Ricardo Parellada

ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF PRACTICAL WISDOM

1.INTRODUCTION

Ethical theory usualIy pays more attention to the ways and possibilities ofjus­tifying ethical norms, than to the frequent difficuIties an agent faces in con­

sidering particuIars and circumstances in order to form a moral judgment that can guide action. The most balanced refiections on this matter beIong to the tra­

. dition of ethical thought that goes back to Aristotle. This tradition conceives of prudence or practicaI wisdom (<ppÓVl1(n.~) as an intellectuaI virtue that is responsibIe for moral knowIedge and discernment, but not so much about norms and principIes from a general viewpoint, as about their reIevance to actual and often unique situations. The study of practical wisdom and contingency responds to the constant need to weigh arguments and circumstances in the face of challenges of decision and action, which usually cannot be met through a direct or mechanical application of norms or principIes. I

According to the Aristotelian tradition, there is in moral judgment a funda­mental component of not explicit baIancing of norms, vaIues, and emotions,

.., which cannot be dispIayed openIy or reduced to the application of explicit ethical principIes. Moral judgment is not to be mechanized, but refined and cuItivated. Upbringing and education shouId take this faet into account, and cannot cany out their mission properly if they disregard the importance of reasonable habits and skills for considered judgments and praiseworthy actions. Although it is con­ceived mainly for the analysis of individual action-the only one 1deal with in this article-the approaeh from the idea of practical wisdom is also relevant when considering issues and debates of public and general concem.

Now, according to the c1assical conception, although practicaI wisdom is devoted to tackling contingency, it is not to be identified with the mere ability to find the most appropriate means to pursueany given end. The reason is that for Aristotle practical wisdom presupposes an acquaintance with ends of value that is not purely intellectuaI, but must rather be invoIved in character. This acquain­tance with the good ends líes behind Aristotle's distinction of practical wisdom (<PPÓVJ1O~)from mere ability (&1.VÓ't~: ability is the capaeity to find the most

. convenient means to achieve any particular end, while practical wisdom is the same capacity when the end is good. For this reason Aristotle says, as we shall see, that wisdom is the ability of the just persono and that one cannot be wise with­

1he MlHiem SchlNllmall. LXXXIII. N(lvembt'r 2005 1

• •

out moral sensibility. Once the agent has appropriate moral knowledge and dispo­sitions directed toward justice or temperance, for example, practical wisdom has a double task: in the first place, discerning the most reasonable course of action, and, in the second place, issuing the command that prompts action on the part of

. the corresponding virtue or capacity. TIte medieval tradition generally conserved this conception of practical wis­

dom, which disappeared from modem philosophy. Thus, prodential imperatives are for Kant those of technical reason serving anY encls, ~d prodence (Klugheit) plays in Kant's ethics the role Aristotle assigns to mere ability. Contemporary eth­ical and economicthought generally identifies prudence with instrumental rea­son. TIte classical understanding of practical wisdom has importance in various contemporary' forms of reassessing and actualizing Aristotle's practical philoso­phy, but it has been the object of divergent interpretations. The main objective of this essay is to expound the central aspects of the Aristotelian conception of <PP<)V1"lOU; as the fundamental practical virtue, its connection with the most basic values and moral character, and its role in moral judgment and directing action. Finally, 1 will mention the significance of the reappraisal of this classical notion for the understanding not only of individual agency, but also of public delibera­tion and collective choice.

2. PRACTICAL WISDOM AS KNOWLEDGE ABOUT CONTINGENT PARTICULARS

The notion of practical wisdom arises in response to diverse questions about human action in general and its moral aspects. The two fundamental problems that motivate Aristotle's refiection are that general knowledge ofien does not suf­fice in order to discem the reasonable or convenient in particular situations, and that reflection and judgment do not provide accurate explanations of human actions, which are sometimes contrary to deliberations and decisions of the agent. Aristotle starts his analysis of.action from a distinction-widely present in the previous philosophical and literary traditions-between two general capacities of the human psyche: reasoning about objects and acting on them. The Aristotelian refiection upon practical wisdom offers a way of understanding the relationship between the human mind and will as an explanation for those well-known phe­nomena and the inadequacy of previous doctrines such as Socratic intellectual­ism. "For acting well (EU1tpal;í.a) or badly-Aristotle says-requires both thought and character (5távol.a and 1')9oc;) [...] That is why decision is either understanding combined with desire or desire combined with thought; and this is the sort of principIe that a human being is.''2

It is well-known thatAristotle begins his refiection on the good in any con­text by characterizing it as the end toward which things tend. When applying this notion to the human being, he considers that we can recognize a truly human

2

•

function or task: rationa! activity. The question about the possibility of canying out this activity better or worse seems at first to be a teehnical question entirely similar to those referring to the characteristic functions of any beings or objects, such as other living creatures, human organs, or artifacts created by mano Since rational activity is directed as much to thought as to action, it will be necessary to distinguish the capacity to apply it well or badly (with or without virtue) in both domains. The term employed from the outset by Aristotle to designate rational activity and those human actions that are worthy ofesteem is a1to'O&iioc;.J

The analysis of practical wisdom in book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics can be first approached from this notion of good or excellent action in a sense that does not yet have to be moral. In the previous books, Aristotle has dealt with other notions that are relevant lo understanding the way practical wisdom handles par­ticular situations. In accordance with this previous treatment, virtue of character or moral virtue is an eleetive habit that operates after deliberation about factors and circumstances has taken place.4 Moral virtue, as an appetitive or desiring dis­position, is in charge of choice and action. Choice-and therefore action-, Aristotle affinns, will be good or appropriate inasmuch as this is true also of rea­soning and desire: "Now virtue of character is al state that decides; and decision is a deliberative desire. If, then, the decision is exceUent, the reason must be true and the desire correet, so that what reason asserts is what desire pursues." And he explains how we should understand the truth of practical reasoning by means of the following consideration, which calls for a careful interpretation: "This, then, is thought and truth concemed with action [...]; for truth is the function of whatever thinks. But the function of what thinks about action is truth agreeing with correet desire."5

Therefore, in his analysis of the roles of intelligence and character in good and valuable choices, Aristotle makes the following statements: (i) choice is good.if practical reasoning is true and desire is correet; (ii) desire has to pursue what reason says; and (iii) practical reasoning is true if it agrees with correet desire. As it is evident, if desire is correet simply for following what practical reasoning concludes, then (ii) and (iii) constitute a circle. In order to understand properly these apparently circular statements, it is necessary to consider first the complete discussion of the functioning of practical wisdom and its connexion with the moral virtues.

In the previous books, the analysis of moral virtue had made it clear when it is neeessary to resort to considerations regarding practical wisdom. Virtue looks for the reasonable midpoint between two rejectable ends, but in order to attain this mean appropriately general rules and considerations do not suffice. The mean

Aristotle~ Theory 01Practical Wisdom Ricardo Parellada

3

•

is even dependent on the agent, and Aristotle describes it by referring to the lucid­ity and moderation of the wise persono Thus, the mean is "as the correct reason says," and virtue then is "a state that decides, consisting in a mean, the mean rela­tive to us, which is defined by reference to reason, that is to say, to the reason by .reference to which the prudent person would define it."6 When he undertakes a direct analysis of practical wisdom in book VI, Aristotle appeals to the same observation, and he asserts that in order to understand the nature and functioning of <ppÓV11OU; we have to consider which men we call <pp6Vl.1J.Ol. or wise. The first thing he finds is the following: "It seems proper to a prudent person to be able to deliberate finely about things that are good and beneficial for himself, not about sorne restricted area-about what sorts of things promote health or strength, for instance-but about what sorts ofthings promote living well in general."7

In accordance with this characterization of the prudent or practically wise person, the first description or definition of the virtue of practical wisdom Aristotle offers is that of "a state grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about things that are good or bad for a human being.''8 ~VT')CfU; is not a fonn of science because, unlike science, it deals with the contingent, what can be otherwise; and it is also distinguished fmm art (Le. production) because, although the latter also focuses on the contingent, it has external ends. By con­trast, the end of practical wisdom "is acting well itself' (aiYt1Í 1Í eu1tpC1;'n 'tÉMX;).9 As Aristotle adds in the same paragraph, science and art can be used for good or evit, and the voluntary misuse of them indicates expert knowledge; on the other hand, practical wisdom and the moral virtues cannot be used for evil, because such misuse would plainly show the lack of them. Practical wisdom is not an exclusively rational disposition such as the capacities of science or opin­ion, because it cannot be forgotten Iike them, which also shows its connection with the virtues of character. It is true that the sole consideration of the aboye first definition of <PPÓV11Ote; can preveot one fmm perceiving its connection with the moral virtues. But Aristotle points out this connection c1early a few Iines below: "A sign of this is the fact that we call people prudent about sorne [restricted area] whenever they calculate well to promote sorne excellent (0'1tOu&t.t~) end, in an area where there is no craft."IO

Aristotle also points out in passing that individual wisdom cannot cover everything and that it should not be isolated fmm the domestic administration and the political regime, but up to this point he is most concemed with distinguishing it fmm science because of its focusing on the contingente Wise judgment, he says, can be compared to the intuition (VO'Üc;) referring to the principies or intellectual Iimits that are not the object of reasoning. For judgment concerns the other extreme of the practical: the individual and contingent, which is not subject to reasoning either, but to a fonn of intuition. Aristotle affinns that in the last consid­eration of complex particular situations, wise judgment can be better described as a stroke of intuition, than as the outcome of reasoning. That would be often the

4

•

case, for example, when we have to draw a fine Jine between reasonable and cow­ardly conduct, or to establish the terms of a fair distribution that cannot be delayed. He points to this intuition, both in book VI, dedicated to the intellectual virtues, as well as in book 11, dedicated to moral virtue; with the tenn aio9Tpu;. sensible intuition.1I

3. THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF PRACTICAL WISDOM AND MORAL VIRTUE

One of the clearest ways of beginning to see the properly moral considera­tions that Aristotle introduces is to examine the connection between practical wis­dom and the virtues of character, or moral virtues. The last two chapters of book VI are devoted to showing the interdependence ofpractical wisdom and the moral virtues: in chapter 12 Aristotle shows that practical wisdom presupposes moral virtue, whereas in chapter 13 he shows that moral virtue presupposes practical wis­domo Tbe first point is that theoretical knowledge ~f the proper ends of virtuous behavior-the justo the honorable. the good (Búcal.Ov, KaA.6v, ciya96v)-is not enough for a behavior of that nature to take place. As at many other points of bis ethical arguments, Aristotle uses an ilIustrative comparison with health: inasmuch as healthy habits are not strengthened by acquai.ntance with medical science or gyrnnastics, the skills ofpractical wisdom-fine judgment and moderate but deter­mined action--do not stem from the mere awareness of the ends of value. Although anchored in intelligence, the habit ofCAJÓVI'lOU; can ooly operate well if it displays an appropriate connection with the appetitive or desiring dispositions.

The dependence of practical. wisdom on moral virtue is manifest when we consider the capacity to calculate and deliberate about a course of action inde­pendently of the nature of the ends pursued. As 1 have already said, Aristotle asserts that this capacity is not caBed wisdom, but mere ability or astuteness (OOtVÓ't1lC;).I2 Tbere is no wisdom without ability, but there is no wisdom either if calculatior::a does not intend, one way or another, to serve sorne of the noble or fine ends defined by the different virtues. uFurther," Aristotle says, "we fulfill our function insofar as we have prudence and virtue of character; for virtue malees the goal correet, and prudence nialees the thingspromoting the goal [cor­rect]." Moreover, when the end is not praiseworthy, part of the phronetical lucidity is lost, for it is often vivified and enhanced by the nature ofthe end pur­sued: uAnd this [best good) is apparent only lo the good person; for vice per­verts us and produces false views about the principies of actions. Evidently, then, we cannot be prudent without being good (aaúva'tov <pp<)vq.a.ov efvat IlTt oVta ci'yae6V)."13

Aristotle sTheoryofPractical Wi.fdom Ricardo ParcHada

s

•

On the other hand, in chapter 13 Aristotle establishes the difference between natural virtue and virtue par excel1ence (K'UpÍa). Natural vinue is the broad dis­position we ofien recognize in people whom nature has endowed unequally with traits of justice or temperance, whereas virtue proper is the improvement of the habits of character that canoot actually take place without the guidance of experi­ence or the perspicacity of practical wisdom. In his previous treatment of virtue, Aristotle recalIs, it was already detennined that it is not a rational disposition, as Socrates thought, but it does not arise in the absence of reason. It is rather accom­panied by reason (J.lf'tll AÓ'Y0U), and right reason is here practical wisdom. Moral intentipn combined with a diminished wit works badly, for it is well Icnown that the road to hell is paved with good intentions. The conclusion is plain: '~we

cannot be fully good (a'Ya9Ov K'Up~) without prudence, or prudent without virtue of character.tt Since each virtue requires prudence or practical wisdom and practical wisdom is required by them all, practical wisdom and the moral virtues will not be out of balance, but in certain ha.rmony, that reaches its fullness in the wiseone.14

In sumo when analyzing the interdependence of practical wisdom and moral virtues, Aristotle's outline is that the virtues offer the end of action-they embrace the desire of being just or not being a coward, for example-whereas <ppÓVTlC'~deliberates in order to detennine what just or brave action would con­sist of on this or that particular occasion, and looks for the means to carry it out. It would seem unreasonable to maintain that, since the ends are proposed by desiring dispositions, they will be in great measure arbitrary, or a mere refiection of the longings of an individual, a particular society, or a singular cultural momento To my mind, the enquiry carried out by Aristotle ioto the most praiseworthy behavior in different spheres of Iife entaiIs a clear estimative purpose. The better ends of action are not for Aristotle simply those favored by a majority or a certain group, but those of excellent types oí.behavior in different sph~res of human interaction. The ends and actions considered by Aristotle are those of a complex and civilized society, and we can recognize many of them as belonging also to our own moral and social transactions. IS On the other hand, Aristotle conceives of preferences not as merely desired, but also as rationally aclcnowledged. and says that ends should be the object both ofappetite and reason: "For both [bis appetitive part and his rea­son] aim at the fine, and the temperate person's appetites are for the right things, in the right ways, at the right times, which is just ~hat reason also prescribes."16 But the nature of the ends of action demands a more detailed treatment.

4. THE ENDS OF ACTION

In the characterization of <ppÓvr¡m.c; from the qualities of the cpp6vqwc:;, we have already seen Aristotle's observation that only those pursuing a respectable (01tou&xí'09 end are actually called practically wise. Already in the final chap­

•

ters of book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, dedicated mainIy to the study of happi­ness, we find a clear distinction among the desirable things between those that are more or less respectable or noble. Aristotle does not leave detennination of the importance of the different goods or ends in the hands of the many or of the men of the world; he detennines this importance starting from the different life styles. The different types of ends are from the outset the object of valuing on the part ofAristotle, who affinns that the person who judges these things rightly it is the onou&iiOC;.

AIso, in the discussion of moral virtue in book nan extremely important dis­tinction between three grand types of desirable ends appears: the noble or fine (lcaA,6v), the useful (OUJ..l<pÉpOV'tOV), and the pleasant (T¡StoV),17 And in his thorough analysis of the different virtues of character, Aristotle constantly uses the tenns o"noOOa\OC;, lCaA,6c;, <X'Ya96c;, e'O to describe the most praiseworthy action and the agent who carries it out. Aristotle singles out fundamental spheres oí human activity and reftects upon the most convenient and appropriate ways oí acting in each one of them: in the face of dangers and difficulties, in dealing with our instincts and bodily needs, in the administration oí money, and regarding the idea of oneself, the telling of facts, interaetion with fellow men, or the distribution of resources. As we have seen, he conceives of appropriate behavior as a mid­point, relative to each agent, between two inappropriate excesses. Bul, what is a mean from a quantitative perspective is the maximum from the point of view of esteem and value, and Aristotle finds that in most cases the appropriate behavior is the froit of effort and susceptible of moral valuation. The moral virtues are the capacities to act well in those different spheres-bravery, temperance, generosity, magnanimity, trothfulness, affability, justice-and, from the point of view of each one of them, it is clear that there are noble and base behaviors that Aristotle describes in some detail.

The person who can discriminate and c8ITY out valuable behavior is described as 01t0'08a\oc; or eX'Ya96c;.18 Similarly, the person who can discrimi­nate between real and apparent goods, and thus between natural and artificial pleasures, isalso labeled in book III as onoOOaí'oc; or <X'Ya96c;.'9 As we have seen in the previous paragraph, in the treatment of practical wisdom in book VI the valuing of ends and actions presented in books n10 V appears again, because without this evaluation, this virtue cannot be described correctly. The analysis of deliberation also shows, as the interdependence between practical wisdom and the moral virtues had done, that the language and the moral reality studied by Aristotle contain a more or less explicit evaluation of the ends and actions of agents. Thus, Aristotle does not call good a deliberation (eUJXn>A,1a) that is sim-

Aristotle ~ Theory 01Practical Wisdom Ricardo Parellada

7

..

ply effective, but "goOO deliberation is the sol1 that reaches a goOO." Indeed, the analysis ends up showing that "if, then, having deliberated well is proper to a pru­dent person, goOO deliberation will be the type ofcorrectness that accords with what is expedient for promoting the end about wbich prodence is true supposition.''20

This observation also makes clear that, although Aristotle generally ascribes the end to appetite, and deliberation on the specification of the end and on the means to attain it to practical wisdom, he also refers to the end ¡ntended by appetite as the one captured by practical wisdom. In bis classic book, Pierre Aubenque emphasizes this intellectual apprehension of the ends of action: "it does not seem that Aristotle has ever given up the intellectual, and thus universalizable, detenni­nation of value. In this sense, Aristotle does not make here any concession to rela­tivism, wbich, on the contrary, he tries to overcome."21 'PJbe wise roan also knows the particular," Aubenque affinns later on, "but this falso] means in the first place that his knowledge of the universal is not to be questioned."22 As he finally puts it with a beautiful fonnula, "the substitution of the <pp6"'4J.OC;, who is not the platon­ic sage, for the traditional 01to'U&iioc; inaugurates, in the teeth of the empiricism of the popular tradition and simultaneously against the platonic philosophy of essences, what could be called an existential intellectualism."23

The question about the nature of the evaluation offered by Aristotle of the different ends and the most valuable actions in the different spheres of action has been the object of controversy, as well as its relevance to contemporary reflection. On the one hand, sorne interpreters 8SCribe to Aristotle an empírical determination of ends and virtues. In sorne cases, it is thought that Aristotle does not offer any kind of evaluative considerations, but ends are rather given by the positive prefer­ences of the agents. In the best case, it is argued that bis analyses of action and the roles of intelligence and character are significant independently of their relevance for ethics. In other cases, it is affinned that the valuations of ends and behaviors offered by Aristotle correspond to the traditional and collective wisdom of the Greek race or to theAncient world in general, incommensurable with ours.24

On the other hand, it is known that Saint Thomas Aquinas ascribes knowl­edge of the goOO to the intellectual habit ofsynderesis or natural reason thatoffers valuable ends to the rational and the sensory appetites. Practical wisdom looks for a way to carry out these ends and is in a relationsbip of interdependence with the virtues very similar to that expounded by Aristotle. In thé Theological Summa, which is much more incisive in these malters than his Commentary on Aristotle Jo Nkomachean Ethics, Aquinas offers penetrating analyses of the psychology of acbon. These are in many cases very faithful to Aristotle's spirit and convey more specific insights on questions Aristotle handles with less detail. Nevertheless, the concept of synderesis as a habit of practical principIes is a contribution that goes further than an explanation of Aristotle's ideas. Aristotle attributes the awareness of ends of action to both appetite and intelligence, and even seerns to speak on sorne occasions about an intuition of practical principles.2~ But an intellectuaI

8

habit such as synderesis actually belongs to the Thomist"elaboratioÍl, especially since the foundation of its objects is the will of God. For this reason, I do not regard the interpretation of Gauthier and Jolif as acceptable on this point. According to these authors, in order to become a source of obligation, practical wisdom must entail "a universal knowledge of the purpose of human life, a pur­pose that is not, certainIy, the Good itself of Plato, but the metaphysical vision of God.''26

However, it is evident that for Aristotle the quality of the different desirable ends and objects (the noble, the useful, the pleasant), ofbehavior and the virtues, cannot be merely empirical, contingent, or arbitrary, but is the object of a deter­mined evaluative approach and an aware search for the good.27 In his description of the virtues and the ends of action, Aristotle pays attention to the knowledge stored in linguistic terms and usage, to received customs and laws, but he never fails to ask himself about its legitimacy and does nol refrain from passing value judgments when he considers it necessary. Thus, for example, he considers absurd and unjust a law of Cyme on homicide that allows the acquittal of a criminal if he can gather a sufficient number of relatives to testify in his favor. For all human beings, Aristotle says, "seek not the way of their ancestors, but the good.''28

Pierre Aubenque points out this duality of the Aristotelian descriptions of ends and behaviors by saying that they are both "p'henomenological and axiologi- . cal." 29 In the same sense, Nicolai Hartmann had affirmed without hesitation that "in the specific detenninations of the individual virtues we have a conjunction of detenninations of real being and ideal demands or, if one wants, of empirical and a priori detenninations."3O Since the reading of Heidegger only highlights the first of these two aspects, it does not seem to me to be a sound interpretation of Aristotle's ethical thought. In his lectures on Plato's Sophist, in which he devotes an extensive introductory part to Aristotle, and in particular to book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, Heidegger points out that when he interprets the Aristotelian discussion ofcppóvtptc; and action as phenomenology of Dasein, he is only concemed with its descriptive aspects and he leaves aside the estimative and prescriptive ones. Heidegger does not seem to go further than saying that ..the ftoor of cpp6V'T)Otc; is &SI;a (opinion)."3.

In my opinion, however, the main significance of the Aristotelian conception of practical wisdom lies in the fact that it does take into consideration awareness of the valuable ends and behaviors in various spheres of life, as well as attention . to complexity and particularities, not only of the changing situations and circum­stances, but also of the diverse uses, valuations and received customs. The Aristotelian notion of practical wisdom has the difficult, endless, and crucial task

Aristatle:r Theory 01Practical Wisdom Ricardo Parellada

9

of weighing the objectivity of the most general ends and the true sensitivity toward particulars and differences. Its significance for contemporary ethical and political reftection comes fmm this.

s. THE REASONS FOR ACTION

Besides evaluating the diffe:ent ends of action, Aristotle refers explicitly to another central aspect of ethical theory, that is, the fundamental criteria for assessing actions from a moral point of view. This explicit dimension of Aristotle's ethical reftections has not always been acknowledged appropriately. Thus, for example, in spite of pointing out the axiological side of Aristotelian ethics, as we have just seen. Pierre Aubenque affinns that Aristotle "does not end up distinguishing clearly the conditions of the technically effective action and those of the morally good one, the definitions of the usefui and the good." Aubenque recal1s the double meaning, utilitarian and moral, of Greek expres­sions such as cX'Yo:9óc;, eu, EU npá't'tEtV and even óp96'tr¡c;, which can desig­nate "the rightness of the end as well as the moral1y neutral perspicacity of judgment." The conclusion he draws, however. on a Heideggerian manner, is that Aristotle provides "a general theory of action, a hermeneutics of human existence, rather than an ethical theory."32

Now. in Aristotle's ethical writings we find not only pmperly ethical consid­erations regarding the ends of action, but also. counter to what Aubenque affinns here, very preciseobservations about the fundamental criterion for the moral assessment of actions. As has been pointed out more recently, this criterion is none other than the reason why these actions are perfonned. The action that pur­sues a good end is a morally good one when it is simply motivated by the fact that that end is worthy of being carried out, and is not perfonned out of necessity or convenience.33 An action is just and thus praiseworthy if it is carried out because it is something just, not because it is what the agent finds most convenient. The action will be a generous and worthy one if the agent is moved by the intended result, not by what people may say or think. The criterion for the moral worth of an agent's actions is that they be done for the sake of something noble or valu­able; it consists. for example, in doing the just or the noble, because it is just or noble. Aristotle says it most clearly:

We begin here: we say that sorne people who do just actions ('ta Sí1Cal.CX, the just things) are not yet thereby just, if. for instance. they do the actions prescribed by the laws either unwillingly or because of igno­rance or because of sorne other end. not because of the actions them­selves (St' airtá), even though they do the right actions, those that the excellent person ought to do. Equally, however, it would seem to be pos­sible for someone to do each type of action in the state that malees him a good person, that is to say, because of decision and for the sake ofthe

10

• •

----- ---

actions themselves (aiYtrov tvelCa 'tcOV 7tpa't'tOfJÉVCOV).34 80th in his analysis of moral virtue in book 11 as wel1 as in the subsequent indi­vidual treatrnent of the different ethical virtues, Aristotle affinns again and again that the valuable and praiseworthy aspect of an action is that it be done for the sake of a valuable end. He points out this role of moral motivation with diverse expressions such as OullCaAóv, O'tt lCaM>V, lCcxA.06 ~lCa. This point is also clear in the Eudemian Ethics: "it is by a man's purposive choice that we judge his character-that is, not by what he does but what he does it foro Similarly also bad­ness causes purposive choice to be made from the opposite motives."3.5 Clearly, that the action is morally good if it is done for the sake of a valuable end is an eth­ical criterion that is similar to the one proposed by Kant, according to whom the action is morally good if it is done out of respect for a norm or, in other words, from duty. Christine Korsgaard has clearly pointed out this parallelism.36 As she explains in full, the Aristotelian "for the sake of the noble" ('ta\) lCaAoU xáptV) and the Kantian "from duty" (aus Pflicht) are similar as the motives that give moral worth to an action.37

Now, this concurrence in the role of motivation as the source of the moral worth of actions should not make us loose sight of the very different ways both thinkers conceive of our knowledge of the actions that should be perfonned. According to the Aristotelian analysis, the agent responds to the valuable aspect of an action (just, moderate, generous), that is to say, to a materially detennined end. On the other hand, according to the Kantian analysis, the agent acquires awareness of ethical nonns through the application of the fonnal mechanism of the categorical imperative. In fact, it is in opposition to the Aristotelian character­ization of the ends of value, together with the role of the virtues inthe happy life, that Kant maintained that the material considerations must unavoidably be empir­ical, and that we can only anive at universal ethical nonns by means of the ratio­nal and fonnal mechanism of the categorical imperative. The parallel treatment of ethical motivation by both thinkers has no equivalent in their conceptions of our access to norms, so if we want to speak of the fonn of the action in Aristotle's case it must be in a different sense.3I

It is true that, besides the subjective condition of action--tbat it be done for the sake of an end of value, which determines its moral worth-for Aristotle the fully achieved and pnliseworthy action must comply with sorne objective condi­tions, such as being done in the right way, at the right time, directed to the right

. object, etc. But it is difficult to infer from this a notion of the form of the action to which we can ascribe its nobility. The Aristotelian analysis of the different types of valuable actions-phenomenological and axiological at the same time, as

Aristotle~ Theory 01Practica/ W"udom Ricardo Parellada

11

Aubenque says-is always guided by the meaning of those types of aedon. The analysis of what is usually understood, and what should be understood, by a just, moderate or geoerous action focuses on the sense of these notions, and for this rea­son it is known as material analysis. On the other hand, Kant seeks a eharacteristie

. of the maxim of aetion that can tum it into a morallaw independently of material eonsiderations, that is, io aformal way-this eharacteristic is its universality. The Aristotelian treatment of ~oral motivation-tbat the action be done for the sake of its nobleness or value-is referred, in a material way, to the different types of ends worthy of being pursued, that we have considered in the previous paragraph.39

What is eertain is that the difference between earrying out an action for the salce of the noble (in Kantian tenns, from duty) and earryiog it out because of an extemal obligation oreonvenience (io Kantian tenns, for different types of inclina­tion) eannot be more explicit in Aristotle's ethics. For example, when dealing with voluntary aetion, Aristotle affinns: "[E]veryone in every action aims at something fine or pleasant ('ta i¡aéa KCXl. 'ta KMa [...] 'to'\Jtrov 'YQp xápl.V 1táVtec; 7távtcx np<Í'tOOOC:HV)."40 When dealing with eourage: "[The soldiers] are worse to the extent that they aet because of fear [8t.<X <póf3ov, a type of inelination], not because of shame [8t' cx~, awareness of the fine or noble], and to avoid pain, not disgrace [...] The brave person, however, must be moved by the fine, not by eom­pulsion (&\ 8'oi>8'MvKTJV óvBpelov Elval., CfAA' 01;t KcxA6v)."41 And, when eonsidering the transition from ethies to politics. Aristotle bases the need for sorne properly moral precepts among the laws on the same distioetioo:

Henee we need laws eoocemed with these things [the discipline oí adults] aIso, and in general with all of life. For the many yield to eom­pulsion more than to argument, and to sanctions [external obligation, inelinatioo] more than to the fine [internal obligation, duty, respect for the norm]. That is why legislators must, in sorne people's views, urge people toward virtue for the salce of the fine ('too KaAoU XáptV):~2

Aristotle begios his refiections on the good and the virtues in technieal terroso But, as we have seen, he immediately goes into eonsiderations about the value oíends and the moral worth of aetioos. These analyses are thorougb and clear. and they offer not just a phenomenology or bermeneutic of human aetion, as Heidegger and Aubenque say, but, importantly, key notions and elemeots ofethieal theory.

6. THE STRUCTURE OF MORALACTION

Keeping in mind the previous considerations about the ends of action and the eonnection between practical wisdom and the moral virtues, we can reconstruet the strueture of moral aetion as eooeeived by Aristotle. In the face oí a concrete and vital situation that demands an answer bere and now on the part of the agent, it is c1ear that the first task of praetical reason and, eonsequently, of <pp6V'TlOtc;, consists in deliberating about tbe aetioo to be earried out.43 As we bave seen,

12

••

deliberation is properly phronetical or wise for Aristotle-not the work of mere astuteness-if it presupposes an address of the appetitive dispositions toward the ends of vaIue, that is, if there is a previous inclination or intention of moral virtue toward its proper end. Next, practical wisdom has to pass a judgment about the course of action that must be followed and, since in Aristotle's moral psychology the principie of movement always comes from the appetitive dispositions, moral virtue must choose-that is, undertake-the proposed action.

Now, says Aristotle, "it is even more diflicult [than deciding] to abide by our judgment, since the results we expect [when we endure] are usually painful, and the actions we are compelled [to endure, when we choose] are usually shame­fuI. "44 For this reason, within the context of traditional ethical thought, it has fre­quently been held that the task of practical wisdom does not end with judgment, but rather it culminates in a lingering rational command that encourages the will to follow through with the éhosen behavior. Thus, Aquinas assigns a great impor­tance in his psychology to this cornmand on the part ofpractical wisdom, which is known as ;mper;um. With his habitual analytic perspicacity, he discusses, for instance, whether this action of cornmanding is characteristic of the reason or tbe will, and he concludes that it is an act ofreason that presupposes the motion of tbe Will.45 Nevertheless, later philosophical tradition discussed vividly whetber or not an accurate description ofour practical reason should ascribe to practical wisdom this third psychological act, following cleliberation and judgment

Be this as it may, the Thomist conception of imperium or comman~which is more elaborated on this point, is perfectly compatible with Aristotle's treatment. Indeed, in chapter 10 of book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics we can find the thought that motivated the distinction between the judgment and command of <ppÓvrp~: 'That is why comprehension [aúvro~, goodjudgment, sagacity] is about the same things as pllldence, but not the same as pllldence. For prudence is .prescriptive (m1.'taK't1.K1Í, cornmanding), since its end is what action we must or must not do, whereas comprehension only judges (lcpt'tucft J.1ÓVOV)."<46

With this stlllcture of actioil, Aristotle tries to acknowledge the different tasks carried out by intelligence and character, discovered in the course of his detailed anthropological reflections, and to explain sorne psychological phenom­ena-such as the weakness of the will-which are difficult to understand with the conceptual tools of earlier moral psychology. Thus, moral action in the face of a complex real situation entails the following psychological acts: (1) the intention of moral virtue toward its proper end, such as justice; (2) the phronetical delibera­tion abaut the real factors and circumstances that are relevant in that situation; (3) the phronetical judgment about what appears, in that particular moment and situ-

AristotlesTheory 01Practical Wisdom Ricardo PareHada

13

..

ation, as the mostjust course of action; (4) the choice of moral virtue, which undertakes the necessary movements to carry it out; and (5) the command of practica! wisdom, which reaffinns and ensures the detennination of the will to follow the indications of judgment and choice:47

l. The intention of moral virtue. 2. The deliberation of practical wisdom. 3. The judgment of practical wisdom. 4. The choice ofmoral virtue. 5. The cornmand of practical wisdom.

Starting from this strueture, there is a natural interpretation of the apparent circle found in the passage quoted in the first paragraph of this article. Firstly, the obser­vation that practical reasoning is true if it agrees with correct desire can be taken as meaning that the judgment of <PPÓV11O'~must agree with the previous correct intention of moral vírtue. Secondly, the indication that desire has to pursue what reason says can be interpreted as meani~g that moral virtue must follow, in the next momento the judgment of <PPÓV11O'~.According to this understanding of the structure of moral action, choice is correct ifpractical reasoning is true and desire is good. In otber words, it is correct if <PPÓV'J'lO~is in agreement witb the previ­ous desire of a good end and if action follows the judgment of cpp6v1p~. CarIo Natali, for example, offers a reasonable explanation of what Aristotle understands by the correctness of desire:

In order to define practical truth, the virtue of A.oy1.0't1.1CÓV, i. e. of the deliberative part of the soul, Aristotle is obliged to establish what is meant by "truth" or, better, "correctness" in speaking of desire. This may seem a strange question to us now, but Aristotle, aIso in the case of desire, regards a fonn of correspondence with its object as being trutb. Just as in scientific knowledge truth is affinning or denying in confonni­ty with the state of tbings, so too in desire truth is a movement tending toward the true good and away from the apparent good.4I

Once we clearly understand what Aristotle means by the correctness (sometimes even called truth) oí desire, it is not difficult to understand also what he means by practical truth: that is, the concurrence of practical deliberation and judgment with the desire directed toward the ends of value. This is in full agreement with the Thomist interpretation of practical truth: verum per conformitatem ad apeti­tum rectum.49

This structure oí moral action renders clear alsb Aristotle's conception of tbe practical syllogism, sometimes called the syIlogism oí <pp6V'1'lO~. The first premise of this syllogism oí action is the intellectually comprehended direction of appetite toward the good or tbe just, or its expression in a general nonn of behav­ior, for instance: un is not fair to get paid for tbe work done by another person." . Tbe second premise is the defining one, and it is detennined by tbe judgment of <ppóvT]O'~, after due consideration of the situation and its circumstances:50

14

••

"Although it seems that I have done this work myself, and sorne extra money would not hurt me, it is crystal c1ear to me that someone did it for me and that it would not be fair that I get paid instead of that person." The conc1usion of tbe syl- . logism of action is not a proposition, but the action that corresponds lo the previ­ous reasoning and the rightness of character: "1 choose tbat the work be charged by the person who did it." Now, as Arislotle says, we sometimes find it difficult lo be consequent with our own judgments--the fiesh is weak-and for tbis reason practical wisdom must get involved again. IfI find it difficu1t lo aet in accordance with what I have decided or even started lo undertake, practical wisdom plOtests and orders the will to end what it has already begun: "Just let the money go to the legitimate hands."

This Aristotelian notion of <pp<)V'JlOlC; or practica1 wisdom disappeared from the currents of modern philosophy which do not generally take account of the Aristotelian and scholastic traditions. As we have seen, Aristotle conceives of practical wisdom as interdependent with the moral virtues and as acquainted tbrough them witb ends of value. By contrast, in Kant's etbics, for instance, the virtue of prudence is reduced to instlUmental ability, entlUsted exclusively with finding the most appropriate means to a given ende There is also little room for the psychological subtleties of practical wisdom in contemporary philosophical or economic tbeories of rational choice and action that understand them as unana­lyzed outeomes of tbe interaction of the beliefs and desires of agents. The c1assi­cal virtue of practical wisdom is intended mainly at understanding individual action, but it can be significant also when we want lo highlight the importance, in collective action, of appropriate deliberation and judgment, while at the same time retaining certain general ends of value.51 FlOm individual and collective points oí view, this conception oí practical wisdom and moral action points out tbat there can be no lucid deliberation or balanced judgment in the absence of refiection upon the ends that are tnJIy worthwhile.52

IIn the last decades, there have been impar­ ICV. ed. 2001), l.ove's Knowkdge (Oxford: tant developments in moral philosophy devoted Oxford University Presa, 1990). See also John lo tbe difficulties of moral perception and moral McDowell, Mind, Wzlue. and Re4lity (Cambridge, judgemenL Sorne contributions have anti-theo­ MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Lawrence retical implications; for example, Bemard Blum, Moral Perception and Particularity (New Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). University Press, 1981), Ethics and the Limits of Another line oí thought argues foc tbe context­Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard dependence ofmmd reasons and questions ethi­University Press, 1985). Other POSitiODS have cal principies from a viewpoint of "moral forcefully taekIed tbe problem of moral percep­ particularism," mainly inspired by me writings oí lion and the priority of the singular in Jonathan Dancy; foc example, Moral Reasons Aristotelian or literary manners; for example, (Oxford: Blackwen, 1993), Ethks Mthout Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility DiGoodness Principks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Presa, 1986, 20(4). A good survey of me positions prompted

Aristotle's Theory ofPractical Wzsdom . Ricardo PareUada

15

by particularism is the collection OOitOO by Brad Hooker and Margaret Little, Moral Particularisnr (Oxford: Oxford Universjty Press, 2000). Since the main objective of the present essay is to provide a self-contained picture ofAristotle's conception of pr.tetical wisdom, with its anthropological aOO eth­ical implications, Ido nOl refer here to these con­temporary complex positions.

2Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 2, J139 a 36 - b 6. Trans. T. Irwin, 2nd oo. (lndianapolisICambridge: Hacken Publishing Company, 1999). Greek text ed. Bywater in Oxford Classical Texts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, reprinted 1962).

31n c1assical Greek, onou&xi'oc;; means 'respectable,' 'worthy,' and is contrasted to yeAoi'oc;;, 'ridiculous,' 'unworthy of respect: Plato uses the term frequently as a contrast to cpauA.oc;;. 'of little worth' (Plat. Phaedr. 261 b 2, Resp. 424 e 7, Leg. 816 d 9). I owe mese indica­tions to 1. Rodriguez Alfageme (Complutense University ofMadrid).

WE, n. 6,1106 b 35. 'NE, VI, 2, 1139 a 23-31. fiNE, VI, 1, 1138 b 21 and 11, 6, 1107 a 1-3.

English translations usually render phronesis by practica! wisdom, in arder to distinguish it from the usual meaning of prudence as instrumental ability. In his recent translation, T. Irwin has revivOO the old term prudence, which is c10ser to Latin's prudenlia and to the terms used in Roman languages. In my text I use both practical wis­dom aOO prodence fOl' Aristotle's phronesis..

WE, VI, S, 1140 a 26-28. WE,VI, S, !140bS-7. 'NE, VI, S, l140b 8. IUNE, VI,5, 114Oa29·31. "NE, 11, 9, 1109 b 24 and VI, 8, 1142 a 29. UNE, VI, 12, 1144 a 23. IlNE, VI, 12, 1144 a 8-10 and 3S-37. CarIo

Natali expresses this dependence in conceptual terms: "(possession of phronesis) analytically contajns (possessjon of ethical virtue)," in The Wisdom 01Aristotle, G. Parks, transo (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 200 1), 5 l.

'WE, VI, 13, l144b31- 114Sa2. "Martha Nussbaum has wjdely argued for a

reappraisal of AristOlle's virtues and main good ends. Sec, fOl' example, "Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach," in M. Nussbaum and A. Sen, OOs., The QuaJit)' 01Lije (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993),242-269. On the other hand, Aristotle js an important source of inspira­tion for her capabiJities approach, restated and reassessed in WOlnen and Human Development: The CapabiJiti!s Approach (CambridgeINew

York: Cambridge Uoiversity Press. 2(00) (lill of capabilities on pages 78-80). It is wOl1h menlion· iog also the contributions to a Symposium dedi· catOO to. Nussbaum's political philosophy. published in Ethics 111 (2000). with her response on pages 102-140. As I have already said. in the context of this article I cannOl deal with these important contemporary developments.

I6NE,III. 12. 1119 b 17-20. After reviewing carefully different ways of understanding this point, Cario Natali affinns tbat fOl' Aristotle the means are the object of reason (pp. 45-49), that hands them down to desire. whereas the ends are the object of desire, but must be acknowledged by reason (pp. 49-S4).

'1NE, n. 3,1104 b31. 11Cf. S. Broadie. "Aristotle's Elusive Summum

Bonum." Social PhiJosophy and PoJicy, 16 (1999): 233-251, al p. 236, n. 14: "Aristotle com­monly uses 'spout1aios' (literally: serious) to mean 'moraIly good'."

I'NE, m. 4, 1113 a 28. 'J.ONE, VI, 9, 1142 b 23 and 33-35. 21p' Aubenque. Lo. prudence chez Aristote

(paris: PUF, 1963),46-49. 22/bid., 58. Cf. NE, VI, 8. 1141 b 15. 2JAubenque, SO. 24Cf. the trenchant arguments against these

views in Nussbaum, "Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach."

25Cf. lile discussion of the role of the intuition of principies and particular cases within theoreti­cal and practical knowledgc: NE, VI, 11.

26Aristote, L'Éthique d Niconulque, R. A. Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif, eds. (2.... ed. LouvainIParis: Publications Universitairesl Nauwelaerts, 1970),11,2.469. Although 1 dis­agree on this point, 1regard this commentary of Aristotle's ethics to be one of the most precise and usefuI.

2700 lile same line. see S. Broadie, Elhics with Aristotle (New Yor:kIOxford: Oxford University Press, 1991),257, aOO O. Guariglia, La Itica en Aristóteles o la moral de la virtud (Buenos Aires: Eudeba. 1997). "La voluntad de lo bueno," 210 fr.

apoJitics, 1268 a 39 ff. Cf. Nussbaum. "Non­Relative Virtues: An AristOleJian Approach," 242.

:l9Aubenque, 38. lON. Hartmann. "Die Wertdimensionen der

Nikomachischen Ethik" (1948), in Kleinere Schriften, Bd. I (Berlin: De Groyter, 19.55). 200.

31M. Heidegger, Plato: Sophistes (1925), 9A 19 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1992), SS. Cf. Natali 2001. 184, 187.

16

• •

32Aubenque, 103. 331 lcarot this, as many other things, from Juan

Miguel Palacios' rich lectures on Ethics at the Complutense University of Madrid. See also C. Korsgaard, "From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble," ·jn S. Engstrom and J. Whiting, eds., Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 203-236; andK. Rogers, "Aristode on Loving Anotber for His Own Sate." Phronesis 39 (1994), 291-302.

"J4NE, VI, 12, 1144 a 15-21. ;"Eudemian Ethics, EE, n, 1228 a 2-4: lCal

Stlt 'tOMO tx 'tfic; npoalflá1e.coc; Kpívq.aevnoieS<; 'tte;, 'totYto S' é:J'tl 'ta 'tlvoc; lWlCa JtPCÍ't'tEl dU' oi> 'tÍ 1tPCÍ't'tE1.. ÓflOmc; lit! lCal 1'¡ lCalCUx 'tWv tvaVt1CDV lWlCa nolEi 'tfcv npoaipEalV. Trans. H. Rackham. LoebClassical Library (LondonlCambridge, Mass.: Heinemannl Harvard University Press, reprinted 1992).

36C. Korsgaard, "From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble" and "Self-Constitution l. The MetaphysicaJ Foundations of Normativity," Lecture I of the Locke Lectures 2002 at Oxford University (2002, unpublished).

37'fhisethical criterion did not remain unno­ticed by Anselm of Canterbury: "Disc. Nec minus apertum mihi videtur quia sicut volendum est unicuique quod debet; ita volendum est ideo, quia debet, ut justa sit ejus voluntas. Mag. Bene intelligis haec duo necessaria esse voluntati ad justitiam: velle sciJicet quod debet; ac ideo, quia debet [...) Mag. Bene ergo diximus justitiam esse rectitudinem voluntatis servatam propter se, id est quae servatur propter se." "S. And it seems no less clear to me thal in arder for a man's will to be just, be must will for the reason be ought, even as he must will what he ought. T. You understand well that these two thinls are necessary for a will to be just: willing what it ought [to will) and will­ing for tbe reason it ought [to will] [oo.) T. Therefore, justice is uprightness-of-will kept far its own sake." In De veritate, cap. XII. J. Hopkins and H. Richardson, transo (Minneapolis: Arthur Banning Press, 2000). 1owe this refer­ence to Juan Miguel Palacios.

311Cf. Korsgaard's argumento 1996, 218: "It is even possible to argue that nobility is a fontUJl property... Now when Aristotle specifies the orthos logos, be always gives us a Iist of what we might aJso think of as the parts of the aetion. The aetion that is in accordance with the orthos logos is done in the right way aOO at the right time,

directed to tite rigllt object, and so oo. So we might think thal its overall rightness consists in tbe way its parts are combined, that is, in its formo The parts are combined in a way that enables tbem lo func:tion, taken tógether, as a reason for aetion."

39Although he does nOl identify its role as a fundamental moral criterion, Cario Natali does point out clearly the function of the end as tbe motive of action: "The end that one intends by means of an action is actuallythe cause of [ratber the motive for) that aetion,and is the principie 01'

staning point of deliberative reasoning," in Natali 2001, 177.

MINE, In. 1, tilO b 12-13. 4WE, m, 8. 1116 a 31-b 4. 41NE, X, 9, 1180 a 4-8. 43NE, VI. 7, 1141 b 8-9. 44NE, m, 1, 11 10 a 32-34. 45Saínt Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologitu,

II-n, qq. 47-56, esp. 47. Cf. L.-E. Palacios, La prudencia pol{tica, 2" ed. (Madrid: Gredos, 1978),9S «.

46NE, VI, lO, 1143 a 7-11. TIte term ml'talC­'tl~ should nOl be translated as 'normative; because this tenn conceals the commanding dimensi~n ofcppóvrptc;.lrwin's translation ren­ders it well with "prescriptive," and so does Rowe's in Nicomachean Ethics, C. Rowe, trans., S. Broadie, introd. and cornmentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2(02). Rackham makes the point even more explicit: "issues com­maods." This important meaning of the tenn is manifest in the dictionaries of Liddcll-Scott· JoReS (cornmanding, authoritative) and Bailly (qui conceme le commandement; epitaktilcos: im¡Hrotivemmt).

41Aquinas, ibid. Palacios 1978, ibid. 4INatali 2001, 12 f. 49Aquinas, Sunutu:l Theologiae, 1-11, q. 57, 5,

ad 3; Palacios 1978, 71. In my opinion, it is nOl comet to ascribe 10Aristotle a notion of the prac­tical truth of actions due to their contribution to achieving happiness., as it is often done.

"'Paul Ricoeur explains this task of the second premise in the following way: "trouver I'uni­versel appropri6l une situation singuli= el con­strui~ la mineu~, en ccla consiste It ap6'ation de la pensée qu'Aristote a appe~ tour l tour calcula­trice, opinante, législative", in "A la gloi~ de la phronesis," 21 f., in J.-Y. ChAteau, ed., La véritl pratique: Aristote, Éthique el Nicomoque. Livre VI (Paris: Vrin, 1997), 12-22.

Aristotle ~ Theory 01Practical Wisdom Ricardo Parellada

17

•

"As 1 have already nOled, much work of Martha Nussbaum goes decidedly in this direc­tíon. A recenl application of me idea ofphronesis 10 capability lheory and human developmenl that combines respecl fOl general norms and complex particulars can be seen in S. Deneulin, "Promoring Human Freedoms under ConditioDS ofInequalities: a Procedural Frarnework." JouT7llJ1 ufHuman Development 6,1 (2005), 75-92.

521 aro graleful lo Salvador MI.. I,nlcio Rodríguez Alfageme, Ignacio Sánchez-CuencA and William Charron, editor of lhis joumal. fOl' comments and correctíons. This essay WIlI wril­ten dUring a visiting period al Harvard University. 1aro very grateful lo its Philosophy Department, tbe Real Colegio Complulense al Harvard and tbe Madrid Regional Governmenl fOl support.

18