Why has the integration of European security policy not progressed as far as that of economic...

Jack Richard WardleTechnische Universität Darmstadt (September 2014) 1

Why has the integration of European security policy not progressedas far as that of economic policy?

Contents

Introduction Realism outlined European integration European Economic integration and Realist thinking European Foreign Policy Integration and Realist Thinking Conclusion

Introduction

The European Union, a political and economic partnership between

28 European countries, is a unique and controversial entity. It is

a political system which bears resemblance to both federal states

and inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), but differentiates

itself from both in the sense that the rules its member states

have to abide by become more similar to IGOs or to federal states

depending on the types of polices to which the rules pertain.1

Another contributor to the singularity but also the

contentiousness of the European Union is the unparalleled social,

cultural, historical and linguistic diversity displayed by its

member states.2 The integration of these countries originates with

the formation of the European Economic Community as a result of

efforts to promote economic interdependence and thereby lessen the

likelihood of future conflict within Europe.3 The formation of this

1 Blackley, Oliver 2011. “The Unique Character of the European Union”. Online. Available at: http://www.e-ir.info/2011/06/22/the-unique-character-of-the-european-union/. Accessed on 15 August 2014

2 Dobson, Lynn & Weale, Albert. “Governance and Legitimacy.” In The European Union: How Does it Work?, edited by Elizabeth & Stubb, Alexander Bomberg. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

3 European Union. How the EU works. Available at: http://europa.eu/about-eu/index_en.htm. Accessed on 31 August 2014

http://europa.eu/about-eu/index_en.htm

http://www.e-ir.info/2011/06/22/the-unique-character-of-the-european-union/



economic alliance in 1958, a community of six European countries

at the time, could be seen as an attempt to draw a line under the

tumultuous first half of the 20th Century. The liberal concept of

“complex interdependence”, which purports that an increase in

economic integration leads to complex transnational

interdependencies which act to stabilise international

governmental relationships, seems to support this theory.4

Why, then, has European economic integration progressed so much

further than European security or foreign policy integration?

Liberals may argue that the various economic and trade ties shared

between the European Union member states have reduced the

likelihood of intercontinental conflict to the extent that the

importance of military force or integration is significantly

lessened. However, I assert that a single European military force

would remove the threat of intracontinental conflict entirely.

This is also a liberal argument.5 From a realist perspective, the

economic interests of EU members and extraneous nations may not be

necessarily reciprocal, and an integrated European military could

have the force to more effectively defend the interests of its

member nations. Perhaps the reason lies in the aforementioned

diversity of the member states, the distinct political ideologies

of the various electorates and governments and the resultant

inability of any central controlling body to efficiently achieve a

satisfactory consensus between the 28 member states. Another

practical problem for Europe in terms of an integrated military is

4 Keohane, Robert Owen, and Joseph S. Nye. Power and Interdependence. Vol. 3. New York: Longman, 2001.

5 Dunne, Tim. 2008. Liberalism. In: Baylis et al, ed. 2008. The Globalization of WorldPolitics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch 6, pp. 109


the difficulty in building a cohesive military machine in which

there are 24 official L1 languages.6

I will attempt to answer the above question with a realist

approach. The three branches of realism will be briefly outlined

below. However due to the paucity of literature regarding the most

contemporary branch of realism, neoclassical realism and it’s

pertinence with regards to the evolution of the European Union, I

will refer mainly to neorealist articles and theories. Where

elements of neoclassical realism are pertinent, it will be

explicitly stated. The ensuing section will discuss the apparent

failure of realism to explain the phenomenon of European economic

integration. Following on from this, I will discuss the level of

military integration of Europe and explain how branches of realism

can account for its stunted progression. Finally, I will attempt

to fuse these two discussions in a conclusion that will directly

address the title question.

Realism Outlined

Realism is a school of political thought which “provides the most

powerful explanation for the state of war which is the regular

condition of life in the international system”.7 It has been the

dominant theory of world politics since the beginning of academic

international relations.8 The primary principle of realism is that

6 European Comission, 2014. Official Languages. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/languages/policy/language-policy/official_languages_en.htm. Accessed on: 13 September 2014

7 Dunne, Tim and Brian C. Schmidt. 2008. Realism. In: Baylis et al, ed. 2008. The Globalization of World Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch 5, pp. 91.

8 Ibid., p. 95

http://ec.europa.eu/languages/policy/language-policy/official_languages_en.htm



states find themselves in an anarchic global system. The global

political environment is inherently hostile as there is no supreme

authority under which sovereign states must exist and resultantly,

all states must secure their interests and perpetuate their

existence by maximising their power relative to other states.9

Power was defined by Morgenthau as “man's control over the minds and actions

of other men”,10 and in terms of international relations, national

power is commonly measured in terms of the magnitude of military

expenditure, armed forces, gross national product and population.11

Possibly the most important mechanism used by realists to explain

the military strategies of nations is the balance of power.12 This

is the assumption that “...if the survival of a state or a number of weaker states is

threatened by a hegemonic state or coalition of stronger states, they should join forces,

establish a formal alliance, and seek to preserve their own independence by checking the

power of the opposite side... The mechanism seeks to ensure an equilibrium of power in

which case no one state or coalition of states is in a position to dominate all the others”.13

It is also important to differentiate between hard power, the

ability of a nation to coerce other nations by using or

threatening to use its stronger economy and military to the

detriment of the nation it wishes to coerce; and soft power, which

involves co-opting and shaping situations in international

politics, imposing a kind of indirect control.14

The realist school of thought has been split into three main

9 Ibid, p. 9510 Toledo, Peter. "Classic Realism and the Balance of Power Theory." Glendon

Journal of International Studies/Revue d'études internationales de Glendon 4 (2005).11 Cox, Robert W. "Social forces, states and world orders: beyond international

relations theory." Millennium: journal of international studies 10.2 (1981): 126-155.12 Sheehan, Michael J. The balance of power: history and theory. Taylor & Francis, 1996.13 Dunne and Schmidt, 2008. pp. 9414 Nye, Joseph S. "Soft power." Foreign policy (1990): 153-171.


categories. Classical realism, structural realism (or neorealism)

and neoclassical realism. Classical realism purports that

international politics is driven by an endless struggle for power

which has its roots in human nature15. Structural- (neo) realism

rejects the assertion that the struggle for power it is rooted in

human nature, instead stating that the aforementioned anarchical

system and the fear, jealousy, suspicion and insecurity it fosters

is the cause of power politics. There are two sub-categories to

neorealism: offensive- and defensive realism. Offensive realism is

based on idea that all states are continuously searching for

opportunities to gain power at the expense of other states, and

that power maximisation, indeed, striving to be the hegemonic

international power is the best path to peace.16 Defensive realism

assumes that the ultimate concern of states is not for power but

for security, though power is a useful means to achieve security.17

Neoclassical Realism recognises the importance of factors such as

the perceptions of state leaders, the domestic political landscape

and the different capacities of states to translate various

elements of national power into state power.18 Neoclassical realism

offers a synthesis of ideas from classical and structural realism

and takes into account domestic attitudes towards policy, a very

pertinent element of European decision-making, which further

strengthens the theory and its application to the lack of European

military integration.19 It is unfortunate that there seems to be no

articles linking the phenomenon and the theory in the empirical

15 Dunne and Schmidt, 2008. pp. 9516 Mearsheimer, John J. The tragedy of great power politics. WW Norton & Company, 2001.17 Waltz, Kenneth N. "The origins of war in neorealist theory." Journal of

Interdisciplinary History (1988): 615-628.18 Dunne and Schmidt, 2008. pp. 9819 Ibid. p. 99


literature.

European Integration

The process of integration in Europe started with the creation of

the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. The Paris Treaty,

which was borne out of a desire for Franco-German reconciliation

after the Second World War, created supranational institutions

which regulated the coal and steel production in the 6 original

member states.20 This was followed by the Rome Treaties of 1957,

which saw the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC)

and the removal of all customs duties levied against countries

within the community; as well as the European Atomic Energy

Community (Euratom), the main concern of which was developing

nuclear energy and distributing it to its member states while

selling the surplus to non-member states.21 These first steps can

be seen as a pragmatic method of removing potential sources of

tension between previous enemy states, whilst at the same time

aiding specialisation, reducing trade costs and creating an

environment in the region in which every member state benefited

economically and mutually.

It has been stated that a desire to be included in the EEC

contributed in part towards the democratisation of Greece,

Portugal and Spain in the 1970s and 1980s; a further compliment to

the liberal notion that integration leads to regional stability

and civilisation. These previously dictatorial states acceded to

the European Union in 1981 and 1986, at the same time as the20 European Union. How the EU works. Available at:

http://europa.eu/about-eu/index_en.htm. Accessed on 31 August 201421 Ibid



Single European Act, which saw the removal of barriers to the

movement of labour, goods, services and capital, (along with

providing a treaty for foreign policy cooperation), was passed.22

The 1992 Maastricht Treaty saw the creation of the European Union

and the Euro, along with the “pillar structure” of the European

Union, comprising the European Community (EC) pillar, the Common

Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar, and the Justice and

Home Affairs (JHA) pillar. These three pillars are associated with

economic, foreign and judicial policy respectively.23 It is the

first two pillars which will be discussed in more depth here.

Economic Integration and Realist Thinking

The gradual, civil and peaceful development of the European

Economic Community and eventually the European Union seriously

challenges the realist view that every state is self-serving, as

“...autarky is a wiser policy than interdependence and vulnerability (in a self-help

system)”;24 and on a regional level it challenges the axial realist

principle of states in anarchy. The European Union, being a

largely supranational organisation (at least with regards to

economic matters), has authority over all its member states and

member states therefore do not have to fear or defend themselves

against neighbouring countries. Classically, realists have argued

that any cooperation is extremely difficult in the international

22 Kopstein, Jeffrey S., and David A. Reilly. "Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the postcommunist world." World politics 53.01 (2000): 1-37.

23 Dinan, Desmond. "Ever closer union: an introduction to European integration."Boulder: London (1999).

24 Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. (1979) Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley (pp106). Cited in: Collard-Wexler, Simon. "Integration under anarchy: Neorealism and the European Union." European Journal of International Relations 12.3 (2006): 397-432. pp. 400


system. This is because “cooperation under anarchy is similar to a prisoners

dilemma in which the dominant strategy is to defect”,25 and concerns about the

relative distribution of gains can hinder cooperation.26 Though

realists are generally more concerned with the power balance in

relation to military power rather than economic power,27 these

arguments can be seen as equally pertinent in the economic sphere,

as “economic capacity is intimately tied to military capabilities”.28 It has been

stated that “few realist scholars have made any significant effort to predict or explain

the subsequent course of European integration or the operation of the EU as an

institution”.29 Is this because the process of integration in Europe

flatly contradicts realist thinking?

There have been attempts by realists to tackle the apparent

incongruity between their school of thought and the European

reality. Kenneth Waltz attributed the progress of European

integration to the fact that the United States had emerged after

World War II as “the guarantor of West European security, leaving the Member States

of the European Community free to pursue integration without concerns about security

threats from their European partners”.30 This implies that the (defensive)

realist impetus for European states to pursue power, namely

security, was gone post WW2, which allowed them to instead pursue

a more liberal agenda. Many realists consider the formation of the

25 Collard-Wexler, Simon. "Integration under anarchy: Neorealism and the European Union." European Journal of International Relations 12.3 (2006): 397-432. pp. 400

26 Ibid, p 40027 Dunne and Schmidt, 2008 pp. 9228 Snidal, Duncan. “Relative Gains and Patterns of International Cooperation.”

The American Political Science Review. 85.3 (1991): 701-726. pp 703. Cited in Collard-Wexler, 2006.

29 Pollack, Mark A. "International relations theory and European integration." JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 39.2 (2001): 221-244. pp 222

30 Ibid. pp 223


EEC (an occurrence which supports liberal arguments)31 to be an

epiphenomenon of a higher, global distribution of power in the

international system which actually supports realist ideas.32 It is

indeed reported in the literature that under the neorealist

paradigm, cooperation is expected to be more feasible under the

protection of a hegemon, in this case the US.33 Additional

neorealist arguments claim that the increasing integration of the

EEC during the 1980s was an example of economic power balancing

against the very dominant Japanese and US markets.34

These arguments were however swiftly countered by many

commentators as world events seemed to contradict them. The

culmination of the Cold War in the late 80s/early 90s brought with

it an end to the bipolar international system and the return to a

multipolar international system.35 36 Bipolar international systems

are deemed by realists as inherently more stable than multipolar

systems,37 and it was predicted by Mearsheimer that the fall of the

Soviet Union would create an atmosphere of increased tension

between European states as concerns about relative gains and

security would rise, leading eventually to a dramatic decline in

European efforts to integrate38. This, of course proved not to be

the case, demonstrated by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty which

actually represented a significant escalation in European

31 Dunne, 2008, pp. 11332 Pollack, Mark A. (2001). pp 22333 Collard-Wexler, Simon. (2006) pp. 40234 Pollack, Mark A. (2001) pp. 22335 Pollack, Mark A. (2001) pp 22336 Collard-Wexler, Simon. (2006) pp. 41037 Ibid. pp 40038 Mearsheimer, J. J. “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold

War”. (1990) International Security, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 5 - 56


integration. This development strongly contradicts Waltz's

argument.

The fall of the Soviet Union has similarly crushing implications

for the second neorealist response mentioned above. The German

reunification, a consequence of the disintegration of the Soviet

Union, threatened other EU member states with a potential German

economic hegemony.39 Under the neorealist paradigm, the expected

response of other member states would have been to perhaps exclude

the reunified Germany from the Union, or create additional

economic ties with neighbouring nations which excluded Germany.

Instead, however, definite 'bandwagoning' behaviour on the part of

Italy and France, who insisted upon economic and monetary union,

was observed40 This, of course, goes against the realist assumption

that states generally prefer to balance against dominant powers

rather than bandwagon with them, and poses a significant problem

for realist scholars.

European Foreign Policy Integration and Realist Thinking

The first major step towards European foreign policy integration

came with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and the accompanying creation

of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), though its

origins are found in the 1956 formation of European Political

Cooperation (EPC) an informal consultation process between member

states regarding foreign policy agendas.41 The CFSP aims to achieve

39 Pollack, Mark A. (2001), pp 22340 Ibid. pp. 22341 Smith, Michael Eugene. Europe's foreign and security policy: the institutionalization of

cooperation. Cambridge University Press, 2004.


certain, defined objectives such as to safeguard the common

values, interests, independence and integrity of the EU, among

other measures, by “defining general principles and guidelines for CFSP; deciding on

common strategies; adopting joint actions; adopting common positions; strengthening

systematic cooperation between member states in the conduct of policy.”42 These

actions are conducted on a “primarily intergovernmental basis, mainly because of

the politically sensitive nature of foreign and security policy.”43 This means the EU

has very limited military capabilities and no autonomous military

power, with its member states retaining their own individual armed

forces, and responsibility for the overall protection of the EU

lying with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).44 This is

in great contrast to the level of control the EU holds over

economic policy, for example, where it has power to, among other

things, set interest rates in the Eurozone.45 There is of course a

difference between military and economic power; indeed many

realists focus solely on military capabilities whilst perhaps

underestimating the increasing relevance of economic power.46 The

main differentiating factor is that military power affords a

nation the capability of directly threatening the security of another

nation.47 The use of economic power can be effective in coercing

42 Politics.co.uk, Common Foreign and Security Policy. Available at: http://www.politics.co.uk/reference/common-foreign-and-security-policy. Accessed on 14th September 2014.

43 Ibid44 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2014. Collective Defence and Common

Security: Twin Pillars of the Atlantic Alliance. (Online PDF) Available at: http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_06/20140606_140602-peg-collective_defence.pdf

45 Eichengreen, Barry. "European monetary integration with benefit of hindsight." JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 50.s1 (2012): 123-136.

46 Gray, Colin S. Hard Power and Soft Power: The utility of military force as an instrument of policy in the 21st century. Strategic Studies Institute, 2011.

47 Blanchard, Jean-Marc F., Edward D. Mansfield, and Norrin M. Ripsman, eds. Power and the purse: economic statecraft, interdependence and national security. Routledge, 2014.

http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_06/20140606_140602-peg-collective_defence.pdf


http://www.politics.co.uk/reference/common-foreign-and-security-policy


other nations; economic sanctions can do irreparable harm to those

receiving them; however, I would argue that economic power, in

contrast to military power, cannot be used to directly threaten a

nation's security or sovereignty. Even in terms of non-military

foreign policy, it is very hard for the EU to acquire

transnational consensus, with the domestic effects of economic

sanctions imposed by the EU on third parties varying widely from

country to country. A recent example of this being the case is the

Ukraine crisis and the EU's response to it.

Russia's military intervention in Ukraine after the impeachment of

President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014, and the annexation

of Crimea by the Russian Federation was met with widespread

condemnation and global reaction48. Sanctions were imposed by many

western nations including the United States, Australia, Canada and

the European Union49. The EU sanctioned Russia's energy, defence

and financial sectors, along with many individuals. This worsening

of EU – Russia business ties has however proven problematic for

certain nations within the EU. For example, German exports to

Russia totalled $51bn in 2013, and Germany and Italy alike are

highly dependent on Russian energy.50 France has significant

outstanding contracts for warships which are supposed to be

produced for Russia,51 and Great Britain undertakes a lot of48 Cecire, Michael, 2014. The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. Foreign Policy Research

Institute. Online. Available at: http://www.fpri.org/articles/2014/03/russian-invasion-ukraine

49 BBC, 2014. Ukraine Crisis: Russia and sanctions. Online. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26672800

50 BBC, 2014. How far do EU-US sanctions on Russia go? Online. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-28400218. Accessed on: 13 September 2014

51 Meagan Clark, 2014. Russia Sanctions: Germany, Others Suggest EU Buy Out French Warships Contract From Russia. International Business Times. Online. Available

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-28400218


business with Russia in the financial sector.52 As a result of

these different interdependencies, different states carry out the

EU imposed sanctions with varying levels of enthusiasm and because

of this lack of cohesion between member states, EU foreign policy

as a whole is undermined.

This is a good example of the realist view of sovereign nations

protecting their own interests whilst perhaps acknowledging the

harm this is doing to the efficacy of supranational institutional

foreign policy. It can perhaps be cited as a reason why European

security policy has not integrated to the same level as economic

policy. Another recent example of this apparent disregard or

contempt for collective foreign policy is France, Spain and

Italy's paying of ransoms to Islamic State, a political/religious

group widely recognised to be the richest terrorist group in the

world and quickly becoming the salient concern of politicians

globally.53 The paying of ransoms by these countries was probably

motivated by internal domestic pressures, with the public's

concern for the unfortunate hostages outweighing their concern for

the implications of paying and consequently directly funding the

barbaric actions of the group. As this theory takes into account

the pressures applied to governments by their electorates, this

could possibly help confirm neoclassical realist theories.

at: http://www.ibtimes.com/russia-sanctions-germany-others-suggest-eu-buy-out-french-warships-contract-russia-1647858. Accessed on 20 August 2014

52 BBC, 2014. How Far do EU-US sanctions on Russia go?53 Wintour, Patrick and Ian Cobain, 2014. David Cameron scolds Nato leaders over

Islamic State ransom payments. The Guardian. Online. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/sep/04/david-cameron-isis-ransom-hostage-david-haines. Accessed on 5 September 2014

http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/sep/04/david-cameron-isis-ransom-hostage-david-haines


http://www.ibtimes.com/russia-sanctions-germany-others-suggest-eu-buy-out-french-warships-contract-russia-1647858



Indeed, a significant hindrance to the integration of foreign and

security policy in the EU can be attributed to the realist notion

that nations are inherently loathe to give up or to any extent

sacrifice their sovereignty. The reason for this, to once again

posit a neoclassical realist theorem, could be because of internal

political pressures based upon the fear citizens hold of losing

their democratic ability to influence policies. In the UK in 2013,

for example, the Conservative Party's pledge to hold an in/out

referendum on EU membership was enshrined in law54. It can be

confidently stated that this was a strategic political decision

made to satisfy certain groups of individuals within the

Conservative Party's base. Following a similar trend, a rapid rise

in nationalist representatives being elected to the European

Parliament was witnessed across Europe in the last European

elections,55 and one can perhaps understand the difficulty in

establishing a premise for further integration on a security or

military policy level as this trend continues.

Europe's lack of military integration could be alternatively

attributed to a reluctance to offset the balance of power that

currently exists. An amalgamation of European armed forces could

be seen as an affront or a threat to the quasi-hegemonic United

States. This theory is supported by neorealist thought, as it

claims that a challenge to hegemony leads to instability as both

54 BBC, 2014. Timeline: Campaigns for a European Union Referendum. Online. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-15390884. Accessed on: 5 September 2014

55 McDonald-Gibson, Charlotte and John Lichfield, 2014. European election results 2014: Far-right parties flourish across Europe. The Independent. Online. Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/european-election-results-2014-farright-parties-flourish-across-europe-in-snub-to-austerity-9434069.html. Accessed on 05 September 2014

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/european-election-results-2014-farright-parties-flourish-across-europe-in-snub-to-austerity-9434069.html



http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-15390884


hegemon and challenger rush to build up their power. This is

essentially what was witnessed in the aftermath of the Second

World War with the outbreak of the Cold War. This led to

widespread instability as proxy-wars were fought across the world

with the Soviet Union and the United States supporting opposing

sides in different regions.

Confirmation of this theory can be found in an article for the

Heritage Foundation by Luke Coffey.56 In this article it is argued

that European Defence integration would undermine NATO,

transatlantic relations and as a result of that, European

security. Throughout, the point is stressed that “deeper EU defence

integration will ultimately decouple the US from Europe”,57 and the importance of

assured influence for US leaders relative to the level of

resources the US has committed to the European Union is

continually highlighted. This, of course, is an assertion that

supports the realist view that states continuously strive to

maintain and increase their levels of power over other nations.

This could be interpreted as an outside pressure from the

hegemonic US to hinder EU defence integration.

It is important to also stress the pertinence of NATO in

determining why integrated defence policies have not been pursued

zealously by EU member states. NATO is an intergovernmental

political and military alliance which effectively negates the

56 Coffey, Luke, 2013. EU Defense Integration: Undermining NATO, Transatlantic Relations, and Europe's Security. The Heritage Foundation. Online. Available at: http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/06/eu-defense-integration-undermining-nato-transatlantic-relations-and-europes-security. Accessed on: 5September 2014

57 Ibid.

http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/06/eu-defense-integration-undermining-nato-transatlantic-relations-and-europes-security

http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/06/eu-defense-integration-undermining-nato-transatlantic-relations-and-europes-security


necessity of an integrated European military.58 NATO was formed in

1949 as a balancing force to counter the military power of the

USSR.59 This supports the realist “balance of power” theory, as the

formation of NATO could be interpreted as bandwagoning behaviour

against a common threat. Furthermore, as it is an

intergovernmental organisation, it requires only limited

sacrifices of sovereignty for member nations. The subsequent

outbreak of the Korean War and the perceived possibility of all

communist countries working together incentivised NATO to

implement a more solid military strategy, and the eventual

inclusion of West Germany, tipping the power balance in NATO's

favour,60 triggered the creation of the Warsaw Pact, which drew the

battle lines for the Cold War. The outbreak of the Cold War

necessitated the continuation of intergovernmental military

integration under NATO.

NATO's existence can now possibly be explained by offensive or

defensive realist theory, though neorealists would have expected

NATO to have “unravelled”61 after the end of the Cold War era.

Neorealist Christopher Layne lists the reasons that NATO has

continued to exist and expand, reasons which support the above

arguments of the US perpetuating its hegemonic status:

58 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. What is NATO? Online. Available at: http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html. Accessed on 8. September 2014

59 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. A Short History of NATO. Online. Available at: http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html. Accessed on 10 September 2014

60 Isby, David C., and Charles Kamps. Armies of NATO's Central Front. London: Jane's, 1985.

61 Layne, Christopher. "US Hegemony and the Perpetuation of NATO." The Journal of Strategic Studies 23.3 (2000): 59-91.

http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html

http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html


(1) the United States would seek to

extend its influence in, and control over, the European

security environment;

(2) this extension of US control

would be manifested by both the geographical and ideological

extension of US interests;

(3) Washington's perception of its

European security interests would expand


prevent the re-emergence of a multipolar system within

Europe;


maintain its hegemony by preventing the emergence of rival

great powers, including Germany, a united Europe, or a

resurgent Russia.

This could explain, then, why Europe has not pursued a more solid

military integration programme like it did with its economy. A

build up or pooling of military resources could have been

perceived by the United States and other salient global powers as

a threat, could have led to a multipolar global power structure, a

structure which is inherently less stable than a bi- or unipolar

power structure and ultimately led to a fresh era of global

tension and possible conflict. The European Union, an indisputably

liberal institution with liberal goals,62 would presumably wish to

avoid provoking such a circumstance.

62 Bowen, J. D. (2011), “Theory In Action: Liberalism” (online video) Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tZbDMUaqwE8. Accessed on: 04. September 2014

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tZbDMUaqwE8


Conclusion

The question posed at the start of this paper was “Why has the

integration of European security policy not progressed as far as

that of economic policy?” I have attempted to tackle this question

by highlighting the dominant international relations theory,

realism, and analysing some of the historical events which led to

the integration of Europe, how some of these have contradicted

realist thought and how in some ways they have corroborated it.

The economic integration of Europe poses significant problems for

realist theorists, as it has involved sovereign states sacrificing

their sovereignty to an extent by giving up their powers to

control trade and immigration, and in some cases their control

over monetary policy (in the Eurozone) to a supranational

institution. This contradicts the realist position that states act

to maximise their sovereign power. That having been said, there are

some strands of realist theory which can account for this

apparently liberal campaign of economic integration. For example,

the status of the US post-WW2 as the guarantor of Western-European

security removed the motivation of nations in that region to

struggle against their neighbours, removed the fear and suspicion

fostered by a state of anarchy, and allowed these nations to

pursue a liberal agenda. Other strands of realist theory posit

that the increasing level of European economic integration was a

strategy to balance the economic dominance of the USA and Japan.

The comparatively low level of military/foreign policy integration


can be better explained by realist scholars. Firstly, nations are

inherently loathe to give up their sovereignty. This pertains

especially to armed forces and military capability, as military

power can directly affect the security of other nations. An

additional factor is the varied, sometimes conflicting

international economic interests of different member states and

the drastic hindrance these conflicting interests can pose in

reaching a consensus between the 28 states, all of which have the

power to veto military policies. The current situation in the

Ukraine and the (some may say glib) response which it has provoked

from some of the most powerful member states of the EU seems to

corroborate this theory.

Other reasons that a consensus among member states might be

difficult to reach include the varied political positions of

nations with regards to foreign policy and military actions. There

are, for example, five states in the EU which are recognised as

neutral and would therefore veto any proposition for military

engagement. Other countries in the EU have distinctly liberal

political attitudes, holding the opinion that war or military

force can only be used as the last resort and under a plethora of

conditions. The time it may take to satisfy such states that all

conditions have been met means that a European integrated military

would be sluggish and ineffective, unable to respond promptly to

international events. Neoclassical realism has a big part to play

in explaining why this is, as this strand of realist thought takes

into account the considerations that state leaders have to take

into account in terms of the domestic political repercussions of


their foreign/military policy actions and their personal

perception of the events and the correct way to react.

Inability to reach consensus aside, it is possible that European

leaders do not wish to destabilise the balance of power that

already exists. Realist theorists would expect that the rise of an

integrated European military would be viewed as a threat by other

salient global powers, and that the fear and tension this could

create worldwide is unnecessary and avoidable. Unnecessary,

because the motivation to maximise European security is moot, with

the responsibility for the security of all EU member states lying

with NATO, a military alliance which includes the hegemonic United

States. One could argue that the break-up of this alliance caused

by the threat of a separate European military could be detrimental

to the security of member states. The third possible reason that

the European Union has not integrated its military proportionately

to its economy may therefore lie with the US's offensive realist

goal to perpetuate its hegemony, principally by keeping NATO in

formation and thereby holding its significant influence over

affairs in the continent.

The disparity between the levels of integration of these two very

important political fields probably lies in the nature of the

consequent outcomes of their manipulation. An integrated European

economy is seen to benefit the members economically, and it also

increases the power of member states, as a collective union, to

enforce sanctions against problematic nations outside the union,

for example. This ability has obvious coercive advantages and can


enhance the EU's usage of diplomatic (soft) powers to attempt to

influence global political events. The use of sanctions does not

directly threaten the security of the countries they are imposed

upon. Therefore a large integrated economy and the power this

provides can perhaps be seen as a less incendiary alternative to

military power, and one that poses no threat to the global

hegemon.

The consequences of the development of an integrated military, in

contrast to those mentioned above, could be seen as destructive,

incendiary and costly. Military conflict is not beneficial to any

state, whether it be the aggressor or the defender, and as a

result the pursuit of military power may be discouraged by current

world powers. In a sense, I am positing that economic integration

carries more mutual benefit than acrimony, whereas military

integration is quite the opposite.

It will be interesting to see, in the coming months and years, how

the theories I have presented in this paper will hold out. With

tension increasing once again between Russia and the West, and a

quickly growing terrorist grouping claiming its right to be a

state in the Middle East, it is hard to predict the trajectory

that events will follow. One may assume, however, that in

anticipation of further global hostility, the EU will not threaten

its ties with the global hegemonic superpower, the United States

of America.


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