more Ukely to survive a nuclear assauh.
The plan faUed. A whole series of blunders, miscalculations, and unexpected
events prevented civU defense from findmg popular acceptance. From hs earUest
begmmngs m 1951 and 1952, the United States' postwar civUian preparedness programs
seemed to felter. One factor which hampered U.S. civU defense efforts was the lack of
federal support and leadership. Congress was often at fauh, usuaUy aUocating no more
than a smaU fraction ofthe amounts requested for civU defense unless the country was
ennured m a crisis, such as the 1961 dispute over BerUn. Sheher mitiatives were the most
Ukely to feel the bhe ofthe congressional hatchet, because they were expensive, and
experts debated theh usefiUness. FCDA Administrator MUlard CaldweU and other
spokespersons for civU defense recognized that the federal government must lead by
341
exan^le. The national legislature's refusal to support civU defense transmitted to the
pubUc the message that civilian preparedness was not unportant.
The activity, or mactivity, ofthe coimtry's presidents also encouraged the pubUc
to question the vaUdity and the value of civiUan defense. President Harry S Truman
postponed the creation of a federal civU defense agency for years. After signing the CivU
Defense Act of 1950 uito law he became an outspoken proponent of civilian preparedness,
but the sums he requested for passive defense were significantly smaUer than the amounts
he demanded for active defense measures. The situation worsened when Dwight D.
Eisenhower won the presidency in 1952. CivU defense budget requests and appropriations
plummeted during his two terms of office. The one-time general and foU-tune fiscal
conservative placed his feith and the country's money in the expansion ofthe United
States' nuclear arsenal, instead of a nationwide system of shehers. His decision to
disregard the recommendations ofthe Gaither report and his attempts to defuse Soviet-
American tensions contributed to the fiirther decUne of civU defense, 1953-1961. When
John F. Kennedy entered the White House m 1961 he sought to revive civUian defense.
The president's conmiitment to preparechiess and the mcreasuig uistabUity of U.S.-
U.S.S.R. relations gave civU defense leaders hope for a revitaUzed program PubUc
distmst of civUian preparedness measures had been growmg for more than a decade,
however, and Kennedy's sheher mitiatives met with vocal and widespread criticism
Later, after the Cuban MissUe Crisis pushed the United States and the Soviet Union to the
brink of nuclear war, Kennedy hunself backed away from civU defense and began to speak
less about faUout shehers, more about arms Umitations and closer Russian-American
342
relations. CivU defense lost its most powerfiU and charismatic spokesperson, and
preparedness programs suffered. CivUian preparedness was dealt yet another blow by the
Lunhed Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which U.S. and Soviet diplomats signed m 1963. By
drivmg nuclear detonations underground, the treaty removed the threat ofthe
superweapons from the pubUc eye and fiirther contributed to the decUne of civU defense.
Presidents, senators and representatives, even the admmistrators and cUrectors of
the nation's federal civU defense agencies hmdered preparedness ui the United States.
MiUard CaldweU was an outspoken racist. His appomtment to the FCDA was opposed by
the mUUons of "mvisible" men and women that identified with Ralph EUison. Val Peterson
fered even worse with the pubUc. Charges that he was uiept and decehfol drove hun from
office m 1957. The rapid succession and brief tenure ofthe civU defense leaders that
foUowed—Leo Hoegh, Frank B. EUis, Edward McDermott, and Steuart Pittman-gave
U.S. federal civU defense agencies an aura of instabiUty, generating more pubUc distmst
toward preparedness.
The reorganization of civU defense bodies, the redistribution of civU defense
responsibiUties, and the redefinition of civU defense strategies added to the atmosphere of
imcertauity and confusion that clung to the American civU defense program. In the short
span of thuteen years, each ofthe foUowmg agencies exercised some authority over
civUian defense issues: the Federal CivU Defense Admmistration, the Office of Defense
MobUization, the Office of Defense and CivU MobUization, the Office of CivU and Defense
MobUization, the Office of Emergency Planmng, and the Office of CivU Defense. During
that same period, civU defense strategies shifted focus every few years. CivUian
343
preparedness agencies promoted the foUowmg inhiatives, ui order: pubUc bomb shehers,
mass evacuation, private faUout shehers and mass evacuation, private and pubUc faUout
shehers and mass evacuation, private and pubUc faUout shehers. The changes in name,
leadership, and strategy made the United States' civUian defense agencies appear clueless.
Tme, many ofthe changes m civU defense sttategies stemmed from advances in
offensive weaponry or from greater understandmg, or wide-spread misconceptions, ofthe
dangers posed by nuclear devices. The successful detonation of a thermonuclear device
forced a reevaluation of civU defense planning. Sputnik and the development of
intercontinental ballistic missUes preciphated another reassessment of civiUan poUcies. Yet
another reexamination of civU defense mitiatives occuned because ofthe Lucky Dragon
incident and growuig pubUc concerns—some leghimate, some exaggerated—about feUout.
Preparedness agencies responded to each new perceived threat, but the simple fact that the
FCDA or the OCDM had to react, had to modify hs strategies for survival, provided the
skeptics with an excuse for ignoring civU defense. Defense technologies were not keeping
pace with offensive weapons systems. CivU defense seemed always to lag behind. Few
people were wUUng to mvest tune or money in preparedness mitiatives that were expensive
and yet Ukely to be obsolete m a few years.
Tune hself acted as an enemy to civU defense. With each year that passed the
tradhion of pubUc maction grew sttonger. Smce the FCDA and hs sister organizations
were deaUng with a society characterized by hs conformist atthudes, a long-standmg
record of pubUc apathy was a matter of great concem. As tune passed and the average
chizen saw few or none of theh fiiends enroU for civUian defense trauimg, h became more
344
difficult for preparedness agencies to recruit volunteer personnel, and the possftUity of
foture mass pubUc mvolvement duninished. In addhion, tune further con^Ucated the task
of civU defense recruiters, because with each passmg year the American people grew more
accustomed to Uvmg hi the shadow ofthe bomb. They leamed to continue ui theh daUy
Uves, acceptmg the possibUity of nuclear annUiUation but refusmg to panic, just as they
accepted the possibiUty of bemg mvolved m an automobUe accident every tune they got
hito theu* cars and drove down the freeway.
Perhaps most damaging to civU defense initiatives, 1950-1963, was the federal
leadership's mabUity to identify conectly and benefit from the trends and established
behavior ofthe United States' Fifties society. It was unperative for civU defense agencies
to find "the pulse" of American society. CivU defense was a social program, dedicated to
the protection ofthe people. Its success was dependent on pubUc participation. CivU
defense planners wanted to educate the enthe population and hoped to enlist miUions for
special assignments. Recmhmg fifteen or twenty mUUon volunteers for civU defense
would pose few difficulties for preparechiess agencies in a country with authoritarian rule.
A poUce state could force pubUc participation, but the United States grants hs chizens
many civU Uberties. Substantial numbers of Americans opposed the draft even during
periods of mUitary emergency. Defense planners recognized that a peacetune draft for
civUian defense would meet great resistance. CivU defense was, by necessity, a voluntary
activity. It was therefore unperative for civU defense agencies to devise persuasive
strategies that would enable them to tap into the population.
345
The Federal CivU Defense Adnunisttation, the Office of CivU and Defense
MobUization and the other preparedness bodies did tty to caphaUze on the social trends of
the Fifties. Noticmg that a majority of Americans belonged to social and professional
clubs, the FCDA and hs successors asked the representatives of national organizations to
encourage theh members to volunteer for civU defense. The associations' leadership
compUed v dth the FCDA's requests, but recmitment returns were much lower than civU
defense officials had anticipated. MUlard CaldweU, Val Peterson and other dhectors of
preparedness agencies had hoped civU defense would benefit from the "joumig mania" that
mfected the United States' population m the Fifties, but they faUed to reaUze that the
people were jomuig estabUshed organizations and clubs which would boost them up to a
higher rung on the social or professional ladder. In a decade dommated by the pursuh of
economic success and peer acceptance, most Americans were networking for poshion,
power, and money. Civic responsibUities were a secondary concem.
FCDA attempts to share in the membership boom experienced by reUgious bodies
also met with faUure. Perhaps as a resuh of nuclear anxieties and the pressures of
conformity, the United States enjoyed hs most reUgious decade m the 1950s. As with the
professional and social clubs, the FCDA tried to tap this source of personnel by enlisting
the aid of reUgious leaders, caUing upon them to raUy support for civU defense. The
response was mixed. Ministers and clergymen from the tradhionaUy more conservative
churches compUed. Progressive and pacific denominations refused, at first argumg that
civU defense would actuaUy encourage war and an accelerated arms race. A national
network of shehers would make the United States' diplomatic leadership reckless, wUUng
346
to start a nuclear war, because the American people were protected. It would also
stunulate the arms race, mcreasmg hs aheady frenzied pace, because a sttong civU defense
system would chaUenge the Soviets to develop weapons of greater power, weapons which
could destroy even deep-earth shelters. In the early Sbcties progressive churches added
"unmoraUty" to thek Ust of reasons for opposmg civU defense. Shehers brought out the
worst m some people, mmisters contended. Some sheher owners were wUUng to gun
down neighbors that demanded entry during an emergency.
More difficult to explain was the Umited response from conservative
congregations. The churches themselves were strong m number and often patriotic. Why
then, were the returns from the FCDA campaigns so smaU? Agam the national character
and FCDA blunders suggest the answer. In the Fifties the deshe for conformity was a
powerful force. To volunteer for civU defense would have necesshated leavuig the safety
of conservative, conformist America and standmg alone. It was unfortunate for the FCDA
that the more progressive reUgious bodies opposed civU defense. Their UberaUty ui a
society dominated by conservatism aheady set them apart. Hence, in one way, they were
better candidates for preparedness than were the members of conservative reUgious
bodies.
During Val Peterson's term as admuiistrator the FCDA adopted a new stategy
for attractmg pubUc support. It released pubUcations and announcements that boasted
highly charged texts, fiUed whh emotional appeals. It was during Peterson's
admmistration that the FCDA securely tied together reUgious and civUian preparedness
motivations and responsibUities. StUl, the years that Peterson headed the Federal CivU
347
Defense Admmistt-ation represent one ofthe periods of greatest mstabUity for the agency.
The one hundred eighty degree shift m strategy from bomb shehers to mass evacuation,
the Lucky Dragon mcident and the rise of pubUc concerns over faUout, the U.S.
government's reluctance to tmthfoUy answer people's questions, aU contributed to the
further decUne of civU defense. Many conservative reUgious Americans were uideed
worried about the nuclear age, but a confused and mept FCDA was not, for them, the
answer.
The Federal CivU Defense Administration and subsequent preparedness
organizations encountered addhional difficuhies when they attempted to chaw large
numbers of women mto civiUan defense. A lack of confidence m preparedness mitiatives
and the need to conform must have weighed heavUy in women's decision to remain aloof
from chil defense. FCDA and OCDM recmhment campaigns also exhibhed a duaUty that
would have exasperated equaUy tradhional-minded and Uberated women.
The FCDA targeted women, because the mles ofthe conservative Fifties society
dictated that men should work m the office from 9 a.m to 5 p.m, and women should tend
to the home. If the Soviets launched an attack at midday, suburban America would be
without male leadership. The FCDA wanted women to step in and fiU this gap in the
country's civUian defense. On the surface, the plan sounded sensi*ble, but the group
targeted and the jobs offered were m conflict. The FCDA tried to enUst the aid of
housewives, tradhional women with a sense of civic responsibUity, but preparedness
leaders asked them to accept poshions of authority that feU outside the normal spheres of
responsibUity occupied by theh gender. CivU defense tracts beckoned women to the
348
warden service. Many warden preattack duties, such as gettmg acquainted whh everyone
m the neighborhood, distributmg leaflets, and teachmg the mdunents of civU defense
would have been considered acceptable for the ttadhional woman. Most Americans
would have perceived a warden's post-attack duties, however, as mascuUne m nattu-e.
After an enemy assault, the FCDA expected the nation's wardens to chase off vandals,
organize crews to clear wreckage and gather the dead, and, m general, assume the role of
block leader. The FCDA asked ttaditional females to take nontradhional jobs. This
confiised strategy did not work. Most housewives who volunteered for civU defense took
courses m first-aid and jomed the welfare services.
There remained to the FCDA those women that were yearning for an opportunity
to test or step outside the spheres to which they had been relegated, but civU defense
Uterature and announcements were fiUed with ambiguous statements and messages. Even
as the FCDA chaUenged women to accept new responsibUities, h remmded them that
participation in civU defense would afford them a chance to exercise theu* nurturing spirits.
They could extend protective arms over the people around them. They could act as
mother hens for their enthe neighborhood. A dual message was apparent in the campaigns
to atttact female recruits. Yet honicaUy, the agency's uiabUity to recognize the dual
nature ofthe United States' Fifties society constituted one ofthe reasons for the feUure of
federal civU defense sttategies.
By the end ofthe Sbcties, h was apparent to the most casual observer that the
U.S.A. was a country divided, and the rift seemed to foUow generational Unes. Through
theh dress, theh music, and theh behavior, many young people openly rejected the
349
traditions and values of theh parents and grandparents. A youth-dommated
counterculture existed separate from, but concurrent with, an older, mamstteam American
society.*^"
The seeds for this dual society were sown during the Fifties and early Sbcties.
The west coast counterculture ofthe Sbcties traced hs roots back to the Beats. Expressmg
then* dissatisfection with a 1950s America nm by business-oriented, warmongering,
conformist "squares," Jack Kerouac, AUen Gmsberg and the Beats sought a more vital
existence through spontaneity, free love, Eastem spirituaUty, and experimentation with
drugs. The "power" movements ofthe latter 1960s arose out of fiiistrations with the slow
pace ofthe civU rights movement and the Umhed gams h had achieved from the 1950s
forward. The Fifties spawned the music of rebeUion, Rock nRoU. Sbcties rockers Janis
JopUn, Junmy Hendrix, the RoUmg Stones, and the Beatles sunply contributed to the
evolution of a sound first made femous by artists such as Little Richard, Chuck Berry,
Buddy HoUy, and Elvis. Lastly, organizations such as SANE laid the groundwork for the
larger "no nuke" and anti-war protests ofthe 1960s and 1970s. American society began
tospUtuithel950s.*^'
CivU defense found acceptance neither whh the older, tradhional, and
conservative majority social group nor the younger, nontradhional, and Uberal mmority
*2 WUUam L. O'NeUl, Coming Apart: An Informal History of America in the 1960's (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 200-227.
*25David Halberstam, The Fifties (New York: VUlard Books, 1993), 295-307: MUton Viorst Fire in the Streets: America in the 1960s (New York: Sunon and Schuster, 1979), 55-88;'and Carl Belz, The Study of Rock, 1954-1966 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).
350
fection. Few statistical surveys of pubUc attittides toward civU defense present the
demographics of dissent, and a first glance at those which provide more complete data
seems to reveal Uttle. Whether young or of a mature age, Americans rejected civU
defense. However, when combmed with an understandmg ofthe dual society that was
bom m the Fifties and came of age m the Sbcties, a close scmtuiy ofthe mformation
compUed by surveyors suggests an answer for the faUure of civUian preparedness
mitiatives m the Sbcties and beyond.*^*
A majority of both older and younger Americans were unwUUng to volunteer for
civU defense, but they refused service for different reasons. Often, those of a mature age
considered the risk of a nuclear war mfinitesunal, or they beUeved the United States'
mUitary would blunt the force of an enemy attack. In ehher scenario, an uidividual's
UkeUhood of becoming the victun of an enemy missUe was mimmal. Survey respondents
who expressed these views belonged to the majority, tradhionaUst, conservative society of
the Fifties. They were optimistic about the foture, and they beUeved ui themselves and
theh country. These were the people that made Norman Vincent Peale's The Power of
Positive Thinking a perennial best-seUer m the Fifties. They were optimistic about the
foture, and with good reason. They had survived the Great Depression. They had seen
fascism, a menace to the world, defeated by the United States and the forces of "good."
As for atomic weapons, the older generation beUeved that they should be embraced.
* *Jui Nehnevajsa, C/v/7 Defense and Society (Office of CivU Defense Research Subtask 4821 A, OCD-OS-62-267, 1964), 34, 41-44; and David K. Berlo et al.. The Fallout Protection Booklet: A Report of Public Attitudes Toward and Information about Civil Defense (East Lansmg: Michigan State University, 1963), 2, and Appendbc 1.
351
"Lhtle Boy" and "Fat Man" had helped the United States defeat Japan m World War II.
An arsenal of nuclear weapons would keep the U.S.A. and hs people free from foreign
dommation during the Cold War.*"
In the early Fifties, civU defense officials recognized that a large number of
Americans seemed to delude themselves mto a false sense of security. Spokespersons for
civU defense, mcludmg President Harry S Truman, noted with alarm the unreaUstic and
possibly dangerous wishful thuikmg that characterized a substantial portion ofthe
population. FCDA records and conespondence do not mdicate, however, that
preparechiess leaders understood the reasons behmd the optunism*^*
Nehher did federal officials recognize that Americans of different age groups
harbored separate concerns about civiUan defense. By 1963 negativism had been growing
in the United States for a decade or longer. Many young Americans rejected the values
and beUefs of theh elders. The members of this rebeUious, teenaged and twenty-
something crowd had not Uved through the Great Depression, nor could a majority
remember the triumphant wave of pride and patriotism that washed over the United States
when atomic detonations m Japan punctuated the end of World War II m 1945. Instead,
*2'Nehnevajasa, C/v/7 Defense, 34, 38,41-44, 60; and Berlo et al., Fallout Protection Booklet, 2 and Appendbc 1.
* *"A PreUmmary Report on PubUc Attitdes Toward CivU Defense...Based on Personal Interviews by the Survey Research Center ofthe University of Michigan, 1951-1951," President's Secretary's FUes document. Folder 11, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, Papers of Harry S Truman [Hereafter HST], Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri; MUlard CaldweU to Robert A. Lovett, n.d.. President's Secretary's FUes document, Folder 11, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST; and Hany S Truman to Robert A. Lovett, 7 Febmary 1952, President's Secretary's FUes document. Folder 11, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST.
352
the McCarthy anti-communist witch hunts, the ttumoU ofthe early civU rights movement,
weapons of mass desttiiction and the feUout scare, a space race which the Soviets seemed
to be wummg, the assassmation of a president, these were the events which defined theh
adolescent and young adult Uves. There were reasons for the negative attitudes they
displayed. WhUe a majority of young people remamed ttiie to their parents' ideas, a vocal
mmority of young Americans broke away, jommg protest movements or eventuaUy
becommg part of a counterculture which advocated "droppmg out" ofthe tradhionaUst
society.*^'
The rebel youth ofthe Sixties and Seventies opposed nuclear armaments and
therefore civiUan preparedness as well, but the majority of young people who remained
loyal to theh parents' conservative values also manifested an unwUlingness to support civU
defense. Conformist or nonconformist, radical or reactionary, aU ofthe chUdren ofthe
Fifties witnessed the development of nuclear superweapons and deUvery systems. Most of
these young people became convinced that a nuclear war would destroy humankmd or
would reduce the Earth to such a state that no one would want to Uve on h. Moreover,
even though federal leaders made a conscious effort to present the more poshive aspects
of preparedness, civU defense agencies were m part responsible for encouragmg this
doomsday mentaUty.*'"
CivU defense organizations could not conqjletely avoid projectmg negative
unages. During hs first year of existence, the Federal CivU Defense Admmistration
*2'Viorst, Fire in the Streets, 55-420.
*'"Berlo et al. Fallout Protection Booklet, 2 and Appendbc 1
353
suggested every American make identification tags part of their daUy dress. CivU defense
spokespersons avoided discussmg the need for "dog tags," but the unpUcation was clear.
In the next war, enemy strikes agamst the homefront were Ukely, and many Americans
would be chaned or blasted beyond recognition. Dog tags were for identifymg victuns,
not survivors. StUl, school systems acted upon the FCDA's recommendations and offered
reasonably-priced i.d. necklaces to theh students. In 1952, when President Harry Truman
attended the "Alert America" exhibh that came to the caphol, civU defense personnel gave
him a set of tags. Photos ofthe presentation went to the newspapers. The FCDA wanted
the schools and the president to lead Americans to civU defense, but the dog tag initiative
did not promote the idea that preparedness would save Uves. It suggested that everyone
Ul the United States, mcludmg chUdren at school and the chief executive at the White
House, would be at risk during a nuclear war.*"
EspeciaUy among school-aged chUdren, civU defense drills also contributed to a
growuig sense of foreboduig and helplessness. "Duck and Cover" drUls were common,
and school evacuations were not rare. During the driUs, chUdren whose teachers had told
them ofthe formidible power unleashed by a nuclear detonation must have wondered just
how much protection plaster and brick, or a thui layer of wood, afforded. Sbcties student
activist Todd GhUn later recorded the feeUngs he and his classmates experienced during
civU defense exercises. GhUn first described the driUs themselves: "Every so often, out of
the blue a teacher would pause m the middle of class and caU out, 'Take Cover!' We
*""The Alert America Convoy Comes to Washmgton," 3, FUes of Spencer R. Quick, HST; and Federal CivU Defense, "FCDA Urges Every CivUian to Wear Identification Tag," The Civil Defense Alert 1, no. 7 (1951): 10.
354
knew then to scramble under our mmiattu-e desks and to stay there, cramped, heads folded
under our arms, untU the teacher caUed out, 'AU clear!'" He noted, "Under the desks and
crouched m the haUways, tenors were ignited...[w]e could never quite take for granted
that the world we had been bom mto was destmed to endure." GhUn refened to hunself
and his feUow students as "the first generation compeUed from uifancy to fear not only war
but the end of days. "*'
GhUn and his fiiends were fiightened by the "duck and cover" drUls ofthe Fifties
and Sixties, but FCDA-sponsored community exercises were even more Ukely to foster a
sense of doom in young Americans' minds. In many post-attack sunulations, civU defense
personnel asked chUdren to act as casualties of a nuclear strike. Some ofthe young
people "made beUeve" they had broken bones, abrasions, and cuts. Others suffered from a
mUd case of radiation skkness. StiU others foUowed the instmctions of civU defense
officers and pretended to be dead or dying. In 1955, a number ofthe students that
participated m Arkansas's "Operation Able" school evacuations were designated as
criticaUy-Ul victuns of radiation.*" In Texas, the Beaumont area "Operation Mercy"
exercises boasted "reaUstic casualties made up of Boy Scouts and medical students aU
tagged with theh particular mjury."*'" After civU defense volunteers "processed" the
*' Todd GhUn, The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage (New York: Bantam Books, 1987), 22-23.
*"Mattie TreadweU, Actuig Regional Admuiistrator, Region 5, to Dhector, PubUc Affau-s Office, Federal CivU Defense Admmistration, 24 May 1955, Folder: I.E.l, Test Exercises (Various), Book 8, I.D. 17 to I.I.A2, Office FUes ofthe Director, RG 396, National Archives Branch Deposhory, Fort Worth, Texas.
*'""Operation Mercy," C/v/7 Defense Newsbriefs, 2, no. 5 (1955)
355
casualties through a sortmg station, emergency vehicles carried the wounded to "the
emergency field hospital located at Averil Elementary School," where sbc- to twelve-year-
old students got a good look at the victuns of a nuclear attack.*" The FCDA not only
sanctioned, h recommended the use of juvenUes for casualty sunulation.*'*
During duck and cover school exercises, Todd GhUn hid under a desk and
worried about the foture, his thoughts nmnuig wUd. He wrote, "Under the
desks...existentialists were bom." How many more chUdren were permanently affected by
the sight of "dead" comrades or by a forced stmt on a stretcher, pretenduig to be wounded
or a corpse? Instead of creatmg a youthful army of civiUan defenders, preparedness
leaders and the official practices of civUian defense agencies contributed to the rise of
nuclear fears and negativism among the young.
CivU defense never became an accepted and valued part ofthe Fifties society, or
societies, that existed m the United States from 1945 to 1963. A host of poUtical, social,
and technological fectors contributed to the perpetuaUy depressed state of preparedness
programs, but civU defense also faUed ui hs bid to find popular acceptance because h feU
mto a gap between two generations. Older, tradhional, poshive Americans saw no reason
for civU defense because they considered the risk of nuclear war or the possibUity of
Soviet missUes penetratuig U.S. defenses to be negUgible. The members of a younger,
uncertaui, negative generation refosed civUian preparedness because they contended more
*""Operation Mercy," C/v/7 Defense Newsbriefs 2, no. 5 (1955).
*'*Federal CivU Defense Admmistration, Tentative Guide: Method for Conducting Field Exercises (Washmgton, D.C: Federal CivU Defense Admmistration, 1953), 15-17, 31.
356
no defense, whether con^)rised of active miUtary or passive civUian measures, or both,
would provide substantial protection from nuclear weapons. They beUeved mUUons of
people would die when the bombs feUs, and mUUons more would perish from the effects of
residual radiation. FaUout would render vast swaths of land uninhabitable for centuries.
Civilization would come to an end, and possibly aU Ufe on the Earth would be
extuiguished. Civilian defense leaders did not foUy understand the society that they
targeted. And since civU defense was a social program dependent upon the wUUng
participation of every man, woman, and chUd m the United States, h could succeed only if
those responsible for hs promotion accurately identified and caphaUzed on the
characteristics of American society.
357
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