Why the Cogitative Power?

A. Leo White, “Why the Cogitative Power?”

It is common for readers of Aquinas to regard his theory of abstraction as indispensable to a

realist account of human intellectual cognition. What is far from common, however, is an

understanding of how, according to Aquinas, sentient cognition makes abstraction possible. Aquinas

himself offers very few details about this matter, although he does assert in the Summa contra gentiles

that the operation of the vis cogitativa or cogitative power is needed to prepare the phantasm for

abstraction.1 Many studies of the cogitative power have taken Aquinas at his word in this regard, but

none have sought to justify the claim that this power is needed to make way for intellectual cognition.2

In this paper, I argue that intellectual apprehension and judgment are possible only if a sense power

performs the following two roles. First, it must work in conjunction with the other internal senses and

with reason in order to determine which individual shall be considered by the intellect. Secondly, it

must work in conjunction with reason to determine how an individual shall be apprehended, i.e.,

whether generically or specifically. I then show that Aquinas assigns these two roles to the vis

cogitativa. The operation of this internal sense therefore serves as a kind of bridge between the sensory

grasp of the particular and the intellectual grasp of the universal. As we will also see, this bridge

possesses characteristics that go beyond what we would normally assign to sensory cognition. The

most important of these characteristics is the way in which the cogitative power comes to perceive its

proper object, which Aquinas calls the per accidens sensibile, by bringing past perceptions to bear on an

individual that is presently being perceived.

My argument will be somewhat indirect, for in section one I will consider whether the common

sense (i.e., the terminus of the five external senses) and the imagination, working in concert with the

agent intellect and possible intellect, could bring about an act of intellectual abstraction without being

aided by the cogitative power.3 After noting the various ways in which this initial account of

abstraction falls short, I will infer, in section two, the characteristics of the cognitive operation that

renders the phantasm suitable for abstraction. I will then compare these inferences in section three with

A. Leo White, “Why the Cogitative Power?” Aquinas’s own words describing the role of the vis cogitativa in making intellectual apprehension

possible. In section four I will respond to anticipated objections to this paper’s interpretation of the

cogitative power by contrasting the ways in which the cogitative power and the intellect apprehend

their respective objects, and in section five I will conclude by noting still unresolved issues.

I preface my arguments about the role of sensation in abstraction by giving the following brief

overview of St. Thomas’s theory of abstraction. Aquinas develops this theory in order to explain how

one’s intellectual grasp of the natures of material things derives from one’s sense knowledge. This

derivation requires explanation because of the difference in the modes of being that characterize

sensory and intellectual cognition. According to Aquinas, something is intelligible only inasmuch as it

is immaterial.4 The intellect itself is an immaterial power5; nevertheless, the intellect is only potentially

determined by any specific intelligible form. It must therefore pass from potency to act with respect to

form by receiving an intelligible species.6 Aquinas says that this passage takes place through the

intellect’s being “immuted” or “impressed” by something that is actually immaterial and hence actually

intelligible.7 But phantasms, like the internal senses to which they belong, are material and hence are

only potentially intelligible.8 Since nothing material can impress something immaterial, the material

phantasm which represents the individual cannot immute the intellect.9

Aquinas closes the gap between the material phantasm and the intellect by distinguishing two

intellectual principles in human beings. An active intellectual principle, called the agent intellect,

makes the phantasm or sensible species actually immaterial so that the latter will be able to impress a

receptive intellectual principle, called the possible intellect, with an intelligible species.10 In De

veritate, he clarifies the manner in which the phantasm is made actually immaterial, saying that the

agent intellect acts as the principal cause and the phantasm acts as the instrumental cause in bringing

about an immutation in the possible intellect. It follows that the phantasm is immaterial through its

participation in the activity of the agent intellect, for an instrumental cause participates in the transitive

A. Leo White, “Why the Cogitative Power?” activity of the principal cause.11 Hence saying that a phantasm is “actually immaterial” does not mean

that an intelligible form exists in the imagination. It also follows that both the agent intellect and the

phantasm contribute to the effect brought about in the possible intellect, albeit in different ways. That

is,

the possible intellect receives forms whose actual intelligibility is due to the power of the agent intellect, but whose determinate likeness to things is due to cognition of the phantasms.12

It is owing to the phantasm that the intelligible species impressed upon the possible intellect is a

determinate likeness of something in nature, while it is because of the agent intellect that this likeness is

immaterial. By distinguishing the agent intellect from the possible intellect, therefore, Aquinas shows

how the material phantasm can contribute to the impression made upon the immaterial, receptive

intellect.

The possible intellect’s being impressed with an intelligible species does not yet constitute a

cognitive act on the part of this intellectual principle. This impression merely supplies the formal

determination according to which the intellect actively forms an intelligible species. Through the

formation or “expression” of this intelligible species, the intellect performs its first cognitive operation,

called “apprehension.”13 Through apprehension, the possible intellect knows the nature of a material

thing apart from the consideration of a particular individual at a determinate time and place. For

example, I may understand “human” apart from the consideration of any particular human. While the

first act of the intellect is a simple apprehension, the second is a composition or division through which

one applies what one has apprehended to the individual represented by a phantasm.14 Aquinas also

A. Leo White, “Why the Cogitative Power?” refers to the second act of the intellect as a judgment and the formation of a proposition. For example, I

may judge that Socrates, the individual represented by the phantasm, is human. The third act is

reasoning, the process by which the intellect proceeds from already knowing one truth to knowing a

previously unknown truth.

1. Indirect Arguments

I will now use the above sketch of abstraction as the basis for reasoning about the nature of the

sensible species or phantasm that is illuminated by the agent intellect.15 As I mentioned in the

introduction, this section will argue indirectly for the need of some additional cognitive power besides

the common sense, imagination, and the intellect in preparing the phantasm for abstraction. This

argument will unfold in four stages: 1) the common sense and imagination cannot determine on their

own which individual they shall represent to the intellect; 2) these two sense sensory powers cannot

determine whether the nature of that individual shall be apprehended in a general or in a specific

manner; 3) the agent intellect can make neither of the determinations mentioned above; and 4) the

possible intellect can make these determinations only if it operates in conjunction with a sentient power

that in some way emulates intellectual cognition.

I will begin by considering whether we could abstract intelligible notes immediately from the

proper and common sensible characteristics that we are presently sensing. To put this in the language

of Aquinas, I am asking whether the agent intellect could bring about the impression of an intelligible

species upon the possible intellect by illuminating the sensible species in the common sense.16 Note,

first of all, that the common sense cannot determine which individual acting upon the external senses

shall be the object of intellectual apprehension. The following example, given in the first person, will

illustrate this inability: suppose that I look inside the window of a diner and see a slice of a pie in one of

A. Leo White, “Why the Cogitative Power?” the glass cases behind the counter. At the same time I notice, from the corner of my eye, that a small

black object is falling from a man’s pocket as he gets up from one of the stools in front of the counter. I

also feel the balmy wind blowing lightly as I savor the smell of baking bread issuing from a nearby

bakery, and I hear the sounds of cars passing by me as I stand on the sidewalk. I may engage my

intellect in considering the pie, the man who is getting up from his chair, the chair upon which this man

is sitting, the cars that are passing by, the odors issuing from the bakery, or any other of the individuals

given simultaneously in the very same scene. But the operation of the common sense, inasmuch as it is

passive with respect to the immutations occurring in the external senses, will be the same regardless of

which individual becomes the focal point of my intellectual awareness. To put it another way, the same

operation of the common sense can serve as the basis of the intellectual awareness of different

individual objects; hence this operation does not determine which of the individuals acting upon the

external senses shall be the object of intellectual apprehension. It is necessary, therefore, that some

other cognitive power play this role.

The imagination seems to supply the characteristic that is lacking in the common sense, for this

power can single out one of the many individuals that are presently acting upon the external senses by

forming a phantasm that represents it. The imagination also offers a stability that is not available to the

common sense, for the perceiver and the perceived constantly shift with respect to each other, causing

the potential object of intellectual apprehension to pass in and out of the range of the common sense.

The imagination, on the other hand, can continue to present this individual even when the object is

momentarily absent. Hence the imagination seems to provide a more suitable object for the

illuminative activity of the agent intellect than does the common sense.17

I grant that the imagination may play a key role in giving a stable focus to our intellectual and

sentient awareness. For example, after seeing the pie in the glass case, I may continue imagining it

even as I enter the front door of the diner and momentarily lose sight of the pie. It does not seem,

A. Leo White, “Why the Cogitative Power?” however, that the imagination determines on its own which of the many individuals lying before the

external senses shall be represented through a phantasm. Nor does the imagination determine on its

own that it shall sustain the apprehension of some individual, should it become absent momentarily.

Instead, as I will argue below, the imagination forms phantasms only through the concerted operations

of other cognitive powers, such as the memory.

The imagination’s need for the memory is obvious in the case in which we apprehend

something that we have previously perceived but is now absent.18 Yet Aquinas states that the memory

also helps animals to estimate or judge something while it is present.19 The latter need for memory

becomes apparent once we consider the role of appetite in directing our attention to objects. In the

example mentioned above, I focus upon one of the many items that I see only because I regard it as

good in some way. For example, I focus upon what looks like a slice of lemon meringue pie because it

seems appetizing. Aquinas explains that the desire or craving for a sensory good arises upon imagining

what it would be like to possess the good in question.20 In other words, I focus upon the pie because I

desire to eat it, and I desire the pie because I imagine tasting it. Of course, I can imagine tasting the

flavor of the pie that I now see only because I have tasted other, similar-looking ones in the past. The

memory of my past perceptions therefore disposes me to associate the looks of the pie behind the

counter with a savory flavor. The case in which I focus upon a sensory good therefore illustrates how

memory is needed to direct my imagination to conceive the desirable aspects of an individual that I do

not presently sense, even while I am presently sensing other sensible qualities belonging to that same

individual. By imagining the desirable yet absent features of something present, I focus my sentient

awareness upon it, thereby making it available for rational consideration.

Aquinas assigns a role to the imagination in representing the object of rational appetite as

well.21 He makes it clear, however, that reason itself plays an active role in directing the formation of

these phantasms.22 Later on, I will consider the nature of the active role played by reason in directing

A. Leo White, “Why the Cogitative Power?” our imagination. For the present, however, it is important to note that the imagination does not form an

image of something desirable to the rational appetite unless it is directed to do so by some other

cognitive power. Therefore, both in the case of the apprehension of the sensory good and in the case of

the apprehension of the rational good, imagination directs one toward such objects only because some

other cognitive power or powers has directed it to do so.

In order to illustrate the second deficiency, one that pertains both to the imagination and to the

common sense, let us grant for the moment that either of these sensory powers is able to single out an

individual and thereby present an object to the agent intellect for illumination. Even if this were

possible, the sensible species or phantasm that serves as the object of illumination would be unable to

determine whether the nature belonging to the individual represented by the phantasm shall be

apprehended in a generic or in a specific manner. Consider the example, mentioned above, of my

gazing inside the window of a diner. Upon seeing the pie I may abstract “food,” “pie,” or “lemon

meringue.” Upon seeing the man I may abstract “human,” “animal,” “living,” or “body.” Upon seeing

the stool I may abstract “bar-stool” “furniture,” or “artifact.” Upon hearing the honking of the horns

passing by, I may abstract “sound” or “honk.” In each of these cases I understand the very same nature

with different degrees of specificity.23 The common sense clearly apprehends the sensible qualities of

each of these individuals in the same way, regardless of whether the intellect apprehends the nature of

that individual in a generic or specific manner. The same seems true for the imagination, for this

internal sense apprehends the same proper and common sensible qualities regardless of whether the

individual possessing these sensible qualities is apprehended in a specific or in a general manner. I will

argue below that this invariance of the common sense and imagination with respect to different levels

of specificity in intellectual apprehension reveals that the preparation of the phantasm involves

something more than the awareness of per se sensibles. As a propadeutic to this argument, however, I

A. Leo White, “Why the Cogitative Power?” will first underscore how the phantasm is the sole source of any formal determination in the impressed

intelligible species.

Aquinas likens the operation of the agent intellect to the illumination provided by a light while

comparing the phantasm to an illumined object.24 The light is indeterminate with respect to color while

the colored object is determinate in itself and also determines how vision will be impressed by a

sensible species.25 Similarly, the phantasm is the sole determinant of how the possible intellect shall be

impressed with the “light” emanating from the agent intellect. The impressed intelligible species is in

turn the proximate source of the formal determination of the intention or “expressed” intelligible

species formed by the possible intellect.26 The possible intellect, therefore, can form different

intelligible species only when there are corresponding differences in the phantasms that impress the

possible intellect. But the intelligible species through which the intellect understands something

generically differs from the intelligible species through which the intellect understands something

specifically.27 It follows that the intellect can apprehend the nature of a material thing in these two

different ways (i.e., generically or specifically) only in virtue of corresponding differences in the

phantasms illuminated by the agent intellect. But the imagination apprehends its object no differently

when the nature of that object is to be apprehended by the possible intellect in a general or in a specific

manner: in each case the same sensible species in the imagination presents or represents the same

common and proper sensibles of the individual whose nature is abstracted by the agent intellect. Hence

the same phantasm or sensible species in the imagination or common sense cannot impress two

qualitatively different intelligible species upon the possible intellect. One must conclude, therefore,

that the intellect cannot rely exclusively upon the same phantasm or sensible species in the imagination

or common sense in order to understand the nature of something both generically and specifically.

The broader significance of this argument becomes apparent once we consider that the intellect

may consider an individual in a great number of ways. For example, upon seeing a wallet fall to the

A. Leo White, “Why the Cogitative Power?” floor one may abstract not only “money holder” but also “leather,” “artifact,” “moving thing,”

“rectangular thing,” or “black thing.” The multiplicity of intelligible notes available to us through the

awareness of the same proper and common sensible characteristics of an individual tells us that the

preparation of the phantasm for abstraction involves more than the working of the imagination. Either

the intellect imposes many of these diverse notes upon what we perceive through the external senses, or

the sentient operation through which the phantasm is prepared for abstraction involves more than the

awareness of proper and common sensibles.

Since the common sense and imagination are unable to determine which nature the intellect

shall apprehend and the manner in which the intellect shall apprehend that nature (i.e., generically or

specifically), we must consider whether the intellect itself can make these two determinations. Let us

turn first to the agent intellect. It seems that a power could determine which object shall be understood

only by becoming aware of the phantasm or sensible species that is to serve as the object of abstraction.

Attributing awareness to the agent intellect, however, is extremely problematic. That is because the

agent intellect’s awareness would have to change, since the possible objects of intellectual cognition

vary from minute to minute. The agent intellect would therefore have to pass from potency to act when

becoming aware of something new.28 Moreover, the agent intellect would have to be reduced from

potency to act by a phantasm or sensible species. But the sensible species cannot act upon the agent

intellect, for the material cannot act upon the immaterial.29 Hence the agent intellect cannot become

newly aware of a sensible species. One who attributes the awareness of phantasms to this power

therefore violates the very principle that Aquinas employs in order to demonstrate the existence of the

agent intellect, i.e., the principle that the material cannot act upon the immaterial.

Before turning to the possible intellect, let us review the reasons why the agent intellect and the

common sense cannot determine which phantasm shall be the object of illumination. The common

sense does not need to operate differently when occasioning specific and generic intellectual

A. Leo White, “Why the Cogitative Power?” apprehensions, nor does it need to operate differently when one or another individual acting upon the

external senses is apprehended. This invariance is owing to the fact that the common sense is purely

passive with respect to the sensible species in the external senses. The agent intellect, on the other

hand, remains entirely in act at all times; hence it cannot operate differently at different times. It

therefore cannot determine the object or manner of intellectual apprehension. These two powers are

unable to perform the role in question because one is entirely active and the other is entirely passive.

The power that determines the object and manner of abstraction, therefore, must be somewhat active

and somewhat passive. It must be passive inasmuch as it becomes aware of what is acting upon the

external senses through some kind of impression. Yet it must be active inasmuch as it determines

which of the individuals acting upon the external senses and the common sense shall be apprehended

and then judged by the intellect. Furthermore, this power (or another power) must be active inasmuch

as it determines the degree of specificity with which the possible intellect shall apprehend its object.

The possible intellect seems better suited than the common sense and agent intellect to

determine the object and manner of abstraction, for this power is neither exclusively active nor

exclusively passive. Furthermore, Aquinas himself seems to indicate that the possible intellect plays

such a role when he says that the intellect may command the formation of phantasms so that the latter

may in turn serve as the foundation of intellectual apprehension.30 The active role of the intellect in

forming phantasms seems especially apparent in the Summa theologiae’s discussion of speculative

reasoning. When thinking about geometry, says Aquinas, one must imagine the figures in question in

order to be able to understand their properties with clarity.31 He mentions how scientific reasoning is

aided by the use of well-disposed internal senses.32 This work also notes how the intellect rearranges

phantasms for the sake of understanding new things just as one might rearrange letters in order to form

new words.33 It seems that one forms and rearranges such images through the direction given by the

possible intellect. If the possible intellect can direct the formation of phantasms for the sake of strictly

A. Leo White, “Why the Cogitative Power?” speculative reasoning, it seems that it can also direct the formation of phantasms in order to determine

which of the individuals presently acting upon the external senses shall be apprehended by the

intellect.34 Furthermore, since only the possible intellect is able to apprehend the nature, it seems that

only this power can likewise determine whether one shall apprehend the nature in a generic or specific

manner.

Note that even though the possible intellect may play an active role in determining the object

and manner of intellectual apprehension, it cannot bring about these determinations through

apprehension alone. That is because one determines the object and manner of intellectual apprehension

by determining how a phantasm shall be prepared to impress the possible intellect. The first act of the

intellect, however, abstracts from particular individuals at determinate places and times, while both the

object represented by the phantasm and the phantasm to be illuminated are individual. If follows that

apprehension simpliciter cannot direct the formation of a phantasm. On the other hand, the intellect is

able to consider individuals through the second act of the intellect. It seems, therefore, that intellectual

judgment may direct the manner and mode of intellectual apprehension by directing the formation of

phantasms. Aquinas himself indicates that intellectual judgment accomplishes this when he says that

the intellect commands the formation of phantasms, for a command is a kind of declaration performed

by reason in union with the will in order to elicit action.35 Note that intellectual judgment presupposes

apprehension; it follows that judgment cannot determine the very apprehensive act upon which it is

reflecting. But a prior intellectual judgment may still determine the object and manner of a subsequent

intellectual apprehension.

Clearly, the possible intellect directs future apprehensions by controlling the formation of

phantasms. This article is concerned, however, with the role played by the cogitative power in making

intellectual cognition possible. For that reason, we need to consider the two following questions. First,

can intellectual judgment bring about the formation of phantasms without being aided by the cogitative

A. Leo White, “Why the Cogitative Power?” power? Secondly, can the intellect judge an individual presently acting upon the senses without being

aided by the same internal sense. My response to the first of these questions places a previously made

remark in the context of intellectual judgment. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the

possible intellect has commanded that the imagination form a phantasm, and this phantasm is to serve

as the object of a subsequent abstractive operation by the agent intellect. This command would be

futile unless the phantasm or sensible species that is subsequently formed will be able to impress an

intelligible species upon the possible intellect. But the phantasm formed by the imagination does not

seem to be up to this task, for it does not represent an individual differently when a generic rather than a

specific intelligible species is impressed upon the possible intellect. The invariance of the phantasm in

the imagination with respect to different intelligible species undercuts the thesis that intellectual

judgment, unaided by the cogitative power, can effectively employ the phantasm found in the

imagination in order to facilitate a subsequent intellectual apprehension.

My response to the second of the above tentative theses concerns the sentient awareness of the

individual judged by the intellect. It seems that the intellect could judge that Socrates is human only if

Socrates were perceived as such (i.e., as Socrates) through some kind of sentient awareness. But

Aquinas tells us that Socrates is not perceived as such through the common sense or the imagination.36

That is because an individual such as Socrates is per accidens sensible, while the common sense and the

imagination are aware only of per se sensibles (i.e., proper and common sensibles). Since the common

sense and the imagination are not explicitly aware of the very individual possessing per se sensible

A. Leo White, “Why the Cogitative Power?” characteristics, one’s intellectual judgment will be unable to apply the nature that it has apprehended

abstractly to this concrete individual by relying solely upon these two internal senses.

2. Preparing the Phantasm for Abstraction

Let us now gather the results of the above indirect arguments in order to see what they tell us

about the cognitive operations leading to intellectual apprehension. First, the power that determines

which of the individuals acting upon the external senses shall be apprehended is passive inasmuch as it

must become aware of an individual object that is acting upon the external senses. Yet this power is

active inasmuch as it determines which of the many individuals that are simultaneously acting upon the

senses shall become the focal point of one’s awareness. This “selectivity,” if you will, seems to be tied

to appetite, inasmuch as this cognitive power focuses upon one of the many individuals acting upon the

senses on the basis of its suitability to the sensory or rational appetite. This power is able to direct one

toward a suitable object on the basis of habitual knowledge, for it relates whatever is given through

external sensation to desirable aspects known through memory. By providing an ongoing focus upon

something that is desirable to the sensory or the intellectual appetite, or even to both appetites, this

power also provides a stable object for possible consideration by the intellect.

The power that prepares the phantasm for abstraction must also satisfy a rather paradoxical pair

of requirements. On one hand, it must apprehend the individual as such prior to intellectual

apprehension and judgment. It follows that this power must be sentient, for the proper object of this

cognitive power is the individual rather than the universal. Yet this sentient power must prepare the

phantasm for abstraction differently when a generic rather than a specific intelligible species is shall be

impressed upon the possible intellect. In distinguishing the generic from the specific, the operation of

A. Leo White, “Why the Cogitative Power?” this power seems to parallel intellectual apprehension itself. The sense power that prepares the

phantasm for abstraction therefore seems to possess a kind of awareness that exceeds the ability of a

strictly sentient power.

3. The Vis Cogitativa and Abstraction

Let us turn now to Aquinas’s theory of the vis cogitativa in order to see how it compares with

the conclusions of the above arguments. Note that this power is called the vis estimativa or the

“estimative power” when it is found in brutes. The cogitative and estimative powers are like the

common sense inasmuch as they can apprehend something that is presently acting upon the senses.

They differ from the common sense, however, inasmuch as they are directed toward a fundamentally

different kind of object. The common sense perceives the proper and common sensibles already given

through external sensation; the cogitative and estimative powers, on the other hand, perceive intentions

(intentiones), also known as per accidens sensibles, which are not perceived as such by the external

senses.37 For example, the external senses and common sense of a sheep may perceive the color and

shape of a wolf, but only the estimative power perceives that the individual possessing this color and

shape is harmful and to be avoided.38 While the estimative power of brutes is instinctively aware of the

harmfulness and beneficence of the objects of perception, the human cogitative power arrives at the

awareness of harm or benefit only after having performed many comparisons.39 By performing these

comparisons, the cogitative power also becomes aware of intentions other than harm and benefit. For

example, while a sheep’s estimative power perceives grass as something to be eaten and the ewe

perceives its offspring as something to be nursed, the human cogitative power perceives a particular

sheep as “this sheep.”40

The operation of the cogitative power seems to possess many of the characteristics that are

needed to bridge the gap between external sensation and intellectual apprehension. Such cognition, as

A. Leo White, “Why the Cogitative Power?” we noted above, is characterized both by passivity and by activity. Like the common sense, the

cogitative and estimative powers are passive or receptive inasmuch as they can become newly aware of

something acting upon the external senses. Unlike the common sense, however, the cogitative and

memorative powers are able, through the acquisition of habitual knowledge, to bring past perceptions to

bear on present cognitive operations. These powers are thereby active in relating what is present to

what is absent.41 The estimative power, says Aquinas, regards an individual object solely as the

principle or terminus of an action or passion (solum secundum quod est terminus aut principium

alicuius actionis uel passionis).42 In regarding one of the many individuals acting upon the common

sense in this way, the estimative power is active, for it determines which of these shall be the focal

point of the perceiver’s attention. This focusing upon what is desirable or undesirable likewise gives

stability to an animal’s awareness.

The cogitative power of humans directs human actions in a manner that parallels yet is superior

to the instinctive judgments performed by brutes. That is because this power directs human action not

only towards sensory goods but toward the object of rational appetite as well. Aquinas indicates that

the vis cogitativa plays this role by calling it the secondary subject of the virtue of prudence.43 This

virtue is the perfection of practical reasoning, which consists of an inquiry into which actions might be

suitable toward a certain good that is consonant with the end of human nature, a judgment that one of

these actions is to be performed, and the command that this action be executed.44 Aquinas justifies the

need for a sense power to serve as the secondary subject of the intellectual virtue of prudence by

pointing out that, while practical reasoning always involves the consideration of the universal good, the

intellect can apply universals to particulars only through the mediation of a sense power.45 The

cogitative power is well-suited to play such a mediating role, for it is closely related both to sensitive

appetite and to intellectual apprehension.

There is yet another way in which the operation of the cogitative power exceeds that of the

estimative power. Operating as it does in virtue of the influence of reason, the cogitative power can

A. Leo White, “Why the Cogitative Power?” compare similar individuals that one has perceived in the past in order to note what they have in

common.46 For example, after having compared many individuals, the cogitative power may come to

apprehend “this human inasmuch as it is this human” (hunc hominem prout est hic homo) or “this tree

inasmuch as it is this tree” (Hoc lignum prout est hoc lignum).47 These comparisons and the resulting

awareness of a new intention constitute a more active mode of cognition, one that belongs to the vis

cogitativa because of its close relationship to reason. This more active mode of cognition serves in turn

as the basis for intellectual apprehension. Aquinas implies the same in his Commentary on the

Posterior Analytics, when he says that the sentient apprehension of “this human” makes it possible for

the intellect to apprehend “human,” i.e., human nature.48 This passage occurs in the context of a

discussion of experience, which pertains to the cogitative power.49 Hence it seems to indicate that the

cogitative power’s awareness of “this human” is a necessary condition for the intellectual awareness of

human nature. In the Commentary on De anima, Aquinas explicitly attributes the sentient awareness of

“this human” to the vis cogitativa: upon seeing a colored thing with one’s external senses, says

Aquinas, one’s cogitative power apprehends “this human or this animal” (hunc hominem uel hoc

animal).50 This passage also offers us an indication that the operation of this sense power accounts in

part for the diversity of ways in which the intellect may be impressed with an intelligible species. For

in apprehending “this animal,” the cogitative power prepares the way for the intellectual apprehension

A. Leo White, “Why the Cogitative Power?” of a nature according to its genus, “animal,” while the cogitative power’s apprehension of “this human”

prepares the way for apprehension of the same nature according to its species, “human.”

4. Two Objections

The preceding arguments have shown why the vis cogitativa is integral to Aquinas’s account of

abstraction. One might summarize the above by saying that the cogitative power parallels intellectual

apprehension, for this internal sense’s apprehension of “this man” is a necessary condition for the

intellect’s grasp of “man” as such. We have not considered, however, whether any sentient power

could actually perceive the kind of object Aquinas says is apprehended by the vis cogitativa. Therefore,

in order to determine whether the claims that Aquinas makes about the cogitative power are plausible, I

will consider two objections that might one might make to his theory of the preparation of the phantasm

for abstraction.

The first of these objections is concerned with whether or not Aquinas attributes strictly

intellectual awareness to this sentient power. The phrases “this man” and “this animal” combine the

indexical “this” with the common noun “man.” Since we normally take common nouns, such as

“human” and “animal,” as signifying universals, it may seem that Aquinas’s account unintentionally

attributes strictly intellectual cognition to a sentient power. I reply that saying the cogitative power

knows “this human inasmuch as it is this human” does not imply that an internal sense knows the

essence or substance “human” as such. In order to do so, this sentient power would have to abstract

from material conditions as well as from the accidents that accompany the substance. Instead, the

cogitative power knows the individual as a concrete whole, and such awareness requires no abstraction.

Nevertheless, differences in the manner in which the cogitative power apprehends an individual

account in part for the differences in the manner in which the possible intellect may be impressed by an

intelligible species. Hence there is some parallel between the cogitative power’s manner of

apprehending an individual and the intellect’s grasp of the nature and properties belonging to that

individual. Let us explore this parallel at length below.


Aquinas himself offers no explanation of how the cogitative power becomes aware of these

difference other than saying that the apprehension of a new intention occurs as a result of having

compared many individuals.51 We can get an insight, however, into the nature of the cogitative power’s

awareness by looking at Aquinas’s words regarding the estimative power of non-rational animals. As I

mentioned earlier, he says in his Commentary on De anima that the estimative power regards its object

as the principle or terminus of an action or passion. For example, a ewe naturally regards its offspring,

not as a lamb, but as nursable, while it regards grass as its food, i.e., as eatable.52 Elsewhere, Aquinas

mentions the example, originally given by Avicenna, of how the estimative power of a sheep regards

the wolf as harmful and as something to be avoided.53 In other words, the estimative power

instinctively judges that its object is the source of some change that will sooner or later take place on

the part of the perceiver, or it regards the object as something to be acted upon by the perceiver.

The cogitative power of humans, however, comes to perform a judgment called experience

(experientia or experimentum),54 through which it grasps something common to many individuals.55

The vis cogitativa acquires experience as a result of having deliberately compared many similar

individuals that one remembers having perceived in the past. Aquinas illustrates experience with the

example of someone who has not studied medicine but has administered the same kind of herb to many

individuals suffering from fever. After noting how many or all of these different individuals have

recovered from fever, this person comes to regard this herb as anti-pyretic.56 Like instinctive judgment,

experience regards its object (i.e., the herb) as the source of a change that will take place in something

else (i.e., the patient). Unlike instinctive judgment, however, experience is not tied to the immediate

bodily harm or well-being of the perceiver, for it considers change qua common to many individuals at

different times. Experience is therefore more objective than instinct, yet it is not universal, for it

consists of the awareness of what is common to many rather than the apprehension of what is common

to all. Since this awareness is restricted to what is common to a limited number of individuals that one

has perceived in the past, it pertains to sensation rather than to intellection.57 Hence the phrase “this

man” used to exemplify the object of the cogitative power does not impute any awareness of what is

A. Leo White, “Why the Cogitative Power?” universal to this sentient power. Furthermore, in apprehending “this man” or “this animal,” this internal

sense simply regards an individual as the source of a change; the intellect, on the other hand,

apprehends the very nature in virtue of which this individual can bring about such changes. Hence

Aquinas’s attribution to the vis cogitativa of the awareness of “this man” need not constitute some

disguised attribution to this sentient power of an intellectual awareness of a nature.

The second objection to the plausibility of Aquinas’s theory of the cogitative power concerns its

ability to determine the degree of specificity of intellectual apprehension. Since only the intellect can

know a nature as such, it may seem that only the intellect can determine whether the nature shall be

considered generically or specifically. I reply that the cogitative power is able to consider the same

individual in diverse ways by regarding it as the source of different types of changes. In apprehending

a human as “this animal,” the cogitative power regards this individual as the source of self-movement;

whereas in regarding the same individual as “this man” this sentient power regards it as the source of

properly human activities, such as speech. Furthermore, the cogitative power is able to apprehend the

same individual in various other ways as well. Earlier I gave the example of an object that could be

regarded as “leather,” “money holder,” “artifact,” “moving thing,” “rectangular thing,” or “black

thing.” I submit that each of these intellectual apprehensions originates in part from a different type of

perception by the cogitative power, operating differently at different times thanks to its conjunction

with memory, reason, and both sensory and rational appetite. Hence the operation of this power plays

an integral role in giving rise to the rich diversity in the manners of intellectual apprehension.


5. Two Remaining Questions

I must acknowledge that two gaps remain in the arguments I have presented. The first concerns

the relationship between the perception of per se sensible objects and per accidens sensible objects. I

have noted that the individual to which proper and common sensibles belong is not perceived as such

by the external senses. Nevertheless, our awareness of individuals is clearly dependent upon the

common sense’s awareness of what is per se sensible (i.e., the sensible qualities belonging to any

individual to be apprehended by the cogitiatve power). The reader therefore may reasonably ask how it

is possible for the awareness of per accidens sensibles to originate from the awareness of per se

sensibles yet supersede this lower level of awareness. Secondly, this study does not address in detail

the claim that the intellect can command the cogitative power to form phantasms suitable for

abstraction. This claim requires that the intellect already be aware in some way of the very phantasm

that will impress the intellect with an intelligible species. The reader may reasonably question whether

this account is undercut by circularity. I do not believe that these problems vitiate Aquinas’s account of

human cognition; I submit instead that they can be solved by paying careful attention to the ways in

which the cogitative power’s operations parallel the judicative and discursive operations of the

intellect. The present study at least establishes the foundation for future investigations into these

matters, for it articulates how and why the cogitative power’s operation foreshadows and parallels

intellectual apprehension.


1. “. . . [N]on semper phantasmata fiunt intelligibilia actu, sed solum quando sunt ad hoc disposita. Disponuntur autem ad hoc per actum cogitativae virtutis, cuius usu est in nostra potestate.” SCG II, cap. 76 (13:481). All quotations, unless otherwise noted, are from Sancti Thomae de Aquino opera omnia iussu Leonis P. M. XIII edita (Leonine edition) (Rome: Editori di san Tomasso, 1882- ). All translations are mine unless otherwise indicated.

2. Cajetan’s Commentaria in Posteriora analytica Aristotelis, ed. E. Babin and W. Baumgaertner, vol. 2 (Lugdunensi, 1579; Quebec: Les Presses Universitaires Laval, 1952), 201, refers to experience (the judgment performed by the cogitative power at the terminus of an inquiry) as a quasi-confused universal. The commentator for the Summa contra gentiles says in SCG I, cap. 53 (13:153, par. 6) that the cogitative power forms something analogous to a concept. In “A Forgotten Sense, the Cogitative According to St. Thomas Aquinas,” Modern Schoolman 20 (1942): 123-40, 210-29, Julien Peghaire explores many analogies between the operation of the cogitative and intellective powers. In “An Essay on Experimentum,” Laval theologique et philosophique 22 (1967):76-115, James Stromberg argues that the cogitative power serves as a bridge between sensation and intellection in virtue of its ability to perceive what is common to many individuals. Cornelio Fabro’s “Knowledge and Perception in Aristotelic and Thomistic Psychology” New Scholasticism 12 (1938): 337-65 emphasizes how the cogitative power’s perception of the per accidens sensible anticipates the intellect’s awareness of substance. In The Discursive Power: Sources and Doctrine of the “vis cogitativa” According to St. Thomas Aquinas (St. Louis, Missouri: The Modern Schoolman, 1952), George Klubertanz criticizes Fabro, and he denies that the cogitative power represents the nature of the individual to the intellect. According to Klubertanz, the imagination rather than the cogitative power is the source of the phantasm from which the intelligible species are abstracted; the cogitative power merely focuses one’s attention on the phantasm in the imagination.

3. Note that in listing internal senses that may serve as an alternative to the cogitative power in preparing the phantasm for abstraction, I do not list sense memory. That is because, on Aquinas’s account, the operation of the sense memory is inseparable from that of the vis cogitativa, inasmuch as memory retains intentions originally perceived by the cogitative power.

4. ST I, q. 79, a. 3, c.

5. ST I, q. 75, a. 2, c.

6. ST I, q. 79, a. 4, ad 4.

7. ST I, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3; see also ST I, q. 84, a. 6, c. and ST I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 3.

8. ST I, q. 79, a. 3, c.; QDV q. 10, a. 6, c.

9. ST I, q. 84, a. 6, c.

10. ST I, q. 79, a. 4, ad 4; see also SCG II, cap. 77 and QDA a.5, c.

11. QDV q. 27, a. 4, c. and QDV q. 26, a. 1, ad 8.

12. QDV q. 10, a. 6, ad 7. Following the translation by James V. McGlynn in Truth, vol. 2 (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953), 29.

13. SCG I, cap. 53.

COMMENTComment [1]: Endnotes

A. Leo White, “Why the Cogitative Power?” 14. ST I, q. 85, a. 5, c.

15. Note that all phantasms are sensible species (for examples of Aquinas referring to phantasms as species, see ST I, q. 78, a. 4, c. and QDV q. 8, a. 5, c.); the converse, however, is not true, for Aquinas does not regard sensible species found in the common sense as phantasms. CMR cap. 2 explains why: the term phantasma signifies the product of an operation or spiritual immutation called phantasia (n.b., this term is frequently used to refer to the internal sense power in which the operation occurs), and this immutation occurs subsequent to the immutation in the common sense. Hence it cannot be identified with the immuation in the common sense.

16. Etienne Gilson implies that the sensible species in the common sense can serve as objects of intellectual illumination in the following passage: “Let us suppose that subsequent to the operations described above a sensible body impressed its image in the common sense. And let us designate this image by the term phantasm (phantasma). We still should not have the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge; we should not even have its sufficient cause; but we should at least have the matter on which this cause works.” (Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas [New York: Random House, 1956], 217). Note that Gilson assumes that Aquinas intends the term phantasma to signify, not only the sensible species in the imagination, memory and cogitative power, but also the sensible species in the common sense.

17. Note that I am using the term “imagination” according to its narrower meaning, that is, to refer to the internal sense that retains the sensible species received by the common sense. Many commentators, including Dominic Bañez, John of St. Thomas and many twentieth-century Thomists, believe that Aquinas often uses the terms imaginatio and phantasia to refer to the concerted operations of the imagination, cogitative power and memory. I concur with them; however, this issue is not yet relevant to our present discussion. See Dominic Bañez, Scholastica commentaria in primum partem Summa theologiae S. Thomae Aquinatis, t. 4, ed. Luis Urbano, Biblioteca de thomistas españoles, v. 8 (Madrid: Editorial F. E. D. A., 1934; reprint, Dubuque, Iowa: W. C. Brown Reprint Library, 1965), q. 78, a. 3, dub. 5, and John of St. Thomas, Cursus philosophicus thomisticus, vol. 3, Naturalis philosophiae: De ente mobili animato (Turin: Marietti, 1937), 252-53. For twentieth-century Thomists who concur with John of St. Thomas, see Robert E. Brennan, “The Thomistic Concept of the Imagination,” The New Scholasticism 14 (1940): 149 and Thomas V. Flynn, “The Cogitative Power,” The Thomist 16 (1954): 544 and Anthony J. Lisska, “A Note: Aquinas’s Use of Phantasia,” The Thomist 40 (1976): 295-99.

18. According to SCG IV cap. 11, sensible species originating with the sensible object proceeds by way of the imagination to the memory. In ST I, q. 93, a. 6, ad 4, Aquinas states that the memory is the source of the operation of the imagination.

19. QDV q. 24, a. 2, ad 7; CMP I, lec. 1 (Marietti ed., pars. 15-16, , p. 9).

20. Aquinas gives rather fragmentary indications of the role of the imagination in causing desire or craving. In ST I-II, q. 33, a. 1, ad 2, while arguing that desire itself is pleasurable, Aquinas assumes that desire is precipitated by imagining the thing desired. It seems that one derives pleasure from imagining the object of desire precisely because one imagines the possession of this object, or because imagining this delightful object is already a kind of union with it (Aquinas seems to hint at the latter in ST I-II, q. 32, a. 3, c.). In CAN III cap. 10, while discussing imperfect animals, Aquinas once again implies that imagining the object of desire directs animals toward what is pleasurable. Imperfect animals, which have only touch for an external sense and lack any memory, show through their actions that they have cravings and imagination. This statement about appetite and cognition in imperfect animals is based upon an analogy with the behavior, appetite and cognition found in humans. Aquinas assumes in this passage that the

A. Leo White, “Why the Cogitative Power?” imagination plays a similar role in bringing about desire in humans.

21. The following examples seem to illustrate how the imagination can direct one’s sensory appetite toward the object of the rational appetite. One can be pleased by imagining that an abundant good exists in oneself (ST I-II, q. 32, a. 6, c.); by imagining that one is wise and excellent (ST I-II, q. 32, a. 6, ad 3); or from imagining that one is doing the appropriate action (ST I-II, q. 38, a. 2, ad 3). See also ST I-II, q. 32, a. 7, ad 1 and ST I-II, q. 38, a. 3, c.

22. QDV q. 25, a. 4, c.; QDV q. 26, a. 3, ad 13; ST I-II, q. 17, a. 7, c.; and ST I-II, q. 30, a. 3, ad 3. Although these passages mention only the imagination; one should not take them as referring exclusively to one internal sense, for Aquinas says elsewhere (e.g., in QDV q. 10, a. 5, ad 4; QDV q. 10, a. 5, c.; and ST I, q. 81, a. 3, c.) that reason controls the sense appetite via the vis cogitativa inasmuch as that internal sense mediates the application of universal reason’s universal knowledge to singulars.

23. The intellect can apprehend the very same nature either generically or specifically; see ST I, q. 76, a. 3, ad 4; ST I, q. 67, a. 5, c.; ST I, q. 85, a. 5, ad 3; and ST I-II, q. 67, a. 5, c.

24. ST I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 4; see also ST I, q. 79, a. 4, c.

25. ST I, q. 79, a. 3, ad 2.

26. SCG I, cap. 53; see also QDP q. 8, a. 1, c.

27. QDV q. 8, a. 1, c.

28. ST I-II, q. 50, a. 5, ad 2.

29. Furthermore, in being reduced from potency to act, the agent intellect would receive an actuality or form that it did not previously possess. Aquinas, however, expressly denies that the agent intellect is receptive in any way in QDV q. 10, a. 8, ad 11 in contrarium.

30. “. . . [S]ecundum enim imperium intellectus formatur in imaginatione phantasma conveniens tali speciei intelligibili, in quo resplendet species intelligibilis sicut exemplar in exemplato sive in imagine.” SCG II, cap. 73 (13:462).

31. ST I, q. 86, a. 2, ad 2.

32. ST I, q. 89, a. 5, c.

33. ST II-II, q. 173, a. 2, c.

34. Note that Aquinas mentions in ST I, q. 14, a. 16, c. that speculative knowledge includes not only the knowledge of objects that cannot be changed by human action, but also apprehension and judgment of the nature of an individual.

35. ST I-II, q. 17, a. 1, c.

36. “. . . [S]ecundum accidens sensibile dicitur ut si dicamus quod Diarris uel Sortes est sensibile per accidens, quia accidit ei esse album: hoc enim sentitur per accidens quod accidit ei quod sentitur per se; accidit autem albo, quod est sensibile per se, quod sit Diarris; unde Diarris est sensible per accidens. Vnde nichil patitur ab hoc in quantum huiusmodi.” CAN II, cap. 13 (45.1:119, lines 56-63).

A. Leo White, “Why the Cogitative Power?” 37. Aquinas sometimes follows the Latin translation of Avicenna in calling any sensible object that alters the external senses a forma and in calling any sensible object that does not affect the external senses an intentio. At other times, Aquinas signifies the same distinction by using the terms per se sensibile and per accidens sensibile, which have their origin in the Moerbeke translation of De anima.

38. ST I, q. 78, a. 4, c. and ST I, q. 83, a. 1, c. These passages speak of instinctive judgment, which Aquinas attributes to the estimative power in SN III, d. 26, q. 1, a. 2, c. (Scriptum super Sententiis magistri Petri Lombardi, vol. 3, ed. R. P. Maria Fabianus Moos [Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1956], par. 27, p. 817).

39. ST I, q. 78, a. 4, c. Note that newborn human infants are guided by a limited range of instinctive estimations: see SN II, d. 20, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5 (Scriptum super libros Sententiarium magistri Petri Lombardi, vol. 2, ed., Pierre F. Mandonnet [Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1929], 515.

40.“. . . [E]stimatiua autem non apprehendit aliquod indiuiduum secundum quod est sub natura communi, set solum secundum quod est terminus aut principium alicuius actionis uel passionis, sicut ouis cognoscit hunc agnum non in quantum est hic agnus, set in quantum est ab ea lactabilis, et hanc herbam in quantum est eius cibus . . .” CAN II, cap. 13 (45.1:122, lines 213-22).

41. In CMP I, cap. 1 (In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, ed., Raymundi Spiazzi [Rome: Marietti Editori, Ltd., 1964], par. 11, p. 8) and CMR cap. 1, Aquinas characterizes brutes as being imperfectly prudent inasmuch as they can provide for the future on the basis of their memory of the past. It follows that in relating the perceiver’s present actions to both the past and the future, the estimative power’s judgment applies what is absent (i.e., the past and future) to what is present.

42. CAN II, cap. 13 (45.1:122, lines 213-22).

43. ST II-II, q. 49, a. 2, ad 3.

44. ST II-II, q. 47, a. 8, c.

45. ST I, q. 86, a. 1, ad 2.

46. CPA II, cap. 20 (1:401, par. 11).

47. CAN II, cap. 13 (45.2:122, lines 209-11).

48. “Manifestum est enim quod singulare sentitur proprie et per se, sed tamen sensus est quodammodo etiam ipsius universalis. Cognoscit enim Calliam non solum in quantum est Callias, sed etiam in quantum est hic homo, et similiter Socratem in quantum est hic homo. Et exinde est quod tali acceptione sensus praeexistente, anima intellectiva potest considerare hominem in utroque. Si autem ita esset quod sensus apprehenderet solum id quod est particularitatis, et nullo modo cum hoc apprehenderet universalem naturam in particulari, non esset possibile quod ex apprehendsione sensus causaretur in nobis cognitio universalis.” CPA II, cap. 20 (1:402, par. 14).

49. Earlier in the same chapter of CPA II, Aquinas discusses the origin of experience from memory and sense.

50. CAN II, cap. 13 (45.1:121, lines 191-97). Note that Foster translates the Latin term animal as “beast,” while I translate the same term as “animal.” I offer two justifications for my translation. First, the genus “animal” is the more typical meaning of the Latin term animal; secondly, the passage from which this term is taken describes a situation in which a human perceiver may take the same object in two different ways.

A. Leo White, “Why the Cogitative Power?” It does not seem likely that the same individual would be the object of such different perceptions: brutes are not typically mistaken for humans, nor are humans mistaken for brutes, unless, perhaps, they are very remote. It seems more likely that one would regard a human as falling under the genus “animal.” Aquinas says as much in ST I, q. 85, a. 3, c.: there he points out that our sentient cognition passes from the more general to the specific as the individual comes closer to the perceiver; hence sense perceives an individual as an animal before it perceives that individual as a human.

51. CPA II, cap. 20 (1:401, par. 11); CMR I, cap. 1 (Marietti ed., par. 15, p. 9); and CAN II, cap. 13. See also ST I, q. 78, a. 4, c.

52. CAN II, cap. 13 (45.1:122, lines 213-22).

53. ST I, q. 78, a. 4, c.

54. Aquinas regards the terms experientia and experimentum as synonyms. See James S. Stromberg, “An Essay on Experimentum,” Laval Theologique et Philosophique 22 (1967): 76.

55. CPA II, lec. 20 (1:401).

56. CPA II, lec. 20 (1:401, par. 11); CMP I, lec. 1 (Marietti ed., par. 19, p. 10).

57. CMP I, lec. 1 (Marietti ed., par. 18, pp. 9-10); see also ST II-II, q. 47, a. 3, ad 2.

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