Building on Mezirow's Theory of Transformative Learning: Theorizing the Challenges to Reflection

Building on Mezirow’s theory of transformative learning:

Theorizing the challenges to reflection

PhD. Kaisu Mälkki

Department of Teacher Education

University of Helsinki

Published in: Journal of Transformative Education 8, 2010; pp.42-62

Abstract. The prevailing theoretical discussion on reflection within adult and higher education focuses

on the cognitive and rational dimensions of reflection, at the expense of the emotional and social dimensions.

Consequently, the theories deal with the ideals, but leave issues pertaining to the understanding of the

prerequisites, challenges and obstacles of reflection largely unaddressed. This article proposes a theory

which sheds light on the nature and the prerequisites of the process of reflection.

The theory development was based on analyzing Jack Mezirow’s theory of transformative learning. In

order to deepen the understanding of the emotional dimension which was fruitfully yet insufficiently

conceptualized within Mezirow’s theory, Antonio Damasio’s neurobiological theory of emotions and

consciousness was utilized as a complementary theory. Based on these differing theories, it was possible to

construct a theory which conceptualizes the challenges to reflection and opens new directions for further

research concerning integrating the cognitive and emotional perspectives.

Keywords: reflection, critical reflection, transformative learning, theory development, emotions in

learning

Introduction

The notion of reflection has become popular among both researchers and practitioners within

the fields of adult learning, education, and the development of expertise, during recent decades.

Although some scholars claim that reflection is being widely promoted in educational settings with

little result (see e.g. Ecclestone, 1996; Gur-Ze’ev, Masschelein & Blake, 2001; Procee, 2006), there

are also empirical studies which have been able to validate both the existence as well as the

relevance of reflection in practice (see Taylor, 1997, 2000, 2007).

Jack Mezirow’s (e.g. 1981; 1991; 2000; 2009) theory of transformative learning offers one of

the most sophisticated conceptualizations of reflection, within a larger frame of a theory of adult

learning. However, like other adult and higher education theorizing (see Illeris, 2007; 2009;

Kaisu Mälkki / THEORIZING THE CHALLENGES TO REFLECTION

Malinen, 2000; McAlpine et al., 1999; Merriam, 2008; Postareff & Lindblom-Ylänne, 2011; Schutz

& Pekrun, 2007; Sutton, Mudrey-Camino & Knight, 2009; Sutton & Wheatley, 2003), Mezirow’s

theory has been criticized for overemphasizing the rational and cognitive aspects of learning, at the

expense of the non-rational, emotional and social aspects (Clark & Wilson, 1991; Dirkx, 2008;

Kitchenham 2008; Illeris, 2004; Mezirow, 2009; Taylor, 2000). Consequently, Mezirow’s theory

implies a rather idealized and rational process of reflection, compared to the understanding

emerging from empirical studies. In fact, the insights emerging from empirical studies seem to

suggest that reflection is more than a rational process, and that it is not always easy to carry out.

Furthermore, emotions and safe relationships have been shown to be inextricable factors within the

process of reflection (e.g. Brookfield, 1994; Jokikokko, 2009; Taylor, 1997, 2000, 2007, 2008).

However, this more comprehensive empirical understanding of the process of reflection is not

quite in line with the theory itself. These further insights have yet to be used to challenge and

develop further the theory of transformative learning (Mezirow, 2007). Although within recent

years, there has been lively discussion aimed at extending the view of transformative learning

towards a more holistic, integrative, and comprehensive conception of learning (see e.g. Dirkx,

2008; Gunnlaugson, 2007; Illeris, 2004; Kitchenham 2008; Mezirow, 2009; Taylor 2008), the

conceptual connections between e.g the cognitive, emotional and social aspects of reflection are left

unconsidered. Consequently, no theory has been offered for explicating and analyzing the

prerequisites and challenges to reflection. Such a theory would by necessity need to include

conceptualization of the dynamics of reflection that would 1) explicate the presuppositions of the

very process of becoming aware of and questioning one’s assumptions; 2) depict the conditions for

carrying it out; and 3) also indicate possible barriers for the process.

This paper proposes a developed theory to shed light on the prerequisites and challenges to

reflection. The theorization is based on analyzing the interrelationship between the meaning

perspective and reflection, and their cognitive and emotional dimensions, within Mezirow’s theory.

Furthermore, in order to deepen the understanding of the emotional dimension, Antonio Damasio’s

neurobiological theory of emotions and consciousness is utilized as a complementary source for

theory-building.

At this point I will briefly remark that the social dimension is fundamentally entangled with

the cognitive and emotional dimensions considered in this article. This is manifested also in

Mezirow’s work, for instance in the way he describes the meaning perspective as socially

constructed (Mezirow, 1991), and states that the meaning perspective also provides a sense of

community (Mezirow, 2000). Some consequences of the social dimension to the process of

reflection have been considered by Brookfield (1994; 2006). For example, Brookfield’s notion of

cultural suicide refers to a ‘risk’ of being cut off from the cultures and groups one has been involved

in, as a possible consequence of challenging the social givens within these groups (Brookfield,

1994; 2006). I regard cognitive, emotional and social dimensions as inseparable, although within

this article I focus specifically on the interconnections between the cognitive and emotional

dimension.

The article is structured as follows: The following section briefly discusses the philosophical

methods and methodological orientation of the theory-building. The next section considers the

conceptual analysis of Mezirow’s transformative theory, whereas the subsequent one explicates the

bases for utilizing Mezirow’s and Damasio’s theories together and summarizes Damasio’s offerings

for my analyses. The last section summarizes the results of the theory construction, i.e. the

theorization of the challenges to reflection. The article ends with conclusions, which place the

developed theory within the wider research field.


Method

Unlike within empirical research, there has not been much focus on methodical questions

within philosophical and theoretical research, until recently. However, within the past few years,

methodological issues have been brought up to discussion among the philosophers of education.

There have been calls for increased explicitness concerning what has been done, why, and on what

premises (see Ruitenberg, 2009; Ruitenberg, 2010; Staindish 2009). Therefore, in the following I

will briefly consider my approach regarding the theory-building presented in this article.

In the theory development, I used rational reconstruction (Davia 1998; Habermas, 1979;

Hannus & Simola, 2010; Rorty, 1984) and different philosophical and conceptual analytical

methods (see Holma, 2009; Kakkuri-Knuuttila, 2007; Ruitenberg, 2010). The phases of analysis

and theory-building were not pre-planned, but the results of each earlier phase were used to define

the focus of the next phase. These phases become explicated in the subsequent chapters, which

follow the sequential nature of the actual research process. In the following, instead, I outline the

central premises and methodological perspectives orienting the research.

Firstly, I understand theories to be in a process of never-ending progress, instead of being

assumed to reach completeness at some point. Mezirow himself indicates that transformative

learning is a theory in progress (Mezirow et al., 2000). However, I do not assume theories to

develop automatically, but through continuous questioning and refinement (see Layder, 1998;

Mezirow, 1991).

Secondly, by theory development I refer to the aim of conceptualizing a certain phenomenon,

which is not sufficiently conceptualized by any earlier theory. However, I do not assume that any

phenomenon may be theorized as such, without reference to other theories. Therefore I used earlier

theories, i.e. Mezirow’s and_Damasio’s theories, as the basis for the new conceptualization.

Following rational reconstruction (Davia 1998; Habermas, 1979; Hannus & Simola, 2010; Rorty,

1984), I interpreted these earlier theories from the viewpoint of my specific aim of increasing

understanding of the challenges to reflection. This kind of analysis differs from e.g. systematic

analysis (Holma, 2009; 2010), which aims to deepen the understanding of a certain theory or a

conceptual entity as such. As the theory-building was based on analyzing Mezirow’s and Damasio’s

theories, the developed conceptualization became rooted firmly, through explicit conceptual

connections, in the conceptualization of these earlier theories (see Brookfield, 1992; Bacharach,

1989; Whetten, 1989). Consequently, the methodological footsteps were left in view, which is not

often the case in philosophical and theoretical work (see Ruitenberg, 2010). This is an important

feature in terms of the reliability of the method (see Brookfield, 1992).

Thirdly, in analysis and theory building, my focus was on the relational nature of the research

phenomenon, through examining the interrelations between the meaning perspective and reflection,

and the cognitive and emotional dimensions of these. Relational orientation emphasizes

understanding the concepts in relation to each other, instead of focusing on any one concept as such.

Relational approach has been presented as an alternative to substantial thinking, which considers

substances of all kinds as the fundamental units of inquiry (Emirbayer, 1997). Relationality allows

one to examine unfolding processes, instead of focusing on preformed entities and elements. In this

regard, my goal in theorizing was not, for example, to offer ready-made answers or straight-forward

predictions. Rather, I seek to bring into view and explicate the dynamic nature of the challenges of

reflection, in order to offer analytical tools for examining these in various real-life situations (see

Hannus & Simola 2010; Malinen 2000; Whetten 1989).


Analysis of Mezirow’s theory

Mezirow’s (e.g. 1981; 1991; 2000; 2009) theory of transformative learning sees reflection as a

process aimed at becoming aware of and assessing the validity of the meaning perspective.

However, the origins and dynamics of reflection itself remain unexamined, despite the fact that the

purpose, significance and objects of reflection are widely discussed both in Mezirow’s writings and

within other literature (see Taylor, 2000; 2008). After clarifying two terminological issues, I will

examine the nature and basis of reflection by considering its relation to the concept of the meaning

perspective, which involves Mezirow’s conception of the orientation of thinking on a more general

level.

In the following, I elaborate specifically on Mezirowian meaning perspective. Therefore,

although there are critical views concerning the term meaning perspective (Wiessner & Mezirow,

2000), I considered it more precise than the suggested term frame of reference.

Within his extensive body of work, Mezirow differentiates between several different levels,

types and scopes of reflection and critical reflection (e.g. Mezirow, 1981; 1998). My examination

does not concern this variety, but instead the presuppositions of the very process of becoming aware

of and questioning one’s assumptions. Therefore, I use the general term reflection without

specifying the contents or levels. However, in most instances, the closest equivalent to the way I use

the term is Mezirow’s term critical reflection, premise reflection or critical self-reflection.

Tension between reflection and meaning perspective

Meaning perspective is the frame within which meaning-making takes place (Mezirow, 1991).

Understanding is based on grasping the world with our assumptions and expectations, which have

been formed through previous experiences. On one hand, this previous understanding orients and

limits our attention, perceptions and interpretations. On the other hand, this enables us to maintain

our view of the world as well as our sense of stability, community and identity (Mezirow, 1981;

1991; 2000; 2009).

Reflection refers to becoming aware of and assessing the taken-for-granted assumptions

within one’s meaning perspective, in order to construct a more valid belief (see Mezirow, 1991).

Assessing assumptions can be seen to refer to metacognitive application of critical thinking to one’s

own thinking, feelings and actions (see also Mezirow, 2006; 2009). Thus, for this part, reflection

can be seen mainly as a thinking activity. Furthermore, constructing a more valid belief is an act of

meaning-making, if the constructed interpretation is integrated into the meaning perspective and

hence contributes to orienting future meaning-making.

However, when meaning perspective and reflection, as defined above, are considered in

relation to each other, one confronts two conceptually problematic questions:

First, since attention and thinking are substantially guided by one's meaning perspective, the

meaning perspective must have a guiding role also in reflection. Consequently, the process of

reflection appears to be as subjectively oriented, selective, and limited as any human thinking, due

to it being orientated by the meaning perspective.

Second, the role of reflection and the role of the meaning perspective appear opposed, in the

sense that the meaning perspective aims to manage the complexity of life by leaning on the very

self-evidencies reflection aims to question. Therefore, I suggest there is a tension between the

concepts of reflection and meaning perspective, and that consequently these two notions cannot be

considered together without further examination of each. Furthermore, I interpret this tension to


indicate that the very aim of the meaning perspective brings about a counterforce or challenge to

reflection.

In my view, although there is wide emphasis on reflection within adult learning literature (see

Brookfield, 2006; Merriam, 2008; Moon, 2004; Procee, 2006; Taylor, 2007; 2008), these

conceptual questions and their consequences for understanding reflection have not been

acknowledged within scholarly discussion, nor been explicitly considered by Mezirow within his

theory. The tension between reflection and meaning perspective appears to indicate that in order to

understand the nature of the process of reflection, both the nature of the meaning perspective and

the relation between the two must be examined. Further exploration into these concepts is needed in

order to consider first, how the opposition brought by the meaning perspective to reflection actually

operates; and second, how carrying out reflection would still be possible, taking this opposition into

consideration. This will be examined more in detail in the following.

The meaning perspective and emotions

Based on the conceptual analysis of Mezirow’s conception of reflection, meaning perspective, and

the conceptual relationship between the two, it appeared there is a tension between reflection and

meaning perspective, and that this tension may indicate challenges to the process of reflection. In

order to explore this conceptual dilemma further, I carried out another cycle of conceptual analysis

of Mezirow’s theory based on his (1981; 1991; 2000; 2009) texts. This time, I oriented towards

those references which in any way imply that reflection is not easy, or that there may be difficulties

or problems of some kind in actualizing reflection.

As a result of the analysis, I brought out a set of references describing the painfulness of the

process of transformation and reflection. I interpreted these instances to indicate the fact that

reflection is not an easy or purely rational process. I illustrate this point with some examples of

these references, based on Mezirow’s (2000) article.

For instance, Mezirow mentions that:

“A defining condition of being human is our urgent need to understand and order the meaning of our

experience, to integrate it with what we know to avoid the threat of chaos.” (Mezirow, 2000, p. 3; see

also Mezirow, 1991)

“Transformative learning ... is often an intensely threatening experience in which we have to become

aware of both the assumptions undergirding our ideas and our emotional responses to the need for

change” (Mezirow, 2000, pp. 6–7; see also Mezirow, 2009)

“Our values and sense of self are anchored in our frames of reference. They provide us with a sense of

stability, coherence, community and identity. Consequently they are often emotionally charged and

strongly defended.” (Mezirow, 2000, p.18; see also Mezirow, 1991)

In general, the above instances indicate that, in Mezirow’s view, there is an emotional

dimension to transformation, which goes hand in hand with reflecting on one’s assumptions. These

instances, in fact, appear quite contradictory to the often-criticised aspects of Mezirow’s theory,

namely that it focuses on cognitive and rational aspects at the expense of emotional and social

aspects (see Clark & Wilson, 1991; Mezirow, 2009; Taylor, 2000). Nevertheless, this criticism may

be seen as justified, in the sense that Mezirow does not explicate the conceptual relations between

the emotional and cognitive dimensions of meaning perspective and reflection (see also Mezirow,

2009). In addition, the overall origins and functions of emotions are not considered. Although

Mezirow does not elaborate more specifically on the role of emotions in relation to the meaning

perspective or reflection, some further insight may be gained by examining the above excerpts in

more detail. Based on my analysis, I suggest the following conceptualization:


The meaning perspective may be seen to be supported and protected by emotions. Firstly, this

is manifested in the way Mezirow (2000, 3) emphasizes the need to understand and order the

meaning of our experience: “...integrating it with what we know to avoid the threat of chaos.” In

this, the threat of chaos may be seen as the reverse side of meaning-making: we feel anxious and

experience a threat of chaos, when understanding and successful meaning-making within the frame

of reference is not possible, and vice versa. Secondly, emotional support for the meaning

perspective is implied by the above instance, which explicates that these frames of reference are

emotionally charged and often strongly defended (Mezirow 2000, 18). Thirdly, Mezirow (2000, 6–

7) mentions that becoming aware of our assumptions and emotional responses in transformation is

often an intensely threatening experience. This indicates that reflection may be painful.

To be more specific experiencing anxiety and feeling threatened by chaos may be seen to be

related to situations in which one is unable to cope with the environment, make meaning according

to one’s meaning perspective, and understand what is happening within it or within oneself,.

Consequently, one feels anxious at the lack of safety brought by events being understandable and

predictable in terms of one’s previous assumptions. An extreme example of such a situation would

be a woman coming home after a day at work, but finding someone else’s furniture in her house.

Unpleasant emotions are likely to be associated with her perception of not knowing what is going

on.

On the other hand, unpleasant emotions may be linked to one’s assumptions and emotional

responses becoming under question. The case of long-held emotionally charged assumptions

becoming challenged can be seen to refer to the core of the meaning perspective, i.e. to the stability

of one’s sense of identity being challenged (see Illeris, 2007; Mezirow, 1991; 2009). An example of

this would be a man discovering that his father, whom he had thought financially independent, had

to plead for money from his parents in order to support his family. Although the person in case is

not under any threat, he may feel as if his whole life was at stake.

The above considerations would indicate that unpleasant emotions are related to the instances

when coherence and continuity are not maintained within the meaning perspective. However,

Mezirow (2000, 3) implies that we basically aim to avoid anxiety and feeling threatened by chaos,

i.e. instances of unpleasant emotions. In this way, it appears that by aiming to avoid unpleasant

emotions, we simultaneously aim to maintain coherence within the meaning perspective.

Furthermore, this indicates that there is an emotional or experiential dimension to

interpretation. I emphasize this by using the term comfort zone, which I define as follows: On one

hand, when continuous and coherent interpretation (cognitive component) is not possible, we feel

unpleasant feelings (emotional component). On the other hand, when we are able to interpret

situations coherently and continuously (cognitive component) within the light of our meaning

perspective, we may experience comfortable feelings (emotional component), which often go

unnoticed, as there are no unpleasant emotions present. Therefore, when we are able to maintain the

coherence and continuity of our meaning perspective, we may be seen to be functioning on a

comfort zone. Correspondingly, when this is not the case, we are out of the comfort zone, or at the

edges of it. Furthermore, I propose the term edge-emotions to refer to the unpleasant emotions

which arise at the edges of the comfort zone, that is, when the meaning perspective becomes

challenged.

The reinterpretation of the conceptual relations between the cognitive and emotional aspects

of the meaning perspective that I suggest above, makes it possible to connect Mezirow’s

cognitively-focused descriptions of the functions of the meaning perspective to the emotional

indications of the ways in which the functions of the meaning perspective are actually experienced

by the interpreting person. The terms that I proposed and specified serve to bring out the emotional


component accompanying the issues which, within the literature on transformative learning, are

often described mainly in terms of the cognitive viewpoint.

These interpretations sketching an explanation for the challenges to reflection were possible

to reach by analyzing Mezirow’s theory, and inferring conceptual connections based on issues

Mezirow implies, but does not explicitly consider. Based on these analyses, it appears that more

understanding concerning the challenges of reflection may be reached through utilizing other

research, which deals specifically with the nature of emotions and the interconnections between

cognition and emotion.

Utilizing Damasio’s theory to complement Mezirow

The previous analysis showed that a more detailed understanding of the nature and functions

of the emotions would be important for reaching a better understanding of the challenges to

reflection. For this purpose, I used Antonio Damasio’s (1994; 1999; 2003) neurobiological theory

of emotions and consciousness. Naturally, choosing Damasio was by no means an unambiguous

choice. In this section, I will first discuss the bases for this choice. Secondly, I will briefly discuss

the elements that appear fruitful within Damasio’s theory, from the viewpoint of the present study.

Thirdly, I will consider an insufficiently considered issue within Damasio’s theory, which would,

however, be important for the purposes of this study.

Bases for utilizing Damasio’s theory

The reason for choosing Damasio as the complementary theorist was that his theory of

consciousness deals specifically with both emotions and the interconnections between emotion and

cognition. Furthermore, I found it useful for my purposes in theorizing the basic dynamic of the

challenges of reflection that Damasio considers emotions from the perspective of basic research. He

examines the basic nature and dynamic of the researched issues as such, without focusing on

applications, which would bring contextual questions to the front as well (see also Bacharach, 1989;

Whetten, 1989).

Although Damasio’s theory offers understanding useful for my study, from the

methodological viewpoint choosing another theory as a complementary theory raises further general

questions of philosophy of science, regarding utilizing two different theories together in theory-

building:

Mezirow’s and Damasio’s theories are formed within very different disciplines.

Consequently, their methodological and theoretical backgrounds differ as well. In spite of this, the

theories may to some extent be compatible and offer fruitful elements concerning the challenges to

reflection. This view is based on the philosophical presupposition that while the disciplines or

research traditions may be separated, this does not indicate that the boundaries between them would

be static. Neither is it implied that these boundaries would be present in the actual phenomena.

From this perspective, e.g. the philosopher of science Roger Trigg (2007) has emphasized the need

for communication between disciplines, and has encouraged researchers of different disciplines to

utilize each other’s research results in their own research. However, this is not sufficient for

constructing theory in a methodologically sound manner. In addition, it is important to analyze the

conceptual connections and the complementary aspects, as well as the differences between the

theories (see Bacharach, 1989; Brookfield, 1992; Hannus & Simola, 2010; Rorty, 1984; Whetten,

1989). In the end, as in any philosophical research, the final justifications stem from the fruitfulness

of the developed theoretical construction in relation to the focus of the research. In other words,


before the analysis, there is no guarantee whether utilizing certain theories together will prove

fruitful.

Damasio’s fruitful elements from the viewpoint of theory building: The biological function of

emotions

As Damasio’s theory was chosen for the analysis in order to shed light on the nature and

functions of emotions as well as on the connection between emotion and cognition, I will first

discuss in brief Damasio’s view on these fruitful aspects. After that, I will consider Damasio’s

limitations in terms of my purposes of the theory building.

According to Damasio (1999; 2003), emotions first and foremost function as a regulating

element within a living organism, in order to provide advantageous conditions for maintaining life.

The most fundamental role of emotions is, as part of homeostatic regulation, to preserve balance or

avoid losing integrity, which is a prerequisite for maintaining life. Integrity refers both to those

elements of an organism, which must work within a relatively small range of regulation for the

organism to function optimally, and to the need for an organism’s inner states to be relatively stable

in relation to the environment (Damasio, 1999).

In order to survive, a living organism must also be able to act within the environment, avoid

danger, and find sources of energy as well as incorporate and transform energy. These are also

functions of the emotions, both in adjusting the inner states to prepare for a given reaction, and in

producing a given reaction in a triggering situation, for example to escape, attack or undertake

pleasurable activity. According to Damasio, animals have basically these same reactions, although

within humans, they are often in a restrained form (Damasio, 1999, pp. 53–54).

In terms of the connection between emotion and cognition, Damasio considers emotions to be

an inherent part of our mental capabilities, e.g. in functioning as a support system for our decision-

making, through directing attention and regulating its intensity. More precisely, Damasio’s

neurological work shows that a lack of emotion disturbs rationality at least as much as too much

emotion, and that the connection between cognition and emotion is indispensable for mental

functioning as well as for action (Damasio, 1999; see also Illeris, 2005). Basically, the emotions

arising in a certain situation form the basis of our interpretations on how suitable the environment

seems to us (Damasio, 1999; 2003). Thus, the positive emotions we experience, for example, in

association to (social) reinforcement, as well as the negative ones during instances of being

suppressed, inhibited and punished, serve to orient us according to our basic aim for maintaining

life. Emotions give automatic messages based on previous experiences from similar situations, and

direct attention towards or away from a certain object.

Besides the emotions, also consciousness serves homeostatic regulation, although on a more

complex level. Consciousness is closely related to the homeostatic mechanisms including emotions

and attention. With the help of consciousness, it is possible to anticipate, plan and invent new ways

to cope more effectively with a complex and changing environment. This happens through

manipulating the images which partially form the content of consciousness. Furthermore, while

operating with images, the individual is simultaneously aware that the images are within the

individual producing them; the images are located within the perspective of the individual. Based

on this, anticipation and planning in favor of the individual becomes possible (Damasio, 1999;

2003).

In addition to the changing images that enable one to be conscious of different things at

different times, the individual perspective also presupposes a component within consciousness that

is relatively consistent. This relatively consistent component is needed for producing the experience

of the individual experiencing through their consciousness remaining the same, despite the


changing contents of consciousness. According to Damasio, this is enabled by the autobiographical

self, which has its neurobiological counterpart in the convergence zone. It is manifested as

dispositions based on the autobiographical memory. This set of conceptual memories pertains both

to the past and the anticipated experiences of an individual. These neurobiologically anchored

processes make possible our sense of personal historical continuity. Thus, the experience of

consciousness is a product of the interaction between the autobiographical dispositions, and the

images of objects and events. The dispositions allow us to feel that it is ´I who is experiencing`,

simultaneously affecting the perceiving by orienting attention. Furthermore, our sense of self and

identity lean on the autobiographical dispositions, which, by being repeatedly actuated, bring

continuity, coherence and apparent stability to our lives (Damasio, 1999; 2003).

Damasio’s limitations from the viewpoint of theory building: the mechanisms for protecting

the consciousness are not considered

At the previous phases, I analyzed Mezirow’s theory and reconstructed it in terms of the

elements that appeared fruitful for examining the challenges to reflection. On the other hand,

Mezirow’s theory appeared limited, as it did not involve a further understanding of emotions and

the connection between cognition and emotion. The above description of Damasio’s view

concerned the elements that appeared fruitful in order to complement Mezirow’s theory. However,

some aspects of Damasio’s theory also called for extension, in order to be fruitful in terms of the

challenges to reflection.

For example, Damasio does not consider the factors that may threaten the integrity and

coherence of consciousness, and how we may protect ourselves from them. This is somewhat

contradictory, as Damasio precisely explicates that the basic function of emotions is survival and

adaptation, and how consciousness, for its part, also serves this basic function. Therefore, despite

the fact that on the biological and physical level Damasio considers the threats we as humans may

face, and how we biologically protect ourselves from these, he does not, correspondingly, consider

the experienced threat or protection mechanism in terms of the continuity and coherence of

consciousness. This viewpoint would, however, be important for considering the challenges to

reflection.

Theorizing the challenges to reflection

Above, I have discussed the central phases of analysis that enable constructing

conceptualization concerning the challenges to reflection. In this section, I will summarize the core

issues of the developed theory.

Meaning perspective as biologically anchored and emotionally upheld

Based on the analysis of Mezirow’s and Damasio’s theories, I suggest that the meaning

perspective is biologically anchored and emotionally upheld. As a basis for this argument, the

conceptual linkages between Mezirow and Damasio need to be further considered:

Mezirow’s and Damasio’s views concerning the way earlier experiences orient one’s

interpretation may be seen as compatible. Mezirow’s concept of meaning perspective and

Damasio’s concept of autobiographical self may be seen to describe the same phenomenon from

different perspectives: Damasio’s focus is on describing the core of it, i.e. what are the necessary

conditions for the human brain functions enabling consciousness, in the first place. He also

considers somewhat more ‘flexible’ issues, such as how, through imagination, we may manipulate

the images of consciousness, and how the autobiographical self is formed through experiences.


Mezirow, on the other hand, focuses on these contents of consciousness. He considers more

explicitly how these contents are formed within socialization, close relationships and experiences.

These affect the orienting frame of reference within which interpretation takes place. Furthermore,

based on these explications, Mezirow constructs his argumentation concerning the possibility to

modify, change and transform the meaning perspective, and gives reasons for why he thinks there is

a need for this kind of learning in adult life (see e.g. Mezirow, 1978; 2009).

Furthermore, according to Damasio, consciousness functions in favor of a biological life-

support-system, by enabling imagination, planning and other cognitive functions, which may be

used in coping with the environment. I suggest that correspondingly, the meaning perspective

serves these mechanisms aimed at maintaining life in the human organism. Since these thinking

activities are actualized within the meaning perspective, also the meaning perspective may be seen

to support maintaining the functioning of a human organism. However, several issues arising from

this need to be solved both in terms of Damasio’s and Mezirow’s ideas. These are explicated in

more detail in the following.

According to Mezirow (1991), uncomfortable feelings are aroused when meaning-making

within the meaning perspective is not possible, or when long-held beliefs are challenged. I suggest

that these feelings stem from the biological system of homeostatic regulation, which aims at

ensuring balance and continuity within a living organism. As the meaning perspective, or in

Damasio’s terms, autobiographical self, brings continuity to the consciousness in order to ensure

regulation, I suggest that challenging this continuity can be experienced as a threat to the

functioning of the organism. An example of this is the common experience of when during a

negotiation one of the participants reacts heatedly to someone else’s view, as if his whole self were

at stake or challenged. Based on the discussion above, it is possible that he really felt as if his life

was threatened when the opinion in question challenged his long-held emotionally charged beliefs.

Basically, emotions produce reactions appropriate to both physically safe and dangerous

situations (Damasio, 1999). Nevertheless, as consciousness is closely connected to the homeostatic

functions (see Damasio, 1999), the basic emotions can be seen as having an effect even on the

complex mental functions of consciousness. Based on this, I propose that the biological life-support

system, which functions through emotions and the automatic orientation of attention, also supports

the coherence of the meaning perspective.

The following notions may be seen to support this argument: 1) Damasio explains how

emotion and cognition are always entangled and inseparable. 2) Emotions are associated with

(social) reinforcement as well as suppression, inhibition and punishment, which also according to

Mezirow happen naturally, in the process of interpreting new situations within the light of earlier

experiences, and the new experiences again strengthening our expectations about “how things are

supposed to be”. Therefore, the act of interpreting in the light of previous experiences whilst staying

on the comfort zone appears to be supported by emotions, ultimately aiming to ensure the

consistency of the structures of consciousness necessary for survival. Pleasant and comfortable

emotions and feelings are associated with functioning within the comfort zone. In contrast,

unpleasant and uncomfortable emotions emerge when the comfort zone (and also the meaning

perspective) become challenged and questioned.

Automatic orientation towards the comfort zone

I suggest that with the help of emotions, we orient automatically towards our individual

comfort zones and aim to avoid their edges. Ultimately, this is manifest in the way we interpret

situations in ways which enable us to avoid dealing with uncomfortable issues. Arguments in favor

of these suggestions are presented in the following.


Damasio emphasizes that the regulative systems function automatically and stereotypically

without conscious thinking, although regarding some triggers there is considerable variation

between individuals and as affected by culture (Damasio, 1999). In other words, emotions are

activated automatically, outside of consciousness, within the function of maintaining and protecting

the living organism. A threatening situation automatically arouses emotions and directs attention,

for example if we unexpectedly run close to the edge of a cliff, or if a suspicious-looking person sits

next to us on the train. As mentioned earlier, we use emotions as an indicator of the convenience of

a situation (see Damasio, 1999). However, based on my analysis, I suggest that in terms of

consciousness, the autobiographical self, or the meaning perspective of the individual, is the

yardstick determining whether the emotions and feelings associated with a situation are experienced

as unpleasant or enjoyable.

Similarly, all other experiences are defined according to the meaning perspective, e.g. what

one finds mentally challenging, or what is relaxing to an individual. Furthermore, the unconscious

emotional support for the consistency of consciousness is apparent when the emotions direct

attention towards familiar aspects of situations, without a conscious experience of the emotions

causing it. On the other hand, sometimes the emotion can be experienced although we are not aware

of the cause (see Damasio, 1999).

The automatic orientation of emotions (Damasio, 1999) is manifested also in our attention

being automatically oriented towards the comfort zone. At the same time, this means attempting to

avoid the edges of the comfort zone and the accompanying unpleasant emotions, which are

automatically understood as indicating danger, in general. These uncomfortable emotions arising at

the edges of the comfort zone are the ‘edge-emotions’ I introduced above in “The meaning

perspective and emotions”. When the meaning perspective is being challenged, I suggest that the

edge-emotions automatically motivate us to restore the balance, i.e. to interpret the situation

according to our expectations, so as to experience the world as understandable. Examples of this

may easily be found in history of science, when new and revolutionary theories have been strongly

opposed by the scientific establishment. In these cases, it could be said that ’reason’ was exploited

in order to bring about feelings of safety and to maintain the comfort zone, rather than aiming at a

thorough understanding of the situation.

The challenges to reflection

Altogether, based on the above examination on the nature and consequences of the meaning

perspective, it appears that reflection may not be something one willingly takes up and easily carries

out. In the beginning of this article, it was demonstrated that within the meaning perspective, there

are predispositions for searching for the familiar and avoiding the unfamiliar, which forms a

counterforce to reflection. Furthermore, the discussion above explores the basis for these

predispositions, and explains how they are realized with the help of emotions.

Put another way, at the most fundamental level the counterforce to reflection is not merely the

unwillingness to change or the effort this requires, but the natural tendency, based on the biological

life-support system, to maintain pre-existing meaning structures. If one was able to reflect

unrestrictedly, deconstruct and reconstruct one’s meaning perspective without inhibitions, one

would not be able to maintain the basic unity of consciousness that also includes one’s sense of self

(cf. Illeris, 2007; Mezirow, 2000). From this perspective, a counterforce to reflection actually

appears necessary for maintaining the consistency of consciousness.

However, this is not the whole story, as this very consistency rests on the meaning perspective

as a historically and socially shaped personal meaning structure (Mezirow, 1991; 2000). The

existence of the meaning perspective in a conscious human being can be seen as part of a


biologically based life-support system, but its specific form, breadth and flexibility is, to an extent,

socially and personally constructed. Moreover, through the meaning perspective, one is in constant

interaction with one’s social, cultural and material environment. Therefore, although the matter is

not explicated in this paper, it is important to note that these social aspects need to be considered

with regard to reflection.

According to Mezirow (1978; 1991; 2000; 2009), reflection is often triggered when our

assumptions become problematic. This is often the case after a disorienting dilemma, a real-life

crisis, or other, more cumulative set of instances arouse discontent with some aspect of one’s life.

However, as was demonstrated earlier, assumptions becoming problematic is a challenge to one’s

comfort zone, and edge-emotions emerge in order to orient one’s thinking automatically back to the

comfort zone. Based on this, I suggest that assumptions becoming problematic - which is often seen

as a trigger for reflection - is in fact covered by edge-emotions. Based on my synthesis of

Mezirow’s and Damasio’s theories, I propose that there is a tendency to avoid dealing with

discrepancies that threaten the consistency of our meaning structures. Consequently, we are

naturally inclined to interpret the situation in ways which would enable a return to the comfort zone,

in order to feel the comfort resulting from the world appearing safe and understandable.

I therefore suggest that as a prerequisite to becoming aware of and assessing the problematic

assumptions in reflection, one needs to recognize and accept the edge-emotions, so as to become

aware of, assess and explore their bases. The bases of these emotions may be seen to be the very

assumptions that have become problematic. This is in line with Mezirow’s (e.g. 2000) view that

emotional maturity and the ability to manage emotions is important in transformative learning.

Mezirow does not, however, explicate in more detail the prerequisites of this in relation to the

meaning perspective or reflection. In my view, one aspect of this emotional maturity appears to

involve learning to recognize, accept and work with the edge-emotions. Also, Zweig and Wolf’s

(1999) notion of romancing the shadow (as based based on Jung’s thinking) could be considered as

referring to a similar attempt of aiming to bring into awareness experiences one has previously

automatically avoided. However, my concept of the edge-emotions by definition explicates their

dynamics in orienting and limiting our thinking. It enables considerations as to whether these

limiting aspects can be managed.

To summarize, the biologically anchored emotions that aim to support the consistency of the

meaning perspective appear to form a counterforce to reflection. The edge-emotions, aroused at the

edges of the comfort zone, serve as concrete indicators of this counterforce. However, these very

same edge-emotions may be seen to be the key to reflection. The essential question is whether one

is automatically oriented to ignore and explain away the distraction caused by the aroused edge-

emotions, or whether one is able to approach these emotions as an existing experience one may try

to understand. Therefore, the crux of the matter is one’s attitude towards these edge-emotions.

Paradoxically, it appears that precisely through recognizing and accepting irrational reactions and

tendencies, we may better be able to think rationally. This is not an attitude shift comparable to the

familiar, everyday situations, where we consciously tell ourselves to think before we act, or say

something, once we realize an emotional response within ourselves. Rather, the essential issue is to

pay attention to these emotions as physical and psychological indications of our thinking possibly

being oriented not towards openly examining the situation or ourselves in it, but on the contrary

towards restoring balance and returning to the comfort zone.

Re-thinking aspects of Damasio’s theory: The bi-polar and double-edged nature of emotions

The last issue considered here involves re-thinking some of Damasio’s ideas, which may be

seen to follow from the earlier analysis while complementing the theorization of the challenges to

reflection.


Earlier, I argued that Damasio has considered the nature of emotions only from the biological

and physical perspective. In terms of consciousness, Damasio focuses only on the composition and

conditions of consciousness as a whole. That is to say, he does not consider the possible threats and

challenges to the coherence and stability of the structures of consciousness, or what kind of

mechanisms may protect these structures from threats. Based on the above examinations, I suggest

that emotions not only serve the survival of the body, but that they are bi-polar in the sense that they

are oriented from both the survival of the body and the maintenance of the coherence of meaning

structures within the consciousness.

Furthermore, in Damasio’s (1999; 2003) considerations, emotions are presented mostly in a

positive light, implying that the messages indicated by emotions would always be unambiguous and

in favor of maintaining life. Based on my synthesis of Mezirow’s and Damasio’s theories, I would

instead suggest that emotions are by nature double-edged, in the sense that if the messages indicated

by emotions are taken unquestioningly to protect the consciousness, the protection of the “body”

might suffer. As an extreme example, we might automatically be oriented towards avoiding all

edge-emotions indicating threat to the meaning perspective, completely rejecting all uncomfortable

thoughts, viewpoints and situations which arouse them, in order to maintain feelings of comfort – as

if these feelings of comfort guaranteed the best possible conditions for managing life. This would,

however, paradoxically lead us to the one-sided aim of always defending our assumptions from ever

being questioned, and to strive to strengthen the assumptions of the previous meaning perspective,

at all cost. When the contexts change (see Mezirow, 2000), our protection mechanisms would in

this extreme example continuously have to fight the challenging stimuli. This, in turn, would orient

our resources solely towards defending our perspectives, and bring on a compulsive need to restore

the comfort zone with any means possible. From the survival perspective, this kind of meaning

structure no longer appears as a functional mechanism supporting adaptation to the environment.

Quite the contrary, it would lead one to lose contact with one’s environment, as one could no longer

be open and flexible to the new stimuli encountered in everyday life. An extreme example of this

would be a prejudiced person, who, in a case of emergency, would not accept help from the member

of a group he considers suspicious, since accepting the help would question his basic conviction.

In fact, from the perspective of survival, certain flexibility in one’s meaning structure appears

necessary for managing life and adapting to one’s environment, while enabling one to maintain

contact both to one’s own emotions and to the characteristics of the environment. This kind of

flexibility in meaning structures would not, however, appear possible if the biological messages of

emotions were followed unquestioningly. On the contrary, we have the emotionally supported

tendency to base interpretations on previous experiences in order to understand situations within the

light of our biographies, and this also strengthens the perceived validity of the assumptions. This

enables us to experience ourselves as living in a sufficiently safe, predictable and understandable

world. However, relating to emotions one-sidedly (avoiding the uncomfortable, aiming for comfort)

would lead us to a static, conservative, ever-narrowing funnel. By contrast, in order to dismantle

this kind of vicious cycle and make one’s perspective more flexible, one would have to be able to

go against one’s tendencies and try to recognize and work with the edge-emotions. In this sense,

reflection may be seen to support the biological mechanisms aimed at maintaining life and enabling

adaptation to the environment. Furthermore, edge-emotions appear as a threshold for the success or

failure of reflection.

To conclude, both reflection and its counterforces may ultimately be seen to support survival.

This dilemmatic issue is comparable to the issue of food: too little or too much food does not

provide the best conditions for the functioning and well-being of an organism – and the quality of

the food consumed matters, too. More generally, Damasio shows how cognition supports survival

in enabling thinking, planning, imagination etc. as based on the entanglement of cognition and

emotion (Damasio 1999; 2003). In addition to this, based on my synthesis of Mezirow’s and


Damasio’s theories, I suggest that cognition may be seen to support survival in that it enables

conscious working with the entangled relationship between cognition and emotion, which does not

always work purely in favor of survival.

Conclusions

Thus far, the scholarly discussion on reflection has considered reflection from the rational and

predominantly cognitive viewpoint. In consequence, the ideals of reflection are clearly known, but

less understanding has been gained of the actualities of reflection, and there is no adequate

explanation for the fact that reflection is not always easy to carry out.

Based on the analyses in this study, I suggest that the challenges of reflection are

fundamentally connected to the way the biological life-support system affects our thinking through

the emotions.

The theorization presented in this article offers conceptualization concerning the prerequisites

of and challenges to reflection. It may be seen as an analytical tool-box for examining various

attempts at reflection in various contexts and situations. While depicting the mechanisms that

function as a counterforce to reflection, it also opens a perspective for considering possibilities for

carrying out reflection, and suggests ways to locate and deal with the assumptions to be reflected

on. Furthermore, it explicates how the assumptions possibly found within reflection may not always

be rational and reasoned explanations stemming directly from one’s meaning perspective. Rather, it

exposes these as more complex intertwinements, affected by the biological and emotional

mechanisms aiming to ensure the structures of consciousness remain intact.

From the theoretical viewpoint, the theorization may be seen as a further development on

Mezirow’s theory of transformative learning. Although it does not consider all concepts and aspects

of adult learning viewed in Mezirow’s theory, it offers a new perspective to considering the process

of transformative learning from the viewpoint of its prerequisites.

The theorization is based on analyzing Mezirow’s view on reflection and meaning perspective

on the one hand, and Damasio’s view on emotions and consciousness on the other. The basic

dynamic of the challenges to reflection was conceptualized by bridging the gap between these two

theories, through exploring the connections between the biological functions of emotions and the

nature of the meaning perspective. In this, the concepts of comfort zone and edge-emotions were

introduced, capturing the intertwinement of emotion and cognition in a way that offers an

understanding of the challenges to reflection.

As the most important direction for future research, theorizing the challenges of reflection

requires further analysis concerning the social dimension. The relations between the cognitive and

emotional dimensions, considered within this study, need to be complemented with examining their

interrelations to the social dimension as well. This would enable a more specific consideration of

issues in terms of facilitating reflection. Previous studies have shown safe and supportive

relationships, as well as the role of the facilitator, as important factors (e.g. Brookfield, 1994;

Jokikokko, 2009; Taylor, 1997; 2000; 2007; 2008). These could be examined in more detail in

research focusing on theorizing the challenges of reflection within the social dimension.

Furthermore, several scholars within the field of sociology emphasize the need to become aware of

prevailing social givens, and explicate the nature of these from the social perspective (see


Brookfield 2000; 2005). Combining these sociological perspectives with the insights I present in

this article may prove fruitful for both fields of research.

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