SHELTERING SOCIETY: CIVIL DEFENSE IN

THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1963

by

KREGG MICHAEL FEHR, B.S., M.A.

A DISSERTATION

IN

HISTORY

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in

Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Approved

Accepted

August, 1999

Copyright 1999, Kregg Michael Fehr

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

One name appears on the cover of this text, but dozens should be added to it.

Many caring and generous friends, relatives, colleagues, and associates have offered their

advice and their support throughout my course work and the dissertation. I am indebted

to them all, and a number merit particular recognition.

I respect and admire the members of my doctoral committee, and I am gratefiil for

their guidance. Besides serving as the chairperson of my committee. Dr. Ronald Rainger

has acted as my mentor and my friend. A man of great professional and personal

propriety, he is my example. In addition, both inside and outside the classroom, during

formal lectures and during informal meetings at one of Lubbock's burger stands, Dr.

Rainger has labored to teach me the skill most essential to a historian. He has taught me

how to formulate, shape, and ask valuable questions. I cannot express my gratitude. The

other members of my committee also have my most sincere appreciation. Dr. George

Flynn further honed my approach to writing. Dr. Donald Walker challenged me and

encouraged me to publish. The positive comments made by Dr. Idris Traylor sustained my

drive. And the courteous and confident mannerisms of Dr. Allan Kuethe first convinced

me to enroU at Texas Tech University in pursuit of a Ph.D, in history.

The staff members of several organizations and institutions also deserve my thanks.

First, I wish to recognize the efforts of Barbi Dickensheet and the Texas Tech Graduate

School Office. Second, my thanks to the research room employees at the Harry S Tnmian

Library, the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, the National Archives Branch Depository in

ii

Fort Worth, Texas, and the National Archives and Records Administration in College

Park, Maryland. Third, I wish to express my appreciation for the research grant awarded

to me by the Harry S Truman Library.

With thoughts, prayers, and gifts, many fiiends and femily members have

supported my scholastic career. Special thanks to my family—William, Barbara, and Kathy

Fehr, Tim and Susan Ebelthite, Kent Fehr and family, the Curtises, the Bells, and Aaron

Flowers. Also, I am grateful for the aid and the comic relief provided by my fiiends "El

Jefe," "Nimiber One," and "Nasaboy." I appreciate "El Jefe," a fiiend and colleague who

postponed many a border raid in order to call me and offer words of advice and

encouragement. I value highly the fiiendship of'*Nimiber One," and my education is more

complete because of his lunch-time book reviews. And I am indebted to "Nasaboy" for

his willingness to engage in brainstorming sessions and for devoting almost as much

attention to my topic as to his own.

Last in these acknowledgments, but first in my heart, thank you to Jane and Katie.

I thank you, Katie, for insisting that I take some time off from my projects to play "Candy

Land" or "Turkey." And I thank you, Jane. Thank you for feigning interest when I

bombarded you—daily—wdth my "latest thoughts" on civil defense. Thank you for

watching "Bert the Turtle" fihns with me and for incorporating the phrase "Duck and

Cover" into the Fehr-family vocabulary. Thank you for your limitless patience, your self-

sacrifice, and your optimism. I could not have completed this work without you.

m

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION 1

n. CLOUDS OVER WASHINGTON: CRISES AND THE RESURRECTION OF CIVIL DEFENSE 13

m. ALERTING AMERICA: MILLARD CALDWELL AND THE POLITICS OFPERSUASION 48

IV. THE BUCK NEVER STOPPED HERE: BLAME, VALUES, AND THE END OF THE CALDWELL ADMINISTRATION . . . 101

V. "FROM DUCK AND COVER TO RUN LIKE HELL": MASS EVACUATION, VAL PETERSON AND THE FCDA 132

VI. THE SKY IS FALLING: CHICKEN LITTLE, THE LUCKY DRAGON, AND THE HOLMELD INVESTIGATIONS 178

Vn. GOD, APPLE PIE, AND CIVIL DEFENSE: INFLATING THE RHETORIC FOR A DEFLATING PROGRAM 227

Vm. SHELTERS FOR CAMELOT: KENNEDY AND CIVILDEFENSE 295

DC. CONCLUSION: BETWEEN THE BOMB AND A SHELTERED SPACE 340

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 358

IV

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the 1990s, as in the 1950s and 1960s, nuclear weapons captured headlines. At

the end of the decade, India and Pakistan engaged in a regional arms race that featured a

nimiber of imdergroimd detonations. In the spring of 1999, intelligence sources learned

that the Chinese had been stealing nuclear secrets from the United States. And,

throughout the Nineties, military theorists warned that the cnmibling of the Soviet Empire,

the economic difficulties of the Russian Republic, and the resultant sale of military

hardware ensured that it was only a matter of time before a terrorist organization acquired

a warhead and threatened the world with nuclear blackmail. Most Americans did not msh

out to purchase bomb shelters at the end of the millennium or at midcentury. The

apparent lack of concern for civilian preparedness measures during a nuclear era raises

questions about the value of civil defense strategies, and the government and popular

response to preparedness initiatives. In 1999, a few studies on civilian defense existed, but

a new and more complete reassessment of American civil defense was needed.

The time frame 1945-1963 is logical for a book-length study of U.S. civilian

preparedness initiatives. The year 1945 marked a turning point in the history of the United

States. World War II ended. The Cold War began. Some scholars argue that U.S.­

Soviet tensions were rising even before 1945, that World War II and the Cold War

overlap. Such an argument has merit, but the evolution of early-modem civil defense

policy is in many ways a social history, and, for the American people as a whole, the Cold

War began in eamest after the Second World War. Until the Axis powers were defeated,

the U.S. government was generally successfiil in its attempts to focus American hatreds on

Germany, Italy, and Japan. The Soviet Union was the United States' aUy, and it was

recognized as a necessary partner in the world conflict. Its strength, its desire to replace

the United States as the dominant global power, its political ideology, and a host of other

factors brought the U.S.S.R. into open confrontation with the U.S.A. after the war. The

U.S. federal government, an entity with a long-standing and accomplished record of

successfiil propaganda campaigns, now encouraged its people to adopt a paternalistic

attitude toward the defeated Germans and Japanese and direct their animosity toward the

Soviet Union. The American people responded admirably. Public support enabled the

Cold War to become a heated conflict.'

In 1945, the American people identified Stalin's Soviet Union as the foreign

power to loathe and fear. The hatred and worries produced by U.S.-Soviet competition

contributed to the shaping of American society in the post-war years. So did a

technology, the atomic bomb. The simimer of 1945 saw the introduction of the

superweapon into the United States' military arsenal, and four years later the Soviets

acquired atomic capabilities. With its ability to increase himdred-fold the potential hazards

of warfare, "the bomb" itself generated much anxiety, increased the price of a Cold War

turned "hot," and acted as a defining influence on society. Atomic bombs and the rocket-

' Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1984 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 8-28; John Lewis Gaddis, Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 3-47; and William E. Leuchtenberg, A Troubled Feast: American Society Since 1945 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1973).

propelled thermonuclear devices that followed carried the world into an era of less

security, the "Atomic Age."^

Like 1945, the year 1963 marked another turning point in U.S. history. The

Atomic Age did not come to an end, but President John F. Kennedy's detente initiatives

did represent a step toward a safer, more sane world. Even after an assassin's bullet cut

down Kennedy in Dallas and the hurriedly swom-in Lyndon Johnson sponsored a massive

expansion of the U.S. military and increased American involvement in the Vietnam

Conflict, communist and capitalist rivals relied upon conventional weapons and

negotiation to settle their differences, instead of moving toward a nuclear exchange. The

threat of an atomic or thermonuclear war subsided until the Election of 1980 sent Ronald

Reagan to the White House.

In addition to its significance for Kennedy's strategy shift away from nuclear

posturing, 1963 is important because it serves as a line of demarcation for American social

behavior. Although the postwar social phenomenon labeled simply "the generation gap"

sank its roots in the late 1940s and began to grow in the 1950s, it was during the Johnson

years that the gap became a fissure and threatened the cohesion of the United States.

Both LBJ's aggressive foreign policy and his "War on Poverty," his domestic policy,

widened the generation gap. By the latter Sbrties mature, conservative. Cold War

The best account of Americans' fears of world-ending catastrophes is found in Spencer Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988).

^Allan M. Winkler, Life Under a Cloud: American Anxiety About the Atom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 165-208.

warriors were clashing in open and sometimes violent confrontations with a generation of

identity-seeking, idealistic, yoimg people. The Fifties society was bom in 1945 with the

Cold War and expired in 1963 when Johnson became president.

The golden age of federal sponsorship for civil defense also came to an end in

1963. Today, the phrase "civil defense" conjures up images of fallout shelters and school-

conducted "duck and cover" drills, but it was much more. Modem, post-World War II

civil defense initiatives were a response to the development of a technology, atomic

weaponry. Civil defense measures were intended to discourage a nuclear strike against the

United States, guarantee the nation's survival by protecting the citizens and resources of

the country if attack should occur, and enable the U.S.A. to recover from an atomic

assault and retum quickly to a position of global power. To achieve success, federal civil

defense agencies employed a host of technologies and strategies, including: bomb

shelters, fallout shelters, dispersal, mass evacuation, and the stockpiling of supplies. Civil

defense strategies shifted in response to foreign and domestic crises, advances in offensive

weapons capabilities, and changes in presidential and agency leadership. Of the United

States' presidents, John F. Kennedy was the most vocal and active proponent of civilian

preparedness measures. In 1961 and 1962, he carried American civil defense efforts to

new heights when he proposed and worked toward the creation of a national network of

public fallout shelters. In 1963, when he distanced himself from preparedness initiatives.

''Milton Viorst, Fire in the Streets: America in the 1960s (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), 55-231, 383-420, 464-543; William L. O'Neill, Coming Apart: An Informal History of America in the 1960's (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 128-146; and Godfrey Hodgson, America in Our Time (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1976), 353-398.

civil defense dried up. Those parts of the plan dedicated to meeting the challenges of

natural disasters managed to weather the drought of support, and eventually the agencies

responsible—such as the Federal Emergency Management Administration—accmed quite a

bit of power. Those civil defense initiatives devoted to surviving nuclear strikes by foreign

aggressors never recovered.

Few book-length works take the United States' civil defense program as their

central subject, and those which do are flawed because of their narrow focus. Several

policy studies exist. Nehemiah Jordan's U.S. Civil Defense Before 1950 and Lyon G.

Tyler, Jr.'s dissertation, "Civil Defense: The Impact of the Planning Years, 1945-1950,"

analyze the events which led to the creation of the Federal Civil Defense Administration.

Civil Defense in the U.S.: Band-Aid for a Holocaust?, by Thomas J. Kerr, concentrates

on the political and legislative history of civilian preparedness in the twentieth century.

Tyler and Kerr's works in particular are weU-written and well-reasoned. Both examine

the effect of political leadership and international affairs on the congressional support

mustered for civil defense initiatives. Their studies, and Jordan's, show a clear connection

between foreign crises and legislative support for civilian defense. Nonetheless, all three

books—even Kerr's, which covers a much broader period of time—provide an incon:q)lete

picture of American civil defense because they ignore the social dynamics of preparedness.

Civil defense was directed at all civilians, not just at government officials. The program's

success was dependent on the volimtary bureaucratization of the coimtry's entire

population. A study that attempts to explain the history of U.S. civil defense, but fails to

discuss the characteristics of the society targeted, decontextualizes the subject and

produces misconceptions about the program. The works by Kerr, Tyler, and Jordan lead

one to the conclusion that the public response to civil defense must have followed the

same trends as were evident in the behavior of the men and women on Capitol Hill. Such

a conclusion is incorrect. Civil defense never became an accepted responsibility,

integrated into the everyday lives of Americans. Crises may have led to public criticism of

civilian defense agencies and may have precipitated greater congressional interest in

preparedness, but they did not yield notable increases in the level of public participation in

civil defense initiatives.

Guy Oakes's The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War

Culture offers a different, much more personalized, view of the United States'

preparedness measures, but in some ways, his work is as narrow as those written by

Jordan, Kerr, and Tyler. Oakes portrays the civil defense of the late Forties and Fifties as

one gigantic federal hoax. Indulging the public in its penchant for conspiracy theories,

Oakes asserts that presidents Harry S. Tnmian and Dwight D. Eisenhower, their advisers,

and even the heads of the United States' preparedness agencies personaUy did not believe

civil defense initiatives would protect the country or its citizens if a nuclear exchange

occurred. Still, during the early years of the Cold War, federal leaders developed

^Nehemiah Jordan, U.S. Civil Defense Before 1950 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Defense Analysis, 1966); Lyon G. Tyler, Jr., "Civil Defense: The Impact of the Planning Years, 1945-1950" (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1967); and Thomas J. Kerr, Civil Defense in the U.S.: Band-Aid for a Holocaust? (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983).

elaborate civilian defense can^aigns to prevent the people from giving themselves over to

panic or despair.

Oakes's work provides some insights into the habits of the Fifties society, and he

marshals some of the strategies and devices that the government used to attract the

attention of the average American, but his book, like the policy studies, is of limited value.

Tyler, Kerr, and Jordan's works were narrow because they focused on one facet of civil

defense. Oakes's work is narrow because the author seems to have gathered evidence to

support a preconceived thesis. Although Oakes offers as proof of his argimient's validity

some very damning statements that Eisenhower made about civil defense, he either did not

locate or chose to ignore other positive, private statements made by the former president.

Thorough research shows that the picture presented by Robert Divine in Blowing on the

Wind, a picture of a president who manifested the same confusion about the effects of

nuclear weapons as that shown by both the scientific commimity and the public in general,

is more accurate. Moreover, Eisenhower's attitudes toward civil defense and public

shelters in particular appear to have been influenced greatly by his fiscal conservatism.

To establish his argimient, it was necessary for Oakes to limit strictly the focus of

his work. His conspiracy theory would have been most appealing if he could have traced a

federal policy of deceit in civil defense from the FCDA's inception in 1950 through the

end of the Cold War. The evidence does not support such an argument. There is no

^Guy Oakes, The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 3-9.

^Oakes, Imaginary War, 152-163; and Robert A. Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).

question that Kennedy was committed to civilian defense when he entered the presidency.

Hence, Oakes was forced to concentrate on the history of civil defense from 1945 to

1961. Even within that narrow time-fi:"ame he encoimters serious challenges to his thesis.

He offers little authoritative evidence to prove that either early preparedness planners or

President Harry S Tnmian were participants in an official campaign of deceit. Further, as

with his assertions about Eisenhower, Oakes's claims that Tnmian was a conspirator are

not substantiated by the records available at the Harry S Truman Library or elsewhere.

The works that come closest to identifying the tme nature of civil defense, 1945

to 1963, are cultural and social studies of the Atomic Age and the Cold War Era. Paul

Boyer's By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the

Atomic Age, Spencer Weart's Nuclear Fear: A History of Images, Allan Winkler's Life

Under A Cloud: American Anxiety About the Atom, Margot Henriksen's Dr.

Strangelove 's America: Society and Culture in the Atomic Age, and Elaine Tyler May's

Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era all fell into this category.

While these studies do consider the social side of civil defense, civilian preparedness

comprises only one in a myriad of subjects discussed. On average each author devotes one

chapter, or sometimes two, to an analysis of civil defense. Such a limited examination of

the topic further underscores the need for a book-length work. Moreover, somewhat

understandably, these precursory attempts at explaining the phenomenon of civilian

8

defense and the population's reactions to preparedness initiatives are often misleading or

inaccurate because the authors draw overly simplistic conclusions.*

Boyer, Weart, Winkler, and, to a lesser extent. May, infer that civil defense was

an accepted part of American society for close to a decade, and most contend that events

such as the Cuban Missile Crisis led to increased, if temporary, public participation in

civilian defense programs. If such an assertion was tme, imdoubtedly it would have been

made by the federal agencies responsible for civil defense from 1945 to 1963. If those

agencies could offer proof of an upsurge in public involvement, they would increase their

chance of obtaining greater allocations from Congress. The records of the various federal

civil defense agencies show, however, that they could make no claim to widespread

popular support. Henriksen is not duped as often as the other authors of Fifties-era social

and cultural studies, but reliance on an imscholarly secondary source does bring her to the

false assimiption that the Berlin Crisis precipitated a "bomb-shelter craze" in the United

States.

While limited analysis and the use of weak sources can lead an investigator to an

erroneous conclusion, the misuse of cultural artifacts also can steer the researcher toward

an inaccurate supposition. Social history, with its emphasis on population demographics

*Paul Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (New York: Pantheon, 1985); Weart, Nuclear Fear; Winkler, Under a Cloud; Margot Henriksen, Dr. Strangelove's America: Society and Culture in the Atomic Age (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1997); and Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, 1988).

^oyer. By the Bomb's Early Light; Weart, Nuclear Fear; Winkler, Under a Cloud; May, Homeward Bound; and Henriksen, Dr. Strangelove's America.

and individual and community behavior is more easily quantified than cultural history,

which focuses more on artifects and the inferences that can be drawn from them. The

most reliable cultural histories are those which are groimded in solid, quantitative, social

analysis. After establishing the social patterns of a people, the historian may choose to

present artifacts that reflect the characteristics and values of the society. Less reliable

cultural studies "place the horse before the cart." Without first investigating the statistical

data available on a society, the researcher examines an artifact and formulates hypotheses

about the people's beliefe and character. Cultural studies are most effective when used to

compliment, rather than to create, a social analysis.

Paul Boyer, Margot Henriksen, and other social-cultural historians that study the

Atomic Age seem to make inaccurate assertions about civil defense because they give

greater consideration to artifects—films, toys, or advertisements—and to individuals and

small groups that are not necessarily representative of the whole society. After the Berlin

Crisis an increased number of advertisements for fallout shelters and articles with do-it-

yourself shelter blueprints may have appeared in newspapers and magazines, but that does

not prove every American bought or constmcted a shelter. It also cannot be used as

authoritative proof of increased public enthusiasm for civil defense.

Sheltering Society takes as its thesis the following argimient: despite federal

leadership and a series of elaborate publicity campaigns, civil defense never became an

accepted and valued part of the Fifties society that characterized the United States from

1945 to 1963. A thorough analysis of the goeds established by the federal civil defense

agencies, their attempts to realize, or meet, those goals, and the public response to

10

preparedness initiatives provide the basis for the argument. Quantitative data compiled by

government employees and private citizens substantiate the thesis. No single, simple

explanation for the difficulties experienced by civil defense initiatives—such as a

widespread sense of doom or ultimacy—is presented. Rather, a host of contributing

factors, including politics, advances in technology, bureaucratic mistakes and

inconsistencies, and social perceptions and behavior are offered. Although federal

preparedness initiatives were less than successful, an examination of civil defense history

provides valuable insights into the society of the Fifties. Detailed description and analysis

of the strategies that federal agencies enq)loyed to win popular support, and an assessment

of the public's response, yield an image of a conservative people that were confused about

the threat posed by nuclear weapons and distrustful of ever-changing civil defense policies.

As it progresses, the work becomes more focused on an analysis of American

society. By necessity, however, it begins with a policy sketch that carries the reader from

early planning in 1945 to the creation of the Federal Civil Defense Administration and to

President Harry S Truman's signing of the Civil Defense Act of 1951. The study then

evaluates the first attempts to build grassroots support for civil defense and offers

explanations for the limited public response. The advent of the hydrogen bomb, the

swearing in of Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and the resultant changes in

civil defense policy comprise the next focus of the book. Lastly, the work looks at the

Kennedy years and concludes with the assertion that civil defense fell between the gaps in

American society. The author hopes Sheltering Society: Civil Defense in the United

11

States, 1945-1963 will add to the corpus of Atomic Age studies by tendering a more

complete and accurate accoimt of civilian preparedness in America.

12

CHAPTER n

CLOUDS OVER WASHINGTON: CRISES AND

THE RESURRECTION OF CIVIL DEFENSE

The world entered the "Atomic Age" on a Monday morning. On July 16, 1945,

at 5:29 a.m., a plutonium inqjlosion bomb detonated over the desert region known as the

Jornada del Muerto—the Journey of Death—in southem New Mexico. A blinding flash, a

deep rumble, a blast wave of tremendous power rushing out from the site of the explosion,

an immense, expanding, purple-hued cloud rising above the desert floor—these were the

first signs that the "Trinity" test was a success. Subsequent studies revealed that the bomb

had released a force equal to the detonation of 18,600 tons of TNT.'°

Witnessing the test were military and scientific personnel of the U.S. Army's

Manhattan Engineer District, the body responsible for developing an atomic device. Many

recorded what they saw, heard, and felt on that summer dawn, but Robert Oppenheimer, a

physicist and science director of the Manhattan Project, provided perhaps the most

striking and oft quoted observation. "We waited until the blast had passed, walked out of

the shelter and then it was extremely solemn. We knew the world would not be the same.

A few people laughed, a few people cried. Most people were silent. I remembered the

' Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), 670-77.

13

line from the Hindu scripture, the Bhagavad-Gita... *Now I am become Death, the

destroyer of worlds.'"''

Even as one branch of the U.S. military was devising weapons to destroy

mankind, another was developing strategies to protect it. The same day that the Trinity

test took place in New Mexico, the Deputy Chief of Staff ordered the Army Service

Forces (ASF) to formulate a plan for post-World War II civilian defense. Ironically, the

United States' wartime "preparedness" agency, the Office of Civil Defense (OCD), had

been disbanded just over two weeks earlier. In May, 1945, when the defeat of Germany

was assured. President Harry S Truman ordered the OCD to cease all functions on Jime

30. The office closed as directed, but elements of the military believed that civil defense

should be included in a general assessment of possible, post-World War II, defense

problems. The order passed down to the ASF, and, on August 4, that body delegated the

responsibility to the Office of the Provost Marshall General (OPMG). When the OPMG

received the assignment, its officers knew nothing of the secret testing of an atomic device

in the Jornada del Muerto. Two days later, however, they learned that the atomic bomb

was a reality—one which increased the importance and vastly compoimded the difficulty of

their project.'

''Quoted in Rhodes, Atomic Bomb, 676.

' Lyon G. Tyler, Jr., "Civil Defense: The Impact of the Planning Years, 1945-1950,"(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1967), 13-15; President's Press Releases, 2 May 1945 and 5 June 1945, President's Secretary's Files, Box 227, Folder Civil Defense, Papers of Harry S Tnmian [hereafter HST], Harry S Truman Library [hereafter HSTL], and Harry S Tnmian, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S Truman, 1945-52/53, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1961), 30-31.

14

On August 6, 1945, the United States became the first and, thus fer, the only

nation to employ an atomic device against a human populatioa At approximately 7:20

a.nL Japan's early warning radar system detected aircraft approaching from the south. Air

raid alerts soimded in many cities in southem J^an, including Hiroshima, but when the

radar operator determined that no more than three planes were heading toward the city, he

canceled the alarm. The people of Japan had suffered attacks by himdreds of American

bombers; three lone planes seemed little cause for concem. Besides, Hiroshima had been

left virtually imtouched by enemy bombing raids in the past. Its citizens went about their

daily morning routines as the planes closed in on the city. At 8:15 a.m. "Little Boy," a

uraniimi-based atomic bomb, detonated over Hiroshima. The force imleashed combined

with secondary fires to produce a scene of tremendous devastation. Two-thirds (60,000)

of the buildings in the city collapsed in min or were damaged beyond repair, and more

than half of Hiroshima's 255,000 inhabitants were killed or injured. President Harry S

Tnmian informed Americans of "the bomb's" existence and its use against the Japanese

sixteen hours after the attack took place. Three days later, on August 9, another

American B-29 dropped "Fat Man," a plutoniimi bomb, onto Nagasaki. The second

atomic bomb crippled 20,000 stmctures and left 60,000 people dead or injured. The next

day, the Japanese requested that they be allowed to surrender, prompting representatives

of the Manhattan Project to contend that the use of the use of the atomic bombs had

ended the war in the Pacific.'

' U.S. Army, Manhattan Engineer District, The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, (n.p.: Manhattan Engineer District, n.d.), 1-34; and Truman, Public Papers, 1: 197-99.

15

Even without the appearance and proliferation of atomic weapons, the Office of

the Provost Marshall General feced a difficult task in planning post-war civilian defense.

Later, when the Federal Civil Defense Administration became a reality, spokespersons for

the new agency claimed that civil defense was a time-honored tradition in the United

States, as old as the nation itself The minutemen, ready to repel the British on a

moment's notice, pioneer men and women, protecting their farms from marauding bands

of natives-these were civilians, defending themselves and the American home front.'"

A further cited proof of the United States' tradition of civil defense was the

federal government's creation of the office of Civilian Defense (OCD) in 1941. President

Franklin D. Roosevelt had established the agency largely in response to pressure from

mimicipal leaders—in particular, Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia of New York and Director of

the United States Conference of Mayors, Paul V. Betters—and public concerns over the

German air raids in Europe. FDR appointed LaGuardia to head the office, but the mayor

resigned after a short term. He claimed he foimd it too difficult to run both the OCD and

the city of New York. The ranks of the volunteer corps swelled to some ten million

persons when John Landis took control, but the Harvard Law School dean called for the

termination of the OCD in 1943. Landis noted that the real preparedness took place at the

mimicipal and individual level, and he maintained that local civil defense organizations

were sufficiently sound to ensure a state of national civilian readiness. By 1943 it was also

'"Federal Civil Defense Administration, Civil Defense: An American Tradition (Washington, D.C.: GPO, n.d.); and Guy Oakes, The Imaginiary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 130-31.

16

apparent to most defense planners that sustained attacks against the American homeland

were unlikely. Nonetheless, President Roosevelt and, later. President Harry S Truman

refused to disband the OCD until victory in Europe was assured. When Truman and the

members of Congress resurrected civil defense in 1950, preparedness advocates could

claim, tmthfully, that the concept of a U.S. civilian defense force was not without

precedent, but the nature of American civil defense changed dramatically after World War

Postwar crises precipitated both the retum of civil defense and the modification

of preparedness strategies. Crises arose when Americans believed their lives, their

country, or their national ideals were at risk. In the years following World War II, crises

most often resulted from American confrontations with communist rivals, and especially

vdth its arch-rival, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Americans of the post-war era

soon discovered that even though the Second World War had ended, their nation was not

at peace. The United States had survived its "hot war" with Germany and Japan only to

enter into a "cold" one with the Soviet Union. In the decades following World War II's

conclusion, the two nations—one the self-proclaimed champion of democracy, the other of

communism—competed for superiority in politics, in economics, and in science and

technology. For most Americans, each Soviet challenge precipitated a period of crisis.

Each Soviet advance, each communist victory, represented a setback for democracy, a

defeat for the United States-a period of even greater crisis.

' Thomas J. Kerr, Civil Defense in the U.S.: Band-Aid for a Holocaust? (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), 14-19.

17

The mere possibility of a future war with the Soviet Union produced a crisis for

civil defense planners. The United States had never before confronted an enemy that

possessed the ability to launch a heavy bomb-strike against the American homefront.

Prior to the Cold War era, American civilian lookouts had often kept their eyes trained on

land and on the seas, but rarely on the skies. In the nineteenth-century American West,

pioneers watched for an enemy approaching on foot or on horseback. Throughout the

Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, civilians looked out at the Atlantic Ocean and

strained to catch sight of a mast, a wooden hull, something that would reveal the approach

of forces from across the sea.

Amphibious assault and attacks on U.S. ships in harbor remained an important

concem for civilian "spotters" during World War II. Along the Atlantic Coast, volunteers

now watched the ocean for the dull-gray hull of steel ships, and, more importantly, for the

periscopes and the cigar-shaped outlines of prowling German U-boats. Rumors persisted

that German scientists were working toward the development of a trans-Atlantic bomber

and an intercontinental missile, the V-4, but these *Svonder weapons" failed to materialize

during the war. The threat posed by Nazi submarines was real and immediate. Civilian

lookouts trained their eyes on the waves. On the West Coast, Americans stared out at

another ocean, the Pacific, and worried that a Japanese task force would appear on the

horizon. Like their German allies, the Japanese did not possess long-range bombers that

could strike at the continental United States. Unlike the Germans, however, the Japanese

had allocated resources to the building of aircraft carriers which could accommodate light

bombers. With the memory of Pearl Harbor fresh in American minds, spotters did scan

18

the skies west of California, Oregon, and Washington for enemy planes. As the war

ground on, the expected enemy aircraft failed to appear, but Japanese subs occasionally

did probe the Pacific Coast. As on the eastem seaboard, spotters on the West Coast

found their eyes drawn to the ocean.'^

For its part, especially during the last few years of its existence, the Office of

Civilian Defense did not seem to indicate that an aerial attack on the American home front

was probable, much less inevitable. It sponsored a number of air-raid drills and organized

bands of civilian lookouts, but the absence of enemy planes in American air-space

prompted many state and municipal affiliates to place their protective services on

"standby." The OCD did not protest. A full sixty percent of its projects were not even

oriented toward protecting the populace. The agency concentrated most of its energies on

promoting morale-building activities such as victory gardens, salvage operations, and war

bond drives. The office's preference for growing vegetables rather than watching for the

enemy is perhaps an indicator of how seriously the threat of an attack against the

continental United States was taken.'

During the Cold War, members of the defense establishment argued that a future

conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States was a distinct probability. They

believed, further, that if a war empted the Soviets would possess both the capabilities and

' Allan M. Winkler, Home Front U.S.A.: America During World War II(Arlington Heights, lU.: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1986), 30-31.

' Elwyn A. Mauck, "History of Civil Defense in the United States," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 6, no. 8-9 (1950): 268-69; and Office of the Secretary of Defense, War Department Civil Defense Board, A Study of Civil Defense (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1948), 8.

19

the resolve to strike at the American homeland. As a result of Alaska's proximity to the

fer eastem reaches of the U.S.S.R., invasion was a concern, thus mandating a close watch

on the Soviet Union's Navy. In general, however, the focus of American civil defense

shifted from the coastal seas to the skies. According to a number of officers within the

defense establishment, an expanding, maturing Soviet Air Force posed the greatest threat

to the United States. The scenario that they sketched was one in which long-range, heavy

bombers scrambled from bases in Russia, flew north over the Arctic Ocean, over the Pole,

over Canada, and then descended on U.S. industrial centers—not just those that dotted the

Pacific coastline, but also those in the Great Lakes region, the densely-packed industrial

belt of the East Coast, and, perhaps, those in the southem United States. American

fighters and ground fire would down some of the raiders, but many would slip through and

would rain devastation on the cities below.'*

The atomic bomb added a new dimension to the Soviet air threat and the crisis

faced by American plaimers of civilian defense. The United States was the only power

that possessed "the bomb" in 1945, but personnel in the Office of the Provost Marshall

General believed that Russian scientists and engineers would one day succeed in

producing their own atomic weapons. Seconding this opinion was major General Leslie

'*"Top Military Leaders Say CD is a Co-Partner," The Civil Defense Alert 1, no. 1 (1951): 1-4; and Office of the President, Air Policy Committee, Survival in the Air Age (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1948).

20

R. Groves, military commander of the Manhattan Project, who predicted that the U.S.S.R.

would possess atomic capabilities in ten to twenty years.'

OPMG planners did not appear to doubt that once the Soviets had developed an

atomic device, they would employ it in a confrontation with the United States. Economic

considerations made its use a logical choice. Advocates contended that the bomb saved

lives; the bomb saved time; the bomb saved money. It was the atomic bomb that rendered

an aerial attack preferable to an amphibious assault. President Truman maintained that his

decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had prevented the deaths of

thousands of American soldiers who otherwise would have been ordered first, to effect an

amphibious landing on the islands of Japan and then, to wage a costly campaign to subdue

the inhabitants. Truman believed that the damage wrought by the detonations of "Little

Boy" and Fat Man" had forced an early Japanese surrender. For those who accepted his

pronouncements, atomic weapons offered tempting prospects. Armed with this new

technology, diplomats could bully adversaries or, when conflict was unavoidable, they

could wage short, cost-efficient wars. °

The eventual reality of a Soviet Union armed with atomic weapons presented

substantial difficulties for civil defense plaimers. Since the United States cast itself as a

' William Lawrence, The General and the Bomb: A Biography of General Leslie R. Groves, Director of the Manhattan Project (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company. 1988), 267.

^ Truman, Public Papers, 1: 362; David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 458-59; Monte N. Poen, ed.. Strictly Personal and Confidential: The Letters Harry Truman Never Mailed {Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1982), 35-35; and Oakes, Imaginary War, 14-16.

21

global policeman—a respondent to, rather than an initiator o^ aggression, members of the

defense establishment had to devise a plan that would enable the United States to survive

an enemy attack and then mobilize to mount a counterattack. The ability to deliver such a

coimterstrike necessitated more than the protection of industrial centers and military

materials; it required preventing panic and widespread loss of morale in the civilian sector.

The atomic bomb was a weapon capable of inflicting massive psychological, as well as

physical, damage. '

An investigating team from the Manhattan Engineer District conducted postwar

studies on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and recorded the psychological trauma induced by the

August 1945 atomic assaults. The survey noted that, immediately following the attacks,

the inhabitants of the two cities fled in panic. The civilians' desire to remove themselves

from harm's way was understandable; what surprised the team was the absence of

significant remigration to the cities once the crisis had passed. The American observers

wrote that even after three months of peace "their [the Japanese's] paralysis was still

remarkable." ^ The members of the survey also reported that although many Japanese

civilians had grown accustomed to mass air raids during the war, after the atomic

bombings *the appearance of a single plane caused more dismption of nonnal life than the

appearance of many hundreds of planes had ever caused before." ^ The text went on to

'Oakes, The Imaginary War, takes for its theme civil defense as a mechanism for preventing panic during the Atomic Age.

^ Manhattan Engineer District, Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 34.

^^bid.

22

state, "[T]he effect of this terrible fear of the potential danger from even a single plane on

the lives of the peoples of the world in the event of any future war can easily be

conjectured."^"

American defense planners both appreciated and worried about the "paralysis,"

the "terrible fear," and the panic that an atomic assault could produce. Breaking the

morale of the Japanese people was a hoped-for result of the bombings of Hiroshima and

Nagasaki, but officers of the Manhattan Engineer District claimed that the United States

had targeted the production centers of the two cities. They contended that it was the lack

of zoning in Hiroshima that had resulted in high civilian casualties. Three-fourths of

Hiroshima's inhabitants lived in the heavily industrialized center of the city; residences

were clustered around fectories. In Nagasaki, homes and production centers were more

segregated. The bomb had exploded, "as intended," over the industrial valley that held the

Mitsubishi Steel and Arms works and the Mitsubishi-Urakami Ordnance works. If the

weapon had detonated farther south, it would have been over the city's main residential

areas, and a greater number of civilians would have been killed. Defense personnel were

concemed that the United States' rivals would not limit their objectives to the destmction

of production facilities. Indeed, they feared that an enemy might specifically target U.S.

civilian populations as well as industrial centers in an attempt to cmsh American morale

with a single, heavy, atomic bombardment. To the Office of the Provost MarshaU General

fell the responsibility for devising a plan to reduce the psychological and physical damage

that a bombardment of the American homeland would produce. To the OPMG fell the

"Manhattan Engineer District, Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 34.

23

responsibility for creating a civil defense program and tailoring it to meet the challenges of

the Atomic Age. ^

The office wasted no time in launching its project, but little headway was made

until the spring of 1946. Upon receiving the assignment in early August, 1945, Colonel

Alton C. Miller, Director of the Provost Division, created a Civilian Defense Branch

within the OPMG. Miller then sent out a questionnaire to former officers of the now-

defimct Office of Civilian Defense. The document solicited responses on a number of

issues, including the lessons leamed from World War U, the desirability of a permanent

civil defense agency, the in jact of atomic weapons on civil defense strategies, and the role

of the military and local, state, and federal governments in civilian defense. Miller also

looked to the future. He asked survey participants to consider the possibility of rocket-

propelled atomic weapons. What changes to civil defense strategies were required to

counter the threat of atomic missiles? Completed questionnaires trickled into Miller's

office, but the colonel and his staff were disappointed with the responses. Most of the

individuals that retumed the provost surveys refused to speculate about atomic bombs and

missile warfere. Instead, they acted as if future wars would be fought with conventional

bombs. They suggested the United States employ the blackout, evacuation, and shelter

strategies used by the British during the Wecond World War. Frustrated by the

unimaginative responses and uncertain as to what strategies postwar civil defense agencies

should adopt. Miller and the members of the Provost Division's Civilian Defense Branch

^ Oakes, Imaginary War, 34-36; and Manhattan Engineer District, Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 6-7, 14.

24

lost some of their drive. More than a year after the OPMG had begun to consider the

subject of civil defense, it had yet to issue a report. The project failed to move forward

again until February, 1946, when Colonel Miller asked Lt. Colonel Bamet W. Beers, of

the Strategic Bombing Survey (SBS), to head the OPMG's Civilian Defense Branch. ^

Colonel Beers brought to the committee years of experience in civil defense-

related activities, and he had visited Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the "Little Boy" and

"Fat Man" detonations. Before joining the Bombing Survey, he had been stationed at

Govemor's Island, New York. There he had supervised the Army personnel that worked

in the Office of Civilian Defense's regional center. Indeed, it was his duties on Govemor's

Island that landed him a position with the Strategic Bombing Survey. Survey Chair

Franklin D'Olier was a regional director for the OCD. The presidential directive which

spawned the SBS ordered the Secretary of War to establish the survey for the purpose of

evaluating the impact of Allied air attacks on Germany. D'Olier added a civil defense

team and placed Beers in charge. Beers subsequently traveled to Germany and, after

President Harry S Truman expanded the SBS's mission, to Japan. While in the two

countries, he studied their civil defense systems of World War 11. ^

Colonel Beers's investigations convinced him that civil defense measures could

protect a population from an aerial assault—even if the aggressors were armed with atomic

bombs. Like the Manhattan Engineer District investigators that surveyed the damage

^ Tyler, "Planning Years," 16-18, 26.

^ Tyler, "Planning Years," 26; and Nehemiah Jordan, U.S. Civil Defense Before 1950: The Roots of Public Law 920 (n.p.: Institute for Defense Analyses, Economic and Political Studies Division, 1966), 58.

25

done to Hiroshima by "Little Boy," Beers' team blamed crowded, flammable housing and

the lack of zoning for the devastating civilian losses in that city. Their published findings

also reported, however, that prior to the August 6 attack, Hiroshima's inhabitants had

evinced a general attitude of apathy toward civil defense. Further, the few neighborhood

shelters that had been constmcted had not withstood the destmctive force of the bomb

because they had been modified until they were no longer practical, protective stmctures. *

From Hiroshima, Beers's Civil Defense Division headed to Nagasaki. There, his

team sought out survivors of the August 9 attack. Beers claimed that he personally

interviewed about two hundred people who had been within a hundred yards of Ground

Zero-the ground-level point directly below the explosion's epicenter-at the time of "Fat

Man's" detonation. When Beers left Nagasaki, he was certain that the United States

could identify and adopt defensive measures that would save lives during an atomic

assault. He accepted the appointment offered by Miller. ^

Throughout March and April of 1946, Lt. Colonel Beers and the handful of men

assigned to the OPMG's Civil Defense Branch gathered information and quickly pieced

together a report. They sifted through responses to the Miller questionnaire. They drew

on the Strategic Bombing Survey's studies of civil defense in Germany and Japan. While

civil defense in those two countries was only a marginal success, it was part of England's

"finest hour" during World War II. The members of Beers' group therefore also examined

^*U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Civilian Defense Division, Target Report of Civilian Defense Division Field Team No. 1, Covering Air Raid Protection Facilities and Allied Subjects in the Town of Hiroshima, Japan, 15 November 1945, 11-13, 29.

'Tyler, "Planning Years," 26.

26

the civilian preparedness measures enq)loyed by Great Britain. They were especially

inq)ressed with the British government's foresight. England had begun to formulate a

system of civilian defenses shortly after World War I. Years of peacetime preparation

paid off during World War II when civil defense measures saved thousands of lives. The

British experience convinced Beers that the United States should launch a civil defense

program immediately, not wait for an emergency before taking action. ''

On April 30, the Civil Defense Branch issued its findings in a work entitled

Defense Against Enemy Action Directed at Civilians. The classified report, referred to as

"Study 3B-1," laid the foundation for civil defense in Cold War America. The document

provided a core of ideas, comments, and suggestions that other defense planners repeated

and which legislators eventually implemented. Identifying civil defense as an attempt both

to preserve civilian lives and property from an enemy assault and guarantee the rapid

resumption of normal conditions after an attack, the authors of Study 3B-1 asserted that

the primary responsibility for civilian defense devolved upon the civilian, the individual.

To insure an effective civil defense program, they believed it was necessary to indoctrinate

the country's entire population.

It was to be a program that was built on the principle of self-help. An

information campaign would teach Americans to protect themselves. Trained to react,

civilians would seek shelter or evacuate a threatened area before an attack took place.

Then, once the bombardment had ended, civilians would again take the initiative-

^ Tyler, "Planning Years," 27.

27

administering first aid to the wounded, putting out fires, clearing away wreckage and the

dead. '

Local and state government bodies would recruit volunteers and channel

information to the public, but they would be subordinate to a federal office that formulated

policy and held ultimate authority over all personnel. Believing civil defense to be a

natured extension of the War Department's responsibilities. Beers and his assistants argued

that a permanent, federal, military and civilian-staffed agency should be established and

placed under the direction of the Secretary of War. Japan, Germany, and Great Britain

had boasted similar systems during World War II, and the centralization of power had

proved useful. Yet, Study 3B-1 called for the creation of such an entity in peacetime, and

in a country whose citizens coveted their state's rights and the autonomy of their local

governments, ^

How the people would respond to the proposed program remained open to

speculation, for the War Department did not act on the suggestions of the OPMG's

Civilian Defense Branch. The department's heads did not appear convinced that civil

defense was necessary. Though the Russians rejected Bernard Bamch's June 1946

proposal that the United Nations control the world's atomic energy, this did not produce

an atmosphere of fear in America. The United States remained the only country that

possessed atomic weapons. Defense personnel estimated it would be years before the

Soviets developed atomic capabilities. Despite Study 3B-rs recommendation that the

''Tyler, "Planning Years," 28, 33-37.

'2 Jordan, Civil Defense Before 1950, 60-61,

28

U.S. government create a civilian defense body immediately and prepare for the

eventuality of an aggressive, atom bomb-armed U.S.S.R., the country's military leaders

decided civil defense was not an urgent need. Defense agencies did not have unlimited

resources. Disarmament and reconversion initiatives had followed the end of the Second

World War. Restricted by postwar cuts in appropriations, the military was finding it

difficult enough to maintain established programs. Accepting new missions, such as civil

defense, would further strain the defense establishment's budget. Members of the War

Department's Plans and Operations Division opposed saddling the U.S. military with the

added expense of civilian defense. '

In July, acting on the advice of the Plans and Operations Division, Secretary of

War Robert Patterson asked the Bureau of the Budget to investigate the question of

postwar civil defense. Besides compiling the budget, the bureau analyzes and coordinates

the functions of the various federal agencies. Patterson suggested that the bureau

determine which department should assume responsibility for civil defense. It appears that

he hoped the budget office would absolve the War Department of civil defense duties.

Bureau leaders punted the ball back to the military, however, telling the War Department

'Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 211; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972), 103-09; and Jordan A. Schwarz, The Speculator: Bernard M. Baruch in Washington, 1914-1965 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 490-507.

29

to continue its investigations until the Bureau of the Budget decided to initiate its own

study.^

After a few more exchanges between the two offices, the War Department

launched another examination of civil defense. On November 25, 1946, Secretary

Patterson created the War Department Civil Defense Board. Actually comprised of two

bodies—a senior board staffed with high-ranking officers and a junior committee that

included representatives from all of the military's General Staff division-it was to identify

the War Department's role in civilian preparedness and propose an organizational

stmcture for civil defense. Of all the board's members, only one had any experience with

civil defense matters—Lt. Colonel Beers sat on the junior committee. Beers's expertise

was essential in the deliberations of what became known as the "Bull Board," nicknamed

after the group's chairman. Major General Harold C. Bull.'

Given the circumstances that precipitated the creation of the Bull Board, it

should have surprised no one when its members minimized the Army's civil defense

responsibilities. The board completed its report, A Study of Civil Defense, more

commonly referred to as the "Bull Report," on February 28, 1947. Recognizing civilian

preparedness as part of the country's line of defense, the study suggested the

establishment of a federal civil defense agency, subordinate to the Secretary of War, but

independent of the existing armed services branches. The members of the board also

'"Tyler, "Planning Years," 43-45.

' Carey Brewer, Civil Defense in the United States: Federal State, and Local (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, 1951), 12; and Tyler, "Planning Years," 48.

30

contended that the federal organization should not extend below the regional level. They

asserted that most civil defense requirements could be met quite easily by expanding the

services offered by local and state governments. Echoing the findings of Study 3B-1, the

Bull Report argued that civilians and the governments that dealt most directly with them

should bear the majority of the civil defense burden. As for the federal agency, it would

formulate policy, offer guidance, and, if an attack occurred, it would supplement civilian

volunteer divisions by dispatching a few mobile reserves to bomb-stmck cities.'^

Despite the work of the War Department Civil Defense Board and the OPMG's

Civilian Defense Branch, civil defense remained in the planning stage. In July 1947,

Congress passed the National Security Act. Besides creating the Central Intelligence

Agency and the National Security Resources Board, the act made the Air Force an equal

partner with the Army and the Navy and placed all three bodies under the direction of

James Forrestal, the man named to the new position of Secretary of Defense. Throughout

the late 1940s, Forrestal appeared as reluctant as Secretary of War Patterson had been to

push for a civil defense program that might force a redistribution of the monies available

to the armed forces. He expressed his concem that the federal government would expect

the military to carry out civil defense responsibilities without the benefit of additional

appropriations or personnel. It was nearly a year after the Bull Board had submitted its

' War Department Civil Defense Board, Study of Civil Defense, 3, 9-18, 20-24.

31

report before Forrestal moved on the issue of civil defense, and crises seemed to force his

hand.'"

Relations between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

continued to deteriorate during 1947. Two years earlier at Fuhon, Missouri, Great

Britain's Winston Churchill had delivered his femous "iron curtain" speech, in which he

decried the Soviet Union's creation of communist puppet-states in Eastem Europe. Still,

the presence of an immense Soviet army in Europe and the desire of most Americans to

"bring the boys home" once World War U had ended combined to reduce the possibility of

armed conflict over states such as Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. Eighteen days before

the BuU Board issued its report on civil defense, the aforementioned countries and Italy

signed peace treaties—drawn-up by the Allies' Council of foreign Ministers—that

effectively acknowledged Soviet control in Eastem Europe.'*

It was one thing to send American troops into Bulgaria and Romania to confront

entrenched battalions of the U.S.S.R.'s Red Army. It was another to allow communism to

continue to spread. Even as the February 10 treaties were being signed, American

statesmen were formulating strategies that came to epitomize American Cold War policy.

Early in 1947, representatives from war-weakened Great Britain notified their American

counterparts that the United Kingdom could no longer extend financial aid to Greece and

"U.S. Public Law 253, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (26 July 1947), National Security Act of 1947; and James Forrestal to Harry S Truman, 27 January 1949, Official File document. Folder 10, Box 2, Civil Defense, B File, HST.

*"U.S. Sends 2 Protests to Russia on Manchuria and Iran Actions: Churchill Assails Soviet Policy," New York Times, 6 March 1946, sec. 1, p. 1, col. 4; and "5 Treaties Signed in Paris Ceremony," New York Times, 11 February 1947, sec. 1, p. 1, col. 2.

32

Turkey, both of which were besieged by communist insurrections. In response. President

Truman went before the members of Congress and presented what became known as the

"Truman Doctrine." He argued that "it must be the policy of the Untied States to support

free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."'

Congress appropriated $400 million for aid to Turkey and Greece. In July, George F.

Kennan, former counselor to the American embassy in Moscow, anonymously published

"The Sources of Soviet Conduct" in Foreign Affairs. In the article Kennan called for the

"containment" of Soviet aggression. It was also the summer of 1947 when Secretary of

State George Marshall proposed offering aid to the war-torn countries of Europe in order

to stimulate their recovery."^

Soviet statesmen were wary of American initiatives. Though the Marshall Plan

was open to Russian and Eastem European participation, Soviet officials denounced it as

an attempt to expand the United States' economic empire, and refused aid for themselves

and their Eastem European satellites. Fearful of a revitalized, pro-American Westem

Europe, the Soviet Union then supported a communist takeover that felled a

Czechoslovakian coalition government in February 1948. The coup brought the last non-

communist Eastem European country into the sphere of Russian influence and completed

' Truman, Public Papers, 2; 178-79.

"^"X"[George F. Kennan], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs (25 July 1947): 566-82; and Kolko, Limits of Power, 359-61.

33

the division of Europe between the Soviets and the Americans. The players had been

choseiL The two teams now feced one another."'

Days before Czechoslovakia was absorbed into the eastem Bloc, and nearly a

year after the War Department Civil Defense Board had completed its study. Secretary

Forrestal released the Bull Report to the public and announced that he planned to create a

civilian-dominated committee to draw-up a comprehensive civil defense program.

Uneasiness bom of the Czechoslovakian crisis helped propel his plans forward. Realizing

that a sound communications system was vital to civil defense, Forrestal asked the

president of the Northwestem Bell Telephone Company, Russell J. Hopley, to head the

proposed civilian planning body. Hopley accepted and took control of the newly-

established Office of Civil Defense Planning (OCDP) in late March. The ever-present and

experienced Lt. Colonel Beers transferred to the office at Hopley's request."^

As the OCDP swung into action, another international crisis arose, bringing a

sense of urgency to the committee's work. Hoping to force England, France, and the

United States to relinquish control of West Berlin, the Soviet Union began to impede

Westem traffic to the city in April 1948. In June, communist Russia stopped all Western,

over-land transportation into West Berlin, making the blockade complete. President

Truman and the United States' allies responded by "airlifting" supplies to the besieged

city. Though Soviet fighters did not scramble into the air to down the Westem supply-

planes, the crisis convinced many Americans—including those in the Office of Civil

"'Kolko, Limits of Power, 361-65.

" Tyler, "Planning Years," 86-87.

34

Defense Planning-that war might empt soon. The OCDP staff hurriedly conducted their

investigations and con^iled their report."'

Civil Defense for National Security, the "Hopley Report," went to press in

September 1948. Although its authors agreed v ith the Bull Board's assertion that the

state and municipal governments should shoulder the majority of the responsibility for civil

defense, the two studies differed somewhat. The Hopley Report proposed a more

decentralized system, one in which state leaders controlled civil defense. It designated the

chief executives of the states as the primary directors of civilian preparedness operations.

Each state would enact its own civil defense laws, though the Hopley Report did include a

ready-made model piece of legislation for the states to use if they so chose. Each

govemor would control civil defense operations within his state. Local preparedness

organizations would report to the state offices.""

Federal responsibilities would be minimal. The state executives would be under

the ultimate authority of the secretary of defense, but the report seemed to suggest that he

would leave the states to their own devices. The federal civil defense administration

would be restricted to offering advice, guidance, and, perhaps, some financial assistance.

The Hopley Report even declared against committing federal mobile reserves to civil

"'Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1982 (New York: McGraw HiU, Inc., 1993), 75-76.

""Office of Civil Defense Planning, Civil Defense for National Security (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1948), 47-48, 280-85.

35

defense. Instead, the study's authors proposed that the states and municipalities develop

their own mobile reserves and negotiate mutual-aid agreements with their neighbors."^

Like the Bull Board, however, the members of the Office of Civil Defense

Planning found their work ignored. The Berlin Crisis lasted close to a year, but as

American and British airlifts proved successful, the "storm-clouds" over Washington,

D.C., seemed to disappear, and with them, enthusiasm for civil defense. President Harry S

Truman announced that the current foreign policy situation did not justify the creation of a

permanent civil defense program. He insisted that preparedness issues remain in the

planning stage. Since the Security Act of 1947 had established the National Security

Resources Board (NSRB) to supervise and coordinate civilian and military mobilization, in

a March 1949 memorandum Truman ordered the NSRB to assume responsibility for civil

defense policy suggestions. Secretary Forrestal disbanded the Office of Civil Defense

Planning a few months later."

Despite its mandate, the board accomplished little until the appearance of another

crisis forced it to act. It delegated its civilian disaster relief responsibilities to the General

Services Administration. Those areas involving military defense-air raid warning systems.

" Office of Civil Defense Planning, Civil Defense for Security, 18-24.

"^U.S. Public Law 253. 80th Cong., 1st sess. (26 July 1947), National Security Act of 1947; Truman, Public Papers, 4:146; President Harry S Truman to Chariman, National Security Resources Board, memorandum, 4 March 1949, Official File document. Folder 10, Box 2, B File, Civil Defense, HST; and Mauck, History of Civil Defense, 269.

36

civilian air patrols, protective shelter constmction projects-it assigned to the Department

of Defense."^

Then, in August, a radioactive cloud rose into the air above the Soviet Union.

Not wanting to believe reports that the Soviets now possessed "the bomb," and afraid of

the way Americans would respond to the news. President Truman did not go public with

the information until September 23. His announcement triggered some panic among the

people and caused a storm to break in the capitol. Faced with a U.S.S.R. armed with

atomic weapons, Bernard Bamch, Representative John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts, and

other members of Congress demanded information on the present state of U.S. civil

defense. Upon discovering that it continued to languish in the planning stage, they lashed

out at the administration, criticizing its lack of initiative."*

The NSRB responded to the political pressure. The board's temporary chairman,

John R. Steelman, dispatched a letter to the govemor of each state. It indicated that the

NSRB was and had been formulating a national policy of civil defense. Nonetheless, since

its investigations were incomplete, the board urged the individual states to enact

temporary legislation, as outlined in the Hopley Report. In addition to the letters, the

NSRB began to distribute information on both the medical dangers to humans and the

stmctural damage to buildings that would result from an atomic explosion. The Atomic

" Mauck, History of Civil Defense, 269.

"*Trunian, Public Papers, 5:435, 509; Jordan, Civil Defense, 95-96; and Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1949, 95, pt. 16: A6024.

37

Energy Commission (AEC) provided the data for the reports. Itself the victim of political

attacks, the AEC was hastily compiling a work on the effects of nuclear weapons."^

Before Americans could recover from the shock of Truman's announcement,

they were hit with another crisis. On October 1, 1949, the world witnessed the

inauguration of the People's Republic of China, an event which formally shifted more than

500 million people-about one-fifth of the Earth's human population-into the communist

camp. In the midst of the furor created by the Soviet atomic test and the fell of nationalist

China, Senator Brien McMahon (D., Connecticut), Chairman of the Joint Committee on

Atomic Energy, announced his board's decision to hold public hearings on the question of

civil defense. Senator Estes Kefeuver (D., Tennessee), chairman of a special

subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, also directed his board to scmtinize

U.S. civil defense initiatives. ^

The committees opened their hearings in March 1950 and continued them

throughout April of the same year. With the exception of NSRB personnel, most of the

witnesses called before the committees charged the federal government with neglecting the

creation and implementation of a national civil defense program. The members of the

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the special subcommittee of the Committee on

Armed Services agreed, yet they failed to press for an immediate civil defense policy. By

"National Security Resources Board, "Document 121," "Medical Aspects of Atomic Weapons," and "Damage from Atomic Explosions and Design of Protective Stmctures," in U.S. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings on Civil Defense Against Atomic Attack, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950, 9-10, 36-47, and 47-61.

^^New York Times, October 1, 1949, p. 1:1; Jordan, Civil Defense, 97; and Tyler, "Planning Years," 221-222.

38

the time the hearings had ended, the People's Republic of China had been established for

sbc months. The Soviet A-bomb also was old news. The committees had spent their

venom on the NSRB, now Congress itself became apathetic toward civil defense. '

Though it was no longer the object of intense, congressional scmtiny, the NSRB

retumed to its planning with renewed vigor. The board had been energized by the

additions of Paul Larson and Stuart Symington. On March 1, Larson became director of

the NSRB's Civilian Mobilization Office (later renamed the Civil Defense Office). An

atomic research management expert, Larson had served as director of the Sandia Atomic

Laboratory in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Also during March, the NSRB received

Symington, the Secretary of the Air Force and a civil defense advocate, as its permanent

chairman. Under the prodding of these two men, the board began to produce a civil

defense plan. ^

Yet another crisis contributed to the sense of urgency surrounding the NSRB's

assignment. On June 25, North Korean forces crossed over the 38th parallel into South

Korea in an attempt to unite the two countries under communist control. In the weeks

that followed, the invaders steadily pushed the South Korean troops and their American

allies back, into the peninsula's southeastem comer. The Allies were still in that

'Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings; and Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Civil Defense, Preliminary Report of the Subcommittee on Civil Defense, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950.

^%rdan. Civil Defense, 83, 88, 97.

39

precarious position on September 8, 1950, the day on which Symington submitted the

NSRB's report to President Truman. '

United States Civil Defense, often called *the Blue Book," after the color of its

cover, drew heavily from the Hopley Report, but there were differences that set the two

documents apart. First, the Blue Book suggested that the director of a federal civil

defense administration report directly to the president, not to the secretary of defense.

Second, though the Blue Book's authors agreed with Hopley that the primary

responsibility for civil defense fell to the states and the municipalities, they prescribed a

larger role for the federal government. They suggested that it stockpile medical supplies

and provide an undisclosed amount of fimding for shelters, control centers, and for

communication and air-raid warning systems. In addition, the federal civil defense office

would establish training fecilities and would organize a nation-wide education and

information campaign. "

Shortly after receiving the booklet, Truman passed it on to the members of the

national legislature. He requested that they use the document as a model and enact civil

defense legislation in the near fiiture, but Congress adjourned before considering civil

defense. The military reverses in Korea had inspired President Truman to endorse civil

defense. Less than a week after the president received the NSRB's report, however, the

Korean Conflict began to turn in favor of the United States. On September 14, United

"Galium A. MacDonald, Korea, The War Before Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 3, 37-39.

"National Security Resources Board, United States Civil Defense (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1950), 1-27.

40

Nations forces-consisting mostly of American and South Korean troops-under the

command of General Douglas MacArthur had counterattacked. Mac Arthur had ordered

an amphibious landing at Inchon, behind enemy lines. The maneuver had retumed U.N.

forces to the offensive, and, since then, they had driven steadily northward. When the

Korean crisis began to stabilize, the urgent need for civil defense legislation seemed to

disappear. ^

On October 1, U.N. troops reached the thirty-eighth parallel. They had

accomplished their mission. They had retaken South Korea, but State officials were

tempted to pursue a new objective, the reunification of Korea under the South's

leadership. Chou En-lai, foreign minister for the People's Republic of China, wamed that

his country would not remain idle if U.N. forces crossed into North Korea, but decision­

makers in Washington and American commanders in the field ignored the warnings. They

"called" what they believed was a bluff. MacArthur's troops pressed on and pushed the

North Korean forces back, toward the Chinese border. By late November an Allied

victory, and a unified Korea, seemed assured. United Nations forces had seized all but the

northernmost parts of the Korean peninsula, and MacArthur was preparing for a final

assault. Then on November 26, the unexpected occurred. Thousands of Chinese soldiers

poured across the Yalu River into North Korea. The sudden onslaught caught the

Americans and their allies by surprise; they reeled back to the thirty-eighth parallel, and

"Truman, Public Papers, 6: 641; and MacDonald, Korea, 48-50.

41

beyond. This change in events represented a new crisis, and it forced Truman into a press

conference on November 30,1950.^

The Indian Treaty Room was filled with reporters on that Thursday morning.

President Truman stood before the press, his countenance serious. The recent setback in

Korea was not the first blow suffered by Truman's administratioiL As the United States'

chief executive in 1945, President Harry S. Truman had shared in the glory and acclaim

when the Allies stood victorious at the end of World War U. The United States' chief

executive, Truman was also the chief target for those Americans who sought to assign

blame when things went wrong."

Leading the throng of assailants were political adversaries. Republicans and

conservative Democrats who had argued that Franklin D. Roosevelt's **New Deal" was

too liberal and too expensive, now opposed Truman's "Fair Deal," which they identified as

an extension of his predecessor's policies. Truman's critics did not restrict their

comments to his domestic programs. Determined to undermine his presidency and his

chances for reelection, Truman's enemies also seized upon every Cold War defeat. After

each setback they claimed that the president was not fully prosecuting the war against

communism. He was, they asserted, "soft on communism." These charges rang out

loudly in the fall of 1949 when China, with its one-half billion person population entered

the communist camp. Now, a year later, the scales threatened to tilt even further in favor

' MacDonald, Korea, 57-78.

"McCullough, Truman, 820.

42

of communism, and no doubt Truman feared again hearing that his foreign policy was

"soft."'*

The president seemed determined to forestall these charges at his press

conference on November 30, 1950. As usual, his attire was in^ccable-a well-tailored

suit, a crisp shirt, polished shoes. From the days of his youth, Harry S. Truman had paid

meticulous care to his appearance, a fact attested to by the state of his dress even then.'

On this morning, however, the president seemed most concemed that his administration

not appear slovenly, especially with regard to foreign policy. He opened with a short,

prepared statement in which he assured the American people that the recent reverses in

Korea would not cause the United States and its U.N. allies to abandon their mission in

that war-tom peninsula. He then announced that the United States would bolster its

military strength in order to confront communist aggression throughout the world. As

questions began to pour from the assembled reporters, Truman further "proved" that he

was not "soft." He asserted that, in Korea, the United States would "take whatever steps

are necessary to meet the military situation."^ The members of the press caught his hint,

but they wanted verification. A reporter asked the president if he was suggesting that the

'*Robert J. Donovan, Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1949-1953 (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982), 82-87; Alonzo Hamby, Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 518-20; and McCullough, Truman, 742-44.

'McCullough, Truman, 45.

^Truman, Public Papers, 6: 641.

43

U.S. might use the atomic bomb to resolve the conflict. Truman replied, "There has

always been active consideration of its use." '

Before the day's end, word of President Truman's **bomb threat" had sped

throughout the United States and across the Atlantic Ocean. His statements precipitated a

storm of anxiety and protest in England. In the House of Commons, Mr. Edgar Granville

of Eye, requested that Prime Minister Atlee go immediately to the United States to confer

with the president. After Granville expressed his anxiety, others took to the floor and

criticized what they perceived to be rash and irresponsible behavior on the part of the

United States' chief executive. Later that day, representatives of the Labor Party

presented the prime minister with a letter that detailed their concerns and which contained

the signatures of more than one hundred members of Parliament. Atlee contacted the U.S.

State Department and prepared to leave for Washington."

To prevent any further panic, abroad or at home, on Thursday afternoon White

House Press Secretary Charlie Ross issued another statement—one that was intended to

clarify the president's morning remarks. Ross told the press that the mere possession of a

weapon implied that it might one day be used, but he stressed that the president, alone,

was authorized to order the use of atomic weapons, and President Truman had not issued

such an order. Ross's announcement produced little effect in England or in the United

States. The British government was stOl concemed. Atlee flew to Washington for a series

61 Truman, Public Papers, 6: 641,

^^Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., vol. 481 (1950), cols. 1403-1439; and New York Times, December 1, 1950, p. 1:1.

44

of conferences with President Truman. In the United States, summaries of Ross's press

release went into the Friday morning newspaper articles that covered Truman's stated

"atomic policy." Gallup surveys showed, however, that a majority of Americans fevored

employing atomic weapons against the Chinese. Many adult Americans believed that the

United States' use of *the bomb" had brought victory in World War II, and they now

looked to it as a solution for the present crisis. '

To the population-at-large the answer to the expanding Korean conflict might

have appeared that single: use the bomb; China will succumb to America's superior

technology; and the United States and its allies will win. To those individuals actually

responsible for U.S. defense, the solution did not appear so clear-cut. The world had

changed since President Truman had ordered "Little Boy" and "Fat Man" dropped on

Hiroshima and Nagasaki. No longer was the United States the sole possessor of the

atomic bomb. The Soviets now had their own atomic weapons, and in 1950 communist

China and the U.S.S.R. were closely allied. The Sino-Soviet rift that later allowed the

United States to '*play-ofi" the Soviet Union and China against one another had not yet

occurred. If President Truman employed atomic devices against the Chinese, his actions

might precipitate a further expansion of the Korean conflict into another world war—one

with Soviet Russia, and its atomic capabilities, pitted against the United States. Such a

possibility was not lost on Truman or on the members of Congress. Finally, after five

years of planning, they began to resurrect civil defense.

'McCullough, Truman, 822; American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1971, vol. 2 (New York: Random House, 1972), 950.

45

Congress acted first. The national legislature had been in recess when the

Chinese launched their offensive in North Korea. Because of the crisis. Congress

reconvened in special sessioiL On November 30, the same day that President Truman

shook the bomb at the Chinese, Representative Carl Durham (D., North Carolina)

submitted H.R. 9798 to the House. Durham served on both the House Armed Services

Committee and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The congressman was well aware

of the horrors that an atomic explosion could unleash on military or civilian persoimel, and

especially on a people who were uninformed about the power of atomic weapons and who

were not trained to react to an atomic attack. Durham's bill was a step toward educating

and preparing the American people; it proposed the creation of a federally-administered

program of civilian defense. Two days later, on Saturday, December 1, 1950, Senators

Brien McMahon, Estes Kefeuver, and Harry P. Cain (R., Washington) offered similar bills

to the Senate. President Truman also showed his support for civil defense on the first day

of December. Recognizing that the legislative process of bill introduction, compromise,

reintroduction, and, perhaps, eventual acceptance would delay the creation of a body for

directing the country's civil defense, he issued Executive order 10186, which established a

temporary Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) in the Office of the President.

The reverses in Korea had prompted the president and the members of Congress to act.

Just as international crises had pushed forward civil defense planning, the eventual

resurrection of civil defense in the United States also was a response to a crisis.^

^Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950, 96 pt. 12; 16007. 16009, 16043; and President, Executive Order 10186, Federal Register 15, no. 235 (5 December 1950): 8557-

46

Congress displayed unusual speed in its passage of the federal civil defense act.

The hearings before the House's subcommittee took place on Tuesday, December 5. The

Senate hearings began the next day and lasted until December 12. Few witnesses opposed

the establishment of a federal civil defense agency. Illustrating the consensus on the

question, when the House passed H.R. 9798 on December 20, 1950, only Clare Hof&nan

(R.) of Michigan dissented. Two days later, the Senate passed its bill, S. 4268. Select

delegates from the House and from the Senate then hammered out a compromise biU,

which Senator McMahon proposed on the first day of the new year. '

On January 12, President Harry S Truman signed the Civil Defense Act of 1951

into law, and the FCDA became a permanent body. The act was a near replica of the

NSRB's United States Civil Defense. The delegation of civil defense responsibilities

remained much the same as the NSRB had recommended. The long-sought civil defense

law was now a reality, but it remained for the federal, state, and local governments to take

the act and translate it into an effective, national program. As their first step, they had to

convince the public that civil defense was necessary, that it was an integral part of life in

the Atomic Age.^

^^Congressional Record, 16824, 16979, 17120; U.S. House Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on H.R. 9798 to Authorize a Federal Civil Defense Program, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950; and U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Armed Services, Hearings on S. 4217 and S. 4219 to Authorize a Federal Civil Defense Program, and for other Purposes, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950.

^Truman, Public Papers, 7: 26-7; and Public law 920, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (12 January 1950), 1262-73.

47

CHAPTER m

ALERTING AMERICA: MILLARD CALDWELL

AND THE POLITICS OF PERSUASION

The crowd lined both sides of Constitution Avenue. As they watched for the

parade's lead vehicles, some of the spectators fought the chill of the brisk January morning

by huddling together. Others simply sank further into their coats. They waited. The wail

of police sirens indicated that the approaching motorcade was close, and drawing nearer.

Finally, vydth lights flashing, a police escort tumed from Twelfth Street onto Constitution

Avenue, the last street on the parade route. The policemen guided their motorcycles

toward the procession's final destination, the Departmental Auditorium. ^

Stretching out behind the escort was the main body of the motorcade, thirty

tractor-trailers, brightly painted in white and red. On the sides of the trailers, in letters

over a foot tall, were the words "Alert America"—the name of the civil defense exhibit that

the convoy had brought to Washington, D.C., and which it was scheduled to carry to

cities throughout the United States. The day of the parade, a number of the tmcks were

empty. Alert America staff members had earlier transferred the vehicles' contents to the

^ "The Alert America Convoy Comes to Washington," 3, Files of Spencer R. Quick document, Folder 17, Box 2, Civil Defense, B File, Papers of Harry S Truman [hereafter HST], Hany S Truman Library [hereafter HSTL].

48

auditorium, where the exhibit was to nm for a week, from January 7 to Januaiy 13,

1952.'*

When the last of the tmcks had slowed to a stop at the Departmental Auditorium,

opening ceremonies began in eamest. In front of the building, a color guard con^rised of

representatives from the different armed services stood at attention, and the Second

Army's drum and bugle corps played martial airs for the crowd. The music eventually

gave way to key-note speeches by Major General Roger M. Rainey, Director of

Operations for the U.S. Air Force, and John E. Fondahl, civil defense director for the

District of Columbia. By the time the introductions, speeches, and "thank yous" had

ended, and the Alert America exhibit was officially opened to the public, it was one

o'clock in the aftemoon.'^

The crowd surged forward. Pushing through the auditorium's doors, citizens of

Washington and visitors to the capital found themselves confronted with a series of

displays designed to promote civil defense awareness and to attract civilian volunteers to

the program. In the foyer stood an artist's rendition of Paul Revere who, according to the

creators of the exhibit was a symbol of the United States' long-established tradition of

civil defense and the perfect example of an "alert American." Passing through the foyer,

visitors entered a U-shaped exhibit hall. Here they encountered montage boards that

projected the industrial and medical benefits of "Atomic Power in a World of Peace."

'*"Convoy Comes to Washington," 14, HST; and Valley Forge Foundation, The Alert America Convoys (n.p.: Valley Forge Foundation, n.d.), 7.

' "Convoy Comes to Washington," 3, 14, HST.

49

Farther down the passageway, stood a series of displays that depicted the possible

"horrors of modem warfere."^

The "horrors" section of the hall did not immediately focus on the destmctive

power of an atomic attack. Instead, it examined a number of other 'Veapons" that an

enemy might en:q)loy against the American home front. Repeating flashes of light

contributed to the illusion of an exploding fectory in the sabotage display. A giant walkie-

talkie surrounded by socialist newspapers wamed Americans to guard themselves against

psychological warfare. A backdrop of simulated flames lit up the remains of a building

destroyed by an incendiary bomb. In the biological warfere display, a trenchcoat-clad

enemy agent prepared to empty a germ-filled vial onto a crop of wheat. A large bubbling

container and an image of a choking man called attention to the dangers of chemical

warfare. '

Only one of the modem war displays emphasized atomic attack. The last in the

series of "horrors" displays, it was a diorama entitled "This Could Be Your City."

Surrounded by the sounds of air raid sirens and an actual recording of an atomic blast,

visitors to the exhibit watched a miniature metropolitan area crumble to the ground, the

victim of an atomic strike.'

^^alley Forge Foundation, Alert America Convoys, 3, 5-6; and "What you will see in the...Civil Defense Alert America Exhibit," Files of Spencer R. Quick document in Folder 18, Box 2, Civil Defense, B FDe, HST.

""What you will see," HST.

' Ibid.

50

Having bombarded their guests with a series of depressing and disheartening

scenes. Alert America's creators now offered a ray of hope. Moving past the destroyed

city, visitors noticed a softly-lit, life-sized image of a woman, one arm clutching an infant

to her chest, the other protectively encircling the shoulders of an injured, young boy.

War-battered, she stood on a pile of mbble in the middle of a mined city, but there was a

determined, defiant look in her eyes. While viewers gazed on this scene, the rich, soothing

voice of CBS correspondent Edward R. Murrow assured them that through civil defense

"'we can beat this menace.'" The "voice of America" during the Forties and Fifties,

Murrow had stood on the streets of London, covering the Battle of Britain while bombs

burst around him. Americans tmsted him. He had witnessed first-hand the German

bombing raids on England's crown city, and he had seen the effectiveness of the British

civil defense system. He was the ideal spokesperson for U.S. civil defense. '

The sections of the exhibit hall beyond the Murrow recording seemed intended to

substantiate Murrow's statement and to convince visitors to volunteer for civil defense.

Large placards outlined civil defense strategies, and animated models illustrated the United

States' attack warning system. Farther down the hallway, patriotic music beckoned to the

visitors, leading them to an area where the walls were hung with pictures of ordinary

Americans exercising their freedoms—a citizen expressing his concerns at a town meeting;

a little girl, hands clasped in prayer. Toward the ceiling, in capital letters, the phrases

"LOVE YOUR FREEDOMS," "LIVE YOUR FREEDOMS," "GUARD YOUR

'"What you will see," HST; and Joseph Persico, Edward R. Murrow: An American Original (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988) 172-74.

51

FREEDOMS," called Americans to duty. Moving past these patriotic slogans and images,

visitors entered the last room in the exhibit, the ''payoff room"—an area filled with free

FCDA booklets and with Alert America staff members waiting to sign up recruits for first-

aid, rescue, and warden training. "

The exhibit's creators considered the Washington show a success. Everyday,

January 7-13, the doors of the Departmental Auditorium opened at one o'clock in the

aftemoon and closed nine hours later, at ten. And everyday, thousands of Americans

crowded into the exhibit hall. During its week-long stay in the capital, 32,000 people

viewed the Alert America displays. Some 3,500, including President Harry S Truman,

pledged their support by signing "Count Me In" cards, which committed the signers to

take civil defense training classes.^' The president's tour of the show and his registration

as a civil defense volunteer were symbolic actions, but according to FCDA officials,

necessary for promoting preparedness. Deputy Administrator James J. Wadsworth had

tried to impress upon the president's aides the need for the chief executive's presence. A

show of support from Truman was essential to the display's success, Wadsworth insisted.

He continued, arguing, "As the Nation's top civilian, the country would expect him to

take a personal interest in this exhibit and its work on behalf of Civil Defense." '

""What you will see," HST; and Valley Forge Foundation, Alert America Convoys, 1.

'"Convoy Comes to Washington," 3, HST.

'James J. Wadsworth to David Stowe, memorandum, 22 December 1951, Official File document, Folder 6, Box 2, B File, Civil Defense, HST.

52

Other fectors besides President Truman's example brought visitors to the exhibit.

No doubt the free admission drew many individuals. A saturation campaign also ensured

that the people of the Washington, D.C. area would know of the event. The FCDA sent

out a thousand announcements over the radio. Twenty-five different stations broadcast

Alert America ads. Television programing also carried stories on the exhibit. Newspapers

devoted more than 11,000 lines to the event. On each day of the exhibit's stay in the

capitol, civil defense spokespersons advertised the event using the metropolitan area's air­

raid warning system—it could send voice messages as well as siren blasts.

Advertisements for the exhibit appealed to each Americans' patriotism and to

their self-preservation instinct. Posters of Paul Revere went up a week before the displays

came to Washington. According to legend, the patriot's cries of "The British are

coming!" had attracted the attention of Americans during the Revolutionary War. In 1952

Paul Revere rode ahead of the Alert America exhibit and announced that the convoy was

coming to Washington, D.C. Where the hero of the American Revolution feiled to inspire

the people to attend, "the bomb" might succeed. In addition to the Paul Revere posters,

other placards went up. ^ Many of these boasted a drawing of a mushroom-shaped cloud

and the disturbing, yet hope-filled message, "SEE THE SHOW THAT MAY SAVE

YOUR LIFE!'"*

Edward H. Burdick, the man who designed the Alert America displays, also

deserved much of the credit for the exhibit's success. Burdick had worked with public

^ "Convoy Comes to Washington," 4, HST.

*Ibid.

53

displays before. He was responsible for the design of many of the displays at the 1939

New York World's Fair.^

Such experience was invaluable. For decades, countless thousands of Americans

had sought a few hours of escape from the back-breaking strain of agricultural labor and

from the long hours and mind-numbing routine of blue-collar jobs, by visiting fairs and

expositions. Americans attended fairs in large numbers even during the lean years of the

Great Depression. Burdick capitalized on this social trend. The informative, yet eye­

catching displays found in the Alert America shows were reminiscent of exhibit halls found

in state and world feirs. They projected a feir-like atmosphere, and they drew large

crowds of visitors.*^

By the end of the year, hundreds of thousands had seen the Alert America

displays. The stay in Washington had been only the beginning of a long tour-of-duty for

the Alert America staff. On January 14, 1952, the exhibit left the capital. The fleet of

tractor-trailers which had transported the displays to Washington split into three, ten-tmck

convoys, each of which carried the gospel of civil defense to a different section of the

country. They worked their way across the United States, stopping in major cities and

^% alley Forge Foundation, Alert America Convoys, 1; and "Convoy Comes to Washington," 14, HST.

*^obert W. Rydell, World of Fairs: The Century of Progress Expositions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993)1-11, 24-26, 115-156; and Valley Forge Foundation, Alert America Convoys, 7.

54

county seats, opening to the public for a few days, and then moving on to the next city on

their route.*'

The Alert America tours were well-planned and well-executed. In its annual

report to Congress, the Federal Civil Defense Administration boasted of the exhibits'

success. But the hundreds of thousands of Americans that the exhibits educated, and the

tens of thousands that volunteered for "preparedness" training, represented only a fraction

of the total number of people that the FCDA hoped to inform and enlist. Agency

publications stated that the FCDA needed to recmit between 15 and 17.5 million people

and educate the entire population of the United States—some 150 million people—in order

to build an effective civil defense program. The Alert America convoys were just one

small part of a huge can^aign to draw the American public's attention to civil defense.*^

Millard Caldwell, the FCDA's first administrator, was the person ultimately

responsible for ensuring that the agency met its goals. When the Alert America exhibit

opened in Washington, D.C, Caldwell had been directing the FCDA for just over a year.

On December 1, 1950, the same day that President Truman had created a temporary

Federal Civil Defense Administration, he had selected Millard Caldwell to head the body.

Several factors made Caldwell an attractive candidate for the post. First, he was a former

*'"Convoy Comes to Washington," 19, HST; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, Annual Report for 1952, (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1953), 47-9.

* Federal Civil Defense Administration, Report for 1952, 1; Federal Civil Defense Administration, Annual Report for 1951 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1952), be, 6, 19, 21: and Advisory Bulletin 85, Advisory Bulletins Binder, OCDM Publications, 1950-60, Box 1, RG 396, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Md. [hereafter NARACP].

55

govemor. State officials had voiced some concem over the creation of a new civil defense

agency, because of the actions taken by the old Office of Civil Defense. Since the OCD

had been hurriedly created as the United States entered World War U, its leaders were

most concemed with the speed at which the program grew. In addition, Fiorello La

Guardia, the office's first director and mayor of New York City, favored municipal civil

defense organizations. In the name of expediency, but influenced by its director's bias, the

office often bypassed the logiced organization of the United States' federalized system.

The agency endorsed civil defense plans that the states submitted for approval, but it also

gave the nod to independent programs devised by municipal governments and those

offered by privately-organized civil defense associations. The result was a crazy patch­

work quilt of authority in which state plans did not always agree with municipal programs,

and in which private organizations could sometimes flout the civilian preparedness

guidelines drawn-up by city governments. Hence, when Tnmian created the FCDA, state

officials demanded a system that reserved to the states the rights to guide, monitor, and

coordinate civil defense initiatives within their boundaries.*'

By naming Millard Caldwell director of the FCDA, President Truman allayed the

fears of many state officers. From 1945 to 1949 CaldweU had served as govemor of

Florida. Moreover, he was a recognized leader and spokesperson for the state

*'U.S. Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on Nomination of Millard Frank Caldwell, Jr. to be Federal Civil Defense Administrator, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951, 10; Nehemiah Jordan, U.S. Civil Defense Before 1950: The Roots of Public Law 920 (n.p.: Institute for Defense Analyses, Economic and Political Studies Division, 1966), 40-43; and War Department Civil Defense Board, A Study of Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1948), 9.

56

governments. While chief executive of Florida, he had chaired both the National

Govemor's Conference and presided over the deliberations of the Council of State

Governments.

Less a fector than the positions he held, but of some importance in his receiving

the FCDA post, was the state in which Caldwell govemed. While most states had

dismantled their civil defense programs once the OCD had shut down in 1945, Florida was

one of only four states whose civil defense policies remained intact and in effect after

World War II. Commentary—negative or positive—on Caldwell's handling of Florida's

civil defense program is lacking. Nonetheless, if critics challenged Truman's decision to

appoint him FCDA director, the president could argue that Caldwell was one of a mere

handful of individuals who possessed experience in administering a large-scale, postwar

civil defense program.*"

The last fector that weighed in Caldwell's fevor was his political affiliation. He,

like Truman, was a Democrat. Truman gave a fellow party-member the reins to the

FCDA. Members of the Republican Party evinced little concem when Caldwell accepted

control of the temporary FCDA. And they remained quiet in January 1951, when the Civil

Defense Act of 1950 perpetuated the FCDA, and President Truman promptly nominated

Caldwell for the office of agency administrator.*^

*"Dorothy C Tompkins, comp.. Civil Defense in the United States: A Bibliography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), 9.

* Senate Subcommittee, Hearing on Nomination of Caldwell.

57

Once confirmed by the Senate, Caldwell lost little time executing his

responsibilities. Citing the need for a strong, grass-roots base of support for civil defense,

he focused his energies and those of his agency on educating the American people and

attracting civilian volunteers. Defense planners had long argued that the ultimate

responsibility for civil defense devolved upon the individual. Caldwell agreed. He

believed that a tmly effective civil defense required the indoctrination of the entire

American populace. Each citizen needed to know the facts about the possibility of an

enemy attack, the effects of an atomic explosion, what precautions the government was

taking to ensure the survival of the country and its people, and what private citizens could

do to protect themselves and their property.*'

Caldwell also wanted a core of Americans to volunteer for further training in civil

defense. Just as an educated populace was imperative to ensure the success of the United

State's civil defense system, so too was a trained civilian auxiliary that could spring into

action once an emergency arose. Caldwell's FCDA sought recmits for eleven service

categories: police, fire, warden, communications, rescue, health, welfare, supply,

transportation, engineering, and headquarters staff When referring to the recruitment

program, Caldwell often claimed that the FCDA required 15 million volunteers. Breaking

down the need for so many recmits, Caldwell reported that for every 1,000 people in

*'Lyon G. Tyler, Jr., "Civil Defense: The Impact of the Planning Years, 1945-1950," (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1967), 33-37; NSRB, U.S. National Security Resources Board, United States Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1950), 3, 9-18, 20-24; "Proofs of 12 Articles, MiUard Caldwell," PubUc History Files, 1950-62, Box 14, RG 396,; "Govemor Caldwell-April 17, 1952, 'Society of Newspaper Editors Speech,'" Public History Files, 1950-62, Box 8, RG 396; and Federal Civil Defense Administration, Report for 1951, vii-bc, 19-21.

58

target areas-industrial centers, cities near military installations-nearly 150 trained civilian

defenders were required. Non-target, or support, areas had to produce only seventy-two

volunteers per 1,000 inhabitants. On other occasions. Administrator Caldwell argued that

even more Americans—17.5 million rather than 15 million-were needed. Since he tended

to submit the second, larger estimate when he was transmitting information to the

members of Congress, it is likely that he was exaggerating in an attempt to secure more

appropriations for his agency.*^

Through massive publicity cetmpsdgns, the federal agency intended to awaken

Americans to the need for participation in civil defense, but organizing an army of civilian

defenders required cooperation from all levels of government. Most individuals that

volunteered would not sign-on with the FCDA; rather, they would join local civil defense

organizations. These local bodies were subject to the authority of state directors, and the

state directors, or their appointed special liaisons, reported to the FCDA's Field

Administration Division.**

To ensure uniformity in the nation's federal, state, and local civil defense

programs, and thus avoid the confusion that had been a hallmark of the World War II

Office of Civil Defense, the FCDA inaugurated an advisory bulletin series on March 6,

1951. Issued to the state directors, who then disseminated the information to local

"preparedness" associations, the bulletins kept the United States' civil defense network

*'"Proofs of Articles, Caldwell," RG 396; and Federal Civil Defense Administration, Report for 1951, be, 19-21.

**Federal Civil Defense Administration, Civil Defense Training and Education (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951), 8-11, 14-15, 17, 19; and Idem, Report for 1951, 71-72.

59

apprised of revisions to national strategies and changes in the authority granted to the

FCDA and to its state and municipal partners. Having established a system for channeling

information to the lower governments, the Federal Civil Defense Administration and its

director tumed their attention to educating the public.*

An experienced public relations team assisted Caldwell in the coordination of the

agency's education and recmitment campaigns. John DeChant, FCDA Director of Public

Affairs, seemed tailor-made for his job. He was a skilled writer, the author of Devilbirds

and the coauthor of Flying Leathernecks. Before World War II he had worked as an

editor for newspapers, trade magazines, and The New World—a. Chicago-based Catholic

newsletter. During the war, he served with the Marines, working his way up to the

position of senior Marine public relations officer in the Pacific theater. While with the

Marines, he devoted special attention to the air war in the Pacific, making him a valuable

find for the FCDA. After World War II, DeChant managed a national public relations

campaign for the aircraft industry. °

At the Federal Civil Defense Administration headquarters in Washington, D.C,

DeChant was assisted by Harold Goodwin, Deputy Director of Public Affairs, and Donald

T. Sheehan, Program Consultant to the Public Affeirs Office. During WWII Goodwin had

worked with DeChant in the Marine Corps, and, like DeChant, one of his interests was

aviation. A more prolific writer than his boss, Goodwin had published twelve books and

* "Advisory Bulletin Series Includes All Prior Memos," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 1 (1951): 3; and Advisory BuUetin 23, Advisory Bulletin Binder, RG 396.

^"John DeChant, Director of Public Affairs," President's Secretary's Files document. Folder 11, Box 2, Civil Defense, B File, HST.

60

more than two hundred magazine articles by 1951. In addition to his contacts with the

producers of U.S. serials, Goodwin had ties to the radio industry. For five years he

worked the New England area, organizing a regional radio news service. Further

bolstering his resume and his potential value for the FCDA were Goodwin's stints as an

advertising agent and, after World War H, as a member of the U.S. Information Service.

While affiliated with the Information Service Goodwin headed a mass media program in

the Philippines. '

Donald Sheehan's record of pre-FCDA experiences was just as impressive as

either DeChant's or Goodwin's. A lieutenant colonel in the Air Force Reserve, Sheehan

had served as a public relations officer for the U.S. Air Force during World War II.

Without doubt his contact with that branch of the military made him attractive to the

FCDA, but of potentially greater value was his experience with religion and educational

programs. In the early 1940s Sheehan had served as the National Catholic Welfare

Conference's Bureau of Information director, and for a short time he ran the National

Conference of Christians and Jews office in Washington, D.C. Sheehan became involved

in educational concerns after the war when he accepted an assignment as a special

consultant for United States Commissioner of Education John W. Studebaker. A team of

able, veteran, public relations specialists, John DeChant, Harold Goodwin, and Donald

Sheehan were essential for the promotion of the FCDA's objectives. ^

'"Harold L. Goodwin, Deputy Director of Public Affairs," President's Secretary's Files document. Folder 11, Box 2, Civil Defense, B File, HST.

' "Donald T. Sheehan, Program Consuhant, Public Affairs Office," President's Secretary's Files document. Folder 11, Box 2, Civil Defense, B File, HST.

61

Under Caldwell's direction, the FCDA public affairs office saturated the

American public with the details of civil defense. During the three-month period, April-

June 1951, the agency scheduled the release of twenty-four different manuals. Other, new

publications were to follow later in the year. In addition, the office reprinted civil defense

booklets that the National Security Resources Board had commissioned, works such as

Survival Under Atomic Attack. By the end of 1951, the FCDA had distributed more than

55 million pamphlets to the public. '

In tone, the Caldwell-era publications were more dry, informative, and clinical

than those published later in the decade. FCDA appeals to Americans' patriotism and,

more often, their self-preservation instinct were not uncommon while he was in office, but

it was subsequent FCDA leadership which portrayed civil defense as a moral issue..

Caldwell was proud that his pamphlets simply stated "the facts." Among the points

presented were reminders that the United States and the Soviet Union were embroiled in a

Cold War which might tum "hot" at any moment. Further, the world had entered the

Atomic Age, and a war between the United States and its arch-rival could result in the use

of weapons of mass destmction against the American people. " Caldwell considered the

possibility of death a great motivational tool for the public. Later critics of CaldweU's

administration claimed that it employed "scare tactics" in order to promote civil defense.

Pamphlets such as This is Civil Defense decried the inadequacy of traditional military

'Advisory BuUetin 27, Advisory BuUetin Binder, RG 396.

"Federal CivU Defense Administration, This is Civil Defense (Washington, D.C 1951).

62

defenses, for example, anti-aircraft guns and American fighter planes, against a massed

raid by Soviet bombers. "Right now enemy planes can reach every city in the United

States."^^ "There is no way of preventing most enemy bombers from reaching their

targets."^ According to the FCDA, those targets were not simply the United States'

industrial centers, mUitary bases, and seats of government. They included the American

nuclear famUy-men, women and chUdren. To improve their odds of surviving an attack,

Americans needed to learn more about civU defense.

Many CaldweU-era pamphlets did appeal to Americans' self-preservation instinct,

but they did not portray civU defense as one hundred percent effective against an atomic

attack-it was not. The text of This is Civil Defense stated that readers who foUowed the

advice of the FCDA would improve their chances of survival, but it reminded them that

there were no guarantees even for the most dedicated civiUan defenders.' The FCDA

reissues of Survival Under Atomic Attack wamed, "Should you happen to be one of the

unlucky people right under the [atomic] bomb, there is practicaUy no hope of Uving

through it. In fact, anywhere within one-half mUe of the center of the explosion, your

chances of escaping are about 1 out of 10." * Such negative statements seem almost

calculated to discourage, rather than encourage, pubUc support for civU defense. But, to

^ Federal CivU Defense Administration, This is Civil Defense, 4

^Ibid., 5.

"'Ibid., 10.

*National Security Resources Board, Survival Under Atomic Attack (Washington. D.C: GPO, 1950), 4-5.

63

the CaldweU administration, educating Americans about many of the ugly aspects of

atomic warfere was an integral step in the creation of an effective civU defense program.

Asserting that a Soviet strike would target the national wiU as weU as people and fecUities,

CaldweU's FCDA argued that the American people must be prepared to face the horrifying

reaUties of nuclear warfere. If unprepared for the loss of Ufe and scenes of carnage that

an atomic bomb, or bombs, would produce, the civUian population of the United States

might panic, thus making it difficult—if not impossible—for the nation to recover and fight

back.^

Alhough combating panic was a pressing concem for civU defense planners, so

was the need to reduce the number of casualties that an attack would produce. Neither

civiUan recruits nor sizeable congressional appropriations would be forthcoming unless the

FCDA could present civU defense as a Ufe-saving strategy. Why volunteer to participate

in civU defense if it would do nothing to improve one's chances of survival? Why aUocate

monies for reinforced civU defense headquarters or shelters if they were useless against

atomic weapons?

FCDA officials recognized the interrelationship between civU defense's Ufe-

saving capabUities, recruitment and Congressional support. FCDA pubUcations and

federal CivU Defense Administration, This is Civil Defense, 7-10; MUlard CaldweU, "If Soviet A-Bombs Come," interview in U.S. News & World Report, 12 October 1951, 36-41; MUlard CaldweU, "Can Americans Take It," Civil Defense Alert 1, no. 8 (1952): 4; "Medical CivU Defense Conference," PubUc History FUes, 1950-62, Box 11, RG 396; "Proofs of (12) Articles," RG 396; and Guy Oakes, The Imaginary War-Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 8, 33-51.

64

spokespersons often boasted, "Casualties can be cut at least in half "'^ The statement

should have been quaUfied. The authors should have added that the higher survival rate

appUed only to those individuals more than one-half mUe away from ground zero. They

also should have told their audience that "cut at least in half' was a "guesstimate." Before

a meeting of medical professionals. Administrator CaldweU scaled down his assessment of

civU defense's Ufe-saving potential. He told Usteners that casualties could be reduced

"perhaps by fifty percent."' ' The members of Congress zeroed in on the confusion and

the inconsistencies in the statistics quoted by top officials. When considering budget

requests, the men and women on Capitol HiU expressed their reluctance to funnel large

sums of money into an agency that could not offer uniform data, backed by quantitative

studies, which proved its value.' ^

The FCDA was in fact attempting to gather information which would

substantiate the importance of the office's mission and its need for a larger budget. In

1951 the civU defense agency funded a number of research projects on shelter design and

the stockpUing of emergency materials, but its leaders refused to wait for the results before

initiating contact with the pubUc. Since civU defense was aimed at society, it was essential

for the FCDA to attract popular support, and quickly. The members of the national

'federal CivU Defense Administration, This is Civil Defense, 9; "Proofs of (12) Articles," RG 396; and "Govemor CaldweU-AprU 17, 1952, 'Society of Newspapers Editors Speech,'" PubUc History FUes, 1950-62, Box 8, RG 396, NABDCP.

'°'"Medical Conference," RG 396.

' Harry P. Yoshpe, Our Missing Shield: The US Civil Defense Program in Historical Perspective, Final Report for Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C, Contract no. DCPA 01-79-C-0294, April 1981.

65

legislature might be reluctant to aUocate resources to an agency that had yet to complete

basic research projects, but they would be equaUy hesitant to give money to a civU defense

office that lacked civUian support. On the other hand, if the FCDA could demonstrate that

it was backed by the people. Congress would be forced to give greater consideration to

the agency's financial requests.'^'

CaldweU and his staff took whatever actions they deemed necessary to win

popular approval. They told the people of the great Ufe-saving potential of civUian

preparedness. They fed crowds numbers and percentages that were based on speculation.

They informed the pubUc that without civU defense in general, and shelters in particular,

many would needlessly die in a war, victims of the blast and fire produced by atomic

detonations. Noticeably absent from most speeches was any discussion of the lingering

radiation hazards produced by atomic detonations. When spokespersons for civU defense

did address the subject, they told the people that there was Uttle to fear.

The Federal CivU Defense Administration was not the first government office to

announce that the long-term threat of radiation poisoning from atomic bursts was minimal.

The misinformation originated with those bodies responsible for the development of

atomic weapons and atomic power. It was in their best interest to defuse Americans'

concerns over radiatioiL Too much pubUc outcry could result in less appropriations,

increasing security costs, and perhaps the closing of research facUities. Persoimel from the

Manhattan Engineer District, the organization which had developed the atomic bomb,

were quick to deny atomic weapons' radioactive effects. In The Atomic Bombings of

' 'Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, 46-48.

66

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, on-site investigators from the district contended that

"mechanical injuries" from flying debris and crumbUng buUdings, and bums caused by the

atomic explosions' initial blast and "flash," were responsible for the large numbers of

casualties in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.'^

When the Atomic Energy Commission was created in 1946, its staff members

reinforced the claims made by the Manhattan Engineer District. The legislation which

created the AEC charged the agency with conflicting missions. It was to promote the

development of atomic power and devise weapons, but it was to make decisions on

radiation safety standards, as weU. Run by Cold War warriors, the AEC devoted most of

its attention to weapons development. Safety never constituted as high a priority as

staying ahead of the Russians in the arms race. The AEC closely guarded the United

States' atomic secrets, only aUowing fragments of information to make their way to the

pubUc or to other government agencies.' ^

In the late 1940s, the Atomic Energy Commission, the leading authority on

atomic matters, began to provide technical expertise to civU defense planners, but its

directors seem to have tmsted civUian defense workers Uttle more than the general pubUc.

In 1949 the AEC offered assistance to the National Security Resource Board's civU

defense planning committee. InitiaUy, the AEC produced a couple of short tracts on

'^U.S. Army, Manhattan Engineer District, The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (n.p.: Manhattan Engineer District, n.d.), 28-33.

'"^George T. Mazuzun and Samuel J. WaUcer, Controlling the Atom: The Beginnings of Nuclear Regulation, 1946-1962 (Berkeley: University of CaUfomia Press. 1985), 6, 37-38.

67

radiation hazards and medical treatment for victims. In 1950 it handed over a lengthy,

detaUed con^ndium of atomic "fects" entitled The Effects of Atomic Weapons. The

NSRB received an uncut, highly technical version of the work. The AEC and DOD issued

a shorter version to the pubUc.'^

The tone of both works was highly optimistic. Each time the authors addressed a

subject that might cause concem they inserted reassuring, positive statements. The

document noted that aU atomic weapons lifted and irradiated surfece debris, and those

radioactive particles could prove hazardous when they feU out of the bomb's cloud. The

experts comforted civU defense persoimel and the pubUc, however, by telling them that

most atomic weapons would explode high above the ground and therefore would generate

only smaU amounts of feUout.'^^ "It would probably rarely be enough to prevent passage

across an area, although it might necessitate suspension of operations for a few days

within the area [contaminated]," the authors contended.' * Ground-level bursts and

underwater detonations would generate more faUout, and it would be of a higher

radioactive intensity, but only those individuals "directly downwind from the explosion"

' ^Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Vol. 2, Atomic Shield, 1947/1952 (University Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1969), 487; and Paul Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 315-316.

' Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, The Effects of Atomic Weapons: Prepared for and in cooperation with the U.S. Dept. Of Defense and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (New York: McGraw-HUl Book Co., 1950), 271-74.

'°*Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Effects of Atomic Weapons, 274.

68

would be at great risk.'^ The writers of The Effects of Atomic Weapons stated also that

the natural decay of radioactive elements would render even the most heavUy

contaminated areas safe for "short time access" after two weeks, and decontamination

processes would soon render bomb sites habitable."° Lastly, even though the book's

authors considered the effects of radiation, they placed the greatest emphasis on the

dangers of blast and fire.

Using the information that the AEC had provided, the NSRB pubUshed a booklet

entitled Survival Under Atomic Attack. When the FCDA assumed responsibUity for the

country's civU defense, it adopted the pubUcation and distributed two milUon copies in

1951. The text of the Survival booklet asserted that the radiation produced by an atomic

bomb was a secondary concem.'" "High-level explosions definitely wUl not create 'areas

of doom' where no man dares enter and no plant can grow. In fact, they wiU leave very

Uttle radioactivity on the ground, even near the point of explosion.""^ The work then

stated that "not one" of the deaths in Hiroshima or Nagasaki had resulted from "Ungering

radioactivity [faUout]." Those that had died from exposure to radiation were victims of

"explosive radioactivity [flashbum victims]" produced by the bombs' detonations.'"

According to the booklet, even if, by some strange circumstance, large quantities of

' Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Effects of Atomic Weapons, 275.

"%id., 313-322.

'"National Security Resources Board, Survival, 6, 9-11, 15, 20-23.

" Ibid.,

"'Ibid., 22.

69

radioactive particles did faU on a person, it was possible to escape injury by quickly

shedding contaminated clothing and taking a bath or a shower.""

The booklet suggested, further, that any house would provide suitable shelter.

"Keep aU vsindows and doors closed for at least several hours after an atomic bombing.""^

And, "Should you get an official report that there is serious contamination in the vicinity,

better cover aU broken windows with blankets or cardboard," it warned."^ Tme, when

Survival was written, the world was stUl learning about the effects-especiaUy the long-

term effects—of exposure to radiation. Moreover, atomic bombs were less powerful and

did not produce as much Ungering radioactivity as the later hydrogen bombs, but the off­

handed manner in which Survival addressed radiation dangers seems a calculated attempt

to make atomic bombs less threatening. The Atomic Energy Commission had suppUed

preparedness agencies with positive, "sanitized" reports that made civU defense more

manageable for the NSRB and the FCDA and more palatable for the pubUc. Residual, or

lingering, radiation was scary. It was invisible, tasteless, scentless, and sometimes

exceptionaUy difficult to remove. Blast and fire were more easUy defined and less difficult

to contend against. Reinforced shelters on the periphery of an explosion could withstand

blast waves. Civilians could leam to "fireproof their houses and fight the secondary fires

that a bomb would produce. They could leam first-aid techniques.

""National Security Resources Board, Survival, 25-26.

'"Ibid., 26.

"^bid.

70

In 1951, the FCDA eagerly embraced the "good news" that the AEC had

provided. During its first year of existence, the civU defense agency feUed to produce one

pamphlet that was devoted exclusively to the issue of atomic radiation, but it pubUshed

many that examined the hazards of ^e-Atomic Blast Creates FIRE, Firefightingfor

Householders, Fire Effects of Bombing Attacks. Throughout CaldweU's tenure as

administrator, the agency chumed out booklet after booklet that foUowed the AEC

formula; they portrayed atomic weapons Uke other, conventional, bombs-bigger, yes, but

stUl manageable and therefore less Ukely to produce panic or despair. There is Uttle

evidence that CaldweU ever questioned the vaUdity of the AEC information. It was to his

and the civU defense agency's advantage to accept the reports at face value. Nor is it

Ukely that he could have thwarted the AEC's misinformation campaign. Later, after the

hydrogen bomb was developed, civU defense leaders wanted to update their educational

campaigns, but the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense resisted

FCDA requests for the declassification of reports."'

The CaldweU Administration adopted a single, narrow, optimistic view of the

radiation hazards produced by atomic weapons, but it had to seU civU defense to a diverse

"'Federal CivU Defense Administration, Atomic Blast Creates FIRE (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951); Idem., Firefightingfor Householders (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951); Idem, Fire Effects of Bombing Attacks (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951); Idem., Report for 1951, 11, 46; Idem., This is Civil Defense; JoAnne Brown, '"A is for Atom, B is for Bomb:' CivU Defense in American PubUc Education, 1948-1963," Journal of American History 75, no. 1 (1988): 74, 84; Val Peterson to General Robert Cutler, 22 May 1953, Folder White House Correspondence, Box 2, Correspondence of Administrator Val Peterson, 1953-1957, RG 396; and Katherine Howard to CD. Jackson, 16 September 1953, Folder CivU Defense (1), Box 16, Subject Series, White House Central FUes (Condifential FUe) 1953-61, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, AbUene, Kansas.

71

populatioa Many of the booklets it pubUshed were written for a general adult readership.

Three of the pamphlets that feU into this category accounted for more than half of the 55

mUUon pubUcations produced by the FCDA in 1951. The agency printed over 29 mUUon

copies of Atomic Blast Creates FIRE, The Civil Defense Household First-Aid Kit, and

Emergency Action to Save Lives.^^^

The distribution numbers actuaUy are somewhat misleading, because the FCDA

permitted state and local civU defense authorities to reprint federal materials. In 1951

more copies of Survival Under Atomic Attack made it into press than any other federal

pubUcation. Most concemed with the blast, fire, and first-aid, the FCDA issued only two

miUion copies of the booklet, but the pubUc appears to have desired aU the detaUs about an

atomic assault—including the dangers of radiation. Survival Under Atomic Attack offered

more information—positive information—about radioactivity and radiation sickness than

did other FCDA pamphlets. In addition to the two miUion booklets distributed by the

federal government, the states and municipaUties reproduced and disseminated another

eighteen milUon copies of Survival to the people of the United States."^

WhUe many of the CaldweU-era pamphlets targeted the general adult population,

others were more specific. 1951 saw the pubUcation of handbooks for most of the

FCDA's eleven service categories. The booklets outUned volunteers' pre- and post-attack

responsibUities. The Warden's Handbook, for instance, instmcted recmits to keep

records on the residents and stmctural features of their neighborhood before an attack.

"*Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, 11.

"^bid., 10-11.

72

After an enemy strike, wardens were to report damage and casualties, direct people to

emergency centers and mobUize neighborhood groups to fight fires and administer first aid

to the wounded.' °

Other pan^hlets appealed to institutions whose aid could prove invaluable in

preparing for a fiiture war. The FCDA recognized that manufacturing centers would

constitute a prime target for enemy bombs because "[o]ur abUity to wage war rests largely

on our industrial plants and their skiUed workers."' ' For their own protection and to

insure that the country could retum fire and sustain a war effort, it was essential that blue-

coUar Americans be weU educated in civU defense techniques. Comprising some sixty

pages. Civil Defense in Industry and Institutions, was one of the FCDA's longest pubUc

booklets. It detaUed a step-by-step plan for organizing a plant's workers for "self-

protection." UntU the FCDA issued speciaUzed guides for hospitals and schools, those

faciUties were also to foUow the guideUnes set forth in the booklet.' ^

In August, the FCDA pubUshed its first handbook for the United States' school

systems. Interim Instructions for Schools and Colleges. The guide served the civU

defense administration in a number of ways. Because of their size, facUities, and pubUc

awareness of their location, schools are often employed as emergency centers during times

of natural disasters. It was only natural for the FCDA to suggest that they be used for

'^^ederal CivU Defense Administration, The Warden's Handbook (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951), 2; and Idem., Report for 1951, be, 45-46.

' 'Federal CivU Defense Administration, Civil Defense in Industry and Institutions (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951), 1.

' Ibid.

73

simUar purposes after an attack. In addition to the schools' post-attack value as shelters

for the homeless, during times of peace, for seven or eight hours a day, nine months each

year, they housed future generations of American citizens. Teachers were responsible for

equipping young Americans with the skUls that they needed to survive and succeed in the

world. In 1951 that responsibUity expanded. To the "three r's" of reading, writing, and

arithmetic, a fourth was added, "readiness." Survival now entaUed coping with the threat

of atomic weapons, and the FCDA expected the pubUc education system to "prepare," or

indoctrinate, the nation's chUdren.' '

Teaching the youngsters about civU defense would also help "get the word out"

to their parents. Teachers would driU into the chUdren what their famUies could do to

protect themselves—buUd home shelters, stockpUe canned goods and bottled water, leam

first-aid, drop to the ground if they happened to get caught outside during an atomic blast.

Then, when Mom or Dad—in the Fifties, usuaUy Mom-picked up the kids from school and

asked them about their day, the chUdren would bombard them with civU defense "facts."

With the enthusiasm of their age, chUdren would pressure their parents to join a growing

army of civiUan defenders who would tum their homes into American strongholds. That

was the way it was intended to work, at least. It is a strategy that the schools and

emergency services stiU employ today. Teachers discuss fire prevention and invite

firemen—who wUl hopefuUy bring with them a fire tmck—to the school to reinforce the

learning. They then send their students home to pressure parents into running fire drUls

'""Education Urged to Lead in CD," Civil Defense Alert 1. no. 5 (1951): 2; Brown, "A is for Atom," 70; Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, 96; and Idem, Interim Instructions for Schools and Colleges (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951).

74

and purchasing smoke alarms. In the 1950s, when one of the social "ideals" was the

emphasis on femUy, few people should have been surprised when the FCDA targeted

parents through their chUdren.' "

To help teachers generate student enthusiasm for civU defense, the FCDA

released a chUdren's pamphlet. Duck and Cover, late in 1951. It was this booklet—the

filmstrip came later—that first introduced American chUdren to the original cartoon

character and civU defense mascot, "Bert the Turtle." Bert showed young people how to

react when they heard an air raid siren or saw the flash of an atomic explosion. Upon

hearing the waU of an alarm or witnessing the glare of an atomic blast, Bert dropped to the

ground and puUed his head, legs and taU into his sheU for protection. Noting that people

do not have their own buUt-in shelter on their back, the booklet instmcted chUdren to

"duck" under a desk or crouch against a waU-utUize any sturdy stmcture that might

afford protection. Then, the chUdren were to "cover" their heads vsith schoolbooks, a

jacket, their arms. These simple strategies would, supposedly, help America's youth to

survive an atomic attack. Though the FCDA retired Duck and Cover-and Bert-after

1952, the booklet and the film-short left a definite imprint on the minds of many

Americans. Decades later, adult "baby-boomers" stUl quote the work's catch-phrase title

' "Federal CivU Defense Administration, Interim Instructions, and Idem C/v/7 Defense in Schools (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1952), 2-3; and Brown, "A is for Atom,' 70.

75

at the mention of civU defense, and Bert remains a weU-known "pop" icon of the Atomic

Age.'25

A number of youth organizations joined teachers and Bert the Turtle in the effort

to buUd enthusiasm for civU defense. Boasting the motto, "Be prepared," the Boy Scouts

of America could not escape the issue of civU defense and its caU for preparedness training

for aU Americans. The organization issued its own C/v/7 Defense Guide for troop leaders.

Boy Scouts administrators added something new to the usual regimen of camping

techniques and survival training that scouts leamed-the boys began to receive instmction

on survival during and after an atomic assault. Besides learning the basics of self-

protection, the Boy Scouts of America volunteered its charges for assistance in emergency

services before and after an attack. Scouts watched the skies for enemy planes. They

leamed how to treat bums. They readied their coraps to accommodate evacuees from

bomb-stmck areas. Perhaps most important for the FCDA, however, boy scouts helped

disseminate civU defense information in the form of pamphlets, advisory buUetins, and air­

raid warning cards. One of the Ulustrations in the C/v/7 Defense Guide showed a young

boy pulling a wagon fiUed with civU defense Uterature, intent on doing his good deed for

the day. The Federal CivU Defense Administration gained many tens of thousands of such

patriotic devotees, and an invaluable advertising tool, when it acquired the Boy Scouts of

' Federal CivU Defense Administration, Duck and Cover (Washington, D.C. GPO, 1951).

76

America's support. The Scouts' sister organization. Girl Scouts of America, and

Can^fire Girls volunteered their aid as weU.' ^

CaldweU and the FCDA attempted to enUst the assistance of as many associations

as possible, regardless of the age or professional background of their members. The

Fifties was a decade during which record numbers of Americans joined social and

professional organizations. Americans were trying to "fit in." It was not a safe time to be

different, to "stick out." At a meeting of a RepubUcan women's club, less than a year

before the creation of the FCDA, Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin had announced

that he possessed a list of 205 Communist Party members who worked in the U.S.

Department of State. Federal government-sponsored witch-hunts foUowed. Anti-

communist hysteria rose, as did the fear of being accused. Many people sought to "prove"

that they were no different from the next person, that they were 100% American. By

joining a club, they accomplished the first goal. If it was a civics-minded organization, they

also accomplished the second. With a total membership of 100 miUion people in 1951,

clubs and associations could help indoctrinate nearly two-thirds of the coimtry's

population and could assist in recmiting civU defense volunteers. By December 31, 1951,

more than 200 organizations had offered their support, including such diverse groups as

' Boy Scouts of America, C/v/7 Defense Guide for Council and District Planning (New York: Boy Scouts of America, 1951), 6, 9-18; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, 84-85.

77

the Association of Junior Leagues of America, the American Chemical Society, and the

Loyal Order of the Moose.' ^

CaldweU's staff recognized that reUgious institutions also provided an ideal

mechanism for disseminating information. During the Fifties the United States

experienced a reUgious revival. By the end of the decade, church memberships had grown

by nearly thirty percent, from 86 mUUon people to more than 110 mUUon. Ninety-sbc

percent of the population identified itself as Protestant, CathoUc, or Jew. Bible sales

skyrocketed. The Revised Standard Version was the best-seUing book of 1952. Ben Hur

and The Ten Commandments were two of the most popular movies of the decade.

Congress responded to the growing reUgiosity by adding "In God We Trust" to U.S.

monies and "under God" to the pledge. The Federal CivU Defense Administration

responded by incorporating reUgious institutions into its education and recmiting

campaigns.

Some critics of the decade's heightened reUgiosity argued that, like other

organizations, churches were profiting from the same pressure-prompted "joining mania"

that had benefitted secular organizations. Others contended that the sudden popularity of

' For a more complete treatment of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, see David M. Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy (New York: Free Press, 1983) and Edwin R. BaUey, Joe McCarthy and the Press (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982); Paul A. Carter, Another Part of the Fifties (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 93-94; J. Ronald Oakley, God's Country: America in the Fifties (New York: Dembner Books, 1986), 45; Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, 16-17, 83-88; Advisory BuUetin 105, Advisory BuUetins Binder, OCDM PubUcations, 1950-60, Box 1, RG 396; "Leaders Plan Campaign Against PubUc Apathy," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 2 (1951): 1,4; and "Conference CaUs CD Vital to Preparedness," Civil Defense Alert 1, no. 3 (1951): 1, 3.

78

reUgion was a natural response to the anxiety produced by the threat of an atomic war.

No doubt both suggestions pleased FCDA educators. If church congregations were

comprised of "joining" Americans seeking to dispel their atomic fears, they were a

potentiaUy invaluable target audience. Ministering on a regular basis to the people who

con^rised that group, the clergy—trusted members of every American community—could

serve as most effective aUies to the civU defense authorities. Hence, the FCDA actively

sought the cooperation of church leaders.' *

As one of his first acts. Administrator CaldweU contacted representatives of

large reUgious groups in the United States and asked that they form a committee to assist

in the civU defense effort. In February 1951, delegates from the Churches of Christ, the

CathoUc Welfare Conference, the Synagogue CouncU of America, the Southem Baptist

Convention and the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod responded favorably to CaldweU's

appeal and formed the ReUgious Advisory Committee to the FCDA. It was a conservative

bastion. Noticeably absent from the advisory body were representatives of the more

progressive Christian denominations—such as the Methodists—or of reUgious groups that

opposed war—the Quakers, the Meimonites.' ^

' *Douglas T. MUler and Marion Nowak, The Fifties: The Way We Really Were (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975), 84-92; Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 82-91; Oakley, God's Country, 319-24; and George M. Marsden, Religion and American Culture (New York: Harcourt Brace CoUege PubUshers, 1990), 207-15.

'^^ederal CivU Defense Administration, The Clergy in Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951),m-iv.

79

Besides contending that an effective civU defense program would save Uves

during an attack, FCDA leaders had stated that it would serve as a deterrent to war. Not

everyone beUeved them. A number of individuals and groups contended that civU defense

could produce the opposite result. Spokespersons for some of the denominations not

represented on the ReUgious Advisory Board argued that a nation which could withstand a

nuclear assault might be less incUned to compromise or seek an alternative to war. The

security offered by a sound civU defense program could encourage U.S. diplomats to

assume a more aggressive and mUitant stance when negotiating disputes. It might also add

momentum to the arms race. If the United States or another country developed and

implemented civU defense initiatives that completely negated the threat of the atomic

bomb, it would almost certainly prompt foreign rivals to develop new weapons of even

greater destmctive power."°

Though they provided thought-provoking arguments, civU defense's reUgious

critics were a minority in the early 1950s. Ignoring them, the FCDA Training and

Education Division and the ReUgious Advisory Committee worked together to create an

information pamphlet for ministers. They finished the first draft of the booklet in late

spring. CaldweU then invited dozens of reUgious leaders to the capitol for a June 1951

"^General Conference, Mennonite Church, Minutes, Reports and Findings of the Church and Society Conference (Newton, Kansas: General Conference Mennonite Church, 1961); and Herman WUl, Jr. to Sidney R. Yates, 25 April 1962, "CivU Defense" Folder, Box 75, Papers of Sidney R. Yates, HST.

80

conference on reUgion and civU defense. At the meeting, FCDA employees distributed

copies of the civU defense booklet and invited comments and suggestions for revisions."'

The final version of the pan^hlet. The Clergy in Civil Defense, went into

pubUcation in October 1951. Much of the work focused on the post-attack role of the

clergy. The text stated that by continuing normal reUgious practices, such as holding

worship services, performing reUgious rites, and offering comfort to congregants,

ministers would provide "security and spiritual composure" and therefore would help to

prevent panic and despair. FCDA Training and Education Division personnel did not

question the potential value of the clergy in restoring order after an atomic assault, but, for

them, the more immediate concem was disseminating information and attracting

volunteers. On page three of The Clergy in Civil Defense, the ReUgious Advisory

Committee recommended "that churches and synagogues be encouraged to cooperate in

the pubUc education, recmitment, and training plans of the local civU defense programs."

Clearly, the FCDA's attention to social and professional organizations, and to reUgious

institutions, was an attempt to tum the social trends of the Fifties to its advantage.

Another "institution," or characteristic feature, of the decade that the agency sought to

exploit was the suburban housewife."^

During World War II and the postwar years, the retum of economic prosperity to

the United States had brought with it a longing for the mythical "Good Old Days" of

'"Federal CivU Defense Administration, Clergy in Civil Defense, ui-iv, 1; and Idem, Conference of Religious Leaders in Civil Defense: Report of Meeting on June 13, 1951 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951), 40-43.

"^Federal CivU Defense Administration, Clergy in Civil Defense, m, 3.

81

strong, "traditional" femUies. World War H had boosted the economy and had puUed the

country out of the Great DepressioiL During the war, the armed services drafted miUions

of men for the war, but the federal government stiU looked to its factories to run at fliU

productioiL The reduced size of the nation's available labor supply, manufecturing plants

producing more war goods and less consumer goods, and rationing drove prices and

wages higher. In the postwar years of the late Forties and early Fifties, increased federal

spending, exports to the war-ravaged countries of Westem Europe, and the mass

production of the television and other consumer goods, combined with a domestic

population that wanted to spend its wartime savings, sustained the economic boom-

Financial security also brought on a "Baby Boom." By the early Fifties, a growing number

of couples were marrying young, buying homes and cars, and raising large famiUes.

People could again achieve these American dreams, and often on a single income."'

Gone, but not forgotten, were the Depression years and the perceived tragedies

of nontraditional, matriarchal famUies. Suicide and desertion rates were high during the

Thirties. BeUeving that their presence was just one more burden, unemployed husbands

and fathers often left their famUies for another place in this world, or, sometimes, the next.

Other unemployed men remained at home, but often they were broken, dispirited-mere

phantoms. The end result was the same. Many women assumed the "traditional

responsibUities" of their male counterparts in an effort to ensure the survival of their

'"Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, Inc., PubUshers, 1988), 9, 11, 20; and John Patrick Diggins, The Proud Decades: America in War and Peace, 1941-1960 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988), 177-88, 212.

82

chUdren, their femiUes. Women remained in their expanded dual roles of mothers and

fethers, homemakers and breadwinners when World War II caUed American men away.""

In the Fifties, years removed from the war's end, with mUUons of discharged

servicemen back home, and the economy thriving, the popular press tried to "tum back the

clock" to an earUer, more "normal" era. Magazines, movies and television shows

portrayed the ideal femUy as one in which the woman was a doting wife and homemaker

and the man was an independent, but supportive, husband and father. Each weekday

morning he kissed his wife, scruflfed his chUd's hair, and went to the office to eam the

famUy's income. She worked in the modest suburban home, did the shopping, was active

in civic-minded organizations, and raised the chUdren to be model citizens. Many

Americans bought into the idea; the Federal CivU Defense Administration did also."^

The recruitment of middle-class, suburban housewives held a special appeal for

the FCDA. The agency needed patriotic wardens that not only knew their neighborhoods

weU, but were also home much of the day. If warden responsibUities were reserved for

males, and a bomb stmck between the hours of 8 a.m. and 5 p.m, many neighborhoods

would be without leadership. A large number of wardens would be working at their

""Robert S. McElvaine, The Great Depression: America, 1929-1941 (New YorK: Times Books, 1984), 174-75, 180-84, 339-40; John A. Garraty, The Great Depression: An Inquiry into the causes, course, and consequences of the Worldwide Depression of the Nineteen-Thirties, as seen by contemporaries and in the Light of History (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, PubUshers, 1986), 108-116; MUler and Nowak, 149; and Michael E. Parrish, Anxious Decades: America in Prosperity and Depression, 1920-1941 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1992), 414-15.

"^May, Homeward Bound, 11-23, 136-42; RosaUnd Rosenberg, Divided Lives: American Women in the Twentieth Century (New York: HUl and Wang, 1992), 138-57; and Diggins, Proud Decades, 212.

83

regular jobs in the city, adhering to the role that society had assigned them Even if they

survived the attack, they probably would find themselves stranded, unable to retum home.

On a more macabre note, many areas might be permanently deprived of their wardens if

the enemy scored a direct hit on the city and successfiiUy destroyed its industrial and

financial centers—and the male wardens working there. By recmiting suburban

homemakers the FCDA could buUd a network of "prepared" citizens that was in place

almost 24 hours a day, not one that would function oiUy if an atomic assault occurred after

J p.m.

The agency also appears to have assumed that women would be weU-acquainted

with the outlay and the residents of their neighborhood. The model women, the "June

Cleavers" of the United States, would be perfect hostesses and helpful neighbors. They

would know everything about the other people and houses on their blocks, because they

took cakes to newly-settled neighbors and introduced themselves, and they regularly

visited with the women of the other, estabUshed famiUes. WhUe the FCDA could make

good use of the Mrs. Cleavers, it could also profit from enlisting the aid of another female

stereotype, "Bewitched's" Gladys Cravitts- the binocular-wielding, professional "busy­

body" who knew everything that occurred in her neighborhood. FCDA Administrator

"^Federal CivU Defense Administration, C/v/7 Defense in Outline: A Study Guide for the National Civil Defense Program (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951), 13; and Idem, Warden's Handbook, 3.

84

CaldweU reported that, of the 17 mUUon volunteers required for effective, national civUian

defense, a majority, some 9 mUUon, should be female."^

That women would volunteer for service, the FCDA did not seem to doubt.

Suburban housewives were supposed to be patriotic, responsible citizens and caring

mothers. For centuries, in the United States and in Europe, women had been revered as

the nurturers, the keepers and teachers of spiritual, moral, and national values. The

tradition was perpetuated in the civic and chUd-rearing responsibUities expected of post-

World War II American homemakers. It is apparent that FCDA leaders beUeved that the

protective, mothering instinct then attributed to aU women would push them to leam

about civU defense and join local preparedness agencies. By volunteering for civU defense

training, women could leam how to equip their husbands and chUdren to Uve in the

Atomic Age. They could better ensure their femUy's survival in case of attack. Moreover,

the American system had "worked" for middle-class suburbanites. The FCDA counted on

them to defend not only their famiUes, but the system that had brought them success"*

'"Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, 19-20; and CaldweU, "If A-Bombs Come," 40.

"*May, Homeward Bound, 13-23, 137-149; and "Proofs of [12] Articles," RG 396; for additional sources on the social constraints placed on men and women in the postwar era, consult Benita Eisler, Private Lives: Men and Women of the Fifties (New York: Franklin Watts, 1986); Carol A. B. Warren, Madwives: Schizophrenic Women in the 1950s (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1987); Mary Dinnerstein, Women Between Two Worlds: Midlife Reflections on Work and the Family (PhUadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992); Brett Harvey, The Fifties: A Women's Oral History (New York: Harper CoUins, 1993). For a Ust of sources and authors who dispute the victimization model of the Fifties, consult June Meyerowitz, ed.. Not June Cleaver-Women and Gender in Postwar America, 1945-1960 (PhUadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994).

85

In recognition of women's importance to civU defense, MUlard CaldweU

increased the number and visibUity of females in administrative posts. In early 1951 he

appointed Mrs. John L. Whitehurst to head a women's activities office within the FCDA.

Whitehurst already possessed years of experience as a civilian defender. A resident of

Baltimore, she organized Maryland's female volunteers into a civiUan auxiUary during

World War II. In 1942, the British government issued her a special invitation to visit the

United Kingdom and observe the activities of female civU defense personnel in England.

She accepted, studied the U.K.'s civU defense system, and then retumed to her duties in

Maryland's preparedness organization. Whitehurst was dedicated to preparedness and

increasing pubUc involvement in civU defense. Toward the end of 1951, when CaldweU

decided to create an Office of Volunteer Manpower to handle recmiting efforts, he

appointed Whitehurst head of the new intra-agency office and made her an assistant

administrator within the FCDA."^

A few months prior to Whitehurst's appointment, the administration selected

women as assistant directors for each of nine new regional offices. The FCDA created the

regional centers in October 1950 in an attempt to coordinate better federal and state

activities. Located in Boston, Richmond, Atlanta, Cleveland, Chicago, DaUas (later

moved to Denton), Denver, San Francisco, and Atlanta, the regional offices served as

clearing houses, gathering and channeUng information to and from the state directors and

FCDA headquarters in Washington, D.C. WhUe the women appointed to the assistant

" "FCDA EstabUshes Manpower Office to Spur Recmiting," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 8(1952): 1,3.

86

directorates included a DaUas attomey, Mrs. Margaret Brand Smith, and a former member

of the U.S. House of Representatives, Miss Catherine EUzabeth Falvey, of Boston, most

came from more traditional "female" professions-they were homemakers, teachers,

columnists. AU boasted distinguished records of service to women's organizations.'"°

Thirty-five more women received appointments to a new FCDA Advisory

CouncU for Women's Participation. Just as the agency had created a ReUgious Advisory

Board in order to capitaUze on the growing reUgiosity of the American people, it seems to

have created the women's advisory board in an attempt to refine its targeting of the

coimtry's female population. LUce the women appointed assistant regional directors, the

members of the advisory councU had been active in women's organizations. Many

formerly or concurrently held offices in professional, civic, and/or social associations for

women.'"'

The FCDA tried to tum social trends to its advantage, but the administration's

grand stratagem for persuading the American people to leam about and become involved

in civU defense was much more simple. Figuratively and, on occasion, UteraUy, the FCDA

simply bombarded Americans with the detaUs of civU defense. There was no escape.

Americans heard about civU defense at work, at church, at school, at their club meetings,

and at home. The information found in official pamphlets made its way into the

'" "Nine Women Named to Regional Offices," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 8 (1952): 3; and "Regional Offices Now in Operation for CivU Defense," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 6(1951): 1,5.

'"'"Nine Women Named," 3; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, 83.

87

newspapers and into magazines v^th a wide and varied readership. Time, Life, Look, U.S.

News and World Report, People Today, Cosmopolitan, McCall 's Magazine, Redbook,

Farm Journal aU ran articles on civU defense. In Washington, D.C, even those Americans

that refiised to pick up a magazine or a newspaper could not avoid civU defense Uterature.

Planes from the U.S. Air Force flew over the city and "bombed" the people below with

civU defense leaflets.'"^

To reach those individuals who either could not or simply would not read, the

FCDA tumed many of its pamphlets into movies, television shows, and radio transcripts.

This is Civil Defense, Emergency Action to Save Lives, and a seven-part Survival series

appeared on the major television networks. Survival Under Atomic Attack, narrated by

Edward R. Murrow made it onto "the big screen." Bert the Turtle made radio

appearances across the country whUe the FCDA readied the movie version of Duck and

Cover.''^

The mass media undertaking was staggering in scale, but it cost the FCDA Uttle.

First of all, the Federal Communications Commission required television and radio stations

to run pubUc service announcements. Second, Millard CaldweU and John DeChant

convinced the film industry to produce short civU defense films free of charge. The FCDA

'"^"Convoy Comes to Washington," 17, HST; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, 12.

'"'"Atomic Survival Film Released This Month First of Series," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 1 (1951): 7; "The Federal CivU Defense Audio Visual Program," B FUe, CivU Defense, Box 2, Folder 16, HST; "CivU Defense Offers 'Survival,'" Folder "CivU Defense Campaign-General," Box 5, FUes of Spencer R. Quick, 1952-53, HST; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, 13-15.

88

assured the movie makers that demand from the pubUc and from local governments would

enable them to recover the costs of production. Lastly, the FCDA's pubUc relations team

secured free space for newspaper and magazine articles. In an interview given to U.S.

News and World Report, CaldweU claimed that the administration had saved weU over

twenty miUion doUars.'"" Deputy Administrator James J. Wadsworth praised the film,

newspaper and magazine industries, calling their contributions "the most heartening thing"

in the FCDA's pubUc awareness campgiigns.'"^

In addition to the articles and films, a misceUany of events carried the gospel of

civU defense to the people. A prime target for an enemy strike, the state of New York

appears to have posted the greatest number of civU defense-related activities, but simUar

exercises occurred throughout the country. Months before the people of Washington,

D.C held a parade to welcome the Alert America convoys, some five thousand residents

in Rochester, New York, marched to show their support for civU defense. To the

northwest, in the Niagara FaUs area, nine thousand volunteers from seven counties staged

fire-fighting and rescue missions after a mock attack. And the usuaUy crowded streets of

New York City were deserted and quiet when officials conducted a test exercise on the

morning of November 28. Residents and commuters began to disappear into the city's

'"""Wadsworth Praises Cooperation of FUm Industry," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 2 (1951): 5; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, 15.

'"'CaldweU, "If A-bombs Come," 41.

89

designated shelter areas when they heard the 10:33 a.m alert; they remained there untU

the "aU-clear" sounded ten minutes later.'"^

The driUs, parades, and leaflet bombing of civiUans had as their goal not only an

increased pubUc awareness, but greater pubUc participation in civU defense. E.G. Gerbic,

Director of Merchandising and Advertising for Johnson & Johnson, and CiviUan Defense

Coordinator for the Advertising CouncU, Inc., designed a recmiting kit for the Federal

CivU Defense Administration. The kit included radio and television transcripts, newspaper

and magazine ads, registration forms, and ready-made speeches. This is Civil Defense, the

speaker's kit, came with presentations for a variety of audiences—city, smaU town, even

rural community. The speeches for urban residents pointed out that city-dweUers would

be prime targets in the next war. For the less-threatened Americans Uving in rural areas,

the kit appealed to the farmer's sense of tradition and patriotism'"^ "On these shores,

farm famiUes have been practicing the basic principle of civU defense since long before

there was a United States. Soon after the landing of PUgrims at Massachusetts, pioneer

farmers were practicing mutual aid."'"* "Farm famUies worked together; they planned

'" "Five Thousand Parade," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 5 (1951): 3; "Niagara FaUs Conducts Big CivU Defense Test," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 5 (1951), 5; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, 69.

'"'Theodore S. ReppUer to Charles W. Jackson, 9 April 1951, Folder "CivU Defense Program," Box 1, FUes of Spencer Quick, 1952-53, HST; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, Speakers Kit: This is Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951).

'"*"Suggested Speech on Rural Communities and CivU Defense," 1, in Federal CivU Defense Administration, Speakers Kit: This is Civil Defense.

90

together. Their only safety lay in joint effort for the common defense."'"^ "Perhaps you

have never thought of civU defense in these terms, but, my fiiends, the good neighbor

poUcy and spirit is an important part of it.""° Recruiters were ever-present fixtures at civU

defense speeches and exercises across the country.

Despite aU the presentations, drUls, movies, articles and pamphlets, 1951 did not

yield the results that CaldweU had hoped for and anticipated. In his first annual report to

the members of Congress, CaldweU boasted that eighty-seven percent of the people Uving

in the United States' major industrial centers had leamed the basics of self-protection. His

statement was not factual—he based his estimate on a survey of only eleven cities—yet it

suggested that the FCDA had nearly achieved its goal of educating aU Americans as to the

importance of civU defense. The agency could make no simUar claim with regard to its

recmiting program. WhUe many Americans might have known something about civU

defense, widespread enthusiasm for the project seems to have been lacking. The recmiting

drives netted only 1,870,199 volunteers, or just over 1/10th the number that CaldweU had

told Congress were necessary for a sound, national civU defense program.'''

'"'"Suggested Speech on CivU Defense," 2.

"°Ibid., 4.

1S1( 'Survey Research Center, A Preliminary Report on Public Attitudes Toward Civil Defense...Based on Personal Interviews by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, President's Secretary's FUes Document in Folder 11, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST; Survey Research Center, Defense of Our Cities: A Study of Public Attitudes on Civil Defense (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Survey Research Center, 1951), 1-3; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, xi, 9.

91

In 1952, the FCDA and its sister organizations at the state and municipal levels

expanded their education and recruiting campaigns, and waited for civU defense to "take

root" in the United States. From Wyoming to Texas to Massachusetts, state and local

civU defense bodies held some two thousand operational exercises, conq)lete with

simulated explosions, mass evacuations, and rescues. In April, five milUon New Jersey

residents participated in the nation's first state-wide alert driU. Connecticut and

Pennsylvania conducted state-wide exercises later in the year.'"

CivU defense films, TV spots, and radio announcements multipUed. NBC, CBS,

and ABC frequently showed "Take Cover" and other 1-4 minute television shorts

produced by the FCDA. Twenty-nine hundred radio stations broadcast pubUc

information announcements from FCDA radio kits-the radio spot, "Bert the Turtle," won

an Ohio State University award for "best educational show" for chUdren. Also in 1952,

Bert made his sUver-screen debut. Duck and Cover was just one of four 10-minute films

that the agency released that year. Paramount Pictures produced its own civU defense

newsreel and sent copies to five thousand theatres.'''

The Federal CivU Defense Administration stepped up its assault on the reading

populace, as weU. Newspaper articles on civU defense appeared with more regularity than

in 1951, and the number of magazine articles that covered the topic increased by more

'"Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1952, 5.

'"Federal CivU Defense Administration, "Bert the Turtle Script for Radio Transcription, ChUdren's Program" (Washington, D.C: Federal CivU Defense Administration, n.d.); and Idem, Report for 1952, 45.

92

than sbcty-five percent. In addition, the FCDA released dozens of new technical guides

and pubUc information handbooks.''"

Four of the works addressed a subject that, to many people, was and stUl is

synonymous with civU defense-bomb shelters. Shelter from Atomic Attack in Existing

Buildings, parts I and II, explained how to identify suitable shelter areas in stmctures

raised before 1952 and how to reinforce portions of those buUdings. Interim Guide for

the Design of Buildings Exposed to Atomic Attack proposed "bomb-proof designs for

architects to employ when drawing plans for a new stmcture. Besides writing that the

buUdings should contain a shelter area, at least eighty percent of which was below ground

level, the booklet's authors argued that new industrial faciUties and government buUdings

should be "earthquake-proofed" with concrete and steel reinforcing. The authors reported

that the stmctures in Hiroshima and Nagasaki designed to withstand the effects of an

earthquake had survived the force produced by atomic blasts.' ^

The Federal CivU Defense Administration attracted more than two miUion

recruits in 1952. Many registered during a nation-wide, November recmiting drive. On

November 11, Armistice Day, the Federal CivU Defense Administration kicked off the

"Pledge for Home Defense." From the 11th to the 27th of November, Thanksgiving Day,

' "Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1952, 42.

'"Federal CivU Defense Administration, Shelter from Atomic Attack in Existing Buildings, Part I-Methodfor Determining Shelter Needs and Shelter Areas (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951); Idem, Shelter from Atomic Attack in Existing Buildings, Part II-Improvement of Shelter Areas (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1952); Idem, Interim Guide for the Design of Buildings Exposed to Atomic Blast (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1952); and Idem, Report for 1952, 77.

93

preparedness agencies attenq)ted to convince Americans to volunteer for service. The

FCDA and its state and municipal partners employed aU the weapons avaUable to them-

handbooks, posters, radio and television ads, movies, speeches, raUies.' * Once again, the

Air Force bombed civUians with leaflets. Those people who picked up and examined the

papers that rained down on them read, "This could have been a bomb-Pledge for Home

Defense—Register Today."'"

The massive recruiting canq)aign contributed to the agency's success, but the

refining of another strategy seems, in part, responsible for increased pubUc support. The

FCDA began to place greater emphasis on the value of civU defense auxiUaries in coping

with peacetime disasters—especiaUy natural disasters such as floods, tornadoes, and

hurricanes. Educating Americans in self-protection and first-aid was practical; it could

save Uves even if World War IH never occurred.''*

Today, although the Cold War is over, students in many parts of the United

States continue to participate in civU defense drills. An alarm beU sounds. Teachers

march their charges into the halls, teU them to kneel against a waU and cover their heads

with their hands. The teachers and students perform a "tornado drill," not a bomb driU,

but it is a legacy of the civU defense "duck and cover" years of the 1950s. There were

'' "Kit, Pledge for Home Defense," PubUc History FUes, 1950-62, Folder 3, Box 29, RG 396, NABDCP; and "The Federal CivU Defense Administration presents Signs of Our Time," Folder "CD Campaign-general," Box 5, FUes of Spencer R. Quick, 1952-53, HST.

'"Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1952, 54.

•'*Ibid., 19-22.

94

other practical uses for civU defense. Wardens could assist in the evacuation of flood or

hurricane-threatened areas. PoUce and fire auxUiaries could help restore order after a

natural disaster hit a community. The Federal Emergency Management Administration,

the successor of the civU defense agencies of the Fifties and Sbcties, today concerns itself

almost exclusively with natural disasters.

As early as 1951, the Bureau of the Budget had argued that the FCDA should be

responsible for coordinating the federal response to natural disasters. The FCDA refused,

however, because it was a new agency, and its leaders did not want the added duties. The

Housing and Home Finance Agency accepted the job.'''

Later, CaldweU seems to have realized that he could increase pubUc support for

"readiness" if he demonstrated the practical uses of civU defense during peacetime

emergencies. In the FCDA's first annual report to Congress, he noted that auxiUary

poUcemen assisted in traffic direction and crowd control when a large fire broke out in

Bath, New York. Floods in Missouri and Kansas "furnished hundreds of opportunities for

using civU defense."'^ But CaldweU submitted only a few examples of civU defense in

action. In 1951 there was no measurable response to his weak claim that civU defense was

of much benefit during times of peace as weU as war.

It took the great midwestem floods of 1952 to awaken Americans to the

practical, peacetime value of civiUan defense. For more than a week during mid-April,

' 'James J. Wadsworth to Harry S Truman, 9 January 1953, President's Secretary FUes document in Folder 11, Box 1, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST.

'federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, 70.

95

flood reports occupied the front page of the New York Times. More than one hundred

thousand people in nine states-Montana, North and South Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin,

Kansas, Missouri, Iowa, and Nebraska fled their homes as the Mississippi and Missouri

rivers broke out of their channels and rushed over surrounding flood plains. Fed by the

spring thaw of extremely heavy snow accumulations in the Dakotas and Montana, the

Missouri River posed the biggest threat to midwestem communities. For a thousand mUes

"Muddy Mo" overran its banks. In some areas, the great river sweUed to a width often

mUes, and Army engineers calculated that it blanketed 1.25 miUion acres of fermland."*'

For days, national attention focused on the battle that raged between the

Missouri and flood-fighters at CouncU Bluffs, Iowa, and across the river at Omaha,

Nebraska. Fearing that the river would rise above levees and flood walls, 35,000 of

CouncU Bluffs' 45,000 residents abandoned the city. Another 5,000 people evacuated

Omaha. A force of some 24,000 men—Army engineers, regular Army troops, national

guardsmen, and 9000 civilian volunteers-remained behind to fight the river. They worked

franticaUy along a twenty-three mUe front, pUing sandbags on top of levees which were

five feet short of the anticipated 31.5 foot river crest. The greatest danger to the two

'^'"74,000 Homeless as Floods Expand 'Ghost Town' List," New York Times, 14 April 1952, sec. 1, p. 1, col. 3; "Flood Crest Hits Sioux City Hard, Moves on Omaha," New York Times, 15 April 1952, sec. 1, p. 1, col. 8; "Floods Sweep On: President to Fly to 7-State Parley,: New York Times, 16 April 1952, sec. 1, p. 1, col. 1; "Truman Demands Flood Action Now After Aerial Tour," New York Times, 17 April 1952, sec. 1, p. 1, col. 1; "Rain Turns Levees to Mud as Omaha Awaits Flood Peak," New York Times, 18 AprU 1952, sec. 1, p. 1, col. 1; "Omaha DUces Hold but Sewer Break Poses new Danger," New York Times, 19 AprU 1952, sec. 1, p. 1, col. 3; "Floods Spread Out on Rich Farmland: Crest Past Omaha," New York Times, 20 AprU 1952, sec. 1, p. 1, col. 4; "Floods Rush down on St. Joseph, Mo., and Huge Air Base," New York Times, 21 AprU 1952, sec. 1, p. 1, col. 6.

96

cities came on AprU 18. As the river squeezed through the narrow channel between

CouncU Blufife and Omaha, it rose to a record crest of more than thirty feet. CivUian

volunteers and soldiers manned the levees, plugging weak spots, beating back a river that

poured forth more than 380,000 cubic feet of water by per second. "Muddy Mo" did not

break through or wash over the hastUy raised walls. The floods remained front page news

for several days, but the worst was over. By AprU 21, the river crest had begun to flatten

out, and Army engineers predicted that the crest would "dissipate almost entirely" when

the Missouri merged with the Mississippi River.' ^

New York Times reporters ^plauded the efforts of civiUan volunteers in

containing the flood waters, but they never directly mentioned the importance of civU

defense.'" Once again, it was the "voice of America," Edward R. Murrow, who praised

civilian defense activities. "Everyone I taUted to has said that the key to this whole

business, the reason we raised 13 mUes of levees 3 feet in 6 days, the reason we evacuated

people so smoothly, the reason there was no declaration of martial law, the reason for

almost everything came back to civU defense organization."'^ He continued, "The civU

defense people here did not just make plans to deal with a bombing attack. They trained

'""Crest Hits Sioux City," sec. 1, p. 1, col 8; "Floods Sweep On," sec. 1, p. 1, col. 1; "Missouri Strives to Engulf Omaha," New York Times, 17 AprU 1952, sec. 1, p. 8, col. 1; "Rain Turns Levees to Mud," sec. 1, p. 1, col. 1, and p. 8, col. 3; and "Floods Rush Down," sec. 1, p.l, col. 6.

'""Battle of the Inch Fought With Flood," New York Times, 16 AprU 1952, sec. 1, p. 18, col. 1; and "Thousands in Mud Hold 'Mighty Mo,'" New York Times, 19 April 1952, sec. l ,p . 16, col. 3.

'^Quoted in Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1952, 19.

97

four battaUons of auxUiary firemen....They trained 400 auxUiaiy poUce...." "CivU defense

tried to train at least one person in each home in...first aid...."'"

The floods and other natural disasters provided perfect opportunities for

practicing civU defense. Whether a bomb or a hurricane stmck a community, many of the

results were the same-the destmction of buUdings and fields, large numbers of homeless

and injured people, the need for medical stockpUes and aid from nearby communities. The

April floods and the increased coverage given to the peacetime benefits of civU defense led

to new duties for some state officers and for the FCDA. A number of governors assigned

to their civU defense directors the responsibUity for coordinating flood disaster operations.

The Federal CivU Defense Administration requested the action that the Bureau of the

Budget had suggested a year earUer, namely, that the FCDA assume responsibUity for

coordinating the federal government's responses to natural disasters. In 1952 the Bureau

of the Budget endorsed the proposal, and on January 15, 1953, President Harry S. Truman

confirmed the FCDA's new responsibiUties by issuing Executive Order 10427.'^

It is probable that the focus on the peacetime value of civU defense was a

significant factor in the number of recmits enlisted in 1952. CivU defense organizations

registered more than two miUion volunteers, bringing the grand total to nearly four

miUion. That sum stiU feU fer short of the FCDA's 15-17.5 milUon person goal, but at

least the numbers were on the rise. Agency personnel could not have known that their

' 'Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1952, 21.

'^Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1952, 23; and President, Executive Order 10427, Federal Register, (15 January 1953).

98

yearly recruitment rettims, Uke the "Muddy Mo," had crested, and would never again rise

so high.

The FCDA and its state and municipal counterparts' battle plans had been weU-

laid. The various elements of the education and recruitment campaigns had one common

denominator-they focused on "Americanisms." The FCDA held up American heroes that

epitomized the spirit of civU defense, such as Paul Revere and pioneers on the westem

frontier. It attempted to tie civU defense to "norms" that characterized Fifties America,

for instance, the joining of secular and reUgious institutions, the housewife/mother ideal

for women. Even the FCDA's saturation campaign and the media it used reflected

American values. Employing television, movies, radio, magazines, and newspapers, the

agency mass-produced civU defense for a mass-media and mass-consumption-oriented

society. Lastly, since the nineteenth century, when Alexis de TocqueviUe penned

Democracy in America, Americans had been considered a practical-minded people. The

midwestem floods of 1952 iUustrated the practical value of civU defense during peacetime.

A superficial examination of the FCDA's strategies might convince some observers that

CaldweU should have obtained his 15-17.5 miUion volunteers, but he did not. The

recruiting returns showed a much smaUer number.

Millard CaldweU achieved more in his two years as the FCDA's administrator

than many who foUowed him accomplished during longer terms of office. He was

disappointed with civU defense's progress, however, and he was disenchanted with his

position. Though the FCDA had steadUy expanded under his direction, CaldweU was

99

looking to blame someone for the agency's slow rate of growth, and, by the end of 1952,

he was determined to resign.

100

CHAPTER IV

THE BUCK NEVER STOPPED HERE: BLAME, VALUES,

AND THE END OF THE CALDWELL ADMINISTRATION

"It is idle to complain of pubUc apathy in civU defense so long as official apathy is

obvious. The pubUc looks to its leadership for the cue."' ^ With those words, MUlard

CaldweU placed the blame for civU defense's shortcomings squarely upon the shoulders of

governing officials. Although he argued that municipal, state, and federal governments

shared the blame for civU defense's inadequacies, CaldweU held the men and women on

Capitol HUl most responsible.

CaldweU claimed to understand the initial reluctance to approve large sums for

civU defense. He beUeved representatives and senators were reacting to the apathy shown

by their constituents. But once the Federal CivU Defense Administration's education

campaigns were in fuU swing, and a majority of Americans had leamed what civU defense

was and why its proponents said it was needed, CaldweU no longer understood why the

members of Congress withheld support. During Harry Truman's presidency, the national

legislature faUed to appropriate more than a tenth of the funds requested for civU defense.

" Federal CivU Defense Administration, Annual Report for 1951 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1952), V.

101

CaldweU asserted that the constant slashing of budget proposals undermined the FCDA in

the pubUc mind and crippled the preparedness efforts of the lower governments.'^*

His charges were correct, in part. Congress's parsimony does seem both a

reaction and a contributor to pubUc apathy. CaldweU contended, however, that the

FCDA's promotional efforts convinced a majority of Americans that civU defense was a

necessary part of Ufe in the Atomic Age. Then, more Congressional butchering of civU

defense funding requests began to undo what the FCDA had accompUshed. His assertion

was not home out by the people's habits. In their daily routines and activities Americans

showed their elected officials what they beUeved was most important. CivU defense was

not at the top of the list. CivU defense was present during the Fifties, but it feUed to win

pubUc acceptance. Even after a majority of the people knew the definition and the goals

of civU defense, most faUed to respond to its caU. CaldweU blamed Congress, but some of

the fault feU to the FCDA and its administrator. A large portion of the blame belonged to

no one—civU defense simply did not "fit-in" with the time-honored traditions and

prejudices held by many Americans Uving in the early Fifties.' ^

' *MUlard CaldweU, "If Soviet A-Bombs Come," interview in US News & World Report, 12 October 1951, 38; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, v-vi, xi, 6, 8-9.

'^^niversity of Michigan Survey Research Center, C/v/7 Defense in the United States, 1952 (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Survey Research Center, 1952), 13, 17, 43-44; Federal CivU Defense Administration Press Release, 29 June 1952, Folder: CivU Defense Campaign-General (2), Box 5: Ch-CivU D, FUes of Spencer R. Quick, Papers of Harry S Truman [hereafter HST], Harry S Truman Library [hereafter HSTL], and Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, v-vi, xi, 6, 8-9.

102

StUl, MUlard CaldweU could not see beyond Congress. Time and again the

national legislature hamstrung civU defense initiatives by withholding appropriations. In

March 1951 President Truman requested $403 miUion for civU defense, designating $250

miUion of the sum for shelter constmction. The federal government had pledged it would

match state and municipal expenditures for the creation of blast-resistant areas in new or

existing buUdings. The FCDA was unable to keep its promise, however, because

Congress aUocated a scant $31.75 milUon for civU defense. As a consequence of the

dearth in fimding, the only parts of the shelter program that the agency acted upon were

research into home and pubUc shelter constmction, and the identification of existing

stmctures that could withstand—or could be modified to withstand—the force of an atomic

explosion.'^°

CivU defense's fimding problems did not improve greatly throughout Truman's

tenure as president. Congress apportioned approximately ten percent of the total that the

president requested. Toward the end of June 1951, when Truman submitted his budget

proposal for fiscal year 1952, he asked $535 mUUon for civU defense. The members of

Congress reduced that amount to $75 mUUon, and they earmarked $56 mUUon for

emergency stockpUes of medicine, medical and firefighting equipment, and other suppUes.

Again, the shelter program was put on hold. With each financial postponement of civU

defense initiatives, Truman raised his budget demands. For fiscal 1953 he requested $600

' ' President's Press Release, 1 March 1951, President's Secretary's FUes document in Folder 13, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST; Congressional Quarterly Service, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964 (Washington, D.C: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1965) 267; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, 50-52.

103

mUUon for civU defense, but Congress remained opposed to spending such large amounts

on "passive" defense. It granted the FCDA a mere $43 mUUon. Besides delaying the

shelter program, the reductions in federal appropriations forced the FCDA to discharge

350ofll50en^loyees.'^'

Administrator CaldweU was fiirious with the lack of congressional support. In

press releases, speeches, and reports, he and other leading officials within the Federal CivU

Defense Administration lashed out at the members of the national legislature. Congress

had passed the CivU Defense Act in January 1951, but only two months later it

appropriated less than one-eighth of the FCDA's fimding requests. The House and the

Senate began gutting civU defense before it was a weU-estabUshed program whose

effectiveness could be gauged. CaldweU argued that the members of Congress were

making his job inqjossible. How could he successfiiUy buUd a program that required the

cooperation of the states, the municipaUties—the cooperation of every citizen in the

country—when the federal government was not united in its support of civU defense

poUcy? The national legislature's actions influenced the lower governments' and the

people's responses to civU defense.' ^

'^'President's Press Releases, 21 June 1951 and 2 November 1951, President's Secretary's FUes documents in Folder 14, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST; President's Press Releases, 24 AprU 1952 and 15 July 1952, President's Secretary's FUes documents in Folder 13, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST; Congressional Quarterly Service, Congress and Nation, ll^, and J. J. Wadsworth to employees, 18 July 1952, Folder: Letters, MisceUaneous, Box 11, Alphabetical Section: Leaflets to Materials, PubUc History FUes, 1950-62, RG 396, National Archives and Records Administration, CoUege Park, Md.

'^Federal CivU Defense Administration Press Release, 29 June 1952, and FCDA DaUy News Digest, 30 July 1952, Folder: CivU Defense Canpaign-General (2), Box 5,

104

CaldweU had powerful aUies who echoed his arguments. Independently and

through the Governors' CouncU, the states' chief executives ejq^ressed their

disappointtnent.'^' City leaders added their voices to the storm of criticism''" In a letter

penned July 20, 1951, Mayor WUUam F. Devin of Seattle, president of the American

Municipal Association, detaUed the concerns of some forty mayors. Devin sent copies of

the letter to President Truman and to the members of the Senate, the House of

Representatives, and the National Security CouncU. Expressing the views of many

municipal leaders he wrote, "The people who would be kUled or injured by an atomic

attack Uve in the cities we represent. They look to us for protection. We have to see

them daUy. We would Uke to teU them that our cities are weU prepared in case of an

enemy attack and that our state and national resources are behind them in any fight for

survival. We can not [sic] teU them so at this time." He continued, writing that the

$31.75 mUUon Congress appropriated in the spring of 1951 "was almost a death blow to

the entire civU defense program." He argued that the wholesale slashing of the proposed

budget had led taxpayers to wonder why their local governments demanded more money

Ch-CivU D., FUes of Spencer R. Quick, HST, HSTL; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1951, v-vi, xi, 6.

'^'"Dewey Appeals to People to Support CivU Defense," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 4 (1951): 4; and MUlard CaldweU to Frank J. Lausche, 13 April 1951, Folder: Letters, Miscellaneous, Box 11, PubUc History FUes, RG 396.

' ""Mayors CaU for Stronger Support of CivU Defense," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 4 (1951): 3.

105

for civU defense, since the behavior of the federal government indicated it was

nonessential.'^'

President Truman dashed off a response to Devin. He agreed that Congress had

neglected its responsibUities to the cities and to the American people. "We cannot afford

to gamble with the Uves of our citizens," he wrote. Truman assured Mayor Devin that he,

at least, was and would remain a staunch supporter of civU defense.' *

He did. The man who had signed the CivU Defense Act into law in January of

1951 was one of civU defense's most visible—and vocal—champions. His praise for civiUan

"readiness" provided the FCDA with an endless string of quotes. He attended civU

defense exhibits. He recorded messages to be played for volunteers. He met with state

and municipal civU defense directors. He offered encouragement to those individuals

laboring to constmct a viable, national, civU defense program, and he chastised the people

and government bodies that he beUeved were undermining "preparedness" efforts.'^

President Truman recognized that grass-roots support for civU defense was

lacking. In a speech given on the first anniversary of his signing of the CivU Defense Act,

' 'WUUam F. Devin to the President of the United States [Harry S Truman], 20 July 1951, Official FUe document. Folder 4, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST.

' ^Harry S. Truman to WUUam F. Devin, 2 August 1951, Official FUe document. Folder 4, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST.

'^John T. Gibson to Mr. Perlmetter, memorandum, 23 July 1951, Official FUe document. Folder 8, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST; John DeChant to Joseph Short, 22 October 1951, Folder 5, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST; MUlard CaldweU to Matthew ConnaUy, 1 January 1952, Folder 8, Box 2, CivU Defense B FUe, HST; "Conference CaUs CD Vital to Preparedness," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 3 (1951): 1, 3; President's Press Release, 21 June 1951, HST; and President's Press Release, 24 AprU 1952, HST.

106

he compUmented the FCDA on its promotional activities and the nearly two mUUon

recmits that it had attracted in 1951. But that was not enough, he wamed. He chaUenged

civU defense personnel to redouble their efforts to stimulate interest among the masses. It

would not be an easy task, the president remarked. Theirs was a "tough, unpleasant, but

grimly necessary job."' *

Truman, Uke Administrator CaldweU, argued that the greatest obstacle to nation­

wide preparedness, that the stumbUng block which made the responsibiUties of civU

defense promoters so "tough" and "unpleasant," was Congress. He contended that the

constant slashing of the Federal CivU Defense Administrations's budget proposals

constituted an "indirect nuUification of our laws."' ^ In less strident tones. President

Truman repeated this assertion on the day he sent the FCDA's first annual report to

Congress, AprU 24, 1952. Addressing the members of the national legislature he said, "In

January 1951, the Congress passed the basic legislation under which our civU defense

program has been set up. It is good legislation...But ever since this law was enacted, the

program has been starved for lack of adequate appropriations."'**^ Truman contended that

the refiisal to aUocate the necessary funding also posed a threat to national security. "I

want to be as clear about this as I can," he stated. "We simply cannot afford a penny-

wise-pound-fooUsh attitude about the cost of adequate civU defense...Every weakness in

' *PwZ>//c Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S Truman, 1945-1953, vol. 8 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1966), 26.

"President's Press Release, 21 June 1951, HST.

'*^resident's Press Release, 24 AprU 1952, HST.

107

civU defense increases an aggressors' temptation to attack us. Every weakness in our civU

defense adds to the strength of a potential enemy's stockpUe of atomic bombs.'"*'

As evidenced by the consistent, extreme reductions in federal funding for civU

defense, the members of Congress ignored the criticisms leveled at them They had their

reasons for strictly Umiting civU defense appropriations. Congress offered a number of

sound arguments. When civU defense spokespersons demanded aUocations for shelter,

StockpUe, or emergency services appropriations, the doUar amounts proffered often

seemed to be spur-of-the-moment estimates, rather than the result of carefiU studies.

FCDA officials stated that their agency was in the midst of researching the country's

shelter and stockpUe needs. DetaUed reports were forthcoming, they noted, but they

required money to continue the studies and to begin stockpUing suppUes and modifying

existing buUdings for attack. Congress was reluctant to hand over the amounts requested

without hard evidence of the need for the money. They feared that civU defense would

become an unjustified money-pit that would absorb bUUons of doUars and would serve

Uttle purpose. CaldweU himself recognized that the members of the national legislature

saw the possibUity of another, ever-expanding federal bureaucracy, and insatiable

constmction projects.'*^

'*'President's Press Release, 24 AprU 1952, HST.

'* Harry P. Yoshpe, "Our Missing Shield: The U.S. CivU Defense Program in Historical Perspective, Final Report for Federal Emergency Management Agency," Washington, D.C, Contract No. DCPA 01-79-C-0294, April 1981; and CaldweU, "If A-Bombs Come," 39.

108

FCDA Administrator CaldweU was partiaUy responsible for Congress' concerns.

Although he usuaUy requested only a couple hundred miUion doUars for shelter projects,

and though he did not advocate buUding enough protective fecUities to house every person

in the United States, CaldweU once stated that a complete shelter program—one that

would cover the needs of aU U.S. citizens-would cost $300 bUUon. It was a fooUiardy

statement, largely based on personal conjecture, but Congress did not forget.'*'

WeU might Congress balk at the thought of paying out $300 bUUon for shelters,

or contributing to the exponential growth of yet another federal bureaucracy, but some of

its excuses for denying federal funds to the FCDA were less sound. In June of 1952

Congressional leaders declared that one reason they were withholding support was the

FCDA had not spent aU of the monies previously aUocated to civU defense. Administrator

CaldweU argued that Congress had ignored FCDA contracts for research and equipment.

The Federal CivU Defense Administration was waiting to pay for services and suppUes that

had yet to be deUvered, but the agency had obUgated its entire budget, he noted.'

Perhaps even more distressing to the administrator were earUer deUberations by

the House Appropriations Committee. In the spring of 1951, the committee's members

suggested withholding mUUons of doUars because, even with the money, civU defense

protective measures probably would not be in place by the end of the year. The

committee report stated that "leaders in Government" had testified that the country feced

184

'*'CaldweU, "If A-Bombs Come," 41; and Yoshpe, "Our Missing Shield."

'*"Federal CivU Defense Administration Press Release, 29 June 1952, FUes of Spencer R. Quick, HST.

109

"its greatest danger from enemy action during the present year." The House

Appropriations Committee recommended denying funds to the FCDA since "they could

not be expended in time to meet the present emergency.'"*' The committee then proposed

the creation of a $100 mUUon Emergency Fund that the FCDA could tap after the United

States entered a period of emergency.'*^

FCDA officials were Uvid. The House would not approve civU defense funding

because readiness initiatives would not be whoUy completed by December 31, 1951? In a

point-by-point analysis of the House Appropriations Committee report, the FCDA caUed

the committee's recommendation "an amazing statement" and asked why, if Congress was

in tmth taking such a "fetaUstic approach" to U.S. defense, bUUons of doUars had been

aUocated for "fer-reaching" mUitary projects that would not be completed during the

calendar year.'*^ Addressing the Emergency Fund proposal, the FCDA analysis stressed

that the main purpose behind the creation of the national civU defense program was the

need to equip the United States with the information and tools necessary to prepare for,

and recover from, a future attack. CivU defense focused on "preparedness" and

"readiness." The FCDA's report said of the Emergency Fund, "This is the phUosophy

which would lock the bam door after the horse is stolen.'"**

'*'Quoted in "Federal CivU Defense Administration Point by Point Analysis, House Appropriations Committee Report," p. 2, Folder: Letters: MisceUaneous, Box 11, Alphabetical Section: Leaflets to Materials, PubUc History FUes, 1950-62, RG 396.

'*'"Point by Point Analysis," 5, RG 396.

'* Ibid., 2.

'**Ibid., 5.

110

In its later budget deUberations, Congress dumped the Emergency Fund, but its

mere suggestion is important for interpreting Congressional attitudes toward civU defense.

Refijsing fimds untU a period of national emergency foUowed the estabUshed pattem of

attention to civU defense only during moments of crisis. The House had claimed that 1951

was the year in which the United States would face the greatest possibiUty of attack, but

by spring the Korean Conflict had once again stabUized, with United Nations forces

entrenched south and communist troops north of the 38th paraUel. Moreover, officers

within both the Department of State and the Department of Defense showed a willingness

to accept a stalemate, rather than once again attenq)t to subjugate aU of North Korea and

risk further expansion of the conflict. The aura of crisis which had surrounded the passage

of the CivU Defense Act of 1950 had abated. The members of Congress and their

constituents could relax a bit and tum their attention to other matters.'*'

The vast majority of Americans were not focusing on the Korean War and the

possible "need" for civU defense; they were attempting to capitaUze on the economic

opportunities and the comforts that the Fifties offered. They were earning and spending

money. During the 1950s, Americans set new records for personal consumption. Annual

rates cUmbed to $218 bUUon in 1952. In an era when conformity and "fitting-in" were at a

premium, middle-class Americans and those striving to appear middle class found it

essential to "have" what everyone else had, just as it was necessary to act Uke the rest of

the crowd. Americans packed their homes with televisions, record players, appUances,

'*'CaUum A. MacDonald, Korea: The War Before Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1982), 90-92.

I l l

and new furniture, and to keep up personal appearances they purchased new clothes,

mouthwash, and cologne. The people spent the more than $150 bUUon that they had

saved during World War H, and they increased their buying power by making purchases

on the instaUment plan and applying for the latest consumption tool-the credit card.

Diners Club was introduced in 1950, and American Express appeared a few years later.'^

Business promoters added to the spending frenzy by equating one's purchases

with one's patriotism. They proclaimed the growing rates of consumption an Ulustration

of Americans' beUef in, and support o^ the capitalistic system. This rationale suggested

that the famiUes that spent the most were least Ukely to be communist. Spending was

American. Spending was moral. Be a patriot. Do what is right. Consume more, business

prompted.'''

Many Americans were quite susceptible to the "pressure pitches" of

advertisements and, just as importantly, to group pressure. David Riesman, author of The

Lonely Crowd, posited that middle-class Americans were no longer self-reUant and

independent in their thinking. They were no longer "inner directed." Instead, most were

now "other directed," their ideas and standards formulated by the group or the

organization. Americans strove for consensus and harmony. They "fit-in," they showed

they were part of a larger, feceless whole of "Americans" by foUowing the prescribed

habits of marrying young and accepting the roles assigned to their gender—the men taking

'^Survey Research Center, C/v/7 Defense, 13; and Douglas T. MUler and Marion Nowak, The Fifties: The Way We Really Were (Garden City, New York: Double Day & Company, Inc., 1977), 116, 119.

' 'MUler and Nowak, The Fifties, 119.

112

corporate jobs, the women becoming model housewives. They bought modest homes in

the suburbs and fiUed them with modem conveniences and with chUdren. The "typical"

nuclear age femUy attended church regularly, and each femUy member "belonged" to other

groups or associations—such as the Boy and Girl Scouts, the Junior League, and the

KiwanisClub.'^^

If Americans were so fixated on conformity and a consensus that was predicated

on one's "Americanism," why then did civU defense organizations experience so many

difficulties with their recruiting efforts? One possible explanation can be extrapolated

from Paul Carter's study of Fifties culture. Carter argued that the record numbers of

people who joined clubs in the 1950s did so in an attempt to extend their private Uves.

EUcs and Junior Leaguers, V.F.W.'s and Daughters of the American Revolution, they were

most interested in expanding their social circles. They cared Uttle for their clubs "as

vehicles for pubUc action," he contended. CivU defense offered some opportunities for

socializing, especiaUy for neighborhood wardens, but it required training, work, and taking

a stand on the "preparedness" issue. To volunteer for civU defense was to become a civU

defense advocate.'''

Douglas T. MUler and Marion Nowak offered another possible explanation in

The Fifties: The Way We Really Were. MUler and Nowak stated simply that the emphasis

on conformity and consensus produced a people that "seemed smothered in a blanket of

' ^David Reisman, The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), 3-31.

'''Paul Carter, Another Part of the Fifties (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 94-95.

113

inertia, apathy..." "Apathy" was one of the words civU defense leaders employed most

when they assessed the pubUc's attitudes toward preparedness.""

In addition, the mere passing of time worked against civU defense in the Fifties.

The longer the ranks of the preparedness agencies remained only partiaUy fiUed, the less

their chance of ever meeting their recruitment goals, because civU defense would be

perceived by more and more individuals as feUing outside the consensus. To volunteer for

civU defense would be to leave the safety of the group; it would draw attention. The

FCDA and its sister organizations at the lower levels of government needed to "seU" civU

defense quickly.

Although the Federal CivU Defense Administration saturated the pubUc with the

details of civU defense and portrayed it as an American tradition, only 4 miUion people had

volunteered by the end of 1952. The civU defense education campaigns themselves were

partiaUy responsible for the lack of recruits! Numerous civU defense pamphlets and

announcements minimized the danger of an atomic attack. Down-playing the seriousness

of radiation sickness and portraying atomic bombs as Uttle more than "big" conventional

bombs curbed the fear and the sense of urgency that would yield volunteers for civU

defense."^

No doubt some members of the American pubUc found the FCDA's

nonconfrontational strategies difficult to accept. To some people, it must have appeared

""MUler and Nowak, The Fifties, 131.

" AUan M. Winkler, Life Under a Cloud: American Anxiety About the Atom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 114-116; and National Security Resources Board, Survival Under Atomic Attack {"^ostmi^on, D.C: GPO, 1950), 20-26.

114

cowardly. CivU defense offered two responses to the sudden appearance of enemy planes.

Americans could "duck and cover,"—hide under desks and in shelters—or they could effect

a mass evacuation—run away from the danger. These options were no doubt inconsistent

with what most citizens perceived as the United States' traditional response to an

aggressor. Though a majority of Americans Uving in the Fifties would have contended

that the United States did not start wars, they would have asserted that neither did their

country lose wars, because Americans did not back down or cower when threatened. The

image of mUUons of Americans scurrying underground, huddling together, praying,

trembUng, and crying must have been much less palatable than the thought of remaining

above-ground, defiant, whUe the might of the U.S. armed forces swatted the aggressors

from the skies. "

Indeed, a major concem for civU defense officials was the pubUc's faith in the

United States mUitary. To convince Americans that civU defense was an urgent need,

FCDA pubUcations and advertisements quoted defense leaders who had announced that

the mUitary, alone, could not offer sufficient protection from an atomic attack. The names

and statements that the FCDA produced were impressive. Secretary of Defense Robert A.

Lovett caUed civU defense a co-equal partner with the mUitary. Generals Omar Bradley

and George C MarshaU agreed. U.S. Air Force Secretary Thomas K. Finletter and

General Hoyt Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, stated that a majority of the planes in

"^Rupert WUkinson, American Tough: The Tough-Guy Tradition and American Culture (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984), 3-10; and "Training Imperative to CivU Defense, Leaders Hear," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 3 (1951): 4.

115

a Soviet bombing offensive would make it to their targets.'" The FCDA quoted General

Vandenberg's declaration that, "Even if we had many more interceptor planes and anti­

aircraft guns, and a radar screen that blanketed aU approaches to our boundaries, a

predictable 70% of the enemy's planes would penetrate our defenses, despite the

extraordinary skiU and valor of our pUots.""*

CivU defense personnel constantly repeated Vandenberg's warning, but to Uttle

effect. The pubUc must have written off Pearl Harbor as an aberration. The continental

United States had never suffered a serious air-assault. Besides, there existed the attitude

that the United States' armed forces were invincible. In 1951, a study produced by the

University of Michigan's Survey Research Center showed that sbcty-nine percent of the

survey participants beUeved the U.S. military able to "completely protect" or at least

"prevent heavy damage" to American cities."' In his comments on the report, MUlard

CaldweU wrote, "This type of bUnd faith in miUtary protection is perhaps the most serious

road-block to pubUc action and participation in civU defense that has yet been

"^"Top MUitary Leaders Say CD is a Co-Partner," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 6 (1951), 1-5; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, This is Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951), 5.

"*Hoyt Vandenberg quoted in Federal CivU Defense Administration advertisement, C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 10 (1952), 4.

'""A PreUminary Report on PubUc Attitudes Toward CivU Defense...Based on Personal Interviews by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigaa 1950-1951," President's Secretary's FUes document. Folder 11, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST.

116

encountered."^^ President Truman caUed it an "alarming trend" and asked Secretary of

Defense Robert Lovett to meet with him so they could "plan an immediate course of

action" to counter pubUc misconceptions.^^' The information indicating this "alarming

trend" was deleted from the copies of the research center's survey that were released to

the pubUc. ^ The FCDA staff also continued to hammer away at what they beUeved was

an incorrect assessment of the country's defensive capabUities, but CaldweU's old nemesis,

Congress, reinforced the popular opinion by aUocating bUUons for the mUitary and only a

few miUions for civU defense. In a critique of the House Appropriations Committee's

proposed reduction of the civU defense budget for Fiscal Year 1953, CaldweU charged the

committee members' actions showed a "a ridiculous disregard of reaUty." °'

The members of Congress were not the only ones to disregard reaUty. The 1951-

52 civU defense campaigns refused to recognize that the majority of Americans were not

white, middle-class suburbanites. In his monumental work. The Invisible Man, Ralph

Ellison teUs the story of an Afiican American who strives to discover his self-worth in a

society that fails to recognize the value of its minority citizens. The story begins with the

^ ' MUlard CaldweU to Robert A. Lovett, n. d.. President's Secretary's FUes document. Folder 11, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST.

2°'Harry S Truman to Robert A. Lovett, 7 February 1952, President's Secretary's FUes document, Folder 11, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST.

" MUlard CaldweU to Robert A. Lovett, n.d., HST.

^ 'Federal CivU Defense Administration Press Release, 29 June 1952, HST.

117

Unes, "I am an invisible man....I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to

see me."^^

Black Americans were "invisible" to the Federal CivU Defense Administratioa

On pamphlet covers and in agency photos and films the feces were Caucasian, the fashions

middle class, and the houses suburban. Each issue of the FCDA's news serial. The Civil

Defense Alert, contained numerous photographs of white, middle-class Americans

engaged in preparing for attack. The July-August 1951 edition included a photo of FCDA

secretary Pat Searles—wearing pearls and an evening gown, her hair perfectly coifed—

packing soap into a household first aid kit. An Ulustration on the cover page of The

Warden's Handbook showed twenty-one prospective wardens, eight women and thirteen

men, aU of whom were white. The artist depicted a few in civU defense helmets, but

others—including a doctor, a farmer, and a coUege graduate—wore clothes that indicated

their professional status. A stethoscope hung around the doctor's neck, and a graduation

cap and tassel identified the coUege student. The actors in the "Survival" series and Paul

and Patty, two of Bert the Turtle's human co-stars in "Duck and Cover" also conformed

to the stereotype projected by FCDA pubUcations. Throughout the 1950s, when Blacks

appeared in civU defense pamphlets or posters, usuaUy they were hidden behind the feces

of whites, or they were portrayed as attack victims, being attended by trained, paternalistic

Caucasian Americans. "^

^^Ralph EUison, Invisible Man (1947; reprint. New York: Random House, 1952), 3.

2° Photo insert, C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 4 (1951): 3; Federal CivU Defense Administration, The Warden's Handbook (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951); Federal CivU

118

Once again, the Federal CivU Defense Administration's actions reflected the

cultural and social trends of Fifties America. The FCDA was not alone in its exclusion of

Afiican-Americans from pubUcations and films. "I Love Lucy" starred Cuba-bom Desi

Amaz, and "The Honeymooners" focused on the Uves of working-class Americans, but

most television shows featured "Uly-white," middle-class famUies Uke those found in

"Father Knows Best," "Leave it to Beaver," and "Ozzie and Harriet." Black Americans

did not appear on "the tube." Caucasian, male Americans owned aU of the television

broadcast stations throughout the Fifties and on into the Seventies. It was 1970 before

Congress and the judiciary sought to diversify programming and pressured the Federal

Communications Commission (FCC) to give preference to minorities that appUed for

broadcast Ucenses. Black Americans were almost as rare on the sUver screen as they were

on television in the Fifties. When they did manage to secure roles in movies, they often

found themselves playing loveable, but semi-inteUigent domestics. Afiican-Americans did

not fit in with the image that the FCDA or the majority of television and movie

broadcasters wished to project, so they were either excluded or marginaUzed. ^

Defense Administration and National Education Association Safety Commission, Duck and Cover (n.p.: Archer Productions, Incorporated, 1952), filmstrip; and "The Federal CivU Defense Administt-ation Presents Signs of Our Times," Folder: CivU Defense Campaign-General (2), Box 5, FUes of Spencer R. Quick, HST.

^^Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Regulating Broadcast Programming (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press and AEI Press, 1995), 89; and Joel Spring, Images of American Life: A History of Ideological Management in Schools, Movies, Radio, and Television (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), 184.

119

Many Afiican-Americans anticipated that the FCDA would manifest the

traditional prejudices of southem whites-especiaUy with MUlard CaldweU heading the

agency. When President Truman nominated CaldweU to the position of FCDA

administrator, spokespersons for the nation's Black community opposed the appointment.

Hundreds of protest letters poured into the White House. Chapters of the National

Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) authored and dispatched

most of the communications, but other organizations-such as the Brotherhood of

Sleeping Car Porters and the Congress of Racial EquaUty-and individual private citizens

sent many. °

Besides petitioning the president, the NAACP contested the nomination by

appeaUng to another branch of the federal government. On January 15, a subcommittee of

the Senate's Armed Services Committee held a hearing on the subject of CaldweU's

nomination. Clarence MitcheU, director of the NAACP's Washington Bureau, testified on

behalf of his organization and Afiican-Americans throughout the United States. MitcheU

charged that CaldweU was a racist. He quoted the former govemor's pubUc indictments

of the Supreme Court's decision to open the Democratic primaries to Black voter

participation. "* He claimed that CaldweU had refused to remove from office a sheriff

^"^Folders: 2965-MisceUaneous (1945-1950), 2965-MisceUaneous (Jan.-March 1951), and 2965-MisceUaneous (April 1951-53), Box 1743, Official FUes, HST.

®*U.S. Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on Nomination of Millard Frank Caldwell, Jr. to be Federal Civil Defense Administrator, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951, 1-3.

120

"who was a central figure in a terrible lynching."^"' MitcheU even contended that

CaldweU, Uke other southem whites, refused to address Blacks as "mister" in written

correspondence in order "to remind them forever that they are inferior...." '°

CaldweU did not deny the charges, but he did respond. He admitted that he

disagreed with the Supreme Court's mUng, and he refused to apologize for his views. "I

happen to beUeve that a group of people voluntarily in an association have the right to

select the membership of that association," he stated.^" With regard to the "lynching"

sheriff, CaldweU said a person was kUled, but no "lynching" took place. He then asserted

that he had not dismissed the sheriff in question because the people would have

proclaimed the official a martyr and would have reelected him to office. Instead of firing

him, CaldweU told the members of the subcommittee, "I castigated him, and as a result of

that castigation, the people of the county defeated him and a better sheriff was elected." '

When CaldweU spoke on the issue of written salutations, he again refused to deny the

charge or to apologize for his actions. "I reserve the right to address any person...in such

manner as I please and in accordance with my own views," he said. He continued, "There

are many white people for whom I do not reserve the title of'mister'."^"

^ ^ . S . Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on Caldwell, 3.

^'%id.

2"Ibid., 11.

' Ibid.

2"lbid.

121

Clarence MitcheU argued that President Truman had made a grave mistake when

he nominated CaldweU to the post of FCDA administrator. He asserted that Truman's

decision was not based on any particular merits that CaldweU possessed. The nomination

was an attentat, rather, to appease the Dbdecrats-white, racist, southem Democrats who

had broken with the party in 1948 because of its endorsement of mUd civU rights reform

Such an appointment was wrong, MitcheU contended. Since the FCDA administrator

would be responsible for protecting the Uves of aU American citizens, he or she had to be

bUnd to race, social status and party affiUations. '" MitcheU stated, "...his [CaldweU's]

record shows that he would not avoid dual standards on the basis of race." He continued,

"If a bomb drops we do not want regulations that require citizens to nm 10 blocks to a

separate racial shelter when one marked for 'whites only' is just around the comer." '

Despite CaldweU's obvious racial bias and the wit, eloquence, and tmth of

MitcheU's statements, the members of the subcommittee asked few questions and offered

Uttle opposition to CaldweU's appointment. Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon pressed

CaldweU on the issue of addressing blacks as "mister," but he dropped the subject when

CaldweU noted that the FCDA was already foUowing a manual on correspondence

formatting which required "a uniform type of salutation" for aU agency letters. ' Senator

Estes Kefeuver of Tennessee then asked CaldweU if he harbored any views which would

'"U.S. Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on Caldwell, 2.

2'%id., 6.

2'%id., 12-13.

122

prevent him from "fairly administering the law." CaldweU responded, "Senator, I see

nothing." ' The hearing ended shortly thereafter, and the Senate confirmed MUlard

CaldweU as administrator of the FCDA.

In an attempt, seemingly, to pacify Afiican Americans, President Truman later

appointed Mary McLeod Bethune to the thirteen-person CivU Defense Advisory CouncU.

Bethune, Uke CaldweU, was a staunch Democrat and a resident of Florida. The founder

and president-emeritus of Bethune-Cookman CoUege in Daytona Beach, she also boasted

the distinctions of having served as vice-president of the NAACP, director of minority

affairs for the National Youth Administration, and as an advisor to former president

Franklin D. Roosevelt. When Bethune resigned from the FCDA Advisory CouncU in

1952, President Truman fiUed the vacancy with Dr. Margaret Just Butcher, an associate

professor of EngUsh at Howard University, the daughter of renowned biologist Dr. Emest

E. Just.2'*

Both Bethune and Butcher were highly-respected and competent women, but it is

apparent that they served only as window-dressing for the Federal CivU Defense

Administration. The tme power of the FCDA did not rest v^th the advisory councU; it

was wielded by the administrator-MUlard CaldweU. PubUc Law 920, the CivU Defense

' U.S. Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on Caldwell, 13.

"*"Advisory CouncU CaUs for FuU Support of CD," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 5 (1951):4; Federal CivU Defense Administration Press Release, n.d.. Folder: CD Campaign-General (1), Box 5, Ch-CivU D, FUes of Spencer R. Quick, HST; Mary McLeod Bethune to Harry S. Truman, 24 November 1951, Official FUe document. Folder 10, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST; and Donald S. Dawson to WUUam J. Hopkins, memorandum, 5 May 1951, Official FUe document. Folder 9, Box 2, CivU Defense B FUe, HST.

123

Act of 1950, stated that the members of the councU were to "advise and consult with the

Administrator with regard to general or basic poUcy matters." This was easUy

accompUshed, since PubUc Law 920 also declared the administrator chairperson of the

advisory councU. The law further Umited the councU's power by requiring it to convene

only once each year. The administrator, alone, could caU additional meetings of the body.

Lastly, the CivU Defense Act of 1950 permitted the FCDA's administrator to create other,

more speciaUzed, advisory bodies as he or she saw fit.^"

In his pubUc addresses, CaldweU spoke of the need for a color-bUnd, non-partisan

civU defense program. In a speech that he made to several hundred representatives from

different civics groups, CaldweU said, "The Federal CivU Defense Administration must

work with people without regard to poUtical parties, reUgion and races. We must work

with Democratic and RepubUcan Govemors alike. It has been our purpose, and in that we

have succeeded, to keep FCDA on a nonpoUtical basis." " The reaUty of the FCDA's

pubUc education and recmitment campaigns faUed to conform, however, to CaldweU's

lofty rhetoric. African-Americans were invisible to the Federal CivU Defense

Administration.

So were lower-income Caucasians. They too feU outside the economic and

social class targeted by the FCDA. The poor did not grace the covers of agency

pamphlets or appear in the organization's news serials. The FCDA appealed to suburban

^^^U.S Statutes at Large 64 (1950-1951): 1247-48.

22°MUlard CaldweU to Joseph Short, 7 May 1952, Official FUe Document, Folder 9, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST.

124

housewives to volunteer. It ignored lower income women-tenement housewives as weU

as those women whose financial need forced them to work outside the home. The FCDA

even touted middle-class values as essential to civU defense. Suburban housewives were

supposed to keep their homes weU-ordered and clean; the Federal CivU Defense

Administration reinforced this behavior. In bold print, the text of Atomic Blast Creates

Fire stated: "Housewives have a saying that: 'A New Broom Sweeps Clean.' Firemen

have a saying that: 'A Clean BuUding Seldom Bums.' GOOD, CLEAN,

HOUSEKEEPING IS CIVIL DEFENSE HOUSEKEEPING." "Closets, attics, and

ceUars are the main source of home fires, and plain ordinary good housekeeping is a

strong Une of defense against them."^ '

Nonetheless, in their zeal to promote "middle-America," FCDA leaders may have

damaged other agency objectives. Lower-income Americans comprised the largest block

of the country's population. A demographic breakdown of civU defense volunteers'

incomes is nonexistent, but it is Ukely that the FCDA would have attracted more

volunteers if its leaders had paid closer attention to the most basic of the agency's stated

objectives—the participation of the country's entire population. Yet instead of targeting

the poorer classes, the agency pubUshed images that suggested one requirement for civU

defense volunteers was middle-class status.

The Federal CivU Defense Administration sent out mked signals. It caUed for

everyone in the United States to integrate civU defense into their daUy Uves, but it focused

^ 'Federal CivU Defense Administration, Atomic Blast Creates Fire (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951).

125

on middle-class whites. Even in its courting of middle-income Americans, the agency's

strategies appear confiised. One of the disappointments of 1951 and 1952 was the

relatively smaU number of women that volunteered for civU defense. They accounted for

less than half of the four milUon recruits that preparedness organizations had attracted by

the end of 1952. Time and again CaldweU and other FCDA spokespersons had stated that

women must form the majority core of civU defense volunteers. The FCDA appealed to

women's sense of domestic responsibiUty and tradition. Learning about civU defense

would help American women to better care for their femiUes and protect them if an attack

occurred. By volunteering for civU defense duties women could extend their sphere of

care. They could put their maternal instincts to work for the benefit of an entire

neighborhood or community. ^^

Pondering the traditional care-giving roles of middle-class, suburban women in

the Fifties conjures up images of moms tending sick chUdren—taking them bowls of

chicken soup, checking their temperatures, giving them a kiss and tucking them into bed.

One also pictures mom administering Ught first-aid-some antiseptic, a bandage, and

another kiss for a scraped-up chUd. Yet another image that comes to mind is that of

suburban wives and mothers preparing and serving wholesome, nutritious meals for their

femUies and then Ustening sympatheticaUy as each chUd, and dad, recount the events of

their day. When asked which civU defense service branch they would join, more than

222/ ^CaldweU, "If A-Bombs Come," 40; "Women Expected to Form Major Part of CD Force," C/v/7 Defense Alert 1, no. 10 (1952): and "Pledge for Home Defense," Folder: Kit, Pledge for Home Defense, Box 29, alphabetical Section: Kit, Press Kit for DaUy Newspaper to Kit, K-1, PubUc History FUes, 1950-62, RG 396.

126

skty-three percent of the women surveyed answered they would prefer to volunteer for

the first-aid services or the health and welfere division. Another thirteen percent

responded that they wouU volunteer for "traditional" women's jobs-they offered to work

as records keepers, as office assistants. The responses were in keeping with the accepted

gender roles of the Fifties.^'

The FCDA promoted confiision by appealing to women's sense of tradition, even

as it asked them to assume new roles and new responsibiUties. One of the primary reasons

for targeting women was the FCDA needed reUable wardens in the suburbs from 8 a.m. to

5 p.m., but the title "warden" carried with it an aura of authority. Most American women

of the 1950s had been raised to submit, to attend, and to care, not to order. Health and

welfere, first-aid, in these areas women could remain safe and secure in their traditional

roles as care-givers, as auxiliaries in a male-dominated society. They were mere

extensions of women's traditional responsibUities at home. To become a warden meant

crossing the lines, breaking the accepted mles that dictated the extent of men and

women's separate spheres of authority. To break the mles was to leave the safety of the

consensus and become a nonconformist and, perhaps, a social outcast. "

""PreUminary Report on PubUc Attitudes," HST.

^ "Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, Inc., PubUshers, 1988), 104-5, 112-13; Federal CivU Defense Administration, C/v/7 Defense in Outline: A Study Guide for the National Civil Defense Program (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951), 13; and Idem, Warden's Handbook, 3. For additional sources on the social constraints placed on men and women in the postwar era, consult Benita Eisler, Private Lives: Men and Women of the Fifties (New York: FrankUn Watts, 1986); Carol A. B. Warren, Madwives: Schizophrenic Women in the 1950s (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University press, 1987); Mary Dinnerstein, Women Between Two Worlds: Midlife Reflections on Work and the Family (PhUadelphia: Temple

127

In its attempts to attract female recruits, the FCDA's emphasis on women's

"traditional" roles had produced unexpected results. In its larger campaign which aimed at

aU Americans, its focus on patriotism and the supposed American "tradition" of civU

defense resulted in a pubUc response that was just as fiiistrating for agency leaders.

Urban residents, the most Ukely victims of an attack, expressed less wUUngness to

volunteer than did rural Americans. One explanation that the Survey Research Center

offered for this phenomenon was individuals Uving in rural communities and smaU towns

possessed more "community spirit" than did Americans engaged in the rat-race of the big

cities.^'

Again, however, FCDA marketing seems partiaUy at fault. Since rural, smaU-

town America is typicaUy conservative, its inhabitants would be more susceptible to the

patriotic imagery—Paul Revere, hero, "alert American"—and language that the FCDA

employed. In addition, agency spokespersons and pamphlets often pointed to pioneer

farmers as examples of the nation's tradition of civU defense. No doubt many rural

Americans considered themselves the inheritors of that early pioneer spirit. It was only

natural that they would identify more fiiUy with nineteenth-century civU defenders fighting

aggressive Native Americans and stmggling against Nature. ^^

university Press, 1992); Brett Harvey, The Fifties: A Women's Oral History (New York: Harper CoUins, 1993); and Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (New York: W.W. Norton, 1963).

225 Survey Research Center, C/v/7 Defense, 1952, 44.

^Federal CivU Defense Administration, Speakers Kit: This is Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951).

128

When considering its urban audience the Federal CivU Defense Administration

might have been better advised to Unk civU defense more forcefiUly to images of progress

and the fiiture. In the Fifties, automobUes sprouted large taU fins. AppUances became

more stt-eamUned. Toward the end of the decade, architects were drawing-up plans for

gas stations and other buUdings that, once buUt, sported curved, saucer-Uke designs that

made the structures look as if they had been plucked straight out of a "Jetsons" cartoon.

Residents of rural communities may have thought of themselves as keepers of tradition,

but the city was where the United States rushed to meet the fiiture. The FCDA could use

Daniel Boone to attract the support of rural Americans, but it should have tempted city-

dweUers with images of Buck Rogers. ^^

By the end of 1952, the combination of social trends. Congress's parsimony, and

FCDA mistakes and miscalculations had resulted in a limping civU defense program that

lacked nation-wide acceptance. MiUard CaldweU prepared to resign. In his official letter

of resignation, the FCDA's administrator claimed that civU defense was "now a cohesive

and moving part of the national security program." He observed, "Much remains to be

done," but he reminded President Truman that he had always intended to reUnquish his

appointment once he had civU defense up and running. *

^ For the history of "seUing" progress and the future, consult Roland Marchand, Advertising the American Dream: Making the Way for Modernity, 1920-1940 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); and Pamela WaUcer Laird, Advertising Progress: American Business and the Rise of Consumer Marketing (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

^ *Mmard CaldweU to Harry S Truman, 7 November 1952, Folder: White House Correspondence, 1953, Box 2, Correspondence of Administrator Val Peterson, 1953-1957, RG 396.

129

Other issues must have influenced CaldweU's decision to resign. Despite his

claims to the contrary, the evidence indicates that civU defense was not a great success

with the American people by the end of 1952. For two years CaldweU had stmggled

against Congressional and pubUc apathy. Congress had cut regularly his funding requests,

speUing doom for the shelter program and curtaUing other FCDA initiatives. CaldweU had

orchestrated a massive education and recruiting campaign, but the tangible results had

been minimal. It seems likely that CaldweU's decision to resign was more a product of

FCDA feUures than successes.

Another factor in his resignation was CaldweU's anticipation of a RepubUcan

victory in the upcoming presidential election between RepubUcan candidate Dwight D.

Eisenhower and Democrat Adlai Stevenson. Accepted tradition in Washington, D.C,

mandated that department heads submit their resignations upon the election of a new

president. Eisenhower might wish to reward one of his supporters with the post of FCDA

administrator. '

Lastly, Caldwell, himself was itching to retum to a poUticaUy-charged

atmosphere. In private communications to President Truman, CaldweU stated that he had

tired of the poUtical evenhandedness which his job as administrator required. Since his

post made him responsible for the safety of aU American Uves, he could not engage in

partisan poUtics. In an early draft of his letter of resignation, but omitted from his later

official letter, CaldweU made the statement that it was time for him to show his feUow-

^ 'MUlard CaldweU to Matthew ConneUy, 4 October 1952 and 15 October 1952, Official FUe documents. Folder 9, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUes, HST.

130

party members that he was committed to the goals of the Democratic Party. "I wish to be

free of the nonpartisanship which is and must be a part of CivU Defense and to exercise the

privUege of expressing my views poUticaUy," he wrote. "My fiiends are entitled to know

that my loyalty to the Democratic party and its nominees is of a steady non-wavering

quaUty." ' For an individual with poUtical aspirations, spending too much time in the

non-partisan job of FCDA administrator would constitute poUtical suicide. MUlard

CaldweU resigned from the Federal CivU Defense Administration on November 7,1952,

just after the presidential election. Deputy Administrator James J. Wadsworth, a

RepubUcan and the grandson of former Secretary of State John Hay, became acting

administrator of the FCDA."'

For the next eight years RepubUcans guided the actions of the Federal CivU

Defense Administration. The presidential election of 1952 transpired as CaldweU had

anticipated. The war hero, Dwight D. Eisenhower, easUy defeated the lUinois govemor,

Adlai Stevenson. Four years later, Eisenhower trounced Stevenson at the poUs again. As

CaldweU had predicted, one of the poUtical spoils with which the new president rewarded

his foUowers was the post of FCDA administt-ator. In 1953 the Federal CivU Defense

Administration introduced new faces and new strategies to the pubUc. '

""MUlard CaldweU to Harry S Truman, 14 October 1952, Official FUe document. Folder 9, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST.

"'CaldweU to Tmman, 7 November 1952, RG 396.

"^Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: Volume Two, The President (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 369-70.

131

CHAPTER V

'FROM DUCK AND COVER TO RUN LIKE HELL": MASS

EVACUATION , VAL PETERSON, AND THE FCDA"'

The warning went out at 11:30 a.m. on May 13, 1955. Soviet bombers had

violated U.S. air space. Spotters reported that enemy planes had penetrated the United

States' northem defenses and were continuing southward on a course that would take

them over Memphis, Tennessee.^'"

Approximately forty-five mUes west of Memphis, civUian defenders in Forrest

City, Arkansas, prepared to receive evacuees from the target area. CivU defense officers

moved into a second-floor courtroom in the town courthouse and estabUshed a control

center. "Ham operators" set up their radios, began to monitor aU incoming messages, and

issued briefs on Forrest City's preparations to meet the emergency. Two radiation-

detection teams assembled and tested their equipment. Other members of the town's civU

defense organization readied the churches and schools that were designated reception

235

areas.

^"Phrase first employed by Mary M. Simpson in "A Long Hard Look at CivU Defense," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 12, no. 9 (1956): 346.

'"Mattie Treadwell, Acting Regional Administrator, Region 5, to Director, PubUc Affeirs Office, Federal CivU Defense Administration, 24 May 1955, Folder: I. E. 1, Test Exercises (Various), Book 8,1. D. 17 to 1.1. A. 2, Office FUes of the Director, RG 396 [In June 1997, many FCDA documents that were scheduled for transfer to RG 396 were stUl located under RG 304 at the depository cited]. National Archives Branch Depository, Fort Worth, Texas, [hereafter cited as NABDFW].

"'Mattie TreadweU to Director, PubUc Affairs Office, 24 May 1955, RG 396.

132

In Little Rock, just over ninety-mUes west of Forrest City, Govemor Orval

Faubus worked to ensure that order would be preserved before, during, and after the

attack. Shortly after the warning sounded, he declared a state of martial law and caUed

out the Arkansas National Guard. Two units of guards and a medical supply convoy

headed to Forrest City. '

Concurrently, Arkansas State PoUce officers secured the primary evacuation

route from Memphis to Forrest City. They closed off U.S. Highway 70 to east-bound

traffic. They erected road-blocks and checkpoints. Then they waited for the expected

flood of refugees."^

The deep rumble of diesel engines announced the approach of the first busload of

evacuees. In the cities of Wheatley, West Memphis, Parkin, Hughes, Haynes,

CrawfordviUe, and Clarendon, teachers had shepherded their students onto buses after air­

raid sirens sounded. To guarantee an orderly and safe flow of traffic, state poUce rode out

to meet the buses and convoyed them to the "Cabin in the Cotton" checkpoint, a spot

some eight mUes outside of Forrest City. At the checkpoint, boy scouts boarded the

buses-Afiican-American scouts for the buses carrying black students and Caucasian boy

scouts for the "whites-only" buses-and directed the drivers to the Forrest City reception

Tift

areas.

"^Mattie TreadweU to Director, PubUc Affairs Office, 24 May 1955, RG 396.

"^Ibid.

"*Ibid.

133

Mean^^Me, the enemy bombers continued to head south. At 1:10 p.m an atomic

bomb detonated over Memphis. In Forrest City, civU defense personnel ordered everyone

to take cover and remain indoors untU one of the radiation teams made certain that the

atmospheric radiation was at acceptable levels. For thirty minutes after the explosion

occurred, one of the four-man teams swept through the downtown area. It gave the "aU-

clear"atl:40p.m"'

The other team was posted at the "Cabin in the Cotton" station. Its members

checked the radiation level of the buses and cars that arrived after the atomic bomb had

detonated. Checkpoint officials routed the post-attack refugees to the Forrest City High

School, where medical personnel treated minor wounds and marched the radioactive into

the school showers. Attendants placed the seriously injured on stretchers, loaded them

into ambulances, and sent them on to hospitals in Little Rock. For the 6,700 citizens of

Forrest City, it promised to be a busy day and night. A steady stream of refugees was

expected. ""

No one in Memphis died from an atomic blast on May 13, 1955. No bomb

actuaUy feU. Air-raid warnings sounded in Arkansas. State poUce cleared an evacuation

route to Forrest City. The govemor sent in the National Guard, and civU defense units

sprang into action, but it was aU part of a mock attack, a civU defense exercise code-

named "Operation Able." The 5,000 school chUdren "evacuated" from the Memphis area

found civU defense instmctors waiting for them at the Forrest City reception sites. The

"'Mattie TreadweU to Director, PubUc Affairs Office, 24 May 1955, RG 396.

^"^id.

134

sttidents spent the aftemoon listening to lectures and watching films and first-aid

demonstrations. "'

In addition to its value as an educational tool for the young, "Operation Able"

provided Forrest City's civU defense organization, the Arkansas National Guard, and the

Arkansas State PoUce with an opportunity to test their plans for coping with a nuclear

assault. Making the exercise aU the more in^ortant was the Federal CivU Defense

Administration's shift in preparedness strategies. Val Peterson, the new agency

administrator, had discarded the shelter-centered strategies of 1951 and 1952 and had

endorsed instead a poUcy of mass evacuation for target areas. Mass evacuation required

increased participation from the rural communities and smaU towns that surrounded

metropoUtan areas. The FCDA's earUer focus on pubUc shelter constmction was,

foremost, a plan for urban Americans. They were the most Ukely victims of an enemy

attack. Why should the residents of distant smaU towns worry? The Soviets could find

more important targets than the sparsely-populated "Mayberrys" that dotted the

countryside. CaldweU's FCDA had tried to impress on rural Americans that they would

have to offer aid and suppUes to survivors in bombed-out cities, but Peterson's mass-

evacuation initiatives more fliUy incorporated rural America into the country's program of

civU defense. Not only would rural communities serve as points of egress for dispatching

suppUes to bomb victims, they would serve as points of ingress for pre- and post-attack

evacuees. In order to leam how to anticipate and accommodate the needs of thousands of

refugees, traffic officers and smaU-town civU defense organizations, Uke the one in Forrest

^"'Mattie TreadweU to Director, PubUc Affairs Office, 24 May 1955, RG 396.

135

City, Arkansas, had to practice responding to mass migrations from metropoUtan target

242

areas.

In the cities, local preparedness agencies practiced effecting the mass migrations

in an orderly manner. In June 1954, a year before the Operation Able exercise, civUian

defenders in Houston, Texas, held an evacuation drUl. In a letter to Administrator

Peterson, French Robertson, regional administrator for New Mexico, Texas, Louisiana,

Arkansas, and Oklahoma (FCDA Region 5), boasted that Houston's civU defense

organization "conq)letely cleared" the automobUes from hundreds of blocks in the

downtown area in only eight minutes. "'

In Shreveport, Louisiana, that same month, civU defense personnel held an

equaUy significant exercise—one that considered the evacuation of pedestrians. Important

considerations prompted the planning of "Operation Hotfoot" and other simUar drills.

First, not aU of the people who worked in city business and industrial districts owned cars.

Some took pubUc transportation or waDced to work. Second, there might be so many cars

in a downtown metropoUtan area that an automobUe evacuation would prove impractical.

" Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1954 Annual Report (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1955), 8-10, 31; Ralph Lapp, "An Interview With Govemor Val Peterson," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 10, no. 10 (1954): 375; Federal CivU Defense Administration, Facts About the H-Bomb...that could save your life! (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1953); Idem, "CivU Defense-Keystone of National Defense" in C/v/7 Defense Facts: Speaker's Kit, 1955-1956 (Battle Creek, Michigan: Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1955), 5; Idem, The States, Counties, and Cities, and Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1955), 12-14. In addition, in 1955 the FCDA produced a short motion picture entitled Operation Welcome.

^"'Regional Administrator, Region 5 [French Robertson] to Val Peterson, 12 November 1954, Folder: I. C 2, Reports, Annual, 1954-1955, Box 1:1. A. 1 to I. D. 8, Office FUes of the Director, RG 396.

136

Third, the threat of an aerial assault might trigger a panic that would render a mass

automotive exodus impossible. Upon learning that enemy planes were headed toward

them, people might jump into their cars and, in their haste to escape death, drive recklessly

to get out of the city-ignoring traffic Ughts, signs, and poUcemen. The end result would

be a number of accidents and car-jams that would prevent successful evacuation by

automobUe. Ignoring the probabUity that pedestrians would be just as, if not more, prone

to panic than automobUe owners, "Operation Hotfoot's" organizers intended to show that

evacuees could escape a bomb by calmly walking out of the city. Of the exercise's five

hundred participants, three hundred fifty—including the mayor of Shreveport and

Louisiana's state director—put more than four mUes between themselves and the

downtown area in an hour. ""

Such mass evacuation drills were common during Val Peterson's term as FCDA

administrator. In a cabinet meeting on July 29, 1955 Peterson told President Eisenhower

and the executive department heads that thirty cities had held evacuation exercises since

the beginning of the year. "Duck and Cover" was out. "Run LUce HeU" was in. As an

unmistakable sign of the shift in strategy, Peterson's FCDA retired the slow, plodding,

shelter-centered "Bert the Turtle." "

Technological advances in mUitary hardware, poUtical and social agendas, and

personal bias aU contributed to the Federal CivU Defense Administration's decision to

^""Regional Administrator to Val Peterson, 12 November 1954, RG 396.

245/ 'C-25-(2), Box 3, Cabinet Series, Office of the Staff Secretary, White House Office FUes, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

137

encourage mass evacuations instead of shelter constmction. The development of "the

Super," or the hydrogen bomb suppUed the agency with its soundest arguments for

fevoring an evacuation poUcy. The H-bomb exploded with a force equal to that produced

by hundreds, even thousands, of atomic bombs.

It was the Hungarian expatriate and theoretical physicist, Edward TeUer, who

coined the term, "the Super," for the hydrogen bomb. TeUer was one of the most

outspoken proponents for its development. TeUer became consumed with the idea whUe

working at the Manhattan Project's Los Alamos fecUities. Even before the teams at Los

Alamos had successfiiUy constmcted the first atomic bomb, TeUer began studying the

possibiUty of buUding a thermonuclear device. The atomic bomb was a fission bomb. The

power it released was produced by the spUtting of atoms. The hydrogen bomb was a

fusion, or more properly, a fission-fiision-fission device. In the H-bomb, an atomic

explosion (fission) heats deuterium to the point necessary to begin a thermonuclear

reaction in which hydrogen fuses to heUum. The energy produced by fiision then triggers

more fission in an outer sheU of uranium. Atomic explosions are measured in terms of

thousands of tons of TNT. Thermonuclear explosions are measured in terms of mUUons of

tons of TNT. The hydrogen bomb would be a nuclear "super-bomb." "*

Although TeUer and others were thinking about the hydrogen bomb before the

Cold War began, there was opposition to its development and the United States did not

launch a "crash program" to buUd the Super untU 1950. Many of the scientists responsible

" Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), 106, 374; and Idem, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 117.

138

for producing the first atomic devices, such as Robert Oppenheimer, expressed feeUngs of

remorse after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They opposed the buUd-up of a large atomic

arsenal after World War II. In November 1945, a number of scientists from the Los

Alamos Laboratory formed the Federation of Atomic Scientists, later renamed the

Federation of American Scientists. Within a few months, they had written and pubUshed

One World or None. The best-seUer's authors detaUed the horrors of atomic warfere, then

proposed the sharing and international control of the atom as an alternative to an atomic

arms race and, possibly, nuclear war. MeanwhUe, scientists from the Manhattan Project's

MetaUurgical Lab in Chicago started their own journal. With an initial grant often

thousand doUars from University of Chicago ChanceUor Robert Hutchins, biochemist

Eugene Rabinowitch and others created The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. The

Bulletin's first issue appeared in December 1945. This new forum for discussion of

atomic poUcy by some of the United States' most prominent physicists, chemists, and

engineers attracted an international audience. Despite the scientists' opposition, the

United States began to buUd more atomic weapons. In the late 1940s, many of the same

scientists who had earUer opposed the American monopoly and stockpiling of the atomic

bomb voiced their concerns that a crash program to develop the even more powerfel

hydrogen bomb, and the arms race that would surely foUow, ultimately could lead to the

destmction of the civilized world. Others, such as TeUer, argued that the United States

139

must develop the Super because the Soviets would buUd one even if the United States did

not.2"^

In 1949 the Soviets exploded an atomic device, and the debate over the launching

of a crash program to buUd a hydrogen bomb intensified. The Atomic Energy

Commission [AEC] was at the forefront of these discussions. On October 29, 1949, the

AEC's General Advisory Committee [GAC] met to discuss whether they should

recommend the accelerated development of the hydrogen bomb. The Atomic Energy Act,

signed by President Truman on August 1,1946, had authorized the creation of the GAC.

The scientists that the president appointed to the committee were to offer their technical

expertise and guidance to the AEC's commissioners. Among the GAC members present

at the meeting were some of the United States' most notable scientists, scholars, and

engineers: James Conant, chemist, president of Harvard, and a member of the National

Defense Research Committee during World War II; OUver Buckley, president of the BeU

Telephone Laboratories; Caltech President Lee DuBridge; theoretical physicist and Nobel

prize-winner Enrico Fermi, who had played a prominent role in the development of the

first nuclear reactor; experimental physicist and associate director of the Los Alamos

Laboratories from 1947-1951, John Manley; theoretical physicist, GAC chair, and

scientific director of the Los Alamos facUities during WWII, Robert Oppenheimer; 1.1.

" AUce KimbaU Smith, A Peril and a Hope: The Scientists' Movement in America, 1945-1947 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 41-48, 77, 79-80, 109, 128, 203, 235-38, 294-96; Masters, Dexter and Katherine Way, eds. One World or None (New York: McGraw-HUl, 1946); Rhodes, Dark Sun, 203-5, 513-14, 402; and AUan Winkler, Life Under a Cloud: American Anxiety About the Atom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 39.

140

Rabi, experimental physicist and Nobel laureate; Hartley Rowe, an engineer who had

helped buUd the Panama Canal; and Cyril Smith, who had directed metaUurgy studies at

Los Alamos. "*

On that Saturday morning in October, the GAC conducted a round-table

discussion of the proposed crash program. Only Rabi and Fermi favored recommending

high priority for the development of a hydrogen bomb. Conant was the most outspoken

against such a plan, arguing that the creation of a weapon with such destmctive potential

was immoral. Hartley Rowe said, "We buUt one Frankenstein," and agreed with Conant

that it would be a monstrous act to develop and use H-bombs. After the GAC's initial

discussions, four of the AEC's five commissioners-David LiUenthal, Lewis Strauss,

Gordon Dean, and Henry Smyth—joined them. The Joint Chiefe of Staff also put in an

appearance at the meeting. According to LUienthal, the JCS delegates stated that war

with the U.S.S.R. was likely to occur within four or five years. They claimed that

negotiations would not forestaU the coming conflict. The Joint Chiefs favored developing

the H-bomb as quickly as possfcle because it might act as a deterrent to what they

perceived as an otherwise inevitable war. "'

The Joint Chiefs of Staff left shortly after noon, their arguments having made

Uttle impact on the General Advisory Committee. AEC commissioners Henry Smyth and

Gordon Dean thought the members of the GAC had made up their minds before the

meeting ever got underway. Many of the GAC scientists had helped develop the atomic

2"*f/.5. Statutes at Large 60 (1946), 755-775; and Rhodes, Dark Sun, 395-96

^"'Rhodes, Dark Sun, 397-98.

141

bomb, but that was during wartime. Dean and Smyth beUeved that these same scientists

could not bring themselves to recommend the development of an even more powerful

weapon in the absence of world war; the threat of war was not enough. ^"

Saturday evening and into Sunday, Oppenheimer and Manly wrote the GAC

report; Conant and DuBridge drew up the "majority annex." The report announced, "No

member of this Committee was willing to endorse this proposal [a crash program to buUd

a hydrogen bomb]."^'' Conant and the others who opposed the Super's development

convinced Fermi and Rabi to stand with them. The report went on to state that the

members of the GAC saw no ceUing for the potential power of H-bombs. Simply adding

more deuterium to the fusion chamber and more uranium to the sheU would increase the

explosive force. It was clear that the Super would not be a weapon for destroying

industrial fecUities and mUitary targets only. The GAC would not endorse a high-priority

program to develop such a device, because they argued that it would be used for "the

poUcy of exterminating civiUan populations." '

The majority annex, signed by Conant, DuBridge, Buckley, Oppenheimer, Rowe,

and Smith took the scientists' objections further. It voiced their fears that the weapon

might be used to eUminate entire races of people. It also stated that the radioactivity

released from H-bomb detonations could adversely affect the entire population of the

world. The authors and the signers of the annex argued that "a super bomb should never

^'"^odes. Dark Sun, 399.

"'Ibid.

2"Ibid.,401.

142

be produced."^'' Oppenheimer later testified that he and other members of the GAC had

beUeved that their suggestions could Umit the arms race. They beUeved if the United

States refused to develop the hydrogen bomb, the Soviet Union also would refrain from

buUding "Supers."""

The AEC commissioners divided on the issue of an aU-out effort to buUd the H-

bomb. Senator Brien McMahon (D.-Conn.), chairperson of the Atomic Energy

Commission, along with Lewis Strauss and Gordon fevored the program. David

LUienthal, Henry Smyth, and Sumner PUce agreed with the GAC's report; they opposed

the crash-development of thermonuclear weapons. In December, the GAC met again and

reiterated its opposition to the buUding of super bombs '

WhUe the members of the AEC debated the moraUty of the hydrogen bomb, the

mUitary worked to insure that the Super would be added to the United States' arsenal, and

quickly. On January 13, 1950, the Joint Chiefe of Staff issued a memorandum in response

to the GAC's conclusions. The JCS document offered a number of arguments for the

msh-development of the H-bomb. It would be the most powerful weapon known to man.

It could serve as a deterrent to war, as weU as an offensive and defensive weapon during a

war. Perhaps most important, the Joint Chiefs noted "the United States would be in an

intolerable position if a possible enemy possessed the bomb and the United States did

^''Rhodes, Dark Sun, 401.

""Ibid., 403.

"%id., 404-5.

143

not." ' That was enough for President Truman. At the end of January, he ordered a

crash program to develop the Super. '

More than two years passed before the United States detonated its first

thermonuclear device. Three thousand mUes west of HawaU, the Eniwetok atoU—a series

of coral islands that lined the rim of a submerged volcano—provided the testing site. The

"Ivy" test series included two nuclear devices: the hydrogen device "MUce" ("M" for

megaton), and a backup, super-sized fission bomb, "King" ("K" for kUoton), just in case

the MUce shot feUed. Releasing the force often miUion tons of TNT, MUce exploded at

7:15 on the morning of November 1, 1952. A bUnding firebaU three mUes across, thirty

times the size of the one produced by the detonation of "Little Boy" over Hiroshima,

ascended into the air above Eniwetok. The explosion vaporized the island Eleugelab,

gouging out a crater that was more than a mUe across and two hundred feet deep. The

mushroom cloud that rose over the test site expanded untU its stem was thirty mUes

across; its cap was more than three times that width. Inside the cloud, drafts Ufted eighty

mUUon tons of pulverized, irradiated coral and other debris, "faUout" that would blow aU

over the world. '*

The United States introduced the H-bomb into the world, but its monopoly of

thermonuclear weapons was short-Uved. The Union of Soviet SociaUst RepubUcs required

four years to equal the Americans' feat at Trinity. It took less than a year for the Soviet

"<^Rhodes, Dark Sun, 406.

"%id., 407-

"*Ibid., 487, 504-9.

144

Union to catch up to the U.S. in the thermonuclear race. On August 12, 1953, communist

Russia detonated its own thermonuclear device."'

It was into this new world, a world filling up with weapons of such power that

they dwarfed "Little Boy" and "Fat Man," that Val Peterson led the Federal CivU Defense

Administration. For Administrator Peterson there was no confronting an H-bomb. A

hydrogen bomb that possessed the energy of the MUce device could level New York City.

The firebaU alone would cover an area the size of Manhattan. Temperatures within the

mass of boiling gases would reach sbc thousand degrees centigrade, or nine thousand

degrees Celsius—the temperature of the sun's surfece. The cloud would rise, eventuaUy,

but for some twenty seconds, as the gases surged outward and upward, the firebaU would,

in Peterson's words, "kiss the earth." For twenty seconds it would be as if the Sun were

sitting on Manhattan. "[I]n that kind of heat, you wUl join your ancestors rapidly without

any remains," Peterson told a group of industriaUsts. ^ According to the FCDA's new

administrator, the only practical strategy in the face of such devastating weapons was mass

evacuation of target areas. '

Getting out of the path of a nuclear bomb was by no means a new idea in 1953.

Since the advent of the atomic bomb in 1945, scientists, defense planners, and federal

agencies had considered the value of both dispersion and mass evacuation. Dispersion

"'Rhodes, Dark Sun, 524-25.

' ' C/v/7 Defense in Industry, Alphabetical Section, checkUst, to Alphabetical Section, Comparison of State CD, Box 4, PubUcation FUes, RG 397; National Archives and Records Administration, CoUege Park, Md.

261 Lapp, "Interview with Peterson," 376.

145

was, simply, city planning for atomic attack. As evidenced by the United States'

bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the concentration of fectories in metropoUtan areas

offered tempting targets for an enemy armed with atomic weapons. In American cities,

production fecUities were often crowded into designated industrial zones. A direct hit by a

single atomic bomb on one of these centers could wipe-out a city's industrial capacity. If

a Soviet first-strike completely destroyed the United States' industrial strength, there

would be Uttle chance of prosecuting, much less winning, the ensuing war. Less than a

year after the bombing of Hiroshima, in an AprU 1946 issue of The Bulletin of the Atomic

Scientists, Edward TeUer and two coUeagues fretted about the country's industrial

congestion along the north Atlantic Coast and caUed for the dispersal of manufacturing

and population centers. The Bulletin later devoted an entire issue to the subject of

dispersion. ^^

Even before TeUer pubUshed his article in the Bulletin, President Harry S.

Truman tried to force the dispersal of government offices and private industry. On August

30, 1950, the same day that he submitted the NSRB CivU Defense Office's report. United

States Civil Defense, to the members of Congress and asked them to pass a civU defense

act. President Truman requested funding for the dispersal of federal offices. Congress

refused, and the pyramiding of federal en^loyees in the Washington, D.C, area continued.

He experienced more success when he pushed for the dispersal of private industrial

facUities. In 1951 Truman issued an executive order that made federal assistance for

^ J. Marshak, E. TeUer, and L.R. Klein, "Dispersal of Cities and Industries,' Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 1, no. 9 (1946), 267-69; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Sept. {\95\).

146

fectory constmction projects dependent on the aid recq)ient's wUUngness to locate its

plant in an uncongested area. In accordance with the directive, the Office of Defense

MobUization promoted the dispersion poUcy, granting tax breaks, administering defense

loans, and caUing for voluntary cooperation from the various federal agencies and from aU

Americans. A 1953 report indicated the program had proved effective only in the

scattering of subsidized defense plants.^"

The Federal CivU Defense Administration joined with the president and the Office

of Defense MobUization in promoting dispersion. In speeches and pamphlets, agency

spokespersons lectured the pubUc, but they also led by exanq)le. In 1954 the FCDA

vacated its office in Gelmarc Towers, Washington, D.C Leaving only a smaU Uaison staff

in the capitol, the agency transferred its main headquarters to what had been the Percy

Jones Army Hospital, in Battle Creek, Michigan. In addition, the FCDA began removing

its regional offices from major metropoUtan areas to smaUer cities.^^

FCDA Administrator Val Peterson orchestrated the move to Battle Creek and,

through his agency's example, tried to influence the rest of the country. Nonetheless,

dispersion was not his top priority. He favored the program, but it required time, much

^ 'Congressional Quarterly Service, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964 (Washington, D.C: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1965), 263; Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 113; Federal CivU Defense Administration, Basic Course for Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1956), 22; and President's Press Release, 30 August 1950, National Defense-Civil Defense, Assistant to the President FUe: MisceUaneous, general-speeches. Papers of Stephen J. Springam, Harry S Truman Library (hereafter HSTL).

' 'C/v/7 Defense in Industry, RG 396; Federal CivU Defense Administration, FCDA Moves to Battle Creek-1954 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1955), 1-2; and Idem, 1954 Annual Report (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1955), 153.

147

time. To fiiUy disperse the United States' industrial centers would take years, decades,

perhaps longer. Industrial isolation would raise the cost of transporting goods to markets,

a deterrent to any corporate body. Further, despite their personal views on the

effectiveness of dispersion, congressmen and women from heavUy industriaUzed areas or

growing manufacturing centers would be reluctant to support a program that would

suggest that new fectories—and the jobs they offered-should be buUt in less populated

areas, perhaps in another district or another state. When confronted by the editors of the

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut said.

There is nobody more keenly aUve to the dangers of atomic bombardment than I am and yet you wiU not hear me advocating the decentralization of industry out of Connecticut. The first job of a feUow in Congress, you know, is to stay there; out of it, he is no good. For an elected official from New England, endorsement of dispersal would constitute poUtical suicide. '

Fmstrated by the resistance he and the Office of Defense MobUization

encountered, Peterson nevertheless continued to harangue industrial leaders. He reminded

them that dispersion had saved the Soviet Union during World War II. StaUn's pre-war

buUd-up of industrial centers east of the Ural Mountains had enabled the U.S.S.R. to

continue to produce war materials after the Germans had knifed through the Soviet

Union's westem sateUites and into the westem portions of the motherland. Peterson's

assessment was correct, but logisticaUy dispersal was more difficult to effect in the United

2651 ^Mary M. Simpson, "A Long Hard Look at CivU Defense: A Review of the HoUfield Committee Hearings," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 12, No. 9 (1956), 348.

148

States than in the Soviet Union. StaUn ordered dispersal; U.S. officials encouraged,

suggested, and attempted to persuade.^^

Dispersal in the United States progressed haltingly, and it was never fiiUy

accompUshed. MetropoUtan areas, large cities, with their masses of humanity, remained

prime targets for a nuclear strike. Peterson could not wait for dispersion to occur. He

could not wait for a planned America with an equaUy distributed population and industrial

base. He had to propose a plan that would save some Uves if the enemy stmck tomorrow.

The emergency dispersing of populations from crowded target areas, mass evacuation,

seemed to offer a quick, economical solution to the problem of surviving a limited nuclear

war. ^

As with industrial dispersion, mass evacuation was hardly a new idea when Val

Peterson assumed control of the FCDA, but 1953 did mark the first year that a U.S. civU

defense agency openly endorsed "running away" from the bomb. Prior to Peterson's

administration, the federal agencies and personnel charged with formulating civU defense

poUcy either expressed doubts about the efficacy of mass evacuation or they condemned it

completely. United States Civil Defense, the NSRB document that buUt on the BuU and

Hopley reports and which Congress used as a guide for developing the CivU Defense Act

of 1950, clearly outUned federal officers' early views on the subject. The NSRB's CivU

Defense Office concluded that mass evacuations would produce "a dismptive effect upon

organized communities and upon the morale of the people." Hence, "evacuation... should

' ' C/v/7 Defense in Industry, RG 397.

"^Simpson, "Long Hard Look," 348; and Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 113

149

be considered only after aU other means of insuring mass safety have been evaluated."

The document's authors announced that they were "not planning for widespread use of

this method."^ *

On November 30, 1950, in a speech that he deUvered to the American PubUc

Welfare Association, James J. Wadsworth expanded on the National Security Resources

Board's misgivings about mass evacuation. ' Although he was never named

administrator of the Federal CivU Defense Administration, Wadsworth possessed more

experience in civUian defense matters than did either MUlard CaldweU or Val Peterson.

Prior to his service as assistant administrator under CaldweU, Wadsworth worked in the

NSRB's CivU Defense Office. He was instrumental in the preparation of United States

Civil Defense, and he knew weU the reasons the NSRB did not favor mass evacuation. ^^

Before the members of the American PubUc Welfare Association, Wadsworth denounced

what he caUed the "take-to-the-hills mentaUty." First, he argued that mass evacuation was

contrary to human nature. He agreed that when confronted with the threat of a bomb

strike "at first there is a very human impulse to flee," but he contended that the initial

response was quickly overridden by another "much more stronger urge to retum to

^ *National Security Resources Board, United States Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1950), 37.

2^'MemorandumNo. 6, Binder, Advisory BuUetins, 1-49, Box No. 1, OCDM PubUcations, 1950-60, RG 396, NARACP.

"°James J. Wadsworth, Jr., interview by John T. Mason, Columbia Oral History Project, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, vol 2 (24 April 1967), 55-56.

150

femUiar surroundings and the comforting presence of relatives and fiiends...."^^' The

NSRB feared that the anxiety produced by separation from famUy members would prevent

orderly evacuation and would damage American morale even if evacuation was

successfiiUy effected.^^

Wadsworth then charged that mass evacuation was physicaUy impossible for

many metropoUtan areas. He claimed there were so many cars in San Francisco that "if aU

but one major outlet were blocked, the first automobUe in Une would be in Salt Lake City -

950 mUes away - before the last car had crossed the Golden Gate Bridge." Even with

drivers fleeing San Francisco in aU directions, civU defense personnel would face a difficult

task in trying to get aU of them safely out of the city before an attack. Wadsworth noted,

"...the rigors of Sunday driving produce impossible traffic jams in our metropoUtan

centers....Emergency evacuation on a mass scale would be far worse."^"

As an officer of the National Security Resources Board, Wadsworth also had to

consider the impact of mass evacuations on national security. He appealed to his audience

to forget about evacuation. If everyone fled to the countryside, no one would be left to

man the factories, to help the United States fight back. Con^aring city-dweUers under

aerial attack to officers on a ship engaged in battle, he said, "The Navy skipper... 'fights

his ship' to the last...We...must 'fight our cities' in the same way." Wadsworth's message

"'Memorandum No. 6, RG 396.

"^Ibid.

^"Ibid.

151

was clear. Only the "rats" would jump ship when warning sounded. Only the rats would

forsake their femiUes, homes, and their country by running away. "

The CivU Defense Act of 1950 included mass evacuation in its Ust of possible

protective measures, but, under the guidance of CaldweU and Wadsworth, the FCDA

adopted the NSRB's views on evacuating urban populations. The CaldweU administration

concentrated on identifying and constmcting blast-resistant shelters, a plan of defense

which would keep metropoUtan populations in the city, ready to return to work in the

factories that remained standing after an attack. In spite of the agency's stance on

evacuation, a few city leaders insisted they would relocate their civiUans to the

surrounding countryside if a red alert sounded. In the summer of 1952, the FCDA

considered outUning specific regulations for mass evacuations in order to provide the

"maverick" city leaders with a uniform plan of action, but CaldweU's administration never

displayed enthusiasm for evacuation poUcy. Mass evacuation did not become the FCDA's

"official poUcy" untU Val Peterson's administration. '

The Federal CivU Defense Administration lost the benefit of Wadsworth's

experience in the first months of 1953, when President Eisenhower appointed Peterson

administrator. When Ike was deUberating whom to appoint, Wadsworth expressed hope

that he would receive the appointment. He had been passed over once before. He was the

""Memorandum No. 6, RG 396.

^"^^A Report to the National Security Council by the Federal Civil Defense Administration on Evacuation of Civilian Populations in Civil Defense, President's Secretary's FUes document. Folder 11, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST; National Security CouncU Agenda, 13 June 1952, President's Secretary's FUes document. Folder 11, Box 1, CivU Defiise, B FUe, HST; and Memorandum No. 6, RG 396.

152

acting director of the NSRB's CivU Defense Office when Truman created the Federal CivU

Defense Administration. Wadsworth wanted to be named the agency's first administrator,

but he reaUzed his party affiUation-he was a RepubUcan-reduced his chances for the

position. He was right. President Truman chose feUow-Democrat MUlard CaldweU.

Needing Wadsworth's experience and advice, CaldweU brought him into the FCDA as

assistant administrator. When CaldweU resigned in November 1952, Wadsorth became

acting administrator and he told some of his poUtical contacts that he wanted Eisenhower

to confirm him as FCDA administrator. His wish was not reaUzed. When the new

president entered office early in 1953, he foUowed Truman's precedent and appointed a

former govemor, Val Peterson (R-Nebraska), to the post. Seeing no chance for further

advancement, Wadsworth left the Federal CivU Defense Administration. ^^

Wadsworth's experience would be missed, but, unlUce CaldweU, Val Peterson

was already a veteran civilian defender when he accepted the FCDA administrator

appointment. During the CaldweU years, Govemor Peterson had served on the FCDA's

Advisory CouncU. He was weU acquainted with the agency's goals and projects. In

addition, Peterson had witnessed first-hand the value of civU defense in peacetime

emergencies and the importance of seUing preparedness as a practical measure. He was

Nebraska's chief executive in 1952, when "Muddy Mo" overspUled its banks and

threatened Sioux City, CouncU Bluffs, and Omaha. ^

"^Mason, interview, vol 2, 56-58, 64-65.

"^FCDA Press Release No. 249, Folder CD Cam-Genl. (1), Box 5, Ch-CivU D., Quick FUes, 1952-53, HST; and Proceedings of Medical Civil Defense Conference, New York-May 31, 1953 (New York: American Medical Association CouncU on National

153

When Peterson became the FCDA's director, he brought with him weU-defined

views on civU defense poUcy. He had never supported shelter-buUding. As early as 1950,

when the members of Congress were writing the CivU Defense Act and were debating the

FCDA's responsibUities, Peterson spoke against a pubUc shelter program He continued

to oppose federal and state-financed shelter constmction after he became FCDA

administrator. ^*

The buUding of the H-bomb helped justify Peterson's animosity toward the duck

and cover program. Government leaders wanted to buUd most shelters in urban areas, the

primary targets for enemy attack, but the explosive force of a MUce-sized bomb would

level almost every stmcture—including above-ground shelters—and would vaporize most

people within a three mUe radius of ground zero. Directly below the explosion, it would

dig a crater deep enough to destroy the shelters lying close to the surface. It would

destroy a majority of the buUdings and kiU large numbers of people up to thirteen mUes

from the explosion's epicenter. Outside the inner, three-mUe zone, the blast itself probably

would not kiU those Americans who had taken cover in underground shelters. Peterson

noted, however, that the buUdings in most metropoUtan areas rose high and were packed

closely together. When the bomb's blast wave ripped through the city, crumbUng

skyscrapers and the other stmctures m its path, it could bury the area under thirty or forty

Emergency Medical Service, 1953), 64, 67.

"*Congressional Quarterly Service, CONGRESS and the NATION, 263; Thomas J. Kerr, C/v/7 Defense in the U.S.: Band-Aid for a Holocaust (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), 44, 60-61; Simpson, "Long Hard Look," 347; Ralph Lapp, "An Interview with Govemor Val Peterson," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 9, No. 7 (1953), 238; and Idem, "Interview with Peterson," (1954), 375-76.

154

feet of mbble. The shelters below the detritus would become death traps. Shelter

occupants might survive the initial explosion and stUl never see dayUght again. ^

The monetary cost of undertaking a national shelter program was another of the

fectors that pushed Administrator Peterson toward an endorsement of mass evacuation.

Peterson was a budget-conscious RepubUcan, which may partiaUy explain why

Eisenhower chose him for the head post in the FCDA. Peterson knew that a shelter

program would require tens of bUUons of doUars. The great cost of such a program was

what triggered his early outbursts against federaUy-financed shelters. With the

development of the hydrogen bomb, his opposition to shelter constmction seemed to

increase. He opposed spending so much money on faciUties which he beUeved offered no

guarantees of survival. It was impractical. Nor was there any guarantee that the FCDA

would receive funding for shelter constmction even if Peterson asked for it. The members

of Congress had ignored CaldweU's pleas. There was Uttle reason for Peterson to beUeve

his administration would fare any better. With the pubUc shelter program as with

industrial dispersal, time was a cmcial factor. CaldweU's FCDA stuck with the idea of

pubUc shelters for two years, even though it did not receive the money to implement the

program. The administration had waited for Congress to act, whUe the United States'

arch-rival developed bigger and better bombs. *"

"'Lapp, "Interview with Peterson," (1954), 376; Federal CivU Defense Administration, Facts About the H Bomb; and Proceedings of Medical Civil Defense Conference, 69-70.

^*^en-, C/v/7 Defense Band-Aid, 59-61; and Lapp, "Interview with Peterson," (1953), 238.

155

Val Peterson was unwUUng to commit large outlays of money or time for pubUc

shelter constmction. Mass evacuation offered a more immediate and economical solution

to the FCDA's problems. CaldweU's successor contended that the training of civUian

populations to evacuate target areas could begin at once. If spotters detected enemy

bombers, city poUce and civU defense personnel could do more than throw up their hands

in despair over the shelters that had never been buUt. They could do more than teU people

to duck down, cover their heads, and pray. They could atten^t to effect mass evacuations

and save Uves. *'

Granted, untU the United States developed better systems for detecting the

enemy there might not be time to evacuate everyone from the target cities. Peterson told

Americans that ducking and covering might be their only option if enemy aircraft

approached undetected. He also endorsed the buUding of shelters by private citizens on

the periphery of a target area, and inner-city shelters constmcted by private businesses that

insisted on keeping personnel in their factories—even if a nuclear assault was imminent.

But shelter-seeking was to be at most a secondary measure in the Peterson

administration's plans. The best defense against the hydrogen bomb was great distance

between the explosion and people. Whether cities received half an hour or four hours of

281i 'Lapp, "Interview with Peterson," (1953), 238; Idem, "Interview with Peterson," (1954), 375-76; Ken, C/v/7 Defense Band-Aid, 62-64; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1954 Annual Report {"^asYm^on, D.C: GPO, 1955), 1, 8-9, 31-33.

156

waming, by immediately effecting a mass evacuation, civU defense personnel would save

Uves.'*2

Another mark in mass evacuation's fevor was its relatively low expense when

compared with a pubUc shelter program. Mass evacuation was not cost-free, but it was

cost-effective and practical. The defense measures required for improving the new

programs' chances of success would have been necessary even if the FCDA had gone

forward with its pubUc shelter plan. Early waming constittited an essential component of

both civUian defense strategies. The Federal CivU Defense Administration required

advance waming of an enemy air raid in order to mobUize personnel and begin moving

people to safety. The greater the waming time, the more civUians could be ushered into

shelters or evacuated from a target area. *'

In speeches, interviews, and official pubUcations, Peterson stressed the need for

improving the United States' aircraft detection system At a Cabinet meeting on May 1,

1953, Peterson told President Eisenhower that early waming offered the only hope for

survival in an atomic attack. The greatest problem lay with the United States' radar net.

GraduaUy, the Eisenhower Administration strengthened the country's early detection

system. The miUtary employed a miscellany of devices to detect incoming bombers.

Scattered throughout the United States and Canada, radar instaUations probed the skies.

To supplement the land-based stations on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, picket Unes of

* Lapp, "Interview with Peterson," (1953), 237; Idem, "Interview with Peterson," (1954), 375-76.

"'Federal CivU Defense Administration, Annual Report for 1952 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1953), 79; and Idem, 1954 Annual Report, 57.

157

radar-equipped ships and aircraft "pinged" the horizon for enemy planes. "Texas towers"-

-ofifehore radar instaUations dotted the tidelands in the Gulf of Mexico. In each state,

civilian volunteers in the Ground Observer Corps stared into the sky and reported every

aircraft they thought might prove hostUe. Lastly, one of the great defense projects of the

Eisenhower Administration was DEW, the distant early waming system, a joint-Canadian-

U.S. project to constmct an impenetrable radar web across the northem portion of North

America—the enemy's most Ukely point of ingress. *"

The raising of a protective radar barrier around the United States continued

throughout Eisenhower's two terms as president, but mechanisms for transmitting an alert

were largely in place by the time Val Peterson became the FCDA's administrator. In each

of the U.S. Air Force's eleven divisional Continental Air Defense Command centers, the

Federal CivU Defense Administration stationed Attack Warning Officers. Once the Air

Force confirmed the approach of enemy aircraft, the FCDA's attack warning personnel

would transmit an alert via CADW, the CivU Air Defense Waming System, a

communications network that deUvered the waming to some two hundred substations

nationwide. From these secondary warning centers, the alert passed on to the various

local civU defense headquarters, which then sounded waming devices to alert the

populace. In 1953, the waming system was mostly con^lete, but the area in which it was

lacking was one that was essential for guaranteeing a "prepared" population. CADW

*"Federal CivU Defense Administration, Safe because some American looked to the SKY! (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1953); Idem, 1954 Report, 57; Lapp, "Interview with Peterson," (1953), 237; Proceedings of Medical Civil Defense Conference, 72; and 1 May 1953, Folder c-4 (2), Box 1, Cabinet Series, Assistant Secretary Records, 1952-61, White House Office, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (hereafter DDEL), AbUene, Kans.

158

could disseminate an alert to every area of the United States in fifteen minutes, but less

than fifty percent of the nation's cities possessed waming sirens in 1953. By the end of

the next year, that number rose to just over fifty percent, and it continued to cUmb, but

slowly."'

Those Americans who were fortunate enough to hear waming sirens and who

fled from the city, or descended into shelters, would want to know what was happening in

the target areas and they would need to be notified when the danger had passed. Sirens

sounded to alert the people to an impending attack, and again when the FCDA issued an

aU-clear. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) developed the "Plan for the

Control of Electromagnetic Radiation," or "CONELRAD," to keep the people informed

during a period of emergency. Under the CONELRAD system, Americans were to tune

to either 640 or 1240 on their AM radios. CivU defense staff members would use those

frequencies to broadcast news briefs and emergency action instmctions. The FCC

considered AM broadcasts safe, but it ordered television and FM radio companies off the

air during a mUitary emergency, arguing "their broadcasting beams could be used as

direction finders by enemy bombers." *

Once the FCDA and the FCC introduced CONELRAD, Westinghouse, PhUco,

RCA and other firms showed their patriotism by manufacturing CONELRAD-ready

radios. The sets boasted a triangle over 640 AM and another over 1240 AM. The pubUc

"'Federal CivU Defense Administration, Annual Report for 1953 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1954), 107-9; and Idem, 1954 Annual Report, 61.

"^Federal CivU Defense Administration, In Case of Attack! CONELRAD (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1953); and Idem, Annual Report for 1953, 112.

159

did not have to memorize the civU defense frequencies and then try to recaU them during a

nuclear apocalypse. Private industry was doing its part to ensure that the United States

and the free enterprise system survived. *^

In addition to waming and communications, an improved highway network was

an essential component for effective civU defense. The importance of constmcting a

reliable system of roads is obvious when considering mass evacuation, but it would have

been necessary even if the agency had continued to focus on a shelter-buUding program.

From the earUest post-war deUberations on preparedness, through the CaldweU and

Peterson administrations, and beyond, civU defense planners had concluded that cities

which feU victim to an atomic assault would require aid from surrounding communities.

"Mutual aid" was one of the topics discussed by each of the major civU defense planning

boards. Without a dependable transportation network, emergency suppUes and volunteers

would not make it to the survivors in a bombed city."*

* A triangle within a circle served as the official civU defense emblem during both World War II and the Cold War years. Throughout the Second World War, a helmet or an arm band boasting a red and white striped triangle within a blue circle denoted its wearer as an air raid warden. Many of the old WWII civU defense items were employed by civU defense bodies during the Cold War years. Nonetheless, the official symbol for Cold War civU defenders was a blue circle surrounding a white triangle that contained the letters "C" and "D" in red.

"*War Department CivU Defense Board, A Study of Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: National MUitary EstabUshment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1948), 16; Office of CivU Defense Planning, C/v/7 Defense for National Security (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1948), 191-94; National Security Resources Board, United States Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1950), 45-47; Federal CivU Defense Administration, Annual Report for 1951 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1952), be, xi; Idem, Annual Report for 1952, 12, 22; Idem, Annual Report for 1953, 14.

160

Peterson's endorsement of mass evacuation made iiiq)roved roadways even more

essential for civU defense. Mutual aid considerations required the highways connecting the

cities to be wide and sound in their constmction. Mass evacuation poUcy placed the same

demands on the streets within the cities. With enemy bombers streaking toward their

targets, traffic jams would speU certain death for thousands of urban Americans. To

ensure a population's quick, orderly evacuation before the bombs feU—to save as many

Uves as possible—the United States had to buUd new roads and strengthen and modify

those in existence.

The National Security Resources Board and the Department of Defense

submitted their own reasons for updating the country's highway system. The enemy might

foUow an air strike with troop landings. Improved highways would better facUitate the

mass movement of American soldiers to meet an invading army. *'

More than a plan for coping with a possible future war, an expanded road

network was a necessity that offered immediate and ongoing benefits. The automotive

industry boomed in the 1950s. Manufecturers in Detroit sold almost eight mUUon cars in

1955 alone. Between 1952 and 1955, the percentage of American famUies that owned

automobUes increased from sbcty to seventy percent. The country's roadways were not

keeping pace with the expanded needs of the growing "car culture." Most metropoUtan

areas possessed no high-speed expressways, and the Pennsylvania TumpUce comprised one

of a mere handful of four-lane highways that connected American cities. The roads were

"'Jack Gorrie to Dr. Steelman, 9 June 1952, Memorandum, Folder 10, Box 28, National Security Resources Board, White House Central FUes, HST.

161

too narrow, the traffic too congested, the risks of driving too great. By 1955 automobUe

accidents were kUUng more than 36,000 people annuaUy in the United States. The

appropriation of more federal monies to improve the road network could aUeviate such

problems. It was a practical measure. '®

In their final report to the Federal CivU Defense Administration, the scientists and

experts assigned to Project East River stressed the need for advertising the practical value

of civU defense initiatives. MUlard CaldweU had launched Project East River whUe serving

as the FCDA's administrator. With financial assistance from the NSRB and the

Department of Defense, the FCDA contracted with Associated Universities, Inc. to

determine the measures necessary for creating an effective civU defense program. More

than one hundred physicists, chemists, engineers, and other experts participated in the

project. Associated Universities , Inc. submitted the final multi-volume Project East River

report to Peterson's administration early in 1953."' The FCDA claimed the study had

proved "invaluable...in developing civU defense plans..." ' Peterson took the experts'

advice. Mass evacuation was practical and multipurpose. It necessitated better roads, and

every time Americans traveled to work or to play, to church or to Grandma's house on

' Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 250; and President's Press Release, 22 February 1955, Advisory Committee to Industry FUe: CivU Defense-AiinapoUs, Box 25, Papers of John M. Redding, HSTL.

"'"Summary and CheckUst of Recommendations" and "Historical Summary of Project East River Operations," app. IA of Report of the Project East River: General Report, Part I (New York: Associated Universities, 1952),

"^Federal CivU Defense Administration, Report for 1953, 60.

162

those wide, quick, safe highways, they would be reminded that civU defense was indeed

practical. CivU defense was beneficial. CivU defense was progressive.

Progress, the theme separated Peterson's mass evacuation program from

CaldweU's shelter initiatives. Peterson could appeal to Americans' fescination with

progress. CaldweU could not. Peterson could declare that the road requirements of mass

evacuation poUcy would carry the United States into the fiiture, into a new and better era.

The FCDA would sponsor an ever-growing, ever-improving transportation network.

Four-lane highways and better ferm-to-market roads would criss-cross the country,

faciUtating mass evacuation and mutual aid, but also encouraging economic growth by

providing easier, faster transport between supply and demand centers. Wider, more

numerous streets in the cities and suburbs would reUeve traffic congestion and would

reduce the risk of accident and injury. Highways that ran through the downtown areas of

large cities would contribute to urban renewal. Peterson could use mass evacuation to

conjure images of a future era in which Americans were richer, their transportation faster,

their cities cleaner, and their Uves safer. CaldweU's shelter poUcy evoked less appeaUng

images of an earUer, harsher age in which humans dweUed in caves. Mass evacuation

conveyed a sense of movement, action, a migration to a better place. It was active.

Shelter programs were passive. Americans were to remain where they were, sit quietly,

and wait for the horror of an attack to end. The progressive nature of mass evacuation

requirements suppUed Peterson with a valuable tool for promoting civU defense."'

293i *For more detaUs on highways as a tool for urban renewal consult Richard O. Davies, The Age of Asphalt: The Automobile, the Freeway, and the Condition of Metropolitan America (PhUadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1975), 4-20.

163

In President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the FCDA found strong support for a better

highway system LUce former President Harry S Truman and leaders within the FCDA,

Eisenhower worried about the vulnerabUity of the United States government. With

governmental dispersal a bust, and with the number of federal officials in Washington

multiplying each year, Eisenhower saw the development of better roads and mass

evacuation procedures as an essential element in maintaining continuity of government

fimctions during a crisis. He also recognized that the needs of the country's expanding

economy and the escalating number of vehicles on the roads rendered the United States'

present system of highways obsolete. Lastly, he favored a comprehensive, federaUy-

fimded roads project because it would put miUions of people to work and would hush or

quiet many of the administration's critics who were calling him a do-nothing, or "Whig,"

president. '"

Eisenhower instmcted Vice President Richard Nbcon to introduce the subject of

road improvements at the July 1954 Govemors' Conference. The states' chief executives

were stunned by the breadth of the program that the Eisenhower Administration

submitted. The proposal included such things as the constmction of uniform interstate

highways with more lanes and broad shoulders, higher, sturdier overpasses and bridges,

additional and better ferm-to-market roads. The plan proposed a ten-year federal outlay

of $50 bUUon, over and above the $700 mUUon that the government was then spending

each year."'

'"Ambrose, Eisenhower, 250.

"'Ibid., 251.

164

Having briefed the state's leaders, Eisenhower worked to transform his plan from

pen and chaUc statistics to actual concrete and asphalt roadways. In the faU the president

appointed a special committee to research funding options for the program Early in 1955,

the committee submitted its report. It downsized federal responsibUities to $31.225 bUUon

over ten years, and it suggested paying for the project through special bond issues that the

federal government would retire with gasoUne and tire taxes. ' On February 22, 1955,

President Eisenhower gave Congress the report and a patriotic speech intended to move

senators and representatives to an endorsement of the plan. "Our unity as a nation is

sustained by free communication of thought and by easy transport of people and goods.

The ceaseless flow of information throughout the RepubUc is matched by individual and

commercial movement over a vast system of inter-connected highways....But, in large

part, the network is inadequate for the nation's growing needs." '

After a brief discussion of the various groups which had looked into the United

States' road requirements, the president Usted the reasons that "quick and forward-

looking" action was needed. He taUced of the opportunity to decrease traffic congestion

and the number of fataUties caused by automobUe accidents. He spoke of the high cost of

vehicle maintenance that stemmed from old and iU-repaired roadways. And he taUced

about civU defense. "In case of an atomic attack on our key cities, the road net must

permit quick evacuation of target areas, mobUization of defense forces and maintenance of

' Ambrose, Eisenhower, 251.

"^President's Press Release, 22 February 1955, Papers of John M. Redding.

165

every essential economic function. But the present system in critical areas would be the

breeder of a deadly congestion within hours of an attack." '*

More than a year elapsed before Congress passed the Federal Aid Highway Act,

commonly refened to as the Interstate Highway Act. Democrats in the House refused the

initial proposal because of the fimding issue—they wanted to raise the money for the

highways by taxing the tmcking industry more heavUy. The plan languished in a

legislative purgatory for close to a year, whUe the Eisenhower Administration and the

Democrats in Congress wrestled over funding mechanisms. Determined to see the

highways buUt, but unable to budge the Democrats, Eisenhower finaUy acquiesced to their

demands in January of 1956. The president sent word to the RepubUcans in Congress,

teUing them to agreed to the Democrats' proposal that the system be financed through

users' taxes. Congressional leaders of the country's two dominant poUtical parties then

worked on the bUl throughout the spring and early summer, and President Eisenhower

signed the Federal Aid Highway Act into law on June 29, 1956.^"

Eisenhower took much pride in the new interstate highway system. In his

memoirs he bragged that "it was the biggest peacetime constmction project of any

description ever undertaken by the United States or any other country."'^ The president

then offered dramatic examples of the project's "bigness." "The amount of concrete

"*Press Release, 22 February 1955, Redding Papers.

^"Ambrose, Eisenhower, 251, 301, 306.

'^vsight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), 548.

166

poured to form these roadways would buUd eight Hoover Dams or sbc sidewaUcs to the

moon. To buUd them, buUdozers and shovels would move enough dirt and rock to bury

aU of Connecticut two feet deep."'"' Eisenhower did not forget to mention the defensive

value of the in^roved highways. "And motorists by the mUUons would read a primary

purpose in the signs that would sprout up alongside the pavement: 'In the event of an

enemy attack, this road wiU be closed....'"'"^

The Federal CivU Defense Administration had announced its endorsement of

mass evacuation strategies more than two years before President Eisenhower penned his

name on the highway bUl. During his first year as FCDA administrator, Val Peterson had

often discussed the merits of target evacuation, but the agency did not give official notice

of a poUcy shift untU it released Advisory BuUetin No. 158 in January 1954. The Peterson

Administration noted that the advent of the hydrogen bomb had rendered previous shelter-

centered strategies obsolete. Scientists and engineers had made great leaps in weapons

technology but only smaU steps in the development of protective stmctures. Mass

evacuation of bomb targets offered the best, the only, chance of surviving a nuclear attack.

Dispatched to regional, state, and local preparedness leaders. Advisory BuUetin No. 158

heralded the FCDA's change in strategy, and it recommended that civU defense directors

initiate studies of their urban areas and begin formulating evacuation plans.'^'

'"'Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 548.

'"'Ibid., 549.

'"'Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1954 Annual Report, 31

167

Achieving universal acceptance of mass evacuation strategies by the thousands of

civU defense organizations scattered across the country constituted a major chaUenge for

the Federal CivU Defense Administration, yet a bigger problem confronted the agency.

The shift in federal strategies necessitated the reeducation of the entire population of the

United States. Peterson plugged the FCDA's new reUgion whenever he had an

opportunity. Mass evacuation became the main topic in his speeches and interviews, and

in newly-released agency pubUcations and FCDA-sponsored exercises.'""

Since automobUes played such a cmcial role in the new civU defense poUcy, the

FCDA issued a panqihlet that dealt exclusively with Americans' favorite form of

transportation—- Wheels to Survival: Your Car and Civil Defense. Paternalistic in tone,

the 1955 leaflet opened with a series of "common sense" admonitions that young drivers

StUl hear from their parents today. "Keep your tires properly inflated....Keep your gas

tank more than half-fiiU at aU times...." The leaflet's authors condensed the remaining

myriad of parental commands—get the oU changed, check the water, the transmission fluid,

the antifreeze—into one general suggestion: "Keep your car in the best possible

mechanical condition."'"'

^ C/v/7 Defense in Industry, RG 397; Federal CivU Defense Administration, Basic Course, 22-23; Idem, Report for 1953, 2, 5-6, 65-66; \954 Annual Report, 8-9, 30; Idem Facts about H-Bomb; Proceedings of Medical Civil Defense Conference, 68-72; Lapp, "Interview with Peterson," (1953), 277; and Idem, "Interview with Peterson," (1954), 365-66.

'"'Federal CivU Defense Administration, 4 Wheels to Survival: Your Car and Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1955), n.p.

168

Upon conq)leting the maintenance advice section of the work, 4 Wheels' writers

focused on the specific benefits of the car in a civU defense emergency. Besides pointing

to its obvious usefulness as a get away vehicle in a mass evacuation, the FCDA touted the

car as a miniature shelter, a home away from home, and a supply center. "Shelter in an

unexpected blast is a bonus you get from your car. More importantly, the car provides a

smaU movable house. You can get away in it-then Uve, eat, and sleep in it in almost any

cUmatic conditions...." "Your car can be a shopping center....Keep...emergency rations in

a carton, ready to be put in the trunk...Know what would be needed in the way of water

containers, first aid kit, clothing, and blankets...see that no item is forgotten if an

emergency arises."'"^

Lastly, the pamphlet emphasized the mles of poUte driving during an evacuation.

The booklet told drivers to use their vehicles to push or puU disabled cars, and stated that

it would result in "Uttle increase in your own gasoUne consumption." Other mles included

picking up as many waUcing evacuees as one's car could cany, obeying traffic authorities,

not crowding or racing other cars, and avoiding the temptation to "honk" if the traffic

slowed. "...[D]on't lean on the hom. Your impatience may become someone else's panic.

That can cost Uves!"'"^ There was no need for hysteria or fiiistration during an atomic

attack. If Americans would foUow the recommendations in 4 Wheels to Survival they

could move quickly and safely—even cheerfuUy—to a semi-rural haven far away from the

nuclear bombs that were plummeting toward their city.

'"^Federal CivU Defense Administration, 4 Wheels to Survival.

'" Ibid.

169

The FCDA tumed its back on the CaldweU and Wadsworth era arguments which

said evacuation was a physical inpossibUity in many metropoUtan areas. With motorists'

cooperation and the proper planning, the speedy, safe evacuation of most cities was

possible, the Peterson Administration claimed. Peterson's FCDA noted that large

numbers of cars and people made their way out of the cities at the end of every work day.

In support of its assertions, the FCDA offered a study of Chicago traffic. In 1955, at 4:30

p.m the single square-mUe population of the "Loop area" usuaUy stood at 910,000. By 6

o'clock only 85,000 remained. The FCDA noted even more people could move to safety

during a weU-effected evacuation, because civU defense personnel would not permit

incoming or cross traffic. The automobUes would aU be heading out.'"*

The agency submitted the conclusions of Dr. John BaUock as further evidence in

support of the efficacy of mass evacuation. BaUock, who worked in the Johns Hopkins

University Office of Research Operations, compUed a detaUed report on the number of

Uves that could be saved by a mass evacuation of the Washington, D.C, area. His studies

showed that a ten megaton hydrogen bomb would kiU close to a miUion people if the

metro's population only had time to duck and cover, but with an hour of waming and

prompt, orderly evacuation, the number of fataUties could be reduced by sbcty percent.'"'

Still, theories and reports alone would not convince everyone that mass

evacuations were practical. Peterson needed to point to actual evacuations in which

people had been relocated successfiiUy. He encouraged pro-dispersal, local civU defense

'"*Federal CivU Defense Administration, States, Counties, Cities, 9.

'"^^^,9-10.

170

organizations to stage mass evacuations in their cities. These multi-purpose exercises

would provide opportunities to train and test civU defense personnel and would bring the

FCDA needed pubUcity and statistics for its latest Ufe-saving strategy. A growing number

of urban preparedness organizations heeded the FCDA's caU. Many of them held their

practice drUls during the annual Operation Alert exercises-national civU defense driUs-

that Administrator Peterson initiated.""

The Federal CivU Defense Administration sponsored its first Operation Alert in

June of 1954, only months after Advisory BuUetin No. 158 announced mass evacuation as

the agency's official poUcy. PubUc booklets on mass evacuation were stiU in various

stages of completion. The general populace was not yet fliUy acquainted with the specifics

of emergency dispersion, and, in fact, many local civU defense bodies were stUl debating

the merits of evacuation strategy. Since U.S. civU defense was in the midst of a major

transformation, the first Operation Alert focused primarily on the outdated CaldweU-era

strategies.'"

The twenty-four hour exercise got underway at 11:00 a.m. on June 11. The

FCDA issued an alert; enemy bombers had violated American air space and were heading

toward targets in Canada and the United States. For the most part, pubUc participation

was Umited to a brief shelter driU. In twenty states, most of them in the industrial

northeast, the waU of sirens announced "Waming Red." People left their cars and offices

and took cover. Ten minutes later the sirens sounded "Waming White," and shelter

""Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1954 Annual Report, 1, 6-9, 27, 32-45.

'"Ibid., 32-45.

171

occupants emerged, fresh, unharmed, some no doubt smiUng at the game they had played,

and retumed to their daUy routines."'

With few exceptions, the rest of the exercise was conducted on paper and over

the phone by local, state, and regional civU defense authorities. The FCDA reported that

atomic, not hydrogen, bombs had detonated over forty-two metropoUtan areas in the

United States. SmaUer cities and towns had suffered incendiary raids and had been

victimized by saboteurs. Nearly twenty-five hundred "poUtical subdivisions" of the

country's civU defense networks worked through the logistics of dispatching emergency

personnel and suppUes to the stricken areas, providing care for the injured and homeless,

and, in general, setting the country back on the road to recovery. Although the exercise

was predicated upon the civU defense of the atomic, rather than the thermonuclear, age, in

its report to Congress the FCDA made special mention of the many civU defense

organizations that had discussed enacting mass plans and had proposed future evacuation

driUs.'"

It was the 1955 Operation Alert, a more grandiose undertaking than its 1954

predecessor, which pubUcized the FCDA's commitment to the strategy of mass

evacuation. Hypothetical hydrogen bombs replaced the imaginary atomic weapons of the

1953 drUl. For those areas that received advance waming of the attack, mass evacuation

offered the best chances of survival. Operation Alert, 1955, began on June 15 and ran

through June 18. On the first day of the exercise, the CivUian Air Defense Waming

'"Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1954 Annual Report, 34.

"'Ibid., 34-45.

172

System alerted fifty of ninety-two "critical target" cities of the approach of Soviet

bombers. Local civU defense groups sprang into action, many evacuating civUians from

the target areas. CD personnel outside the threat of a thermonuclear blast readied

reception areas for pre-attack evacuees and the wounded and homeless that would arrive

in the aftermath of an explosion. As alerted metropoUtan areas prepared for

thermonuclear war, the FCDA announced an enemy surprise attack against seven

additional cities. The people in these zero-warning areas had no choice but to "duck and

cover." Projected casualty rates for evacuated target areas were lower than for the cities

that received no waming. The message was clear, greater waming time and mass

evacuations saved Uves. Those people who remained in a target area would die.""

The local evacuations received some press coverage, but Val Peterson's main

pubUcity stunt for ensuring that Americans leamed the primacy of mass evacuation was

conducted with the cooperation of President Eisenhower, the members of the Cabinet and

Congress. In order to guarantee the continuing operation of the United States'

government, 15,000 federal employees, mcluding the nation's chief executive and

legislative officers, evacuated Washington, D.C. and set up temporary headquarters at

more than thirty undisclosed sites in Virginia. After the FCDA announced that an H-bomb

reduced the White House, the Capitol BuUding, and most of Washington to a pUe of

smoking mbble, television stations broadcast a message from the president. Seated in one

of his emergency compound's tents, unmffled by the devastation that had rained down on

""Guy Oakes, The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 85-86.

173

the country, Eisenhower reassured Americans that their government and their nation had

survived the (simulated) attack. The American way of Ufe would continue-thanks to

mass evacuation, Peterson could have added.'"

The FCDA's administrator aUowed the president and the press to speak for him.

They cooperated. Eisenhower's participation ki the exercise ensured widespread media

coverage of the event. In the name of national security. Administrator Peterson then

manipulated the members of the press. Insisting that the president's whereabouts would

have to remain secret during an actual attack, Peterson refused to grant reporters access

to Eisenhower's compound. Instead, the administrator confined the press to

"NEWPOINT," a media center located in a Richmond, Virginia, office buUding. They

were a captive audience, starved for information. The FCDA fed them exactly what

Administrator Peterson wanted the pubUc to see. The image that the press passed on to

the pubUc was one of a renewed and thriving civU defense agency, whose mass evacuation

strategy was accepted at the highest levels of government."^

The Federal CivU Defense Administration's campaign to seU the evacuation

concept appealed to the characteristic values of the American people. Mass evacuation

was practical. Scientists and the president of United States had demonstrated that it could

save Uves. It was cost effective; it was much less expensive than a pubUc shelter program.

Evacuation was progressive; by mandating a better network of roads, it pushed the

country toward a future America of great wealth, safety, and speed. Yes, speed

'"Oakes, Imaginary War, 86, 89.

"%id., 87-88.

174

constituted another seUing point for mass evacuation. Americans had a love-affair with

speed and the sense of racing into the future that it conveyed. In the fable of the tortoise

and the hare, American society is better represented by the speed-conscious hare."^

The FCDA retired Bert the Turtle because he embodied the shelter-centered

poUcies of the CaldweU Administration, but he also did not fit in with the images of speed

and progress that mass evacuation conveyed. In the fikn version of Duck and Cover, Bert

creeps along at a snaU's pace. There is no chance he is going to be able to put enough

distance between himself and an atomic detonation. He has no choice but to "duck and

cover" when a bomb explodes. Under Peterson, the FCDA predicated its defense strategy

on speed—fast waming, fast evacuation, fast recovery. Bert had Uttle chance of surviving

an H-bomb. His slow gait and his last-minute ducking would not save him. If a hydrogen

bomb feU, an empty, smoking sheU would be aU that was left of the now Ul-prepared turtle.

The FCDA's Training and Education Division could have put Bert in a sleek, fast car,

modified his civU defense hardhat to resemble a racing helmet, slapped some goggles and

gloves on him, and placed him at the head of a mass evacuation motorcade. Yet, as long

"^Richard O. Davies, The Age of Asphalt: The Automobile, the Freeway, and the Condition of Metropolitan America (PhUadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1975) 4-8; Mark H. Rose, Instertate: Express Highway Politics, 1941-1956 (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1979), 97-98. For information on the "seUing" of progress in the United States consult Roland Marchand, Advertising the American Dream: Making the Way for Modernity, 1920-1940 (Berkeley: University of CaUfomia Press, 1985); and Pamela WaUcer Laird, Advertising Progress: American Business and the Rise of Consumer Marketing (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

175

as the FCDA's mascot was a turtle, the agency would project unwanted images of a civU

defense that was slow, plodding, half-asleep, and backwards."*

The civU defense poUcies that Val Peterson initiated seemed destined to succeed

because the FCDA developed strategies that in many ways embodied American values.

Peterson's Administration tapped into more than Americans' fascination with progress and

speed. The new civU defense poUcies appealed to Americans' sense of individualism.

Peterson criticized spending money on pubUc shelters—taxing the rich to pay for stmctures

to protect the poor, cramming people into communal shelters. In an age of anti-

communist hysteria, Peterson moved the FCDA away from a poUcy which many feUow

RepubUcans and conservative Democrats could charge was sociaUstic in nature.

Peterson's FCDA endorsed a plan that celebrated capitaUsm and the individual.

Americans would escape harm by sheUing out money for private shelters or by cUmbing

into their private vehicles and evacuating the target areas. This privatization of civU

defense accompUshed two objectives: it tied FCDA initiatives more closely to dearly-held

pubUc values, and it placed the burden for civU defense where the authors of the early

preparedness reports had intended—on the shoulders of the individual.

Val Peterson was at the apex of his glory in 1955. He had launched a weU-

planned campaign to win support for his civU defense plans, and the president himself had

participated in a mass evacuation. LUce MUlard CaldweU, however, Peterson made

mistakes whUe serving as administrator of the Federal CivU Defense Administration.

"*Federal CivU Defense Administration and National Education Association Safety Commission, Duck and Cover (n.p.: Archer Productions, Incorporated, 1952), filmstrip; and Laird, Advertising Progress.

176

Years earUer, CaldweU had resigned. In 1956 Peterson found himself besieged with

charges of ineptitude, and came close to being forcefliUy removed from office.

It was a tiny enemy, armed with an invisible weapon, which made Peterson and

his poUcies vulnerable to attack. The FCDA's administrator was slow to recognize

pubUcly the danger this new enemy posed and slow to move the FCDA to deal with the

threat. As evidence accumulated which proved the enemy—though smaU-was great in

number, and the weapon—though invisible—was real and dangerous, the outcry against

Peterson and the FCDA's inactivity grew. "FaUout," tiny particles of matter swept into

the air by the detonation of an atomic device, was the enemy, and radiation its weapon,

which unseated the Peterson Administration and forced yet another reevaluation of civU

defense strategies.

177

CHAPTER VI

THE SKY IS FALLING: CHICKEN LITTLE, THE LUCKY

DRAGON, AND THE HOLIHELD INVESTIGATIONS

Now, I am not a psychologist...but...I am famUiar with a famous treatise on the anatomy of fear...The principal character in this case history was Chicken Licken [sic] whose obsession it was...that the sky was faUing. Now, this Chicken Licken [sic] was a leader—of a sort—though the fear of disaster from above seemed to have paralyzed her abiUty to reason. And so, when a single acorn feU on her head, she was able to convince herself that This Was It! As she had long expected, the sky was reaUy falling; the world reaUy was coming to an end, and there was nothing she could do to save herself but run and teU the king. Unfortunately, Chicken Licken [sic] was able to convince others of the same thing, and so her fiiends Henny Penny, and Cocky Locky, and Drakey Lakey, and aU the rest, joined her in a headlong msh to the Capitol—I mean the castle—looking for aid. But on the way they met a very, very smart fox, and what did Foxy Loxy do? Taking advantage of their panic-stricken desire to be saved by someone else—anyone else but themselves—he steered them smoothly into his hole, and ate them aU up...And so it seems to me that the moral of this tale is not that the sky didn't faU-for it might, in our time...The real moral is that there must be some stabUizing influence in every home, and in every neighborhood, to lead the Chicken Lickens [sic] of our world away from imagined dangers.'"

Standing before the National Board of Directors of the General Federation of

Women's Clubs, FCDA Deputy Administrator Katherine G. Howard continued her speech

by charging the "housevsives and homemakers of the land" with the responsibUity of

learning the facts of civU defense and disseminating them to their famiUes and fiiends.

Howard told women to arm themselves with knowledge and strike back at the naysayers

and fataUsts. The most powerful weapon in the enemy's arsenal was not the atomic or the

'""The Distaff Side of CivU Defense," Folder Board of Directors of the General Federation of Women's Clubs, Box 10, Katherine G. Howard Papers, 1917-74, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (DDEL). The chUdren's Uterature character to which Katherine Howard refers is more commonly caUed "Chicken Little."

178

hydrogen bomb, it was the hysteria, despair, and apathy that had infected many Americans

and which spread to others everyday. Howard caUed upon housewives, the keepers and

nurturers of patriotic values to act as antibodies to this paralyzing contagion, and destroy

the disease that would so weaken Americans' resolve it would guarantee the nation's

defeat in a future war. The FCDA's deputy administrator voiced her certainty that the

United States would survive a nuclear war and would emerge victorious if women puUed

together and acted as a moral, stabUizing influence for the country's 160 mUUon citizens, if

they ensured that "aU of them [were] dedicated to the freedom of their nation."'"

Howard's was an "isms" speech, with individuaUsm, voluntarism, optimism, and

patriotism occupying center stage, but a careful observer wUl notice that Mrs. Howard

also engineered a subtle attack against the CaldweU-era shelter poUcy. When Howard

deUvered her address in October of 1953, Val Peterson had been running the FCDA for

close to a year, and already the agency was reflecting the new boss's bias toward pubUc

shelters. Howard utUized the story of Chicken Little to teach women the importance of

resisting panic. At the same time, however, the fable offered a criticism of pubUc shelter

initiatives. Chicken Little ran to the government for help, instead of helping herself The

Peterson Administration focused its attention on mass evacuation poUcy-citizens' use of

private transportation to escape an atomic attack. The agency also reserved some praise

for concemed, shelter-centered, private citizens who took the initiative and either

purchased or constmcted shelters for their suburban homes. Peterson reserved most of his

criticisms for federaUy-fimded pubUc shelters-they were expensive, their Ufe-saving

'""Distaff Side of CivU Defense," Howard Papers.

179

potential uncertain, and they transferred the responsibUity for civU defense from the

individual to the government.'^'

When she recited the detaUs of Chicken Little's demise, Howard aimed a

subUminal knockout punch at the shelter strategy. Chicken Little and her fiiends

franticaUy sought someone to save them as their world was coming to an end. Dreaded

A-bombs-in this case, "a" for acom-were falling from the sky! The deceitful Foxy Loxy

opened his spacious underground shelter to the pubUc and invited them to take cover.

Chicken Little and her fiiends accepted, descended into the shelter, and there they died.

No doubt if Peterson could have tacked an epUogue onto the end of the story, he would

have noted that the inteUigent animals stayed calm and above ground. They watched for

waming of an acom-bomb attack, avoided bumps and bmises by evacuating the area when

an alert sounded, and Uved long, productive, happy Uves.

When Katherine Howard stated that the sky indeed might faU during her Ufetime,

she was referring to the possibiUty of enemy planes dropping bombs on the United States.

In the years that foUowed Howard's presentation, however, a growing number of

Americans became preoccupied with another danger that rained down from the sky,

"faUout"-irradiated dust and droplets of water that were by-products of nuclear test

detonations. The initial explosion of a nuclear device would lift tons of radioactively-

charged, pulverized debris into the air. The heavier particles and those not caught by wind

'""Distaff Side of CivU Defense," Howard Papers; Ralph Lapp, "An Interview with Govemor Val Peterson," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 10, no. 10 (1954): 375-76; and Proceedings of Medical Civil Defense Conference, New York-May 31, 1953 (New York: American Medical Association CouncU on National Emergency Medical Service, 1953), 69-70.

180

currents would quickly faU back to the earth, creating an area of high radioactive

contamination in the immediate vicinity of the atomic or thermonuclear burst. The Ughter

matter would "feU-out" more graduaUy as it drifted on the winds tens, even hundreds, of

mUes from the bomb site. The concentrations of irradiated feUout would diminish with

distance from ground zero, but the fact remained that nuclear tests produced huge,

eUiptical swaths of "dirty," or radiation poisoned, land and water on their windward sides.

Debates over the danger posed by nuclear testing and the Ungering radioactivity it

produced raged within the scientific community and spread to the pubUc at large. The

advent of the hydrogen bomb and the visible effect that contact with radioactive debris

produced in humans brought a new intensity to the arguments between nuclear tests'

advocates and critics.'"

The Federal CivU Defense Administration was one of the agencies caught in the

middle of the debate. The FCDA had downplayed consistently the danger of radiation,

and it continued in its "see no evU" poUcy. Val Peterson hoped to shift civU defense

strategies from bomb shelters to mass evacuation; faUout threatened to unseat his plan.

Americans could drive fifteen or twenty mUes from a target area and escape the blast and

fire produced by an H-bomb, but recognition of faUout as a Ufe-threatening enemy would

necessitate sending evacuees to areas fifty, one hundred, or more mUes away. Peterson's

'"Robert A. Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 35, 321; and Howard BaU, Justice Downwind: America's Atomic Testing Program in the 1950s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), vU-bc.

181

only other option was to retum the FCDA to a poUcy of shelter constmction, a poUcy

which he had opposed since before Congress passed the CivU Defense Act of 1950.'"

The story of Chicken Little developed new overtones and held a special meaning

for the FCDA in the mid-1950s. Indeed, the sky was faUing, and Chicken Little raUied

others to petition the government to protect them from death and/or disfigurement. In her

speech Howard said, "...fear of disaster from above seemed to have paralyzed her

[Chicken Little's] abUity to reason."' " Peterson's FCDA appUed this statement to the

faUout-fearing pubUc at large. The Federal CivU Defense Administration reacted to taUc of

radiation dangers as it had in the past. It acknowledged that nuclear bombs produced

some radioactivity, but it contended lingering radiation would cause few deaths.

According to the FCDA, blast and fire remained the most dangerous threats in a nuclear

strike, and mass evacuation was a viable strategy for escape. The Peterson Administration

refused to retum to a shelter-oriented civU defense poUcy. Val Peterson remained

steadfest in his conviction that mbble from crumbUng buUdings would make the shelters

death traps-Chicken Little, Henny Penny, and the rest would die underground.'"

Unfortunately for Peterson, shelters led to his-not Chicken Little's-downfaU.

For the tale of Chicken Little to Ulustrate the history of civU defense in the Fifties, the

'"Thomas J. Ken, C/v/7 Defense in the U.S.: Band-Aid for a Holocaust? (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), 44.

'""Distaff Side of CivU Defense," Howard Papers.

^^^Medical Conference, 69-70; Federal CivU Defense Administration, Facts About the H-Bomb (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1953); and Idem, Facts About Fallout (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1955).

182

story's ending requires modification. In the updated version. Chicken Little enUsts the

support of prominent scientists and poUtical lobbyists, as weU as other concemed citizens,

and she attracts the attention of the government. The country's legislative body then

holds an inquiry to determine what action has been taken to meet the threat of faUout from

the sky, finds the nation's civU defense leadership and poUcies inept, and caUs for a change

in personnel and preparedness strategies. The head of the civU defense agency resigns. A

new director steps in and advocates the constmction of faUout shelters. Foxy Loxy stops

eating his feUow citizens and, instead, tries to strike it rich by buUding underground

shelters which he claims provide safe, fun, and cozy Uving for any famUy.

Although fear of radiation's adverse effects on the Uving increased dramaticaUy in

the mid-Fifties, concem first appeared decades earUer, shortly after the discovery of X-

rays and radioactive elements. The earUest studies of radiation focused on X-rays, which

the German physicist WUhelm Roentgen found in 1895. WhUe conducting experiments

with cathode-ray tubes—electricaUy-charged vacuum tubes which glowed because of the

heat-induced movement of negatively-charged particles, electrons-Roentgen noted that a

fluorescent screen some distance from the tube also glowed. The effect was not reduced

when he covered the cathode tube v^th black paper, and the glow's intensity weakened

only sUghtly when Roentgen placed his wife's hand between the tube and the screen.

Upon looking at the hand, the physicist reaUzed that he could see the faint outUne of the

bones, and he reaUzed what was occurring. The charged cathode-ray tube was radiating

183

energy in the form of an electromagnetic wave, or ray, through the paper, the air, and the

hand, onto the screen. Roentgen named the waves "X-rays", "X" for unknown.'"

FoUowing hard on the heels of Roentgen's find was the discovery by other

scientists that certain naturaUy-occurring elements released radiant energy. Early in 1896

Henry Becquerel, a physicist from France, proved that uranium was one such element.

Two years later, Piene and Marie Curie, who coined the term "radioactivity" for the

spontaneous emission of radiation, separated a new radioactive element, radium, from a

uranium-rich pitchblende ore.' ^

InitiaUy, scientists and the pubUc aUke entertained great hopes for the medical

uses of radiation. The X-ray's abUity to serve as a photographic tool for bones and

internal organs advanced diagnostic medicine and benefitted the surgical fields. Doctors

also employed X-rays to treat skin blemishes and discussed the possibiUty of using the

electromagnetic waves to determine pregnancy and, perhaps, photograph the soul.' *

Americans welcomed the practical uses of radium, as weU. The radioactive

element was a key ingredient in Dr. W. J. Morton's "Liquid Sunshine," which appeared on

the market in the first decade of the twentieth century. Morton claimed that those who

'"Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon &, Schuster, 1986), 41. Radio waves, microwaves, gamma waves, cosmic waves, and visible, infrared, and ultraviolet Ught are other members of the electromagnetic spectrum.

'"AUan M. Winkler, Life Under A Cloud: American Anxiety About the Atom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 85.

'"Winkler, Under a Cloud, 86; and Stephen HUgartner, Richard C BeU, and Rory O'Connor, Nukespeak: The Selling of Nuclear Technology in America (Fairfield, Penn.: Penguin Books, 1983), 2-3.

184

drank the glowing eUxir would be healed of any internal disorder. When introducing

Liquid Sunshine to a meeting of Massachusetts Institute of Technology alumni, he praised

his tonic's quaUties, stating "it wUl be possible to bathe a patient's entire interior in violet

or ultraviolet Ught....We know of the value of sunshine on the outside...and we beUeve it

wUl have a simUar effect on the inside."'^' His product sold. At a later banquet, the MIT

alums ended their dinner with a Liquid Sunshine toast. With gusto, people in the

Northeast downed radioactive cocktaUs and waited for physical regeneration.""

In addition to their manifested enthusiasm for radium's supposed therapeutic

vgdue, Americans prized the substance for its luminous quaUty. The watches produced by

the United States Radium Corporation boasted glow-in-the-dark faces. The company

hired young women to paint numbers on the dials, usuig oU paints with a high radium

content. During the course of the workday, as their camel-hair bmshes became frayed, the

women would smooth them back to a point by twirUng the bmsh tips between their Ups.

Sometimes, to reUeve the tedium of their work, they would paint their naUs or their teeth

and flash glowing smUes at their coworkers.'"

The initial euphoric celebration of aU-things radioactive ended abmptly as the

dangerous side affects of radiation began to appear. People that worked closely with X-

rays developed bums and cancer. As high energy electromagnetic rays penetrate the body,

they produce an ionizing effect. The waves' force separates electrons from atoms,

'^'Quoted in HUgartner et al., Nukespeak, 5.

""Ibid.

"'Winkler, Cloud, 87-88.

185

creatuig atomic fragments, or ions. Ionization dismpts a ceU's stmctural integrity and can

lead to the mutation or death of the ceU. The blood and blood-producing tissues are

especiaUy vulnerable to the effects of radiation. Besides killing large numbers of red blood

cells, radiation dismpts ceUular division and reduces the production of white blood cells

and anticoagulants, thus lowering the body's resistance to disease."^

Radioactive materials such as radium and the entire varied spectrum of fission

products released by an atomic or hydrogen bomb's detonation, generate both particle and

wave radiation and constitute an even greater health hazard than X-rays. NaturaUy-

occurring and synthetic radioactive elements spontaneously undergo nuclear decay. As a

byproduct of decomposition, they emit radiant energy in the form of alpha and beta

particles, and gamma rays. Alpha particles are positively-charged HeUum atoms; beta

particles, high-energy electrons. Gamma rays are electromagnetic waves, Uke X-rays, but

characterized by a higher energy value and shorter wavelength. Of alpha, beta, and

gamma radiation, the last is the most dangerous. Gamma rays penetrate non-dense

substances—including flesh and bone—more readUy than do alpha or beta particles.

Nonetheless, if particle radiation is inhaled or ingested and becomes lodged in the internal

organs, it can prove just as deadly as its wave counterparts. The dangers posed by the

ingestion of radioactive materials were made pubUc when the female en^loyees of the

"^Rhodes, Atomic Bomb, 731; George T. Mazuzun and Samuel J. WaUcer, Controlling the Atom: The Beginnings of Nuclear Regulation, 1946-1962 (Berkeley: University of CaUfomia Press, 1985), 33; and Ruth Adams and Susan CuUen, eds., The Final Epidemic: Physicians and Scientists on Nuclear War (Chicago, lU.: Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, 1981), 151-223.

186

United States Radium Corporation, suffering and dying from a number of diseases, sued

their employers.'"

A number of variables, including the length of exposure to radioactive materials

and the level of radioactivity, determine the path that radiation sickness takes. Many of

radiation's pioneering scientists, such as Marie and Piene Curie, experienced hair loss,

graduaUy developed red or purple radiation "bums,"and then succumbed to diseases such

as cancer as a result of their prolonged exposure to relatively low-level radiation. Many of

Hiroshima and Nagasaki's inhabitants who received massive doses of gamma radiation

when an atomic bomb detonated exhibited more extreme symptoms. Thousands died

almost instantly, their bodies covered with third degree radiation bums. Others survived

the external bums but not the internal damage. These "Uving dead" often first complained

of headaches and fetigue, and ran fevers. They experienced inflammation of the mucus

membranes. Then they began to suffer from dianhea, its blood content high. As tissues

and organs died, the bleeding became more pronounced, blood flowing out of the mouth,

the rectum, and the urinary tract. Most died from the hemonhaging. The people who did

not sustain as much internal damage and who managed to recover from the initial violent

trauma stUl inclined a greater risk of future disease because of the mutation of ionized

cells and damage to the immune system.""

'"Mazuzun and WaUcer, Controlling the Atom, 33-34; and HUgartner et al., Nukespeak, 9-11.

""Rhodes, Atomic Bomb, 731-32; and Adams and CuUen, Final Epidemic, 195-96.

187

With the recognition of radiation hazards came attempts to minimize the risk of

injury. During the 1910s, radiation advisory bodies sprang up in England and Germany.

As awareness increased so did the number of advisory committees abroad. The European

organizations created an International Congress of Radiology to coordinate the various

boards' findings. In 1928, at its second meeting, the Congress estabUshed the

International X-Ray and Radium Protection Committee v^ose task it was to recommend

guideUnes for radiation use. The foUowing year, a group of U.S. businessmen and

radiological experts formed the American Advisory Committee on X-Ray and Radium

Protection. Eight people, half of them representatives from the country's X-ray

equipment manufacturers and the other four taken from professional societies, comprised

the board's membership.'"

The strong presence of businessmen on the American Advisory Committee

guaranteed that the board would not denounce the use of radioactive substances

altogether, but would try to determine how much radiation the human body could absorb

before showing signs of Ul effects. It should have surprised no one when the committee

adopted standards proposed by physicist Arthur MutscheUer, an employee of an X-ray

equipment con^any. German-bom, but an American emigre, MutscheUer proposed

tolerance Umits for exposure to radiation. Since the harmful effects of radiation first

manifest extemaUy as red blotches, bums, on the skin, MutscheUer attempted to determine

the maximum daUy dose of radiation a person could receive and not develop a skin

initation. In 1934, the American Committee on X-Ray and Radium Protection and the

'"Mazuzun and WaUcer, Controlling the Atom, 34.

188

intemational advisory body used MutscheUer's studies to derive tolerance Umits for

exposure to radiation. The unit of measurement employed was the roentgen (r), its name

taken from the X-ray's discoverer. The United States' advisory committee recommended

levels of. 1 r per day for whole body exposure and 5 r per day for workers' fingers. The

intemational group set Umits that were sUghtly higher. WhUe significant, MutscheUer's

investigations were far from exhaustive. Decades passed before scientists developed a

thorough understanding of radiation's effects on Uving organisms."^

In the 1930s the American and the intemational radiation committees endorsed

the idea of a radiation threshold. They did not fliUy recognize the potential danger of

exposure to high-energy electromagnetic waves and particles. They observed no teU-tale

characteristics of sickness in workers who were exposed daUy to smaU doses of radiation.

Early in their history, therefore, the advisory bodies based their recommendations on the

notion that below a certain level of exposure, radiation produced a less toxic reaction in

humans."^

The threshold theory's opposite, the cumulative-effect argument, gained

acceptance in the 1940s. According to those who championed the cumulative hypothesis,

absorption of any radiation was dangerous because it dismpted normal ceU stmcture and

behavior. Individuals exposed to low level radiation on a regular basis suffered a constant

energy-bombardment of their ceUs, and the cumulative effect of smaU radiation doses

could prove injurious or even lethal. Working from this new premise, the American

"^Mazuzun and WaUcer, Controlling the Atom, 34.

'"Ibid., 35.

189

advisory body, which had changed its name to the National Committee on Radiation

Protection (NCRP), modified its suggestions on radiation exposure. In the years

foUowing World War II, as scientists amassed more information on the effects of

radiation, the NCRP dropped the term "tolerance dose," adopted "maximum permissible

dose," and lowered whole-body Umits from .1 r per day to .3 r per week. StUl, the word

"permissible" impUed that the committee's members beUeved certain considerations-such

as profit for the X-ray equipment manufacturers or research for the scientists-justified the

limited absorption of ionizing particles and rays."*

For officers of the federal government, it was the defense of the "free world" that

relegated concerns over radiation poisoning to a position of secondary importance. The

Manhattan Project's development of the atomic fission bomb during World War II raised

new questions about radioactivity. In the aftermath of the bombings of Hiroshima and

Nagasaki, medical doctors and other scientists gathered volumes of data on the causes of

death in the two cities. As mentioned previously, most studies concluded that the bomb's

blast and secondary fires accounted for the majority of deaths. Yet the investigating teams

could not whoUy disregard the effects of radiation. They could not ignore the thousands

of people who died from "flash bums" received when the Little Boy and Fat Man

explosions released banages of gamma radiation. The most penetrating rays in the

electromagnetic spectrum, the high-intensity beams sped through the cities, ripping

through buUdings, through humans, through aU but the most dense substances, Uke lead.

"*Maziizim and WaUcer, Controlling the Atom, 37-39.

190

Smashing electrons off the atoms they encountered, the rays left behind a traU of dead and

dying Japanese.'"

The research teams could not overlook the devastation wrought by gamma

radiation, but they did contend that the dangers posed by "Ungering radiation" were

negUgible. FaUout was bom with the detonation of the first atomic device; nonetheless,

the term "faUout" did not become a household word in the United States untU the mid-

Fifties. Lingering radioactivity was not recognized as Ufe threatening. After Little Boy

and Fat Man exploded, particles of inadiated matter hung in the atomic clouds over

Hiroshima and Nagasaki and graduaUy feU out onto the land and the people below. But in

their official reports to the U.S. government, civilian and miUtary investigators claimed

that no one had died from the residual radiation.'""

Perhaps their assertions were conect, although the lack of understanding about

radiation's biological effects, in general, and the first-time encounter with the biological

effects of an atomic bomb, cast a paU of uncertainty over the reports. The atomic bombs

detonated high in the air, not at ground level, Umiting the load of inadiated debris Ufted

into the stem and cap of the mushroom-shaped clouds. The force of the bombs'

explosions further restricted the amount of faUout; Little Boy weighed in at only 12.5

kUotons and Fat Man at 22 kUotons. Hydrogen bombs measured at the megaton level.

'"Rhodes, Atomic Bomb, 731-34; and U.S. Army, Manhattan Engineer District, The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, undated, 1-34.

'""U.S. Army, Manhattan Engineer District, The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (n.p.: Manhattan Engineer District, n.d.), 1-34.

191

Lastly, in 1945 it was known that most radioactive isotopes decayed quickly-some took

only seconds, others hours or a couple of days.'"'

It required the detonation of future, bigger atomic and hydrogen bombs to trigger

concem over faUout. Americans worried a Uttle after the 1946 Operation Crossroads tests

at BUcini, one of thirty-four atolls that comprise the MarshaU Islands in the West Pacific.

The second atomic bomb detonated during the exercise generated much higher levels of

initial and residual radiation than anticipated. The device exploded underwater and

inadiated more debris than had the atmospheric detonations of Little Boy and Fat Man.

Radiation poisoned the water in the atoU's lagoon, and faUout, in the form of radioactive

dusts and drops of water, blanketed the region. Ships entering the test area became

contaminated. Fish absorbed so much radiation that they left images of their internal

physiology when placed on photographic plates.'"^

David Bradley, a medical doctor and a member of the Operation Crossroads

radiological team, recorded the tests' effects and his own worry about the uncertainty of

Ufe in the Atomic Age. His book's title. No Place to Hide (1948), reflected the author's

fear of the radiation released by atomic bombs. No Place to Hide made the New York

Times bestseUer Ust for ten weeks, and by the end of the decade more than 250,000

Americans had purchased a copy. If each buyer shared the book with ten people, and they

aU were persuaded by Bradley's arguments, they would stUl represent less than two

'"'Rhodes, Atomic Bomb, 711, 740.

'"^David Bradley, No Place to Hide (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1948), 103-4, 125.

192

percent of the country's total population. Bradley's work merits attention because it is an

early attempt to raise pubUc awareness on the issue of atomic radiation and feUout, but its

intact on pubUc opinion should not be exaggerated.'"'

In 1950, widespread fear of faUout was stUl four years distant, even though

Americans were suddenly placed in much closer proximity to atomic tests. The Atomic

Energy Commission had petitioned for a domestic atomic test range to supplement the

Pacific site, and to insure that the United States could continue its exercises unintermpted

if an enemy interfered with the isolated testing area in the Pacific Ocean. After examining

potential sites in New Mexico, Utah, and North CaroUna, the Truman Administration

decided the Nevada Desert would become home to the new testing range. From 1950 to

1963 the United States detonated dozens of atomic and hydrogen bombs at the Las

Vegas-Tonopah Bombing and Gunnery Range. Many produced large, "dirty" clouds fiUed

with radioactive debris. The faUout from a May 1953 atomic shot, designated "Harry,"

but which came to be caUed "Dirty Harry," exposed the inhabitants of St. George, Utah,

to more radioactivity than the yearly aUowances that the National Committee on Radiation

Protection recommended for people who worked with radiation. In its wake, Harry's

inadiated cloud left a number of sick people and more than four thousand dead sheep.'""

"Dirty Harry" was one of the few pre-1954 detonations that brought complaints

from private citizens and the press. A carnival atmosphere generaUy sunounded the

atomic tests. The Las Vegas-Tonopah Bombing and Gunnery Range became a tourist

'"'Bradley, No Place, xiv; and Winkler, Under a Cloud, 91.

'""BaU, Justice Downwind, 28-29, 43-44; and Winkler, Under a Cloud, 92-93.

193

attraction- With the site a mere hour's drive from Las Vegas, Americans could travel to

the range and "ooh" and "aah" over the biggest "fireworks" displays known to man. Area

newspapers pubUshed the scheduled detonations of nuclear devices and pointed out the

best vantage points for those who wanted to watch the show.'"'

The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was in large part responsible both for the

overwhelming amount of early pubUc enthusiasm over atomic weapons and the low levels

of criticism. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 which created the AEC charged the body

with conflicting duties. The commission was to promote the use of atomic energy, but it

was responsible also for ensuring pubUc safety. The AEC made the official decisions on

radiation safety measures. Although the NCRP continued to pubUsh its own findings and

recommendations, it remained an advisory body without official recognition or power.

Determined to maintain American superiority in nuclear power and the arms race, and

recognizing the relationship between pubUc support and federal appropriations, the AEC

focused on its promotional campaigns and often neglected its responsibUity to protect the

people from radiation hazards. On occasion the commission tried to buUy the NCRP,

pressuring the advisory body to release information to the AEC before informing the

pubUc. With advance waming, the AEC could prepare reactive strategies that either

upheld the NCRP findings or attempted to discredit them. '"

'"'Winkler, Under a Cloud, 92

'" BaU, Justice Downwind, 37-39; and Mazuzun and WaUcer, Controlling the Atom, 6, 37-38.

194

In addition, AEC employees later testified that their superiors had ordered them

to give vague answers when questioned about tests Uke the Dirty Harry shot that

jeopardized the pubUc's health. In official statements and pubUcations, agency personnel

contended that the threat of injury from residual radiation was minimal. Although reUable,

quantitative data on the chronic dangers was lacking, AEC en^loyees knew that exposure

to large amounts of highly-radioactive particulate faUout was dangerous. A former AEC

PubUc Health Service Radiation Safety Monitor, Frank Butrico, testified that his superiors

ordered him to distort the tmth when residents of St. George, Utah, caUed him after Dirty

Harry's cloud dumped tons of uradiated dust on their city. Butrico told AEC officers that

his radiation-detection instruments had jumped off the scale. PersonaUy, he took several

showers and bumed the clothes that he had been wearing when the test occuned, but the

radiation monitor foUowed his orders and told concemed private citizens that area

radiation had not risen to dangerous levels. Radio stations in the St. George area passed

on the AEC's pubUc recommendation that people simply shut their windows, remain

indoors for a few hours, and perhaps take a shower if they had been outside. The

radioactivity persisted much longer than the AEC's waming impUed, but radiation was

invisible, and the commission's most important considerations were keeping the American

pubUc calm, optimistic, and in favor of fiiture testing.'"^

As a result of its conflicting mandates and its bias toward the development of

nuclear hardware, the AEC withheld information and misled the pubUc for decades. In the

late 1950s, at the height of the faUout controversy, the commission's FaUout Studies

'" BaU, Justice Downwind, 43-44; and Winkler, Under a Cloud, 93.

195

Branch in its Biology and Medicine Division discovered that radioactive iodine traveled

straight to the thyroid gland when ingested, leading to thyroid cancer. The AEC buried

the report. The American pubUc did not leam of the iodine/thyroid study and others that

would have proved equaUy damaging to the AEC's Cold War mission, untU the late

1970s, when Freedom of Information Act requests to the Department of Energy forced

their release.'"*

For years, the Federal CivU Defense Administration served as a conduit for

distributing the AEC's misinformation to the people. The AEC was the official authority

on nuclear hazards. It was the body responsible for issuing reports on the effects of

radiation. It was the agency which possessed a General Advisory CouncU staffed with

atomic scientists. The FCDA boasted no simUar panel of scientific experts; rather, it was

staffed with poUticians, businessmen, promotional speciaUsts, and tme beUevers who had

worked as civU defense personnel during World War II. The FCDA looked to the AEC's

experts for information on radiation hazards. Then, through miUions of civU defense

pamphlets, news articles, and pubUc announcements, it disseminated the AEC's "official

line," the message that the commission wanted the American pubUc to hear.'"'

The AEC/FCDA relationship raises obvious questions. Were FCDA leaders

privy to aU of the AEC's data on radiation hazards? Was the FCDA an innocent or a

willing "dupe" of the Atomic Energy Commission? The evidence indicates that members

of the Peterson Administration knew the AEC was withholding facts from the pubUc, and,

'"*BaU, Justice Downwind, 44.

'"'Ken, C/v/7 Defense Band-Aid, 76.

196

when in 1954 "feUout" became a primary concem for the average American, the FCDA

coUaborated with the AEC in restricting the flow of information to the pubUc. In

particular, the result of AEC/FCDA exchanges during Eisenhower's brief affair with a

federal "poUcy of candor" show that the Federal CivU Defense Administration compUed

with the Atomic Energy Commission's demands for secrecy.""

Physicist Robert Oppenheimer began the crusade for governmental candor. In

the July 1953 issue of Foreign Affairs, Oppenheimer wamed against the disastrous

consequences of an arms race. He feared nuclear annUiUation of the United States and the

Soviet Union and compared the two atomic powers to "two scorpions in a bottle, each

capable of killing the other, but only at the risk of his own Ufe." Oppenheimer voiced his

opinion that the people would support his caU for a halt to the arms race if the country's

leaders would reveal the tme size and power of the United States' nuclear stockpUe.'"

President Eisenhower was taken with Oppenheimer's "candor poUcy" proposal.

LUce the former science director of the Manhattan Project, the United States' chief

executive fevored an end to the arms race and possibly nuclear disarmament, but he knew

the American pubUc would frown upon such a suggestion. Eisenhower saw a ray of hope

in Oppenheimer's suggestion. Perhaps if the people leamed the fiightening detaUs of the

H-bomb's destmctive power it would shock them into supporting a disarmament initiative.

Accordingly, the president instmcted one of his executive assistants, CD. Jackson, to

""Ken, C/v/7 Defense Band-Aid, 71-73.

'"J. Robert Oppenheimer, "Atomic Weapons and American Foreign PoUcy," Foreign Affairs (July 1953), 528-31.

197

write a speech that would candidly and in graphic detaU reveal the power of fusion

weapons."^

Admiral Lev^ Strauss, chairperson of the Atomic Energy Commission, opposed

the proposed "poUcy of candor." Strauss's commission had withheld information from the

pubUc precisely because he did not want Americans to strike for nuclear disarmament.

Moreover, the AEC chair realized that once the government revealed the size and power

of the U.S. arsenal to the American people, the information would make its way to the

Soviets. Strauss was a Cold War warrior. He beUeved U.S. security hinged on the

country's atomic strength. He contended that Soviet interest in disarmament or a testing

moratorium was a calculated strategy to further communist expansion—a propaganda tool

for convincing third world nations that the U.S.S.R. was the "good guy" and a mse for

stripping the westem European countries of their detenent force and lulling them into a

state of bUssfiil ignorance. If the leaders of Russia knew the exact dimensions of the

American detenent stockpUe, they would not rest untU their own was equal or greater in

force and number. They might outwardly pretend to comply with disarmament, but

secretly they would intensify their efforts to overtake the United States in nuclear

technology. Secretary of State John Foster DuUes voiced the same objections.'"

WhUe the AEC mounted an offensive against the proposed candor poUcy, the

FCDA pledged its support for the program. Val Peterson dashed off a letter to General

"^Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 132.

'"Ibid., 132-33.

198

Robert Cutler, the chair of the National Security CouncU's Planning Board. Peterson

fevored a poUcy of candor, because he beUeved the absence of official, authoritative pubUc

releases jeopardized the FCDA's mission. The people had noticed the federal

government's sUence, its close censorship and screening of reports, the lag between its

knowledge of Soviet tests and pubUc announcements confirming the events. Peterson

contended that the absence of candor encouraged the spread of rumors that were always

either more fiightening or much more optimistic than the tmth. If Americans came to

beUeve in the existence of super-weapons which could completely destroy the world,

bombs from which there was no escape, they would not join a civU defense organization.

There would be no point. Similarly if Americans did not beUeve that the United States and

the Soviet Union were developing weapons of mass destmction, there would be no

impetus for enrollment in civilian defense. Peterson contended that a lack of candor "has

resulted in uncertainty and an unwillingness to support these [civU defense] programs."

The FCDA's administrator blamed the government's hush poUcy for the pubUc's

increasing apathy toward civU defense.""

Peterson singled out no specific federal entity for criticism, but a September 16,

1953 letter from Deputy Administrator Katherine Howard to CD. Jackson identified the

Atomic Energy Commission as one of the agencies that was throwing roadblocks in front

of the FCDA. In her petition to Jackson, the deputy administrator identified one of the

FCDA's immediate reasons for supporting the candor poUcy. CivU defense officials

""Val Peterson to General Robert Cutler, 22 May 1953, Folder White House Conespondence, Box 2, Conespondence of Administrator Val Peterson, 1953-1957, RG 396, National Archives and Records Administration, CoUege Park [hereafter NARACP].

199

wanted to give the pubUc more infomiation on the H-bomb, but the Atomic Energy

Commission and the Department of Defense had vetoed the idea. Howard contended that

the lack of specific detaUs and "the expected fluny of speculation in print and over the air

appears to be having the usual result. When a problem, or a threat, looms so

overwhelmingly that it seems to have no answer, the human mind tends to reject it and

take refiige in escapism" Howard stated that the FCDA had confronted successfoUy a

simUar problem with pubUc fear of the Soviets' atomic capabUities. To fight despair and

resignation, the agency had bombarded the people with information on "what it [the

atomic bomb] can do, what it probably cannot do - and what action they can take to

minimize its effects." The FCDA took pride in the "progress...made in preparing the

American pubUc psychologicaUy against the A-bomb." Howard argued that her agency

could ready the people to meet the threat of the hydrogen bomb if the Atomic Energy

Commission and the Department of Defense would cooperate and declassify materials

relating to the 1952 MIKE test at Eniwetok.'"

In particular, Howard wanted access to a fUm that the AEC and DOD had made.

The movie cataloged the events of the Operation Ivy test, from the MIKE explosion to the

after-effects of high-level radioactivity. In her letter to Jackson, Howard contended that

Operation Ivy footage would act as a counter to wUd "unofficial speculation" about the

power of the H-bomb. The FCDA would buUd an education campaign around the film

and would supply the pubUc with a calm, unemotional, and authoritative exposition of the

'"Katherine Howard to CD. Jackson, 16 September 1953, Folder CivU Defense (1), Box 16, Subject Series, White House Central FUes (Confidential FUe) 1953-61, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, DDEL.

200

essential fects about thermonuclear weapons, their probable effects, and civU defense

measures to minimize those effects. According to Howard, whUe the tme measure of an

H-bomb's force was sobering, felse rumors of its apocalyptic power were much more

fiightening. She asked the government to tum on the Ughts for the American people.

Monsters always seem bigger and scarier in the dark."*

The Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense officiaUy

opposed the poUcy of candor, because they claimed it would compromise national

security. According to the two bodies, the United States could release neither the tme

size and power of the country's nuclear arsenal nor the Operation Ivy film. Both verbaUy

and visuaUy, the movie revealed the dimensions of the MIKE blast. The AEC and the

DOD did not want that information to filter to the Soviets. Further, the tmth might not

reassure the American pubUc; it might scare them kito opposing nuclear armament.

Admiral Strauss made it clear to President Eisenhower that he opposed any slowdown in

the United States' development and production of bigger, better bombs."^

By the closing months of 1953, Eisenhower had abandoned his hopes for a poUcy

of candor. Jackson had drafted several speeches that detaUed the honors of nuclear

warfere, but the president's assistant secretary had faUen prey to the same rumors whose

pubUc influence civU defense authorities so greatly feared. The president complained that

Jackson's descriptions of a nuclear conflict always ended with "everybody dead on both

"^Howard to Jackson, 16 September 1953, Eisenhower Papers.

'"Howard to Cutler, Eisenhower Papers; and Ambrose, Eisenhower, 132-33.

201

sides with no hope anywhere," and he pointedly asked his secretary, "Can't we find some

hope?' Jackson cUd not beUeve that there was any to be found."*

Eisenhower feced a dUemma. If he presented one of what came to be caUed

Jackson's "Bang! Bang! papers," it could produce disastrous results. Most Ukely, the

American people would demand disarmament initiatives, but what if the plans feU

through? Americans would either despair or they would demand lavish spending on

survival projects, such as community shelters, underground cities. Eisenhower opposed

sinking bUUons of dollars into pubUc shelter projects. He was a budget-conscious

RepubUcan, and a veteran of war. Later, when approached with recommendations for a

national pubUc shelter program, the exasperated president exclaimed that the people's

morale, their spiritual strength, not expensive gadgets, would ensure the country's

survival. Rather than risk breaking the pubUc's spirit with predictions of nuclear

aiinihUation, the president discarded his plans for a poUcy of candor.'"

The Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense could claim

victory, but so could the Federal CivU Defense Administration. Howard and Peterson

secured footage from the miUtary's Operation Ivy film and produced a movie of their own,

but the FCDA version was far from candid. Administrator Peterson assured Strauss that

the AEC wold be invited to assist the PubUc Affau-s Office in the creation of the movie.

The end result was a piece which, in the language of the film industry, had been "edited for

content." Entitled Operation Ivy, the twenty-eight minute movie showed the preparations

"*Quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower, 133.

^^^AirtorosQ, Eisenhower, 133-35.

202

for the MIKE test, the awe-inspiring firebaU and mushroom cloud, and reported the power

of the hydrogen device's blast. The document excluded aU information relating to the

radioactive feUout that had blanketed the test area. When confronting the pubUc, the

FCDA "sanitized" the hydrogen bomb as it had the atomic bomb. It minimized the danger

of lingering radioactivity and treated fission and fusion devices aUke as more powerfel, yet

StUl conventional, weapons.'^

Scientists argued about the chronic effects of radioactive feUout for years after

the advent of the H-bomb. Often experts on opposite sides used the same studies to

support their claims. Nonetheless, Peterson's FCDA deceived the people intentionaUy by

ignoring or minimizing the known risks of faUout. At stake was the new civU defense

poUcy of mass evacuation. Getting out ofthe way of an explosion was feasible. Running

from an invisible enemy carried by the wind was more difficult. In 1953 Peterson canied

out the decision to change the FCDA's survival strategies. An experienced poUtician, he

knew the pubUc outcry and distmst that would accompany another about-face, so he hid

the facts from the people and refused to modify the agency's Ufe-saving strategies imtU his

career was in a shambles, and the agency's poUcies had been discredited.'*'

He did not have long to wait. In March 1954, a month before the civU defense

administration made Operation Ivy avaUable to the pubUc, and only two months after the

FCDA officiaUy embraced mass evacuation as its primary strategy, events transpired which

'*"Guy Oakes, The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 59.

'*'Ken, C/v/7 Defense Band-Aid, 71; and Winkler, Under a Cloud, 95.

203

brought the word "feUout" an accepted place in the EngUsh language and in most

Americans' vocabulary. On the morning of March 1, the Atomic Energy Commission

detonated its first tme hydrogen bomb over the BUcini atoU, in the MarshaU Islands.

Code-named BRAVO, the fission-flision-fission explosion was the first shot in the

CASTLE series of tests. The AEC had cordoned off a large danger zone before

proceeding with the detonation, but the radiation that the bomb released exceeded the

experts' estimates. Ignoring the contamination boundaries that the AEC had drawn, tons

of highly radioactive faUout spread outward from the test site, forming a poisonous eUipse

two hundred mUes long and forty mUes wide. A secret AEC report later estimated that

one hundred sbcty mUes off the windward side of BUcini, radiation levels were high enough

to kiU. Some one hundred mUes east ofthe atoU, the eighty-sbc inhabitants ofthe island

Rongelap absorbed enough radiation to cause Ulness, surfece bums, and hair loss. The

United States evacuated the people of Rongelap and another one hundred fiffy MarshaU

Islanders threatened by the spreading radiation.'*^

The faUout from BRAVO endangered hundreds of people, but in the weeks after

the test, intemational attention focused on a few Japanese fishermen, the crew ofthe

Fukuryu Maru, the Lucky Dragon. The smaU fishing boat had been more than ninety

mUes west of BUcini, weU outside the official danger zone, when BRAVO Ut up the sky.

The boat's crew marveled at the bomb's firebaU and watched the radioactive cloud rise

over the ocean's surfece and fen out toward them The cloud brought with it a powdery

white ash which feU Uke a heavy snow on the Lucky Dragon and the men standing on its

'"Oakes, Imaginary War, 61.

204

deck. They were fishermen, not atomic scientists, radiological experts, or physicians.

They did not know what they had taken on board their ship. Then they feU Ul. They

experienced headaches, nausea, and hair loss. They suffered from skin bums, vomiting,

and dianhea. Its crew the victim of radiation sickness, the Lucky Dragon Umped home to

Japan. Doctors treated the men, but several remained sick for weeks. One, radio operator

AUcichi Kuboyama, died after a prolonged battle with the Ulness. His internal organs were

a mess, devastated by the ionizing effects of radiation.'*'

The outcry from Japan was great, and the concem in the United States grew

steadUy. Both the AEC and the FCDA had assured the people repeatedly that nuclear

weapons were much Uke conventional bombs, that the danger from Ungering radioactivity

was exaggerated. The experiences ofthe Lucky Dragon's crew told a different story.'^

The Executive Office, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal CivU

Defense Administration aU took steps to ensure damage control. During his March 24

press meeting. President Eisenhower said that the radiation released by Bravo had

"surprised and astonished the scientists." He posited, "...something must have happened

that we never experienced before."'*' WhUe continuing to absolve the AEC scientists of

any responsibUity, the president tried to reassure the American people by teUing them that

'^'Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 4-5, 7, 30-31.

'*"lbid., 7, 29-35.

365i 'Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953-1961, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1960), 346.

205

the AEC would begin "to take precautions that never occuned to them before."'**

Eisenhower's statements did not reUeve the tensions produced by the Bravo detonation. If

anything, they increased the pubUc's fears. Reporters interpreted the president's remarks

as an admission that the AEC had lost control ofthe nuclear weapons that it was

developing. The hydrogen bomb was some sort of nuclear Frankenstein that could end up

destroying its creator—the United States.'*^

Chairman Strauss atteiiq)ted to end the pubUc speculation, but his miscues only

added fuel to the fire. He acknowledged that the Japanese fishermen had suffered

radiation poisoning, and he reluctantly admitted that the Lucky Dragon had been outside

the danger zone deUneated by the AEC. He denied, however, that the test had gotten out

of hand. Rather, he contended that shifting winds had resulted in the contamination ofthe

Lucky Dragon and its crew. Straus took the AEC's usual stand on the issue of lingering

radiation. The AEC chairman stated that the dangers of faUout had been exaggerated by

the press. He noted that most radioactive isotopes degraded quickly, and he ridiculed the

notion that a radioactive death cloud was going to descend on Japan and wipe out the

people of that island nation.'**

Strauss told Americans to "rejoice" over the success ofthe CASTLE tests; the

United States had leamed much and had strengthened its defensive position. Reporters

pressed him, asking just how much destmction an H-bomb produced. How powerful an

'**Eisenhower, Public Papers, 2: 346.

'*^Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 8.

'**Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 12; and Ken, C/v/7 Defense Band-Aid, 69.

206

H-bomb could be buUt? Up to that point, Americans had known that the United States

possessed fesion devices, but they stUl remained ignorant ofthe vast energy discharged by

thermonuclear weapons. Strauss's answer staggered the members ofthe press. The

hydrogen bomb "can be made to be as large as you wish—large enough to take out a

city."'*' Reporters fired questions at the chairman. They wanted him to name a city that

the bomb could destroy. Strauss gave them New York. He beUeved the country's

offensive nuclear capabUities constituted the AEC's number one priority, and he was

proud ofthe H-bomb's power. Strauss could not resist the opportunity to boast of its

destmctive potential. Yet instead of calming the pubUc, his comments contributed to the

growing unease in the country.' "

UnUke the post held by Lewis Strauss, Val Peterson's job did not entaU the

development of offensive weapons. As director ofthe Federal CivU Defense

administration, his one, his only, concem was the protection ofthe American people from

nuclear or natural disaster. He would be the scapegoat if the feUout panic did not

dissipate. Both the president and Strauss could claim they had fevored the continued

development and testing ofthe Super to counter the Soviet threat. Russia possessed

thermonuclear devices. But Peterson had to teU the people what his agency had

accompUshed in securing pubUc protection from H-bombs and the faUout they produced.

He had no ready answer. Mass evacuation solved the problem of evading thermonuclear

'*'Quoted in Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 13.

' "Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 13; and Ambrose, Eisenhower, 169.

207

blast, but the FCDA had cooperated with the AEC and had closed its eyes and ears and

those ofthe American people to the threat of Ungering radiation.

The Peterson Administration initiaUy stuck with its bUnd and deaf strategy.

Peterson repeated the AEC's assertions that rumors of persistent death clouds were false;

most radioactivity dissipated in a few hours. FCDA pamphlets continued to ignore the

threat of faUout. A year passed before agency pubUcations began to address the issue. To

further reduce the pubUc unease over faUout, Peterson released Operation Ivy in AprU

1954, a month after the BRAVO detonation. LUce the FCDA's pamphlets, the film

described the blast effects of thermonuclear weapons but completely excluded any mention

of radioactive feUout.'^'

Administrator Peterson's strategy backfired. The close media tracking ofthe

Lucky Dragon's ailing crew had shown the world that faUout could cause sickness and

death. A number of scientists in the United States had begun to rebuke the government's

attenq)ts to hide the tmth from the pubUc. Americans started to doubt. They began to

distrust the neatly packaged statements proffered by the AEC and the FCDA. Physicist

Ralph Lapp, who usuaUy lavished praise on Administrator Peterson, criticized the decision

to release the misleading film. Operation Ivy, to the pubUc. The frequent contributor to

the Bulletin ofthe Atomic Scientists caUed for official candor. He argued that the AEC

and FCDA's reluctance to supply the people with cmcial facts such as the exact size and

power of a hydrogen blast was contributing to the growth of nuclear fear and the sense of

impending doom pervading the United States. Lapp contended that copies ofthe

'^'Oakes, Imaginary War, 58-59.

208

Operation Ivy movie 'Vere anything but reassuring. In feet, they hurt the basic concept of

civU defense-in this regard the films may now be dubbed POISON IVY."'^

PubUc speculation on the "real" dangers posed by nuclear weapons ran wUd and

influenced popular culture, especiaUy the movies.'" The film industry found the pulse of

American society and capitaUzed on the people's nuclear fears by unleashing a host of

Atomic-Age monsters. Radiation-spawned genetic mutants played title roles in THEM!,

The Blob, and Attack ofthe Crab Monsters. In the cult-classic THEM!, an army of giant

ants crawl out ofthe New Mexico desert and threaten man's existence. A scientist

theorizes that the mutant creatures were a product of "Ungering radiation from the first

atomic bomb."' "

No doubt screenwriters received their inspiration for THEM! and the other

mutant "creature features" from scientific studies that showed radiation could precipitate

genetic mutations. In 1946, geneticist Herman MuUer won a Nobel prize for his work

with radiation-induced fly mutations. MuUer faUed to engineer elephant-sized insects, but

he did produce flies with odd numbers of wings and other defects. The Nobel laureate

added to the radiation fears ofthe Fifties when he supported a statement by Cal-Tech

geneticist A. H. Sturtevant that radioactive faUout was causing eighteen hundred

" "CivU Defense and the H-Bomb," Folder "L," Box 1, Conespondence of Val Peterson, RG 396, NARACP.

'""How Fatal is FaUout?," Time (22 November 1954), 79; and Winkler, Under a Cloud, 98.

""Quoted in Winkler, Under a Cloud, 98.

209

mutations in humans every year. But the scientific community was not uniform in its

response to Sturtevant's assertions. Many distinguished scientists disputed his claims.'"

In a country whose people had looked to the scientific community as the font of

aU knowledge, the lack of a consensus on the feUout issue increased pubUc concem.

Faced with the pubUc and professional dUemma, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS)

created a number of panels to investigate the problem The committees' findings were

heartening for those who beUeved in their vaUdity. Sturtevant and MuUer, who had voiced

their convictions that the faUout was producing birth defects, modified their positions.

Both served on the NAS's Genetics Committee. Its 1956 report stated that the faUout

generated by the U.S.S.R.'s and the United States' nuclear tests had exposed Americans

to some radiation, but the amount was less than one would receive from many common

medical procedures. StUl, the Genetics Committee counseled caution, because the

national and intemational advisory boards on radiology had long deemed any exposure to

racUation as potentiaUy harmful. The Genetics Committee's report seemed tmstworthy. It

had been endorsed by two scientists who had earUer led the charge against faUout, and it

quaUfied its findings with a waming that revealed scientists remained uncertain about the

chronic effects of low-level radiation. If aU ofthe NAS committees had retumed simUar

report, the pubUc's fears might have subsided.' *

The NAS's Pathology Committee produced a study that inspired more distmst

and anxiety. A number ofthe Pathology Committee's members were Atomic Energy

'"Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 51-53; and Winkler, Under a Cloud, 95.

"*Winkler, Under a Cloud, 96,

210

Commission scientists, and the report they submitted sounded as if Admiral Strauss had

written it himself One ofthe committee's investigations centered on Strontium-90, a

particularly hardy radioactive isotope. Concem had risen over the probabUity that Sr-90

was traveUng up the food chain, accumulating in humans, and causing mutation, sickness,

and disease. After feUing onto the grass, the isotope was ingested by cattle. It then

passed on to people through mUk and became lodged in the bones-the blood producing

part ofthe body, an area extremely sensitive to radiation. In the late 1950s, the

Committee for Nuclear Information, based at Washington University in St. Louis,

coUected tens of thousands of chUdren's baby teeth and showed that, whUe stUl below

NCRP recommended levels, the Sr-90 content in the teeth had increased dramaticaUy

during the years of unUmited atmospheric testing.' ^

The National Academy of Science's Pathology Committee made simUar

discoveries in 1956. People were ingesting Strontiiim-90, yet not in great quantities.

UnUke the Genetics Committee report, however, the pathology study did not warn that

any radiation could prove harmful. Instead, the committee harked back to the days when

radiological advisory bodies had endorsed the concept of a threshold level for radiation

absorption. The NRA's Pathology Committee announced an "unequivocaUy safe amount"

of Strontium-90 that Americans could consume. The report's antiquated language and its

unrestrained optimism pronqjted criticism from the press and from other scientists. Ralph

Lapp denounced the study for ignoring the radiological protocols estabUshed decades

earUer, and for failing to consider that the arms race would cause the amount of Sr-90 in

'"Winkler, Under a Cloud, 96, 102.

211

the atmosphere, in cows' mUk, and in people's bodies to rise. Americans did not know

whom to trust. Influenced by the poUtical and moral considerations of nuclear weapons,

scientists appeared in uhra-Uberal and ultra-conservative camps, and everywhere in

between. The radiation issue sent wave after wave of discordant ripples through a society

mled by the law of conformity.'"

The dissent and uncertainty itself generated fear. Unsure ofthe tme threat posed

by low-level radiation, the rumors spread and gained more acceptance. Americans began

to demand protection from the invisible enemy that threatened them. They asked which

agency was responsible for saving them from a radioactive plague, and what had been

done to secure their welfare. The eyes ofthe country slowly turned to focus on Val

Peterson and the Federal CivU Defense Administration.

Peterson tried to weather the storm in a boat that was sinking rapidly. Adopting

a poUcy of candor would have necessitated a restmcturing of civU defense poUcies. If the

FCDA recognized the feUout threat, it would have to replace or at least supplement mass

evacuation with a feUout shelter program. Peterson responded to the pubUc criticisms and

demands much as President Herbert Hoover had responded to the pubUc clamor during

the early years ofthe Great Depression. He inaugurated a campaign of deiual and

optimism He blamed others. He refused to modify civU defense strategies untU his career

was close to an end, and by then it was too late.

When fingers began to point at Peterson, he aimed his at MUlard CaldweU.

Peterson charged the CaldweU Administration with using "scare tactics" to buUd support

'"Winkler, Under a Cloud, 96; and Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 34-35, 43.

212

for civU defense. The impUcation was that CaldweU had encouraged or at least tolerated

overblown rumors o f the bomb's" destmctive potential, and therefore was somewhat

responsible for the wUd speculation and grovmig unease over feUout. Peterson's remarks

come across as a criticism of CaldweU's atten^ts to be more candid with the pubUc.

CaldweU's FCDA told the people that they would die if a bomb went off and they were

close to ground zero. CaldweU did misinform the pubUc as to the radiation hazard

produced by nuclear weapons, but he seems to have simply passed on the information the

AEC gave him, without questioning its vaUdity. The Peterson Administration regularly

and knowingly deceived the people ofthe United States.

In his efforts to reUeve pubUc concerns, Peterson launched a campaign of

optimism which ignored or minimized the danger of radioactive faUout and the power of

the United States' enemies. With its AprU 1954 release of Operation Ivy the FCDA

attempted to tranquUize Americans who had become panicky over the feUout issue. When

pubUc concem continued to increase, Peterson recaUed FCDA materials that might further

scare the people. Among the items retired in the closing months of 1954 were a series of

"negative" posters. Once featuring a giant maUed fist faUing from the sky and smashing

into a residential area canied the caption, "CIVILIANS: ENEMY TARGET NO. 1."

Another showed a head-on view of an enemy plane and deUvered the solemn message,

"NO MILITARY DEFENSE CAN PREVENT ATTACK ON OUR CITIES." A third

213

poster boasted an Ulustration of an explosion flinging a man's enqjty hat high into the air

and wamed, "make no mistake...CIVILIANS ean be bombed!"'"

Peterson continued the FCDA's campaign of optimism into the new year.

Besides removing negative materials from the education packets it distributed, the civU

defense administration introduced a number of new, positive pamphlets and films,

including some that finaUy discussed radioactive feUout. PubUc concerns had not

subsided, forcing the FCDA to offer some information on the issue of Ungering

radioactivity from bomb debris. Facts About the H-Bomb... that could save your life!

purported to give the "fects" about the 1952 MIKE shot. The pamphlet passed on to its

readers the exact dimensions ofthe crater, firebaU, and cloud produced by the blast, but

only twice did the authors of Facts About the H-Bomb employ the word "faUout" in their

leaflet. They suggested that injury from radioactive debris would be relatively minor, yet

they admitted that faUout from the MIKE test had posed a danger to aU Uving creatures

within a 300 square mUe area ofthe explosion. WhUe continuing to plug mass evacuation.

Facts About the H-bomb urged Americans to "equip the most protected place you can

find...for an air-raid shelter."'*"

'^'Folder Administrative Media and PubUcations, 1952-54, Box 1, Alphabetical Section, Acquiring Surplus to Alphabetical Section, Alert Signal, PubUcation History FUes, 1950-62, Distribution Branch, PubUcations office. Office of CivU Defense, RG 397, NARACP; and "THE FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION presents SIGNS of our TIME," Folder CD Campaign-general [2], Box 5, FUes of Spencer R. Quick, HST.

'*"Federal CivU Defense Administration, Facts About the H-Bomb... that could save your life! (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1953).

214

Despite its description ofthe MIKE device's power and reach. Facts About the

H-Bomb's text was upbeat, fiUed with positive statements. Recognizing that much ofthe

fear of thermonuclear devices centered on the feet that they were hundreds or thousands

of times as powerful as atomic weapons, staff writers tried to dispel a popular

misconception. "A bomb 1,000 times as powerfel as the Hiroshima bomb wUl not cause

damage 1,000 times as fer away-only 10 times as far."'*' A bomb's explosion is spherical

in form, not Unear, so the area of destmction on the ground would not double every time a

bomb's power was increased twofold. For those dispirited Americans who equated

nuclear war with the end ofthe world or at least the end ofthe United States, the

pamphlet stated, "...[T]he H-bomb, despite the wider range ofthe destmctive force, wUl

not destroy the earth. There wiU always be much more of America undamaged and many

more miUions of our people aUve and eager to fight back and win, than there wiU be death

and destmction."'*^ The abUity ofthe United States and its people to survive a

thermonuclear assault constituted the central theme of Facts About the H-Bomb.

Other works offered more detaUed accounts of how Americans would avoid

injury and harm from blast, fire, and radiation. When the clamor over faUout refused to

die down, the AEC and the FCDA had no choice but to address the issue of Ungering

radioactivity. Forced into a comer, in February 1955 the Atomic Energy Commission

acknowledged that the BRAVO test had produced massive quantities of radioactive

faUout. A simUar detonation in Maryland would blanket the entire state with potentiaUy

'*'Federal CivU Defense Administration, Facts About the H-Bomb.

'*2lbid.

215

Ufe-threatening debris. StUl, the AEC reassured Americans by teUing them the feUout

produced by a fusion bomb would threaten oiUy a Umited area for a brief interval of time,

because most radioactive isotopes would degenerate quickly, and the others would spread

out in the stratosphere, becoming less concentrated as winds swept them away from

ground zero. The AEC further assured the pubUc that the peacetime thermonuclear tests

conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union had not caused the world's radiation

level to rise significantly. In addition, the commission addressed pubUc concerns about the

unthinkable—nuclear war. Once again the agency soothed Americans' fears by arguing

that even if the United States feU victim to a thermonuclear bomb strike, the people within

the faUout danger zones could take precautions to protect themselves from radiation.'*'

The FCDA continued to second the AEC's pronouncements. After the Atomic

Energy Commission made its pubUc statements about feUout, the civU defense

administration released Facts about Fallout, which reiterated some AEC claims and

expanded on others. The FCDA employed two forms of media, a film and a pamphlet, to

teU the same "facts." FinaUy, Americans heard from the FCDA that their suspicions were

conect; faUout was dangerous. It could cause sickness or death. LUce Facts About the H-

Bomb, however, Facts About Fallout projected optimism and confidence. Both the

booklet and the film assured the people that they did not have to be numbered among

feUout's victims. They could survive the threat from the sky if they would foUow the

FCDA's rules. After an attack Americans should tune in to faUout advisories on their TVs

'*'Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 38-39; Ken, C/v/7 Defense Band-Aid, 70-71; and "H-Bomb Tests, They're Safe," US News and World Report (25 February 1955), 128-35.

216

or radios. By studying prevaUing winds, meteorologists would be able to predict the paths

that the radioactive debris would take and the areas that would suffer the greatest

contamination. Upon learning that they were in the danger zone, individuals should seek

shelter. An ordinary house would halve the amount of radiation its occupants received. A

shelter covered with three feet of packed dirt or shielded with other dense materials would

drop the level of exposure to nU. Many ofthe "fects" presented were tme, but the agency

indulged in some exaggeration to further its, and the AEC's, goal of projecting positivism.

Conqjaring radioactive dust to ordinary household dust. Facts About Fallout told

Americans that if they were caught in a shower of inadiated debris, the discarding of

contaminated clothing and a good scmbbing with soap and water would rid them ofthe

pesky radioactive particles. There was no reason to worry. The contaminated could

survive. Further, people locked tight in their home shelters would have to remain there no

longer than a week. Between the natural decay of radioactive isotopes and the efforts of

decontamination crews, the country would be clean and safe in no time.'*"

It had taken much puUing and pushing, but by 1956 the FCDA had

acknowledged the dangers posed by radioactive faUout and had modified its strategies to

meet the new threat. One of the main shifts occuned in official terminology. In the past,

Peterson and the FCDA had encouraged Americans to buUd private "bomb shelters" to

protect them from blast. By 1956 the agency was advocating "faUout shelters" to

minimize the danger from radioactive debris. The shift was most notable in the FCDA

'*"Federal CivU Defense Administration, Facts About Fallout; and Oakes, Imaginary War, 121-23.

217

booklet Home Protection Exercises. The 1953 and 1954 editions told the pubUc to stash

three day's worth of emergency suppUes either in a blast resistant shelter or in a reinforced

area in their homes. With feUout an officiaUy acknowledged threat in 1955, the third

edition of Home Protection Exercises caUed for the buUding of a stockpUe that could last

for a week. The next year, yet another version ofthe booklet discussed the differences

between a "feUout shelter" and a "bomb shelter," and advised femUies to make sure they

had adequate radiation shielding.'*'

Despite the official recognition of faUout as a radiation hazard, the FCDA refused

to abandon its mass evacuation poUcy or to push for a pubUc shelter initiative. In feet,

Peterson made few adjustments to the FCDA's Ufe-saving strategies. He continued to

support mass evacuation because he did not beUeve the people in an industrial center

would survive a direct hit by an H-bomb. His administration had offered encouragement

to individual Americans, especiaUy those on the periphery of target areas, who wished to

buUd or purchase home shelters. And in 1955 and 1956, Peterson and the FCDA began to

suggest that everyone needed a feUout shelter, but the agency and its administrator

continued to push for private initiative rather than a program of federaUy-flmded pubUc

shelters. It was a mistake that subjected Peterson's agency to ridicule and criticism. With

pubUc concerns over the feUout issue continuing to mount and with the FCDA seemingly

'*'Oakes, Imaginary War, 118-20.

218

disinterested and slow to react, the House of Representatives launched an investigation of

the United States' civUian preparedness program'**

On the morning of January 31, 1956, a Tuesday, Representative Chet HoUfield

(R.-CaUfomia) caUed to order the MUitary Operations Subcommittee ofthe House

Committee on Government Operations and opened a series of hearings on civU defense.

Over the course ofthe next five months, dozens of mUitary leaders, engineers, scientists,

and civU defense personnel entered room 1501 ofthe House Office BuUding, testified, and

answered the questions directed at them by HoUfield and the other members ofthe

subcommittee. Ostensibly, the purpose ofthe hearings was to strengthen the United

States' civU defense program. An outspoken proponent of civU defense, HoUfield had

introduced House Joint Resolution 98 to Congress earUer in the month. HoUfield's

resolution advocated the reconstitution ofthe FCDA as an independent executive

department. Other Congressmen offered simUar bills; one by MiUtary Operations

Subcommittee member R. Walter Riehlman (D.-New York) caUed for the FCDA to be

organized as an executive department, but within the Department of Defense. HoUfield

stated for the record that his subcommittee had convened to consider the merit ofthe

proposed civU defense legislation.'*^

HoUfield wanted to see the FCDA strengthened, because he was a tme beUever in

the power of civiUan defense to save Uves during a nuclear war, but he also was upset with

'**U.S. Congress, House, Government Operations Committee, MUitary Operations Subcommittee [hereafter GOCMOS], Hearings: Civil Defense for National Survival, 84th Cong., 2d sess., 1956.

'*'GOCMOS, C/v/7 Defense, 2.

219

the present state of civU defense and desired a change in poUcy. Before the subcommittee

heard from a single witness, HoUfield had decided that the FCDA had accompUshed Uttle

during its five years of existence, and especiaUy since Peterson had assumed control.

HoUfield was a pubUc shelter advocate. He chided the pubUc for its apathy and Congress

for its indifference toward civU defense; nonetheless, he and the other members ofthe

subcommittee centered their attack on the Peterson Administration and its refusal to

endorse a pubUc shelter poUcy. In his opening statement, HoUfield said, 'There is a

widespread beUef in this country that civU defense is either fetUc.or hopelessly inadequate

under the present anangements...it is about time...an inteUigent course of action [was]

formulated." HoUfield disagreed with Peterson's strategies, and the people needed

someone or some agency to pay for the fear and uncertainty that the faUout debate had

engendered. The hearings on civU defense offered an opportunity to satisfy both HoUfield

and the pubUc. It was open season on Peterson and the FCDA.'**

The witnesses that appeared before the subcommittee tended to reinforce

HoUfield's opinion that the FCDA lacked effective leadership and sound poUcies for

ensuring the people and the country's survival. Personnel from the Atomic Energy

Commission tried to deflect attention and blame away from their own agency. They

testified that the AEC maintained Uaisons v ith the FCDA and kept the civU defense

administt-ation informed of their findings. The HoUfield Committee foUowed up by asking

why, then, with a steady flow of information between the two agencies, had the FCDA

accompUshed so Uttle in the areas of civUian protection? AEC witnesses were quick to

'**GOCMOS, Civil Defense, 1.

220

point out that their agency merely provided the FCDA v dth briefe on the nature of nuclear

weapons. They told the members ofthe subcommittee that civU defense was not an AEC

responsibUity and stated that their experts had not presumed to teU FCDA leaders how

they should nm their agency. After raising a protective shield around their own

commission, witnesses from the AEC sometimes attempted to stem the subcommittee's

attacks on the civU defense administration. AEC scientists noted that the FCDA's

scientific and technical staff was virtuaUy nonexistent. But instead of accepting the

FCDA's staff deficiencies as an excuse, the HoUfield Committee used the information to

support its assertion that the Peterson Administtation was ineffective and poorly led.'*'

Many witnesses whole-heartedly agreed with the subcommittee's assessment of

the FCDA's record of achievement. Some ofthe most bUstering criticism came from Dr.

Merle A. Tuve, director ofthe Camegie Institute's Research Laboratory in Washington,

D.C, and chairman of both the National Academy of Science's and the National Research

CouncU's (NRC) committees on civU defense. He contended that "the present sad state of

civU defense needs Uttle comment. The whole country knows of it with devastating

conviction. Govemor Peterson is a devoted pubUc servant and a personaUy Ukeable man,

but he and his top Ueutenants seem to have no conception of what should constitute an

acceptable performance by their organization.""" Tuve pointed to the "total inadequacy

ofthe technical guidance which FCDA has given to individuals and local communities."

'*'GOCMOS, Civil Defense, 8-43.

""Ibid., 200

"'Ibid.

221

CaUing for a variety of preparedness initiatives, including more emphasis on industrial

dispersal, better waming systems, and the constmction of blast and feUout shelters, the

NAS/NRC spokesperson noted that a nuclear attack against the United States would

cause "the dismption ofthe entire febric of our society...unless we make perhaps a

hundred times more preparation than we have to date in the area of civU defense.""^

FCDA Administrator Val Peterson did not receive an opportunity to respond to

the criticisms leveled at himself and his agency untU AprU 17, 1956. Peterson appeared

before the committee five times over the next month. Representative HoUfield assured the

administrator that he was before a "friendly committee," but the written record ofthe

proceedings shows that the exchanges between Peterson and the subcommittee became

increasingly tense and more heated with each day of testimony and intenogatioiL'" From

the begmning, Peterson was on the defensive, and with good reason. Early on the first day

ofthe FCDA director's testimony, HoUfield launched into a somewhat rambUng discourse

ofthe subcommittee's concerns. He told Peterson, "[W]e wUl want to explore with you

what has been done by your Department in the shelter field, what you have advocated in

the sheUer field.""" Continuing, he stated, "We wonder why with the knowledge that you

have on hand and the knowledge that the Atomic Energy Commission has developed...the

American people have not been given a more effective program in the shelter

"^GOCMOS, Civil Defense,l93.

'"Ibid., 1230.

""Ibid., 1168.

222

field....Words have been spoken, but no effective program is now in being...."'"

Summarizing his and the subcommittee members' feeUngs about the FCDA's

"accompUshments," HoUfield charged, "[T]he civU defense that does exist is inadequate,

and I don't think that even any ofthe most enthusiastic members of your [Peterson's]

department would say that we have any way near adequate, even 5 percent adequate

[defense].""*

Peterson had Uttle chance of convincing the HoUfield Committee that the FCDA

had accon:q)Ushed anything productive since the resignation of Administrator Millard

CaldweU. The committee's members equated civU defense with a pubUc shelter program.

Val Peterson had fevored mass evacuation over shelter poUcy. In day after day of

hearings, HoUfield and his coUeagues griUed Peterson for his endorsement of evacuation

and his faUure to request money for pubUc shelters."^

Peterson tried to fend off his attackers with a variety of arguments and excuses.

According to the FCDA's administrator, after the development of fusion weapons, but

before the recognition ofthe danger from faUout, the pre-attack evacuation of target zones

seemed the most reasonable civU defense strategy. He argued that mass evacuation

continued to have merit in 1956. People within three or four mUes of a thermonuclear

blast would not survive. Before the bomb feU, Americans in metropoUtan areas should

relocate to shelters outside the city. HoUfield scoffed, "I don't want to evacuate my femUy

'"GOCMOS, Civil Defense, 1169.

"*Ibid.

'"Ibid., 1169-1402.

223

out in the Mojave Desert outside of Los Angeles... when it is 125 to 130 degrees out there.

I would rather take a chance in a scientificaUy devised shelter." Peterson responded, "You

and I differ. I would rather be in the desert when the bomb goes off.""* Peterson made a

mistake, however, when he admitted that the foture development ofthe intercontinental

baUistic missUe (ICBM) would render evacuation obsolete. Functional ICBMs would

reduce waming time and, therefore, the time avaUable for effecting mass evacuations.

Some Soviet missUes would strike the United States half an hour after lifting off from the

U.S.S.R. Peterson's assertions that the FCDA should continue its mass evacuation

strategies untU the ICBM's development were less convincing than HoUfield's arguments

that the civU defense agency needed to prepare for the foture.'"

Although Peterson defended his administration's decision to proceed with its

evacuation strategies, he contended that the FCDA had never completely abandoned its

shelter poUcies. He noted that the FCDA had continued to urge the private constmction

and purchase of shelters throughout his years as administrator, and he announced that the

real threat of faUout had convinced him that the there should be a compUmentary

relationship, a 50/50 balance, between shelters and evacuations. When the members ofthe

subcommittee pressed Peterson for the detaUs of his shelter program, however, he had to

admit that the FCDA had given the pubUc some advice, but no comprehensive plans, no

blueprints for buUding home shelters. Peterson stated that the FCDA was stUl

investigating, stUl conducting studies to determine the best and most economical

'''GOCMOS, Civil Defense, 1178.

'"Ibid., 1166-67, 1179,1216-17,1340.

224

sttiictures. He offered the same excuses when committee members questioned him about

pubUc shelters. Why had he feUed to request money for a pubUc shelter program?

Peterson said the studies were not complete and suggested that the penny-pinchers in

Congress would insist on a bargain plan. The subcommittee counterattacked, presenting

transcripts of Peterson's testimony during hearings over supplemental appropriations in

1954. Not only had the FCDA administrator faUed to request funding for pubUc shelters,

he had praised Congress for denying shelter aUocations for the CaldweU Administration.

Peterson dismissed the statement as having no bearing on the HoUfield inquiry. He

contended that the FCDA stiU had much to leam about thermonuclear weapons and feUout

when he had addressed Congress in 1954."""

Val Peterson's testimony consumed a month, but, at the end, the members ofthe

House Subcommittee on MiUtary Operations remained unswayed by his arguments and

unaccepting of his excuses. Perhaps HoUfield summed up their feelings best when he

commented that four years had passed since the United States had tested its first

thermonuclear device; more should have been accompUshed in guaranteeing civUian

protection. The subcommittee's final report recommended greater powers for the Federal

CivU Defense Administration and the elevation ofthe FCDA's director to a cabinet-level

office, but it also caUed for an aggressive pubUc shelter constmction program and was

relentless in its criticism ofthe Peterson Administration.""'

400 'GOCMOS, Civil Defense, 1336-1345.

""'GOCMOS, Civil Defense, 1213; and U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, MUitary Operations Subcommittee, C/v/7 Defense for National Security: Twenty-Fourth Intermediate Report, Report no. 2946, 84th Cong., 2d sess.,

225

The pubUc ridicule had humUiated and embittered Val Peterson. After the

hearings concluded he began to look for a different job, preferably one that would take

him out ofthe pubUc eye and one that would afford him some measure of peace.

President Eisenhower also must have recognized that a change in FCDA leadership was

necessary if there was to be any hope of restoring pubUc confidence in civU defense. Ike

found a job for Peterson—in Denmark. The president secured the FCDA's director a

position as ambassador to the smaU northem European nation. Val Peterson officiaUy

resigned from the Federal CivU Defense Administration on May 31, 1957 and fled the

country. Radioactive faUout and Peterson's rigid adherence to evacuation strategies had

mined him.""

The next FCDA administrator, Leo Hoegh, updated the agency's Ufe-saving

strategies. He shifted the focus of federal civU defense initiatives away from mass

evacuation and toward faUout shelters, but in some ways the legacy of Val Peterson Uved

on within the FCDA. When Peterson had noticed that recmitment returns had begun to

slump, he had raised the emotional content ofthe civU defense administration's pamphlets

and pubUc announcements. Hoegh adopted this practice during his term of office, but

technological, poUtical, and social factors contributed to the fiirther decUne of civU defense

in the Uiuted States.

1956.

"" Val Peterson to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 31 May 1957, Folder White House Conespondence, Box 2, Conespondence of Administrator Val Peterson, 1953-1957, RG 396, NARACP.

226

CHAPTER v n

GOD, APPLE PIE, AND CFVIL DEFENSE: INFLATING

THE RHETORIC FOR A DEFLATING PROGRAM

Across the United States church beUs pealed, ringing out the message, "God

favors civU defense." BeU-ringing soon gave way to sermons that deUvered the charge,

"God wants YOU in civU defense." In Ross County, Ohio, the pastor ofthe Seventh Day

Adventist church preached on the inqx)rtance of "preparedness" in the Nuclear Age.

Throughout the state of Maine, ministers from aU denominations incorporated civilian

defense topics into their sermons. To the south, in New Jersey, members ofthe clergy

praised the state's emergency civiUan volunteers. The beU-ringing and the sermons

"kicked-ofiP' National CivU Defense Week, September 9-15, 1956. The Federal CivU

Defense Administration had requested church participation, and, once again, the United

States' reUgious community had gone to bat for civU defense. According to FCDA

reports, the church activities served "as a dramatic reminder that CD is a barrier against

any invader who would rob the citizens of their reUgious freedom"""'

CivU defense was moral. The wiU of God and the actions ofthe FCDA were in

harmony. It was neither the first nor the last time that civilian defense leaders made such

claims. Months before the church beU-ringing campaign, codenamed "Operation Ding

Dong," launched National CivU Defense Week, the Federal CivU Defense Administration

403 f ^"Roundup of National CD Week" (Sept. 9-15, 1956), Box 15, Alphabetical Section "Reports" to Alphabetical Section "Standards," RG 396, National Archives and Record Administration, CoUege Park [hereafter NARACP].

227

released The Church in Civil Defense, a panq)hlet intended to tie civU defense more

closely to reUgion."""

The panqjhlet was the product of Val Peterson's request that the ReUgious

Affairs Office, successor to the Advisory CouncU on ReUgion, revise and regenerate the

1951 pubUcation, The Clergy in Civil Defense. The members ofthe ReUgious A f ^ s

Office took the CaldweU-era booklet and infosed it with new Ufe, reworking its dry

statements into impassioned arguments and pleas. The revised work's text contended that

democracy and civU defense were approved by God. Indeed, the authors of The Church

in Civil Defense came close to asserting that the United States' government and the

Federal CivU Defense Administration were divinely inspired. Yet able leadership was not

enough, the paper wamed. Even God's elect could suffer if they faUed to prepare for life

in the Nuclear Age. Americans must fortify their spirits, thek minds, and yes, even their

homes in order to face an enemy, an ungodly communist monster, that was watching for

any sign of weakness in the countries ofthe westem world. According to the authors of

The Church in Civil Defense, communist Russia was hoping for an opportunity to destroy

the values held dear by many mUUons of Americans. The booklet's authors wrote, "The

very existence of Westem civUization is endangered...not only democratic government, the

highest form of poUtical order yet evolved...but reUgion itself is chaUenged by a godless,

totaUtarian tyranny."""' Continuing, the text stated, "Communism is a substitute reUgron.

""""Roundup of National CivU Defense Week," RG 396; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, The Church in Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1957).

""'Federal CivU Defense Administration, Church in Defense, 2.

228

At its deepest level, the conflict between Soviet communism and the free world is a

reUgious conflict....The Party tries to usurp the place ofthe church and to give the writings

of Marx and Lenin the status of sacred scriptures."""*

The authors of The Church in Civil Defense told Americans not to underestimate

the threat posed by communism "[T]his godless, new reUgion has a fanatic missionary

zeaL An apathetic church...could not stand up against the sweep of communism. The old

Marxian charge that reUgion is the opiate used to oppress the people can be dispeUed only

by an alert and positive church, a church motivated by its tenets of love of God and love

of man, and therefore, a church actively interested in any program of human welfare."""

The writers then played their trump card, a phrase that bound together reUgious concerns

and civU defense. "CivU defense is a program of human welfare devoted to saving and

sustaining Ufe."""* Having identified a common goal for churches and preparedness

agencies, the ReUgious Affairs Office suggested church leaders act as pubUc educators and

recmitment officers for civUian defense. "The Church should explain civU defense to its

members....Church members should be urged to volunteer for local civU defense.""'

In its content and style The Church in Civil Defense was a departure from a

majority ofthe pamphlets produced during MUlard CaldweU's administration. The

language and the phrasing used in most pubUcations from the earUer era were more

""*Federal CivU Defense Administration, Church in Defense, 2.

""%id., 3.

""*Ibid.

""'Ibid, 9.

229

concise and more dry. Con^ared to the emotionaUy-charged booklets ofthe Peterson and

Hoegh administrations the CaldweU-era pamphlets seem quite stale. CaldweU's The

Clergy in Civil Defense and Peterson's The Church in Civil Defense both worked toward

a common goal. Both sought to inspire the nation's reUgious community to support the

FCDA in its campaign for an effective national program of civUian defense. But The

Clergy in Civil Defense merely told reUgious leaders that they could perform a service to

their congregants and to the FCDA by supporting civU defense initiatives. The Church in

Civil Defense triggered passionate responses with its images of a palpable evU, bent on

enslaving the world, yet opposed by a church and FCDA-led crusade to push back the

darkness."'" Bonowing a passage from the apostle Paul's epistle to the church at

Ephesus, the authors of The Church in Civil Defense wrote ofthe fight against

communism, "[W]e wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principaUties, against

powers, against the mlers of darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high

places.""" Such emotionaUy-charged language was rarely employed during the CaldweU

administration.

When CaldweU took the FCDA's reins, the civU defense agency was new, its

appeal untested. His administration focused first on simply getting the information out to

the people. His agency inundated the country with pamphlets. His pubUc affairs office

targeted specific groups within society and attempted to capitaUze on the social trends of

"'"Federal CivU Defense Administration, The Clergy in Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951); and Idem, Church in Defense.

""Ephesians 6.12 KJV, quoted in Federal CivU Defense Administration, Church in Defense, 3.

230

the Fifties. On occasion, the administration appealed to Americans' feeUngs-especiaUy

their patriotism That the displays in the Alert America convoys were intended to

manipulate Americans' emotions cannot be denied, but the convoy's exlubits were the

exception to the mle. Primarily, CaldweU tried to reason with the people. He presented

them with the facts that he beUeved would grab their attention and would compel them to

participate in civU defense."'

The emotional content ofthe FCDA pubUcity campaigns increased dramaticaUy

during Val Peterson and Leo Hoegh's terms. Already in 1953, when Interim

Administrator James Wadsworth passed control ofthe FCDA to Peterson, civU defense

was tired and ready to be put to pasture. Peterson's shift in preparedness strategies not

only faUed to revive civilian defense, it further depressed it. His refesal to embrace a

pubUc shelter program during the faUout scare mined his career and encouraged more

apathy toward, and distmst of, civU defense initiatives. CiviUan recmitment dropped

during the Peterson years. As volunteer totals fell, the language in FCDA pubUcations

became more urgent, more charged with emotion. Despite the inflated rhetoric, however,

returns on the FCDA's recmiting campaigns continued to plummet.""

"' VaUey Forge Foundation, The Alert America Convoys (n.p.:VaUey Forge Foundation, n.d.); "What you wUl see in the...CivU Defense Alert America Exhibit", FUes of Spencer R. Quick, Papers of Harry S Truman, Harry S Truman Library; Federal CivU Defense Administration, Annual Report for 1951 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1952), 84-88; Federal CivU Defense Administration, Annual Report for 1952 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1953), 41-54; and Idem, This is Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO), 4-5, 10.

""Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1954), 101; Idem, Annual Statistical Report (Battle Creek, Michigan: Federal CivU Defense Administration, 30 June 1956), 93-96 [hereafter cited as 1956 Statistical Report]: Idem, Leadership Guide: National Civil Defense Week, Sept. 9-15 1956 (Washington,

231

By the time Leo Hoegh assumed control in 1957, civU defense was near death, if

not already dead. Hoegh inherited the pubUc mistrust generated by the Peterson

Administration. He tried to dispel it. He threw himself into his work. He and his staff

modified the FCDA's commitment to mass evacuation, endorsing, instead, a more-

balanced plan that placed greater emphasis on the need for feUout shelters. Hoegh and his

Ueutenants were more candid with the people about the risks of nuclear war, and , Uke

Peterson, they continued to appeal to Americans' emotions. Again Uke Peterson,

however, Hoegh did not fare weU. Trends in poUtics, pubUc opinion, and technological

innovations combined to ensure that civU defense remained in a deflated state throughout

Eisenhower's two terms as president ofthe United States."'"

Although the Peterson and Hoegh administrations saw a steady decUne in pubUc

support for civUian defense, Val Peterson's first few months as director ofthe Federal

CivU Defense Administration were fiUed with excitement and a sense of optimism. In

March 1953, Peterson and other national, state, and local civU defense leaders attended

the "Operation Doorstep" atomic test series in Nevada. The Atomic Energy Commission

had agreed to devote a portion ofthe program to civU defense matters. The FCDA

wanted to know what types of stmctures could survive an atomic blast. At the test site.

D.C: GPO, 1956); and Idem, C/v/7 Defense Facts: Speakers Kit, 1955-1956 (Battle Creek, Michigan: Federal CivU Defense Administration, n.d.).

"'"Office of Defense and CivU MobUization, THE NATIONAL PLAN for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization (Washington, D.C: GPO, October 1958), Annex 10; and Executive Office ofthe President, Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, ANNUAL REPORT ofthe Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization for FISCAL YEAR 1961 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1962), 12-15.

232

agency personnel constmcted two-story, wooden-framed houses that boasted basement

"lean-to" shelters. The FCDA also ananged the buUding of underground shelters outside

the homes and near the projected "ground zero." As a final touch federal employees

ananged mannequins in reaUstic poses throughout the homes and shelters-the Ufe-Uke

dummies had been donated by the L. A. DarUng Company of Bronson, Michigan.""

Hours of work went into readying the site; seconds were sufficient to destroy it.

On March 17, an atomic bomb detonated over the civU defense test area. Heat from the

explosion scorched the houses. Then the blast wave hit, scattering fragments of wood and

mannequin limbs over the desert plain."'*

Americans witnessed the devastation. The FCDA caUed Operation Doorstep

"the first pubUc atomic test." The AEC had invited newspeople to the bomb site.

Broadcasting companies relayed images ofthe civU defense test to televisions throughout

the country, and movie-goers saw the scenes replayed in sUver screen news shorts."'

The most enduring images showed the destmction of a house that was only 3500

feet away from ground zero when the atomic device exploded. The bomb's blast

destroyed the house in less than three seconds. Film crews slowed their tapes and, frame-

by-frame, showed the pubUc the destmctive force ofthe atomic bomb. The power ofthe

bomb's blast smashed through the house, leveling it. Although the blast wave canied

most ofthe debris far from the home's foundation, some ofthe shattered buUding

""Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 58-60.

"'*Ibid., 58.

"'%id., 58-59,70-71.

233

materials coUapsed in upon the basement. Jagged boards thrust down into the

underground area, but the femUy's basement lean-to shelter held. Inside, a mannequin sat,

plastic smUe intact, its body untouched by the destmction around it. The FCDA made

posters using sbc "stUls" that showed the house being blown apart and a seventh picture of

the unharmed mannequin. Operation Doorstep was a success, a pubUc relations coup for

the FCDA."'*

When Val Peterson left the testing grounds and returned to his office he was

optimistic about the foture of American civU defense. Waiting on the administrator's desk

was a letter from a concemed citizen who worried that the preparedness program had not

attracted enough civilian recruits. A. S. Trew of California suggested a civU defense draft

to flesh out the ranks. Peterson assured Mr. Trew that forced participation was not

necessary, and told him that the country's civU defense program would soon "have aU the

volunteers it needs...."""

The FCDA's administrator was already working to ensure pubUc participation in

civU defense. The govemor of Nebraska during the floods of 1952, Peterson, Uke MUlard

CaldweU before him, recognized the importance of emphasizing the practical worth of civU

defense. A practical program would encourage pubUc and Congressional support. The

Operation Doorstep tests supposedly showed that the agency's wartime strategies were

sound. Peterson also set out to iUustrate the value of civU defense in times of peace. In

"'*Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 58.

""Val Peterson to A. S. Trew, 14 April 1953, Folder "T", Box 1, Conespondence of Val Peterson, 1953-1957, RG 396, NARACP.

234

1953 he attenpted to focus national attention on civU defense as a mechanism for coping

with natural disasters. The FCDA's 1953 Annual Report devoted more pages to the issue

than did any ofthe agency's previous or foture yearly reviews."^"

Occupying the spotUght were the stories of two tornadoes, one that descended

on Waco, Texas, and one which ripped through Worcester, Massachusetts. The people of

Waco were completely unprepared when a "twister" hit their city on May 11, 1953. Most

ofthe city's inhabitants knew of an Indian legend which said the area had never been

stmck by a tornado. They beUeved that they would remain safe, immune to the funnel

clouds that aU too often ravaged other Texas cities." ' Waco authorities also beUeved their

city an unlikely target for atomic attack. Much smaUer than Houston, Dallas, or Fort

Worth, surely it would not attract the enemy's attention. FCDA staff members recorded,

"[T]he mayor admitted a general impression that CivU Defense and ABC warfare were too

compUcated and 'too highfalutin' for the average town.""" Waco's civU defense program

plodded along haltingly, plagued by rapid tumover in its leadership and widespread apathy

in the general populace.

As a result, the civUian defense organization was unable to offer significant levels

of aid in the aftermath ofthe disaster. The tornado sttiick Waco's major downtown

" "Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 14-22, 26-27, 36, 43-47, 64.

""Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 15, 26-27, 36; and Federal CivU Defense Administration, DaUas Regional Office, The Waco Disaster, May 11, 1953 (DaUas: Federal CivU Defense Administration, DaUas Regional Office, 1953), 1.

""FCDA DaUas Regional Office, Waco Disaster, 3.

235

intersection, 5th and Austin, earUer designated by civU defense authorities as the

"Assumed Aiming Point" of an enemy bomb strike, during rush hour. Moving south to

northeast at a speed of thirty to thirty-sbc mUes per hour, the raging winds clawed their

way through the city, leaving behind a two block wide swath of destmction that stretched

from the heart ofthe city to its northem boundaries. BuUdings lay in heaps. Buried in the

mbble, held captive by tons of bricks, plaster, and wood, were dozens of people. Ofthe

many who died that day, a substantial number were lost because of inadequate

preparation. A weU-organized civU defense agency would have fielded trained rescue

teams immediately. With adequate civU defense many ofthe tornado's victims could have

been saved. Instead, they bled to death in the debris, waiting for a rescue which never

came. The FCDA's annual report observed, "The tornado which stmck Waco on May 11

brought understanding of [the importance of] civU defense not only to Texas but to the

entire region.

As a counterbalance to the Waco story, the FCDA pointed to the response of

civU defense personnel in Worcester, Massachusetts, when a simUar disaster befeU their

city. On June 9, a month after the Waco tornado, a fimnel cloud touched down in central

Massachusetts. As in Texas, the tv^er hit a population center during rush hour. The

death toU was high, ninety-four, but it would have been much higher without pron^t

action by the local preparedness organization. UnUke the Texans in Waco, the people of

Worcester were serious about civU defense. Worcester boasted a weU-staffed and highly-

trained emergency body. At its head were leaders in local government who had taken on

""FCDA DaUas Regional Office, Waco Disaster, 36.

236

the additional responsibUities of disaster planning."^" As soon as the tornado swept

through the city, the local civU defense agency initiated "speedy, efficient, rescue

efforts.""" By midnight, civiUan defenders had restored a measure of order to the stricken

city. Rescue crews had freed aU ofthe surviving injured from the wreckage and had

placed them under medical care. In addition, civU defense personnel opened temporary

shelters for the 10,000 homeless and provided the refogees with food and blankets. The

FCDA praised the organization in Worcester, stating, "The operation there was a model of

effective civU defense disaster recovery action.""^*

The Waco and Worcester tornadoes showed Americans that civU defense was

indeed practical. Training for a wartime emergency could prepare a population to meet

peacetime disasters, and vice-versa. In deaUng with the devastation wrought by natural

disasters, emergency personnel gained experience which they could draw upon if an enemy

launched a bomb strike against American cities. The editors ofthe Waco News-Tribune

perhaps summed it up best when they wrote, "Waco's misfortune may ultimately have

been someone's salvation. The Waco tomado is the nearest thing to an atomic bomb

disaster that nature has planted in these United States....Waco's tomado is a 'dry run' for

atomic disaster planning in every municipaUty in the U.S. and for Uncle Sam too."" '

""Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 27.

""Ibid., 15.

""Ibid.

^^^Waco News-Tribune quoted in FCDA DaUas Regional Office, Waco Disaster, 1.

237

Val Peterson's focus on the peacetime value of civU defense merely constituted

an expansion ofthe FCDA strategies formulated by MUlard CaldweU's team In many of

his attempts to buUd pubUc support for civU defense, Peterson foUowed the example of his

predecessor. Peterson continued CaldweU's saturation canpaign. The reading populace

was hard pressed to escape the subject of civiUan preparedness. During 1953, the Federal

CivU Defense Administration pubUshed and disseminated more than 12 miUion booklets

and leaflets. In 365 days the agency issued more than 600 press releases to media

representatives. The FCDA boasted that magazines and newspapers pubUshed over a

milUon articles, editorials, advertisements and other items that featured civU defense. In

addition, members ofthe FCDA's Training and Education Office composed entries for the

Americana, Britannica, and Collier's National encyclopedia series." *

Peterson's Administration also zeroed in on radio and television audiences.

Radio coverage in 1953 exceeded that ofthe previous two years. The FCDA distributed

new "dramatic" programs and spot announcements to the major networks and to local

broadcasting fecUities. In July, ABC affiUates inaugurated a weekly series on

preparedness. Federal civU defense personnel suppUed the American Broadcasting

Company vyith a Une often-minute programs that covered every fecet of civU defense.

FCDA spokespersons also put in guest appearances on prime-time shows such as "Meet

the Press," "Crossfire," and "Arthur Godfrey." Seemingly impressed with the need for a

strong civUian defense program, nationaUy-recognized newsman Arthur Godfi^y permitted

the FCDA and Air Force-sponsored Ground Observer Corps to plaster his fece and the

""Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 68-69.

238

statement "OUR COUNTRY NEEDS CrVILL\N PLANE SPOTTERS" on a series of

"car cards." Placed behind the windshield of parked cars, the cards served the dual

purpose of advertising civU defense and providing electtomagnetic shielding-they

protected automobUes' interiors from the sun's rays." '

FCDA leaders courted the estabUshed audiences of radio, but they also

recognized that television was the country's festest growing media outlet and potentiaUy

the agency's most valuable contact with the pubUc. The Peterson Administration paid

close attention to the television market, supplying civU defense film kits to each new

station that went on the air. The number of broadcasting stations increased by close to

three hundred percent in 1953 alone. By the end ofthe year more than 75 percent ofthe

United States' 160 milUon inhabitants were within range of one or more stations. The

agency capitaUzed on the pubUc fascination with T.V. and the visual component that

television offered. Networks broadcast the images ofthe Operation Doorstep tests and

showed FCDA-produced shorts such as Disaster on Main Street, Trapped, and This is

Civil Defense.'^^^

The Training and Education Office invaded Americans' Uves. CivU defense ads

and news briefs found their way into the magazines and newspapers which the people

read, and the radio and television programs which the pubUc heard and watched.

Additional civU defense propaganda awaited Americans outside the home, especiaUy at the

" 'Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 71; and Godfrey Car Cards, Component of Kit #2, "Volunteer in the CivUian Ground Observer Corps", Box 26, PubUc History FUes, 1950-62, RG 396, NARACP.

"'"Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 70.

239

more popular spots where Americans sought to reduce the accumulated pressures and

strains ofthe work week and the tensions of Ufe in the Nuclear Age. At cinemas across

the country, newsreel "traUers" replayed in stop-motion photography the destmction of

the home in the Operation Doorstep test. And at fairs and convention centers, civU

defense exhibits figured prominently. UntU August 1953 the Alert America convoys

continued to tour the United States. The FCDA then recommissioned elements ofthe

traveUng display as an "On Guard, Canada" convoy and sent it north, charged with the

mission of spreading the civU defense gospel and making new converts in the neighboring

country.""

Besides employing the same mechanisms for disseminating civU defense

information, Peterson's FCDA adopted many ofthe CaldweU administration's strategies

for capitalizing on social trends. With Americans' mass participation in professional and

social clubs stiU on the rise, the federal preparedness agency increased its targeting of

organizations that boasted large, national memberships. Peterson and his staff expanded

on the CaldweU poUcy of asking national associations to pressure their members into

volunteering for civU defense. On September 22, 1953, the FCDA issued Advisory

BuUetin No. 152 to its regional offices and state affiUates. The buUetin declared it agency

poUcy to accept "gifts of suppUes, equipment and fecUities" from organized groups.

ImpUcit in the buUetin's massage was the soUcitation of gifts by civU defense leaders. In

addition to petitioning reUgious, social, and professional associations for suppUes and use

of their facUities, FCDA officials began encouraging clubs to organize their members into

""Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 70-75.

240

civU defense teams, equip them, ttain them, and offer them to state or local preparedness

agencies."'^

In 1954, the Federal CivU Defense Administration issued a twenty-page C/v/7

Defense Registration Kit to dozens of organizations across the country. The packets

suppUed clubs and associations with everything they would need to hold an "R-Day"

(Registration Day). Included in the kit were pages of justifications for an organization's

involvement in civU defense, detaUs on promoting civUian preparedness among the club's

rank and file members, sample registration cards, and ready-made speeches that only

lacked the insertion ofthe speaker's, organization's, and host city's names into three or

four blanks. Even as the FCDA pushed national associations to participate in the civUian

defense program, the agency carefoUy promoted the idea that the professional and social

organizations had initiated cooperation. In the speeches found in the registration kit

certain words, such as "our" and "responsibUity" were underUned for emphasis. Not only

was the word "voluntarily" underscored in one sample speech, each letter was

capitalized.""

In particular, Peterson and the Federal CivU Defense Administration wanted more

participation from women's groups. During Peterson's administration as weU as the

CaldweU years, women ranked high on the FCDA's list of prospective recmits, because

the "Fifties woman" was stereotyped as nurturing, civic-minded, patriotic, and at home in

"' Advisory BuUetin No. 152, 20 September 1953, Binder, Advisory BuUetins, 50-199, Box 1, OCDM PubUcations, 1950-60, RG 396, NARACP.

""Federal CivU Defense Administration, C/v/7 Defense Registration Kit (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1954), 1-19.

241

suburban America from 9 am to 5 pm Targeting women for civU defense recruitment

seemed a sensible and sound strategy for boosting enroUment. Hence, in the feU of 1953

the FCDA's Women's Advisory Committee invited leaders from national women's

organizations to a conference on women and civU defense. Forty-sbc officers representing

groups with a coUective membership totaUng more than twenty-five mUUon women

attended the two-day session at the FCDA's National Training Center in Olney, Maryland.

There, federal spokespersons from the Women's Advisory Committee urged the

assembled leaders to preach civU defense to their constituents and urge them to volunteer.

Many women's associations cooperated with the FCDA's requests. They passed civU

defense resolutions. They plugged civU defense in their club buUetins. They invited

FCDA personnel to speak at meetings, luncheons, and at banquets."'"

WhUe Peterson's focus on women and women's groups merely represented an

extension ofthe FCDA's practices during the CaldweU years, the former govemor of

Nebraska did introduce a new slant to the persuasion campaign; he pushed for the

portrayal of civU defense as a famUy undertaking. Today, the mention of civU defense

brings to mind two images that have endured since the early Fifties. One mental picture

features schoolchUdren ducking under their desks or crouching in haUways. The other

centers on a femUy in a bomb shelter. Dad, Mom, and the kids are craiiq)ed, crowded into

tight quarters, but they are smiUng, and often they are playing a board game or Ustening to

a radio. The first image is a legacy ofthe CaldweU administration. Despite Val Peterson's

"'"Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 79-80.

242

preference for mass evacuation over shelters, the second image, with its en^hasis on the

femUy as a civU defense unit, is primarily a product ofthe Peterson era.""

From the compUing ofthe earUest Atomic Age reports on preparedness, such as

Study 3B-1 and the BuU committee investigations, civU defense planners and

spokespersons had consistently maintained that preparedness was the responsibUity ofthe

individual. Although much ofthe language remained the same-ultimate responsibUity stUl

rested upon the individual-during Peterson's term as administrator the emphasis began to

shift. The FCDA began to focus more and more on the femUy as the base unit in the

civilian defense army. The Federal CivU Defense Administration's goal was the

bureaucratization ofthe American people, the creation of a federalized system of home

defense that utilized the skills of every man, woman, and chUd in the United States. The

agency wamed that the advent ofthe Atomic Age had placed American civilians on the

front Unes, and they must prepare for the unthinkable—a nuclear strike against the

heartland. The mere expression "home defense," so often employed by the Peterson

Administtation, suggested the importance ofthe famUy in civU defense. According to the

FCDA, the defense ofthe homeland began in the home. "'*

""Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 67; and Idem, Home Protection Exercises (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1953).

"'*Lyon G. Tyler, Jr., "CivU Defense: The Impact ofthe Planning Years, 1945-1950," (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1967), 27, 33-37; War Department CivU Defense Board, A Study of Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: National MUitary EstabUshment, Office ofthe Secretary of Defense, 1948), 9; Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 67; Federal CivU Defense Administration, Home Protection Exercises; Idem, The Home Defense Action Program (n.p.: Federal CivU Defense Administration, September 1953); Idem, Home Preparedness Workshop: A Guide for Group Leaders, (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1953); and Idem, Rural Family Defense (Washington, D.C:

243

Of course some households received more attention from the FCDA than did

others. In the 1950s, the stereotypical American home, the ideal portrayed in movies, on

television, in books and magazines, and even in advertisements was represented as a

modest house in a middle-class, white, suburban neighborhood. It was a "Father Knows

Best" kind of home complete with a tidy lawn, perhaps a white picket fence out front, a

smaU vegetable garden in the back, and, inside, a "nuclear" famUy-Dad, Mom, and two or

three weU-groomed and weU-mannered chUdren. These were the households that the

FCDA featured in its fikns and pubUcations. These were the households that the agency

seemed most intent on preparing for a nuclear strike."'

Modem and educated, it was Ukely that the parents in these "picture perfect"

households had read Dr. Benjamin Spock's perennial bestseUer, The Common Sense Book

of Baby and Child Care, an instmction manual that showed Mom and Dad how to forge

sttonger femUy ties and mold their chUcfren into better adults. Presumably, many of them

had acted upon Dr. Spock's suggestion that they abandon the old mother/father autocracy

model for their famUy. Rather, make the family a bastion of democracy. Do not simply

dictate behavior and expect the chUdren to act Uke obedient, but mindless, automatons.

Gather the chUdren together and hold orderly famUy discussions. Include them in the

decision making process. Grant them power over their own Uves. Permit them to be

GPO, 1956)

437 The artwork on FCDA pamphlets provides much insight into the federal office's agenda and target audiences. The drawings in Home Preparedness Workshop and Home Protection Exercises are typical of FCDA artwork throughout the Fifties and early Sbrties.

244

thinking, contributing, and independent members ofthe femUy, and aU-the chUd, the

parents, the community, the country-would reap the benefit."'*

Peterson's FCDA echoed Spock's ideas and suggested that the members of a

famUy sit down together, discuss civU defense responsibUities, and divide them. Yet, whUe

many ofthe agency's mechanisms for achieving its goals were the same as those posited

by Dr. Spock, the measurement of success, the results anticipated by Spock and the

FCDA, were polar opposites. UnUke the author of Baby and Child Care, FCDA

admmistrators wanted to create a society of trained and weU-rehearsed automatons that

would react instantly, unflinchingly, when a civU defense emergency arose. Valuable time

would be lost if Americans had to stop, think, and deUberate what course of action to

foUow when the air raid sirens sounded.""

FCDA plans suggested that each individual in the famUy, chUdren included,

assume primary and secondary civiUan defense responsibiUties and then ttaui and driU

regularly to guarantee optimum performance during an attack. Dad might act as primary

house warden and communications expert. During an emergency he would oversee the

loading of suppUes and his household troops into the shelter or, if time permitted an

evacuation, into the famUy car. Once the escape vehicle or the shelter had been

provisioned, fiUed with famUy members and secured, Dad would attempt simultaneously to

"'*Benjamin Spock, The Common Sense Book of Baby and Child Care (New York: DueU, Sloan and Pearce, 1945).

""Federal CivU Defense Administration, Home Protection Exercises, 3-4.

245

keep the femUy calm and Usten for CONELRAD updates. As chief communications

officer he would exercise complete control over the radio's tuning and volume dials.

Mom might act in a dual capacity as chief medical officer and as quartermaster

general. Although the FCDA encouraged women to serve as neighborhood wardens,

many civU defense pubUcations presupposed that most women would volunteer for those

duties associated with the traditional "female" responsibUities of care giver, cook, and

maid. Within the microcosm ofthe nuclear home. Mom patched up her chUdren's

everyday scrapes and bmises; she would also tend to the injuries caused by an enemy

bomb strike. Mom kept the suburban house clean, neat, and weU-stocked with food; she

would do the same for her femUy's bomb shelter and car. Lastly, Mom would be ready to

prepare wholesome and nutritious meals either in the house's kitchen or in the shelter. In

the latter her skUls would be put to the test, but surely, aided by the innate creative

abUities attributed to her gender, she would succeed in making attractive and appetizing

dishes from canned and dehydrated foods."""

"Grandma's Pantry," a program launched in the Peterson Administration, but one

which gained momentum and greater attention during Leo Hoegh's term of office, focused

on Mom's quartermaster/cook responsibUities. FCDA pubUcations that popularized the

program boasted a picture of an older, quaint kitchen, complete with a weU-stocked

larder, a pot-beUied stove, and a pan of homemade roUs just out ofthe oven. The caption

below the picture recaUed images from adult Americans' chUdhood. "Remember

GRANDMA'S PANTRY with its shelves loaded with food, ready for any emergenc)

"""Federal CivU Defense Administration, Home Protection Exercises, 4-6.

246

whether it be unexpected con^any or roads blocked for days by a winter's storm?*""' The

text then informed its audience that the rigors and uncertainty of Ufe in the Atomic Age

necessitated "the recreation of GRANDMA'S PANTRY in a sheltered area ofthe modem

home.""" Peterson and Hoegh's personnel bombarded women with the program's catch

phrase: "Grandma's Pantry was Ready-Is Your Pantry Ready in Event of Emergency?'""'

Just Uke Mom and Dad, the chUdren also were to have civU defense

responsibUities. Theirs were the lesser tasks. Often they acted as assistants to the adults.

They helped Dad carry last-minute suppUes to the famUy shelter or the car. They assisted

Mom in meal preparation and cleaning. If Grandma or some other older person were

Uving at the house, the chUdren might bear the responsibiUty of escorting them to safety,

closely watching to make sure they did not stumble. In addition, the chUdren might be in

charge of gathering and taking to the shelter a couple of games, decks of cards, and/or a

few favorite books. IdeaUy, the presence of such diversions would keep the chUdren

content and quietly occupied whUe hydrogen bombs leveled their neighborhood and whUe

Dad and Mom Ustened to CONELRAD briefs. Moreover, the games and books would

provide the entire famUy with entertainment and a temporary escape from harsh reaUty if

""'Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, Inc., PubUshers, 1988), 103; and "Grandma's Pantry Belongs in Your Kitchen," quoted in Newsletter by, for, and about Women in Civil Defense (May 1958), 1.

""'Ibid.

^'^^ Grandma's Pantry, 1.

247

staggered enemy attacks or concentrated radioactive faUout mandated an extended stay in

the shelter."""

The chUdren's role in the femUy's civU defense program may seem minimal, but

theb- parents were to assure them that they were valued contributors to the famUy's and

the country's system of civU defense. The chUdren ofthe 1950s were being readied for the

chaUenges ofthe 1960s. Trained and routinely drUled in civU defense techniques, informed

ofthe Unportance of civilian preparedness, taught to accept with pride the duties thrust on

them by the FCDA, and witness to their parents' example, the chUdren should cUck

smoothly into positions of greater responsibUity once they reached adulthood. A

particularly devastating enemy attack might even prematurely force more responsibUity on

the chUdren.

Each femUy member, regardless of age, was considered an expert, the authority

for the primary tasks aUotted to them Workmg together, this team of experts hopefoUy

would function as an efficient base unit in the United States' civU defense corps. Yet

unless the enemy scheduled his attacks after 5 pm it was unUkely that aU members ofthe

unit would be assembled at home when an emergency stmck. Nor was there any

guarantee that each individual on the team would survive a nuclear assault. It was

therefore imperative for Mom, Dad, and the chUdren to famUiarize themselves with each

others' responsibUities. Each famUy member would have primary duties, but they would

"""Federal CivU Defense Administration, Home Protection Exercises, 3-4; and Idem, Between You and Disaster (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1956). May, Homeward Bound, 93-94, 103-9.

248

also cross-train in secondary fields. Mom might weU be the primary care giver, but an

older chUd and Dad too might take first aid courses, just in case.""'

Although many FCDA pubUcations suggested American famUies participate in

civU defense, the single pamphlet most responsible for detaUing the division of tasks was

Home Protection Exercises, part ofthe agency's 'TamUy Action Program" Boasting a

caricature of Dad, Mom, the kids, and Grandma gathered around a coffee table and

discussing their assigned duties, the booklet Usted "eight important famUy exercises," such

as "preparation of your shelter, home nursing, and provision of safe food and water in

emergencies."""* The work then gave a more detaUed analysis of each exercise or

responsibiUty and, below each explanation, provided two blanks. One famUy member was

to affix their signature to the blank marked "To direct famUy action." Another was to sign

his or her name on the line above "helper or alternate."""^

By training and drilling for a civU defense emergency, each famUy, each base unit

in the country's civU defense network, increased its chances of surviving an atomic attack.

The FCDA thus could tout civU defense as a measure for ensuring self-preservation.

Further, if aU or nearly aU American fariiiUes saw to their own safety by foUowing FCDA

guideUnes, the result would be the creation of a formidable civU defense army, one capable

of ensuring not only the survival of many of its individual units, but the survival ofthe

""'Federal CivU Defense Administration, Home Protection Exercises (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1953), 3-6.

""*Ibid., 3.

""%id.,4-16.

249

country as weU. StUl fiirther, spokespersons for civU defense-including President Dwight

D. Eisenhower-argued that the buUding of a truly effective national civU defense program

at the grass-roots level could possibly deter an aggressor from launching a nuclear

strike.""*

No doubt some famUies performed just as FCDA personnel wished, but most did

not. Agency plans for a United States in which each person, each famUy was aware and

supportive of civU defense goals never became a reaUty. Indeed, the FCDA even feUed to

attract the whole-hearted support ofthe middle-class suburbanites on which it focused its

energies. Recmitment returns dropped whUe Val Peterson was in office, and they did not

recover when Leo Hoegh took control in 1957.""'

Gains in volunteer recmitment might have bolstered the FCDA's position in

Washington. Through 1953, the Federal CivU Defense Administration regularly pubUshed

its recmitment totals in its annual report to Congress. Evidence that indicated a lack of

civiUan participation could cause the FCDA's appropriations to dry up. On the other

hand, large classes of recmits, and especiaUy a record of escalating pubUc involvement,

would help justify past and foture funding by showing legislators that the American people

""*Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 6; Dwight D. Eisenhower to Val Peterson, 17 July 1956, "White House Conespondence, 1956," Box 2, Conespondence of Administrator Val Peterson, 1953-1957, RG 396; and "A Critical Problem," President Eisenhower Press Conference, 14 March 1956, "White House Conespondence, 1956" Box 2, Conespondence of Administrator Val Peterson, 1953-1957, RG 396.

""'Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, 101; Idem, 1956 Statistical Report, 93-96; and Idem, Annual Statistical Report (Battle Creek, Michigan: Federal CivU Defense Administration, 30 June 1958), 50-52 [hereafter cited as 1958 Statistical Report].

250

were supportive of civU defense, and the FCDA was using its monies to good effect.

Besides sending the book-length annual reports to the members ofthe House and the

Senate, FCDA officials made the document avaUable to their regional offices, state and

local affiUates, and to the pubUc at large. There, the report's optimistic tone was expected

to generate an enthusiasm in estabUshed preparedness offices and among the general

populace. Together with other civU defense campaigns, this enthusiasm hopefoUy would

translate into greater recmitment returns the next year and thus would place more pressure

on Congress to increase FCDA aUocations. This strategy was less than successfol."'"

Volunteer totals that had tapered off during MUlard CaldweU's last year in office

began to drop radicaUy whUe Val Peterson served as administrator. In 1953

approximately 500,000 volunteered for training as civU defense auxUiaries. That number

was misleading, however, because it represented a compUation of enrollment totals for aU

civU defense service classes—first aid, warden, and a number of others—yet there is no

indication that FCDA staff members counted only once a preparedness enthusiast who

took more than one class. It seems, instead, that each civU defense training facUity simply

reported its annual totals. Since Peterson's FCDA pushed a program of cross training, as

outUned in Home Protection Exercises, it is aUnost certain that the actual number of

civUians involved in preparedness training was lower than the 500,000 reported. Despite

the severely Umited success of his 1953 recruitment campaign, Peterson stUl could argue

that civU defense had attracted a sum of 4.5 mUUon volunteers since the FCDA's inception

in 1950. Yet again the numbers misrepresent the reaUty, because the agency did not

"'"Federal CivU Defense Admmistration, 1953 Annual Report, 101,

251

report how many trained civUian defenders either became inactive or conq)letely forsook

their duties each year.""

Peterson's FCDA dealt with the recruitment crisis by hiding from Congress the

diminishing returns. In 1954 and in subsequent years the Federal CivU Defense

Administration excluded volunteer totals from its annual report to the men and women on

Capitol HUl. Only those Senators and Representatives that located and carefliUy read one

of a very limited number of agency statistical reports would know approximately how

many individuals had taken preparedness courses or had volunteered for civU defense

responsibUities. The FCDA did not include volunteer totals in its report to Congress,

because the number of recruits was dropping. In its Annual Statistical Report for fiscal

year 1956, the agency recorded a total pubUc enroUment of 4,471,000 people in civil

defense-the FCDA had claimed 4,500,000 recruits two years earUer, at the end of 1953.

By June 30, 1957, the number of individuals cataloged for state and local civU defense

responsibUities had faUen to 3,344,941."''

When it came to recruitment totals official deceit, or inadequate measures for

reporting and calculating the actual pubUc involvement in civU defense, or both seem to

have been endemic to the Federal CivU Defense Administration. When French Robertson

announced his intent to resign as administrator of FCDA Region 5, he praised state,

county, and city directors for "furthering the progress of civU defense," but he quoted no

""Federal CivU Defense Administtation, 1953 Annual Report, 101.

"' Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1956 Statistical Report, 17: and Idem 1958 Statistical Report, 15.

252

specific number of volunteers to substantiate his claim that progress had been made.

Grouped with Robertson's typewritten speech is a hand-drawn chart detaUing the

"Tabulation of tt^ining reported by states." Ofthe five states in his region, only Texas,

the home state for Region 5's headquarters, showed substantial gains-68,477 trained

civUian defenders-for the year. Arkansas placed second v^h some 5,700 trainees, but

more than half were volunteer firemen, and only 6 people out ofthe reported 5,700 had

taken a course in "Basic CivU Defense" measures. Trainee totals for Oklahoma and

Louisiana were even smaUer than in Arkansas, and New Mexico, never a sttong supporter

of civU defense, had yet to report any statistics whatsoever. On the bottom ofthe chart, in

capital letters, the hand-written message "DO NOT PUT IN FORMAL RECORD" glares

at the reader.""

Val Peterson tried to shore up the FCDA's crumbling foundation with gadgets,

gimmicks, and especiaUy with emotionaUy-charged appeals to the pubUc. CivU defense

was American. Peterson's staff pricked the conscience of each patriot by pairing symbols

of freedom with civU defense goals. Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin,

George Washington, and the other founding fathers ofthe United States, they were aU

committed to the idea of civU defense if the FCDA's pubUc relations experts were to be

beUeved. The authors ofthe U.S. Constitution opened the document with the words "We,

the people." Popular opinion held that it was through the determination and the

"""Statement of French M. Robertson, Regional FCDA Administrator, Region 5, Denton, Texas", Folder V.A.I, Speeches by Key Regional Officials, Box 8, Office FUes of the Director, RG 396 [In June 1997, many FCDA documents that were scheduled for transfer to RG 396 were stUl located under RG 304 at the depository cited]. National Archives Branch Depository, Fort Worth, Texas.

253

cooperation of Americans from every class, trade, and age that this country was bom In

the 1950s the Federal CivU Defense Administration attempted to use that idea to its

advantage. The agency told Americans that, once again, it was time for "we, the people"

to do their duty—this time by preparing for a nuclear exchange. One kit that the FCDA

distributed to spokespersons for civU defense included the passage, "CivU defense is 'We,

the people'...and it's now up to us to preserve...this nation.""'"

For those Americans who associated patriotism with the spirit ofthe pioneer,

federal pubUc relations speciaUsts conjured up images of a nineteenth-century homestead

under Indian attack. Inside the home were "women and chUdren moulding buUets, loading

muskets, putting out fires from flaming anows and tending the wounded whUe their

husbands and fathers did the fighting to protect them""" The mental picture produced

was one that suggested continuity in U.S. civU defense throughout the country's history.

Neither the concept of civUian defense nor the Peterson Administration's focus on a

femUy-oriented program was new, the FCDA argued. Pioneer famUies had been ready to

defend their homes. Nuclear famUies must be prepared to do the same. FCDA speech

writers reminded their readers that whUe most ofthe physical violence in World War I and

World War II had occuned far from home, advances in aircraft design and development

placed modem Americans in the same situation as nineteenth-century pioneers on the

Westem frontier; their homes were within range of an enemy attack. In the words of one

"'"Quoted in "CivU Defense-Keystone of National Defense", in Federal CivU Defense Administration, C/v/7 Defense Facts: Speakers Kit, 1955-1956 (Battle Creek, Michigan: Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1954), n.p.

""Ibid.

254

agency pubUcation, "[W]e've run the fiiU cycle, and civU defense is right back on our

Uteral doorstep., [sic] because that's right where a war ofthe Atom Age would be.""'*

Besides parading time-honored examples ofthe American spirit before the

people, the FCDA used contemporary American icons to seU civU defense. Since most

Americans recognized the names of popular actors and singers, the FCDA habituaUy

enlisted the aid of stars such as Tony Bennett, Andy Griffith, and others when recording

radio spots. The stars increased the agency's visibUity and hopefoUy convinced the artists'

devoted foUowers that the entertainment industry's eUte considered civU defense

worthwhUe.

The wholesome, aU-American image that Andy Griffith and his TV personas

projected made him an invaluable commodity for civU defense promoters, but

Administrator Val Peterson located another individual that many would have considered

even "more American." Her name was Ramona Deitmeyer, and she Uved in Lincoln,

Nebraska, with her husband and their five chUdren. Praised as "the country's outstanding

homemaker," she also boasted a title that identified her as a champion of American ideals.

She was American to the core. She was "Mrs. America" for 1955. White, middle-class,

married with chUdren, Mrs. America was an even better fit for the FCDA than 1955's Miss

America would have been, because Peterson wanted a famUy-based program of civU

defense. Working in conjunction with the Federal CivU Defense Administration, the local

civU defense agency in Lincoln contacted Mrs. Dietmeyer, took pictures, and wrote a story

"'*Quoted in "CivU Defense-Keystone of National Defense," in Federal CivU Defense Administration, C/v/7 Defense Facts, n.p.

255

which told "how 'Mrs. America' makes certain of civU defense protection in her home.""'

MeanwhUe, Bert Nevins, president and managing director of Mrs. America, Inc. pressured

Nebraska Senator Carl Curtis to schedule a photo shoot of Mrs. America and her femUy

signing up for civU defense at the White House, in the presence of President

Eisenhower."'*

By incorporating the country's founding fethers, westem pioneers, and Mrs.

America into its pubUcity can:q)aigns, the FCDA hoped to prove to the people that civU

defense was indeed American. The agency also sought to convince the pubUc that civU

defense was moral, that it was the right thing to do. Peterson and the FCDA reminded the

people that peace and the safeguarding of human Ufe constituted the two primary goals of

the civU defense program. HopefliUy, the creation of a strong preparedness network

supported at every level—from the grassroots up—would deter an enemy from launching a

nuclear strike against the Uiuted States. Nonetheless, if an aggressor did go forward with

its attack, civU defense could reduce the number of casualties sustained. Lastly, civU

defense could save Uves even if a potential aggressor chose not to attack, even if the peace

were maintained. Both Peterson and CaldweU had argued that civUian defense planning

""Bert Nevins to Mrs. Jean FuUer, 24 May 1955, Folder "D", Box 1, Conespondence of Val Peterson, RG 396, NARACP.

"'*Bert Nevins to Carl Curtis, 24 May 1955, Folder "D", Box 1, Conespondence of Val Peterson, RG 396, NARACP.

256

and manpower could be employed to combat natural disasters and cope with the

destmction they left behind.""

CivU defense was American. CivU defense was moral. CivU defense was the wUl

of God. It was the last supposition that afforded the Peterson Administration its greatest

opportunity to raise the emotional content of its pubUcity campaigns. The ttappings of

reUgion were omnipresent in the United States ofthe Fifties. Americans' enthusiasm for

reUgion, so apparent during Hany S. Truman's years as president, did not diminish during

Eisenhower's two terms. If anything, the pubUc's reUgiosity increased, driven perhaps in

part by the fear of ever "bigger" bombs, the desire for conformity, and an administration

that openly spoke ofthe need for spiritual sttength in the Nuclear Age."*"

In pubUc before the press, and in private, sequestered with the members of his

Cabinet, President Dwight David Eisenhower caUed for a more spiritual America. He

argued that through hope, feith, and determination, through strength of wiU and spirit, the

American people would see their way of Ufe defeat communism, and the United States

would win the Cold War. Eisenhower's expressed beUefs were based upon his

experiences in World War II. He had seen firsthand the physical and emotional

devastation that saturation bombing had produced in Europe, and he told the men and

""Federal CivU Defense Administration, Annual Report for 1952 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1953), 19-22; Idem, 1953 Annual Report, 6, 14-22; and Idem, Church in Defense, 3.

"*"Douglas T. MUler and Marion Nowak, The Fifties: The Way We Really Were (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975), 84-92; J. Ronald Oakley, God's Country: America in the Fifties (New York: Dembner Books, 1986), 319-24; and George M. Marsden, Religion and American Culture (New York: Harcourt Brace CoUege PubUshers, 1990), 207-215.

257

women of his Cabinet that Americans could not imagine the honor that awaited them if

the world was destmed for nuclear war. MUitary hardware, civU defense shelters and

evacuation routes, these would be of Uttle value unless the people possessed deep reserves

of spiritual strength to sustain them during and after a nuclear holocaust.

Eisenhower's references to a spiritual America, though numerous, were often

vague in their definition. His speeches held appeal both for reUgious Usteners that equated

spiritual strength with feith in God and for agnostics and atheists who measured spiritual

strength in terms of wUl power and self control. Yet, whUe Eisenhower may have issued

guarded pronouncements on spirituaUty, others in his administration were more direct,

speaking openly of theu* hope for an America that was fortified by strong reUgious

beUefe."*'

Echoing the charges ofthe Roman CathoUc Church and many Protestant

reUgious leaders, as well. Secretary of State John Foster DuUes contended that

communism was a reUgion in itself—a dangerous, aggressive reUgion. It should therefore

be opposed by organized reUgious bodies, and Americans should sign up for the jUiad. A

layman in the Presbyterian Church and the former head ofthe Federal CouncU of

Churches' Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, DuUes stated that Soviet Communist

Party members were fanatical beUevers, missionaries driven to spread their creed

"*'Federal CivU Defense Administtation, Federal Civil Defense Administration Announces a Special Course for Clergymen (Battle Creek, Michigan: Federal CivU Defense Admmistraiton, 1956), n.p.; Mark SUk, Spiritual Politics: Religion and America Since World War II (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), 23, 40, 44, 68, 91 -92, 98; and Ambrose, Eisenhower, 38.

258

throughout the world. The only way to withstand them, he argued, was to ground

Democracy in a "righteous and dynamic feith. ""*

An Eisenhower appointee, Val Peterson foUowed the example ofthe president

and his leading advisors. From the moment he took control ofthe Federal CivU Defense

Administration, Peterson began to Unk civU defense to reUgion and spirituaUty. He

repeated Eisenhower's and DuUes's warnings and arguments. He appropriated key

phrases and incorporated them into his own discourses on reUgion and civU defense."*' In

A Message to Clergymen, an inttoduction to a 1956 FCDA pubUcation, Peterson wrote,

"A righteous and dynamic feith in god and injustice can restore to us a measure

of ..security... in the midst of material insecurity. CivU defense rests on persons, and

reUgion makes persons strong.""*"

It was natural for Peterson to second the views of his president and benefector,

but it is evident that the FCDA's administrator also recognized and seized an opportunity

to bolster popular support for civU defense. Throughout the United States' history, and

perhaps even more in the 1950s when popular reUgiosity peaked, Americans have been

fiercely protective of their constitutional guarantee to freedom of reUgion. If Peterson and

the FCDA could convince the pubUc that communism posed a threat to reUgion, and civU

defense was a viable means of protecting the country, the people, and their freedoms,

Americans might be persuaded to enroU in preparedness programs. Accordingly, the

"*'SUk, Spiritual Politics, 23, 91-92.

"*'Federal CivU Defense Adnunisttation, 1953 Annual Report, 6.

"*"Federal CivU Defense Administration, Special Course for Clergymen, n.p.

259

presence of reUgious phraseology in FCDA authored pamphlets and speeches increased

dramaticaUy during Peterson's tenure as administtator.

As Deputy Administtator Katherine Howard worked her way across the country,

trying to mobUize women's clubs in support of civU defense, she popularized the

connection between civU defense and reUgion. Howard wove bibUcal scripture into her

speeches and peppered them with homespun Christian proverbs. Addressing the members

ofthe Raleigh, North CaroUna, Women's Club, she spoke of feith and works-women's

faith in their own abUities and the value of a good work ethic in preparing for a civU

defense emergency. Reminding her audience of an old saying, "The Lord helps those who

help themselves," Howard told her Usteners to get involved and strongly hinted that God

would approve of their actions."*'

Katherine Howard suggested to the women of Raleigh that God would want

them to support civU defense. Val Peterson made similar claims, but he also took the

FCDA's logic a step farther. In a speech entitled C/v/7 Defense in Industry, Peterson

argued that civU defense in fact acted as a shield to reUgion. Of course God favored

civiUan preparedness; civU defense constituted a detenent to war. Without it, a nuclear

exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union was more Ukely to occur.

Without civU defense the U.S. might not be able to recover from a Soviet strUce. Further,

if the United States lost a war to its hated communist rival, the Soviets would revoke

Americans' freedom of worship. With an undisguised appeal to his Usteners' emotions.

"*'"Something Attempted, Something Done," Raleigh Women's Club, Box 10, Papers of Katherine G. Howard, 1917-74, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library [hereafter cited as DDEL].

260

Peterson closed his presentation by saying, "If a war occurs we must never forget that

those people wUl be coming over here to destroy our freedom of reUgion. Communism in

the final analysis cannot stand the existence office churches in the world.""**

The charged language found in the speeches deUvered by Peterson and Howard

made its way into FCDA pamphlets as weU. The text of one booklet stated, "CivU defense

is essentiaUy a welfere program. It makes plans and provides means so that in time of

disaster every American can put into practice the divine injunction to 'Love thy

Neighbor.'""*^ Another argued ministers should support preparedness measures because

"[t]he church, in consonance with the wiU of God, is anxious to preserve Ufe, physicaUy as

weU as spirituaUy.""** Bringing to mmd the Declaration of Independence's assertion that

an individual had the right to Ufe, Uberty, and the pursuit of happiness, the text continued,

"ReUgion upholds the proposition that man has worth and dignity in the sight of God.

Freedom is one of man's inaUenable rights. The world is now in an imcon^romising

contest between those who defend freedom...and those who deny that man has any

inaUenable rights at aU, between those who look upon man as a chUd of God and those

who look upon him as a thing.""*' Yet another pubUcation, one that advertised itself as a

"**"CivU Defense in Industry," Alphabetical Section CheckUst to Alphabetical Section Comparison of State CD, Box 4, PubUcation FUes, RG 397, NARACP.

"* Federal CivU Defense Administration, Special Course for Clergymen, n.p.

"**Federal CivU Defense Administration, Church in Defense, 2.

"*1bid., 3.

261

conq)endium of "civU defense fects" Usted the three things that the Soviets most wished to

destroy in the United States; reUgious freedom occupied the top spot on the Ust." "

There is nothing unusual in Peterson's attempt to capitaUze on Americans'

emotions. He headed a federal agency, and most governments fen the flames of patriotism

and reUgion to achieve their ends. Nor is it surprising that when Peterson's

Administration began smking, the FCDA tried to baU itself out of trouble by winning

popular support. The agency's pubUcation record provides a Ust of figures that chart

Peterson's growing concerns for, and reactions to, a decUning civU defense program.

Although the FCDA released mUUons of pamphlets between 1953 and 1955, 1956 marked

a watershed year for the dissemination of civU defense pubUcations. The sum of booklets,

guides, and posters distributed since the FCDA's creation totaled 145,078,401 by June

1956. Of that number nearly fifty miUion made their way into the pubUc domain during

the last fiscal year. The quantity of civU defense pubUcations distributed had steadUy

grown since 1954, when Val Peterson had committed the FCDA to mass evacuation and

the pubUc was beginning to worry about the hazards of radioactive faUout. Americans

received 8,529,874 pubUshed materials on civU defense during fiscal year 1954. A year

later, civU defense bodies distributed 23,382,325 informational booklets. In 1956 pubUc

disenchantment with the Peterson Administration had grown so great Senator Chet

HoUfield directed a congressional inquiry into the civUian defense program The same

year, seemingly in an attempt to win approval from the pubUc and deflect the criticisms of

"'"Federal CivU Defense Admmistration, C/v/7 Defense Facts, 3.

262

the HoUfield Committee, the FCDA and its state and local auxUiaries saturated the country

with 48,936, 460 pubUcations.""

Not only the number, but the language and oft times the subject matter ofthe

pamphlets released in 1956 by the Federal CivU Defense Administration show the agency's

desperate attempts to attract attention. It was in 1956 that the FCDA issued the

emotional tract The Church and Civil Defense and an equaUy potent booklet entitled

Federal Civil Defense Administration Announces A Special Course for Clergymen. The

second pamphlet began with a personal note from Val Peterson to the members ofthe

clergy. "We [the FCDA] covet your partnership in the great humanitarian effort of

providing for the safety and health of our people," he wrote."" Next, the FCDA's staff of

writers assured reUgious leaders that the nation's statesmen agreed that "mankind has

gotten itself into a situation where men must open their hearts and minds to divine tmth or

be obUterated by the material monsters that they have created.""" The work's authors

then paraded a few Eisenhower and DuUes quotes intended to substantiate the assertion

that American statesmen recognized the Cold War as an economic, poUtical, and spiritual

stmggle. At the end ofthe text the leaflet Usted the topics that FCDA instmctors would

address in the course. Many, such as "The Church and Emergency Mass Care" and

"Spiritual Ministtations in Disaster Situations" involved practical appUcations, but others,

for example "The Nature and Characteristics of Our Adversary" and "Christianity and

" 'Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1956 Statistical Report, 100.

"' Federal CivU Defense Achninistration, Special Course for Clergymen, n.p.

""Ibid.

263

Communism Conttasted," seem designed to inspire a heightened sense of patriotism

toward the United States and a holy wrath toward the Union of Soviet SociaUst

RepubUcs."'"

The FCDA released dozens of pan^hlets in the months before the HoUfield

Committee began its hearings in January 1956, but the agency continued its accelerated

efforts to win popular approval even after the House MUitary Operations Subcommittee

ended its deUberations in June. If the FCDA could have shown evidence of increased

pubUc support before or during the hearings, the agency might have been able to better

defend itself against HoUfield's attacks. The Federal CivU Defense Administration faUed

to produce any such statistics, however, and the members ofthe HoUfield Committee

issued a bUstering appraisal ofthe Peterson Administtation and the country's state of

civUian preparedness. For the FCDA credibUity after the release ofthe report was just as

important as trying to fend off criticism when the HoUfield investigations first got

underway. Hence, the publishing frenzy and the campaigns for acceptance that

characterized the FCDA throughout the first half of 1956 continued unabated-and

possibly even intensified—during the last sbc months ofthe year. The agency released The

Church in Civil Defense in the faU.""

On September 9, 1956, the Federal CivU Defense Administration kicked off

National CivU Defense Week, a campaign which agency pubUcists caUed the "FCDA's

most extensive pubUc education program...to develop awareness, motivation and

"'"Federal CivU Defense Administtation, Special Course for Clergymen, n.p.

""Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1958 Statistical Report, 15-1%.

264

participation in CD activities....""'* Agency officials made the event difficult to ignore.

Those that orchestrated the undertaking employed saturation tactics, gimmicks, and

emotionaUy-charged language to awaken and mobUize the people. To pubUcize the event

and stimulate interest, the FCDA and its sister organizations at the state and local levels

dissemmated over a mUUon civU defense guides, comic books, and leaflets.""

The week's catch phrase-Alert Today, AUve Tomonow-headUned most ofthe

pubUcations, and it was almost always accompanied by a caricature of Mr. CivU Defense,

the FCDA's first mascot since Val Peterson had retired Bert the Turtle in 1953.

Cartoonist Al Capp, best knovm for his L'U Abner series, created Mr. CivU Defense.

There was no mistaking Mr. CivU Defense's affiliation; his torso was comprised ofthe two

capital letters "C" and "D." Yet in spite of his alphabet body, Mr. CivU Defense looked

neither as siUy nor as sluggish as Bert the Turtle. The pose most favored by the new

mascot was one in which he was standing with his legs set wide apart, his arms akimbo, a

FCDA "steel-pot" helmet strapped to his head and jauntUy puUed down over the left eye,

his right eye alert and peering out from under the hat's brim, his mouth fixed in a

determined and confident grin. UnlUce the Bert character which always looked scared,

tentative, searching for an excuse to duck into his shell, Mr. CivU Defense appeared

"'*"Roundup of National CD Week," RG 396.

""Ibid.

265

prepared, aware, eager to spring into action and save Uves. He was also eager to teU the

pubUc about civU defense measures. "'*

Al Capp did not simply draw a figure for the FCDA to stamp on its posters and

leaflets, he Ulustrated an agency comic book entitled Mr. Civil Defense Tells about

Natural Disasters!. The cover and the first page ofthe comic reveal that L'U Abner and

Mr. CivU Defense are acquaintances. L'U Abner remains around long enough to introduce

the pubUc to Mr. CivU Defense, but he cannot tarry, perhaps because he has his own

Atomic Age issues to address in Dogpatch. The same year that Al Capp created Mr. CivU

Defense, "L'U Abner," the play, hit Broadway. The show's story centered on a decision

by the U.S. government to tum Dogpatch into an Atomic proving grounds. In the FCDA

comic, Al Capp does not teU his audience whether L'U Abner is anxious to save his home

or simply ready to get back to courting Daisy Mae, but on the first page L'U Abner

mounts a mule and rides out ofthe picture, leaving Mr. CivU Defense to explain the

importance of civiUan preparedness in natural disasters. Appearing in comic books and

leaflets, on posters and placards, Mr. CivU Defense drew attention to the FCDA and

National CivU Defense Week. The Capp-created character served as a spokesperson for

the federal agency and as a herald for the awareness campaign.""

"'*"Roundup of National CD Week," RG 396; and "Press Kit for Weekly Newspapers," and "Leadership Guide," Binder, CivU Defense Week, 1956, Box 3, OCDM PubUcations 1950-60, RG 396, NARACP.

""Al Capp, Mr. Civil Defense Tells about Natural Disasters! (New York: Graphic Infomiation Service, Inc., 1956); "Press Kit for Weekly Newspapers," RG 396; and "Leadership Guide," RG 396.

266

National CivU Defense Week began on a Sunday. The National Broadcasting

Company officiaUy launched the event by televising a recorded message from the

president. CaUing civU defense "a good investment," Eisenhower contended that a

prepared people would be "more self-reUant in the Uttle emergencies of every day [sic]

Ufe," better equipped "to meet any natural disaster," and would "help deter aggression and

constitute...a positive force for peace.' President Eisenhower encouraged "every

American famUy' to support the FCDA and participate in its readiness crusade."*"

The president's speech had signaled the beginning ofthe week-long observance.

Now others took up the cry of "Alert Today, AUve Tomonow" and swept into action.

Govemors and mayors seconded the president's remarks and caUed upon their people to

back local, state, and national civiUan defense initiatives. At Fort Myer in ArUngton,

Virginia, the U.S. Army held a special ceremony to honor the FCDA and its director, Val

Peterson. The Army's Third Infantry Regiment paraded before some 3,000 spectators and

saluted Administrator Peterson whUe the regiment's band and chorus honored him with

the first performance of "Heads Up America," a civU defense march. Secretary ofthe

Army Bmcker commended Val Peterson for his dedication to civUian preparedness.

Bmcker declared, "[I]n this Nationv^ide[sic] CD effort you are contributing significantly to

the security and safety of America.""*'

If the people remained unmoved by the praise and affirmation that governing

officials and the Army had offered to the FCDA, if patriotism did not weU up within them

"*""Roundup of National CD Week", RG 396.

"*'Ibid.

267

and push them to sign up for civUian defense, perhaps God would work a change in their

hearts. CivU defense had the approval and endorsement ofthe largest organized reUgious

faiths in America. With such visible displays of support as the beU-ringing campaign-

Operation Ding-Dong-and sermons on civUian preparedness, the country's spiritual

leaders threw the protective mantle of reUgion around civU defense. To ignore the FCDA

and National CivU Defense Week was to ignore the wiU of God."*

Each day ofthe week brought new attempts to focus the pubUc's attention on

civU defense. There were drills, parades, and speeches. The U.S. Weather Bureau tracked

and reported feUout patterns after a simulated attack. There were civU defense movies and

documentaries. NBC showed "Survival Stteet," a Uve docudrama broadcast from the

FCDA's National Rescue School in Olney, Maryland. There was must-have, civU defense

paraphernalia. The FCDA introduced a blue dress-suit uniform for its women volunteers,

and the Bendbc company plugged its new pen-Ught-shaped radiation detector, the pocket

dosimeter."*'

According to the FCDA, the saturation campaign paid dividends. The agency's

pubUshed "Roundup" ofthe event declared National CivU Defense Week "highly

successful," but the FCDA feUed to back its statement with substantive proof Despite

mentioning more than a dozen cities that organized for, and participated in. National CivU

Defense Week, the "Roundup" newsletter itself noted that a number of municipaUties

either had ignored the observance completely or had reported unsatisfactory levels of

"*2"Roundup of National CD Week," RG 396.

"*'Ibid.

268

pubUc and official participation. In addition, the "Roundup" did not Ust any concrete gains

for civU defense. The members ofthe FCDA's PubUc Affeirs Office wrote of parades and

evacuation drills, yet not once did they reveal how many, or how few, Americans signed

up for preparedness training during National CivU Defense Week."*"

Perhaps the agency's pubUc relations personnel were sUent, because the news

was discouraging. Even though the FCDA stepped up its pubUcity programs in 1956, the

office did not see a marked mcrease in the number of civUian defense volunteers. During

Millard CaldweU's two-year term as administrator, the Federal CivU Defense

Administtation attracted some four milUon volunteers. Val Peterson served as agency

head for more than three years, but, with regard to pubUc recmitment, his record of

accompUshment feU short ofthe standards estabUshed by CaldweU. When Peterson

resigned from the FCDA in July of 1957, cumulative volunteer totals had faUen below 3.5

mUUon. EnroUment had slowed so much, the number of recmits was exceeded by the

number of people who were dropping out of civUian defense."*'

A variety of factors contributed to the decUne of civUian defense, but there is no

escaping the conclusion that Val Peterson and the poUcies he initiated were in large part

responsible. Once in office Peterson took an FCDA that had been shelter centered and

focused it instead on mass evacuation. This shift in poUcy represented a one hundred

eighty degree tum for the agency. Its early leaders had been adamantly opposed to what

they caUed the "take to the hUls" mentaUty. Such a radical shift in Ufe-saving strategies

"*""Roundup of National CD Week," RG 396.

"*'Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1958 Statistical Report, 15.

269

was bound to confuse the pubUc. It did. Uncertainty and distrust grew when the feUout

issue emerged. The Atomic Energy Commission, the Armed Services, and the Federal

CivU Defense Administtation misled the people, and the covemp generated speculation

and exaggerated rumors about the potential hazards from radioactive debris. When Chet

HoUfield and others began to investigate civU defense and demand faUout shelters, the

FCDA again seemed to reconsider its battle plans. During Peterson's last eighteen

months, the agency kept mass evacuation plans, yet assigned shelters a larger role in

civilian protection. Future administrators aU but abandoned mass evacuation, returning

the FCDA to the shelter orientation ofthe CaldweU years. As civU defense poUcy evolved

during the Fifties, preparedness officers altematingly told Americans to "duck and cover,"

"nm Uke heU," "nm Uke heU to a shelter far away," and, finaUy, again suggested that

people simply "duck and cover." To many the FCDA must have looked clueless, and the

HoUfield hearings and report only served to reinforce negative opinion."**

Peterson was aware ofthe problem, though he did Uttle to solve it. In his

personal papers he kept a cUpping from a Pittsburgh newspaper. Dated march 31, 1955,

and entitled "YeUing 'Wolf Too Often," the editorial attacked the FCDA and its

administrator first for constantly harping on the possibUity of a nuclear holocaust, and

second for faUing to present a consistent, sound strategy for survival. The author wrote.

"**Mary M. Simpson, "A Long Hard Look at CivU Defense," Bulletin ofthe Atomic Scientists 12, no. 9 (1956): 346; National Security Resources Board, United States Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1950), 37; Memorandum No. 6, Binder, Advisory BuUetins, 1-49, Box No. 1, OCDM PubUcations, 1950-60, RG 396; Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1954 Annual Report (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1955), 31: Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, Annual Report ofthe Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization for Fiscal Year 1960 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1961), 13-15.

270

"These excited [civU defense] officials never have been able to clear up for most of us the

perplexing question of what to do when we get the eight-minute waming. First, we were

told to hide. Then...we were advised to run. Then the poUcy Une shifted to hide again and

then to run." The editor's letter exaggerated the fects and was somewhat inaccurate in its

description of agency changes in strategy, but in tone and content the message it

transmitted encapsulated the attitudes of many Americans toward civU defense in the mid-

Fifties."*'

Without doubt Val Peterson contributed to the decUne ofthe FCDA and civU

defense, but the man who appointed him to office. President Dwight D. Eisenhower,

deserves a portion ofthe blame. Others have written of Eisenhower's indifference and

skepticism toward civU defense and have speculated that the few concessions he made to

the FCDA were intended to satisfy preparedness advocates and to prevent panic. Guy

Oakes's The Imaginary War is the best received ofthe conspiracy theory works. Oakes

depicts Eisenhower as a world leader who never beUeved in, or even seriously considered,

the value of civU defense. He contends that the president's participation in civilian defense

exercises was nothing more than posturing for the pubUc. If the people thought, as Oakes

states Eisenhower did, that no country and its population could withstand and quickly

recover from a nuclear assault, it would undermine pubUc morale. The people would be

paralyzed with fear. They would panic, and the instabUity generated would cause the

United States to faU behind in the Cold War and might even encourage Soviet aggression.

"*'"YeUing 'Wolf Too Often," Folder "Ho," Box 1, Conespondence of Val Peterson, 1953-1957, RG 396, NARACP.

271

An elaborate scheme of government Ues and posttiring was preferable to internal turmoU

that could lead to a Soviet Cold War victory and, possibly, to foreign domination.

Oakes's work is weU-crafted, and his argument is fascinating and especiaUy appeaUng to

those Americans who see federal "men in black" behind every event-from the Kennedy

assassination to UFO sightings-but a broader and deeper examination of Eisenhower and

civUian preparedness reveals that a variety of factors influenced the president's civU

defense poUcy."**

Expense seems to have been the foremost consideration for Eisenhower. When

he ascended to the presidency "Ike" promised the American electorate a "dynamic

conservatism" that was Uberal toward people, but tight with the purse strings. He kept his

promise. His administration did not dismantle the New Deal programs already in place,

but it did find ways to cut federal costs, and one way was to give the Army a new look.

Recognizing the detenent value of a large nuclear stockpUe, Eisenhower got more "bang

for the buck" by downsizing the Armed Services and scaling back on aUocations for

contemporary weapons, whUe simultaneously flinneling more money into nuclear

armaments. During his two terms as president, Eisenhower requested more than 5 bilUon

doUars for nuclear weapons. Although he refened to civU defense as another means of

discouraging aggression, Eisenhower no doubt saw that hydrogen bombs, with their

offensive capabUities, constituted a greater force for detenence and therefore were a

better investment than civUian preparedness, which was purely defensive. In eight years

President Dwight David Eisenhower petitioned Congress for a total of 832 mUUon doUars

"**Oakes, Imaginary War, 3-9, 152-63.

272

for civU defense, sUghtly more than half the amount, 1.5 bUUon doUars, that President

Harry S. Truman had requested from 1951 to 1953."*'

In addition, Eisenhower appointed Val Peterson to the FCDA, and Peterson was

known for his anti-shelter stance. Projected costs for a system of pubUc shelters ran to

tens of bUUons of doUars, and the shelters themselves would serve only one purpose.

Mass evacuation was less expensive, and the suggested highway and road constmction

necessary for creating viable avenues of escape would benefit the United States even if

war never came. WhUe no evidence has surfeced that indicates Eisenhower selected

Peterson because ofthe Nebraska govemor's opinions on shelters and evacuations, the

lower cost and multiple-use nature of a mass evacuation poUcy would have appealed to

the president's fiscal conservatism."'"

Placed within the context of his poUtical theory, Eisenhower's Umited budget

requests for civU defense are logical and easUy understood. Nonetheless, to the general

pubUc and to Congress Eisenhower's parsimony represented more than dynamic

conservatism at work; it was an indictment of civilian preparedness. If civU defense reaUy

would save Uves and prevent war, surely the president would demand more fimding for the

"*'Stephen Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 (New York: Penguin Books, 1985), 137-38. Budget ofthe United States Government for Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1951 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1950), M 34 [hereafter cited as BUSG]; BUSG, 1952, M 14; BUSG, 1953, M 18; BUSG, 1954, M 18; BUSG, 1955, M 37; BUSG, 1956, M 22; BUSG, 1957, M 20; BUSG, 1958, M 20; BUSG, 1959, M 37-38; BUSG, 1960, M 22; and BUSG, 1961, M 20.

"'"Congressional Quarterly Service, CONGRESS and the NATION, 263; and Thomas J. Ken, C/v/7 Defense in the US: Band-Aid for a Holocaust (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), 44, 60-61.

273

FCDA. The people foUowed the lead ofthe commander in chie^ a veteran of war. They

placed their feith in the United States' nuclear arsenal rather than in civU defense. With his

domestic poUcy, of which civU defense was a part, Eisenhower raised doubts about the

need for civUian preparedness. He did the same with his foreign poUcy.

Under Truman, the United States was always close to, or actuaUy engaged in, a

firefight. President Truman mtervened in Turkey and Greece when communist rebels

threatened to take over after World War II. He refused to back down when StaUn closed

off the roads to BerUn. He sent American soldiers to defend South Koreans and to strike

back at the North. Truman projected a warhawk attitude throughout his years as

president. He did not singly rattle the saber of American wealth and might; he drew it,

and he used it. During Truman's last two fliU years as president, 1951 and 1952, the

FCDA enroUed approximately four mUUon recmits. There is Uttle doubt that Truman's

aggression and the very real threat of another world war prompted some Americans to

volunteer for civU defense training.""

In the spring of 1953, when Dwight D. Eisenhower was sworn in as president, he

took the United States down a different foreign poUcy path. Eisenhower attempted to

reduce the tensions between the United States, the Soviet Union, and other communist

nations. During his first year in office, he negotiated a cease fire with North Korea. In

1954 Eisenhower defosed the Chinese Crisis. The United States entered a mutual defense

pact with Chiang Kai-Shek, the leader ofthe nationaUst Chinese in Taiwan, but only after

Chiang agreed to halt guerUla raids against the mainland, Mao Tse Tung's "Red China."

""Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, 83-131; and Oakley, God's Country, 214-216.

274

In his deaUngs with the Soviet Union Eisenhower was aided by the death of Joseph StaUn

and the rise to power ofthe more moderate and, Uke Eisenhower, less mUitarUy aggressive

NUcita Khrushchev. The cold War continued to rage, but the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R

fought each other in the factories and the laboratory, in economics and science, rather than

in the field."'^

The two superpowers did vie for advantage in "neutral" countries. Eisenhower

encouraged Secretary of State John Foster DuUes to further "contain" communism by

negotiating mutual protection treaties with states not yet behind the Soviet curtain, but the

president did not try to wrestle estabUshed sateUites away from Russia. In 1956 when

Hungary attempted to break away from Soviet domination, the United States refosed to

aid the rebels. America stood icUy by whUe Russian tanks roUed into Budapest and put

down the insunection. Eisenhower's diplomacy diminished the possibiUty of a third world

war and, with it, the perceived need for civilian defense.""

President Dwight D. Eisenhower even tried to reduce the nuclear threat. In his

first year as president Ike proposed an "Atoms for Peace" program Presented to the

United Nations, the project caUed for the creation of an intemational agency to Umit and

guide the use of atomic energy. Although Eisenhower's speech drew a standing ovation

from the members ofthe U.N., the Soviets refosed the plan. StUl, the president's project

was newsworthy, and it received much press. In 1953 Americans beUeved their president

wished to avoid a nuclear war at aU costs, even to the point of sunendering some ofthe

""Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, 148-49, 169-75.

""Ibid., 162-63..

275

countty's autonomy over the development of atomic weapons and power. Who needed

civU defense?"'"

Eisenhower further undermined civUian preparedness by appearing confused,

uncertain, and at times antagonistic when confronted with civU defense matters. Although

Guy Oakes argues that the president always beUeved civU defense fotUe and only put on a

show for preparedness enthusiasts and to prevent panic, a close examination of

Eisenhower's behavior indicates that Ike, Uke so many other Americans, was not sure

what he should beUeve. EspeciaUy during his last few years in the Oval Office,

Eisenhower made some damning statements about nuclear war in general and civU defense

in particular. Yet, m a number of his Cabinet meetings, Eisenhower expressed a keen

interest in shelters and other civU defense strategies, and appeared hopefol that

preparedness initiatives might indeed save Uves if a nuclear holocaust occurred. The

scientific community itself was divided on the immediate and lasting effects of a nuclear

exchange and the efficacy of civUian defense poUcies. It is reasonable to conclude that

Eisenhower also had to wrestle with uncertainty.""

"'"Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. HoU, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley: University of CaUfomia Press, 1989), 113-43..

""Oakes, Imaginary War, 3-9, 152-163; Notes on Cabinet Meeting, 1 May 1953, Folder C-4 (2), Box 1, and Notes on Cabinet Meeting, 18 October 1957, Folder C-39 (3), Box 4, Cabinet Series, Office ofthe Staff Secretary, Reports 1952-61, White House Office, DDEL; and Supplementary Legislative Meeting-CivU Defense Shelters, 14 November 1958, Legislative Meeting-CivU Defense, 28 July 1959, and Cabinet Meeting-Funding of Delegate Agencies' CivU Defense and Defense MobUization Functions, 31 JuK 1959, Cabinet and Legislative Meeting Index-CH-DED, Box 19, Arthur Minnich Series, White House Office, Office ofthe Staff Secretary: Records, 1952-61, DDEL.

276

President Eisenhower did in feet consider the implementation of a national system

of pubUc feUout shelters. The press given to the HoUfield inquiries left him Uttle choice.

The 1956 HoUfield hearings desttoyed the credibUity of Val Peterson, the FCDA, and

mass evacuation poUcy. As a direct result ofthe proceedings, Peterson agreed to stay on

with the Federal CivU Defense Administration only untU July of 1957. It was natural for

Congress and the pubUc to conclude that civU defense strategy would soon shift back to

the shelter-orientation ofthe CaldweU years."'*

Peterson himself began the process of modifying FCDA poUcy. Although he

refused to abandon mass evacuation conq)letely, he more fliUy incorporated faUout

shelters into the agency's survival strategies, and he told the president that a national

shelter system could be constmcted for a cost of twenty to forty bUUon doUars. HoUfield

and others urged Eisenhower to adopt such a plan, but the president baUced; the expense

was too great.

Hoping to find a more economical solution to the country's civU defense

dUemma, President Eisenhower created the Security Resources Panel. Composed of

private citizens and more commonly known as the Gaither Committee, after Rand

Corporation and Ford Foundation chakman H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., the Security

Resources Panel set out to answer the question posed to them by Eisenhower, "If you

"'*AUan M. Winkler, Life under a Cloud: American Anxiety About the Atom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 118-19; and Val Peterson to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 31 May 1947, White House Conespondence, Box 2, Conespondence of Administtator Val Peterson, 1953-1957, RG 396, NARACP.

""Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 119.

277

make the assumption that there is going to be a nuclear war, what should I do?*"'* The

Gaither panel did not submit its report. Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age, to

the president untU the end of 1957. The committee had expanded its mandate and its staff;

and eventuaUy consulted close to one hundred individuals with expertise not only in civU

defense, but in offensive devices—bombers and rocketry-as weU.""

The report was neither what President Dwight D. Eisenhower expected nor what

he desired, especiaUy with regard to civU defense. The Gaither Committee recommended

that the government embark immediately on a pubUc shelter-buUding program, projected

cost, fifty bUUon doUars. The Gaither Committee members considered this precaution

necessary. Americans were growing more concemed about feUout daUy, and the Soviets

had made great strides in their nuclear capabiUties.'""

The report was released in the aftermath ofthe Sputnik debacle. On October 4,

1957, a Soviet rocket canied the first man-made sateUite into space. Sputnik, a sphere

twenty-two inches in diameter orbited the Earth. Americans panicked. Not only had the

U.S.S.R. won the first round in the space race, it had demonstrated visibly the power and

advancement of its rocketry program. The Soviets had earUer claimed they possessed a

working intercontinental baUistic missUe (ICBM). The Sputnik feat lent credence to their

assertions and increased American fears of nuclear attack. A missUe fired from a platform

"'*Quoted in Gregg Herken, Counsels of War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 112-13.

""Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 119; and Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1993), 35-39.

'""Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 119.

278

in Siberia could reach the United States in thirty minutes. If the Soviets managed to

develop a submarine deUvery system, the waming time would be further reduced, because

rockets could be fired just off the eastem or westem seaboards. Americans along the

coasts, and many of those further to the interior would not have time to effect a mass

evacuation; they would have no choice but to duck, cover, and hope for the best. The

need for shelters had never seemed so urgent.'"'

Nonetheless, a national system of pubUc shelters was not forthcoming. President

Eisenhower had commissioned the Gaither study after Peterson had proposed a quite

expensive shelter program. When the members ofthe Gaither committee attached an even

higher price tag to the shelter project, they ensured it would be refosed. It was. The

budget-conscious Eisenhower was not about to aUocate fifty bUUon doUars to a project of

questionable detenent value and Ufe-saving potential, when he spent only five bUUon on

nuclear weaponry—which he considered much more essential. In addition, though the

Democrats were pubUcizing the supposed "missUe gap" in order to increase their party's

chances for a presidential victory in 1960, Eisenhower knew that no such gap actually

existed. Tme, Soviet rockets were more powerfel than those developed by the United

States, but photos from U-2 spy planes showed the president that the Russians had not

erected missUe platforms aU over Siberia. Unfortunately, though Ike reassured Americans

that there was no missUe gap, he could not reveal the source of his information. The

'"'Divine, Sputnik Challenge, xUi-xvUi, 7-8; and Margot A. Henriksen, Z)r. Strangelove's America: Society and Culture in the Atomic Age (Berkeley: University of CaUfomia Press, 1997), 105-6.

279

United States was supposed to be the "good guy" in the Cold War conflict. It would not

stoop so low as to spy on its enemies.'"^

It was with little or no hesitation that Eisenhower refused the Gaither

Committee's proposals. Secretary of State John Foster DuUes led the attack against a

national shelter system, arguing that it would be resented by the United States' aUies and

misunderstood by its enemies. America's financiaUy-dependent sateUites in Europe were

on the front Unes of defense, a stone's throw from the nuclear capabiUties ofthe Soviet

Bloc. They would be angry over such lavish expenditure to protect the people ofthe

United States, who already had two oceans separating them from the U.S.S.R., unless the

Americans were also willing to pay for shelter constmction in westem Europe. For their

part, the Soviets would teU the world that the frenzied digging and pouring of concrete in

either Europe or America was evidence that the United States was no longer looking for

diplomatic solutions to the Cold War. It was preparing to hide its people underground,

launch its missUes, and emerge from a nuclear exchange victorious and with most of its

population intact.'"'

Eisenhower seconded DuUes' assertions. The president had heard these and

other persuasive arguments before from Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs (NSA). In the spring of 1957 Cutler had completed a fairly

"^D'Yvine, Sputnik Challenge, 116-17, 172-83.

'"'James R. KUUan, Jr., Sputnik, Scientists and Eisenhower: A Memoir ofthe First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977), 96-101; and Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), 221-23.

280

in-depth investigation of shelters. After consulting AEC and InteUigence records. Cutler

submitted his conclusions to the president. The NSA special assistant recommended that

the Eisenhower Administtation not undertake a shelter program that would cost tens of

bUUons of doUars. Cutler Usted five reasons for refiising the suggestions that the Gaither

Committee later made. He argued that the two most in )ortant considerations were: first,

the scientific community's division on the efficacy of shelters; more studies needed to be

conducted to determine if they actuaUy would save Uves; and second, the expense would

place an incredible strain on the government and the economy. According to Special

Assistant Cutler, DuUes' foreign poUcy concerns were tertiary. Cutler's voice was not

heard only once by Eisenhower and then forgotten. He continued to brief the president on

shelters throughout 1957, even in the weeks after the Sputnik launch.'""

Although Eisenhower ignored the Security Resource Panel's impassioned pleas

for a federaUy-sponsored national system of feUout shelters. Congress and the people

barely flinched. They reacted to the ICBM threat in much the same way as they had

earUer reacted to the news that the Soviets had developed an atomic bomb. There was an

initial period of panic, but as the days cUcked by and no Soviet strike occuned, concem

diminished. Besides, Lyndon Johnson and most ofthe other Democrats that exploited the

Sputnik debacle did not ask for shelters so Americans could hide from superior Soviet

weapons. They demanded, instead, that the federal government close the gap between

U.S.S.R. and U.S. rocket technology. After the initial shock ofthe Soviet's feat had worn

'"""CivU Defense" (1) and (2), Box 4, Briefing Notes Subseries, NSC Series, Office of Special Assistant for NSA Recommendations, 1952-61, White House Office, DDEL.

281

505

off; the pubUc only cast an occasional glance at civU defense. The people's attention was

riveted on the space race, the creation of NASA, the progress ofthe United States'

Explorer sateUite program. The vast majority of Americans Ufted their eyes and looked

toward the heavens, toward outer space, toward the foture; few looked down at the

ground and seriously pondered a step backward, a retum to the cave.

There were exceptions. In an AprU 1958 issue of Bulletin ofthe Atomic

Scientists, Senator Chet HoUfield, perennial chan^)ion ofthe stUl-disgruntled, die-hard

shelter advocates, blasted President Eisenhower for rejecting the Gaither Committee's

suggestions. HoUfield admonished the president to carry out his ConstittitionaUy-assigned

duties, especiaUy the one that charged him with the "responsibUity of protecting our nation

against a foreign foe." The Senator from CaUfomia continued to push for a national

system of shelters.'"*

A month after HoUfield's tirade, the Eisenhower Administration announced its

endorsement of a national shelter poUcy, to be overseen by the FCDA and Administrator

Leo Hoegh. Despite the timing of its unveUing, the National Shelter PoUcy does not seem

to have been a concUiatory gesture directed at HoUfield. Rather, the plan represented

merely the first in a series of steps that Eisenhower and the FCDA took so they could

deflect criticism The National Shelter PoUcy actuaUy accompUshed very Uttle in the

erection of an American shelter network, but it projected an image of governmental

'"'Divine, Sputnik Challenge.

'"*Ralph Lapp, "CivU Defense Shelters: An Interview with Congressman Chet HoUfield," Bulletin ofthe Atomic Scientists 14, no. 4 (1958): 134.

282

concem and action, and it afforded both Eisenhower and Hoegh the opportunity to claim

tmthfoUy, that they were reacting to the demand for feUout shelters.'"'

In essence, Eisenhower's National Shelter PoUcy was an every-person-for-

themselves type of program. Ike took the burden of shelter constmction and dumped it

into each American's backyard. According to the program's guideUnes, the Federal CivU

Defense Admmistration would continue its canq)aigns to acquaint the pubUc with the

dangers posed by feUout and the measures a person could take to reduce their risk of

injury. FCDA en^loyees also undertook the identification of available shelter in existing

buUdings. Lastly, the federal government funded research on femUy shelter designs and

buUt prototype feUout stmctures. If the people wanted immediate access to a reUable

faUout shelter, if they were unwUUng to wait for the FCDA to designate shelters in their

community, or if they distrusted the wholesale labeUng of every church basement and

court house break room as a "safe" haven from radioactive faUout, they would have to put

in their own shelter. In fact, as part ofthe National Shelter Plan, FCDA leaders

encouraged the head of every household in America to buUd or purchase a shelter for their

home. Eisenhower reminded the people that responsibUity for civU defense ultimately

rested upon the individual, not the government.'"* Leo Hoegh stated bluntly that the new

'"'Office of Defense and CivUian MobUization, National Plan, Annex 10; and Idem, Annual Report for 1961, 12-15.

'"*Infonnation BuUetin No. 68, Infomiation BuUetins, 1958-1961, VirgU L. Couch Papers, 1951-80. DDEL.

283

"poUcy was based on the oldest American tradition-that every man wUl protect his

femUy.'""'

During the summer, the Eisenhower Administration took a second step to defiise

tensions over the FCDA's handUng of civU defense matters. The president made the

Federal CivU Defense Administration disappear. On July 1, 1958, Congress approved

Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan I, which gave the president more authority over civU

defense and merged the FCDA and the Office of Defense MobUization (ODM) into one

unit, the Office of Defense and CivU MobUization, later renamed the Office of CivU and

Defense MobUization (OCDM).""

Leo Hoegh had suggested the office consoUdation months earUer. Hoegh, a

fiscal conservative who prided himself on his record of cutting back civU defense costs and

personnel even fiirther than Eisenhower demanded, had noticed that both the Federal CivU

Defense Administration and the Office of Defense MobUization were charged with

responding to disasters in the United States. Some dupUcation of effort therefore

occuned. For instance, both ODM and the FCDA stockpUed emergency suppUes. Also,

both agencies estabUshed plans for maintaining government continuity during an

emergency. Seeing an opportunity to reduce federal expenses and confusion, Hoegh

caUed for the unification ofthe two agencies. Reorganization Plan I, which led to the

creation ofthe OCDM, was primarily an economic action. It saved money, but the

'"'Information BuUetin No. 68, Couch Papers..

""Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953-60/61, vol. 6 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1960), 61.

284

reorganization also conveyed the message that the discredited and defimct FCDA had

been laid to rest.'"

ActtiaUy, the FCDA sinq)ly adopted a new name. WhUe some ODM en^loyees

lost their jobs, the vast majority ofthe FCDA hierarchy, including Leo Hoegh, whom

Eisenhower named director ofthe new office, were absorbed into the OCDM. The federal

body responsible for civU defense was now caUed the Office of CivU and Defense

Mobilization, but it looked, sounded, and acted Uke the FCDA of yesterday."^

In late July, three weeks after the founding ofthe OCDM, Dwight D. Eisenhower

took a third step toward sUencing civU defense's critics. He signed into law an act that

declared the federal, state, and local governments "joint partners" in civiUan preparedness.

The federal government was to shoulder more ofthe financial burden for providing

radiological equipment and was granted permission, but not required, to help pay the

states' civU defense personnel and administtative costs. To the average civU defense

advocate, the law sounded favorable, but federal budget requests and aUotted

appropriations for civU defense did not rise dramaticaUy the next year, or in any ofthe

years remaining to the Eisenhower presidency. In the OCDM, money-conscious Hoegh,

'"Notes on Legislative Meeting, 22 April 1958, Folder L-47 (2), Box 5, Legislative Meetings Series, Office of Staff Secretary, Records 1952-1961, White House Office, DDEL; and Notes on Cabinet Meetings, 18 and 25 April 1958, Folder C-44 (2), Box 5, Cabinet Series, Office of Staff Secretary, Reports 1952-1961, White House Office, DDEL.

"^Infomiation BuUetin No. 4, Infomiation BuUetins, 1958-1959, Box 3, OCDM PubUcations, 1950-1960, RG 396, NARACP.

285

who had fevored the bUl's passage, sttipped other FCDA projects to pay for the increased

StockpUe costs.'"

Guy Oakes's assertion that civU defense was one great charade during the

Eisenhower Administtation is more convincing when one examines Ike's actions during

his last few years in office. In cabinet meetings the president stUl displayed mbced

emotions toward civU defense. As late as the summer of 1959 he told the members of his

Cabinet that civU defense was as vital to national security as armor on a tank.

Nonetheless, an examination ofthe official poUcies that he approved for the OCDM

indicate that he had decided against a costly civUian preparedness program. The poUcies

enacted from 1958 to 1960 seem designed to placate the few remaining civU defense

enthusiasts and to prevent the fearfol from panicking or sinking into despair. Eisenhower

often characterized the national wiU as much more essential to the health, and even the

survival, ofthe country.""

Yet another factor must be considered when looking at the way Eisenhower, the

members of Congress, and the pubUc responded to civU defense from the spring of 1958

through the winter of 1960. On the surfece, the UkeUhood of nuclear war seemed to

decrease. Americans were hiUed into a felse sense of security in the spring of'58 when

the Soviets finished a series of thermonuclear exercises and then shocked the world by

declaring they would stop testing thermonuclear weapons. The United States was caught

'"SR 552 and SR 594, "Operation Alert 1957," SR 520-664, Box 3, OCDM PubUcations, 1950-60, RG 396, NARACP.

""Cabinet Meeting, 1 May 1953, DDEL; and Cabinet Meeting-Funding of Delegate Agencies' Functions, 31 July 1959, DDEL.

286

off guard by the announcement, which occuned just before a slate of U.S. tests were

scheduled to begin. Recognizing that the U.S.S.R. had already scored a pubUc relations

victory, Eisenhower saw the American exercises through to their conclusion before

announcing in the feU that the United States would also suspend further nuclear weapons

tests. The U.S.-Soviet moratorium on testing lasted untU the U.S.S.R. resumed their

atmospheric detonations in 1961. For three years nuclear testing ranges were sUent. It is

no wonder that congressional and pubUc support feU off in the late Fifties.'"

Despite executive, legislative, and pubUc apathy, OCDM Director Leo Hoegh at

least "went through the motions" for civU defense. Hoegh continued the promotional and

recmitment campaigns fevored by his predecessor, Val Peterson. LUce the FCDA before

it, the OCDM flooded the pubUc with leaflets and pamphlets, radio and television

announcements, movie shorts and traveUng displays. In addition, appeals to the people's

sense of patriotism, reUgion, and moraUty continued."*

The events sunounding CivU Defense Day, 1958, were representative ofthe

Hoegh Administtation's tactics of persuasion throughout the late 1950s. OCDM

personnel tried to buUd pubUc support by stirring the people into an emotional frenzy.

President Eisenhower declared December 7 National CivU Defense Day. The date itself

was intended to stir Americans' passions, for exactly seventeen years earUer, the Japanese

had dealt a devastating blow to the U.S. Navy at Pearl Harbor. Besides appeaUng to the

'"Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 107.

"*Federal CivU Defense Administration, 1958 Statistical Report, 45-75; and Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, 1960 Annual Report, 9-12;

287

people's patriotism, the OCDM used the image ofthe defeat at Pearl Harbor to remind the

pubUc ofthe need for vigUance. CivU defense pubUcists said the 1941 surprise attack had

been "unprovoked," and moraUy wrong, but they reminded the American people that

another moraUy bankmpt country now possessed the abUity to strike the United States.

The only way to deter attack was to ready the country's mUitary and civUian population

for war. One OCDM pubUcation stated, "...Pearl Harbor should be a stark reminder to

every American ofthe tremendous prize a Nation has to pay for unpreparedness." The

official slogan for CivU Defense Day, 1958, was 'Teace Through Preparedness.'""

The preparations for National CivU Defense Day also saw the continuation ofthe

Peterson tradition of focusing on Americans' reUgious values. OCDM staff writers

suggested Bible passages for mayors, ministers, and other city leaders to incorporate into

their speeches and sermons. First on the list of target scriptures was I Samuel, chapter

seventeen, verses forty-one to forty-seven, which told the story of David and GoUath-

Goliath representing a huUcing, but godless, Soviet Union, and David representing a

smaUer, less physicaUy powerful, but moraUy strong, and approved-by-God United States.

A second suggested passage seemed taUor-made for a civU defense agency that was trying

to convince Americans to get more involved."* The thirty-third chapter of Ezekiel, verses

two through four state, "When I bring a sword upon a land, if the people ofthe land take a

man of their coasts, and set him for their watchman: if when he seeth the sword come

'"Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, 1958 Radio and TV Kit for Dec. 7 National Civil Defense Day (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1958), n.p.

"*Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, 1958 Newspaper Kit for Dec. 7 National Civil Defense Day (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1958), n.p.

288

upon the land, he blow the tmn^t , and wam the people; then whosoever heareth the

sound ofthe tmn^t , and taketh not waming; if the sword come, and take him away, his

blood shaU be upon his own head."'" The OCDM was sounding the caU for civU defense.

The people had no right to complain if they refused to act on the agency's suggestions.

Notwithstanding its use of inflated rhetoric, Hoegh's Office of CivU and Defense

MobUization faUed to attract large numbers of volunteers during the last three years of

Eisenhower's presidency. By the end of 1960, the federal civU defense agency claimed to

have added 2.5 mUUon recmits to the 4 mUUon that enroUed whUe MUlard CaldweU was

administrator ofthe FCDA, but that sum probably was an exaggeration Even if it was

accurate, in CaldweU's two years as administrator he attracted more recmits than Val

Peterson and Leo Hoegh enUsted during their eight. With recmitment returns continuing

to plummet, Hoegh rescinded the quotas estabUshed by CaldweU. Suddenly the federal

civU defense office was no longer determined to enroU 15 mUUon or 17.5 mUUon

vohmteers. Hoegh declared those quotas "no longer consistent with OCDM poUcy," but

offered no fiirther elaboration.' "

The National Shelter PoUcy also was faltering. Many people ordered copies of

the blueprint designs pubUshed by the OCDH but only a handfol sunk shelters in their

backyards. In 1959 a federal planning board suggested that no more than a few thousand

private citizens had purchased or buUt faUout shehers. Such minimal results were

'"Ezekiel 23.2-4 KJV.

' "Advisory BuUetin No. 227, Binder Advisory BuUetins, 200-228, Box 2, OCDM

PubUcations, 1950-60, RG 396, NARACP.

289

unacceptable. A year later, the OCDM claimed that approximately one mUUon American

femUies possessed faUout shelters. The tremendous leap in the figures quoted suggested

wild exaggeration on the part ofthe federal agency. A spokesperson for civU defense

attempted to explain the ttemendous increase in shelters by stating that many Americans

were putting in shelters every day-they had simply been too embanassed to admit it.' '

LUce Val Peterson before him, Leo Hoegh was unable to attract pubUc support,

and the federal civU defense office continued to spiral downward. Too often federal

preparedness bodies had changed strategies, changed leaders, and changed names. Too

often federal leaders, from the president to the members of Congress to Peterson and

Hoegh, had shown such conservatism when demanding or aUocating money for civU

defense that it seemed they did not beUeve in the efficacy ofthe preparedness projects. In

addition, the moratorium on testing encouraged apathy, because it projected an Ulusion of

a world without H-bombs, a world that had left behind the age of nuclear peril.

There was yet another reason for the decUne of civU defense during the last years

ofthe Fifties. The anti-nuclear movement was growing, and with it, pubUc opposition to

civU defense measures. EarUer in the decade, FCDA personnel had argued that the federal

government must teU the pubUc the tmth about thermonuclear war. They contended that

withholding information would only lead many Americans to beUeve sensationalized

articles that claimed the government was evasive on atomic matters because the tmth was

'2'"OCDM Presentation on CivUian Readiness Base, CivU Defense and Defense MobUization [1957-1960], Box 4, Brief Notes Subseries, NSC Series, Records 1952-61. Office of Special Assistant for NSA, White House Office, DDEL; Winkler, Under a Cloud, 122; and Henriksen, Dr. Strangelove's America, 203.

290

too homble to contemplate. The pubUc would become convinced that a nuclear war

would end CivUization and, perhaps, aU Ufe on the planet Earth. The FCDA's prophecies

came tme. As the United States entered the late 1950s, an ever-increasing proportion of

the population began to caU for an end to nuclear proUferation. According to the "no

nuke" demonstrators, shelters would not save humankind from destmction. The only

certain way to ensure humanity's survival was to prevent a nuclear war from occurring.'^

Arguably, the best-organized and the most vocal anti-nuclear organization ofthe

latter Fifties was the national Committee for a Sane Nuclear PoUcy, more commonly

refened to simply as "SANE." During the summer of 1957, close to the time Val

Peterson was leaving the FCDA's top administrative office and Leo Hoegh was entering,

Saturday Review editor Norman Cousins and secretary emeritus ofthe American Friends

(Quaker) Service Committee Clarence Picket convened the meeting that led to the

formation of SANE. With the statement, "Something should be done to bring out the

latent sensitivity ofthe American people to the poisoning effect of nuclear bombs on

international relations and humanity," Picket introduced the topic of deUberation for the

conference and the mandate for the organization it birthed.' ' To fulfil its mission, SANE

pubUshed leaflets decrying the dangers of faUout, ran anti-nuclear ads in widely-circulated

newspapers, and produced film shorts for television. By the end of its first year of

existence, the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear PoUcy boasted weU over one

' ^Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 18-19, 71-77, 95-96, 160-205, 227-247.

'^'Quoted in Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 105.

291

hundred chapters across the country and had attracted some twenty-five thousand

members. Its pubUc messages had reached mUUons.' "

WhUe SANE's members massed for the attack, prominent authors, such as NevU

Shute, launched individual forays against nuclear armament. The year of SANE's

founding, 1957, NevU Shute pubUshed On the Beach. In Shute's Cold War classic, the

northem powers, presumably the Soviet Union and the United States, have engaged in a

nuclear war. Thermonuclear-cobalt bombs have thrown so much radiation into the air aU

animal Ufe on the Earth is doomed to extinction. When the book opens, the northem

hemisphere is already devoid of Uving creatures, and the people ofthe southem continents

are waiting quietly for wind cunents to carry the faUout, and death, to them. No one

survives. Some die from the radiatioa Most take government-distributed suicide tablets,

so they can end their Uves before experiencing the agonies of prolonged exposure to

radiation.'^'

Shute's book was a bestseUer, and the story reached a larger audience in 1959,

when On the Beach, the movie, was released. The CathoUc Church condemned both the

book and the movie as apologetics for suicide, a mortal sin. The members of

Eisenhower's Cabmet also considered censuring the movie. On more than one occasion.

' "Robert A. Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 167-68, 196, 203, 214, 236, 277; and Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 106.

' 'NevU Shute, On the Beach (New York: WUUam Monow, 1957).

292

On the Beach was discussed during Cabinet sessions.'^ Leo Hoegh, whom Eisenhower

included in the meetings, said, 'To me and OCDM it strikes almost a subversive blow,"

then voiced his concem that the movie could prove disasttous for civU defense.'" In

Shute's story, there is no escape from feUout. By promoting feeUngs of despair and

hopelessness. On the Beach might increase pubUc apathy toward civU defense. A number

of cabinet officers agreed with Hoegh, but eventuaUy they decided that it would be best

simply to ignore the movie. A pubUc condemnation ofthe show might produce a result

the Eisenhower Administration did not want; it might inspire more people to watch the

movie just so they could see what had the government so worried.' *

In one sense, the concerns expressed by Leo Hoegh and the members of

Eisenhower's Cabinet had merit. Although the anti-nuclear protestors were few in number

during the latter Fifties, they were laying the groundwork for the expanded movement of

the Sbcties. Yet, m another way Hoegh's worry seems sUly, because civU defense was

already dead when he began complaining about NevU Shute's agenda. OfficiaUy, Hoegh

did not recognize that fact. He was quite vocal in praise for himself and his OCDM staff,

because they pubUshed the first comprehensive guide to the coimtry's civU defense

program. Entitled The National Plan for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization, the

' *Notes on Cabinet Meetings, 6 November 1959, 27 November 1959, and 11 December 1959, Folder C-52 (4), Box 5, Cabinet Series, Office of Staff Secretary, Reports 1952-61, White House Office, DDEL.

'2'Notes on Cabinet Meeting, 11 December 1959, DDEL.

'2*Ibid.

293

tome ran to several hundred pages, detaUing federal, state, and local government

responsibUities during peace and every imaginable emergency-domestic or foreign.'^'

On paper Hoegh's accompUshments looked in^ressive: a codified national civU

defense plan, a national shelter poUcy, national civU defense drUls, but in reaUty the

country's civU defense was a paper sheU. Few Americans were volunteering for civU

defense training and responsibUities. Few Americans were buying or buUding faUout

shelters. The relaxation of U.S.-Soviet tensions, the instabUity within the federal civU

defense programs, the cries of anti-nuclear protesters, the cost of a national shelter

program, and the seemingly anti-civU defense actions of President Eisenhower had kiUed

an already-ailing civU defense. CivU defense was dead by 1960, but in the faU of that year

a new president, John F. Kennedy was elected, and Kennedy was committed to civiUan

preparedness. From the date of his inauguration, John F. Kennedy would try to breathe

fresh life into the nation's civU defense program.

' 'Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, National Plan; and OH #480, "Oral History Interview with Leo A. Hoegh on March 19, 1976," DDEL.

294

CHAPTER v m

SHELTERS FOR CAMELOT: KENNEDY

AND CIVIL DEFENSE

On May 25, 1961, President John F. Kennedy deUvered a "Special Message to

the Congress on Urgent National Needs." CivUian defense was one ofthe items he

discussed. Addressing the men and women of both the Senate and the House of

Representatives the president declared, "One major element ofthe national security

program which this nation has never squarely faced up to is civU defense. The problem

arises not from present trends but from national inaction in which most of us have

participated. In the past decade we have intermittently considered a variety of programs,

but we have never adopted a consistent poUcy. PubUc considerations have been largely

characterized by apathy, indifference and skepticism; whUe, at the same time, many ofthe

civU defense plans have been so far-reaching and unrealistic that they have not gained

essential support."""

No longer would the executive office accept a weak and ineffective civU defense

program. President Kennedy hoped to launch a new era in American civUian

preparedness. He told the members of Congress that he was planning to redistribute civU

defense responsibUities, resuscitate shelter initiatives, and demand much more money than

""John F. Kennedy, Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961-63, vol 1 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1962), 402.

295

had his predecessor, Dwight D. Eisenhower. Kennedy kept his promises. Actions soon

foUowed his words.'"

President John F, Kennedy attempted to make civU defense an accepted and

valued part of each American citizen's Ufe, but he did not succeed. Although he conectly

identified many ofthe enors that had prevented civU defense from winning pubUc support

in the past, he made the same mistakes during his presidency. Kennedy criticized the lack

of continuity in civU defense, yet he changed the Office of CivU and Defense

MobUization's mandate, its duties, and its name. He caUed past civUian defense programs

"fer-reaching and unrealistic," but he suggested a shelter plan that would require bUUons

of dollars and years of work to implement. In addition, many Americans considered the

program "unreaUstic," because they beUeved shelters would afford Uttle protection from

thermonuclear weapons, or they were ofthe opinion that a nuclear exchange would make

the Earth so inhospitable, survivors would envy the dead."^

"Jack" Kennedy's grandiose plans for civU defense had tarnished by 1963, but in

1961 they were bright, shiny, new, and-according to the recently inaugurated chief

executive-essential. WhUe Kennedy was president the possibUity of nuclear war did not

seem as remote as during the Eisenhower years. "Ike" had sought a reduction of tensions

between the United States and its communist rivals. He was largely successfol throughout

'"Kennedy, Public Papers, 1: 402-3.

'"Kennedy, Public Papers, 1: 402-3; and Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, Documents on Reorganization of Civil Defense: The President's Message of May 25, 1961 the Director's memorandum of July 7, 1961, the President's Executive Order of July 7, 1961, and the White House Press Release, the Director s Statement and the Secretary of Defense's Statement Thereon (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1961), 6-10.

296

most ofthe Fifties, but toward the end ofthe decade the loosely-knit febric of concUiation

began to unravel. In 1959 and 1960 the United States absorbed heavy blows from the

opposition. On New Year's Day, 1959, Fidel Castro's rebels took Havana and placed

their leader at the head ofthe Cuban government. When President Eisenhower withdrew

economic aid from Cuba, Castro tumed to the Union of Soviet SociaUst RepubUcs.

Americans shuddered at the reaUzation that the Soviet Union had broken through the

United States' carefliUy constmcted waU of containment and had reached across Westem

Europe and the Atlantic Ocean to estabUsh a sateUite ninety mUes off the Florida coast.'"

The people ofthe United States received another joh in May of 1960 when the

U.S.S.R. announced its mUitary had shot down a high altitude American aircraft that had

been photographing—spying on—Soviet defense instaUations. When Eisenhower denied

the charges, the Soviets produced wreckage from the downed U-2 and, more importantly,

the plane's pUot, Francis Gary Powers, who spUled out a confession before camera crews.

The U-2 debacle occuned on the eve of a scheduled East-West summit in Geneva.

Representatives from the United States and the Union of Soviet SociaUst RepubUcs were

to have discussed nuclear armament reductions and controls, but the summit never took

place. When Eisenhower refiised to apologize for spying and would not promise to halt

the U-2 flights over Russia, the Soviets refosed to attend the meeting.""

'"Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University

Press, 1981), 152-53..

""Ibid., 146-151.

297

As relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. deteriorated, pubUc demands for

a stronger America escalated. Foreign poUcy setbacks, technological embanassments, and

the Democrats' charge that Soviet rocket and nuclear weapons programs had sprinted

ahead of U.S. initiatives-that a "missUe gap" existed between the two countries, and it

fevored the Soviet Union-led to pubUc demands for increased defense spending.

Eisenhower worried that the people's sense of near panic and their cries for an expansion

of U.S. mUitary power would lead to an aU-consuming arms race and an aU-powerfol

mUitary-industrial combination that might "endanger our Uberties or democratic

processes." In his January 1961 fereweU address, Eisenhower urged Americans to resist

the puU ofthe mUitary-industrial complex, but his warnings went unheeded.'"

John F. Kennedy and the Democrats' constant pronouncements on the supposed

missUe gap helped them to defeat Richard Nbcon and the RepubUcans in the Election of

1960. When Kennedy entered the Oval Office in the spring of 1961 he canied with him a

pubUc mandate for an expanded miUtary. Shortly after his swearing in, the new chief

executive ofthe United States leamed the tmth about the missUe gap. American rocketry

and nuclear weapons development were ahead of, not lagging behind, Soviet technologies.

The missUe gap was in America's fevor. Nonetheless, Kennedy-who was a veteran of

World War II and, at least in the first two years of his presidency, a Cold War warrior-

yielded to his own personal incUnations and to pressure from the pubUc and the Pentagon.

He requested money for a massive mUitary buUdup. Discarding the stripped and nuclear-

'"Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Papers ofthe Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953-1961, vol. 8 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1961), 1035-1040.

298

weapon dependent "new look" that Eisenhower had given the U.S. mUitary, JFK

inttoduced his plans for a mUitary with "flexible response" capabUities. He caUed for a

strengthening ofthe conventional forces which had been pared down by the Eisenhower

Administration, and he requested an increase in funding for the nuclear weapons

programs. The flexible response sttategy broadened the United States' miUtary options.

The country could deUver a sttong blow either with tanks and men or with bombers and

rockets."*

Kennedy's push for stronger conventional forces and accelerated nuclear

weapons development may have partiaUy aUayed pubUc fears of anruhUation at the hands

ofthe Soviets, but the self-assurance which Americans had displayed during the early

years ofthe Cold War did not retum. In the spring of 1961 the United States continued to

suffer one humUiation after another in the foreign poUcy and the science and technology

arenas. AprU was a bad month for Americans. On the twelfth, Soviet cosmonaut Yuri

Alekseyevich Gagarin became the first man in space. His capsule hurled into orbit by a

modified ICBM, Gagarin circled the Earth in an hour and a half, reentered the atmosphere,

and safely parachuted back to Mother Russia. A week later, the Bay of Pigs fiasco

occuned. Fifteen hundred CL\-trained Cuban exUes landed at la Bahia de Cochinas (the

Bay of Pigs) in the hopes of inspiring a popular uprising against Castro's regime. The plan

"*Richard Walton, Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John

F Kennedy (New York: The VUcing Press, 1972), 60-74.

299

feUed miserably. There was no spontaneous revolt on the island. Castto's troops smashed

the mvading force in three days, capttiring 1,200 ofthe expatriate rebels.'"

During the first few months of Kennedy's presidency, the United States seemed

to sttimble, and the Soviets noticed. Seeing an America that appeared Ul-led and perhaps

weakening in its resolve to "win" the Cold War, and under pressure from mUitarists within

the U.S.S.R. that desu-ed a more aggressive stance against the U.S., Soviet Premier NUcita

Khrushchev attempted to buUy Kennedy. Two months after the feUure at the Bay of Pigs,

the two leaders met in Vienna. Khmshchev went on the offensive, broadsiding his young

opponent with a demand for American ttoop withdrawal from West BerUn, and with a

threat to close off Westem access to the divided city. Khmshchev's concerns over BerUn

were the same as those voiced by StaUn more than a decade earUer. Too many wealthy

and influential East Germans and individuals from other Soviet-controUed European states

were defecting to the West through this hole in the "Iron Curtain.""*

President Kennedy refosed to bow to Khmshchev's demands. His decision to

resist was both ideological and pragmatic. First, Kennedy was determined to fight and to

win the Cold War. Second, to back down, to accept another foreign poUcy defeat, would

have seriously jeopardized his poUtical career. It was a nanow victory that he had won in

'"Walter A. McDougaU, ...the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History ofthe Space Age (New York: Basic Books, Inc., PubUshers, 1985), 243-46; Walton, Cold War and Counterrevolution, 34-59; and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1965), 233-297.

"*Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 379-405; and Thomas G. Paterson, ed., Kennedy s Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy 1961-63 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 37-47.

300

the election of 1960. His supposed UberaUsm and his Roman CathoUc heritage had been

UabUities, particularly in the usuaUy soUd-Democratic South. To give himself a chance for

reelection in 1964, Kennedy had to waUc a poUtical tightrope. He had to ingress the

people, yet if he leaned too fer to the left or to the right, or if he sustained too many hits in

his foreign or domestic poUcy, he would feU from his position of power. Tensions

between the United States and the Union of Soviet SociaUst RepubUcs increased, but

President Kennedy remained firm in his resolve to keep West BerUn open and free from

Soviet domination.'"

To many Americans, war—nuclear war-appeared a distinct possibUity in the

summer of 1961. It did not come as a surprise to aU. Some had anticipated a return to

mUitancy and to a "hotter" Cold War even before Kennedy took office. In July 1960,

when a Chicago Tribune reporter asked Pete Davis if he would rather have a bomb shelter

or a swimming pool, the eighteen-year-old student responded, "There's a probabiUty that

the Democrats are going to get in in November....I think we are going to need bomb

shelters. Their record always has been war." Twelve months later, Davis's comments

must have seemed the words of an inspired prophet.'""

Pete Davis wanted a shelter to protect him from a nuclear attack. Others hedged

their bets, coupUng their faith in shelters with prayers to a higher power. When the BerUn

Crisis sprang up in the summer months of 1961, the Women's Advisory CouncU for

'"Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 379-405.

'""Information BuUetin No. 230, Information BuUetins, 1958-1961 (2), Box 27, VirgU L. Couch Papers, 1951-80, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

301

Defense and Disaster ReUef Executive Committee held a meeting in San Antonio, Texas.

Bess Beeman, one ofthe committee members present, offered a resolution that

recommended "a re-wording in aU panq)hlets being distributed...locaUy, State-wide, or

NationaUy, so that, HEADING THE LIST OF ESSENHAL SUPPLIES to be taken into

shelter...the foUowing be printed: 'Each person wUl bring his or her Bible of whatever

reUgion it may represent, and keep the Bible ever near...."""' The Women's Advisory

CouncU unanimously adopted Ms. Beeman's resolution on June 30.'"^ Without question,

the members ofthe councU were shaken by the events in BerUn, and Khrushchev did Uttle

to aUay their fears. As the crisis deepened, the Soviet premier told American diplomats

that the U.S.S.R. possessed a 100-megaton hydrogen bomb which it would use if war

empted. One cannot help wondering if Khrushchev's threat sent Ms. Beeman scurrying to

her shelter, Bible m hand.

For his part, Kennedy remained above ground, but he did initiate a retrenchment

in civU defense poUcy. In his May 25, 1961 speech before Congress, President Kennedy

had revealed his plans for a redistribution of civU defense responsibiUties. On July 20 the

president issued the executive order which effected the reorganization. Executive Order

No. 10952 ttansfened most civU defense duties from the Office of CivU and Defense

MobUization to the regular executive departments. The Department of Agriculture's

'"'"A RESOLUTION by Bess Beeman," www.pubUc shelter.coni/maiii/cdrom.htnil. A number of interesting civU defense documents are avaUable on this web site. The site is maintained by Jayne Loader et al., who produced the award-winning Atomic Cafe documentary.

'" Ibid.

302

assignment was to gather food for a national reserve. The Department of Health,

Education, and Welfere was to stockpUe medical suppUes.'"'

It was the Department of Defense (DOD), however, that became the biggest

player in civUian defense. In a move that fiirther enq)hasized the Kennedy

Administtation's commitment to an expanded mUitary, the president passed on to DOD

the majority ofthe preparedness responsibUities which the OCDM had shouldered.

Executive Order 10952 charged DOD with the development of a faUout shelter program,

the creation of a communications network for waming civilians of impending attack, the

continuation of pubUc education efforts, and other various duties for estabUshing and

maintaining an effective defense network. To carry out its orders, the Department of

Defense created an Office of CivU Defense. Kennedy nominated Steuart Pittman, a Yale-

law graduate and investment consultant, to head the body.'""

Executive Order 10952 reconstituted the Office of CivU and Defense

Mobilization as a smaUer, advisory and coordinating body, which was later renamed the

Office of Emergency Planning (OEP). Reduced from a staff of hundreds to a select few—a

director and some auxiliaries—OCDM, or OEP, acted as civU defense watchdog. It kept

the president informed on the nation's state of civiUan readiness and helped him to

coordinate the cd-related actions of each executive department. In addition, OEP acted as

'"'Kennedy, Public Papers, 1: 402-3; and Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, Documents on Reorganization, 3-10.

'""Office of CivU and Defense MobiUzation, Documents on Reorganization, 3-10, 12; "Department of Defense (Biography) Steuart Lansing Pittman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (CivU Defense)," Information Kit K-14, FaUout Shelter Program, 1961-63 (2), Box 34, Couch Papers, DDEL.

303

a presidential advisor and assistant in matters of disaster reUef; emergency resource

management, continuity of government, and strategic stockpUing.'"'

Spokespersons maintained that the reorganization was necessary to move civU

defense forward from the "paper plans" ofthe Fifties to a visftle, concrete poUcy in the

Sbcties. Some ofthe earUest post-World War U advisory boards on civU defense had

stated that preparedness issues feU within the domain ofthe mUitary, and should therefore

be directed by defense personnel. Assigning civU defense to DOD was logical. Moreover,

it was hoped that making DOD-an estabUshed, pubUcly-respected, and even admired

branch ofthe government-responsible for civU defense initiatives would bring the

program greater approval from the pubUc and more money from Congress.'"*

There was yet another reason for the reorganization. When it discarded the

name. Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, and created an Office of Emergency

Planning and an Office of CivU Defense, the Kennedy Administtation gave civU defense a

new look, but the division of tasks was a retum to a previous federal plan. The OEP, with

'"'Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, Documents on Reorganization, 3-10; and PubUc Law 296, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (22 September 1961), 630.

'"*SR 880, "Address by Edward A. McDennott, Deputy Director, Office of CivU and Defense Mobilization Before the Department of Commerce BDSA Executive Reserve, Washington, D.C, May 24, 1961," and SR 916, "Address by Edward A. McDermott, Deputy Director, Office of CivU and Defense MobiUzation, Before the 1961 Summer Seminar on Survival in the Nuclear Age—Executive Management, the Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania, August 16, 1961," Box 3, OCDM PubUcations, RG 396, National Archives and Records Administration, CoUege Park, Md.; Nehemiah Jordan, U.S. Civil Defense Before 1950: The Roots of Public Law 920 (n.p.: Institute for Defense Analyses, Economic and PoUtical Studies Division, 1966), 58; and War Department CivU Defense Board, A Study of Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: National MUitary EstabUshment, Office ofthe Secretary of Defense, 1948), 15.

304

its disaster and emergency management responsibUities, was in fact a recreation ofthe old

Office of Defense MobUization (ODM). Kennedy's OCD and OEP were a retum to the

Truman years when the United States possessed both the FCDA and the ODM. Edward

A. McDermott, OEP director, admitted as much on more than one occasion. McDermott

told audiences that Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan I, which had fijsed the Office of

Defense MobUization and the Federal CivU Defense Administration into one body, the

Office of CivU and Defense Mobilization, had faUed. CivU defense agencies witnessed no

upsurge m popular support, and Congress was able to reduce dramaticaUy its aUocations

for passive defense because two preparedness offices had been melded into one. Even

though the reduction of government spending had been one of Eisenhower's primary

concerns throughout his two terms as president, McDermott caUed Reorganization Plan I

unsuccessfol, a mistake. The OEP director stated, however, that Kennedy's E. O. 10952,

with its redivision of civU defense responsibUities had conected the enors ofthe previous

administration.'"'

Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan I might have been a mistake, but Kennedy's

reassignment of civU defense tasks was not the answer for an aUing preparedness program

In his May 25 speech to Congress, President Kennedy had criticized civU defense for being

inconsistent. With Executive Order 10952 Kennedy himself contributed to the confosion

and to the lack of continuity in the United States' preparedness program In the space of a

decade, the American pubUc had been introduced to the Federal CivU Defense

'"'Edward A. McDennott, The Office of Emergency Planning in National Security Planning (Washington, D.C: Industrial CoUege ofthe Armed Services, 1963), 3-4; and SR 916, RG 396, NARACP.

305

Administration, the Office of Defense and CivU MobUization, the Office of CivU and

Defense MobUization, the Office of CivU Defense, and the Office of Emergency Planning,

aU of which were responsible for civU defense at one time or another. CivUian defense

agencies had been created, disbanded, renamed, and reorganized. Changes in leadership

often accompaiued the appearance of "new" civU defense agencies, and, usuaUy, the

modification of existmg preparedness strategies soon foUowed.'"*

President Kennedy initiaUy retained the concepts ofthe National Shelter Plan

formulated during the Eisenhower years, but he ordered an accelerated and more dUigently

executed program. Supposedly, the OCDM had been identifying shelter areas in existmg

stmctures sUice Eisenhower approved the shelter plan in July 1958, but Uttle had been

accomplished. Few sheltered areas had been identified; fewer had been stocked, and stUl

fewer had been marked. In the summer of 1961, Steuart Pittman marshaled the DOD's

Office of CivU Defense forces and sent them out to locate sheltered areas in existing

buUdings.'"'

OCD staff persons employed a strict formula. They required each potential

shelter fecUity's shielding to reduce radiation to 1/100th the level outside the buUding.

The standard thickness for shielding varied according to the material used as a barrier.

For instance, eight inches of concrete or three feet of dirt would folfiU the requirement. It

was a community shelter program, so guideUnes also stipulated that each shelter facUity

548 Kennedy, Public Papers, 1: 402.

'"'Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1961 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1962), 12-15; and SR 880 and SR 916, RG 396, NARACP.

306

must be of sufficient size to hold fifty individuals, with ten square feet of Uving space per

person and another square foot per person for storage space. OCD workers planned to fiU

the storage areas with radiation measuring equipment, first aid kits, sanitation packets,

steel water containers that converted to chemical toUets, and a two-week supply of food

and water-14 quarts of water and 10,000 calories of crackers and carbohydrate

supplements per person.""

The BerUn Crisis assisted Kennedy in his push for an accelerated shelter program.

Bess Beeman ofthe Women's Advisory CouncU for Defense and Disaster ReUef was not

the orUy private citizen who was worried, and Kennedy was in part responsible for her and

others' fears. On July 25, 1961, five days after he reorganized the country's civU defense,

Kennedy deUvered an address on pubUc television. It was a dangerous speech, so charged

and potentiaUy inflammatory that it seemed calculated to promote panic rather than to

offer assurances. After calling BerUn "the great testing place of Westem courage and

will," Kennedy ticked off the measures that he beUeved necessary to meet the chaUenge.

He advocated calling up reserves and increasing the miUtary's total strength to more than

two hundred thousand men. He petitioned Congress for defense aUocations of $3 biUion

plus. In addition, he spoke of civU defense. He discussed the reorganization, the shelter

plan, and he requested a supplemental appropriation of $207.6 mUUon for civU defense.'"

""Information BuUetin No. 9, Information BuUetins, 1961-1963, Box 34, Couch Papers, DDEL; Office of CivU Defense, Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1962 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1963), 14-30; and Idem, Highlights ofthe US Civil Defense Program (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1963), 9.

'"Kennedy, Public Papers, 1: 534-537.

307

Congress granted the entire sum, and Kennedy handed the money over to OCD director

Steuart Pittman, who used the funds to further the shelter initiative."^

As the United States mobilized its resources to meet the growing crisis,

Khrushchev opted for a waU instead of a war. On the night of August 13, 1961, East

German forces erected a barbed-wire barrier to prevent defection to the westem side of

the city. In the months that foUowed, stacked cinder blocks supplemented, then replaced,

the v^e fence. East-West tensions over BerUn began to ease, but the process was

gradual.'"

For a few months after the raising ofthe waU, Americans remained nervous. On

August 18, five days after the East Germans strung barbed wire across the city. Time

pubUshed its infemous "Gun Thy Neighbor?' article. In the United States, the Cold War-

with its government sponsored anti-communist hysteria and the daUy threat of atomic

attack-encouraged and contributed to the rise of radicaUzed survivaUsts, forerunners of

the fiercely independent, heavUy armed, and sometimes violent mUitia groups ofthe 1990s.

"Better Dead Than Red" became the raUying cry of these individuals m the early 1960s.

They considered themselves best prepared for the coming World War III, and they were

detennined to do anything, even fight to the death, in order to preserve their way of Ufe.

"2pubUc Law 141, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (17 August 1961), 342-3; PubUc Law 144, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (17 August 1961), 374; and PubUc Law 33, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (30 September 1961), 737.

'"Patterson, Kennedy's Quest, 42-47.

308

Time's "Gun Thy Neighbor?' article showed that survivaUst values had contaminated the

"bunker mentaUty" of more than a few shelter-centered Americans.""

In the late summer and early faU of 1961, most ofthe U.S. population was

without access to faUout shelters. Steuart Pittman and the Office of CivU Defense were

conducting surveys to locate available shelter space, but it would be months before shelter

faciUties would be marked for pubUc use. Moreover, in early estimates, spokespersons for

the OCD anticipated finding sufficient space for only fifty miUion people, less than one-

third the country's population. Both the OCD and the OCDM recommended that

Americans not wait for a community shelter to pop up next to them. Each femUy unit

should constmct or buy their own shelter. Most Americans did not act on the advice.

Those who did were acutely aware ofthe fact that their shelterless neighbors might panic

and demand admission or force their entry after a nuclear strike.'"

"Gun Thy Neighbor" featured survivaUst shelter owners who were wUUng to use

deadly force to protect their bunkers from desperate refogees-whether the person outside

was a stranger, a casual acquaintance, or a close fiiend. It was a nonissue, some ofthe

shelter owners argued. To overcrowd one's shelter would jeopardize the health and the

chances of survival for aU inside. Moreover, a gun might be necessary to protect shelter

occupants from vandals, rapists, and other criminal elements after a nuclear strike. The

article opened with a quote from a Chicago resident who stated, "When I get my shelter

"""Gun Thy Neighbor?' Time, 18 August 1961, 58.

'"Infomiation BuUetin No. 9, Information BuUetins, 1961-1963, Box 34, Couch Papers, DDEL; "Survival: Are Shelters the Answer?' Newsweek, 6 November 1961, 21; and Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, Report for 1961, 12-14.

309

finished, I'm going to mount a machine gun at the hatch to keep the neighbors out if the

bomb falls. I'm deadly serious about this....I'm not going to run the risk of not being able

to use the shelter I've taken the ttouble to provide my own femUy.""*

The image of feUout shelters with machine guns posted at their entrances eUcited

mixed responses. A number of individuals, including reUgious leaders from traditionaUy

conservative denominations, sided with survivaUsts. One civU defense officer fevored the

idea of armed shelter owners. He contended that it was the head of a household's

Christian duty to protect its famUy. Just as many Americans, however, voiced their

outrage at the idea of machine gun-equipped shelters that perhaps bore a greater

resemblance to fortified "pUl boxes" than to simple, peaceful, havens from radiation."'

Afiican-American comedian Dick Gregory poked fun at the issue. As part of his

stand-up routine, Gregory would reflect, "This intemational situation raises some

interesting ethical problems. LUce, if Faubus [Orval] is driving through one of our

neighborhoods when they drop the bomb, would he go into a colored shelter?... And if he

did-should we let him in?... 'Orval, stop pounding on that door! Don't you know it's

three o'clock in the morning?'""* Gregory would then offer his own personal

"*"Gun Thy Neighbor?," 58.

'""Gun Thy Neighbor?," 58; "Letters," Time, 25 August 1961, 3; and "Letters," Time, 1 September 1961, 4.

"*Dick Gregory, From the Back ofthe Bus (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc.,

1962), 63.

310

commentary. "But I'm only kidding. My type of person is the one who buUds a faUout

shelter with a doorbeU."'"

Even television programming engaged in the debate over the "Gun Thy

Neighbor?' article. On September 29, \96\ The Twilight Zone aired a show entitled

simply "The Shelter." The episode opens with a neighborhood party thrown for Doc

Stockton, the story's anti-hero. Stockton is mmgUng with fiiends, and the image

projected is one of a content, close-knit community, imtU a radio broadcast intermpts the

gathering. Radar have detected unidentified flying objects headed for the area, the

announcer warns. Residents should take shelter immediately. The party atmosphere

disappears abmptly as Doc Stockton acts on the announcement's advice and leads his wife

and son to the safety ofthe femily shelter. His neighbors, who have not been so

foresighted as to have purchased or buUt their own shelters, ask dear Doc Stockton, their

close fiiend, to admit them into his. But a change has come over Stockton. He refoses,

and a change comes over his fiiends too. They break down the shelter's door, even as

another radio announcement declares that the earUer waming was a false alarm. Doc

Stockton and his neighbors look at each other in bare-feced shame, acutely aware of what

they had become in that brief period of crisis.'*" In his concluding message to the show's

viewing audience, nanator Rod SerUng temporized, "[F]or civUization to survive, the

559 Gregory, From the Back, 63.

'*"Margot A. Henriksen, Dr. Strangelove's America: Society and Culture in the Atomic Age (Berkeley: University of CaUfomia Press, 1997), 213-14.

311

human race has to remain civiUzed. Tonight's very smaU exercise in logic from The

Twilight Zone:'''''

During the Fifties, with pan:q)hlets such as The Clergy in Civil Defense and The

Church in Civil Defense, the Federal CivU Defense Administration and the Office of CivU

and Defense Mobilization had tried to convince the pubUc that civiUan defense was a

moral responsibUity. In the early Sbcties that federal ttend continued. In 1961 OCDM

offered the foUowing booklets on the godliness of civiUan preparedness initiatives: An

Introduction to Civil Defense for Churches, The Church as a Shelter, The Religious

Affairs Service, and Excerpts From Sermons on Civil Defense.'^^ The text of «

Introduction to Civil Defense for Churches closed with a section subtitled "THE

HIGHER MEANING OF CIVIL DEFENSE." Below the bold-typed, capitaUzed heading

was the foUowing statement: "At ReUgious Affairs conferences in the OCDM Staff

CoUege, individual clergymen often remark that there are many facets of civU defense

which provide practical opportunities for the exercise ofthe moral virtues taught by the

Church. Strengthening famUy ties...and love of neighbor through community disaster

planning are two examples that are often cited.'"*' Time's "Gun Thy Neighbor?' article

raised questions about the vaUdity ofthe OCDM's assertions. Increasingly during the

'*'Quoted in Henriksen, Strangelove's America, 214.

'*2Federal CivU Defense Administration, The Clergy in Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1951); Idem, The Church in Civil Defense (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1957); Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, Introduction to Civil Defense for Churches (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1961); and Idem, The Church as a Shelter (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1961).

'*'Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, C/v/7 Defense for Churches, 6.

312

Kennedy Administtation, shelters became a moral issue, but not in the sense anticipated

and hoped for by civU defense officials. "Gun Thy Neighbor?' led Americans to consider

the possible immoral ramifications of civU defense and the proUferation of feUout

shelters.'*"

Moral or immoral, open to aU or closed, locked, and guarded by gun-toting

survivaUsts, faUout shelters remained a topic of discussion throughout the feU of 1961.

The constmction ofthe BerUn WaU might have been the first step toward defosing the

crisis atmosphere that sunounded the divided city, but in the weeks after the waU first

went up tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States did not subside; they

rose. In September the Soviets broke their self-imposed moratorium on nuclear weapons

testing and detonated a series of thermonuclear devices, including a 58-megaton hydrogen

bomb—at that tune, the largest weapon of its type ever exploded.'*'

The retum to testing reawakened in some Americans the need for assurances that

they could survive a nuclear war. Shelters came with no guarantees. A bunker at ground-

zero afforded Uttle protection from an H-bomb. In theory, however, shelters outside the

zone of total destmction increased one's chances of Uving through the residual radiation

produced by a nuclear detonation.

Herman Kahn's On Thermonuclear War considered, among other things, the Ufe-

saving potential of an effective civU defense program-one that would include faUout

'*""Gun Thy Neighbor?," 58; "Letters," Time, 25 August 1961, 3; and 'Tetters,' Time, 1 September 1961, 4.

'*'Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 379-405.

313

shelters. Kahn was a mUitary theorist for the RAND Corporation, which, in ttim, was a

think-tank sponsored by the U.S. Air Force. Taken from a series of lecttires which Kahn

presented to his coUeagues at Princeton University's Center of Intemational Sttidies, On

Thermonuclear War became an instant and perennial best-seUer. Its subject, the seemingly

exhaustive analysis in the sbc hundred fifty-one page book, and the author's quantitative

approach-the work is fiUed with statistical charts-brought On Thermonuclear War

renewed attention during the BerUn Crisis.'**

In the text, Kahn spoke ofthe mUUons who would forfeit their Uves if a nuclear

exchange were to occur between the Soviet Union and the United States. Yet despite the

dark focus of its subject, Kahn's work engendered in the reader a sense of positivism. It is

an optimistic look at nuclear war. Kahn notee that a nuclear assault would produce an

unprecedented level of carnage, perhaps leaving tens of mUUons dead and dying, but he

admonished his audience not to abandon aU hope. He wrote, "[A]n 'unprecedented'

catastrophe can be a far cry from an unlimited one."'*' Later, he further encouraged his

readers by offering the foUowing statement, "We [Kahn and other research associates]

concluded that for at least the next decade or so, any picture of total world annihilation

appears to be wrong, urespective ofthe miUtary course of events."'** Lastly, he addressed

another topic of popular debate, "WiU the survivors envy the dead?' Kahn had this to say.

'**Hemian Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960).

'*'lbid., 10.

'**Ibid., 22.

314

"Despite a widespread beUef to the conttary, objective sttidies indicate that even though

the amount of human ttagedy would be greatly increased in the postwar world, the

increase would not preclude normal and happy Uves for the majority ofthe survivors and

their descendants.'"*'

Kahn also contended that the number of casualties could be lowered by

implementing civUian defense measures. Early in his text he noted that "the Umits on the

magnitude ofthe catasttophe seem to be closely dependent on what kinds of preparations

have been made....""" In a subsequent chapter Kahn produced tables that showed the

approximate number of Uves that could be saved if the United States was weU prepared for

attack. He asserted that the coupUng of a plan for the protection ofthe Strategic Air

Command (SAC) with a comprehensive civU defense program that included industrial

dispersal, strategic evacuation, and faUout shelters could dramaticeUly reduce the casualty

Ust. According to his data, a Soviet first strike against SAC and fifty urban areas could

result in ninety milUon casualties if the U.S. was without civU defense, but a complete civU

defense initiative could reduce the casualty level to between five mUUon and twenty-five

mUUon. A foUow-up attack aimed at SAC and one hundred fifty-seven cities could leave

one hundred sbcty mUUon Americans dead, wounded, and missing, but again, effective

civUian defense could bring these numbers down to the stUl appaUing but more acceptable

range of eight mUUon to twenty-five mUUon.'" For those people who considered even the

'*'Kahn, Thermonuclear War, 21.

""Ibid., 10-11.

'"Ibid., 113.

315

lower casualty totals too great, Kahn offered, "[W]ith a conplete civU defense program,

adequate waming, and a relatively Umited Soviet strike (Umited because ofthe

unpremeditated character ofthe war or because the Soviet strike was blunted by the U.S.

attack), U.S. casualties would probably be in the three to ten mUUon range.""^

Kahn dedicated his book "to the goal of anticipating, avoiding, and aUeviating

crises."'" He urged support for civilian defense initiatives because he beUeved

preparedness could save Uves. The purpose behind many of his tables and charts was to

buUd support for civU defense. Clearly, Kahn opposed what he caUed the theory of

"ultimacy"—the idea that a nuclear war would destroy aU life on the planet. Lashing out at

popular Uterature for promoting the concept, Kahn labeled NevU Shute's On the Beach

"an interestuig, but badly researched book.""" Yet Kahn also opposed those ideaUsts who

dismissed the possibiUty of thermonuclear war or who beUeved most Americans would

survive with or without preparedness initiatives.'"

It was a fine Une that the mUitary strategist from the RAND Corporation

attempted to waUc. He had to offer hope to the people to stimulate support for civU

defense, but too much hope, too many assurances, might convince the pubUc that the

danger posed by thermonuclear weapons was not that great, or that the Ufe-saving

capabUities of civU defense were without Umit. Articles in the popular press-one in

"^Kahn, Thermonuclear War, 114.

'"Ibid., X.

""Ibid., 9.

'"Ibid.,7-8, 12, 16-17,97-98.

316

particular-suggest that Kahn was not whoUy successful in his attenpts to maintain

balance."*

In September of 1961, the Kennedy Administration was thrown into disanay

when the Soviets resumed the testing of nuclear weapons. It received another jolt in the

middle ofthe month when Life magazine sent to press an issue headUned, "How You Can

Survive FaUout." On the cover ofthe September 15 instaUment of Life a man in a plastic

"civUian faUout suit" ducked his head and raised his hand, presumably to shield his eyes

from the glare of an explosion that had cast an eerie reddish paU over him. The image was

one that seemed intended to generate concem. The short teases on the cover touted the

issue as a must-have survival manual, and, in effect promised to reUeve Americans' nuclear

fears. Beneath the large-print "How You Can Survive FaUout" headmg came other eye­

catching prompts: "97 out of 100 people can be saved...DetaU plans for buUding a

shelter...and a letter to you from President Kennedy."'" Inside, readers did indeed find a

letter from President John F. Kennedy. Dated September 7, 1961, the note urged the

people ofthe United States "to read and consider seriously the contents of this issue of

Z//e.""*

The next thirteen pages covered a wide variety of civU defense topics and boasted

subtitles such as "A New Urgency, Big Things to Do- and What You Must Leam," and

"Rundown of things to remember in case attack should come." WhUe the article discussed

"*"FaUout Shelters," Z//e, 15 September 1961, 95-108.

'"Ibid., cover.

"*Ibid., 95.

317

ConeU-ad frequencies and first aid techniques for treating radiation sickness, the focus was

on feUout shelters. Featured were photographs of shelters and their owners.'" A double-

paged spread showed Art Carlson and Claude, his son, assembUng a $700 Kelsey-Hayes

prefebricated basement shelter. The constmction and provisioning ofthe shelter took the

Carlson femUy oiUy four hours. The last picture in the photo spread showed the "FamUy

m the Shelter, Snug, Equipped and WeU Organized." OiUy Mrs. Carlson sat smUing in the

shelter. Art and the three chUdren—even young Judy who was stationed behind a stack of

books and the games Clue, Scrabble, and, of course. Life—looked serious, determined to

survive Armageddon.'*" The dour Carlsons were the exception; however, other featured

femiUes appeared to enjoy their shelters. In Orlando, Florida, a smiling Doug Bartholow

reclined m a lounge chair outside his concrete-block shelter, seemingly pleased with what

Life reporters caUed an "attractive addition" to his home.'*' A photo from Vega, Texas,

showed the teenaged AmeUa WUson lying on a wooden-plank bunk in a faUout shelter.

Coca-cola in one hand, phone in the other, she was completely at home in the famUy

bunker. Another photo featured the Pederson femUy and their cattle, aU of whom-

humans and animals aUke-were quite content to spend time in their "above-ground

cormgated steel shelter.'"*^

'""FaUout Shelters," 95-108

'*"Ibid., 104-5.

'*'Ibid., 106.

'*2lbid., 106-7.

318

The Life article also kept its promise to provide detaUed plans for buUding a

shelter. Two shelter types were presented. The more economical ofthe two was the "Big

Pipe in the Backyard under Three Feet of Earth," a claustrophobe's nightmare. The

second more-spacious and more expensive shelter was labeled "A Double-waUed Bunker

for Safety above Ground."'*'

It was not the article's photographs, but rather its content that triggered concem

among the members ofthe Kennedy Administration. Jerome B. Weisner, JFK's science

advisor, wrote, "[I]n the article are statements implying that faUout shelters are aU the

preparations needed for the average femUy to have '97 chances out of 100 to survive' an

enemy attack....CivU defense sttidies by ...WSEG, RAND, ORO and SRI show quite

clearly that mortaUties would be restricted to 45 milUon people without shelters and five

miUion with complete sheltering only in the event that the USSR was extremely

discrimmating m its targeting."'*" Weisner noted, "Attacks directed purely at population

targets could result in 140-150 milUon mortaUties without shelters, and 60-80 mUUon with

complete faUout shehers."'*' BristUng over Life's nanow focus and exaggerated claims,

Kennedy's science advisor wrote, "In my opinion, this article gives the American people

an entirely felse and misleading estimate ofthe protection that would be provided by

'*'"FaUout Shelters," 100-3.

'*"Memorandum, Jerome B. Weisner to President, 27 September 1961, "Staff Memorandum, Jerome B. Weisner" folder. President's Office FUes, box 67, John F. Kennedy Library.

'*'Ibid.

319

feUout shelters, and of potential mortaUties in the event of large-scale thermonuclear

attack on this country.'"**

Weisner also expressed concem over the president's affiUation with the article.

He worried that Kennedy's letter of introduction would convince the people that the

president agreed with the exaggerated claims found in the article. Immediately below its

reprint ofthe letter from Kennedy, Life repeated again its assertion that shelters could

almost guarantee their owner's survival in a nuclear holocaust. "You could be among the

97% to survive if you foUow the advice on these pages...."'*' Weisner caUed the quote a

"grossly misleading statement.'"**

It was too late for Keimedy to retract his letter. It had akeady gone to press.

Moreover, it is not a certainty that President Kennedy agreed with the criticisms voiced by

his science advisor. The evidence is sketchy on whether or not Kennedy knew the

contents ofthe Life article before he dispatched the letter. It could have simply been a

mistake, an oversight, but it is possible that the president knew ofthe article's exaggerated

claims and decided to write a positive introductory letter anyway. The tone ofthe issue

was wUdly optimistic. The article presented shelters as such a sound investment it might

help precipitate a feUout shelter buying and buUding frenzy among the pubUc. Even if the

American people were deceived as to the efficacy of sheUers, the proUferation of private

shelters would have furthered Kennedy's plans for civU defense.

'**Weisner to President, 27 September 1961, JFKL

'*'"FaUout Shelters," 95.

'**Weisner to President, 27 September 1961, JFKL.

320

Despite Kennedy's hopes and the claims of some weU-respected, scholarly works

on CivUian defense in the Atomic Age, no mass movement to constmct or purchase bomb

shelters occuned in the late summer and feU of 1961. Even those federal agencies

responsible for civU defense recognized that Kennedy's shelter initiative was not

producing the hoped-for results at the grass-roots level. In November, Newsweek

reported that federal spokespersons for civU defense were backing away from earUer

clauns that the inhabitants of one mUUon households could take refoge in their own,

private, home shehers.'*'

There were many reasons for the difficulties Kennedy experienced when he

attempted to resuscitate civU defense. First, by the time young "Jack" became president in

1961, Americans had been largely ignoring civU defense for ten years. Starting as a trend

m behavior, pubUc apathy toward preparedness issues had become an estabUshed ttadition,

a part ofthe national character. A poUce state could force an instant reversal of pubUc

attitudes. In a country that granted its people broad civU Uberties, however, any official,

even one as charismatic as JFK, would find it difficult to effect a rapid change in pubUc

behavior.

Second, the continued absence of continuity in civU defense hurt Kennedy's

preparedness initiatives. He reorganized, renamed, and restaffed the federal agencies

responsible for civiUan defense. Moreover, he reworded the purpose ofthe faUout shelter

poUcy begun during the Eisenhower years. President Dwight D. Eisenhower had harped

on the detenent value of civU defense. Kennedy said that was nonsense. In order to be

'*'"Are Shelters the Answer?," 19.

321

susceptible to detenence an enemy must be rational, he argued. Continuing, he asserted

that a rational enemy would never consider the use of nuclear weapons against the United

States, because they would recognize that such an act would result in the mutual

destmction of both the victim's and the aggressor's countries. FaUout shelters would not

serve as part ofthe United States' detenent force, Kennedy contended. They were

msurance agamst an attack by an inational enemy. Kennedy's assessment had merit, but it

nanowed the focus and Umited the value of a sheher program even as he asked Congress

and the people to appropriate more money for his civU defense initiatives.""

Khrushchev's aggressive stance in BerUn and his resumption of nuclear testing

might have led many people to beUeve that an inational enemy had appeared.

Nonetheless, Time's "Gun Thy Neighbor?' article prompted some Americans to consider

their feUow citizens that were taking cover just as hostUe, inational, and "immoral" as

Soviet Russia. The growing attention given to the moraUty of civU defense, a trend which

strengthened the ranks of protest organizations such as SANE, should not be neglected for

its impact on the continuing decline of preparedness in the United States.'"

Lastly, the optimistic tone of works Uke Herman Kahn's On Thermonuclear War

and the Life article on faUout shelters may have produced an unexpected result. Instead of

encouraging popular support, they may have undermined Kennedy's shelter poUcy.

Kahn's quantitative study placed restrictions on the devastating effect of nuclear weapons

""Kennedy, Public Papers, 1: 402.

"'"Gun Thy Neighbor?," 58; "Letters," Time, August 1961, 3; and "Letters," Time, 1 September 1961, 4.

322

and nuclear assaults. His book estabUshed Umits for weapons and wars that many people

had hitherto considered Umitless in their destmctive capabUities. Psychological studies

indicate that, as the bombs got bigger, people were tempted to dismiss them, to put them

out of thek mmds because the weapons were too horrible to consider. UnintentionaUy,

Kahn's work also encouraged Americans to ignore H-bombs because he described them as

weapons with finite capabiUties. This would encourage others to minimize the power of

thermonuclear devices. The Life article serves as one exan^le. Without citing a single

authoritative source, the author further Umited the destmctive capabUities of hydrogen

bombs. The popular press with its optimistic accounts pushed Americans toward the

concept that nuclear warheads were not that different from conventional weapons. Both

could be survived. Europeans had Uved through bombing raids during World War II.

This minimaUst redefinmg ofthe destmctive capabiUties of nuclear weapons may have

encouraged the people to dismiss civU defense, because it was unnecessary—just as the

idea of nuclear ultimacy prompted Americans to ignore preparedness, because it was

fotUe."^

There is no question that John F. Kennedy's plan for civU defense was feltering

by the end of 1961. The crisis atmosphere produced by Khrushchev's demands for a

Soviet-controUed BerUn had subsided into an uneasy peace after the raising ofthe waU in

that city. War no longer seemed as immediate a possibUity as it had in the late summer

and early faU months. Nonetheless, even though the pubUc response to his shelter

initiative had been Umited, Kennedy refosed to abandon his plans. Instead, against the

"'Kahn, Thermonuclear War, 10-11, 21-22, 113-14; and "FaUout Shelters," 95.

323

advice of confidante and speech writer Theodore Sorensen, he broadened the scope of his

sheher poUcy.'"

Phase I of Kennedy's sheher iiutiative came to an end with the closing months of

1961. The first part of his program netted the administtation sufficient sheltered space in

existmg stmctures for some fifty mUUon Americans. The number, though substantial, was

less than one-third the total population ofthe United States. Steuart Pittman and the

OCD had tried to convince the people to buUd or purchase femUy shelters, and President

Kennedy had tried to lead by example. He asked that shelters be incorporated into the

plans for any new federal buUdings, and he pushed for the modification of older federal

faciUties that did not possess sheltered areas. His plan was less than successfol. The

OCD's reluctance to discuss what percentage ofthe pubUc owned home shelters, and the

administtation's refusal and inabUity to acknowledge earUer claims that one-milUon famUy

shelters sat m Americans' backyards or basements indicated a lack of pubUc support.""

In the early months of 1962, the Office of CivU Defense launched Phase II of

Kennedy's sheher initiative. Parts ofthe plan were simply an extension ofthe Phase I

activities. OCD personnel continued to identify sheltered areas in existing stmctures and

began to mark and stock the spaces previously located. It was Phase II that first brought

the pubUc into contact with the now-famUiar black and yeUow "FaUout Shelter" signs.

'"Memorandum, Theodore Sorensen to the President, 23 November 1961, "CivU Defense" folder. Subject FUes, 1961-64, Personal Papers, Box 30, JFKL.

""Kennedy, Public Papers, 1: 402; Information BuUetin No. 40, Infomiation Kit K-14, FaUout Shelter Program, 1961-1963 (2), Box 34, Couch Papers, DDEL; and "Are Shehers the Answer?," 19.

324

Pittman and the OCD also redoubled their efforts to stimulate individuals and private

business to produce their own shekered fecUities. The Office of CivU Defense launched a

massive pubUcity campaign that employed the same mechanisms and strategies formulated

and used by civU defense leaders MUlard CaldweU, Val Peterson, and Leo Hoegh.'"

The Office of CivU Defense flooded the pubUc with wave after wave of new

pamphlets. Two ofthe most widely disseminated pubUcations were Fallout Protection:

What to Know and Do About Nuclear Attack and Family Shelter Designs. In less than a

year, Pittman's OCD distributed thirty mUUon copies ofthe first booklet and eight mUUon

copies ofthe second. Fallout Protection told Americans to equip their homes with

shehers."* Family Shelter Designs provided detaUed plans for the do-it-yourself home

improver who wanted a sheher, but did not wish to buy a prefebricated bunker.

Blueprints for eight different shehers were squeezed between the covers ofthe booklet.

For the civU defense enthusiast with Uttle money. Family Shelter Designs proposed the

small, economical, but functional "Basement Sand-FUled Lumber Lean-To Sheher," the

"Outside Semimoimded Steel Igloo Shelter," or the "Belowground Cormgated Steel

Culvert Sheher,"—which bore a remarkable resemblance to Life's "Big Pipe in the

Backyard Under Three Feet of Earth." For the more affluent civU defender. Family

'"News Release No. 91-62, Press Releases, 1962-1963, Box 34, Couch Papers, DDEL; and Office of CivU Defense, Report for 1962,15-1%.

"*Office of CivU Defense, Report for 1962, 75-78; and Idem, Family Shelter Designs (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1962).

325

Shelter Designs suggested the Waldorf-Astoria of shehers, the "Belowground New

Constmction Clay Masonry Shelter.'""

The pubUcity campaigns and the identification, marking, and stocking of

shehered areas requu-ed federal expenditures, but they were not opposed by the members

of Congress. The men and women on Caphol HUl focused their attention on the other

part of Phase II, the shelter incentive plan. On February 8, 1962, Secretary of Defense

Robert McNamara asked the members ofthe national legislature to amend civU defense

legislation to authorize subsidies for community shelter constmctioa The subsidies would

go to those nonprofit organizations involved in health, education, or welfare that were

willing to buUd pubUc sheher fecUities. The subsidy program was to be an integral part of

Kennedy's shelter initiative. The OCD wanted to provide the pubUc with shehered areas

sufficient for two hundred forty milUon people. Pittman's staff anticipated that the surveys

of existing buUdings would yield ninety milUon spaces. Another five miUion would be

located in federal buUdings. It was hoped that private initiative by famiUes and businesses

would generate shehered fecUities adequate for housing fifty-five nuUion Americans.

Kennedy, McNamara, and Pittman asked Congress to subsidize the constmction of pubUc

shehers for the remaining ninety miUion spaces needed."*

After McNamara requested the subsidies, the MUitary Operations Subcommittee

ofthe House Government Operations Committee began hearings on the subject. Chet

HoUfield was once again investigating and promoting a matter sacred to him—a national

'"Office of CivU Defense, Shelter Designs, 3-30; and "FaUout Shelters," 100-101,

"*Office of CivU Defense, Highlights; and Infomiation BuUetin No. 40, DDEL.

326

network of pubUc shelters. For once, HoUfield and his coUeagues voiced their approval

for the federal civU defense agencies, leadership, and the proposed shelter initiatives. The

subcommittee issued a fevorable report.'"

WhUe OCD and OCDM officials might have been heartened by the HoUfield

subcommittee's voiced approbation, there was no cause for celebration. The MUitary

Operations Subcommittee wielded no influence over the fate of McNamara's proposed

amendment to civU defense legislation. The board with jurisdiction over the subsidy

program was the House Armed Services Committee, chaired by Carl Vinson. A first

glance at Vinson would lead one to beUeve that Kennedy's initiative was sure to pass.

Vinson was a staunch Democrat. For more than fifty years the people of Georgia selected

him as one of their representatives to Congress. He was a pUlar ofthe soUd Democratic

South, but perhaps that was the origin of part ofthe problem he posed for Kennedy. The

South distrusted the CathoUc, "Uberal," young president from Massachusetts. Both

Kennedy and Vinson were Democrats, but Vinson was Protestant, conservative, a miUtary

enthusiast who fevored the expansion ofthe Navy and the other active armed services, yet

a man who was uncertain about the expensive and passive civU defense program. Vinson

refused to hold hearings on McNamara's proposed amendment. When Congress aUocated

'"House Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Government Operations, Hearings Before a Subcommittee ofthe Committee on Government Operations, 87th Cong., 2d. sess., 1962.

327

fimds for CivU defense, none ofthe $460 mUUon requested for shelter subsidies was

forthcoming.*""

Theodore C Sorensen, speech writer and adviser to President Kennedy, had

predicted Program II would meet with difficulties. More than a month before the Office

of CivU Defense launched the second phase of Kennedy's shelter initiative, Sorensen urged

the president to reconsider. Sorensen opened his memorandum to JFK with the statement,

"CivU defense is blossoming into our number one poUtical headache, aUenating those who

beUeve we are doing too much or too Uttle, or with too much confosion."*"' Sorensen

then voiced his opinion that Phase II would not increase the pubUc's confidence in, or its

satisfection with, civU defense. Since the subsidies would be used to buUd shehers in

urbanized areas, rural Americans would feel ignored by their government and would

"insist that Federal subsidies, if justified for some, were justified for aU. Thus the

program, the cost and the poUtical handicaps wiU grow even greater."*"^ He also argued

that subsidizing feUout shelter constmction in cities made Uttle sense, because those areas

would constitute the primary focus of an enemy attack. A faUout sheher would not save

an urbanite from an H-bomb's blast or heat. The more sensible location for faUout shehers

was outside major metropoUtan areas, in rural regions where evacuees would arrive and

*""Thomas J. Ken C/v/7 Defense in the U.S.: Band-Aid for a Holocaust? (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), 130-31; and PubUc Law 741, 87th Cong., 2d sess. (3 October 1962), 717.

*"'Sorensen to President, 23 November 1961, JFKL.

*"2lbid.

328

where the people would be contendmg only whh feUout, not with firestorms and blast

603

waves.

Sorensen also enq)loyed the same reasoning that later would influence Carl

Vinson's decision to ignore the subsidy proposal. The speech writer for the president

caUed Phase n "a ttemendous waste of funds at a cost greater than our education or other

domestic programs."*"" Sorenson asserted that the people should be encouraged to ready

their homes for a nuclear war, but the decision should be left to the mdividual. Each

homeowner had to decide what precautions to take if they Uved in an area that was subject

to natural disasters; they should make the same decisions about a possible nuclear disaster.

Sorensen stated, "The resources ofthe Federal or National Government should be devoted

to strengthening national objectives—deterring a nuclear war, preparing to win h,

protectmg our retaliatory forces, establishing an air defense network, and, as soon as

possible, an anti-missUe defense."*"'

Sorensen advised the president to remain with Phase I and drop the subsidy

proposal. He recognized that Phase I would not "satisfy the HoUfields who want to do

more," but he also maintamed that Phase II, once in effect, would not satisfy them*"*

*"'Sorensento President, 23 November 1961, JFKL.

*""Ibid.

*"'Ibid..

*"*Ibid.

329

Phase II was unjustified, he insisted, unless "pubUc sentiment for a Federal sheher program

is too overwhehning to be persuaded that Program I [sic] is enough."*"'

No pubUc mandate for Phase II existed. In fact, there was less support for civU

defense in 1962 than in 1961. Congress dealt Kennedy's civU defense plan some stunning

blows. Carl Vinson's refiisal to consider the subsidy proposal was not the OCD's only

concern. In addkion to the $460 miUion that he requested for sheher subsidies, Kennedy

had asked for another $235 miUion for other federal civU defense responsibUities. He

received only $120 mUUon.*"* A year earUer, with the BerUn Crisis and the possibUity of

war loommg over the country. Congress had granted the entire sum that JFK had

requested for civUian defense. By the summer of 1962, the Berlin WaU was in place, and

the missUes had not been fired. The crisis had ended, and congressional support for civU

defense had evaporated. Kennedy gave a conect assessment ofthe national legislature's

behavior when he noted that people appeared interested in preparechiess issues only "when

the clouds come...."*"'

The "clouds" of crisis retumed to cover Washington, D.C in October 1962. U-2

flights over Cuba had produced photographs that showed Soviet missUe platforms under

constmction. After the Bay of Pigs incident, spokespersons for the U.S.S.R. had

announced that their countty would protect Cuba from fiirther U.S. attempts to overthrow

the island-state's government. Khrushchev was keeping the Soviet Union's promise.

*"'Sorensento President, 23 November 1961, JFKL.

*"*PubUc Law 741, 87th Cong., 2d sess. (3 October 1962), 717.

*"'Kennedy, Public Papers, 2: 543.

330

Kennedy was not concemed because the rockets in Cuba suddenly opened the Umted

States to a nuclear assault. They did not. Soviet missUes in other locations could reach

the American mainland. JFK looked at the Cuban MissUe Crisis as one more Khrushchev-

issued chaUenge to his and the American people's resolve. President Kennedy refused to

back down. He mobUized ttoops and sent them to Florida to prepare for an invasion of

the island nation. He ordered a naval "quarantine" of Cuba-semantics was important; a

blockade was considered an act of war. He told Khrushchev that he would not permit

Soviet ships, presumably carrying nuclear warheads, to pass through the U.S. Navy's

quarantine and unload their cargo in Cuba. For thirteen days the world stood poised on

the brink of war and, perhaps, nuclear Armageddon.

Khmshchev bUnked first. He offered to order the disassembly ofthe platforms in

Cuba if the United States promised never to attenqjt invasion again. He later amended his

offer, demanding also that the U.S. government remove hs missUes from Turkey. Acting

on the advice of his brother, Robert Kennedy, the president accepted Khrushchev's first

proposal and ignored the second. Khrushchev acquiesced. The platforms and the missUes

were removed. The Cuban MissUe Crisis came to an end.*'"

If ever a single event stood a chance of reviving the country's civU defense

program and mobUizing Americans to demand an expanded sheher poUcy, that event was

the Cuban MissUe Crisis. The stand-off with Cuba and the Soviet Union had brought the

*'"Robert A. Divine, ed.. The Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Markos Weiner PubUshing, 1988), 9-59; and for the other side ofthe story see James G. BUght, Bmce J. AUyn, andDavid Welch, Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993).

331

United States closer to a nuclear war than h had ever been in the past, and for a short time

h appeared that civU defense might receive a boost from the crisis. Secretary of Defense

Robert McNamara continued to ask for sheher subsidies, and Carl Vinson, earUer opposed

to the plan, ordered hearings. House Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee No. 3,

chaired by F. Edward Hebert of Louisiana conducted the hearings sessions in May and

June 1963.*"

Hebert later admitted that he and the other eleven members ofthe subcommittee

were opposed to the sheher incentive plan when the hearings convened. To discredit the

program, Hebert caUed for testimony from witnesses opposed to shehers or civU defense

in general. There were plenty of individuals and groups from whom to choose. The

protest movement had contmued to gain momentum. CoUege professors, engineers,

psychologists, and delegates from the American Friends Service Committee and the

National Committee for a Sane Nuclear PoUcy offered their views on the dangers or

absurdhies of attempting to unplement a national shelter program*'

WhUe some objected to the expense ofthe project or contended shehers would

afford Umited protection, most opponents ofthe incentive program criticized it for hs

*"Information BuUetin No. 58, Infomiation Kit K-14, FaUout Sheher Program, 1961-1963 (2), Box 34, Couch Papers, DDEL; and House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee No. 3, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services Pursuant to H.R. 8042 and H.R. 8200 to Further Amend the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 as Amended, to Provide for Shelter in Federal Structures, to Authorize Payment Toward the Construction or Modification of Approved Public Shelter Space and for Other Purposes, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963.

*' House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee No. 3, Hearings, 3034-52, 4560-4956, 5298-5303, 5600-5601.

332

moral deficiencies. Dredging up the images projected by Time's "Gun Thy Neighbor?'

article, they argued that not oiUy had the sheher issue encouraged some people to behave

Uke insenshive savages, it had weakened the Uiuted States' defensive posture by

preciphating the deterioration of national unity. Americans with shehers were turning

agamst those without. Critics ofthe sheher program theorized that the situation would

only worsen with time and the expansion of civU defense. They hypothesized that to shore

up its feUing preparedness poUcy and to restore pubUc unity, the federal government

would force its people to buUd shelters and tram for preparedness. Some would refuse,

the critics wamed, and they predicted that the stigma attached to "draft dodgers" would

soon also apply to "shelter dodgers." In addhion, those opposed to civU defense asserted

that the adoption of a large-scale sheher constmction poUcy would make Americans feel

too secure. As a consequence, neither civUians nor governmental officials would

recognize the need for disarmament or for ahematives to nuclear warfare when settUng

disputes. CivU defense would increase the possibUity of thermonuclear war by

encouraging the devolution of Americans into aggressive, unthinking beings.

After the naysayers and prophets of doom testified, Steuart Pittman received an

opportunity to rebut the arguments against a sheher incentive poUcy. The testimony ofthe

OCD director contrasted starkly to the emotional appeals issued by the sheher program's

detractors. With charts, statistical reports, and pamphlets, Pittman attempted to tum back

the criticism leveled at the project. His charts and graphs showed that faUout shelters

613

*"House Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee No. 3, Hearings, 3034-52,

4560-4956, 5298-5303.

333

could prevent 25 to 65 mUUon casualties if the Soviets launched a nuclear strike agamst

the United States, but he insisted that whhout a subsidy poUcy the nation would lack the

shehers necessary to protect many of hs chizens. Comparing civU defense without

shehers to armed forces without weapons, he maintained that proper equipment was

essential for an army of soldiers or for an army of civUian defenders.*'"

The members ofthe Hebert subcommittee, so opposed to the project when the

hearings began, found Pittman's arguments persuasive and retumed a fevorable report to

the Armed Services Committee. On August 27,1963, the fliU committee released HR

8200 for House consideration. The biU authorized $15.6 milUon for the constmction of

shehers m federal buUdmgs and another $175 milUon for subsidizing sheher projects

undertaken by nonprofit histitutions. The members ofthe House passed the bUl

September 17.*"

If Pittman and other OCD staff persons celebrated, they did so prematurely. The

Senate Armed Services Subcommittee faUed to refer a sheher subsidy bUl to the national

legislature's higher house. Congress therefore appropriated none ofthe $195 mUUon that

McNamara had requested for sheher constmction.*'*

There were a number of reasons for the faUure of Kennedy's shelter initiative.

Fh-st of aU, the decision by the Senate's Armed Services Committee to ignore the subsidy

*'"House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee No. 3, Hearings, 3053-3177.

'^'^Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, 10a, pt. 21, D 446.

*'*PubUc Law 25, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (17 May 1963), 37; and PubUc Law 215, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (17 May 1963), 425-26.

334

plan more accurately reflected pubUc sentunent than cUd the pro-sheher stance taken by

the House. At the height ofthe BerUn Crisis only five percent ofthe nation's populace

reported that they had made any changes m theu- homes m order to prepare for a nuclear

strike. A survey conducted m 1962, the year ofthe Cuban MissUe Crisis, showed that five

percent ofthe pubUc possessed blueprints or had investigated the possibUity of adding a

shelter to their homes, but less than two percent ofthe nation's heads of households had

actuaUy buUt or purchased a feUout shelters. In the aftermath ofthe Cuban Crisis a 1963

survey reported that the number of shelter owners had increased only sUghtly, to 2.2

percent.*"

The results ofthe OCDM and OCD volunteer recmitment drives of 1961-1963

fiirther attested to the lack of civUian interest in preparedness. By mid-1961, 100,000

adults had graduated from training courses offered by OCDM and hs sister organizations

at the state and local levels. Assuming responsibiUty for civU defense education programs

in the summer of 1961, OCD had trained 261,000 more volunteers by the end of 1962.

Another 263,000 trainees graduated in 1963. Adding the 624,000 mdividuals recmhed

during the Kennedy Administtation to the 6.5 miUion people that civU defense agencies

clakned had volunteered during the Truman and Eisenhower years produced a grand, and

probably exaggerated, total of 7.1 mUUon trained American civU defenders by 1963. In

1951, the Federal CivU Defense Achninistration had estimated h needed 17.5 mUUon

*"American Insthute of PubUc Opinion, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1971, vol. 3 (New York: Random House, 1972), 1732; David K Berle et al.. The Fallout Protection Booklet: A Report of Public Attitudes Toward and Information About Civil Defense (East Lansmg: Michigan State University, 1963), 16; and Jiri Nehnevajsa, C/v/7 Defense and Society (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1964), 89.

335

volunteers out of a nation of approximately 155 mUUon Americans. Twelve years later,

federal civU defense agencies stUl had not recruited 17.5 mUUon individuals, and the

population had sweUed to 189 mUUon people.*'*

John F. Kennedy hmiself was in part responsible for civU defense's inabUhy to

take advantage ofthe Cuban MissUe Crisis. It was not the buUet of an assassin in DaUas,

Texas that deprived U.S. civU defense of hs benefector and hs most powerful poUtical aUy.

Although he had begun his presidency committed to resuscitating civU defense, by 1963

John F. Kennedy was no longer the fiery advocate of preparedness measures that he had

been m 1961. Kennedy, Uke many Americans, had been alarmed by the reaUzation that

nuclear war had been only nanowly averted during the Cuban MissUe Crisis. When the

storm passed, the president's actions reveal that he had adopted at least some ofthe views

espoused by the members of SANE and other protest organizations.*"

Kennedy decided to work toward reducmg the possibUity of a nuclear conflict,

mstead of focusmg on the acquishion of technologies that might or might not enable a

portion ofthe country's civiUan population to survive a thermonuclear strike. In June

1963, John F. Kennedy deUvered a speech at American University in Washington, D.C.

Noting that the Soviet Union and the United States had been "caught up in a vicious and a

dangerous cycle in which suspicion on one side breeds suspicion on the other, and new

weapons beget counterweapons," the president chaUenged Americans as weU as Russians

*'*Office of CivU and Defense MobUization, Report for 1961, 75, 78; Office of CivU Defense, Report for 1962, 62; Idem, Report for 1963, 71; and Bureau ofthe Census, Statistical Abstract: 1964, 5.

*"Walton, Cold War and Counterrevolution, 143-161.

336

er

to reexamme theu- atthudes toward one another. The people ofthe two countries did not

have to love each other, he contended, but to ensure world peace they must "Uve togeth

m mutual tolerance, submhtmg their disputes to a just and peaceful settlement." They

must leam "not to see only a desperate and distorted view ofthe other side, not to see

conflict as inevitable, accommodation as impossible, and communication as nothing more

than an exchange of threats." Sounding very much Uke a spokesperson for SANE,

Kennedy stated, "[I]f we cannot now end our differences, at least we can help make the

world safe for diversity. For, m the final analysis, our most basic common Unk is that we

aU mhabh this smaU planet. We aU breathe the same air. We aU cherish our chUdren's

foture. And we are aU mortal."* "

Kennedy's speech was an offer to reduce tensions between the United States and

the Soviet Union, to promote a detente between the two countries. In June, the same

month as Kennedy's American University presentation, officials in the U.S.A. and the

U.S.S.R. agreed to instaU a direct teletype Unk between the White House in Washington,

D.C, and the Kremlin m Moscow. Dubbed the "Hot Line," the network made possible

instant communication between Soviet and American diplomats. It was a step toward

arbhrating disputes with words instead of miUtary posturing that could lead, mtentionaUy

or accidentally, to a nuclear war. Kennedy's detente initiative was furthered in September

1963 when Soviet and American diplomats signed the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Now a chanpion of sttategic arms Umitation, President Kennedy had caUed for the

suspension of aU nuclear tests, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not agree. Hence, in its

* "Kennedy, Public Papers, 3: 459-64.

337

final form the Lmiited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty prohibhed weapons testing m the

atmosphere, m space, and underwater. Both nations could stUl detonate devices

underground.* '

CivU defense had lost hs strongest and most charismatic supporter. Kennedy's

actions m 1963 suggest that he had embraced open negotiations and more diplomatic

mteraction with the Soviet Uiuon as the soundest strategies for preserving his people from

a nuclear strike. Instead of preparing for war he tried to duninish the possibUity of violent

confrontation. As the United States retumed to the more concUiatory approach that h had

taken under Eisenhower, civU defense lost some ofthe Uttle appeal that remained to h. In

addhion, by removing testmg from sight the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty enabled

Americans to more easUy ignore the existence of mass destmction weqx)ns. The tteaty

drove support for civU defense, as weU as nuclear testing, underground.

By the tune of President John Fhzgerald Kennedy's death m 1963, pubUc demand

for civU defense measures was mostly confined to the die-hard sheher advocates— "the

HoUfields," as Theodore Sorensen had caUed them-and to radical survivaUsts. StUl, the

federal government did not completely discard hs civUian preparechiess programs. The

civU defense agencies ofthe Fifties and Sbcties eventuaUy gave rise to Congress's creation

ofthe Federal Emergency Management Admmistration m 1979. A few years later, civU

defense experienced a Umited and brief resurgence in popularity when President Ronald

Reagan adopted a more aggressive posture toward the Soviet states. Nonetheless, the

* 'Walton, Cold War and Counterrevolution, 143-161; and Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 893-899.

338

golden age of government-sponsored civU defense initiatives came to a hah m 1963, the

same year that the assassination of John F. Kennedy drew to a close the first chapter ofthe

Cold War and an end to the Fifties culture that had been shaped by h.* ^

*2 AUan M. Wmkler, Life Under A Cloud (New York: Oxford Univershy Press, 1993), 132-33.

339

CHAPTER DC

CONCLUSION: BETWEEN THE BOMB

AND A SHELTERED SPACE

Young, blonde, and on the cuttmg edge of fashion, Lmda Bromley of New

RocheUe, New York was ready for anythmg—a party, a night on the town, or a nuclear

disaster. It was her "atomic chic" look that won her a spot on the front page ofthe

Saturday, September 30, 1961 issue of The Houston Post. In place ofthe usual string of

pearls fevored by so many women of her era, Ms. Bromley wore what the Post caUed

"nuclear neckwear," a cham with a dosuneter pendant. Conq)act and Ught, approximately

the same size as a Kennedy half doUar and weighmg less than two ounces, the dosuneter

could be carried or wom without uiconvenience to hs owner. It was a must-have hem for

the serious civiUan defender. If faUout rained from the sky, Ms. Bromley's dosuneter

would be of far greater value than jewehy. It would measure the uitensity ofthe radiation

and would record the level of exposure suffered by hs owner. The Post reported that the

nifty device's manufacturer contended "h could be the next thmg in ladies neckwear...."*"

Lmda Bromley represented the ideal for civU defense planners and promoters.

She had mcorporated civUian preparedness uito her daUy routine. The uhunate goal for

the Federal CivU Defense Admmistration and the agencies that succeeded h was the

creation of a society whose members accepted civU defense as an uitegral part of everyday

Ufe. The elaborate pubUcity campaigns, with theh television and radio advertisements.

*""Nuclear Neckwear," The Houston Post, sec. 1, p. 1

340

parades, and gimmicks would no longer be necessary. Without even thinking about civU

defense, Americans would put dosimeters and identification tags m theh pockets or

around their necks. They would look upon such hems as orduiary accessories, as

deshable and necessary as a watch, a waUet, or a purse. The feUout sheher would become

a standard feature of American homes, considered as essential for humans as were garages

for cars. ChUdren at school and adults at the office or at home would react

mstantaneously, knowing exactly where to go and what to do if wammg shens sounded.

Few people would panic even when feced with an unminent strike by an enemy with

nuclear capabiUties. The knowledge that aU Americans had access to shelters and aU had

been thoroughly trained for an emergency would reassure and calm them. CivU defense

would help buUd a society that was more secure, more homogenous, and, supposedly,

more Ukely to survive a nuclear assauh.

The plan faUed. A whole series of blunders, miscalculations, and unexpected

events prevented civU defense from findmg popular acceptance. From hs earUest

begmmngs m 1951 and 1952, the United States' postwar civUian preparedness programs

seemed to felter. One factor which hampered U.S. civU defense efforts was the lack of

federal support and leadership. Congress was often at fauh, usuaUy aUocating no more

than a smaU fraction ofthe amounts requested for civU defense unless the country was

ennured m a crisis, such as the 1961 dispute over BerUn. Sheher mitiatives were the most

Ukely to feel the bhe ofthe congressional hatchet, because they were expensive, and

experts debated theh usefiUness. FCDA Administrator MUlard CaldweU and other

spokespersons for civU defense recognized that the federal government must lead by

341

exan^le. The national legislature's refusal to support civU defense transmitted to the

pubUc the message that civilian preparedness was not unportant.

The activity, or mactivity, ofthe coimtry's presidents also encouraged the pubUc

to question the vaUdity and the value of civiUan defense. President Harry S Truman

postponed the creation of a federal civU defense agency for years. After signing the CivU

Defense Act of 1950 uito law he became an outspoken proponent of civilian preparedness,

but the sums he requested for passive defense were significantly smaUer than the amounts

he demanded for active defense measures. The situation worsened when Dwight D.

Eisenhower won the presidency in 1952. CivU defense budget requests and appropriations

plummeted during his two terms of office. The one-time general and foU-tune fiscal

conservative placed his feith and the country's money in the expansion ofthe United

States' nuclear arsenal, instead of a nationwide system of shehers. His decision to

disregard the recommendations ofthe Gaither report and his attempts to defuse Soviet-

American tensions contributed to the fiirther decUne of civU defense, 1953-1961. When

John F. Kennedy entered the White House m 1961 he sought to revive civUian defense.

The president's conmiitment to preparechiess and the mcreasuig uistabUity of U.S.-

U.S.S.R. relations gave civU defense leaders hope for a revitaUzed program PubUc

distmst of civUian preparedness measures had been growmg for more than a decade,

however, and Kennedy's sheher mitiatives met with vocal and widespread criticism

Later, after the Cuban MissUe Crisis pushed the United States and the Soviet Union to the

brink of nuclear war, Kennedy hunself backed away from civU defense and began to speak

less about faUout shehers, more about arms Umitations and closer Russian-American

342

relations. CivU defense lost its most powerfiU and charismatic spokesperson, and

preparedness programs suffered. CivUian preparedness was dealt yet another blow by the

Lunhed Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which U.S. and Soviet diplomats signed m 1963. By

drivmg nuclear detonations underground, the treaty removed the threat ofthe

superweapons from the pubUc eye and fiirther contributed to the decUne of civU defense.

Presidents, senators and representatives, even the admmistrators and cUrectors of

the nation's federal civU defense agencies hmdered preparedness ui the United States.

MiUard CaldweU was an outspoken racist. His appomtment to the FCDA was opposed by

the mUUons of "mvisible" men and women that identified with Ralph EUison. Val Peterson

fered even worse with the pubUc. Charges that he was uiept and decehfol drove hun from

office m 1957. The rapid succession and brief tenure ofthe civU defense leaders that

foUowed—Leo Hoegh, Frank B. EUis, Edward McDermott, and Steuart Pittman-gave

U.S. federal civU defense agencies an aura of instabiUty, generating more pubUc distmst

toward preparedness.

The reorganization of civU defense bodies, the redistribution of civU defense

responsibiUties, and the redefinition of civU defense strategies added to the atmosphere of

imcertauity and confusion that clung to the American civU defense program. In the short

span of thuteen years, each ofthe foUowmg agencies exercised some authority over

civUian defense issues: the Federal CivU Defense Admmistration, the Office of Defense

MobUization, the Office of Defense and CivU MobUization, the Office of CivU and Defense

MobUization, the Office of Emergency Planmng, and the Office of CivU Defense. During

that same period, civU defense strategies shifted focus every few years. CivUian

343

preparedness agencies promoted the foUowmg inhiatives, ui order: pubUc bomb shehers,

mass evacuation, private faUout shehers and mass evacuation, private and pubUc faUout

shehers and mass evacuation, private and pubUc faUout shehers. The changes in name,

leadership, and strategy made the United States' civUian defense agencies appear clueless.

Tme, many ofthe changes m civU defense sttategies stemmed from advances in

offensive weaponry or from greater understandmg, or wide-spread misconceptions, ofthe

dangers posed by nuclear devices. The successful detonation of a thermonuclear device

forced a reevaluation of civU defense planning. Sputnik and the development of

intercontinental ballistic missUes preciphated another reassessment of civiUan poUcies. Yet

another reexamination of civU defense mitiatives occuned because ofthe Lucky Dragon

incident and growuig pubUc concerns—some leghimate, some exaggerated—about feUout.

Preparedness agencies responded to each new perceived threat, but the simple fact that the

FCDA or the OCDM had to react, had to modify hs strategies for survival, provided the

skeptics with an excuse for ignoring civU defense. Defense technologies were not keeping

pace with offensive weapons systems. CivU defense seemed always to lag behind. Few

people were wUUng to mvest tune or money in preparedness mitiatives that were expensive

and yet Ukely to be obsolete m a few years.

Tune hself acted as an enemy to civU defense. With each year that passed the

tradhion of pubUc maction grew sttonger. Smce the FCDA and hs sister organizations

were deaUng with a society characterized by hs conformist atthudes, a long-standmg

record of pubUc apathy was a matter of great concem. As tune passed and the average

chizen saw few or none of theh fiiends enroU for civUian defense trauimg, h became more

344

difficult for preparedness agencies to recruit volunteer personnel, and the possftUity of

foture mass pubUc mvolvement duninished. In addhion, tune further con^Ucated the task

of civU defense recruiters, because with each passmg year the American people grew more

accustomed to Uvmg hi the shadow ofthe bomb. They leamed to continue ui theh daUy

Uves, acceptmg the possibUity of nuclear annUiUation but refusmg to panic, just as they

accepted the possibiUty of bemg mvolved m an automobUe accident every tune they got

hito theu* cars and drove down the freeway.

Perhaps most damaging to civU defense initiatives, 1950-1963, was the federal

leadership's mabUity to identify conectly and benefit from the trends and established

behavior ofthe United States' Fifties society. It was unperative for civU defense agencies

to find "the pulse" of American society. CivU defense was a social program, dedicated to

the protection ofthe people. Its success was dependent on pubUc participation. CivU

defense planners wanted to educate the enthe population and hoped to enlist miUions for

special assignments. Recmhmg fifteen or twenty mUUon volunteers for civU defense

would pose few difficulties for preparechiess agencies in a country with authoritarian rule.

A poUce state could force pubUc participation, but the United States grants hs chizens

many civU Uberties. Substantial numbers of Americans opposed the draft even during

periods of mUitary emergency. Defense planners recognized that a peacetune draft for

civUian defense would meet great resistance. CivU defense was, by necessity, a voluntary

activity. It was therefore unperative for civU defense agencies to devise persuasive

strategies that would enable them to tap into the population.

345

The Federal CivU Defense Adnunisttation, the Office of CivU and Defense

MobUization and the other preparedness bodies did tty to caphaUze on the social trends of

the Fifties. Noticmg that a majority of Americans belonged to social and professional

clubs, the FCDA and hs successors asked the representatives of national organizations to

encourage theh members to volunteer for civU defense. The associations' leadership

compUed v dth the FCDA's requests, but recmitment returns were much lower than civU

defense officials had anticipated. MUlard CaldweU, Val Peterson and other dhectors of

preparedness agencies had hoped civU defense would benefit from the "joumig mania" that

mfected the United States' population m the Fifties, but they faUed to reaUze that the

people were jomuig estabUshed organizations and clubs which would boost them up to a

higher rung on the social or professional ladder. In a decade dommated by the pursuh of

economic success and peer acceptance, most Americans were networking for poshion,

power, and money. Civic responsibUities were a secondary concem.

FCDA attempts to share in the membership boom experienced by reUgious bodies

also met with faUure. Perhaps as a resuh of nuclear anxieties and the pressures of

conformity, the United States enjoyed hs most reUgious decade m the 1950s. As with the

professional and social clubs, the FCDA tried to tap this source of personnel by enlisting

the aid of reUgious leaders, caUing upon them to raUy support for civU defense. The

response was mixed. Ministers and clergymen from the tradhionaUy more conservative

churches compUed. Progressive and pacific denominations refused, at first argumg that

civU defense would actuaUy encourage war and an accelerated arms race. A national

network of shehers would make the United States' diplomatic leadership reckless, wUUng

346

to start a nuclear war, because the American people were protected. It would also

stunulate the arms race, mcreasmg hs aheady frenzied pace, because a sttong civU defense

system would chaUenge the Soviets to develop weapons of greater power, weapons which

could destroy even deep-earth shelters. In the early Sbcties progressive churches added

"unmoraUty" to thek Ust of reasons for opposmg civU defense. Shehers brought out the

worst m some people, mmisters contended. Some sheher owners were wUUng to gun

down neighbors that demanded entry during an emergency.

More difficult to explain was the Umited response from conservative

congregations. The churches themselves were strong m number and often patriotic. Why

then, were the returns from the FCDA campaigns so smaU? Agam the national character

and FCDA blunders suggest the answer. In the Fifties the deshe for conformity was a

powerful force. To volunteer for civU defense would have necesshated leavuig the safety

of conservative, conformist America and standmg alone. It was unfortunate for the FCDA

that the more progressive reUgious bodies opposed civU defense. Their UberaUty ui a

society dominated by conservatism aheady set them apart. Hence, in one way, they were

better candidates for preparedness than were the members of conservative reUgious

bodies.

During Val Peterson's term as admuiistrator the FCDA adopted a new stategy

for attractmg pubUc support. It released pubUcations and announcements that boasted

highly charged texts, fiUed whh emotional appeals. It was during Peterson's

admmistration that the FCDA securely tied together reUgious and civUian preparedness

motivations and responsibUities. StUl, the years that Peterson headed the Federal CivU

347

Defense Admmistt-ation represent one ofthe periods of greatest mstabUity for the agency.

The one hundred eighty degree shift m strategy from bomb shehers to mass evacuation,

the Lucky Dragon mcident and the rise of pubUc concerns over faUout, the U.S.

government's reluctance to tmthfoUy answer people's questions, aU contributed to the

further decUne of civU defense. Many conservative reUgious Americans were uideed

worried about the nuclear age, but a confused and mept FCDA was not, for them, the

answer.

The Federal CivU Defense Administration and subsequent preparedness

organizations encountered addhional difficuhies when they attempted to chaw large

numbers of women mto civiUan defense. A lack of confidence m preparedness mitiatives

and the need to conform must have weighed heavUy in women's decision to remain aloof

from chil defense. FCDA and OCDM recmhment campaigns also exhibhed a duaUty that

would have exasperated equaUy tradhional-minded and Uberated women.

The FCDA targeted women, because the mles ofthe conservative Fifties society

dictated that men should work m the office from 9 a.m to 5 p.m, and women should tend

to the home. If the Soviets launched an attack at midday, suburban America would be

without male leadership. The FCDA wanted women to step in and fiU this gap in the

country's civUian defense. On the surface, the plan sounded sensi*ble, but the group

targeted and the jobs offered were m conflict. The FCDA tried to enUst the aid of

housewives, tradhional women with a sense of civic responsibUity, but preparedness

leaders asked them to accept poshions of authority that feU outside the normal spheres of

responsibUity occupied by theh gender. CivU defense tracts beckoned women to the

348

warden service. Many warden preattack duties, such as gettmg acquainted whh everyone

m the neighborhood, distributmg leaflets, and teachmg the mdunents of civU defense

would have been considered acceptable for the ttadhional woman. Most Americans

would have perceived a warden's post-attack duties, however, as mascuUne m nattu-e.

After an enemy assault, the FCDA expected the nation's wardens to chase off vandals,

organize crews to clear wreckage and gather the dead, and, m general, assume the role of

block leader. The FCDA asked ttaditional females to take nontradhional jobs. This

confiised strategy did not work. Most housewives who volunteered for civU defense took

courses m first-aid and jomed the welfare services.

There remained to the FCDA those women that were yearning for an opportunity

to test or step outside the spheres to which they had been relegated, but civU defense

Uterature and announcements were fiUed with ambiguous statements and messages. Even

as the FCDA chaUenged women to accept new responsibUities, h remmded them that

participation in civU defense would afford them a chance to exercise theu* nurturing spirits.

They could extend protective arms over the people around them. They could act as

mother hens for their enthe neighborhood. A dual message was apparent in the campaigns

to atttact female recruits. Yet honicaUy, the agency's uiabUity to recognize the dual

nature ofthe United States' Fifties society constituted one ofthe reasons for the feUure of

federal civU defense sttategies.

By the end ofthe Sbcties, h was apparent to the most casual observer that the

U.S.A. was a country divided, and the rift seemed to foUow generational Unes. Through

theh dress, theh music, and theh behavior, many young people openly rejected the

349

traditions and values of theh parents and grandparents. A youth-dommated

counterculture existed separate from, but concurrent with, an older, mamstteam American

society.*^"

The seeds for this dual society were sown during the Fifties and early Sbcties.

The west coast counterculture ofthe Sbcties traced hs roots back to the Beats. Expressmg

then* dissatisfection with a 1950s America nm by business-oriented, warmongering,

conformist "squares," Jack Kerouac, AUen Gmsberg and the Beats sought a more vital

existence through spontaneity, free love, Eastem spirituaUty, and experimentation with

drugs. The "power" movements ofthe latter 1960s arose out of fiiistrations with the slow

pace ofthe civU rights movement and the Umhed gams h had achieved from the 1950s

forward. The Fifties spawned the music of rebeUion, Rock nRoU. Sbcties rockers Janis

JopUn, Junmy Hendrix, the RoUmg Stones, and the Beatles sunply contributed to the

evolution of a sound first made femous by artists such as Little Richard, Chuck Berry,

Buddy HoUy, and Elvis. Lastly, organizations such as SANE laid the groundwork for the

larger "no nuke" and anti-war protests ofthe 1960s and 1970s. American society began

tospUtuithel950s.*^'

CivU defense found acceptance neither whh the older, tradhional, and

conservative majority social group nor the younger, nontradhional, and Uberal mmority

*2 WUUam L. O'NeUl, Coming Apart: An Informal History of America in the 1960's (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 200-227.

*25David Halberstam, The Fifties (New York: VUlard Books, 1993), 295-307: MUton Viorst Fire in the Streets: America in the 1960s (New York: Sunon and Schuster, 1979), 55-88;'and Carl Belz, The Study of Rock, 1954-1966 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).

350

fection. Few statistical surveys of pubUc attittides toward civU defense present the

demographics of dissent, and a first glance at those which provide more complete data

seems to reveal Uttle. Whether young or of a mature age, Americans rejected civU

defense. However, when combmed with an understandmg ofthe dual society that was

bom m the Fifties and came of age m the Sbcties, a close scmtuiy ofthe mformation

compUed by surveyors suggests an answer for the faUure of civUian preparedness

mitiatives m the Sbcties and beyond.*^*

A majority of both older and younger Americans were unwUUng to volunteer for

civU defense, but they refused service for different reasons. Often, those of a mature age

considered the risk of a nuclear war mfinitesunal, or they beUeved the United States'

mUitary would blunt the force of an enemy attack. In ehher scenario, an uidividual's

UkeUhood of becoming the victun of an enemy missUe was mimmal. Survey respondents

who expressed these views belonged to the majority, tradhionaUst, conservative society of

the Fifties. They were optimistic about the foture, and they beUeved ui themselves and

theh country. These were the people that made Norman Vincent Peale's The Power of

Positive Thinking a perennial best-seUer m the Fifties. They were optimistic about the

foture, and with good reason. They had survived the Great Depression. They had seen

fascism, a menace to the world, defeated by the United States and the forces of "good."

As for atomic weapons, the older generation beUeved that they should be embraced.

* *Jui Nehnevajsa, C/v/7 Defense and Society (Office of CivU Defense Research Subtask 4821 A, OCD-OS-62-267, 1964), 34, 41-44; and David K. Berlo et al.. The Fallout Protection Booklet: A Report of Public Attitudes Toward and Information about Civil Defense (East Lansmg: Michigan State University, 1963), 2, and Appendbc 1.

351

"Lhtle Boy" and "Fat Man" had helped the United States defeat Japan m World War II.

An arsenal of nuclear weapons would keep the U.S.A. and hs people free from foreign

dommation during the Cold War.*"

In the early Fifties, civU defense officials recognized that a large number of

Americans seemed to delude themselves mto a false sense of security. Spokespersons for

civU defense, mcludmg President Harry S Truman, noted with alarm the unreaUstic and

possibly dangerous wishful thuikmg that characterized a substantial portion ofthe

population. FCDA records and conespondence do not mdicate, however, that

preparechiess leaders understood the reasons behmd the optunism*^*

Nehher did federal officials recognize that Americans of different age groups

harbored separate concerns about civiUan defense. By 1963 negativism had been growing

in the United States for a decade or longer. Many young Americans rejected the values

and beUefs of theh elders. The members of this rebeUious, teenaged and twenty-

something crowd had not Uved through the Great Depression, nor could a majority

remember the triumphant wave of pride and patriotism that washed over the United States

when atomic detonations m Japan punctuated the end of World War II m 1945. Instead,

*2'Nehnevajasa, C/v/7 Defense, 34, 38,41-44, 60; and Berlo et al., Fallout Protection Booklet, 2 and Appendbc 1.

* *"A PreUmmary Report on PubUc Attitdes Toward CivU Defense...Based on Personal Interviews by the Survey Research Center ofthe University of Michigan, 1951-1951," President's Secretary's FUes document. Folder 11, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, Papers of Harry S Truman [Hereafter HST], Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri; MUlard CaldweU to Robert A. Lovett, n.d.. President's Secretary's FUes document, Folder 11, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST; and Hany S Truman to Robert A. Lovett, 7 Febmary 1952, President's Secretary's FUes document. Folder 11, Box 2, CivU Defense, B FUe, HST.

352

the McCarthy anti-communist witch hunts, the ttumoU ofthe early civU rights movement,

weapons of mass desttiiction and the feUout scare, a space race which the Soviets seemed

to be wummg, the assassmation of a president, these were the events which defined theh

adolescent and young adult Uves. There were reasons for the negative attitudes they

displayed. WhUe a majority of young people remamed ttiie to their parents' ideas, a vocal

mmority of young Americans broke away, jommg protest movements or eventuaUy

becommg part of a counterculture which advocated "droppmg out" ofthe tradhionaUst

society.*^'

The rebel youth ofthe Sixties and Seventies opposed nuclear armaments and

therefore civiUan preparedness as well, but the majority of young people who remained

loyal to theh parents' conservative values also manifested an unwUlingness to support civU

defense. Conformist or nonconformist, radical or reactionary, aU ofthe chUdren ofthe

Fifties witnessed the development of nuclear superweapons and deUvery systems. Most of

these young people became convinced that a nuclear war would destroy humankmd or

would reduce the Earth to such a state that no one would want to Uve on h. Moreover,

even though federal leaders made a conscious effort to present the more poshive aspects

of preparedness, civU defense agencies were m part responsible for encouragmg this

doomsday mentaUty.*'"

CivU defense organizations could not conqjletely avoid projectmg negative

unages. During hs first year of existence, the Federal CivU Defense Admmistration

*2'Viorst, Fire in the Streets, 55-420.

*'"Berlo et al. Fallout Protection Booklet, 2 and Appendbc 1

353

suggested every American make identification tags part of their daUy dress. CivU defense

spokespersons avoided discussmg the need for "dog tags," but the unpUcation was clear.

In the next war, enemy strikes agamst the homefront were Ukely, and many Americans

would be chaned or blasted beyond recognition. Dog tags were for identifymg victuns,

not survivors. StUl, school systems acted upon the FCDA's recommendations and offered

reasonably-priced i.d. necklaces to theh students. In 1952, when President Harry Truman

attended the "Alert America" exhibh that came to the caphol, civU defense personnel gave

him a set of tags. Photos ofthe presentation went to the newspapers. The FCDA wanted

the schools and the president to lead Americans to civU defense, but the dog tag initiative

did not promote the idea that preparedness would save Uves. It suggested that everyone

Ul the United States, mcludmg chUdren at school and the chief executive at the White

House, would be at risk during a nuclear war.*"

EspeciaUy among school-aged chUdren, civU defense drills also contributed to a

growuig sense of foreboduig and helplessness. "Duck and Cover" drUls were common,

and school evacuations were not rare. During the driUs, chUdren whose teachers had told

them ofthe formidible power unleashed by a nuclear detonation must have wondered just

how much protection plaster and brick, or a thui layer of wood, afforded. Sbcties student

activist Todd GhUn later recorded the feeUngs he and his classmates experienced during

civU defense exercises. GhUn first described the driUs themselves: "Every so often, out of

the blue a teacher would pause m the middle of class and caU out, 'Take Cover!' We

*""The Alert America Convoy Comes to Washmgton," 3, FUes of Spencer R. Quick, HST; and Federal CivU Defense, "FCDA Urges Every CivUian to Wear Identification Tag," The Civil Defense Alert 1, no. 7 (1951): 10.

354

knew then to scramble under our mmiattu-e desks and to stay there, cramped, heads folded

under our arms, untU the teacher caUed out, 'AU clear!'" He noted, "Under the desks and

crouched m the haUways, tenors were ignited...[w]e could never quite take for granted

that the world we had been bom mto was destmed to endure." GhUn refened to hunself

and his feUow students as "the first generation compeUed from uifancy to fear not only war

but the end of days. "*'

GhUn and his fiiends were fiightened by the "duck and cover" drUls ofthe Fifties

and Sixties, but FCDA-sponsored community exercises were even more Ukely to foster a

sense of doom in young Americans' minds. In many post-attack sunulations, civU defense

personnel asked chUdren to act as casualties of a nuclear strike. Some ofthe young

people "made beUeve" they had broken bones, abrasions, and cuts. Others suffered from a

mUd case of radiation skkness. StiU others foUowed the instmctions of civU defense

officers and pretended to be dead or dying. In 1955, a number ofthe students that

participated m Arkansas's "Operation Able" school evacuations were designated as

criticaUy-Ul victuns of radiation.*" In Texas, the Beaumont area "Operation Mercy"

exercises boasted "reaUstic casualties made up of Boy Scouts and medical students aU

tagged with theh particular mjury."*'" After civU defense volunteers "processed" the

*' Todd GhUn, The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage (New York: Bantam Books, 1987), 22-23.

*"Mattie TreadweU, Actuig Regional Admuiistrator, Region 5, to Dhector, PubUc Affau-s Office, Federal CivU Defense Admmistration, 24 May 1955, Folder: I.E.l, Test Exercises (Various), Book 8, I.D. 17 to I.I.A2, Office FUes ofthe Director, RG 396, National Archives Branch Deposhory, Fort Worth, Texas.

*'""Operation Mercy," C/v/7 Defense Newsbriefs, 2, no. 5 (1955)

355

casualties through a sortmg station, emergency vehicles carried the wounded to "the

emergency field hospital located at Averil Elementary School," where sbc- to twelve-year-

old students got a good look at the victuns of a nuclear attack.*" The FCDA not only

sanctioned, h recommended the use of juvenUes for casualty sunulation.*'*

During duck and cover school exercises, Todd GhUn hid under a desk and

worried about the foture, his thoughts nmnuig wUd. He wrote, "Under the

desks...existentialists were bom." How many more chUdren were permanently affected by

the sight of "dead" comrades or by a forced stmt on a stretcher, pretenduig to be wounded

or a corpse? Instead of creatmg a youthful army of civiUan defenders, preparedness

leaders and the official practices of civUian defense agencies contributed to the rise of

nuclear fears and negativism among the young.

CivU defense never became an accepted and valued part ofthe Fifties society, or

societies, that existed m the United States from 1945 to 1963. A host of poUtical, social,

and technological fectors contributed to the perpetuaUy depressed state of preparedness

programs, but civU defense also faUed ui hs bid to find popular acceptance because h feU

mto a gap between two generations. Older, tradhional, poshive Americans saw no reason

for civU defense because they considered the risk of nuclear war or the possibUity of

Soviet missUes penetratuig U.S. defenses to be negUgible. The members of a younger,

uncertaui, negative generation refosed civUian preparedness because they contended more

*""Operation Mercy," C/v/7 Defense Newsbriefs 2, no. 5 (1955).

*'*Federal CivU Defense Admmistration, Tentative Guide: Method for Conducting Field Exercises (Washmgton, D.C: Federal CivU Defense Admmistration, 1953), 15-17, 31.

356

no defense, whether con^)rised of active miUtary or passive civUian measures, or both,

would provide substantial protection from nuclear weapons. They beUeved mUUons of

people would die when the bombs feUs, and mUUons more would perish from the effects of

residual radiation. FaUout would render vast swaths of land uninhabitable for centuries.

Civilization would come to an end, and possibly aU Ufe on the Earth would be

extuiguished. Civilian defense leaders did not foUy understand the society that they

targeted. And since civU defense was a social program dependent upon the wUUng

participation of every man, woman, and chUd m the United States, h could succeed only if

those responsible for hs promotion accurately identified and caphaUzed on the

characteristics of American society.

357

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