What were the conditions--other than those traditionally claimed*--that led the ‘small band of...

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HFXH7 What were the conditions--other than those traditionally claimed*--that led the ‘small band of Spaniards’ to succeed in bringing down the Aztec empire? In 1519, Charles V sent soldiers on a quest to find riches and establish settlements in the New World. When Hernan Cortes arrived ashore in Mexico, he did not know to achieve his goals he would have to conquer a population of over 700,000 citizens of the Aztec Empire in Tenochtitlan. In the retelling of the stories a courage Cortes is usually contrasted against a cowardly Motecuhzoma II (Gillespie 2008, p.25). In the sixteenth century historians described the righteousness of Spanish power, and the reverence of their actions. Of course, this view faded over time, eventually when Mexico gained its independence, historians began to turn away from the conquistadors and turn towards the Aztecs and its political and economic discrepancies with neighbouring or subservient people. There is no denying the roles Cortes and Motecuhzoma II played during the conquest but focus should remain on the Aztecs own politics, which made their empire vulnerable to conquest long before Cortes’s even stepped foot on Mexican sand. More recent 1

Transcript of What were the conditions--other than those traditionally claimed*--that led the ‘small band of...

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What were the conditions--other than those traditionally claimed*--that led the ‘small bandof Spaniards’ to succeed in bringing down the Aztec empire?

In 1519, Charles V sent soldiers on a quest to find riches and

establish settlements in the New World. When Hernan Cortes arrived

ashore in Mexico, he did not know to achieve his goals he would

have to conquer a population of over 700,000 citizens of the Aztec

Empire in Tenochtitlan. In the retelling of the stories a

courage Cortes is usually contrasted against a cowardly

Motecuhzoma II (Gillespie 2008, p.25). In the sixteenth century

historians described the righteousness of Spanish power, and the

reverence of their actions. Of course, this view faded over time,

eventually when Mexico gained its independence, historians began

to turn away from the conquistadors and turn towards the Aztecs

and its political and economic discrepancies with neighbouring or

subservient people.

There is no denying the roles Cortes and Motecuhzoma II

played during the conquest but focus should remain on the Aztecs

own politics, which made their empire vulnerable to conquest long

before Cortes’s even stepped foot on Mexican sand. More recent

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versions of Indian sources that have been drafted under Spanish

rule have shown that the conquest of Mexico can primarily be

understood as a war between different Nahua tribes which Herman

Cortes, the conquistador in charge of the voyage, cleverly

engineered (Clendinnen 1991. p.65). The term Aztec is a loose

term to describe the Nahua speaking people, Triple Alliance

empire, and specifically the Mexica ethnicity of the Nahuatl-

speaking peoples. This essay will be using the term to describe

the members of the Triple Alliance.

In this essay, I seek to add additional viewpoints in the

academia’s understanding of the Aztecs' defeat. The Aztec had been

a powerful empire before the Spanish invasion; however their power

was at risk by pre-existing economic and socio-political

vulnerabilities. Most importantly the economic exploitation of

the commoners. I believe this social stratification is one of the

most important factor in the demise of the Aztec empire.

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Social Inequality

Figure 1: This image highlights the difference in hierarchy, the

illustration shows a slave market (Sahagún, Historia...de Nueva España).

The root of the Aztec defeat by the Spanish was sown with the

centralisation of their government. When they defeated the

Tepenacs, the Aztecs could consolidate their power without any

interference. By uniting three kingdoms, Tenochtitlan, Texcoco and

Tlacopan, they merged into a super state called the “Triple

Alliance.” (Pizana 1999, p.3) The Triple Alliance ruled their

empire not by direct territorial control, but by overwhelming

influence and military force (Pizana 1999, p.3). This fact is

extremely important, because it highlighted the tension that

existed between the centre of the empire, represented by

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Tenochtitlan, and the provinces on the outskirts (Bray 1972,

p.169). The Triple Alliance threatened neighbouring territories

with conquest unless they provided continuous tribute. As

archaeologist Mary Hodge, explains (1998, p.215), “...the array

of goods in the Codex Mendoza and other tribute lists implies

regional specialties... [for example,] Otumba [has] strong

evidence of several craft specialization[s]... for clay-mold

figurines, ceramic censors, obsidian ear spools, obsidian blades,

and other lapidary items.” Therefore, the destruction of

Tenochtitlan was not so much one of Spanish conquest, but as a

result of Aztec mismanagement, expansionism, and exploitation of

other tribes as well as the lower class. The commoner class, whose

responsibility was to pay the tribute in the form of goods,

services, and labour consisted of farmers, artisans, merchants,

and low-level priests (Smith 1996, p.144). Slaves are not part of

any class, as they are not born in this stratum but were usually

people who sold themselves into the trade when they could no

longer support themselves (Smith 1996, p.152).

Motecuhzoma II used his reign to attempt to consolidate power

more closely with the Mexica and also institute a number of

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imperial reforms. He withdrew many of Ahuitzotl's advisors and had

several of them executed (Smith 1996, p.57). He also abolished the

"quauhpilli" warrior class, which allowed commoners to have some

of the privileges of the noble class, insisting that only true

hereditary nobles should enjoy the privileges of the elite (Smith

1996, p.152). By removing this class, he left no chance for

commoners to advance to the nobility (Smith 1996, p.152). This

illustrates that any individual who did not work directly, to

please the tloatani, suffered under Aztec rule. The inequality between

the elite and lower class were huge, differences can also be seen

in the subsistence patterns between the commoner and the elite. As

one might expect, the nobility had a much larger range of food

available to them, than the commoners. The elite enjoyed a diet

consisting of wild foul, poultry, and game, whereas the

impoverished, “...skimmed a floating substance from the surface

[of a lake] which was called tecuitlatl, ‘stone dung’; it was

something like cheese, and they squeezed it into cakes... the

floating substance [was] algae possibly fostered by pollution from

the dense population.” (Harner 1977, p.) This degradation

occurred in part because of the quantity of resources that areas

were required to provide, many times being expected to contribute

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more resources than could be spared.

During his rule he also increased tribute demands in order to

fund constant military operations (Smith 1996, p.183), and those

demands caused further discontent among the subject populations.

With the previous sumptuary laws on items and clothing introduced

by his predecessor Motecuhzoma, which widened the gap between the

commoners and the nobles, citizens began to recognise their own

social status (Smith 1996, p.121). This marked the onset of a

distinct class categories within the empire. Although some of

these classes existed before stratification occurred, this

distinction became more noticeable through the differences in the

standards of living. The growing inequality within the Aztec

community seemed to reach highpoint at the time of Cortes arrival

in Tenochtitlan. After some archaeological scrutiny, Hodge (1998,

p.210) argues that the general standard of living decreased under

Aztec rule when compared to similar demographics. Within the areas

that continued local provincial rule, even the resident elite

could not avoid degenerated conditions. “Excavations directed by

Michael Smith, revealed that after this regions incorporation into

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the Aztec empire, the overall standard of living decreased.

Additionally, elite and commoner houses became more homogenous,

suggesting depression of elite income. [Data] suggests a general

decrease in the standard of living after conquest by the Aztec

empire, seemingly due to taxation by provincial and imperial

powers. (Smith and Jeffrey 1994, p.175). Soon the social classes

within the Triple Alliance could be recognised by a system of

visible prosperity. This is possibly why the Spaniards may have

been embraced, with reservation, as a deliverance from oppression.

In Chalco, Cortes conversed “with the lord and some nobles...who

said they were vassals of Motecuhzoma. In secret they complained

to him saying he committed many grave abuses in...tribute” (Tapia

1963 p.37). Therefore when the Spaniards first arrived in

Mesoamerica, their ease to proceed inland from Veracruz mostly

unopposed was due to local settlements response to their

conditions. Clearly, the complex set of alliances that Cortes was

able to gather with local tribes was an important component of his

military victory against the Aztecs.

Aztec Enemy States

Areas located outside of Aztec control and influence played an

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important part in the victory of the conquistadors. These regions

kept their independence, but were displeased by Aztec overall

dominance (Smith 1986, p.71). Theses regions consisted of the

defiant Tlaxacala and the powerful state of the Tarascan centred

at the city of Tzintzuntzan west of central Mexico (Pollard 2012,

p.143). As Smith (1984 p.73) states “predicted by models of

political evolution... the net result of increased interaction

among city-states in a context of increasing energy levels

(population growth, agricultural intensification, and trade) was

both internal political centralization.” This need for more

resources and labour played a large factor in their economy and

their invasion tactics. Only those with means could acquire the

needed natural resources as the city and population of

Tenochtitlan continued to grow (Townsend 1979, p.11). Despite the

high yield of Aztec agriculture, famines and food shortages were

regular events in the Late Aztec period, resulting in periods of

social unrest and a a general pattern of malnutrition for the

lower class (Smith 2006, p.3).

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Figure 2: Map showing the states allied with the Aztecs and gaps within their

empire (Harvard University)

The Tarascans as mentioned above had had long been enemies of

the Aztecs. The Tarascans ruled over a large territory and were

as aggressive in military as the Aztecs (Evans 2008, p.495). In

1478, the Aztecs with an army of 24,000 launched an attack at the

border zone, but the Tarascans had an army of 40,000 men and

quickly dispatched the Aztecs. It was noted as “the largest pre-

Spanish disaster suffered by the Aztec empire.” (Berden 1996,

p.163) It is clear why the two were engaged in offensive and

defensive military actions, they both had economic interest of

the disputed territory, which was rich in metamorphic rock, copper

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silver and gold deposits (Pollard 1993 p.167). It wasn’t until the

reign of Tizoc (1481-86) that the Aztec political structure showed

severe weaknesses (Evans 2008,). Tizoc was one of the few Aztec

leaders with a fairly bad military record, and eventually this

would make him appear weaker to the Aztec’s neighbours,

tributaries, and enemies alike. Tizoc was unable to conquer the

relatively small town of Metztitlan (Hassig 1995, p.193). The

Tarascans had damaged the Aztecs army and status during a battle

and this defeat would cause a loss of confidence in the Aztec

emperor Tizoc (Evans 2008, p.502) . This would ignite roaring

rebellions all over the empire, this demanded attention from the

Aztec armies (Hassig 1995, p.190-195). This animosity between the

two states was a key factor in the victory of the Spaniards. The

Aztecs had sent embassies to the Tarascans requesting help against

the Spanish but the pleas were ignored and the ambassadors killed

(Pollard 1993, p.170).

There were a number of smaller independent states who were

strong enough to resist the combined efforts of the Triple

Alliance. Notably Cholula had maintained freedom from the Triple

Alliance without incurring animosity (Evans 2008, p.526). The

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city of Cholula was inhabited by Toltecs, Chichimecs, Colomocha

and Olmeca-Xicallanca (Bray 1972, p.163). Cholula's interactions

with its neighbouring states and with the Aztec Empire was

complex, alliances had materialised and then fell through, grudges

were held and then simply ignored. Apparently the Cholulas had

only recently ended their enmity with the Aztec and consequently

became enemies of the Tlaxcalans (Evans 2008, p.530). The

Tlaxcalans had a fierce antagonistic relationship with the Aztec

empire as did the Tarascans during Motecuhzoma II's reign. The

Tlaxcalans were completely surrounded by the Mexica (Smith 1996,

p.11). Despite this they still remained free from their clutches.

This independence shows up in the archaeological data. Survey of

Tlaxcalan sites revealed a lack of the most typical Aztec wares,

and revealed a close ceramic links with Cholula to the south

(Bray. p.170). These Mesoamerican states were powerful enough to

resist the the combined Triple Alliance forces. Many of the

battles between these other states were costly to the Triple

Alliance. The Flowery War between the Aztecs and the Tlaxcalans

raged intermittently from the mid-1450s to the arrival of the

Spaniards in 1519, Mufioz Camargo (1892, p.109-10) places blame to

the Triple Alliance, especially Tenochtitlan, for beginning the

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intervalley hostilities and portrays his native Tlaxcala as the

innocent victim. Although the Aztecs told the Spaniards that they

had allowed the Tlaxcalans to remain independent. The truth was

that the Tlaxcalans were no pushovers and the region was quite

mountainous and the Tlaxcalans were able to defend against the

Aztecs for this reason. (Isaac 1983, p.425). Similarly, to

Totonacs, who resided in the city of Cempoala, the Tlaxcalan

people allied with the Spanish. Their independence allowed them to

openly support Cortes’ approach to the capital without the

repercussions of disloyalty (Smith 1996, p.183). The Tlaxcalan’s

provided the largest amount of support and were crucial to the

Spanish campaign. Taking advantage of pre-existing political

conflicts, Cortes entered into an alliance with the Tlaxcalans and

began building a force made up of local warriors (Fig 3).

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Figure 3: Battle between the Mexica and the Spanish conquistadors with the

Tlaxcalans as their allies. (Smith 1996, p.282)

Conclusion

Despite Cortes role being downplayed in Mexico's history,

Motecuhzoma II continues to be somewhat blamed for the Aztecs'

fall (Gillespie 2008, p.25). Sara Cohen (1972, p.28) thought

Motecuzoma II to have been an extremely superstitious man, and

his beliefs caused the collapse due to his confusion regarding the

identity of Hernan Cortes. Whether this is true is up for debate

but what we can is that Motecuhzoma's hesitation to attack the

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Spanish upon arrival contributed to the Aztecs' downfall (Smith

1996, p.283).

Tlaxcala’s role was pivotal during the remainder of the

Spaniard’s campaign. The warriors of Tlaxcala joined the Spanish

to destroy the Aztecs. Over 6,000 soldiers joined the Spanish

(Halberstein 1973, p.43). This transformed the Spanish five

hundred from a small group of raiders to a capable army. With

their new allies, the Spaniards continued their march to the

capital. As they proceeded, support continued to gather from

additional areas that had suffered under the Aztec control and

influence.

The Aztec fell through a concurrence of political and

cultural factors that combined to bring the empire to its knees.

The Aztecs politically demanded high amounts of tribute,

obedience, even worship for their ruler, while at the same time

letting their tributary city states set their own policies and run

the day to day affairs of their areas (Smith 1996, p.173). There

is a clear weakness in any government that does not directly

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oversee (at least in part) all those under their control and

influence (Calneck 1978, p.56).

Today, the conquistadors are painted as evil and heartless,

greedy and murderous. Though true in many cases, it is important

to remember that the Aztecs committed many of the same acts of

violence and inequality in which the Spaniards did, which

inevitably contributed to their downfall. The mistreatment of the

lower class can be symbolised by one woman, now infamous in

Mexican history and folklore for her role in the conquest, Dona

Marina (Taylor 2014, p.828). Dona Marina is an important figure

in Latin American history, her actions in joining and aiding the

Spanish were likely influenced by her poor social status. Many

have thought of that Dona Marina as a treacherous figure in

Mexico's history. Though, it seems reasonable that Marina would

resent an empire that aided in her enslavement, rather than view

it with loyalty.

Word Count: 2426

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Illustrations

Figure 1: De Sahagún, B. (2010). Historia general de las cosas de la Nueva España I (Vol. 1). Linkgua digital.

Figure 2: Map of the Aztec empire. Digital image. FAS: Harvard Course. FAS, 23 Nov. 2009. Web. 17 Apr. 2015: https://coursewikis.fas.harvard.edu/aiu18/File:Aztec_Empire_c_1519.png

Figure 3: Smith, M. E. (1996). The Aztecs. Blackwell Publishers: Malden.

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