CASE STUDIES

3.1 KHUDA-KI-BASTI - INNOVATION AND SUCCESS IN SHELTERING THE POOR PAKISTAN

Background This scheme was initiated by the former Director General ofHyderabad Development Authority (HDA) in 1986. Restrictive governmentalprocess such as allotment procedures, allocation of loan against landmortgage or land/property ownership provision for speculative purposes,were replaced with unconventional and innovative approaches. Some examplesinclude: targeting needy households; simplification of bureaucraticprocedures; optimizing choice of relocation; providing urban basic servicesincrementally through community involvement; providing housing creditfacilities to every household; creating direct rapport with thecommunities; and periodically monitoring the development process. Thefirst incremental housing scheme (KKB) was developed at Gulshan-e-Shahbaznear Hyderabad and has since been followed by four similar schemes invarious parts of Sindh Province including Karachi. This innovative approachof incremental housing by HDA has proved itself to be a viable alternativeto the public sector's attempts to provide housing for urban poor. Itrepresents a change in the World Bank administered sites and serviceshousing programmes by allocating the service provisions in incrementsaccording to the land holder's need and their ability to pay.

Narrative Khuda-Ki-Basti (KKB) or "God's settlement" is a new experiment inlow-income housing projects. The KKB, Project has been developed inHyderabad as a part of the large Gulshan-e-Shahbaz Scheme by HyderabadDevelopment Authority (HDA). The main scheme was a conventional sites andservices scheme, where serviced plots were provided at the expense of alarge public capital. Most of these plots are still lying vacant, while inKKB, Low-income people have progressively constructed their houses on self-help basis and provided basic utility services, through communityparticipation on an incremental basis. Thus, the success of KKB providesevidence in favour of the idea that incrementally developing houses andhousing services offer the most cost-effective and affordable option ofdeveloping lively habitats for the urban poor. Another important element ofthe KKB Project is that it encourages, rather induces, people to undertakeimmediate construction of houses. In conventional sites and services

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schemes colossal amounts of public money is wasted by the degeneration offacilities not used for decades because the plots are used as safeinvestments and are sold and resold many times before final construction ofhouses takes place. Conventional public housing as well as sites andservices schemes are unaffordable for the low-income group owing to hightransportation costs to centres of employment, the enforcement of buildingstandards and the high costs of infrastructure. In the past three decades,local authorities in Pakistan have developed a large number of sites-and-services schemes, but they have been unable to reach those most in need ofshelter. A UN document (UNCHS, 1991) summarizes the KKB Project as follows:

Description of the Project In an attempt to reach the lowest income groupsin Hyderabad, HDA launched an incremental development scheme. The scheme isbased on the idea that people should settle before houses andinfrastructure are constructed and that, once settled, they can developtheir housing and the infrastructure incrementally, as and when they havethe resources. The incremental development scheme in Hyderabad imitates theapproach followed by the illegal subdividers: it is characterized by easeof entry, immediate delivery of the plot and incremental development of thehouses and the infrastructure. HDA initially recruited illegal subdividersto assist the agency in the identification and settling of low incomefamilies in the incremental development scheme. The scheme, KKB providesinitially only 80 square yard plots and water supply through water tankers.HDA requires a low income family in need of shelter to spend, initially,two weeks in a reception area to prove its urgent need for shelter. Then,the HDA allocates a plot upon the payment of Rs.1000 (US$30) which coversthe full cost of the plot. The family has to live on the plot permanently.The plot is repossessed if found unoccupied; this reduces absenteeownership and speculation. HDA does not set any standards for housing, andthis enables the allottees to build their houses according to theirindividual needs and resources. Once settled, the allottee is urged to makeregular payments into a neighbourhood account, so that the provision ofinfrastructure can be financed, once sufficient funds have beenaccumulated. This eliminates the need for cost recovery. A disadvantage ofKKB is its location, about half an hour from the city of Hyderabad bypublic transport. The industrial zone of the Sindh Industrial TradingEstate is not far away, but the project's low income families, who earnedtheir daily income mainly from informal-sector activities in Hyderabad,faced quite some hardship when they settled in KKB. Furthermore, residentsof KKB had to travel regularly to Hyderabad in the initial phase of thescheme, when the settlement did not have many shops and public services;this made transport one of the costliest items in their budget.Fortunately, conditions are gradually improving, with the settlement of

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more households and the growth of the commercial and small industry sector.Although there is need for improvement of the approach, the results of thefirst three years of the incremental development scheme are quiteencouraging. Some 2800 families have settled in KKB and many have been ableto construct semi-permanent houses. In those blocks which have been able todevelop a strong community organization, water supply, a sewer system andelectricity are already available. Other blocks have, however, not beenable to develop any infrastructure, owing to a lack of leadership: if theycan not manage soon to acquire some basic infrastructure without an up-front payment and re-introduce the need for cost recovery. It is essentialfor the success of the scheme that the population be organized at blocklevel and be urged to make regular payments into the block account forinfrastructure. An agency, such as the HDA does not have the capacity todevelop and organize communities, and to train local leaders. Therefore,for the success of such a scheme, it would probably be best to settleexisting low income communities, rather than individual families, or toorganize communities before settlement. This would imply the followingsequence of settlement: PEOPLE--> LAND--> HOUSING--> INFRASTRUCTURE Oncethe allottees have been settled, the housing agency could hand over thescheme to a non-governmental organization (NGO) and the NGO could organizethe communities, train leaders, assist the population to save money forinfrastructure and advise the community to construct the infrastructure ona self-help basis, as is being done in the Orangi Pilot Project, Karachi.

Impact and Assessment of the Project: An evaluation of KKB Project wascarried out by Dr. Jan van der Linden in 1993. The highlights of thisevaluation are presented below: Specific features of HDA's approach in KKBhave been:

a. Its selective adopting of methods which have proven successful ininformal land supply system;

b. The flexibility in the approach; and

c. Several attempts to organize the inhabitants of the scheme.

Although it is not possible to reconstruct all financial details of thecreation and running of KKB, it appears that the scheme is financiallyviable, while importantly, it does not entail major financial outlays, norrisks, on the executing agency's part. The evaluation's aim is to findanswers to a number of questions requiring attention if replication of KKBis considered. More in particular the following subjects have beenconsidered:

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a. The performance of the targeting strategy;

b. The degree to which the approach encourages urbanization;

c. The performance of physical design criteria;

d. The affordability, both to the target group and the executing agency;

e. The potential of mechanisms to enhance community organizations;

f. Staff requirements;

g. The division of roles between the actors involved.

For the investigation, use was made of written reports and statements.Besides, a survey was carried out among a sample of KKB's residents and anumber of interviews were taken from different actors involved. a. Theperformance of the targeting strategy; By 1993, over 35% of theinhabitants have obtained their plots from actors other than HDA. Alsoabout 35% have passed through the reception area. A large majority of theinhabitants support cancellation of vacant plots/houses, at least in theinitial stages of the settlement. People's support for the concept of thereception area is also high, although complaints were voiced about the wayit was executed. It appeared that this procedure has been particularlyprone to misuse. From the different instruments used in KKB for the sakeof targeting, some appear to be absolutely indispensable, viz.: a) theincremental nature of the scheme; b) the continuous availability of plot;c) the issuing of dwelling permits only, so that vacant houses/plots can becancelled; and d) a simple, one-window bureaucratic procedure, to beperformed on the spot. On the other hand, for all its merits, the receptionareas as a sieve to select genuine applicants would under averageconditions be too prone to misuse. b. The degree to which the ApproachEncourages Urbanization The data obtained in KKB bear out very clearlythat there is no question of KKB having stimulated rural urban migration.c. The Performance of Physical Design Criteria As regards the physicaldesign, a somewhat less liberal use of land especially for open groundsshould be considered. Smaller building blocks and the introductions of semipublic space might enhance community cohesion. Expert advice should besought for the design of a sewerage system. d. The Affordability both tothe Target Group and the Executing Agency The affordability of the housingoption offered in KKB to very poor households is beyond any doubt, while itis difficult to think of options which are cheaper and less risky to theexecuting agency. e. The Potential of Mechanisms to Enhance CommunityOrganizations Ways to enhance community representations and accountability

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of the executing team. Community organization can come about only fromwithin the community itself. Outside agencies can at most try and createoptimal conditions for this and provide assistance or advice. Suchconditions include good access to the executing agency, unambiguous andfull information on financial matters, on rights and duties of thedifferent actors etc. Secondly, as suggested above, some designcharacteristics could perhaps enhance community cohesion. NGOs can provideassistance or advice, but should never try to organize for the population,nor handle their money. f. Staff Requirements As regards theadministration of a project along the lines of KKB, a rule of thumb is thatthe very approach implies that a major part of the management burden isshifted away from the executing agency to the users of the project.Accordingly, staff requirements should be modest. At the same time, theremaining tasks for the executing agency should be performed as well and asefficiently as is possible. For the design, the inputs form a professionalplanner, a civil engineer and a financial expert are indispensable duringthe planning phase, while they would have a supervisory/controlling roleduring execution. For the issuing and registration/cancelling of plots, theregular presence in a site office of an officer conversant withadministrative and accounting tasks is required until some time after allplots have been occupied. g. The Division of Roles among the ActorsInvolved. Major actors are the public sector and the inhabitants of ahousing scheme; other actors, such as the private sector and NGOs have aspecific, secondary role, under average conditions, there probably is norole for the dallal', in a replication scheme. Now after a period of 8years, around 2800 plots have been allotted and the population is about18,000 persons. Five doctors provide health services alongwith permanenthealth care unit of Family Planning Association of Pakistan. Private busesply after every 30 minutes. There are 110 shops to serve the daily need ofthe population. More than 247 carpet looms provide jobs to at least 600persons. In 8 years residents have collected and spent some 5.0 millionRupees in water supply, sewerage and electrification in the Basti.Presently every house has electricity and indoor water supply. Over 2000houses have already been built. The most important fact is that theallottees have occupied their plots and they live there as they built theirhouses. Nearly all families started with reed-huts and within a shortperiod all houses have been converted into permanent structures. However,majority of the roofs are still not weather proof. Income generatingschemes, which are mostly family enterprise, have also been started in thescheme by arranging loans between Rs.2500-25000 (US$75-750) without anycollateral. Within the last 4 years Rs.900000 (US$27270) have beendisbursed to 70 applicants. The family enterprises have provided regularincome to some 150 families, one third being single parent female-headed.

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The scheme has shown that housing activity can very easily be used as astarting point for an overall community development process. All othersocial sector activities like primary education, immunization, familyplanning, social forestry and much needed credit for economic prosperitycan be successfully dovetailed once the community is organized. The KKBexperiment has shown that even without bringing about basic changes in thepower structure of the society, without changing the unequal relationshipbetween government and the slum dwellers and even without any definiteprogramme in favour of the 'wretched of the earth', development agenciescan successfully assume the role of 'informal' sector as its strategy isperhaps the only answer to provide shelter to the urban poor at the presenttime.

Impact 1. 2800 Low income families or a population of about 18000 obtainedshelter through self-help and incremental development. 2. Governmentagency's role changed to that of a facilitator and supporter of a shelterprogramme. 3. 2800 low income families organized themselves to developinfrastructure incrementally without obtaining loans from conventionalfinancial organizations. 4. About 3000 low income plots saved from landspeculators and land grabbers. 5. About 600 jobs created in the cottageindustry (carpet looms) developed in the houses of KKB.

Sustainability Khuda-Ki-Basti (KKB) is a sustainable project because it isbased on the principles of full cost recovery, affordability for low-incomepeople, public participation, incremental development of houses andinfrastructure, public private partnership, and community organization. Itreplicates the methods used by squatters in the development of squattersettlements, yet it is successful in developing a legal, planned andhealthy residential environment for low-income people. While theconventional public housing schemes and even sites and services have provedto be unaffordable for low income people, the KKB has been successful inproviding affordable shelter to the urban poor. The main feature of the KKBis its incremental development approach applied on a self-help basis. Thisapproach effectively reduces the cost of development of houses andinfrastructure and eliminates the problems of cost recovery. Since theproject induces the people to take up immediate construction of theirhouses, the practice of land speculation is avoided. One of the majorachievements of KKB is the organization of low income communities whichbecomes an asset for the future maintenance and sustenance of theinfrastructure developed on self-help basis. More projection the KKB modelcan bring positive change in the role of public sector, which should act asfacilitator and supporter of the low-income housing efforts rather thanprovider.

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Contact Khuda Ki Basti Gulshan-e-Shahbaz Hyderabad Sindh, Pakistan

Sponsor Pakistan Environmental Planning & Architectural ConsultantsManaging Director, PEPAC Ltd. 58 Abu Bakar Block New Garden Town LahorePunjab Pakistan 54600 009242-5868745, Fax 5868742

Partners Saiban (NGO), Karachi, Pakistan. Syed Mohammad Irfan, MD (PEPACLtd.) 58 Abu Bakar Block New Gardon Town Lahore Punjab Pakistan 54600009242-5868745 Director General, Hyderabad Development Authority, PakistanSiddiqui, Tasneem Ahmad, Chairman SAIBAN GRE-319 (2-B) BRITTO ROAD KARACHISind Pakistan 74800 00921-7219055, FAX 7219049

3.2 HDA’S BOLD EXPERIMENT

One of the major problems faced by the cities of developing countries intransitional stage of economy is housing shortage. The presence of thenumber of un-authorised settlers, the so-called katchi abadis, slums,bastis are clear indicators of such process and problems that have beennightmares for the city planners.

Hyderabad (Pakistan) is also one of such cities in which the number ofunauthorisedly settled families range around 30,000 and the figure isconstantly on the increase.

As per rough estimates the present housing shortage and requirement ofadditional housing from over spill, rented dwelling and congestedenvironments in around 52,000 housing units. The figure of congestion isdepicted in the 1981 housing census which shows that 35,000 housing unitsaccommodate 6 to 9 persons in one room only, 500 housing units have 14persons living in one room.

To solve the housing shortage HDA initially resorted to the conventionalapproach of sites and services schemes.

In this sort of schemes, land is sub-divided into plots, carpeted roads areprovided alongwith door to door water supply, sewerage disposal lines,electricity and gas etc, and the combination of a number of such plots isknown as sites and services scheme. The development of plots is downthrough the money received from the allottees mostly in annual installmentsspread over a period of two to three years.

As far as mode of allotment is concerned it is regulated through SindhDisposal of Plots Ordinance 1980 which contains certain ratios of allotmentof quotas covering general public, government servants, professionals, men

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of letters, etc. Under the above ordinance applications are invited throughwide publicly in news-papers and allotment made through ballot if thenumber of applications exceed the number of available plots. In biggercities the population growth rates do not leave the possibility ofutilizing the if. The number of applications are many many times more thanthe plots and hence allotment is always by ballot.

It is an established fact that investment in real estate has proved to bethe safest and most profitable business. People also purchase plots as acushion against galloping inflation as well as dowry for their daughters.In view of these factors whenever a new housing scheme is announced,speculators with huge sums of money at their disposal apply in scores offorms reducing the chances of allotment of plots to the needy.

HDA initiated its first housing scheme in 1979 and over a persons of 8years has developed disposed off about 15,000 plots. It is a surprisingfact that though such a large number of plots have been developed, but only35 plots have been constructed and occupied while 44 are underconstruction. The gap between provision of plots and habitation is quiteintriguing if it is juxtaposed with the housing back-log in Hydarabad.

This revelation led HDA to the clear deduction that somehow HDA,s housingpolicy was not compatible with the sociology and economics of the poorersections of the society i.e the group most desperately in need of shelter.

HDA also realized that to meet the housing requirement of the needy poor,the provision of shelter should have the following basic considerationstuned to the requirement of the target group.

1. Procedure of allotment.2. Affordability.3. Timelag between application, allotment and possession.

The lacunae in procedure of allotment by ballot and its result have beenmentioned above.

Regarding affordability, at the present (1986) scheduled rate fixed by thegovernment and with all the components of development as discussed earlierthe occupancy value of an 80 Sq.yd. plot without any subsidy comes toaround Rs. 12,000.

Spreading the scheme on 3 years we have annual installments of roughly Rs.3000. The average limit of installment being around 25% requires Rs. 3000to be paid alongwith the application and further requirement of 25% at thetime of issuance of allotment order doubles the financial strain on the low

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income group. The period between application and allotment does not involvea period more than one year forcing low income persons to arrange for Rs.6000 in a year.

The question is: If a person can save Rs. 6000 in a year, can he beclassified as belonging to low income group?

Statistics show that 80% of urban poor earn around Rs. 1000 per month andwith this earning if we expect him to save Rs. 6000 in a year for a housingscheme as above, we could definitely be living in a fools paradise.

The timelag between application and possession ranges around 5 years. Onereason is the developer agencies insistence on possession after fulldevelopment of plots with all the services. The result being that theurgent requirements of housing cannot be met. The housing authorities thusdo not have any provision for providing immediate shelter or even immediatebasis of shelter i.e. a plot of land, the result is formation of katchiabadis.

Katchi Abadies form as dallals (brokers) spot a piece of land (in mostcases belonging to the Board of Revenue or any other government/ localagency), divide it into small size plots (ranging between 80 to 240 sq.yd.), indicate the road alignment arrange water supply either throughtankers or by constructing a small tank with service taps, and finallyprovide artisanal skills, and in some cases construction material, oncredit.

The initial requirement of a shelterless family is only a parcel of landwith source of water near by or at hand. He does not require compactedroads or drainage disposal facility of electricity at the initial stage.This one the one hand, enables the shelterless persons to settleimmediately with minimum investment. Other facilities like drainagedisposal etc have been and can be very successfully done by the residentsthemselves on cooperative basis if properly motivated (as in the OrangiPilot Project).

Thus the dallal provides the basic requirement of a shelterless family andsolves their immediate problem of shelter. His strategy has been verysuccessful in the informal sector giving instant results because he makesavailable plots at affordable prices, there is no time lag betweenallotment and possession and so no paper work is involved.

The provision of shelter through the informal sector, formation of KatchiAbadis and development of infrastrucuture on cooperative basis was studied

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in detail by the HDA to evolve a housing strategy in accordance with therequirements of the target group.

The analysis resulted in the introduction of the scheme by the name ofincremental development scheme.

Initially plot sizes of 80 sq. yds. Were earmarked at site. The targetgroup was selected by the HDA with the help of councilors and socialworkers of the target area. The target group were broadly categorized underthe following classification who indicated their urgent need of shelterduly attested by the area councilors and area social workers:-

1. Over spill i.e. families living in inadequate and insufficientaccommodations, purely spatial criteria.

2. Persons living on rent.3. Retired government servants belonging to lower grades.4. Government servants on verge of retirement.

The over spill was calculated on the basis of 120 sft. Per person.Regarding the affordability of payment of development charges the minimumsaving capacity of a family for housing was found to range around Rs. 50per month only.

Based on the above guidelines. Master Plan Department HDA launched a pilotproject in Gulshan-e-Shahbaz in sector D6 and E4 which were initiallyplanned for residential plots of 80 sq. yds. Only. The staff of HDAearmarked the target region and with the help of area councilors and socialworkers prepared a list of families falling in the categories listed above.

Application forms were distributed at the residence of the applicants andRs. 460 was recovered as an initial deposit which included Rs. 10 for theapplication form.

The applicants were called at site and physical possession of an 80 sq. yd.Plot given to them, alongwith a formal allotment order.

Initially the terms of allotment required that they complete theirconstruction within one year. The choice of building material was left tothem. The only building regulations they were to follow was to leave a 3ft. corridor at the rear of their plot to enable them to provide a windowfor cross ventilation. The period for completing the work was kept on theliberal side as the allottees had assured us that the moment they weregiven possession of the plots, they would start their construction orJhuggis and shift to the new accommodation. Howev3er, the applicants did

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not honour their commitment. Only two applicants raised the constructionabove plinth level while 9 others laid only plinths, which merely served asplot demarcation lines. The other 21 plots remained vacant for 15 days.

Since the desired results were not forthcoming. HDA staff started worryingand further research on the project revealed that 50% of the applicantscould not raise enough funds to start any construction work, while theremaining 50% after receiving their allotment order were satisfied with asense of ownership, as they thought that HDA could not take any actionagainst them in view of the legal allotment orders and the fact that theirwas one full year to complete the construction.

HDA then instantly discontinued issuance of formal allotment orders andreviewed the whole strategy. In the new approach no title documents wereissued to the allottees. Instead only the physical possession of the plotswould be given and any documents to be issued is kept in abeyance till thefamily had constructed the house and started living their. In order toassess the feasibility of the scheme and to identify the most needy group,the period of construction was reduced to 3 months only.

There was still not much response by the allottees. The possession of plotwas considered enough by the applicants. Who should start first? This timeHDA found that the main reason was lack of initiative.

HDA waited for 15 days and then started canceling all the previousallocations. Simultaneously, plots were allotted to the new applicants whowere on the waiting list. This time with the following instructions:

1. The applicant must start construction immediately and maintain asteady construction pace so as to shift his family to the plotwithin a month.

2. If the applicant failed to start the construction the next day,the allocation would be cancelled and the plot re-allotted to thenext needy from the waiting list.

3. The allocation would remain valid as long as this allottee wasmaintaining a steady, pace of construction. If for 3 consecutivedays no construction work was noticed on the plot the allocationwould be cancelled and plot re-allotted.

4. The plot would be non-transferable except by way of inheritance.

5. The applicants whose allocation would be cancelled would loosetheir priority and be forfeited. Their names would be entered

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again as per waiting list maintained by HDA. This chance will begiven only once.

This policy was strictly adhered to and a number of plots were cancelledand a re-allotted from the waiting list. This step made it very clear, thatthe HDA meant business and only those person should therefore, come forwardwho were seriously in need of plots to build their own house.

The result of this policy was encouraging and within one month 13applicants resided in their houses. 212 laid their plinths and 110 putJhuggis were they resided during the day time only. Further 89 familiesconstructed their houses with one or two rooms upto roof level, all within1 ½ months.

While the system of identification through area representative andallotment was going on as per list prepared, some of the families could notwait for their turn of allotment despite being recommended by thecouncilors. What they did was that that they shifted their families fromtheir previous premises alongwith their household articles came to theincremental site and sat on a plot on which only the plinth was laid byprevious allottee. This phenomena indicated that the ongoing system ofallotment was inadequate in the sense that it did not cater for theemergencies and would therefore not help in eliminating illegal squattingwhich was one of the equally major aims of this scheme.

This incidence indicated that those who bring their families and all household items at site for allotment of plot would be more genuinely interestedto have a shelter of their own and in turn would therefore be facing equalpush forces from their previous settlement. Could HDA work out a scheme toaccommodate this phenomena in a systematic manner? This was the nextquestion faced by HDA.

The HDA then came out with the answer of reception area scheme within theincremental scheme. An open plot of land used as a reception area. Thosefamilies who were in immediate need of shelter were required to bring alltheir families with their entire household items. They were then placed inthe reception area, where they erected make shift house. These familieswere observed for 5 to 10 days and being satisfied with their sincerity theHDA earmarked regular plots of 80

COST OF CONSTRUCTION 10” X 10”TypeRoom SiteMaterial

Stoping roof-One Room10’ x 10’Bricks + Thatched roof

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MortarWall thicknessCOMPONENTBricks-2500 to 3000Labour-One Mistry 2 Labourersfor 3 daysDoorRoofBeam-WoodSupports (wood) 14 to 16Chatai 8Sarkan 12’ x 18’ (One)

SupervisionContractor ProfitApproximately

Mud Roof & Wall9”PRICERs. 1,000 to Rs.1,200Rs. 480 to Rs.810Rs. 120….to Rs130

Rs. 60 to Rs100Rs. 112 to Rs.128Rs. 60 to Rs80Rs. 55 to Rs60Rs. 1,887 Rs.2,208Rs. 120 Rs.120Rs. 2.007 Rs.2,328Rs. 2,000 Rs.2,300

Sq. yards and advised them to shift their Jhuggi (make shift) house to thenew location and build adequate shelter while living in the same premises.Thus evolving the concept of live and build.

This scheme was initiated on 2nd Nov. 1986 and by 18th Nov. 1986 as much as350 families shifted to their regular plots through the stages of receptionarea and are residing there. No family who passed through the receptionarea scheme left their premises.

At a later stage some observations were received from some white collarfamilies whose social pattern of living discouraged them from living inJhuggi especially because of women folk observing purdah. This aspect wasstudied and different proposals were examined to evolve a low cost room tohouse such families who are needy but cannot afford being passed through

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reception area scheme. This group belonged to the lower middle class havingstricter norms, different from lowest income group.

An allottee of this scheme belonging to a rural area had constructed a roomof bricks with mud plaster, thatched roof again coated with mud. Half theheight of the wall was 9 inch thick while upper half was 4 inch thick. Theroof was supported by central beam of heftier wood. Total cost was Rs.1,500 only. This price was very reasonable and it was decided to open thescheme for white collar persons immediately in need of shelter. Theirregisteration was done separately and they deposited Rs. 2,000.

Thus this scheme also successfully solved the problem of the low middleclass, as well. Further development in constructed unit scheme isutilization of blocks instead of bricks involving Rs. 2,250 only.

The present procedure of allotment is that the desirous family submitsphoto copy of their NIC (National Identity Card) to HDA. The cards arenumbered and date of submission stamped. The HDA picks out 20 families eachaccording to the serial number every Friday and puts upto the notice onsite informing them to bring their families and household items within oneweek of such notice.

On contact with their families they are issued a card for reception area onreceipt of Rs. 460 only as installment of occupancy value. This amount wasfixed after detailed survey as to what was the extent of affordable downpayment of the target groups. The responses indicated the figure of Rs. 460per month. After receipt of the card the family settles in the receptionarea and are watched for some days before being shifted to regular plots.They are followed by the next 20 families on the list, to the receptionarea.

The total cost of the plot, has been fixed at Rs. 9,600. This would includewater supply, sewerage lines, and carpeted roads. Electricity was providedon receipt of the charges in easy installments of Rs. 50 per month in 1980,and proportionally increased by its 20 till 1000. After 1980, the receiptof development charges would be fixed at Rs. 110 per month.

To solve the water problem initially one water tank was constructed by HDAfollowed by 2 more water tanks by the allottees on a cooperative basis.Initially the tanks were supposed to cater for drinking water facilitiesand limited construction activities but the settlers started constructingbrick houses which needed vast quantities of water. To cover this aspect 8inch water line was arranged externally where public stand posts wereerected to solve the problem.

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However HDA found that if any facility is provided through a formalinstitution indirectly, the sense of belonging to the service lines to thebeneficiaries is very weak. At the initial stage HDA laid nylon pipes toprovide temporary water supply facility to some families who had resided inthe scheme. After two days the tee joints were found missing. The knobs atpublic stand posts were found missing one morning and then one fine morningthe entire pipe of 400 ft length was found missing.

This changed the thinking of HDA and thenceforth it was decided that thelane residents would contribute directly for their required level ofservices. A nylon pipe laid by lane residents remains undamaged. Anincident was also noted that a person while crossing an excavated trenchfor sewerage lines carelessly dropped some earth into the pit. He stopped,brought to shovel and cleaned the trench voluntarily before proceedingfurther. He was in effect directly taking care of his own work.

Every resident of lane now chooses their lane leader who is contributingfor their desired services. One lane has applied for sewerage lines anotherfor water line and work is in progress. A committee of the residents havebeen formed to oversee the allotment/

A primary school has been opened by them, a doctor provides part timemedical facilities to the resident and the scheme is thus on the way forprovision of shelter to the homeless on incremental and cooperative basis.

COST OF CONSTRUCTION 10” X 10”TypeRoom SizeBuilding MaterialMortar - RoofWall Excavation for PlinthBlocks 450Cement 3 BagsSand 100 CftWater ChargesLabourDoorChatai 6 Nos. 5’ x 10’Sarkan 12’ x 18’ Beam WoodenRoof Supports wooden 20 Nos.@ Rs.5

Stoping roof-One Room10’ x 12’Bricks for walls &Thatched roofMud with Sarkan &ChataiCementRs. 30 -6” to 1Rs. 700Rs. 210Rs. 100Rs. 40Rs. 560Rs. 120Rs. 60Rs 60Rs. 55

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Building material rent

SupervisionTotal

Rs. 100Rs. 48Rs.2,083Rs. 167Rs. 2,250

3.3 A NEW STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH THE CONTINUED GROWTH OF SLUMSIN PAKISTAN

Like other developing countries hyper urbanization in Pakistan during thelast 30-35 years has been an unprecedented phenomenon. Unfortunately rapidurban growth in almost all developing countries has been associated withpathological growth of urban slums. This is not to say that we areunderplaying the problems of unemployment, crime, traffic congestion,pollution and lack of basic civic services like water, sewerage,electricity, transport and facilities for education, health andentertainment.

It is very intriguing that inspite of all government efforts to stop thisphenomenon and inspite of evolution and application of new alternativestrategies for development, both by national and international agencies,urban slums continue to proliferate with each passing day.

Why has this mass migration and exodus of topic historic proportions takenplace? What are its determinants and context, its reasons, causes?

Paul Harrison in this book “Inside The Third World” while describing theplight of the urban poor has very aptly remarked. “Migration is a symptomof rural poverty and of urban privilege”. The lead cannot provide the ruralpoor with a job, so migration is most cases is like a plea for employment,courageous expression of the willingness to work more than the poor soil orthe unjust society of the home area will allow them to. It is not easy tomigrate, through. For most people it means going into exite, leaving thesupportive network of the extended family. It is a last resort, when allhave failed

Continued growth of urban slums has become a fact of life with us, and willbe so till our cities reach the saturation point….. or burst at the seams.In the foreseeable future this trend cannot be stopped , alternate orreverse, notwithstanding all high pitched stoganooring and empty rhtorics.Reason “political priories manifested through economic strategies are the

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root cause, rural to urban migration the observed malady. Since structuralchanges followed by a turn around in the economic development strategycannot be brought about, our priorities will not change and the landless,near landless, unemployed and underemployed people from the rural areaswill continue to migrate to the big cities and slums will keep on growingor expanding.

But, then how to meet their housing needs? Should we allow them to squatwherever they like and in whatever manner they like and make theamelioration plans for them afterwards? Or, should the government meettheir shelter needs on their arrival in the cities by providing them withbare necessities and keep on improving their living conditions with theircooperation and participation gradually?

On this short paper we have tried to make an in depth study of thephenomenon of continued growth of squatters slums (or katchi abadies as wefondly call them) and reasons for government failure in controlling themfrom a slightly different angle.

We have also tried to analyse public policies for sheltering the urban poorfocusing on their short-coming and pitfalls. Having done that, an attempthas been made to explore the problem further keeping in view thesociological and economic factors like income distribution in Pakistan,rate of saving, cost of housing and the problems connected with theimmediacy of need in having a shelter in big cities like Karachi andHyderabad.

The second portion of this paper suggests an alternative strategy forsheltering the urban poor at affordable prices and without any timelagbetween allotment and possession of land with basic necessities of life. Itgives the details of successful housing project started by HDA to meet theimmediate housing need of the poorer sections of our society.

It is hoped that this short paper will provide useful guidelines to thosedevelopment practioners, planners, sociologists, community workers, andofficials belonging to the national and international agencies who areinterested in finding out a long term, low-cost and meaningful solution ofthis massive and complicated problems at micro level.

Urbanization is world-wide phenomenon. During the last 200 years, the paceof urbanization has accelerated to the extent that today we are on thethreshold of living in a world that is numerically more urban than rural.It has been estimated that by the turn of the century, the majority ofworld’s population will be living in the urban rather than rural places.

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This rapid transformation form a rural to a heavily urbanized world oftoday and the consequent development has a way of life have been far moredramatic spectacular and the population explosion itself.

Migration for work is accelerating in the Third World. Some of it floodstowards cities. A few migrants may be following some vague dream of the bigcity and sophisticated lifestyle. The majority are driven by thenecessities of survival.

Here, we need not go into the contexts and determinants of immigration nordo we intend to concentrate on policies and programs which influencemigration from rural areas to the cities. This is a separate subject andneeds a detailed study.

The intention here is to look at the policies both government and privatewhich have been tried from time to time to solve the housing problem of theurban poor and reasons for their failure, and try to find out what can bethe long term, low-cost, practical solution of this massive problem.

A study of the income distribution in Pakistan is necessary because theeffective demand for housing in static terms is a function of income levelsand the price of housing (and other goods)

Per capita income and its distribution among house holds along with theprice of housing establish the amount of housing that a particular familycan afford. Over time, demand is determined by increases in family income,changes in the distribution of income, and the rate of household formation,which in turn depends upon population growth and the size of households.

According to survey data collected by Karachi Development Authority in1974, 80% households in Karachi had an income of Rs. 500 or less, 14%earned Rs. 500 to 2,000 and only 6% families earned more than Rs, 1,000/-per month which is bare minimum for a family of seven persons.

It is pertinent to note that according to these sources, the rate ofunemployment in Karachi is over 15 %. This rate is as high 20% in low-income areas. Reliable data for under-employment and seasonal unemploymentis not available but keeping in view the high unemployment rate thesefigures can be well imagined.

It is also interesting to know that low-income households spendapproximately 70% of their income on food and clothing.

Juxtaposoed with an income of Rs. 1000/- or loss per month, the price ofhousing in cities like Karachi, Lahore and Hyderabad is just beyond the

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reach of poorer sections of our society. Even in the low-cost housingschemes which are announced with big fanfare, houses constructed on plotsof 80sq. yds cost around Rs. 50,000/- and in most cases down payment wouldbe at least Rs. 10,000/-

Similarly a fully serviced plot of 120 sq. yds would cost between 30,000 –50,000 (depending upon the locality), and a small two-room that would costnot less than Rs. 125,000/-. It may be noted here that on government pricesplots/flats are not available to every purchaser because for every plotthere would be about 100 applicants in Karachi and 15 at Hyderabad, toquote the example of two cities.

As the demand is always more than the supply (because of the huge housingbacklog, natural growth, and high rate of rural to urban migration) marketmechanism keeps pursing up the prices and in most cases poor people with anincome of Rs. 1,000/- or less per month cannot even think of buying a plotof land, what to talk of constructing a house for their family. Hence thecontinued growth of squatter colonies or katchi abadis inspite of allefforts by the government agencies to control their establishment.

It is important to note that the timelog between allotment of plots andactual development is generally between 5 to 10 years. Immediate housingneeds of the poorer sections of the society, therefore, cannot be met andthey are forced to look for plots also where as in most cases they cannotpostpone their shelter needs for such a long time.

It is necessary to see the condition of the urban poor before we discusstheir housing problem:

About 40% live in squatter slums. 75% of them get drinking water from the community taps, 10% from

rivers, ponds, etc. 30 to 40% of them are underemployed or unemployed. 60 to 70% of them cannot afford housing not even public housing. 4-5 persons live in one room, Sewerage services do not exist for 90% of them in cities like

Karachi or Lahore. They have to waste 3-4 hours daily in commuting to work and back. Facilities for health, recreation, education for their children

barely exists.

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They are the barely worst sufferers of all the natural calamities,(rain, tornados, floods, cyclones).

In spite of elaborate studies by national an international agencies andexperts, and inspite of evolution and application of new and alternativestrategies for development, the problem of slums continue to grow. Why doesit happen? What are its causes?

Can we say that the cause for the continued growth of squatter colonies isthat the government response to shelter needs of the urban poor is notcompitable with their sociology and economics?

It is a fact that all urban housing policies are natively conceived and(willingly or unwillingly) tend to ignore the needs of the poorer sectionsof the society.

While discussing housing policies for the urban poor we will concentrate onthe following criteria because the success or failure of any housing policydepends on them:

a) Targetingb) Affordabilityc) Policies & procedure for allotments.d) Timelag between allotments and actual development of fully servicedplots.

Let us now take a detailed look at government policies which were used fortackling this problem from time to time to find an answer to theseimportant questions.

GOVERNEMNT RESPONSE LOW COST BUILT-UP UNITS

Example: Landi, Korangi colonies in Karachi of the early sixties.

This re-settlement scheme launched in Karachi with great fanfare in theearly period of first Martial Law had the following important features:

1. Government had build a large number of low-cost quarters from isown resources and by raising an international loan.

2. Cost of quarters was repayable by the allottees in easyinstallments.

3. This was basically a slum clearance programme as the refugeescoming from India and occupied whatever open land in the city they

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could lay their hands on. The jhuggi-dwellers were not onlyperceived to be a nuisance in the then clean city of Karachi but atthat time they were a politically volatile group and something hadto be done to pacify them. Schemes like this were also thought tobe necessary to create a reformist image for the military regime.

4. The scheme was fairly successful as in a short time large numberof low-cost units were built and the jhuggi dwellers willinglyoccupied the houses which provide them batter living conditionswith certainly of title. But it had its own problems.

PROBLEMS: No government can provide housing at its own cost to everyshelterless person even it loans from national and international agenciesare arranged. Experience has shown that recovery percentage is dismisllylow. In the area of Korangi out of an investment of Rs. 189.2 million, Rs.116.5 million have still not been recovered from the allottees even after25 years.

PROVIDING LAND WITH URBAN FACILTIES:

Example: Metroville Projects in Karachi.

Under these projects land was developed by official agencies and put up fordirect sale to low income groups. The system of providing loans wasdispensed with.

PROBLEMS:

Cost of land with all services was too high for low-income groups. Peoplebelonging to the affluent middle class ultimately grabbed these plots,because they could afford to pay high prices. Since of them purchased twoadjacent plots, demolished the boundary walls and constructed a biggerhouse. It official controls are made stiffer, these projects will lie emptyfor year together (as happened in the case of Karachi Metroville Projects).Here 4,144 plots remained unconstructed for a number of years, while inOrangi 60,000 families started living in the same vicinity in the sameperiod. When controls were relaxed in Metrovillos, construction activitystarted but the target group was elbowed out.

TO OVERCOME THE FINANCIAL PROBLEM THE STATE TURNS

Example: Shah Latif, Surjad Schemes in Karachi and Qasimabad, Gulshan-e-Shahbaz in Hyderabad (schemes deigned for low income groups).

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Under method projects are announced before they are physically commencedand the public is asked to apply for a plot with advance payment. Thissystem is now in vogue in most of the cities of Pakistan and thedevelopment authorities amass huge sums of money and keep them infixeddeposits or use them in other projects after collecting money from thegeneral public. In some of the cases the actual development may take 10 t015 years.

Sites and services methods is now being generally used in Pakistan. Butapart from other problems, this method of providing plots has two severelimitations:

a) In view of the huge backing in housing (specially for the urbanpoor), these plots will always be in short supply resulting inspeculation and rise in prices prohibiting the genuine buyers frompoor sections of the society from buying these plots from the openmarket.

b) Allottees/buyers generally do not purchase these plots forhabitation. The plots are used as (i) a sound investment and (ii)as a cushion against galloping inflation. Plots are also purchasedfor providing cash to meet the unforeseen events and also as longterm investment for marriage expenses of children, specially girls.

OTHER PROBLESM:

These include

a) Cost of too high. Poor people with a monthly income of Rs. 1,000/-or less cannot afford to pay 25% of the total cost which is usuallydemanded with the application.

b) It does not cater to the needs of low-income groups speciallybecause of a big timelag as already discussed.

c) To get a plot, people must apply for it, till a set of forms andfullfil series of formalities. Given unequal relationship betweenthe government and the people (specially the poor and theilliterate) & given the time wasted in bureaucratic redtapism, evenif they are willing to wait for years the poor cannot and do notapply for these plots.

d) Even if they cross all the hurdles, it is not necessary that theyget a plot. Number of applications always far exceeds the number of

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plots available in most cases successful allottees are investorsand speculators.

PRIVATE SECTOR

Almost the same story is repeated with the additional problem that in somecases the developers disappear after collecting money from the purchasers.Bombay Town, Madina Town in Hub area and several other schemes in Karachiare examples in this sector. The private developers no doubt cater to theneeds of the middle income group but the poorer sections of the societyremain out of their purview as the smallest flat would cost around Rs.125,000/-. Similarly a fully serviced plot of 120 sq yds would cost aroundRs. 50,000.

Timelag between allotment and actual development of plots is even more inprivate sector as compared to the government development authorities.Scheme like Saadi Town, Roomi Town etc. in Karachi are examples of thissort. Plots have not been fully developed even after 12 years ofallotment/sale.

Even in low-cost built-up unit schemes about which have recently beenannounced with fanfare, houses constructed on plots of 70 sq. yds wouldcost between 45 to 50 thousand rupees and in most of the cases the downpayment would be around Rs. 10,000/-. In these schemes external developmentis done by government agencies which may take 5 to 10 years. In most of thecases the supervision and the quality of construction is poor causinginnumerable difficulties to the purchasers.

Joint ventures the Zonal plan Scheme of HDA have also failed because of:

a) Poor standard of work by private developers.b) Delay in generating the funds.c) Port supervision by HDA staff.d) Lack of coordination between different government agencies.

CO-OPERATIVE EFFORT

In Pakistan (specially in Sindh) the performance of cooperative movementsis very poor but in the housing sector they have catered to the needs ofmiddle income and higher income group to some extent. However, in most ofthe cooperative housing schemes, poor management, difficulties incollecting installments from the allottees, lack of coordination betweendifferent government departments, abnormal delays, embezzlement of funds bysociety office bearers are some of the chronic problems. Scheme No. 33 in

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Karachi is a sad story and the dream of purchasers remains unfulfilled evenafter 25 years. Similar difficulties were faced by Sukkur CooperativeHousing Societies Union where the entire scheme remained dormant for about20 years before its major problems could be solved.

Having realized that they cannot give/provide regularized land with urbanservices at an affordable price to the poor, the state has accepted thekatchi abadis/squatters colonies as a reality and initiated the process ofregularizing and upgrading them.

KATCHI ABADIS :SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS

The Katchi abadies can be divided into two broad categories:

Old Katchi Abadies

These abadies had three important characteristics:

a) The were mostly located right in the heart of city.

b) Growth was haphazard

c) They had no regular plans; streets were narrow; space for schools,mosques play grounds etc, did not exist.

PROBLEMS:

These include

1) Different surveys show that in the upgrading process 20 to 25% ofthe population is dislocated. The state has to provide them withalternate land at the same cost at which the squatters are beingregularized.

2) Once squatters know that a katchi abadi has been taken up forimprovement/regularization, they show little or no interest ingetting houses. They feel secured so far as land title isconcerned.

3) Regularization charges are quite high. All cannot afford to pay.Payment in installments in a complex and expensive process, so isacquiring the lease. The squatter has to visit several governmentagencies including the registration office and may have to waste 10to 15 days, over a period of 3 to 4 months. For a daily wageearner, it is a very difficult exercise it not an impossible one.He may also be subjected to hostility and institutionalized

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negativism at the hands of government functionaries and may have topay illegal gratification at various stages.

Baldia Town in Karachi is an example for this sort. Decision was taken in1977 to regularize this township; actual work started in 1981 and sincethen not even 10% plots have been regularized.

New Katchi Abadis

Given the failure of government agencies, people have to find ways andmeans to over come their housing problems. The new katchi abadis which havebeen established in different parts of Karachi and Hyderabad are a solutionof the problem by the informal sector.

These New Katchi Abadis have the following characteristics:

1. They are generally located on the periphery of the city.

2. They are planned on the grid iron (official planning regulationswill have little quarrel with their town plans)

3. Modern technology is used in construction.

4. Water is made available either on payment or through civicagencies.

5. Transport needs are also taken care of.

6. The cost is affordable even by the poorer section of thepopulation. In some case no profit is charged because somecommercial plots are kept in reserve for disposal at highcommercial rates to subsidize the development cost of smallerresidential plots.

7. Technical advice for construction and sanitary problem is alsoprovided

8. Immediate concession is handed over to the purchasers with littleor no paper work.

9. Credit is also made available in cash and in kind, if needed.

10. Availability of artisonal skills is also assured.

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11. Protection from eviction in 90% cases is guaranteed as thesedevelopers or ‘dallas’ as we may call them, have a very closeliaison with police and government agencies.

Is it not surprising that government cannot meet of the needs stated abovewith all the power at It’s command?

Over a period of time, these developers/’dallals’ become important andstrong politically as they are influential people of their areas and can beused as a vote getting machines through influence they manage to get civicamenities for these squatter colonies from civic agencies (in some caseswithout payment).

PROBLEMS:

These new abadis face three major problems:

1) They cannot manage to have bulk sewerage disposal system as itrequires huge financial outlays and complicated techniques.

2) Although there is no imminent threat of eviction but the title ofland remains a major issue as these people grab either governmentor private land without paying any amount to the owners. Withouttitle papers getting loan form HBFC or selling the plot posesproblems.

3) External roads are not developed as huge amounts are required forthis purpose and government agencies refuse to take up this workbecause they consider these colonies to be illegal or unauthorizedareas.

This development strategy is successful because it is compatible with thesociology and economics of the urban poor. The extent of its success can bejudged from the fact that this kind of development is growing rapidlyinspite of increasing restrictions from officialdom.

Now the question is: Can the government follow the strategy adopted by the‘dallals’/developers or to put it more succincity: Can the informal sectorbe formalized? Government has two options: either it should integrate theprivate developers/’dallals’ into its own development strategy oralternately adopt the strategy followed by the ‘dallals’

But in either case government will have to surrender a large measure of itspower if either of these moves is to be successful. This will alsonecessitates a change in the unequal relationship between the government

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agencies and the poorer sections of the society. It would than have to beinstitutionalized. Again the question is: Are these things possible? Willthe well-entrenched groups in politics and bureaucracy allow this tohappen? And finally: Can it be done without bringing about structuralchanges in society?

HDA have carried out an experiment to get an answer to thesequestions. )Details of the scheme have been documented separatelyindicating different phases of its implementation and the difficultiesfaced at various stages). Initially we encountered many problems, likepolitical opposition at the local involve; over-coming government rulescovering allotment of plots; lukewarm attitude of our own staff and finallytargeting the right people for this scheme and convincing them of ourbonafides. But so far there have been no major bottlenecks.

The basic concept of the experiment is that plots are to be allotted to themost needy persons at prices they can afford with almost no down payment.Services like internal water supply, sewerage, roads, electricity and gaswill be provided as the allottees would pay their monthly installments.

THE NEW STRATEGY

After carefully observing the process of the establishment of Katchiabadis, HDA earmarked an area of 100 acres from the Gulishan-e-Shahbazscheme for carving out 80 sq. yard plots. Supply of water was arranged byconstructing a water tank with service taps. Initial price of the plot wasfixed at a level at which every poor person can afford i.e Rs. 460/- only.This was possible because these were not fully serviced plots and allsubsequent development was to take place incrementally with the paymentsmade by allottees at the rate of Rs. 60/- per month on the average.

A team of social workers headed by HDA ‘s Research Officer took utmost carein reaching and selecting the target group. Following criteria were fixedfor the section:

a) Overspill i.e. families living in inadequate and insufficientaccommodation-purely spatial criterion, calculated at 120 sq. ftper person.

b) Retired low-salaried employees.

c) Low-Salaried employees proceeding on LPR (leave prior in rentedaccommodation.

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The target area was adjacent katchi abadi so that people could easily shiftto their allotted plots. A form was filled by the survey team whichindicated their monthly income, number of family members, details ofaccommodation whether living on rent etc. It was necessary to weed out theunderserving people.

The scheme has the following other important aspects:

1) Utmost care has been taken to discourage the speculators and theaffluent middle classes. This has been ensured by.

a) demarcating very large number of plots so that there is nopremium on the sale of plots.

b) Not issuing ownership documents unless the house is built, theallottees start residing there, and clear development charges.

c) Fixing a very short period for starting the construction workconstruction to start the very next day of possession otherwisethe possession of plots would be given to other applicants fromthe waiting list.

d) Initiating a new approach to solve the urgent housing problem byaccommodating those applicants who bring family and householditem in the reception area. They are given preference over allother categories.

2) The scheme aims at organizing further developmental activity on aco-operative basis (on the mohallah or lane level) so that:

a) dues are paid and collected by the allottees in time, and

b) development costs are reduced by ensuring supervision by theallottees themselves. It is also planned that some of thedevelopment work, especially the sewerage component should bedone by the allottees themselves (as has been done in theOrangi pilot Project) in order to reduce costs. It has beenobserved that costs are reduced by 30% if government agenciesand contractors are not involved in development work becausethe elements of corruption and profiteering are eliminated.

3) The scheme would also take care of the bulk sewerage disposalproblem which the ‘dallals/brokers/agents ignore to take up becauseof substantial financial outlays and technical problems.

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4) HDA’s site office would provide all advisory services at the doorstep, and most of the paper work (which would be minimal in anycase) would be done by them. Though model plans would be providedto the allottees, use of locally available material and selfemployment in construction activity would be encouraged in order toreduce cost.

5) The scheme does not eliminate the role of the informal sectortotally. Thallawalas (who provide advisory service as well asconstruction material on cast/credit) have been allowed to operatein the area. Only their role as land-grabbers and developers hasbeen eliminated. This has reduced the initial payment towards thecost of land to a very large extent. For example if a ‘dallal’ usedto charge Rs. 5,000/- to Rs.10,000/- for a piece of 120sq. yds.Plot, HDA would only charge an amount of Rs. 460/- for 80sq. yardsplot initially, plus Rs. 260/- at a later stage.

The role of the informal sector should and cannot be eliminated in total.But its role and efforts can be supplemented by the government and otherdevelopment authorities to a large extent. Total formalization of theinformal sector is neither possible nor desirable but integration woulddefinitely yield spectacular results at least in the housing sector.

This scheme is at a nascent stage right now. But after overcoming theinitial difficulties over 800 houses have already been built and work onanother 100 is in full swing. 100 families are not in a position to startconstruction because of several financial constraints. They are putting upin self-made jhuggis. But the most important fact is all the allottees havealready occupied their plots and they live there as they continue to buildtheir houses. Each day there is an addition of one or two families. Thesefigures may not look very impressive but if this scheme is juxtaposed withthe main Gulshan-e-Shahbaz Housing Scheme (where not a single allotttee hasstarted construction nor is ready or willing to construct his/her houseeven after paying all the four installments) the success of this scheme insuch a short period of five months would definitely look spectacular.

This experiment has shown that even without bringing about basic changes inthe power structure of the society; without changing the unequalrelationship between the government and the katchi abadi dwellers, and evenwithout any definite political programme in favor of the wretched of theearth, development authorities can successfully assume the role of thedallals/brokers at least partially and follow their strategy successfully.

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However, we still believe that the poorest of the poor, are still outsidethe purview of this scheme. According to raw estimates, about 10 to 20% ofour population which largely consists of single parent families, mostlyheaded by females, unemployed workers, daily wage earners, crippled and theindigent cannot afford even this sort of housing. The long list ofmustahiquin-e-Zakat will bear us out on this point.

To make this scheme more successful we are trying to undertake thefollowing steps also:

1. Development and encouragement of low-cost appropriate technologybased on cheap materials available locally to reduce constructioncosts substantially. Different model houses starting fromtraditional mud and lime to bricks and blocks have been constructedby the allottees themselves under the supervision and guidance ofHDA with spectacular results so far as cost of construction isconcerned. Similarly different experiments to reduce the cost ofthe roof have been successfully carried out.

2. Allotment of plots to homogeneous groups in a lane/sector so thatthe cooperative efforts at the grassroot level may be successful.These small units would ultimately be integrated into a cooperativeunion or federations.

3. Provision of public transport so that the allottees may not faceany difficulty in reaching their work places.

4. Use of private generators to provide electricity to those who caneffort it. These generators will be installed by those allotteeswho can invest money in the business and recover dues from theusers at their own risk and cost.

5. Constant monitoring and evaluation of the entire scheme in all it’sfacets so that difficulties faced by the allottees at any stage maybe remedied immediately.

In the end it may also be highlighted that investment in housing hastremendous impact on income and employment through the multiplier linkages.According to a recent World Bank research publication (Housing for Low-Income Urban Families) first round effects are the direct increments toincome and employment generated by construction is higher than that formanufacturing and close to that for the economy as a whole. In Pakistan,the income multiplier of housing construction is estimated at 2 and 14

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additional jobs are created for every US$ 10,000 invested in housing, thepublication adds.

3.4 PHA HOUSING SCHEME3.4.1 Introduction

Government of Pakistan announced the construction of apartment to cater thehousing shortage, mainly in big cities. One such project was announced on asite along Wheatman Road, Lahore. Government acquired the land fromRailways Department with no complete adjustment, which posed problemafterward. After the approval of first design with large number of flatsbecome different in terms of site hand over. There fore adjustment had tobe made in design by cutting short the A & B categories as well as minimizeof C & D type flat to only 224 accommodated with in (17-13) 20 blocks withfour floors. Site Layout as well as individual design made clear theoverall categories and three pocket of site can be identified. Projectcommenced on August 8, 1999 with one year completion time and revised dueto political problems with completion date of November 02, 2001. Little hasbeen achieved in respect of completion due to further delays in terms offunding, which is the excuse on the part of contractor to be unable to handover the project on time. NESPAK designed the project and PASCON was theconstruction company, earlier experienced in building roads and irrigationworks; having the first building project of its kind. Further more thecommencement of work at a number of blocks was delayed due to obstructionscaused by the existing sewerage pipe lines, PTC cables, abandoned PakistanRailway track and over head electric lines/poles etc. There problem wastried to solve by the coordination of PMHA & Pakistan Railways. Some blocksfaced obstruction due to encroachments, which were relocated. Sewerage linepassing through block C13 was diverted by the contractor. C18 suffered dueto electric lines. The abandoned railway track had to be removed forcarrying out work properly.

Covered Area of one apartment C-Type : 1115 Sft (5 Marlas) Including circulation

area D-Type : 900 Sft (4 Marlas) Including circulation

area. Date of commencement : August 08, 1999

Time and Date of Completion Original : 12 Months (August 07, 2000) Revised : 27 Months (November 02, 2001)

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Contract Number PHA-003Construction Type C&D ApartmentsDesigner NESPAK (Pvt) LtdContractor PASCONSPM Consultant NESPAK (Pvt) LimitedEngineer’s Representative Mr. Arif J. Butt

Project Cost (Rs. Million)Original109.713

Revised80.5

Number of Blocks (C & D) 18 & 10 17 & 3Number of Dwellings (C and D) 144 & 80 136 & 24

Payments previous Rs. 60.51 MillionThis Month -So Far Rs. 60.51 Million

Physical ProgressHanding over of site 100% (As per revised scope)Removal ,of site obstruction ** Not requiredEngineer’s Meeting at site Every MondayProvision of survey controls 100 %Provision of Detaileddrawings

100 %

Mobilization of contractor 100 %Contractor’s site office 100 %Consultant’s site office 100 %Provision of service utility(WAPDA, Telephone, Water,etc).

100 %

Mobilization of Machinery 50 %Mobilization of Consultant’sStaff

E.R. Inspector, F. Asstt.

Preparation of constrSchedule

Revised schedule as perallowed extension has been

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provided by the contractorfor 20 available blocks.

Location Wheatman Road, Lahore

Letter of Acceptance August 3, 1999Notice to Commence August 7, 1999Date of Commencement August 8, 1999Date of Completion August 7, 2000Revised interim date ofcompletion

November 02, 2001

Achieved Progress (%) * 75.20 %Planned Progress (%) * 100 %Time Lapsed (Days) 993

ANALYSIS RATES

Analysis of rate is a process before bidding and contractor makes use ofhis past experience as well as comparison of rte with similar kind ofprogress. This project which is a kind of “Lump sum” contract is awarded atrate of Rs. 475/sq.ft. In order to calculate, contractor adopted thisprocess; for example he assumes the work to be done on 100 sq.ft. of wall,he will first calculate.

i) Material consumption like brick, mortar layer, wall finish.ii) Use of tool plant like scaffolding etc.iii) Labour input.iv) Income tax payments.v) Overheadsvi) Profit ratio

Likewise, he will calculate all the works to be done, employing, machineryalso taking into account damages etc. Now, he will get a figure for thework of 100 sq.ft. covered area, from where rte of 1 sq.ft. is easy tocalculate.

3.4.2 Problems

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Problems encountered during the construction process are related to thearrangements for the construction specially, and during constructiongenerally. We will discuss some of the important problems, which somehowretarded the activity, as well as escalation of time.

Hand over of site was the very early problem encountered, becauseownership of the site was of Pakistan Railway and PHA authorities findit hard to settle the issues raised by the Railway Department. Thus bycontinued negotiations, some of the problems were solved and remainingescalated after sometime.

Reduced Number of Blocks have to be accommodated in the site planbecause work was started only on half of the blocks arid adjustmentshave to made in the layout design. It was counted due to the railwayemployee’s residences present there.

Layout has to be changed further when it was found that electricitysupply lines pass exactly over some of the blocks. It was rather easyto change layout than top remove the lines.

Extra work has to perform by the contractor in respect of readjustingthe drainpipes, which hindered the excavation of the two blocks. Nowsurprisingly, contractor decided to make the change by his ownexpanses, because in order to make a claim a lot of time was required.

Unrest in the Country made first delay of it’s kind which prolonged tolarge number of months. Now there was a new schedule of completioni.e. 27 months, unlike the previous 12 months. During that timecontractor machinery remain idle most of the time and permanent staffhave to be paid just disturbing the budget.

Workers insurance matter is also pending because earlier thecontractor have only obtained guarantee for the period of 12 monthsand the present schedule, which again has exceeded the 27 months time,is a matter to be settled with the PHA authorities.

Overheads which deduct most the contractor’s share in the profit, wereuncontrolled, mainly due to abnormal delays in the continuity of theproject. Mainly, workers salaries, utility bills, rent of themachinery, idol machinery, maintenance; security of the entire area,delays in payments, site occupation problem, site office constructionand maintenance etc., comprise the overheads.

Excessive delays in payment and the little surety of the projectcontinuity as well as success have created doubts in the contractors

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mind, so does the efficiency of the project.

Stand-by option for the case of machinery utilization is a safetymeasure, but calculated efficiency, some times, creates problems inrespect of the amount of the work done (which disturbs, the schedule).Hoist machine efficiency made somehow problem in this respect, but oftemporary nature.

Model House has still not been eared as per condition of the contract.PHA can make claim but up till now there is no such possibility onaccount of the circumstantial delays in the successful completion ofthe project.

Escalation Clause according to the contract was applied specificallyto the fuel and other cases got little validity

Machinery detailed in the contract has not still been made availableto the site, but the progress of the work bear no ill effect due tothe unavailability of the total machinery. PHA can claim the verycase, only if the workability face delays on this account, but theyrather neglect it on there part for the ease of the contractor. Stillone cannot claim 100% mobilization on the site.

Tests Detailed in the contract could not be confirmed due to thelittle facility on the site. Some tests were carried out in the UETLahore Laboratories.

Brand Names which are given in the contract (please see appendix) werenot made exactly: The very fact only matters when engineer made noticeof the sub-standard material and insists on the product of the brandgiven in the contract.

Employer’s Risks detailed in the contract become activated as per caseof political unrest followed by the change of the government. Otherrisks are of rare nature, so find no liability to the progress.

Batching Plant Availability is asked in the contract, but the case isinteresting because the contractor made available a faulty equipmentthere; which was of no use but only to confirm the contract conditions

3.4.3 Conclusion

There are many examples in respect of excessive as well as abnormal delaysof the scheduled project. There always somehow consequences, which becomeunable to suppress or controlled. The very case of PHA housing (Project

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003) fell victim to the abnormal delays. Overheads became a major problemfor the contractor, which must be kept minimum in order to avoid the burdenover the expected profit, thus swallowing the available resources.Conditions of the contract are going to be ignored to little extent, whichhas no ill effect over the running as well as continuity. Initialsettlement of the disputes in respect of site handover as well asredesigning of the layout took some of the valuable time, when the run ofthe other (same kind) projects was satisfactory. Thus the contractor cannotbe blamed at all, but the initial preparation to begin the project was notin accordance with the standards of the feasibility studies, so does theappearance of extra work, redesigning and rescheduling as well, Some timeshurdles are removed but the very case demanded the new layout to save thecost. Process of making claims is some time untidy because of the littlepreparation and sometimes due to the strong points raised by the employer.

As far as accident are concerned, there is no such evidence due to safetymeasure approach, but not to satisfaction level at all. Although some minorcases of injuries were noticed, but the availability of first-aid made nomajor problem.

Design of the blocks is, if satisfactory, but not qualifying. It is theneglect of the main facade care due to the presence of exposed pipes.Availability of punctures in the areas of the balconies is againquestionable, making problems later on.

3.5 PHA HOUSING PROGRAMME

As part of an economic revival programme, the previous government promisedto provide every family a house by the year 2010. the scheme was launchedin May 1999 and was included in the 9th five year plan (1998-2003). In theinitial stage the ambitions programme envisaged the construction of 500,000houses for middle and lower middle class people in active collaborationwith the private sector.

Under the scheme 75,000 housing units were to be built in Karachi, 50,000each in Lahore and Islamabad and 25,000 each in Peshawar, Multan,Faisalabad and Hyderabad. Quetta and Sukkur were to each have 15,000 newresidential units.

For implementation, 20,250 acres of land was to be brought at an estimatedcost of Rs. 25 billion and the construction was to cause Rs. 300 billion.Al the projects were to be executed by the Pakistan Housing Authority(PHA), specifically formed for the job. Yes, the same PHA, which nowpromises Pakistanis home, albeit with necessary modifications.

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Now the scheme is to be launched from January 22, 2001 with only 4500apartments having been announced to be constructed in Islamabad, Peshawar,Lahore and Karachi. According to the housing and works minister,

1`700 apartments will be constructed in Lahore. 1500 apartments in Islamabad. 1000 apartments in Karachi and only 300 apartments in Peshawar.

The construction will be completed in 18 months.

Officials in the PHA informed TNS that although the scheme appears to be acontinuation of the Nawaz governments programme, in reality that programmehas been shelved. The PHA is now only executing those projects on whichconstruction had started. The only difference is that now the PHA is alsobuying land which was earlier being based and constructing the houses to besold on a no profit, no loss basis.

The official said the apartments will be of B, C & D type categories withthe B-type houses having 3 bed rooms and a T.V. lounge among other things.

The prices would vary from a maximum of Rs. 1.8 million to around Rs.700,000.

“On a first come, first served basis, a person who makes a 100% paymentwill be entitled to a 10% discount and the right to choose a flat of hischoice, some one paying 50% of the cost, will not get any discount and aperson with 10% down payment will be required to pay the remaining amountin 15 equal monthly installments”, the official added.

In case of a large number of applications in the category of 10% downpayment, the selection will be made by balloting.

A HOUSE OF THEIR OWN

Nadeem Iqbal, reviews the government’s decision to launch a housing schemefor the people and wonders how for the 4500 can go in tackling the problem.

Once again an advertisement in the papers and once again a promise. How faris the home from here?

After having shelved Nawaz Sharif’s Prime Ministers Housing Scheme, themilitary government faces the challenge on how to tackle the problem ofhousing in the country. Drastically curtailing the now defunct’ PM housingprogrammes, the government has decided as a lost option to construct 4500

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apartments at the cost of Rs. 500 million in the four major cities,Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi and Peshawar.

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND SURVEY

With the rapidly growing population, officials estimate that every year thedemand increases by 2 million houses. The governments failure to meet thedemand culminate in the emergence of shanty towns, slums and Kachi abadis,which are lucrative businesses for the mafias involved. The squatters areconsidered as illegal by the government.

According to the economic survey 1999-2000: “The estimated back log of 4.3million housing units including 52% to deal with over crowding and 48% assubstandard dilapidated houses require immediate reconstruction”.

The survey added that about 35% of the total urban population lives inkatchi abadis and slums where the population densities are high. Most suchareas are without water supply and sanitation.

Other than the governments public Works Department there are four otherautonomous bodies, National Housing Authority, Pakistan Housing Authority,Federal Government Employees Foundation and House Building FinanceCorporation, but their collective efforts have failed to reduce the housingdeficit.

The previous government’s scheme was considered a political gimmick withNawaz’s right hand man, the then accountability supreme senator Saif-ur-Rehman, calling the shots. It was infact declared and financiallyscandalous “Yellow housing scheme” by its critics. But an improved and morefinancially disciplined scheme could have had the potential to deliverwonders as the project was an out come of an institutional home work.

The scheme envisaged providing direct employment to 600,000 people andindirect employment to another 400,000 people while supporting 40 differentindustries in the country. It was projected that 11.5 million tons ofcement, 1.0 million tons of steel and 20,000 million tons of brick/blockwould be consumed in the scheme.

The government also enhanced HBFC’s loan port folio from Rs. 2 billion toRs. 7 billion. The rate of interest on loans from Rs. 100,000 to Rs.300,000 was fixed at 10%, for loans up to Rs. 500,000 at 15% and for loansmore than this at 20% per annum. HBFC also waived off a total loan of Rs.1521.4 million to 27049 million widows.

However, given the past experience, if such a scheme is launched now it can

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not be implemented till October 2002, scheduled departure time for thepresent government. Now, what will be the home realities at that time, noone knows ……..

3.6 AN ALTERNATIVE TO ‘MERA GHAR’ SCHEME

The Chief Executive must have taken the decision to give a ‘go ahead’signal to the former prime minister’s housing scheme in the best interestof the nation.

However, it would be advisable to learn from the mistakes of the past andplan the programme in a manner that it does not drain the nationalexchequer of the much needed credit for other more vital and viablenational programmes.

Pakistan’s building sector is already laden with over Rs. 250 billions ofbed debts minus the recoveries of the recent past. Instead of putting morepressure and strain on this formal financial sector, judicious alternativeof mobilizing financing from the enormous hidden economy for the housingsector can usher in a new era of wise economic planning and development.The government needs to regulate this sector through appropriate policyplanning effective monitoring measures, and provision of basic infrastructure, instead of injecting public funds for building of housing units.The private sector, if given a conducive environment, can be tempted tomobilize the needed funds from the hidden economy which is as high as about38%.

Housing is one of the basic needs and therefore, provision of accommodationforms part of the responsibilities of the public administration everywhere.The important role of this sector as a stimulus for domestic economicactivity and national development can be identified from three points ofview:

1. Investment in this field is labour intensive.

2. It can stimulate the production of local building materials.

3. It can act as an incentive to mobilize household saving by offeringan attractive investment opportunity.

There is a backlog of about 5.0 million housing units and it will continueto increase over the years unless concerted efforts backed by sound andlong term planning are made to tackle the problem. The formal sector of theeconomy in Pakistan has been building 40,000 to 50,000 dwelling units peryear compared to the annual growth of households of 120,000 per year.

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Unless special efforts are made for providing of additional housing units,the situation will assume alarming proportions.

Governments have been doing their best, wherever possible, to ,improve thecondition. Not ,in too distant and future all villages would haveelectricity and rural housing units, which comprise 80% of the housingstock in the country, would have access to electricity. Similarly, greatemphasis is being laid on the improvement of ,infrastructure. But verylittle progress has been made in provision of new accommodation, mainlybecause of scarcity of resources.

So far the governments in Pakistan have, unfortunately, played a vital rolein aggravating the situation with regard to housing. The famous “Katchiabadis” slogan might have paid dividends in political terms but it hascreated in human living conditions in and around all urban centers of thecountry. These have also deprived the nation of the valuable parcels ofurban land which otherwise could have been used to generate economicactivity to its fullest potential.

But it must be realized that in many countries, efforts on the part of thegovernment to construct housing in the public sector have met with failuresbecause sufficient finance for such programmes is usually not available,costs are normally higher and consequently problems get multiplied insteadof being solved. Hence the policy should be minimum intervention andmaximum support to the peoples own efforts. Unrealistic and unstablesubsidies in the form of free land must be stopped or restricted to benefitonly a few at the lowest level of income. Financial assistance must begiven but not without making provision for recovery of the money.

Housing in all urban centers of Pakistan has become very expensive. Fundsused in the purchase of houses would amount to billions of rupees but allthis wealth remains latent. It is not in circulation and hence doesnot ,play any active role in the national economy. Banks in Pakistan do notloan against real estate.

The desire to own a home can be pleasantly expected to encourage increasedpersonal savings. It will prove so, because in almost all countries of theworld, housing finance institutions in the private sector have played avital role in mobilizing personal savings. The importance of suchinstitutions, such as building societies, in respect of economic andemployment activities also, has been of significant importance to theeconomies of even the developed world. These private institutions havemobilized personal savings and have contributed to housing development to agreat extent and have provided housing finance upto over 80% of the total

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investment. The activities of these private sector organizations have thuscontributed significantly to the national economics on the one hand andprovided the much needed shelter to the majority of the population, on theother.

The government, by giving approval to the Mera Ghar scheme, has alreadyplaced ;high priority on the housing sector. The judicial use of governmentresources combined with private efforts can go a long way in meeting theneeds of the nation in this vital sector. The question of existinggovernment contribution and subsidies should be critically reviewed withthe goals of increasing their effectiveness, avoiding unintended sideeffects minimizing costs to the public and private sectors and distributingbenefits fairly in relation to need. The government contributions must becarefully targeted to groups that have a specific visible need. Governmentresources should be allocated towards the improvement of sites and servicesand slum upgrading, provision of infra structure, the development of landinformation system, the reform of the tand tenure system and thedevelopment of financial markets and institutions.

The task of building new homes as well as providing loans to homeownersshould be diverted to the private sector.

Hence the housing sector does not have to be supported with public fundsborrowed from commercial banks. All that needs to be done is to ,provide apolicy frame work that would encourage the establishment and functioning ofprivate sector housing financing instructions which would have the legalright to repossess the housing units financed by them in case the ownerswere not repaying the loans.

The fraudulent performance of the co-operative housing financingcorporations in the past should not, in any way, be referred to oppose whatis being proposed here. These finance corporations were able to roe thepeople because of the inefficiency and callousness of the regulatory andmonitoring agencies. If housing societies in other countries and, inparticular Britain, can have a financial out lay larger than the commercialbanks, why can not it work in Pakistan? It will definitely work providedthere is a will to let some thing good for the country to work.

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