1

Wittgenstein and the Possibility of

Christian Faith

Introduction

Many scholars who have studied Ludwig Wittgenstein claim

that it is impossible for the philosophy he expounds in

Tractatus Logica-Philosphicus to coexist with religion because he

claims that ethical and theological propositions are

nonsensical. In his book “Tractatus Logica-Philosphicus”, he confines

whether language has meaning or not to the propositions of

natural science (4.11).1 He goes on to claim that the

propositions of metaphysics such as philosophy, theology, and

ethics are nonsense. On top of that, he clearly did not make

any confession of faith. He also did not offer a concrete

discussion about theology. So it is difficult to relate his

philosophy to theology. Nonetheless, his remarks about

religion and his life make us come to different conclusions.

That is, in a sense his life and philosophy have something to

do with the metaphysical world, such as the meaning of life,

and the possibility of Christian faith. For example, he says,

“I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every

1 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus (Lexington, KY, 2011), 34.

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problem from a religious point of view.”2 And he also says, “To

believe in God means to see that life has a meaning”.3 All

these things hint at the possibility of a relationship between

religion and his philosophy, regardless of what his philosophy

really means.

I think that it is impossible to describe what

Wittgenstein’s religious point of view is in a clear and

coherent way. I totally agree with Norman Malcolm, who did not

want to give the impression that Wittgenstein was a religious

person who accepted any religious faith. Nonetheless, I want

to believe, as Malcolm suggests, that there was the

possibility of religious belief, in some sense, whether it was

the Christian faith or not because religion can be regarded as

“a form of life.”4

There have been many attempts to understand the whole

picture that Wittgenstein drew; some of these attempts have

been from a religious point of view. One of his students,

Norman Malcolm, in his books “Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View”

and “Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir”, even claims that Wittgenstein2 M. O’C. Drury, “Conversations with Wittgenstein” in Recollections of Wittgenstein, ed. Rush Rhees (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984), 79.3 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Notebooks: 1914-1916, ed G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1979), 74.4 Donald Hudson, Ludwig Wittgenstein (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1968), 8.

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showed a devotional attitude toward Christianity and

maintained it until he died. Malcolm even tried to find a

certain analogy between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and

religious attitudes.5 Though Wittgenstein did not make a

confession of faith and join the church during his lifetime,

he was influenced by “Gospel in Brief” written by Leo Tolstoy, and

meditated on it. He even tried to follow the path of Tolstoy;

he even went so far as to give his inherited legacy to his

family and fellow artists. I think that though he says that

“What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence” (7),6

the point of his philosophy and his life rather focused on the

world of “what we cannot speak about”.

In this paper, I will delve into how Wittgenstein’s

philosophy relates to theology and religion in order to find

the possibility of Christian faith because I think that

religious belief was an important factor in his life. I

particularly think that what translates religious belief into

action was critical to him. I will also look into how

metaphysical questions in ethics, religion, and philosophy

were meaningful to Wittgenstein by examining his early5 Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View? (Routledge, London, 1993), 4.6 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus (Lexington, KY, 2011), 96.

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philosophy and later philosophy in his books such as “Tractatus

Logico- Philosophicus”, “Philosophical Investigation”, and “Lectures and

Conversations”, etc.

Early Wittgenstein and Religion in “Tractatus Logico-

Philosophicus”

When we read his early book, Tractatus Logico – Philosophicus, we

find that there are two kinds of worlds. One is the world of

“what can be said,” in which experience and verification are

possible. The other is the world of “what cannot be said,” in

which experience, verification, and description are

impossible.7

The whole sense of the book might be summed upthe following words: What can be said at all can besaid clearly, and what we cannot talk about we mustpass over in silence. Thus the aim of the book is todraw a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, butto the expression of thoughts: for in order to be ableto draw a limit to thought, we should have to findboth sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should haveto be able to think what cannot be thought.8

Thus he concludes that “what lies on the other side of the

limit will simply be nonsense.”9 What, then, does “what can be

said” really mean? And what does “what cannot be said” mean?

7 Park Young Sik, The Understanding of Wittgenstein: City and Forest in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus(Suh Kwhang Sa, Seoul, 1984), 151.8 i.9 Ibid, 3.

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Wittgenstein’s opposition to metaphysics is well known.

Indeed, he devotes many parts of Tractatus to clarifying what

“what can be said” is. And he does not go deeply into the

world of “what cannot be said.” Actually, Wittgenstein

emphasizes that all the propositions of metaphysics are

nonsense, along with those of ethics.10 But unlike logical

positivists, Wittgenstein does not deny the world of “what

cannot be said.” It seems that he says that all the

propositions of metaphysics are nonsense only because such a

world is beyond the limit of language; thus he seems to

acknowledge such a world implicitly. Let us look into what

“the world of what can be said.”

The World of What Can Be Said

Let us summarize the content of Tractatus according to its

order. As is well known, Tractatus begins with a series of short

ontological sentences.

1 The world is all that is the case.1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things. 1.2 The world divides into facts.2 What is the case - a fact - is the existence of

states of affairs.2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a

combination of objects (things).…

10 Ibid, 74.

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2.0271 Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is

changing and unstable.2.0272 The configuration of objects produces states of

affairs.…2.04 The totality of existing states of affairs is the

world.…2.061 States of affairs are independent of one another.

The totality of facts is the world and the world divides

into facts. What is striking here is that the unit of the

world is not things but facts. And facts are not the simplest

things. The simplest things are objects. Facts are a

combination of objects (2.01, 2.03, 2031). In short, according

to the ontology of Tractatus, the world consists of objects that

make up the substance of the world, a state of affairs as a

combination of objects, and the totality of existing states of

affairs. The world that Tractatus shows is the exhaustive atomic

world. And the following is a series of sentences about

language and thought.

3 A logical picture of facts is a thought.3.001 'A state of affairs is thinkable': what this means is that we can picture it to ourselves.3.01 The totality of true thoughts is a picture of theworld.…3.14 What constitutes a propositional sign is that in itselements (the words) stand in a determinate relation to

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one another. A propositional sign is a fact.…3.2 In a proposition a thought can be expressed in such away that elements of the propositional sign correspond tothe objects of the thought.3.201 I call such elements 'simple signs', and such a proposition 'complete analysed'.3.202 The simple signs employed in propositions are called names.3.203 A name means an object. The object is its meaning. ('A' is the same sign as 'A'.)…4 A thought is a proposition with a sense.4.001 The totality of propositions is language.…4.21 The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition, asserts the existence of a state of affairs.4.22 An elementary proposition consists of names. It is anexus, a concatenation, of names.…4.411 It immediately strikes one as probable that the introduction of elementary propositions provides the basis for understanding all other kinds of propositions. Indeed the understanding of general propositions palpablydepends on the understanding of elementary propositions.

Language as the totality of propositions in Tractatus

corresponds to the world it refers to. The meaning of language

is the referent it refers to. As is shown in 3.203 in Tractatus,

a name is an object and the object is its meaning.11 For

Wittgenstein, language is truth-functional.12 It is truth-

functional logic that his teachers, Russell, and Frege, came

up with. For them, the truth-value of complex propositions is 11 Donald Hudson, Ludwig Wittgenstein (Richmond, VA: John Kox Press, 1968), 9.12 Ibid, 9.

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the truth-function of elementary propositions which are made

up of it. In other words, ultimately all propositions that

consist of language are either elementary propositions or the

truth-functional combination of elementary propositions. The

world consists of atomic facts that correspond to elementary

propositions.13

The Picture Theory of Meaning

Wittgenstein explains the corresponding relationship between

language and the world by using picture theory. His first

remark on the picture theory of meaning appears in 2.1 in

Tractatus. His picture theory seems to be based on the empirical

world because he thinks that propositions represent the

existence and non-existence of state affairs. That is, for

him, language is a picture.

2.221 What a picture represents is its sense.…4.1 Propositions represent the existence and non-existence of

states of affairs.…4.21 The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary

proposition, asserts theexistence of a state of affairs.…

4.023 A proposition must restrict reality to two alternatives: yes or no. In order to do that, it

13 Kim You Soo, Drawings for understanding Wittgenstein ((Suh Kwhang Sa, Seoul, 1984), 13.

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must describe reality completely. A proposition is a description of a state of affairs.4.024 To understand a proposition means to know what is the

case if it is true. (One canunderstand it, therefore, without knowing whether it is

true.) It is understood byanyone who understand its constituents.

When we look at a picture, we come to know what meaning

the picture is intended to convey. Likewise, since a

proposition is a picture, we come to understand what meaning

the proposition is intended to convey. What, then, is the

meaning of a proposition? According to the picture theory of

meaning, it is the state of affairs that the proposition

represents. When we know the state of affairs, it can be said

that we know the meaning of the proposition. The sense of a

proposition is the state of affairs that it represents. In

other words, only a proposition that describes a state of

affairs is a proposition with a sense. And a proposition that

does not describe a state of affairs is not a proposition with

a sense.

Wittgenstein confines the totality of true propositions

to the whole of natural science (4.11). He defines a

proposition as a logical picture of a situation. So what is a

logical picture? What relation should be there in order for A

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to be a logical picture of B? First, he says, “In a

proposition there must be exactly as many distinguishable

parts as in the situation that it represents” (4.04). That is,

the elements of A must correspond one to one with the elements

of B. Second, there should be a commonality between A and B,

that Wittgenstein calls it “logical form” or “the form of

reality” (2.16, 2.181). Third, there should be “rule of

projection” between A and B (4.0141).14 What does “rule of

projection” mean? We can say that there is rule of projection

between A and B when we can make the situation of B through A

and vice versa. Wittgenstein takes the relation between the

score and the symphony as a case in point.

According to the picture theory of meaning, atomic facts

correspond to atomic propositions. And the world as the

totality of atomic facts corresponds to language, which is the

totality of atomic propositions (4.001). Here we can conclude

that the limits of my language are the limits of my world

(5.6). And propositions that are not based on the empirical

world are nonsense. In other words, what is beyond the limits

of the world cannot be described because it is beyond the

14 Donald Hudson, Ludwig Wittgenstein (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1968), 13.

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limits of language. And what cannot be described through

language cannot be empirically proved because it is beyond the

limit of the world. Thus we should remain silent about what

cannot be said through language in order not to make

nonsense.15 This is why Wittgenstein confines the totality of

true propositions to the whole of natural science (4.11).

What Cannot Be Said

What, then, is the world of “what cannot be said” to

Wittgenstein? G.E.M. Anscombe, one of Wittgenstein’s students,

in his book “Introduction to Wittgenstein’s “Tractatus”, said that

Wittgenstein had complained in his letter to Russell about

Russell’s misunderstanding of the point of his book. According

to Anscombe, the point which Wittgenstein wants to make is

about “what can be said and what can be shown” by propositions

though they cannot be said. Wittgenstein thinks that this is

the most important matter of philosophy.16 Von Ficker, an

editor of Des Brenner, was the man through whom Wittgenstein

gave part of his inheritance to Rilke and Trakl. He got an

important letter from Wittgenstein about the intention and15 Park Young Sik, The Understanding of Wittgenstein: City and Forest in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (Suh Kwhang Sa, Seoul, 1984), 162.16 G. E. M. Anscombe, Introduction to Wittgenstein’s “Tractatus” (London, Hutchinson, 1959), 161.

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point of “Tractatus”. In his letter, according to Von Ficker,

Wittgenstein reveals that the point of his book is ethical.17

What, then, is the world of “what cannot be said”? The

world of “what cannot be said” is the world of “what can be

shown” to Wittgenstein. Let us look at the following

sentences.

4.1212 What can be shown, cannot be said.…6.13 Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of

the world. Logic is transcendental.

…6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and

aesthetics are one and the same.)6.431The solution of the riddle of life in space and time

lies outside space and time.6.44 It is not how things are in the world that is mystical,

but that it exists.…6.52 We feel that even when all possible scientific questions

have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course

there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer.

6.522 There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves

manifest.They are what is mystical.6.53 The correct method in philosophy would really be the

following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural

science--i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy – and then, whenever

17 L. Wittgenstein, Briefe An Ludwig von Ficker (Salzburg, 1969), 35-36.

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someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he

had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would

not be satisfying to the other person--he would not have the feeling that we were

teaching him philosophy--this method would be the only strictly correct one.

7 What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.

Wittgenstein makes a distinction between “what can be said”

and “what can be shown.” What cannot be said but what can be

shown includes logics, ethics, theology, life and death, God,

and anything metaphysical.18 All these are transcendental

because they are beyond the limits of the language of

pictures. Wittgenstein, however, points out that all these

things are not only “what cannot be said” but also “what can

be shown.” They are mystical to him as well. Here is an

important truth that Wittgenstein acknowledges “what is

mystical.”19

Many complex problems of life are totally different from

scientific problems. And they cannot be solved by scientific

method (6.52). These are beyond the boundary of the empirical

world. All these things, which reveal themselves, belong to

mystical world (6.522). What, then, is leading us to what is

18 Donald Hudson, Ludwig Wittgenstein (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1968), 23.19 Ibid, 28.

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mystical? It seems that Wittgenstein relates it to feeling to.

When do we have this feeling about the mystical? Wittgenstein

says, “It is not how things are in the world that is mystical,

but that it exists” (6.44). That is, we can get this mystical

feeling when we think about the fact that the world exists not

about how things in the world are. He also says, “Feeling the

world as a limited whole - it is this that is mystical.” This

indicates that when we feel the world as a limited whole we

can get a mystical feeling.20

As I have said above, according to Wittgenstein’s picture

theory of meaning, God, ethics, and the meaning of life belong

to the mystical category. Why are they mystical? Above all,

they are transcendental and something higher than reality. And

they are something inexpressible and beyond the boundary of

language (6.421, 6.432). We can know that the meaning of life

lies outside space and time. And it becomes clear that

Wittgenstein believes that the problems of life cannot be

solved by scientific method (6.4312, 6.52).21

Logical Positivism

20 Park Young Sik, The Understanding of Wittgenstein: City and Forest in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (Suh Kwhang Sa, Seoul, 1984), 179.21 Ibid, 180. Donald Hudson, Wittgestein and Religious Belief ( The Magmillan Press LTD, New York, 1975), 78.

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When Wittgenstein’s “Tractatus” came out, logical

positivists who belonged to the Vienna Circle, welcomed and

paid keen attention to it. These were groups of various famous

scholars such as economists, sociologists, mathematicians, and

logicians. Wittgenstein was respected by them as their leader.

What bound them together was the belief that the scientific

method was important in philosophy. The common foes of this

school were German idealists such as Hegel, Fichte, and Kant.

In this respect, Russell sided with this Vienna school. On the

surface, the point of “Tractatus” seems to be similar to the

claim that the Vienna Circle was making, that “what we cannot

speak about we must pass over in silence.” This was

reinterpreted by the Vienna Circle as “Metaphysicians, shut

your mouth.” Nonetheless, there were differences between

Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle regarding the propositions

of theology and metaphysics. First, both parties rejected the

propositions of theology and metaphysics but their rejection

were on different bases. The logical positivists did not

regarded theological propositions as analytic proposition.

They did not consider them factual proposition to be verified

as well. However, Wittgenstein rejected theological

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propositions because he considered them impossible to falsify

or verify (5.5151).22 Furthermore, the reason he rejected

metaphysics is that the limit of one’s language is the limit

of one’s world (5.6). Language has a sense as long as it can

depict the world to a person. It cannot picture what is beyond

reality. In this sense, language cannot transcend reality. For

this reason he says “What we cannot speak about we must pass

over in silence.”23 Second, Wittgenstein says that God does not

reveal Himself in the world (6.432). Why does he say so? God

is a transcendental being in that He transcends time and

space, and His activities surpasses those of human beings.24

In the light of the above, it is undeniable that

Wittgenstein acknowledges the mystical realm of “what cannot

be said.” Furthermore, this mystical realm makes itself

manifest (6.522). What, then, is the mystical realm which

makes itself manifest? In what sense does this realm make

itself manifest? It seems to me that such a realm is mystical

in that we cannot discuss it logically. And the mystical realm

seems to make itself manifest in the sense that Wittgenstein

22 Donald Hudson, Ludwig Wittgenstein (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1968), 29.23 Ibid, 29-30.24 Ibid, 33.

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might be imposing a certain meaning it.25

What Can Be shown: A Sense of Mystery toward Life

Ray Monk, in the introduction to his famous book “Ludwig

Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius”, reminds us of one important point

we need to know if we are to understand the philosophy of

Wittgenstein. He points out that there is an unfortunate

polarity among those who try to understand the philosophy of

Wittgenstein. The unfortunate polarity is the one “between

those who study his work in isolation from his life and those

who find his life fascinating but his work unintelligible.”26

He says that his aim is to bridge the gap. Actually, it seems

to me that the formation of Wittgenstein’s thought and the

change in his thought are closely related to various incidents

that he experienced in his life, as well as the context he

lived in, and his personality. Despite his claim that “what we

cannot speak about we must pass over in silence,” he leaves

room for the realm of “what cannot be said”.

I have briefly examined what kinds of realms belong in

this area. These realms include such propositions of

25 Hwhang Phill Ho, Wittgenstein and Religion (Suh Kwhang Sa, Seoul, 1984), 291.26 Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan, Inc, NY, 1990), xviii.

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metaphysics as those concerning ethics, theology, the meaning

of life, and God. On top of that, these kinds of realms are

transcendental as well as mystical to Wittgenstein. But the

most striking aspect seems to be his attitude toward life

itself. To him the fact itself that exists is mystical. It is

feeling the world as a limited whole that is mystical (6.45).

Why did he take such an attitude toward life? If I say that I

think his view might be closely related to the traces of his

life, is it a stretch? As much as his philosophy, his life was

unique and full of a sense of mystery.

The first noticeable thing about Wittgenstein’s early life

is that his parents had strong artistic interests, and their

home became a center of musical life. They had a particular

passion for music and passed it to their children.27Johannes

Brahms was a close friend of theirs. Wittgenstein’s brother,

Paul, was a concert pianist. Another brother, Ravel, wrote his

“Concerto for the Left Hand” for him after he lost his right arm.

This artistic atmosphere and talent seemed to influence his

attitude toward life itself.

When World War I broke out, he returned to Vienna from

27 Donald Hudson, Wittgestein and Religious Belief (The Magmillan Press LTD, New York, 1975),1.

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Britain and sought enlistment. And he volunteered active

service as a private even though he could have been exempt

because he had a hernia. According to Norman Malcolm, at this

time Wittgenstein found Tolstoy’s “The Gospel in Brief” in a

bookstore. He read it many times and had it always with him

under every circumstance. He was known as “the one with the

Gospels” by fellow soldiers.28 According to Ray Monk,

Wittgenstein’s experience of the religious conversion saved

him from suicide, though this cannot be corroborated.29 When he

was in a prison camp, he and his fellow soldiers read

Dostoevsky together. In 1916, Wittgenstein was sent to the

remote Russian front. Dostoevsky’s “The Brothers Karamazov” was

one of the items that he carried, and he memorized large

portions of it.30 The life and work of Tolstoy seemed to

significantly influence Wittgenstein: later he gave away his

inheritance to his sisters. We cannot be totally sure whether

this really influenced his attitude toward life and so plays

an important role in the understanding of what he really

28 Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View? (Routledge, London, 1993), 8 .

29 Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan, Inc, NY, 1990), 115.30 Tim Labron, Wittgenstein and Theology (T&T Clark, New York, NY, 2009), 13.

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wanted to convey in his works, but because an understanding of

a historical context is pivotal to understanding the life and

philosophy of any important philosopher, the claim of Malcolm

and Monk seems plausible.

As is well known, Leo Tolstoy, in his book “What is Art?”,

views the major function of art as moral: in particular, good

art fosters feelings of universal brotherhood. On the other

hand, he claims that bad art inhibits such feelings. He goes

on to say that all good art has a Christian message, because

only Christianity teaches the absolute brotherhood of all

men.31 Wittgenstein thought that Tolstoy’s view of art was

great. On top of that, it seems that he was deeply impressed

by Tolstoy’s free distribution of land to farmers for nothing:

later after being released from prison camp, he returned to

Vienna, and gave away his inheritance to artists and his

sisters. Given the way he lived his life, what was the meaning

of life to him? Does it, as he suggests in “Tractatus,” lie beyond

the limits of language? It cannot be said, but it can be just

shown. If so, then where can it be shown? Is it shown through

the language of irony and the language of music, as well as

31 Wikipedia The Free Encyclopedia, “What is Art?” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Is_Art%3F (accessed November 11, 2011).

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through the daily lives of human beings? According to his

picture theory of meaning, these cannot be said through

language because they are beyond the limit of language. The

ethical meaning of life cannot be described through language,

but it can just be shown through the language of art and a

life that translates religious teachings into action. Was

Tolstoy a man who put the teachings of Jesus into action in

Wittgenstein’s mind?

In 1950, during his stay in New York, Wittgenstein was

diagnosed with prostate cancer. He spent the remaining two

years working on “Remarks on Colours” and “On Certaity.” And he

planned to take a trip to Norway and stay in a monastery. But

due to his worsening health, he had to move into his

physician’s home. When he knew that he had only a couple of

months to live, he hurried to finish half of “On Certainty.” When

his friend arrived, he told his friend, “Tell them I’ve had a

wonderful life.”32 A wonderful life was his final word - like

riddle. To him, life was meaningful and mystical.

Later Wittgenstein and Religion in Philosophical

Investigations

32 Tim Labron, Wittgenstein and Theology (T&T Clark, New York, NY, 2009), 19.

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While “Tractatus” represents Wittgenstein’s earlier thoughts

on language and meaning, his “Philosophical Investigation” represents

his later thoughts on language and meaning. According to

Wittgenstein, we can correctly understand what “Philosophical

Investigations” means against the backdrop of his earlier

thoughts.33In this sense, there seems to be an important

relation between his early thoughts and his later thoughts.

But it can be said that “Philosophical Investigations” is the

most crucial book in that his later thought reveals the

limitations of his early thought and critically overcomes

them. But actually there is not much to show how his thoughts

in “Philosophical Investigations” are related to religious

belief.34 Nonetheless, I think that his interest in the realm

of the mystical continues in his later works.

Language Game and Christian Faith as Form of Life

The major task of “Philosophical Investigations” is to delve into

the relationship between language and the world. But he finds

some problems in his early work “Tractatus” and criticizes it.

Donald Hudson, in his book “Ludwig Wittgenstein”, singles out five

problems of “Tractatus” that Wittgenstein found. 33 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe (Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ, 1958), vi.34 Donald Hudson, Ludwig Wittgenstein (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1968), 48.

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(i) To say that a word has no meaning when nothingcorresponds to it is to confuse the meaning of aname with the bearer of the name…

(ii) It makes no sense to speak of an absolute one-onecorrespondence between the simples of language andthose of reality, as the picture theory required,because it make no sense to speak of breakingreality down absolutely into its simples…

(iii) The Picture theory had assumed that aproposition is meaningless, if it does not have anabsolutely determinate sense.35

Wittgenstein seems to point out that the meaning of

language is determined by its use (432). And there are

concrete contexts in which a word or sentences are used.

Language acquires its meaning in concrete contexts.

Wittgenstein calls them “language-games” (7).36 Hudson writes,

In other words, learning a language is learning toplay what Wittgenstein called a “language-game.” Hedefined a language-game as a “whole, consisting oflanguage and the actions into which it is woven” (7).37

Though he does not define what a form of life is, he says

that the speaking of language is a form of life (23). A form

of life can be “a tacit presupposition” that involves language

activity, human activities, and culture.38 Language activity is35 Ibid, 42-43.36 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe (Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ, 1958), 7.37 Donald Hudson, Ludwig Wittgenstein (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1968), 44.38 Ibid, 47.

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as “much a part of our natural history as walking, eating,

drinking, playing.” (25). And a form of life is “what has to

be accepted, the given”.39

Then is Christian faith a form of life? There are various

forms of life, and Christian faith is one of the various forms

of life. In the form of life of Christianity, people are

sharing their lives by faith-related words and sentences. The

meaning of these words and sentences are determined by the

Christian language-game. Though Wittgenstein did not directly

make a confession of Christian faith, he admitted that it was

possible to make statements about religion. And he told

Malcolm that though he could not understand the concept of

God, he could understand the concepts of the Last Judgment,

forgiveness, and atonement. According to Malcolm, Wittgenstein

candidly admitted that these concepts could sufficiently

affect those who accepted these concepts.40

Theology as Grammar

Wittgenstein uses the expression “theology as grammar.”

This expression appears in a parenthesis in “Philosophical

39 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe (Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ, 1958), 226, IIxi.40 Norman Malcolm, Ludwigh Wittgenstein: A Memoir (Oxford, NY: Clarendon Press, 2001),

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Investigations” (373): “Grammar tells what kind of object

anything is. (Theology as grammar.) ”. Hudson writes,

To be a religious believer, whatever else it may mean,is to participate in a language-game or universe of discourse. If the belief in question is theistic, this will involve talking about, or to, God and sharing in the experiences and activities connected with such discourse, which characterize the theistic form of life.41

In a sense, the relationship between God and theology is

similar to the relationship language and grammar. Long before

human beings learn grammar, they acquire language. Thus

mastering grammar is not the same as using language. However,

the two do not exist independently of each other, because

grammar reveals the logical structure of language. On the

contrary, while grammar cannot exist without language, it can

help refine and clarify language.42

Likewise, long before human beings begin to look into

theology, they have religious experiences. As grammar does

help refine language in terms of logical structure, the

theological study of religion also can help clarify what

religious experiences are.43 41 Donald Hudson, Ludwig Wittgenstein (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1968), 44. Ibid, 58.42 Ibid, 58.43 Hwhang Phill Ho, “Wittgenstein and Religion.” In The Understanding of

26

The Nature of Religious Belief

As Hudson points out, there is not much to show what

Wittgenstein’s view of the nature of religious belief is. But

to some degree, we can infer what he thinks of the nature of

religious belief from his book “Lectures and Conversation: On

the Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief”. Why does

someone think that it is ridiculous to believe in the

existence of the soul after death? Why does someone think

otherwise? While Christians believe in the resurrection of the

body, others do not believe it. Above all, Wittgenstein’s

answer to these conflicting views seems to be that the nature

of religious belief is not a matter of evidence and

indubitability. He takes one person who believes in the Last

Judgment and another who does not as an example to show that.

He points out that there is an entirely different aspect

between belief in a Last Judgment and disbelief in a Last

Judgment.

Suppose someone were a believer and said: “I believein a Last Judgment,” and I said: “Well, I’m not so sure. Possibly.” You would say that there is an enormous gulf between us. If he said “There is a Germanaeroplane overhead,” and I said “Possibly I’ m not so sure,” you’d say we were fairly near. It isn’t a

Wittgenstein (Suh Kwhang Sa, Seoul, 1984), 291.

27

question of my being anywhere near him, but on an entirely different plane, which you could express by saying: “You mean something altogether different, Wittgenstein.”44

But the problem is that the entirely different plane might

not be shown by an explanation of the meaning.45 To

Wittgenstein the nature of religious belief is not “simply a

case of one predicting an empirically observable event and the

other denying it.”46 This is why there is some confusion of

meaning between those who believe in religion and those who do

not. That is, Wittgenstein believes that there is “an entirely

different plane” between them. He goes on to say that the

nature of religion is not a matter of proof:

Suppose, for instance, we knew people who foresaw the future; make forecasts for years and years ahead; and they described some sort of a Judgment Day. Queerly enough, even if there were such a thing, and even if itwere more convincing that I have described but, belief in this happening wouldn’t be at all a religious belief.47

And the best scientific evidence does not play a critical

44 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversation: On Aesthetics, Psychology, And Religious Belief, ed by Cyril Barrett (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2007), 53.45 Ibid, 53. 46 Donald Hudson, Ludwig Wittgenstein (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1968), 48.47 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversation: On Aesthetics, Psychology, And Religious Belief, ed by Cyril Barrett (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2007), 56.

28

role either.48 Solid scientific evidence does not always make

people believe in God. Wittgenstein, according to Malcolm,

thought that any kind of philosophical proofs of the existence

of God could not bring anyone to believe in God:

When Drury still had the intention to become a priest, Wittgenstein warned him against trying to give a philosophical justification for Christian belief, “asif some sort of proof was needed.” Once I quoted to hima remark of Kierkegaard which went something like this:“How can it be that Christ does not exist, since I knowthat He has saved me?” Wittgenstein response was: “You see! It isn’t a question of proving anything!”49

In short, religion is not a matter of proof to

Wittgenstein.

It can be said that those who have religion make a

distinction between what is clear and what is not clear in

their daily lives. But when it comes to religious belief, they

can have beliefs that “the firmest of all, yet are not

grounded in solid scientific evidence. He writes,

Suppose someone is ill and he says: “This is a punishment,” and I say: “If I’m ill, I don’t think of punishment at all.” If you say: “Do you believe the opposite?” – you can call it believing the opposite, but it is differently from what we would normally call believing the opposite. I think differently, in a different way. I say different things to myself. I have

48 Ibid, 5649 Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View? (Routledge, London, 1993), 19.

29

different pictures.50

Here it seems that Wittgenstein points out that religious

belief is quite different from logic. Though those who have

religious belief use the concept of the Last Judgment,

evidence, and experience, these concepts are “entirely

different from what we would normally believe.”51 Hudson

writes,

What then is the difference between religion and science? Two people may disagree as to whether someone is dead or not and if they mean the same by “dead” we can understand the nature of this disagreement; it is a matter of whether they believe that a certain kind of evidence exists or not. But a religious believer could agree entirely with an unbeliever about the evidence forconcluding that a certain person is dead, and yet claim that this person is not really dead at all. It seems that he both does and does not mean the same by “dead” as the unbeliever.52

Wittgenstein points out that religious belief is quite

different from science. The meaning of “dead” that a religious

believer uses, though he uses the same word that an unbeliever

uses, indeed, is totally different from that of “dead” that

unbelievers use.

What, then, is the nature of religious belief to 50 Ibid, 53.51 Ibid, 55.52 Donald Hudson, Wittgestein and Religious Belief ( The Magmillan Press LTD, New York, 1975), 161-162.

30

Wittgenstein? It is about “the firmest of all belief,” things

for a man can risk things. It might be unreasonable or

reasonable in one sense or another.53

Suppose somebody made this guidance for this life: believing in the Last Judgment. Whenever he does anything, this is before his mind. In a way, how are weto know whether to say he believes this will happen or not? Asking him is not enough. He will probably say he has proof. But he has what you might call an unshakablebelief. It will show, not by reasoning or by appeal to ordinary grounds for belief, but rather by regulating for in all his life.54

Religious belief belongs to the things that guide a man’s

life. And it is an unshakable belief that can regulate someone

in all his life. If I say the life of Tolstoy, whom

Wittgenstein respected, belongs to that case, is it an

exaggeration? As is well-known, Tolstoy distributed his

extensive land to farmers for free in order to translate the

teachings of Jesus into action. During the First World War

Wittgenstein discovered Tolstoy’s “The Gospel in Brief ”, and he

read and reread it. It seems that Tolstoy’s life and thoughts

significantly influenced Wittgenstein.55 Like Tolstoy, he also

gave away his inheritance, to his sisters. It seems to me that53 Ibid, 58.54 Ibid, 54.55 Norman Malcolm, Ludwigh Wittgenstein: A Memoir (Clarendon Press, Oxford, New York, 2001), 10.

31

one unshakable belief of Tolstoy’s might have been the

practice of Jesus’ teaching and this might regulate his life.

Is this what Wittgenstein means by “regulating for in all his

life”? Hudson writes,

And religious belief does imply a willingness to change one’s whole life. It is not, or not simply, a matter of asserting to certain propositions for which there is deemed to be good evidence, but of being readyto risk everything for the sake of one’s beliefs.56

The religious belief is not a matter of logic as well as

evidence. Nonetheless, it can be an unshakable belief that

regulates the entire life of a man. This is why Wittgenstein

thinks of Father O’ Hare, who makes religious belief out to be

reasonable, as a ludicrous man.57 He says, “Why shouldn’t one

form of life culminate in an utterance of belief in a Last

Judgment?”58 This means that the religious belief can

significantly affect those who have the religious belief and

culminate in the belief in a Last Judgment. Here what matters

the most to Wittgenstein seems to be a practical, rather than

a doctrinal, aspect of religious belief. I think that this

56 Donald Hudson, Wittgestein and Religious Belief ( The Magmillan Press LTD, New York, 1975), 170-171.57 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversation: On Aesthetics, Psychology, And Religious Belief, edited by Cyril Barrett (University of California Press, Berkeley andLos Angeles, 2007), 57-58.58 Ibid, 58.

32

aspect of religious belief appears in the life of

Wittgenstein. Malcolm writes,

He thought that the symbolisms of religion are “wonderful”; but he distrusted theological formulations. He objected to the idea that Christianityis a “doctrine”, i.e. a theory about what has happened and will happen to the human soul. Instead it is a description of actual occurrence in the lives of some people – of “consciousness of sin”, of despair, of salvation through faith. For Wittgenstein the emphasis in religious belief had to be on doing – on “amending one’s ways”, “turning one’s life around”, No doctrine, no matter how sound, had the power to bring that about.59

Religious belief is not a matter of intelligibility. It

also is not a matter of indubitability because both

intelligibility and induability would not be enough to make

people change their whole lives.60

As I look into the contents of “Tractatus” above, there are

two kinds of world to Wittgenstein: the world of what can be

said and the world of what cannot be said. The former is the

world that can be described by language; the latter is the

world beyond the boundary of language. So we should clearly

say what can be said. But we should remain silent about what

59 Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View? (Routledge, London, 1993), 19.60 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversation: On Aesthetics, Psychology, And Religious Belief, edited by Cyril Barrett (University of California Press, Berkeley andLos Angeles, 2007), 57.

33

cannot be said. In a sense, Wittgenstein’s view about the

meaning of language is a little similar to that of Kant.61 As

is well known, he makes a distinction between phenomena and

noumena. In the realm of phenomena human reason acquires

knowledge through human senses and natural science. But in the

realm of noumena there are objects lying beyond the realm of

scientific experience. Such objects are God, the immortal soul

and human freedom. Pure human reason cannot search for such

areas because they lie beyond the boundary of human

experience. But Kant does not reject the existence of such

areas. He just sets the limit of pure human reason within the

boundary of human experience. At best, pure human reason can

indicate that such metaphysical concepts are plausible.62

Instead he makes metaphysical concepts belong to practical

reason, which is another domain of human reason, in order to

make room for faith.63 Kant’s emphasis on the practical aspect

seems to be an aspect to Wittgenstein’s stress on “what can be

shown, cannot be said (4.1212).” To religious believers faith

can be meaningful in that it is not grounded on a solid61 Hwhang Phill Ho, “E- Green Journal,” http://beautiful-mind.co.kr/xe/1168 (accessed November 8, 2011). 62 Stanley J. Grenz & Roger E. Olson, Twentieth-century theology: God and the World in atransitional age (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1992), 27.63 Ibid, 28.

34

foundation or scientific evidence but in the way it regulate

their lives in terms of practical aspects. As Malcolm says,

“For Wittgenstein the emphasis in religious belief had to be

on doing – on ‘amending one’s ways’, ‘turning one’s life

around’, it seems that Wittgenstein is emphasizing the

practical aspect of religious belief.

Wittgenstein compares the nature of religious belief to the

use of picture:

Here believing obviously plays much more this role: suppose we said that a certain picture might play the role of constantly admonishing me, or I always think ofit. Here, an enormous difference would be between thosepeople for whom the picture is constantly I the foreground, and the others who just didn’t use it at all.64

Religious belief is like using a picture. How, then, is the

nature of religious belief the use of using a picture? Hudson

writes,

Religious belief is using a picture – letting it regulate your whole life, having it constantly in the foreground of your thinking.65

To Wittgenstein a religious person is someone who lives as

though he has a picture of Budda or of Jesus constantly in the

foreground of their thinking. There might be a big difference 64 Ibid, 56.65 Donald Hudson, Ludwig Wittgenstein (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1968), 51.

35

between those who have the picture of the cross of Jesus in

the foreground of their thinking and do their best to live

according to the teachings that the picture gives and those

who do not. In this sense, the difference between those who

have religious belief and those who do not might be the

difference between those who use the picture and those who do

not. The life of those who believe in the Last Judgment will

be ethically different from that of those who do not believe

in it.66 Wittgenstein seems to understand the psychological

aspects of religious belief very well.67 Hudson writes,

To hold a picture before the mind may be thought of as the way to produce certain psychological effects. Preachers used to hold verbal pictures of Hell fire before the minds of their congregations in order to produce conversion or good conduct; saintly men frequently concentrated their attention on the example of Christ with the intention of strengthening their will to imitate him. Some of the things which Wittgenstein says about using a picture – e.g. that it may constantly admonish one (cf. above) – suggest that he thought of the picture’s role as psychological.68

It is obvious that religious belief provides believers

with psychological peace. It seems that Wittgenstein

emphasizes the fact that the psychological aspect of religious66 Ibid, 51-52. 67 Donald Hudson, Wittgestein and Religious Belief ( The Magmillan Press LTD, New York, 1975), 172.68 Ibid, 172.

36

belief can totally regulate the life of believers. As Hudson

hints, fear stemming from the pictures of Hell fire can

comprise part of religious belief.

Finally, Wittgenstein sees religious belief as a form of

life and a realm of attitude of life, not as a matter of proof

and indubitability. He thinks that both religious believers

who think that they can logically prove the Last Judgment and

those who cannot believe in the Last Judgment because it

cannot logically be proved are wrong. Hudson writes,

The reason he gave is (as we have already seen) that this utterance may be the culmination of a form oflife. Believers and unbelievers cannot contradict one another because they do not share the same “form of life.” It is not that they disagree about some proposition within a form of life, but they refuse to say the same kind of things as each other… The essential difference between believers and unbelievers is not that sort of difference. It is that the unbeliever refuses to participate in the believer’s form of life at all.69

Neither belief in the Last Judgment or unbelief in the

Last Judgment is based on empirical facts; both are instead

based on a form of life that cannot be verified and proved.

This is not because one of them is wrong, but because they

cannot share the same “form of life.” Thus we can infer that

69 Ibid, 174-175.

37

God is not an object of proof to Wittgenstein because he

considers extremely unreasonable to prove the existence of

God. I think that this is why he said, “You see! It isn’t a

question of proving anything!” when he heard of Kierkegaard’s

remark: “How can it be that Christ does not exist, since I

know that He has saved me?”70 And this is why Wittgenstein

respected St. Augustine: Augustine saw religious belief as

religiosity to regulate the whole life of religious believer.71

Then how about Wittgenstein’s attitude toward other

religions such as Buddhism, Confucianism, Hinduism, and so on?

Given his view on the nature of religious belief, we can infer

what his attitude toward other non-theistic religion is like.

I think that his attitude toward religious belief can be

amplified and applied to other religions because he views

religion as a form of life and a matter of faith to regulate

the whole life of a man not as empirical facts and

indubitability.

How was it possible for Wittgenstein, who did not

publicly accept Christianity and religious belief to develop

his view on the nature of religious belief? Considering this70 Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View? (Routledge, London, 1993), 19.71 Hwhang Phill Ho, Wittgenstein and Religion (Suh Kwhang Sa, Seoul, 1984), 293.

38

remark in “Tractaus” “It is not how things are in the world that

is mystical, but that it exists.”(6.44), it seems that the

possibility of religion stems from a sense of awe of life or a

mystical sense of life. In a sense, given the shortness of

life, the fact itself that it exists is mystical. And this

kind of a sense of awe of life can lead us to include

Wittgenstein in the realm of religion. I think that the sense

of awe of life can lead Wittgenstein to the possibility of

Christian faith. Is this why Wittgenstein says, “To believe in

God means to see that life has a meaning.” (74e)?72

Conclusion

I have briefly examined the life and philosophy of

Wittgenstein. I briefly introduced the content of “Tractatus”,

“Philosophical Investigations”, and “Lectures and Conversations.” I delved

into how his philosophy relates to theology and religion in

order to find out the possibility of Christian faith, because

I think that religious belief was an important factor in the

life of Wittgenstein. I tried to understand what is meant by

“what can be said” in his “Tractatus”. Particularly, I dealt

with such riddle like sentences hidden in his “Tractaus” as

72 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Notebooks: 1914-1916, ed G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1979), 74.

39

“what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence”(7),

“what can be shown”, and “it is not how things are in the

world that is mystical, but that it exists.” (6.44). Though I

am not confident that I understand his view on the nature of

religion correctly, I think that there is a possibility that

he has some kind of Christian faith, but that faith was

different one from the traditional Christian doctrine.

Wittgenstein was not a reasonable religious philosopher

who clearly distinguished between reason and revelation.

Rather he thought that it was ridiculous try to prove or

falsify the existence of God on the basis of scientific method

and proof. Instead, he claimed that religious belief was not a

matter of indubitability and proof. At the same time, his

religious belief was different from that of Reformed

theologians such as Martin Luther and John Calvin, who say

that human beings can be saved and justified by faith alone,

not by works. Rather, one of the striking features of

Wittgenstein’s thought was his focus on the practical aspect

of religious belief. His life shows that what translates

religious belief into action was critical to him. Though the

sentences in the “Tractatus” seem to be as cold as marble about

40

the realms of “what cannot be said,” he does not deny such

realms such as ethics, theology, man, the meaning of life, and

other metaphysical propositions. As for the nature of

religious belief, he regards it as a form of life that uses a

different language game. I think that his view on the nature

of religious belief also makes other religions other forms of

life where there are different language games going on. Though

he did not officially make a confession of faith and it is

very difficult to relate his philosophy to theology, I think

that his attitude toward life and his view on the nature of

religious belief fully opens the possibility of the Christian

faith.

41

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