Building on Mezirow’s theory of transformative learning:
Theorizing the challenges to reflection
PhD. Kaisu Mälkki
Department of Teacher Education
University of Helsinki
Published in: Journal of Transformative Education 8, 2010; pp.42-62
Abstract. The prevailing theoretical discussion on reflection within adult and higher education focuses
on the cognitive and rational dimensions of reflection, at the expense of the emotional and social dimensions.
Consequently, the theories deal with the ideals, but leave issues pertaining to the understanding of the
prerequisites, challenges and obstacles of reflection largely unaddressed. This article proposes a theory
which sheds light on the nature and the prerequisites of the process of reflection.
The theory development was based on analyzing Jack Mezirow’s theory of transformative learning. In
order to deepen the understanding of the emotional dimension which was fruitfully yet insufficiently
conceptualized within Mezirow’s theory, Antonio Damasio’s neurobiological theory of emotions and
consciousness was utilized as a complementary theory. Based on these differing theories, it was possible to
construct a theory which conceptualizes the challenges to reflection and opens new directions for further
research concerning integrating the cognitive and emotional perspectives.
Keywords: reflection, critical reflection, transformative learning, theory development, emotions in
learning
Introduction
The notion of reflection has become popular among both researchers and practitioners within
the fields of adult learning, education, and the development of expertise, during recent decades.
Although some scholars claim that reflection is being widely promoted in educational settings with
little result (see e.g. Ecclestone, 1996; Gur-Ze’ev, Masschelein & Blake, 2001; Procee, 2006), there
are also empirical studies which have been able to validate both the existence as well as the
relevance of reflection in practice (see Taylor, 1997, 2000, 2007).
Jack Mezirow’s (e.g. 1981; 1991; 2000; 2009) theory of transformative learning offers one of
the most sophisticated conceptualizations of reflection, within a larger frame of a theory of adult
learning. However, like other adult and higher education theorizing (see Illeris, 2007; 2009;
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Malinen, 2000; McAlpine et al., 1999; Merriam, 2008; Postareff & Lindblom-Ylänne, 2011; Schutz
& Pekrun, 2007; Sutton, Mudrey-Camino & Knight, 2009; Sutton & Wheatley, 2003), Mezirow’s
theory has been criticized for overemphasizing the rational and cognitive aspects of learning, at the
expense of the non-rational, emotional and social aspects (Clark & Wilson, 1991; Dirkx, 2008;
Kitchenham 2008; Illeris, 2004; Mezirow, 2009; Taylor, 2000). Consequently, Mezirow’s theory
implies a rather idealized and rational process of reflection, compared to the understanding
emerging from empirical studies. In fact, the insights emerging from empirical studies seem to
suggest that reflection is more than a rational process, and that it is not always easy to carry out.
Furthermore, emotions and safe relationships have been shown to be inextricable factors within the
process of reflection (e.g. Brookfield, 1994; Jokikokko, 2009; Taylor, 1997, 2000, 2007, 2008).
However, this more comprehensive empirical understanding of the process of reflection is not
quite in line with the theory itself. These further insights have yet to be used to challenge and
develop further the theory of transformative learning (Mezirow, 2007). Although within recent
years, there has been lively discussion aimed at extending the view of transformative learning
towards a more holistic, integrative, and comprehensive conception of learning (see e.g. Dirkx,
2008; Gunnlaugson, 2007; Illeris, 2004; Kitchenham 2008; Mezirow, 2009; Taylor 2008), the
conceptual connections between e.g the cognitive, emotional and social aspects of reflection are left
unconsidered. Consequently, no theory has been offered for explicating and analyzing the
prerequisites and challenges to reflection. Such a theory would by necessity need to include
conceptualization of the dynamics of reflection that would 1) explicate the presuppositions of the
very process of becoming aware of and questioning one’s assumptions; 2) depict the conditions for
carrying it out; and 3) also indicate possible barriers for the process.
This paper proposes a developed theory to shed light on the prerequisites and challenges to
reflection. The theorization is based on analyzing the interrelationship between the meaning
perspective and reflection, and their cognitive and emotional dimensions, within Mezirow’s theory.
Furthermore, in order to deepen the understanding of the emotional dimension, Antonio Damasio’s
neurobiological theory of emotions and consciousness is utilized as a complementary source for
theory-building.
At this point I will briefly remark that the social dimension is fundamentally entangled with
the cognitive and emotional dimensions considered in this article. This is manifested also in
Mezirow’s work, for instance in the way he describes the meaning perspective as socially
constructed (Mezirow, 1991), and states that the meaning perspective also provides a sense of
community (Mezirow, 2000). Some consequences of the social dimension to the process of
reflection have been considered by Brookfield (1994; 2006). For example, Brookfield’s notion of
cultural suicide refers to a ‘risk’ of being cut off from the cultures and groups one has been involved
in, as a possible consequence of challenging the social givens within these groups (Brookfield,
1994; 2006). I regard cognitive, emotional and social dimensions as inseparable, although within
this article I focus specifically on the interconnections between the cognitive and emotional
dimension.
The article is structured as follows: The following section briefly discusses the philosophical
methods and methodological orientation of the theory-building. The next section considers the
conceptual analysis of Mezirow’s transformative theory, whereas the subsequent one explicates the
bases for utilizing Mezirow’s and Damasio’s theories together and summarizes Damasio’s offerings
for my analyses. The last section summarizes the results of the theory construction, i.e. the
theorization of the challenges to reflection. The article ends with conclusions, which place the
developed theory within the wider research field.
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Method
Unlike within empirical research, there has not been much focus on methodical questions
within philosophical and theoretical research, until recently. However, within the past few years,
methodological issues have been brought up to discussion among the philosophers of education.
There have been calls for increased explicitness concerning what has been done, why, and on what
premises (see Ruitenberg, 2009; Ruitenberg, 2010; Staindish 2009). Therefore, in the following I
will briefly consider my approach regarding the theory-building presented in this article.
In the theory development, I used rational reconstruction (Davia 1998; Habermas, 1979;
Hannus & Simola, 2010; Rorty, 1984) and different philosophical and conceptual analytical
methods (see Holma, 2009; Kakkuri-Knuuttila, 2007; Ruitenberg, 2010). The phases of analysis
and theory-building were not pre-planned, but the results of each earlier phase were used to define
the focus of the next phase. These phases become explicated in the subsequent chapters, which
follow the sequential nature of the actual research process. In the following, instead, I outline the
central premises and methodological perspectives orienting the research.
Firstly, I understand theories to be in a process of never-ending progress, instead of being
assumed to reach completeness at some point. Mezirow himself indicates that transformative
learning is a theory in progress (Mezirow et al., 2000). However, I do not assume theories to
develop automatically, but through continuous questioning and refinement (see Layder, 1998;
Mezirow, 1991).
Secondly, by theory development I refer to the aim of conceptualizing a certain phenomenon,
which is not sufficiently conceptualized by any earlier theory. However, I do not assume that any
phenomenon may be theorized as such, without reference to other theories. Therefore I used earlier
theories, i.e. Mezirow’s and_Damasio’s theories, as the basis for the new conceptualization.
Following rational reconstruction (Davia 1998; Habermas, 1979; Hannus & Simola, 2010; Rorty,
1984), I interpreted these earlier theories from the viewpoint of my specific aim of increasing
understanding of the challenges to reflection. This kind of analysis differs from e.g. systematic
analysis (Holma, 2009; 2010), which aims to deepen the understanding of a certain theory or a
conceptual entity as such. As the theory-building was based on analyzing Mezirow’s and Damasio’s
theories, the developed conceptualization became rooted firmly, through explicit conceptual
connections, in the conceptualization of these earlier theories (see Brookfield, 1992; Bacharach,
1989; Whetten, 1989). Consequently, the methodological footsteps were left in view, which is not
often the case in philosophical and theoretical work (see Ruitenberg, 2010). This is an important
feature in terms of the reliability of the method (see Brookfield, 1992).
Thirdly, in analysis and theory building, my focus was on the relational nature of the research
phenomenon, through examining the interrelations between the meaning perspective and reflection,
and the cognitive and emotional dimensions of these. Relational orientation emphasizes
understanding the concepts in relation to each other, instead of focusing on any one concept as such.
Relational approach has been presented as an alternative to substantial thinking, which considers
substances of all kinds as the fundamental units of inquiry (Emirbayer, 1997). Relationality allows
one to examine unfolding processes, instead of focusing on preformed entities and elements. In this
regard, my goal in theorizing was not, for example, to offer ready-made answers or straight-forward
predictions. Rather, I seek to bring into view and explicate the dynamic nature of the challenges of
reflection, in order to offer analytical tools for examining these in various real-life situations (see
Hannus & Simola 2010; Malinen 2000; Whetten 1989).
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Analysis of Mezirow’s theory
Mezirow’s (e.g. 1981; 1991; 2000; 2009) theory of transformative learning sees reflection as a
process aimed at becoming aware of and assessing the validity of the meaning perspective.
However, the origins and dynamics of reflection itself remain unexamined, despite the fact that the
purpose, significance and objects of reflection are widely discussed both in Mezirow’s writings and
within other literature (see Taylor, 2000; 2008). After clarifying two terminological issues, I will
examine the nature and basis of reflection by considering its relation to the concept of the meaning
perspective, which involves Mezirow’s conception of the orientation of thinking on a more general
level.
In the following, I elaborate specifically on Mezirowian meaning perspective. Therefore,
although there are critical views concerning the term meaning perspective (Wiessner & Mezirow,
2000), I considered it more precise than the suggested term frame of reference.
Within his extensive body of work, Mezirow differentiates between several different levels,
types and scopes of reflection and critical reflection (e.g. Mezirow, 1981; 1998). My examination
does not concern this variety, but instead the presuppositions of the very process of becoming aware
of and questioning one’s assumptions. Therefore, I use the general term reflection without
specifying the contents or levels. However, in most instances, the closest equivalent to the way I use
the term is Mezirow’s term critical reflection, premise reflection or critical self-reflection.
Tension between reflection and meaning perspective
Meaning perspective is the frame within which meaning-making takes place (Mezirow, 1991).
Understanding is based on grasping the world with our assumptions and expectations, which have
been formed through previous experiences. On one hand, this previous understanding orients and
limits our attention, perceptions and interpretations. On the other hand, this enables us to maintain
our view of the world as well as our sense of stability, community and identity (Mezirow, 1981;
1991; 2000; 2009).
Reflection refers to becoming aware of and assessing the taken-for-granted assumptions
within one’s meaning perspective, in order to construct a more valid belief (see Mezirow, 1991).
Assessing assumptions can be seen to refer to metacognitive application of critical thinking to one’s
own thinking, feelings and actions (see also Mezirow, 2006; 2009). Thus, for this part, reflection
can be seen mainly as a thinking activity. Furthermore, constructing a more valid belief is an act of
meaning-making, if the constructed interpretation is integrated into the meaning perspective and
hence contributes to orienting future meaning-making.
However, when meaning perspective and reflection, as defined above, are considered in
relation to each other, one confronts two conceptually problematic questions:
First, since attention and thinking are substantially guided by one's meaning perspective, the
meaning perspective must have a guiding role also in reflection. Consequently, the process of
reflection appears to be as subjectively oriented, selective, and limited as any human thinking, due
to it being orientated by the meaning perspective.
Second, the role of reflection and the role of the meaning perspective appear opposed, in the
sense that the meaning perspective aims to manage the complexity of life by leaning on the very
self-evidencies reflection aims to question. Therefore, I suggest there is a tension between the
concepts of reflection and meaning perspective, and that consequently these two notions cannot be
considered together without further examination of each. Furthermore, I interpret this tension to
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indicate that the very aim of the meaning perspective brings about a counterforce or challenge to
reflection.
In my view, although there is wide emphasis on reflection within adult learning literature (see
Brookfield, 2006; Merriam, 2008; Moon, 2004; Procee, 2006; Taylor, 2007; 2008), these
conceptual questions and their consequences for understanding reflection have not been
acknowledged within scholarly discussion, nor been explicitly considered by Mezirow within his
theory. The tension between reflection and meaning perspective appears to indicate that in order to
understand the nature of the process of reflection, both the nature of the meaning perspective and
the relation between the two must be examined. Further exploration into these concepts is needed in
order to consider first, how the opposition brought by the meaning perspective to reflection actually
operates; and second, how carrying out reflection would still be possible, taking this opposition into
consideration. This will be examined more in detail in the following.
The meaning perspective and emotions
Based on the conceptual analysis of Mezirow’s conception of reflection, meaning perspective, and
the conceptual relationship between the two, it appeared there is a tension between reflection and
meaning perspective, and that this tension may indicate challenges to the process of reflection. In
order to explore this conceptual dilemma further, I carried out another cycle of conceptual analysis
of Mezirow’s theory based on his (1981; 1991; 2000; 2009) texts. This time, I oriented towards
those references which in any way imply that reflection is not easy, or that there may be difficulties
or problems of some kind in actualizing reflection.
As a result of the analysis, I brought out a set of references describing the painfulness of the
process of transformation and reflection. I interpreted these instances to indicate the fact that
reflection is not an easy or purely rational process. I illustrate this point with some examples of
these references, based on Mezirow’s (2000) article.
For instance, Mezirow mentions that:
“A defining condition of being human is our urgent need to understand and order the meaning of our
experience, to integrate it with what we know to avoid the threat of chaos.” (Mezirow, 2000, p. 3; see
also Mezirow, 1991)
“Transformative learning ... is often an intensely threatening experience in which we have to become
aware of both the assumptions undergirding our ideas and our emotional responses to the need for
change” (Mezirow, 2000, pp. 6–7; see also Mezirow, 2009)
“Our values and sense of self are anchored in our frames of reference. They provide us with a sense of
stability, coherence, community and identity. Consequently they are often emotionally charged and
strongly defended.” (Mezirow, 2000, p.18; see also Mezirow, 1991)
In general, the above instances indicate that, in Mezirow’s view, there is an emotional
dimension to transformation, which goes hand in hand with reflecting on one’s assumptions. These
instances, in fact, appear quite contradictory to the often-criticised aspects of Mezirow’s theory,
namely that it focuses on cognitive and rational aspects at the expense of emotional and social
aspects (see Clark & Wilson, 1991; Mezirow, 2009; Taylor, 2000). Nevertheless, this criticism may
be seen as justified, in the sense that Mezirow does not explicate the conceptual relations between
the emotional and cognitive dimensions of meaning perspective and reflection (see also Mezirow,
2009). In addition, the overall origins and functions of emotions are not considered. Although
Mezirow does not elaborate more specifically on the role of emotions in relation to the meaning
perspective or reflection, some further insight may be gained by examining the above excerpts in
more detail. Based on my analysis, I suggest the following conceptualization:
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The meaning perspective may be seen to be supported and protected by emotions. Firstly, this
is manifested in the way Mezirow (2000, 3) emphasizes the need to understand and order the
meaning of our experience: “...integrating it with what we know to avoid the threat of chaos.” In
this, the threat of chaos may be seen as the reverse side of meaning-making: we feel anxious and
experience a threat of chaos, when understanding and successful meaning-making within the frame
of reference is not possible, and vice versa. Secondly, emotional support for the meaning
perspective is implied by the above instance, which explicates that these frames of reference are
emotionally charged and often strongly defended (Mezirow 2000, 18). Thirdly, Mezirow (2000, 6–
7) mentions that becoming aware of our assumptions and emotional responses in transformation is
often an intensely threatening experience. This indicates that reflection may be painful.
To be more specific experiencing anxiety and feeling threatened by chaos may be seen to be
related to situations in which one is unable to cope with the environment, make meaning according
to one’s meaning perspective, and understand what is happening within it or within oneself,.
Consequently, one feels anxious at the lack of safety brought by events being understandable and
predictable in terms of one’s previous assumptions. An extreme example of such a situation would
be a woman coming home after a day at work, but finding someone else’s furniture in her house.
Unpleasant emotions are likely to be associated with her perception of not knowing what is going
on.
On the other hand, unpleasant emotions may be linked to one’s assumptions and emotional
responses becoming under question. The case of long-held emotionally charged assumptions
becoming challenged can be seen to refer to the core of the meaning perspective, i.e. to the stability
of one’s sense of identity being challenged (see Illeris, 2007; Mezirow, 1991; 2009). An example of
this would be a man discovering that his father, whom he had thought financially independent, had
to plead for money from his parents in order to support his family. Although the person in case is
not under any threat, he may feel as if his whole life was at stake.
The above considerations would indicate that unpleasant emotions are related to the instances
when coherence and continuity are not maintained within the meaning perspective. However,
Mezirow (2000, 3) implies that we basically aim to avoid anxiety and feeling threatened by chaos,
i.e. instances of unpleasant emotions. In this way, it appears that by aiming to avoid unpleasant
emotions, we simultaneously aim to maintain coherence within the meaning perspective.
Furthermore, this indicates that there is an emotional or experiential dimension to
interpretation. I emphasize this by using the term comfort zone, which I define as follows: On one
hand, when continuous and coherent interpretation (cognitive component) is not possible, we feel
unpleasant feelings (emotional component). On the other hand, when we are able to interpret
situations coherently and continuously (cognitive component) within the light of our meaning
perspective, we may experience comfortable feelings (emotional component), which often go
unnoticed, as there are no unpleasant emotions present. Therefore, when we are able to maintain the
coherence and continuity of our meaning perspective, we may be seen to be functioning on a
comfort zone. Correspondingly, when this is not the case, we are out of the comfort zone, or at the
edges of it. Furthermore, I propose the term edge-emotions to refer to the unpleasant emotions
which arise at the edges of the comfort zone, that is, when the meaning perspective becomes
challenged.
The reinterpretation of the conceptual relations between the cognitive and emotional aspects
of the meaning perspective that I suggest above, makes it possible to connect Mezirow’s
cognitively-focused descriptions of the functions of the meaning perspective to the emotional
indications of the ways in which the functions of the meaning perspective are actually experienced
by the interpreting person. The terms that I proposed and specified serve to bring out the emotional
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component accompanying the issues which, within the literature on transformative learning, are
often described mainly in terms of the cognitive viewpoint.
These interpretations sketching an explanation for the challenges to reflection were possible
to reach by analyzing Mezirow’s theory, and inferring conceptual connections based on issues
Mezirow implies, but does not explicitly consider. Based on these analyses, it appears that more
understanding concerning the challenges of reflection may be reached through utilizing other
research, which deals specifically with the nature of emotions and the interconnections between
cognition and emotion.
Utilizing Damasio’s theory to complement Mezirow
The previous analysis showed that a more detailed understanding of the nature and functions
of the emotions would be important for reaching a better understanding of the challenges to
reflection. For this purpose, I used Antonio Damasio’s (1994; 1999; 2003) neurobiological theory
of emotions and consciousness. Naturally, choosing Damasio was by no means an unambiguous
choice. In this section, I will first discuss the bases for this choice. Secondly, I will briefly discuss
the elements that appear fruitful within Damasio’s theory, from the viewpoint of the present study.
Thirdly, I will consider an insufficiently considered issue within Damasio’s theory, which would,
however, be important for the purposes of this study.
Bases for utilizing Damasio’s theory
The reason for choosing Damasio as the complementary theorist was that his theory of
consciousness deals specifically with both emotions and the interconnections between emotion and
cognition. Furthermore, I found it useful for my purposes in theorizing the basic dynamic of the
challenges of reflection that Damasio considers emotions from the perspective of basic research. He
examines the basic nature and dynamic of the researched issues as such, without focusing on
applications, which would bring contextual questions to the front as well (see also Bacharach, 1989;
Whetten, 1989).
Although Damasio’s theory offers understanding useful for my study, from the
methodological viewpoint choosing another theory as a complementary theory raises further general
questions of philosophy of science, regarding utilizing two different theories together in theory-
building:
Mezirow’s and Damasio’s theories are formed within very different disciplines.
Consequently, their methodological and theoretical backgrounds differ as well. In spite of this, the
theories may to some extent be compatible and offer fruitful elements concerning the challenges to
reflection. This view is based on the philosophical presupposition that while the disciplines or
research traditions may be separated, this does not indicate that the boundaries between them would
be static. Neither is it implied that these boundaries would be present in the actual phenomena.
From this perspective, e.g. the philosopher of science Roger Trigg (2007) has emphasized the need
for communication between disciplines, and has encouraged researchers of different disciplines to
utilize each other’s research results in their own research. However, this is not sufficient for
constructing theory in a methodologically sound manner. In addition, it is important to analyze the
conceptual connections and the complementary aspects, as well as the differences between the
theories (see Bacharach, 1989; Brookfield, 1992; Hannus & Simola, 2010; Rorty, 1984; Whetten,
1989). In the end, as in any philosophical research, the final justifications stem from the fruitfulness
of the developed theoretical construction in relation to the focus of the research. In other words,
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before the analysis, there is no guarantee whether utilizing certain theories together will prove
fruitful.
Damasio’s fruitful elements from the viewpoint of theory building: The biological function of
emotions
As Damasio’s theory was chosen for the analysis in order to shed light on the nature and
functions of emotions as well as on the connection between emotion and cognition, I will first
discuss in brief Damasio’s view on these fruitful aspects. After that, I will consider Damasio’s
limitations in terms of my purposes of the theory building.
According to Damasio (1999; 2003), emotions first and foremost function as a regulating
element within a living organism, in order to provide advantageous conditions for maintaining life.
The most fundamental role of emotions is, as part of homeostatic regulation, to preserve balance or
avoid losing integrity, which is a prerequisite for maintaining life. Integrity refers both to those
elements of an organism, which must work within a relatively small range of regulation for the
organism to function optimally, and to the need for an organism’s inner states to be relatively stable
in relation to the environment (Damasio, 1999).
In order to survive, a living organism must also be able to act within the environment, avoid
danger, and find sources of energy as well as incorporate and transform energy. These are also
functions of the emotions, both in adjusting the inner states to prepare for a given reaction, and in
producing a given reaction in a triggering situation, for example to escape, attack or undertake
pleasurable activity. According to Damasio, animals have basically these same reactions, although
within humans, they are often in a restrained form (Damasio, 1999, pp. 53–54).
In terms of the connection between emotion and cognition, Damasio considers emotions to be
an inherent part of our mental capabilities, e.g. in functioning as a support system for our decision-
making, through directing attention and regulating its intensity. More precisely, Damasio’s
neurological work shows that a lack of emotion disturbs rationality at least as much as too much
emotion, and that the connection between cognition and emotion is indispensable for mental
functioning as well as for action (Damasio, 1999; see also Illeris, 2005). Basically, the emotions
arising in a certain situation form the basis of our interpretations on how suitable the environment
seems to us (Damasio, 1999; 2003). Thus, the positive emotions we experience, for example, in
association to (social) reinforcement, as well as the negative ones during instances of being
suppressed, inhibited and punished, serve to orient us according to our basic aim for maintaining
life. Emotions give automatic messages based on previous experiences from similar situations, and
direct attention towards or away from a certain object.
Besides the emotions, also consciousness serves homeostatic regulation, although on a more
complex level. Consciousness is closely related to the homeostatic mechanisms including emotions
and attention. With the help of consciousness, it is possible to anticipate, plan and invent new ways
to cope more effectively with a complex and changing environment. This happens through
manipulating the images which partially form the content of consciousness. Furthermore, while
operating with images, the individual is simultaneously aware that the images are within the
individual producing them; the images are located within the perspective of the individual. Based
on this, anticipation and planning in favor of the individual becomes possible (Damasio, 1999;
2003).
In addition to the changing images that enable one to be conscious of different things at
different times, the individual perspective also presupposes a component within consciousness that
is relatively consistent. This relatively consistent component is needed for producing the experience
of the individual experiencing through their consciousness remaining the same, despite the
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changing contents of consciousness. According to Damasio, this is enabled by the autobiographical
self, which has its neurobiological counterpart in the convergence zone. It is manifested as
dispositions based on the autobiographical memory. This set of conceptual memories pertains both
to the past and the anticipated experiences of an individual. These neurobiologically anchored
processes make possible our sense of personal historical continuity. Thus, the experience of
consciousness is a product of the interaction between the autobiographical dispositions, and the
images of objects and events. The dispositions allow us to feel that it is ´I who is experiencing`,
simultaneously affecting the perceiving by orienting attention. Furthermore, our sense of self and
identity lean on the autobiographical dispositions, which, by being repeatedly actuated, bring
continuity, coherence and apparent stability to our lives (Damasio, 1999; 2003).
Damasio’s limitations from the viewpoint of theory building: the mechanisms for protecting
the consciousness are not considered
At the previous phases, I analyzed Mezirow’s theory and reconstructed it in terms of the
elements that appeared fruitful for examining the challenges to reflection. On the other hand,
Mezirow’s theory appeared limited, as it did not involve a further understanding of emotions and
the connection between cognition and emotion. The above description of Damasio’s view
concerned the elements that appeared fruitful in order to complement Mezirow’s theory. However,
some aspects of Damasio’s theory also called for extension, in order to be fruitful in terms of the
challenges to reflection.
For example, Damasio does not consider the factors that may threaten the integrity and
coherence of consciousness, and how we may protect ourselves from them. This is somewhat
contradictory, as Damasio precisely explicates that the basic function of emotions is survival and
adaptation, and how consciousness, for its part, also serves this basic function. Therefore, despite
the fact that on the biological and physical level Damasio considers the threats we as humans may
face, and how we biologically protect ourselves from these, he does not, correspondingly, consider
the experienced threat or protection mechanism in terms of the continuity and coherence of
consciousness. This viewpoint would, however, be important for considering the challenges to
reflection.
Theorizing the challenges to reflection
Above, I have discussed the central phases of analysis that enable constructing
conceptualization concerning the challenges to reflection. In this section, I will summarize the core
issues of the developed theory.
Meaning perspective as biologically anchored and emotionally upheld
Based on the analysis of Mezirow’s and Damasio’s theories, I suggest that the meaning
perspective is biologically anchored and emotionally upheld. As a basis for this argument, the
conceptual linkages between Mezirow and Damasio need to be further considered:
Mezirow’s and Damasio’s views concerning the way earlier experiences orient one’s
interpretation may be seen as compatible. Mezirow’s concept of meaning perspective and
Damasio’s concept of autobiographical self may be seen to describe the same phenomenon from
different perspectives: Damasio’s focus is on describing the core of it, i.e. what are the necessary
conditions for the human brain functions enabling consciousness, in the first place. He also
considers somewhat more ‘flexible’ issues, such as how, through imagination, we may manipulate
the images of consciousness, and how the autobiographical self is formed through experiences.
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Mezirow, on the other hand, focuses on these contents of consciousness. He considers more
explicitly how these contents are formed within socialization, close relationships and experiences.
These affect the orienting frame of reference within which interpretation takes place. Furthermore,
based on these explications, Mezirow constructs his argumentation concerning the possibility to
modify, change and transform the meaning perspective, and gives reasons for why he thinks there is
a need for this kind of learning in adult life (see e.g. Mezirow, 1978; 2009).
Furthermore, according to Damasio, consciousness functions in favor of a biological life-
support-system, by enabling imagination, planning and other cognitive functions, which may be
used in coping with the environment. I suggest that correspondingly, the meaning perspective
serves these mechanisms aimed at maintaining life in the human organism. Since these thinking
activities are actualized within the meaning perspective, also the meaning perspective may be seen
to support maintaining the functioning of a human organism. However, several issues arising from
this need to be solved both in terms of Damasio’s and Mezirow’s ideas. These are explicated in
more detail in the following.
According to Mezirow (1991), uncomfortable feelings are aroused when meaning-making
within the meaning perspective is not possible, or when long-held beliefs are challenged. I suggest
that these feelings stem from the biological system of homeostatic regulation, which aims at
ensuring balance and continuity within a living organism. As the meaning perspective, or in
Damasio’s terms, autobiographical self, brings continuity to the consciousness in order to ensure
regulation, I suggest that challenging this continuity can be experienced as a threat to the
functioning of the organism. An example of this is the common experience of when during a
negotiation one of the participants reacts heatedly to someone else’s view, as if his whole self were
at stake or challenged. Based on the discussion above, it is possible that he really felt as if his life
was threatened when the opinion in question challenged his long-held emotionally charged beliefs.
Basically, emotions produce reactions appropriate to both physically safe and dangerous
situations (Damasio, 1999). Nevertheless, as consciousness is closely connected to the homeostatic
functions (see Damasio, 1999), the basic emotions can be seen as having an effect even on the
complex mental functions of consciousness. Based on this, I propose that the biological life-support
system, which functions through emotions and the automatic orientation of attention, also supports
the coherence of the meaning perspective.
The following notions may be seen to support this argument: 1) Damasio explains how
emotion and cognition are always entangled and inseparable. 2) Emotions are associated with
(social) reinforcement as well as suppression, inhibition and punishment, which also according to
Mezirow happen naturally, in the process of interpreting new situations within the light of earlier
experiences, and the new experiences again strengthening our expectations about “how things are
supposed to be”. Therefore, the act of interpreting in the light of previous experiences whilst staying
on the comfort zone appears to be supported by emotions, ultimately aiming to ensure the
consistency of the structures of consciousness necessary for survival. Pleasant and comfortable
emotions and feelings are associated with functioning within the comfort zone. In contrast,
unpleasant and uncomfortable emotions emerge when the comfort zone (and also the meaning
perspective) become challenged and questioned.
Automatic orientation towards the comfort zone
I suggest that with the help of emotions, we orient automatically towards our individual
comfort zones and aim to avoid their edges. Ultimately, this is manifest in the way we interpret
situations in ways which enable us to avoid dealing with uncomfortable issues. Arguments in favor
of these suggestions are presented in the following.
Kaisu Mälkki / THEORIZING THE CHALLENGES TO REFLECTION
Damasio emphasizes that the regulative systems function automatically and stereotypically
without conscious thinking, although regarding some triggers there is considerable variation
between individuals and as affected by culture (Damasio, 1999). In other words, emotions are
activated automatically, outside of consciousness, within the function of maintaining and protecting
the living organism. A threatening situation automatically arouses emotions and directs attention,
for example if we unexpectedly run close to the edge of a cliff, or if a suspicious-looking person sits
next to us on the train. As mentioned earlier, we use emotions as an indicator of the convenience of
a situation (see Damasio, 1999). However, based on my analysis, I suggest that in terms of
consciousness, the autobiographical self, or the meaning perspective of the individual, is the
yardstick determining whether the emotions and feelings associated with a situation are experienced
as unpleasant or enjoyable.
Similarly, all other experiences are defined according to the meaning perspective, e.g. what
one finds mentally challenging, or what is relaxing to an individual. Furthermore, the unconscious
emotional support for the consistency of consciousness is apparent when the emotions direct
attention towards familiar aspects of situations, without a conscious experience of the emotions
causing it. On the other hand, sometimes the emotion can be experienced although we are not aware
of the cause (see Damasio, 1999).
The automatic orientation of emotions (Damasio, 1999) is manifested also in our attention
being automatically oriented towards the comfort zone. At the same time, this means attempting to
avoid the edges of the comfort zone and the accompanying unpleasant emotions, which are
automatically understood as indicating danger, in general. These uncomfortable emotions arising at
the edges of the comfort zone are the ‘edge-emotions’ I introduced above in “The meaning
perspective and emotions”. When the meaning perspective is being challenged, I suggest that the
edge-emotions automatically motivate us to restore the balance, i.e. to interpret the situation
according to our expectations, so as to experience the world as understandable. Examples of this
may easily be found in history of science, when new and revolutionary theories have been strongly
opposed by the scientific establishment. In these cases, it could be said that ’reason’ was exploited
in order to bring about feelings of safety and to maintain the comfort zone, rather than aiming at a
thorough understanding of the situation.
The challenges to reflection
Altogether, based on the above examination on the nature and consequences of the meaning
perspective, it appears that reflection may not be something one willingly takes up and easily carries
out. In the beginning of this article, it was demonstrated that within the meaning perspective, there
are predispositions for searching for the familiar and avoiding the unfamiliar, which forms a
counterforce to reflection. Furthermore, the discussion above explores the basis for these
predispositions, and explains how they are realized with the help of emotions.
Put another way, at the most fundamental level the counterforce to reflection is not merely the
unwillingness to change or the effort this requires, but the natural tendency, based on the biological
life-support system, to maintain pre-existing meaning structures. If one was able to reflect
unrestrictedly, deconstruct and reconstruct one’s meaning perspective without inhibitions, one
would not be able to maintain the basic unity of consciousness that also includes one’s sense of self
(cf. Illeris, 2007; Mezirow, 2000). From this perspective, a counterforce to reflection actually
appears necessary for maintaining the consistency of consciousness.
However, this is not the whole story, as this very consistency rests on the meaning perspective
as a historically and socially shaped personal meaning structure (Mezirow, 1991; 2000). The
existence of the meaning perspective in a conscious human being can be seen as part of a
Kaisu Mälkki / THEORIZING THE CHALLENGES TO REFLECTION
biologically based life-support system, but its specific form, breadth and flexibility is, to an extent,
socially and personally constructed. Moreover, through the meaning perspective, one is in constant
interaction with one’s social, cultural and material environment. Therefore, although the matter is
not explicated in this paper, it is important to note that these social aspects need to be considered
with regard to reflection.
According to Mezirow (1978; 1991; 2000; 2009), reflection is often triggered when our
assumptions become problematic. This is often the case after a disorienting dilemma, a real-life
crisis, or other, more cumulative set of instances arouse discontent with some aspect of one’s life.
However, as was demonstrated earlier, assumptions becoming problematic is a challenge to one’s
comfort zone, and edge-emotions emerge in order to orient one’s thinking automatically back to the
comfort zone. Based on this, I suggest that assumptions becoming problematic - which is often seen
as a trigger for reflection - is in fact covered by edge-emotions. Based on my synthesis of
Mezirow’s and Damasio’s theories, I propose that there is a tendency to avoid dealing with
discrepancies that threaten the consistency of our meaning structures. Consequently, we are
naturally inclined to interpret the situation in ways which would enable a return to the comfort zone,
in order to feel the comfort resulting from the world appearing safe and understandable.
I therefore suggest that as a prerequisite to becoming aware of and assessing the problematic
assumptions in reflection, one needs to recognize and accept the edge-emotions, so as to become
aware of, assess and explore their bases. The bases of these emotions may be seen to be the very
assumptions that have become problematic. This is in line with Mezirow’s (e.g. 2000) view that
emotional maturity and the ability to manage emotions is important in transformative learning.
Mezirow does not, however, explicate in more detail the prerequisites of this in relation to the
meaning perspective or reflection. In my view, one aspect of this emotional maturity appears to
involve learning to recognize, accept and work with the edge-emotions. Also, Zweig and Wolf’s
(1999) notion of romancing the shadow (as based based on Jung’s thinking) could be considered as
referring to a similar attempt of aiming to bring into awareness experiences one has previously
automatically avoided. However, my concept of the edge-emotions by definition explicates their
dynamics in orienting and limiting our thinking. It enables considerations as to whether these
limiting aspects can be managed.
To summarize, the biologically anchored emotions that aim to support the consistency of the
meaning perspective appear to form a counterforce to reflection. The edge-emotions, aroused at the
edges of the comfort zone, serve as concrete indicators of this counterforce. However, these very
same edge-emotions may be seen to be the key to reflection. The essential question is whether one
is automatically oriented to ignore and explain away the distraction caused by the aroused edge-
emotions, or whether one is able to approach these emotions as an existing experience one may try
to understand. Therefore, the crux of the matter is one’s attitude towards these edge-emotions.
Paradoxically, it appears that precisely through recognizing and accepting irrational reactions and
tendencies, we may better be able to think rationally. This is not an attitude shift comparable to the
familiar, everyday situations, where we consciously tell ourselves to think before we act, or say
something, once we realize an emotional response within ourselves. Rather, the essential issue is to
pay attention to these emotions as physical and psychological indications of our thinking possibly
being oriented not towards openly examining the situation or ourselves in it, but on the contrary
towards restoring balance and returning to the comfort zone.
Re-thinking aspects of Damasio’s theory: The bi-polar and double-edged nature of emotions
The last issue considered here involves re-thinking some of Damasio’s ideas, which may be
seen to follow from the earlier analysis while complementing the theorization of the challenges to
reflection.
Kaisu Mälkki / THEORIZING THE CHALLENGES TO REFLECTION
Earlier, I argued that Damasio has considered the nature of emotions only from the biological
and physical perspective. In terms of consciousness, Damasio focuses only on the composition and
conditions of consciousness as a whole. That is to say, he does not consider the possible threats and
challenges to the coherence and stability of the structures of consciousness, or what kind of
mechanisms may protect these structures from threats. Based on the above examinations, I suggest
that emotions not only serve the survival of the body, but that they are bi-polar in the sense that they
are oriented from both the survival of the body and the maintenance of the coherence of meaning
structures within the consciousness.
Furthermore, in Damasio’s (1999; 2003) considerations, emotions are presented mostly in a
positive light, implying that the messages indicated by emotions would always be unambiguous and
in favor of maintaining life. Based on my synthesis of Mezirow’s and Damasio’s theories, I would
instead suggest that emotions are by nature double-edged, in the sense that if the messages indicated
by emotions are taken unquestioningly to protect the consciousness, the protection of the “body”
might suffer. As an extreme example, we might automatically be oriented towards avoiding all
edge-emotions indicating threat to the meaning perspective, completely rejecting all uncomfortable
thoughts, viewpoints and situations which arouse them, in order to maintain feelings of comfort – as
if these feelings of comfort guaranteed the best possible conditions for managing life. This would,
however, paradoxically lead us to the one-sided aim of always defending our assumptions from ever
being questioned, and to strive to strengthen the assumptions of the previous meaning perspective,
at all cost. When the contexts change (see Mezirow, 2000), our protection mechanisms would in
this extreme example continuously have to fight the challenging stimuli. This, in turn, would orient
our resources solely towards defending our perspectives, and bring on a compulsive need to restore
the comfort zone with any means possible. From the survival perspective, this kind of meaning
structure no longer appears as a functional mechanism supporting adaptation to the environment.
Quite the contrary, it would lead one to lose contact with one’s environment, as one could no longer
be open and flexible to the new stimuli encountered in everyday life. An extreme example of this
would be a prejudiced person, who, in a case of emergency, would not accept help from the member
of a group he considers suspicious, since accepting the help would question his basic conviction.
In fact, from the perspective of survival, certain flexibility in one’s meaning structure appears
necessary for managing life and adapting to one’s environment, while enabling one to maintain
contact both to one’s own emotions and to the characteristics of the environment. This kind of
flexibility in meaning structures would not, however, appear possible if the biological messages of
emotions were followed unquestioningly. On the contrary, we have the emotionally supported
tendency to base interpretations on previous experiences in order to understand situations within the
light of our biographies, and this also strengthens the perceived validity of the assumptions. This
enables us to experience ourselves as living in a sufficiently safe, predictable and understandable
world. However, relating to emotions one-sidedly (avoiding the uncomfortable, aiming for comfort)
would lead us to a static, conservative, ever-narrowing funnel. By contrast, in order to dismantle
this kind of vicious cycle and make one’s perspective more flexible, one would have to be able to
go against one’s tendencies and try to recognize and work with the edge-emotions. In this sense,
reflection may be seen to support the biological mechanisms aimed at maintaining life and enabling
adaptation to the environment. Furthermore, edge-emotions appear as a threshold for the success or
failure of reflection.
To conclude, both reflection and its counterforces may ultimately be seen to support survival.
This dilemmatic issue is comparable to the issue of food: too little or too much food does not
provide the best conditions for the functioning and well-being of an organism – and the quality of
the food consumed matters, too. More generally, Damasio shows how cognition supports survival
in enabling thinking, planning, imagination etc. as based on the entanglement of cognition and
emotion (Damasio 1999; 2003). In addition to this, based on my synthesis of Mezirow’s and
Kaisu Mälkki / THEORIZING THE CHALLENGES TO REFLECTION
Damasio’s theories, I suggest that cognition may be seen to support survival in that it enables
conscious working with the entangled relationship between cognition and emotion, which does not
always work purely in favor of survival.
Conclusions
Thus far, the scholarly discussion on reflection has considered reflection from the rational and
predominantly cognitive viewpoint. In consequence, the ideals of reflection are clearly known, but
less understanding has been gained of the actualities of reflection, and there is no adequate
explanation for the fact that reflection is not always easy to carry out.
Based on the analyses in this study, I suggest that the challenges of reflection are
fundamentally connected to the way the biological life-support system affects our thinking through
the emotions.
The theorization presented in this article offers conceptualization concerning the prerequisites
of and challenges to reflection. It may be seen as an analytical tool-box for examining various
attempts at reflection in various contexts and situations. While depicting the mechanisms that
function as a counterforce to reflection, it also opens a perspective for considering possibilities for
carrying out reflection, and suggests ways to locate and deal with the assumptions to be reflected
on. Furthermore, it explicates how the assumptions possibly found within reflection may not always
be rational and reasoned explanations stemming directly from one’s meaning perspective. Rather, it
exposes these as more complex intertwinements, affected by the biological and emotional
mechanisms aiming to ensure the structures of consciousness remain intact.
From the theoretical viewpoint, the theorization may be seen as a further development on
Mezirow’s theory of transformative learning. Although it does not consider all concepts and aspects
of adult learning viewed in Mezirow’s theory, it offers a new perspective to considering the process
of transformative learning from the viewpoint of its prerequisites.
The theorization is based on analyzing Mezirow’s view on reflection and meaning perspective
on the one hand, and Damasio’s view on emotions and consciousness on the other. The basic
dynamic of the challenges to reflection was conceptualized by bridging the gap between these two
theories, through exploring the connections between the biological functions of emotions and the
nature of the meaning perspective. In this, the concepts of comfort zone and edge-emotions were
introduced, capturing the intertwinement of emotion and cognition in a way that offers an
understanding of the challenges to reflection.
As the most important direction for future research, theorizing the challenges of reflection
requires further analysis concerning the social dimension. The relations between the cognitive and
emotional dimensions, considered within this study, need to be complemented with examining their
interrelations to the social dimension as well. This would enable a more specific consideration of
issues in terms of facilitating reflection. Previous studies have shown safe and supportive
relationships, as well as the role of the facilitator, as important factors (e.g. Brookfield, 1994;
Jokikokko, 2009; Taylor, 1997; 2000; 2007; 2008). These could be examined in more detail in
research focusing on theorizing the challenges of reflection within the social dimension.
Furthermore, several scholars within the field of sociology emphasize the need to become aware of
prevailing social givens, and explicate the nature of these from the social perspective (see
Kaisu Mälkki / THEORIZING THE CHALLENGES TO REFLECTION
Brookfield 2000; 2005). Combining these sociological perspectives with the insights I present in
this article may prove fruitful for both fields of research.
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