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What’s Inside?: Levinas, the Face and the KaloobanJhon Fred Caranzo

I. Introduction Traditionally, Philosophy has been considered in the West as “philos sophien” or “love of wisdom.” This signification indicates a focus on assimilation, knowing, Being. This is because of man’s natural attitude towards the world – assimilation. However, can this be applied to the Other human person I encounter everyday? This is why the French Jewish philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas, proposed the other way round, “Wisdom of Love.” “Love” here do not have the same meaning as the word would imply to us at first hearing: i.e., erotic, emotional and the like; rather it entails that the relationship with an “other” is given more prominence than the relation of Being to its own self, a relationship of responsibility towards the Other. Responsibility to the other person precedes the very freedom of the self. Levinas argues that it is the infinite responsibility of the Self towards the Other,1 a shift from the focus on Being to the focus on the Other, that makes one authentically being human. This happens in the epiphany of the Face,2 where one sees the Face of the Other with its precognitive core; viz., being called by another and responding to that other.3 The Face here does not stand only as a part of a whole but as a representative of the wholeness, the absolute otherness, of the Other – his kalooban (inside/innermost self). In this paper, I will argue that the Other should be looked at as Face, that is, as his kalooban and not be reduced into the Self’s categories, otherwise one commits violence against the Other. This I will do by utilizing two premises which will then constitute a

1 I used the terms “I” and the “Self” to mean the subject who is in front of the Face of the Other while the term “the same” (le même) was used as a corresponding term to the “the other” (l’ autre); I translated “au-trui” (the personal Other or you) by “Other”, and “autre” by the word “other” following Alphonso Lingis’ translation (which Levinas himself permitted). 2 Whereas, Levinas himself uses lowercase “f” in stating the “face”, we use the term “Face” with a capital “F” in this thesis so as to designate it from the physical face or the countenance of the Other. All citations containing the lowercase shall retain it with the same meaning as that in our discussion which will always appear starting with the uppercase “F” 3cf. Emmanuel Levinas. Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/levinas/

Abstract: Emmanuel Levinas is one of the most important postmodern French philosophers. His main contribution to philosophy is the Ethics of the Face which focuses on the relation of the Self to the Other human person. Levinas defines the Face as the complete otherness of the Other, that is, the undefine-ness of the Other, and which compels me to be responsible to the human Other in front of me. This paper argues that the Other should be looked at as Face otherwise one commits violence to the Other. What makes it unique, however, is that it tries to contextualize the Face in the Filipino experience if the kalooban.

Keywords: Emmanuel Levinas, The Face, kalooban, totality, infinity, responsibility

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hypothetical syllogism: if the Other is absolutely other, then he should be looked at as Face, that is, as his kalooban and not be reduced into the Self’s categories, otherwise one commits violence against the Other; but, the Other is absolutely other. These premises bring us to my thesis statement as our conclusion. To prove my argument, the following questions must be raised: 1. Is the Other really other? 2. How can I commit violence against the Other by Totalization? 3. What is the Face? 4. What does it mean to look at the Other as Face? 5. Why is the Face kalooban (inside) not mukha (countenance)? 6. What does looking at the Other as Face, i.e. as his kalooban, entails? Eduardo Jose Calasanz, in his article “Ethics with a Human Face”, inspired this idea of the Face as kalooban but whereas he utilizes the word loob or the inside of the person, I will use the word kalooban which I believe is more personal than loob. This will make us comprehend the Ethics of the Face much easier.

The Absolutely Other “The absolutely other is the Other.”4 By Other we mean the Human personal other – you. In my day-to-day experience I encounter the Other – in the school, in the workplace, in the parish church, in the sidewalks, almost everywhere or, in other words, in my world yet he does not belong there. “I see the other; but I am not the other.”5 Although he resembles me, he is not me. He slips from my sameness like a wind. I am astounded to encounter someone not a something. I cannot reduce him as I reduce the other things around me precisely because he too is a subject. In order to understand this, one must take note that Levinas’ philosophy should be understood in the context of violence.6 There is violence in almost every level of life: individual, interpersonal, and the social.7 This violence is rooted, as Spinoza contended, in the desire of Being to preserve in its being. The natural attitude of the Self to the things outside him, the extra-ego, is that of assimilation. The I or the Self wants to assimilate, that is, to synthesize everything to himself, making what is other part of the same. Thus reducing the otherness of the Other. But this is a vain enterprise so there arises an attitude of “allergy” towards the Other. Here, physical violence is rooted. The Other is infinitely other – I cannot grasp him. “The Other as other here is not an object which becomes ours or which becomes us, to the contrary, it withdraws into its mystery.”8 The Other is never an object that I could possess or assimilate, thus 4 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 89 5 E. Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1987), 21 6 By violence, Levinas means not only physical violence but also the violence of reducing what is other into the same, specifically if it is done to a human Other. This causes an attitude of “allergy” towards what is other, which leads to physical violence as its extreme form. 7 cf. Eduardo Jose Calasanz, “Ethics with a Human Face” in Commentaries on Moral Philosophy 8 Time and the Other, 78

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“swallowing” him and reducing his otherness into the realm of my sameness. The Other is not a for-me, he is there but not there-for-me. Like the mathematical symbol, pi( ), whose real value, being an infinite one, the human mind cannot fully comprehend, the Other is infinitely other. I may grasp some things about him but I cannot fully know him.

The Other as Other is not only an alter ego: the Other is what I myself is not. The Other is this, not because of the Other’s character, or physiognomy, or psychology, but because of the Other’s very alterity. The Other is, for example, the weak, the poor, ‘the widow and the orphan’, whereas I am the rich and the powerful.10

In this way the Other is “infinite.” We do not mean here that he is beyond the governance of time and space – as if he himself is God – but the Other is “infinite” because he is infinitely ungraspable, he is absolutely other no matter how hard I try to assimilate, categorize, totalize him. But this “not-knowing is not to be understood as a privation of knowledge. Unforeseeableness is a form of alterity only relative to knowledge. For the other is essentially what is unforeseeable.”9 The Other is he who escapes my faculty of knowledge or assimilation. The Other can be seen – I experience his prescence – but never be fully known or possesed. Then what is the Other? Is he my alter ego? No. The Other supersedes and overflows me. He is more than an alter ego. The “snubs,” as I call them, objects to this. They would say that, “If something were, properly speaking, absolutely Other, then it would not be a matter of concern for us and we could simply ignore it, being quite oblivious of it.”11 If the Other is absolutely other, so what? On the contrary, I experience the Other in almost every fabric of my existence. I cannot remain blind to what I perceive with my senses. If I were to see God himself, or an angel, will I just be ignoring him? In this way also, I answer that; the Other even being absolutely other can still communicate with me. Even if he is ungraspable, I can still see him – experience him. And this experience is an ex-perience – from the Latin “Ex” or “to go out.” Thus, ex-periencing the Other is a “going out” from oneself – a going to the unknown. Then what drives me towards the Other? Levinas answers it this way:

9E. Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, trans. Richard Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985), 66 10Time and the Other, 49 11John Caputo, Against Ethics (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), 80. 12Totality and Infinity, 33,

“The true life is absent.” But we are in the world. Metaphysics arises and is maintained in this alibi. It is turned toward the “elsewhere” and the “otherwise” and the “other.” For in the most general form it has assumed in the history of thought it appears as a movement going forth from a world familiar to us, whatever be yet unknown lands that bound it or that it hides from view, from an “at home” [“chez soi”] which we inhabit, toward an alien outside-of-oneself [hors-de-soi], toward a yonder.

The term of this movement, the elsewhere or the other, is called other in an eminent sense… The other metaphysically desired is not “other” like the bread I eat… The metaphysical de-sire tends toward something else entirely, toward the .12

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Desire – the movement towards the excess – this is what drives me to the Other. The world (which I assimilate and utilize) already gives me my needs. On the other hand, I am left in solitude – I experience the solitude of being – and so I yearn for something more, I desire what is not needed. “Need is the return itself, the anxiety of an ego for itself, the original form of identification which we have called egoism. It is an assimilation of the world view of coincidence with oneself, or happiness”13 whereas desire is “the need of him who has no more needs.”14 To desire is to long for something which is considered an excess, that is, something or someone that eludes me.

Totalization – The Violence of Being Western Philosophy’s focus on Being is reminiscent of the Egoistic tradition of the West. Being – I – is a connatus essendi: “[E]very being by its very being desires to remain, desires to conserve itself, in its being. It is this act of self-preservation or auto-conservation that defines itself as a being… For Levinas, both this idea of connatus essendi and Heidegger’s notion of authentic being betray an essential centripetal movement.”15 The natural attitude of the Self towards the world is that of assimilation and utilization. Those who have a scholastic16 background will be very familiar with this idea: everything that I assimilate and know consequently becomes a my, a part of me, thus the same. However, we have said that the Other is absolutely other. I meet the Other everyday as someone I cannot contain on any categories of my fabrication. Thus the Other presents a challenge to this centripetal movement of Being. The insistence of Being – of me – to know, categorize, assimilate, posses the Other is called Totalization. Totality means sameness or in Levinas’ words, “being at home in oneself.”17 Totalization is the act of making what is other part of the same so as to continue being “at home.” “The “natural” or spontaneous being of the I is self-interest: its esse is inter- esse.”18 When I eat a chocolate cake, I totalize it – I am swallowing it – and therefore making the chocolate cake a part of me – a part of the same. Now there is no longer a chocolate cake and me, rather, there was a chocolate cake but is now a nutrient in me. Hence, Totalization is a “swallowing.” This does not mean that totalization is only limited in this. Possession, utilizing, conquering, etc. – all of these fall under Totalization. Before the advent of the Other and his astounding presence, I am busy preserving my being – surviving – and this is what drives me to totalize, that is, to “swallow” the world around me. This is how I relate to the world outside me. “The outside of me solicits

13E. Levinas, “The Trace of the Other,” trans. Alphoso Lingis, in Deconstruction in Context, ed. Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 350; originally published as “La Trace de L’Autre,” in Tijdschrift voor Philosophie (September 1963) 14Ibid. 15Eduardo Jose Calasanz, “Ethics with a Human Face,” in Commentaries on Moral Philosophy, ed. Rain-ier R.A. Ibana and Angelli Tugado (Pasig: CHED, 1998), 163-164 16i.e. those who follow the Mediaeval line of thinking (e.g. Thomism) 17cf. Totality and Infinity, 33 and beyond 18Roger Buggraeve, “Violence and the Vulnerable Face of the Other: The Vision of Emmanuel Levinas on Moral Evil and Our Responsibility,” Journal of Social Philosophy Vol. 30 No. 1 (1999), 30

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it in need: the outside of me is for me. The tautology of ipseity is an egoism.”19 Ipseity, that is “I am from the first the same – me ipse, an ipseity – that I can identify every object, every character trait, and every being.”20 It is a jouissance or an “innocent enjoyment” of the world. “Innocent” because there is no recognition of the Other’s presence yet – it is characterized by need. It is what we call economy and eventually turns into an egonymy, that is, the I making the Law for the things outside of me – subjecting them for my consumption and use.21 There is a centripetal movement22 – an “egology” in the words of Husserl – towards me; everything is a “for-me”. Totalization in itself is not bad. “More than once [Levinas] insisted that a systematic totality is indispensable for human practice and theory; what he fights against is not totality as such, but rather its absolutization: totality cannot be the ultimate.”23 When this is applied to things – especially those we need for survival – it is still a jouissance or an “innocent enjoyment” of the world. What demonizes it is that “Totalization applied to other people, becomes tyranny.”24 The violence of Totalization can be manifested in various forms: from the simple act of reducing the Other in what I see him or want him to be to the gruesome acts of racism and murder in the fullest sense of the word. Let us examine these. We have evidences of it in history. Levinas’ own is that of the infamous “Holocaust” or the “Shoa”, as Séan Hand would call it,25 of the European Jews committed by the Nazis. Hitler’s hatred of what is other, that is, in his case, the Jews. In today’s context, the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) is currently sowing chaos not just in the Middle East but sending tremors throughout the whole world. These extreme Islamists categorize everyone otherwise than Muslim as other and impure and so below the dignity of being human. Violence, thus, against what is “impure” for them is justified by religious ideology. But here is reminiscent of an ego that is “in itself like a sound that would resound in its own echo, the node of a wave which is not once again consciousness.”26 The path of the ego is always the path of Ulysses, the path of returning home to Ithaca – returning home to oneself.

The Epiphany of the Face The phenomenon in which I encounter the other, Levinas designates the term “epiphany of the Face” in order to distinguish it from “manifestation” or “monstration”

19 “The Trace of the Other”, 345 20 Ibid. 21 cf. Leovino Ma. García, “Infinite Responsibility for the Other: the Ethical Basis of a Humane Society According to Emmanuel Levinas,” in Back to the Things Themselves. 22 Eduardo Jose Calasanz, “Ethics with a Human Face”, 164 23 Adrian Theodoor Peperzak, Beyond: The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas(Evanston, Ill.:Northwestern University Press, 1983), 11 24 Leovino Ma. García, “Infinite Responsibility for the Other: the Ethical Basis of a Humane Society According to Emmanuel Levinas,” in Back to the Things Themselves, ed. Florentino Hornedo (Manila: University of Santo Tomas Publishing House, 2003), 264 25 cf. Séan Hand, Emmanuel Levinas (New York: Routledge, 2009) 26 E. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: MartinusNijhoff,1978), 103

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which are all finite. “The way in which the Other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me, we here name face.”27 By “Face” we mean not just the Other’s physical face or countenance nor do we mean that it is just a part of a whole, rather the Face stands for the whole absolute otherness of the Other, a metonymy (the part taken to mean the whole) the linguist would say. “The face is signification, and signification without context. I mean that the Other, in the rectitude of his face, is not a character within a context.”28 The Face is a meaning all by itself. The Face is a sort of metonymy – taking a part to mean the whole. By Face we mean the whole human person in front of me. Calasanz calls this the “loob” or the inside of a person.29 Of course it does not mean the inside organs of the person but the whole being of the Other. The paradox of the Face is that I see the face, i.e., his countenance, but the Face per se of the Other is invisible – i.e., his “loob” (inside) is invisible. Levinas contends that, “The face is exposed, menaced, as if inviting us to an act of violence. At the same time, the face is what forbids us to kill.”30 Killing here does not just mean murder, although it is its apex, killing in Levinas’ word-playing is a general term applied to the act of totalizing the Other. The Face being a signification of the unsignifiable, i.e., the Other absolutely other, carries with it a command: “Thou shalt not kill.”31 Taken postively it means: “Please take care of me.”32 But this command does not render murder impossible so it simultaneously becomes a plea as it is a command. This is what makes the Face ethical. Eduardo Jose Calansanz describes the Face using the Filipino term “loob” (the inside),33 in other words, the Face stands for the whole person of the Other – his “kalooban” (inner self). While Calansanz only translates the Face as loob, I am translating it as kalooban. Why am I translating the Face as kalooban? The term kalooban in Filipino is much personal than loob. While loob can mean the inside of anything (e.g. the inside of a can), kalooban on the other hand, refers only to the human person.34 The kalooban of the Other is comprised of everything that makes the Other other: his experiences, his existence, his emotions, his freedom etc. To look at the Other as kalooban is to acknowledge the otherness of the Other and his freedom from me: “May kalayaan ang

27 Totality and Infinity, 50, 28 Ethics and Infinity, 86 29 cf. Calasanz, “Ethics with a Human Face” 30 Ibid. 31Ethics and Infinity, 89 32 cf. Leovino Ma. García, “Infinite Responsibility for the Other: the Ethical Basis of a Humane Society According to Emmanuel Levinas” 33cf. Eduardo Jose Calasanz, “Ethics with a Human Face” 34Although this might be subject to debate, I beg not to discuss it here for it will require a separate study. For the sake of our discussion, let us assume that kalooban only pertains to persons. For a good discussion on Loob/Kalooban see Albert Alejo, SJ, Tao po! Tuloy! (Quezon City: Office of Research and Publications, School of Arts and Sciences, Ateneo de Manila University, 1990); Dionisio N. Miranda, LOOB: The Filipino Within (Manila: Divine Word Publications, 1989); or Leonardo Mercado, Elements of Filipino Philosophy (Quezon City: Divine Word Publications, 1974)

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kapwa ko bilang kalooban na magbigay kahulugan sa kanyang buhay.”35 To look then at the Other as Face is to look at him as his kalooban: “In a similar manner when [Levinas] speaks of the face as a rhetorical figure… he speaks of the whole person – the person as person, the loob”36 or kalooban. Why not mukha? Although the Other’s mukha or countenance is the way in which I encounter the Other physically, it is as kalooban that he presents himself to me. The very term “Face” carries with it a grave but obvious misunderstanding, one would be tempted to reduce it simply as the Other’s countenance or his mukha – his “face,” that is, his physiognomy, facial expression, character, social status, etc., “that means the “context” from which the other person becomes visible and describable for us.”37 But the Other’s mukha should not be the absolute. “Mas malawak at mas malalim pa ang kalooban kaysa sa pagsasakatawan nito.”38 Here begins the act of totalization, when I encounter the Other I easily categorize him according to his external appearance, his façade – I categorize him to be “fair”, “dark”, “chinita”, “mestiza”, etc. This is the seedbed of racism, putting the Other into my mental categories. One could argue that it is through mukha that we experience or at least grasp the kalooban. I agree with this. Indeed, it was through the embodiment of kalooban, particularly in its monstration through mukha, that we see the Other and appreciate his presence. Otherwise, we will not be problematizing the Other anymore. Like monsters and aliens, we are bothered by the Other’s presence because of his visibility. He is not just a figment of my imagination. But mukha should not be all. One must transcend mukha when relating with the Other. The Other is not just his mukha. He is Face, he is kalooban. Mukha might be able to present to me the reality of the kalooban but it does not unveil its mysteries. The Face is more than the Other’s countenance. “Unlike an object or thing (like a stone or a dog), the Other’s Face in the strict sense cannot be characterized or classified.”39 The Other is “more than a photograph, or rather not only is he factually more – not only more in the sense where there is always more for me to discover – but he can never be adequately reproduced or summarized by one or another image.”40 The Face is not just the mukha but the kalooban – the Face as kalooban means that it is beyond, invisible to the totalizing gaze of the ego.

35Manuel B. Dy, Jr., “Isang Penomenolohiya ng Pagmamahal,” in Magpakatao, ed. Roque Ferriols, SJ (Quezon City: Ateneo De Manila University Press, 1979), 50; “The Other/my neighbour, as kalooban (his inner self), has the freedom to give meaning to his existence.” 36Eduardo Jose Calasanz, “Ethics with a Human Face,” 167 37Roger Buggraeve, “Violence and the Vulnerable Face of the Other: The Vision of Emmanuel Levinas on Moral Evil and Our Responsibility,” 29 38Eduardo Jose Calasanz, “Aking Katawan,” in Magpakatao, ed. Roque Ferriols, SJ (Quezon City: Ate-neo De Manila University Press, 1979), 43; “The kalooban is wider and deeper than its embodiment” 39Leovino Ma. García, “Being-for-Others: Teaching as Learning Responsibility from our Students,” in-Commentaries on Moral Philosophy, ed. Rainier R.A. Ibana and Angelli Tugado (Pasig: CHED, 1998), 248 40Roger Buggraeve, “Violence and the Vulnerable Face of the Other: The Vision of Emmanuel Levinas onMoral Evil and Our Responsibility,” 30

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Infinity: The Face and my Response-Ability What then happens if I look at the Other as Face or his kalooban? We have seen that the Face speaks to me: “Thou shalt not kill! Please take care of me!” Thus when I see the Other as Face I am compelled to respond and my ability to do it – my response-ability – is my responsibility. This relationship, Levinas designates the term, “Infinity” – the relation with the absolutely Other who presents himself as Face, as his kalooban, to me. Infinity here does not mean that of an immortal being but the relationship with the Other who is In-finite himself, that is, a finite being who is infinite in the sense that he exists out of me, infinite from my perspective. “The idea of infinity is the social relationship.”41 This relationship is marked by responsibility: a “paradigm shift”, to use Kuhn’s terminology, from the Ego-centred world to an Other-centred one, from ipseity to 42 This relation with the Other is characterized by looking at the Other as Face, i.e. as his kalooban. Why should we discuss this? The Other as Face renders Totalization as violence when committed against the Other. The alternative comes through the Face – responsibility. Dr. Leovino Ma. Garcia, in a conversation with me, sums it up: “In talking about the Face and the Wisdom of Love, we are talking about responsibility.” In doing so, we must reformulate the commandment, “You shall not kill”, positively: “this prohibition implies the demand to recognize the Other as Other.”43 To see the Other as Face is to promote his uniqueness, his independence, his being a he and not a me. To see the Other as Face is to be responsible to him – to exist for the Other. But, it seems that the paradigm shift from the same to the other will, in turn, annihilate me, then, why should I still care to be responsible to the Other if it will be degrading to me? The idea of Infinity, then, becomes a reversal of Totality – no longer I totalize but the Other Infinitize, i.e. a totalization in reverse. This questions reflect again a misconception of the Other, categorizing everything other, including the human Other in front of me, as in opposition to me. This is why we say, “the same and the other” or the “I and the Other” – or, much clearer in Buber’s term, “I and Thou.” The Other may not be my compliment nor my ornament but certainly it does not follow that he is already my contradiction. We cannot separate the two terms: Other and I. I am always connected to the Other for my very subjectivity is a subjectivity in reference to the Other. What do I mean here? Levinas would say: “Subjectivity is being a hostage.”44 That is,subjectivity arises from confrontation with the Other wherein he is the dominant, that is, the Other eludes my imperial acquisition we call as Totalization, never reducible

41 E. Levinas, “Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity,” in Collected Philosophical Papers, ed. AlphonsoLingis (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993) 54 42 Ipseity comes from the Latin word, “ipso” or “same” while illeity comes from the French pronoun “ille”or “he.” Levinas often use these jargons but for the sake of brevity and a smoother discussion, I have mini-mized their usage in the text. 43 Totality and Infinity, 101 44 Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, 127 45 cf. Anthony Beavers, “Introducing Levinas to Undergraduate Philosophers”. 46 Ethics and Infinity, 96; see also Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence

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to the realm of the same.45 “Subjectivity is not for itself; it is, once again, initially for another.”46 I am subject because I am subjected to the Other and I am unique because no one can replace me in this role. “The responsibility for the other does not originate with my freedom; it precedes my freedom.”47 I am subjected to him without first my choosing it to be. “Responsibility for the other – for his distress and his freedom – does not derive from any commitment, project or antecedent disclosure, in which the subject would be posited for itself before being in- debt.”48 My responsibility to the Other precedes my very existence. Levinas gives us two phrases49 that contextualize this responsibility: “Me Voici” and “Après Vous.” Me Voici, translated in English, means “Here I am!” and, in Filipino, as “Narito Ako!” Levinas got this phrase from the experience of the prophet Isaiah as narrated in the biblical book whose title is his namesake, particularly chapter 6. For Levinas, the word “I means here I am, answering for everything and for everyone”50 even if there is no concrete outcome (my mere presence is what is all needed). The other phrase is “Après Vous” which means, “After you, sir/ma’am.” Here the Other’s ahead-ness, his priority compared to me, is emphasized. These are the words of politeness. It is an affirmation of the Other’s Infinity. Après Vous means that my responsibility to the Other is a “dis-inter-estedness”,51 that is, contrary to Being’s esse being an “inter-esse” or, in other words, Being’s interested position in everything. This is the consequence of my looking at the Other as Face. I am not responsible to the Other for my benefit or only because it will benefit me too. Reciprocity should not be regarded as the motivation for a genuine Other-oriented responsibility. But does this make me commit suicide? Why am I always at the losing side? Levinas answers that reciprocity is already a problem of the Other. My actions – my responsibility – must not be a “what will I gain afterwards” mentality. I am compelled to still take care of myself because it is still part of my being-for-the-Other. My responsibility to the Other is what makes me unique – no one can replace me in this role. For the last time let us ask, why should I see the Other as Face? The answer is that I should see the Other as Face precisely because he eludes my conceptualization which is violence to him, i.e. it is not just an epistemic phenomena but an ethical violation. To see him as Face, as his kalooban and not merely as mukha, is to be responsible to him all my life – responsible in promoting his otherness, that is, his well-being. Furthermore, if the Face is the source of all meaning, as Levinas says it to be, then the Face also is the source of the meaning of Being, that is, I exist for the Other.52 The thing is to get out of my head – of thinking first – and start recognizing the Face in front of me.

47Totality and Infinity, 81; see also pp. 85 and 207 48E. Levinas, “God and Philosophy,” in Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dor-drecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993), 169 49Levinas discussed this lengthily in his Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. For a good discussion on this two phrases see Calasanz, “Ethics with a Human Face” or García, “Infinite Responsibility for the Other: the Ethical Basis of a Humane Society According to Emmanuel Levinas” 50Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, 114 51cf. Roger Buggraeve, “Violence and the Vulnerable Face of the Other: The Vision of Emmanuel Levinas on Moral Evil and Our Responsibility” 52cf. John Llewelyn, Emmanuel Levinas: The Genealogy of Ethics

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Conclusion Consciously or unconsciously, we are all guilty of reducing the Other human person into what I want him to be. Each one of us is guilty of seeing himself as the main character in the story we call life while ignoring that each of us, too, is a character in another’s dream. I do love the Other not because there’ll be something in return but only because he is he. Likewise, I do the good not because God will reward me but because it is good and I love God because he is he: Siya ay siya nga. The Other is always ahead and my persistence on my egocentric existence is a violence against him. To see the Other not as a me, mine, and my but as a Face, as his kalooban, is to be responsible to him. The thing is to get out of one’s head and to acknowledge the Other as Face, as his kalooban. Thus to see the Other as Face, as his kalooban, is to change philosophy’s orientation to Being to the human being in front of me – from “love of wisdom” to the “Wisdom of Love.”

John Fred Caranzo holds a Bachelor in Philosophy degree from Saint Paul Seminary. He is currently the Head Teacher of AMA Computer College-Cebu Señior Highschool Department while undegoing the Postulant formation of the Society of St. Paul.

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