What Do African Donor-sponsored Anti-corruption Programmes Teach Us about International Development...

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SOCIA

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VOLUME 38 AUGUST 2004 No. 4

ISSN 0144 5596

Regional Issue: Africa

Editorial Introduction

Bryane MichaelAfrican Donor-sponsored Anti-corruption Programmes

Jankees van DongeSocial Funds and Decentralization in Zambia and Malawi

Claire DorsnerCommunity Development Projects in Senegal

Diana Conyers and Fanuel CumanzalaCommunity Empowerment and Democracy in Zimbabwe

Maitseo BolaaneGame Reserve Policy and the River BaSarwa/Bushmen of Botswana

Rosaleen SmythCommunity Development and Colonial Office Policy and

Practice in Africa

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© Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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& A

0144–5596V

. 38, No. 4, A

2004,

. 320–345

Blackwell Publishing, Ltd.Oxford, UKSPOLSocial Policy & Administration0144-5596© Blackwell Publishing 2004August 2004384Original ArticleTitle

What Do African Donor-sponsored Anti-corruption Programmes Teach Us about International Development

in Africa?

Bryane Michael

Abstract

Donor-sponsored anti-corruption programmes represent an increasingly large segment of inter-national development assistance to Africa. While the ostensible objective of these programmes isto reduce African corruption, the generality of them suggests that other factors appear to motivatetheir design and implementation. This paper attempts to assess the generality of these programmesby looking at the specificity, relevance and fit of proposed anti-corruption activities. The mallea-bility of these programmes suggests that programme design draws from a mix of broader discursivefields and the genuine attempt to improve project performance and decrease corruption.

Keywords

International development assistance; Anti-corruption programmes; Africa

Introduction

While there are many views and theories of international development asapplied to Africa, a schism is growing between “orthodox” and “radical”branches of international development theory. Underpinning the orthodoxview of international development are the ostensibly scientific (and certainlypositivistic) methods of goal identification, data collection and plannedaction aimed at achieving some form of “progress”.

1

In this view, knowledgeaccumulation and management is necessary for the achievement of well-defined project goals. Recent trends in African development thought andpractice reflect this broader commitment to the orthodox view, including thestress on “good governance” and “capacity building” (Deng

; Ul Haqueand Aziz

; Olowu

; Kruiter

). In contrast, more radical viewsof development see international development projects as the result ofFoucauldian discursive fields (Ferguson

; Escobar

).

2

According to

Address for correspondence:

Bryane Michael, Linacre College, Oxford, OX

JA. Email:[email protected]


this view, the “discourse of development” has served to extend the power ofdevelopment organizations while simultaneously impoverishing the peoplesupposedly targeted for development. Such a discourse consists of “ways ofconstituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectiv-ity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and relationsbetween them” (Weedon

:

). Whereas the “orthodox” view seesdevelopment knowledge and practice independently of social and politicalrelations, the “radical” view places these factors at the centre of analysis.

The anti-corruption projects in sub-Saharan Africa sponsored by interna-tional organizations represent an important issue for addressing this schism.

3

Anti-corruption projects represent a large and increasing amount of devel-opment assistance to Africa,

4

and unlike dam construction or financial sectoradjustment, anti-corruption—as practised by international organizations—requires low capital-to-labour intensities. Rather than providing large stocksof physical capital, anti-corruption programmes normally consist of advice(or “real-time discourse”), often coming from foreign advisors, about theelaboration of anti-corruption programmes. Given that an anti-corruptionproject requires simply one or more international civil servants, airplanetickets, and meetings, these projects can be turned around quickly. Such highthroughput helps to explain the wide coverage of anti-corruption projectsin Africa—almost all African countries have undertaken or consulted on anti-corruption. Anti-corruption—as espoused by the international organiza-tions—also represents a large area of development activity which embracespopular techniques from participation to decentralization.

5

Given its promi-nent place in a “post-Washington Consensus” as a vital component of “goodgovernance”, it both represents orthodox practice and incorporates elementsof the radical critique.

6

Thus, conclusions about anti-corruption in Africamay shed light on the orthodox–radical schism in international develop-ment—remembering that this “schism” represents an artificially constructedideal-type.

The experience of anti-corruption in Africa shows (unsurprisingly) thatboth the orthodox and radical views of development are valid. Donor-sponsored anti-corruption projects in part reflect the discursive practices thatled to their development and political acceptance. Yet they also reflect the exten-sion of knowledge derived from hypothesis-testing and empirical verificationwhich has resulted in a corpus of “best practices” and “lessons learned”.This paper hopes to contribute to the literature by outlining a method forthinking about the relative “mix” of orthodox and radical influence in thedevelopment project and to offer a method of evaluation.

7

The first part ofthe paper will review some of the trends in donor-sponsored anti-corruptionactivity in Africa, noting that the expansion of such activity cannot be com-pletely attributable to the need to reduce corruption. This section will notprovide a detailed or complete history, but only offer needed elements for thesubsequent argument. The second section will look at the discourse of lessonslearned and action planning—focusing on the World Bank’s anti-corruptionprogrammes in Africa—and argue that much of the anti-corruption workostensibly derives from a discourse which has stronger or weaker “specificity”and “relevance” for the aims of anti-corruption programmes. The third


section will address the degree of programme “fit”—looking at the role oflearning from the past as opposed to drawing from anti-corruption nostrumswhich are often without theoretical and empirical grounding. Having intro-duced the notions of specificity, relevance and fit, I examine a case study ofthe Nigerian Judiciary Integrity and Capacity Project.

Anti-corruption in Africa: Some Stylized Facts

Anti-corruption in Africa has a long history, starting in the colonial era(Andreski

; Iheukwumere and Iheukwumere

; Nunn

).

8

How-ever, international donor support for anti-corruption started roughly in themid-

s with the first World Bank programmes in Uganda, Tanzania, andother Southern and Eastern African countries (Langseth and Stapenhurst

). These programmes—and later versions of them conducted by otherdonors such as UNDP and USAID in Africa—tended to have a number ofcommon features. First, they sought to use a “process” with “rigour” to bringtogether different “stakeholders” to elaborate national or sub-national actionplans (World Bank

a: iii). Second, this process was supposed to be“empirically based”, which in practice consisted of conducting opinion pollsabout perceived corruption in a number of institutions in the country. Suchsurveys have been conducted in Benin, Ghana, Guinea, Mozambique, SierraLeone, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.

9

Finally, having data and a pro-gramme, the political leadership is supposed to “internalize” anti-corruptioncomponents. This “first wave” of anti-corruption activity clearly representedthe orthodox and positivistic view of development and governance—lackingmuch real self-examination or self-criticism of this basic approach to anti-corruption (Michael

).If the scarce data available are any guide, by

–

, anti-corruptionprogrammes in Africa accounted for almost half of many European donors’anti-corruption programmes (see figure

).

10

Anti-corruption projects inAfrica constitute roughly

per cent of the Utstein anti-corruption projectdatabase. These data do not take into account activities run by any of theinternational organizations or the North American donors. Thus extrapolat-ing these results beyond Utstein Anti-Corruption Resource Centre’s partnerorganizations is perilous. However, there are two explanations for Africa’sheavy representation in the European donors’ anti-corruption projects whichmay be systematic for other donors.

First, Africa may have had a “head-start” in anti-corruption given thatdonor-led anti-corruption started in Africa. Donors have tended to work inpartnership with other donors and organizations. Such partnership hasconsisted of working on different “components” of the anti-corruption project—World Bank projects often involve the participation of TransparencyInternational and to a lesser extent USAID, UNDP and Norway’s NORAD.At other times, such partnership involves the direct or indirect finance ofpartner organizations—USAID is one of the largest contributors to Trans-parency International (Michael

). Such “partnership” has led to thesituation where one donor’s leadership on a particular project tends toattract more funds, projects and visibility. An orthodox view would note that


such a “head-start” has reduced the uncertainty of working on anti-corruption in Africa and generated room for “synergies” in programmes. Aradical view of such a head-start would see Africa’s preponderance in anti-corruption as a continuation of earlier trends in donor finance—particularlythose new and innovative approaches which other countries would not brook.

A second interpretation of Africa’s heavy representation in global anti-corruption would view such programmes as responding to actual need—namely to corruption in African countries. According to this view, Africa isone of the most corrupt regions of the world, as evidenced by IMF with-drawal from Kenya or its warning to Malawi’s president Muluzi in

.Nigeria also figures prominently in the press for corruption, and in

rated next to last in Transparency International’s “Corruption PerceptionsIndex”.

11

Given the prevalence of corruption, the orthodox view would expecta proportional response; countries with more corruption should receive agreater share of anti-corruption programmes. A radical view would argue thatdonors are trying to undo the patronage systems which they have createdand create a propitious environment for neo-colonialist foreign investment!

Yet the global distribution of anti-corruption projects seems only partiallyto correspond to the global profile of corruption. Figure

shows “control ofcorruption” relative to the OECD countries.

12

Negative values indicate thatthe region is unable to control corruption relative to the level of controlattained by the OECD. According to these data, Africa is the second worstat controlling corruption relative only to the Former Soviet Union. Thus,Africa should rightly obtain a large amount of anti-corruption assistance.

The assistance Africa receives from European donors, though, is dis-proportionate to its levels of corruption. If anti-corruption assistance were“weighted” by the amount of corruption, Africa would have far fewerprojects. For example, if all regions were to have the same “control of cor-ruption” rating, then

.

per cent of anti-corruption programmes should go

Figure

Relative global distribution of anti-corruption projects

Source: Utstein Anti-Corruption Database ()


to each of the seven world regions (

per cent divided by

is

.

per cent).The data in figure

, however, show that the Former Soviet Union is

percent worse than the OECD average, and thus should get

per cent more anti-corruption programmes.

13

If anti-corruption activity were weighted by suchconsiderations, then the relative distribution would be as in figure

. Com-paring with figure

, Africa receives more than its share of (European donor-sponsored) anti-corruption programmes. While this increased share possibly

Figure

Control of corruption

Source: Kaufmann et al. () Point estimates provided by the authors have been normalized so that OECD’s control of corruption represents the baseline.

Figure

Expected distribution of anti-corruption programmes in response to corruption

Source: Author


represents other international political and economic factors, the . percent of the world’s projects is far less than the per cent currently received.

If anti-corruption programmes are unequally distributed across the world,they are also unevenly distributed across Africa. Looking at table , fivecountries—South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia—comprisenearly all the anti-corruption activity. Again, these data should be treated withsome scepticism, as francophone Africa appears largely underrepresented.The data also do not address the type of anti-corruption project undertaken.Indeed, part of this activity could stem from donors attempting to rectifytheir previous contributions toward African corruption (Hanlon ).

If such activity corresponded to need, then there should be a correlationbetween anti-corruption activity and perceptions of corruption (even aftertaking into account the poor quality of the data). Figure shows the Trans-parency International Index and the number of anti-corruption projectsplotted for the Utstein data.14 From the data, little correspondence appearsto exist between the number of projects and perceptions of corruption.15

Kenya has a TI Index of roughly and projects while Nigeria has roughlythe same TI Index value with projects.

The orthodox view of corruption claims that corruption “programming”is based on highly scientific principles (Bailey ). Yet, these principles areonly partially discernible from looking at project allocations across Africa.Donors probably are trying to programme based on the orthodox develop-ment theory, yet there is a role for radical theory as well.

The Discourse of Lessons Learned and Action Planning

If the anti-corruption discourse had been infused with the orthodox, positiv-istic notions of project design and implementation in the early s, bythe late s this discourse extended to “lessons learned”. The discourse

Table

Concentration in Africa’s South and East

Angola Mozambique Botswana Namibia Burkina Faso Nigeria Burundi Rwanda Cameroon Sierra Leone Dem. Rep. of Congo South Africa Ethiopia Tanzania Ghana The Gambia Kenya Uganda Lesotho Zambia Malawi Zimbabwe Mauritania

Source: Utstein Anti-Corruption Database ().


legitimized anti-corruption activity by noting the harms of corruption andsuggesting that anti-corruption activity could promote outcomes—namelyreduce corruption (World Bank ). Anti-corruption’s legitimacy derivednot from anything inherent about anti-corruption itself, but from its functionin delivering certain results. Naturally, in working toward these goals (reflect-ing the scientific, positivist nature of the activity), some activities generatedmore or less favourable results which became “lessons learned”.

Many of these “lessons learned” reiterated the positivistic approachto international development in general. As seen in box , lessons learnedfrom Africa included the importance of surveys, cross-validation, social regula-tion, incentives and organization. Beyond that, though, the lessons learnedare quite obtuse. For example, the first recommendation notes that “anti-corruption surveys and workshops can provide useful information regardingcorruption, and citizens’ attitudes about corruption, and can help to mobilizepublic opinion against corruption”. Yet no specific context is mentionedwhere this “lesson” came from or why it is a lesson. If the word corruptionwere replaced by “poverty” the recommendation would have the sameimpact. The lesson learned is that surveys and workshops “provide informa-tion”—presumably to the social planners in charge of the programme.Indeed, the highly value-laden tone of the lessons makes arguing the counter-claim difficult—that “anti-corruption surveys and workshops can not provideuseful information regarding corruption, and citizens’ attitudes about cor-ruption, and can not help to mobilize public opinion against corruption”.

Such a counter-claim is difficult to make because the recipients of theinformation and the goals of the programme are too poorly defined. Theselessons are not specific by being applicable everywhere—there is no direct

Figure

Correlation between T index score and anti-corruption projects


mention of Africa in the lessons learned. The lessons are not relevant in thatthey are applicable to seemingly everything. and they do not fit within anongoing stream of thought and learning—as each “lesson learned” presentsitself as a completely new finding without mention of previous findings.16

Table summarizes several traits of these lessons learned and notes thedegree to which each trait exhibits lack of specificity, relevance or “fit”.

In order to assess these effects more generally, I look at Africa-focused anti-corruption recommendations generated by the World Bank’s Anti-CorruptionCore Course piloted in Benin, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzaniaand Uganda (World Bank a).17 For each of these countries covered inthe Core Course, action plan matrices were generated for the following

Box

Lessons learned

• Anti-corruption surveys and workshops can provide useful information regardingcorruption, and citizens’ attitudes about corruption, and can help to mobilize publicopinion against corruption.

• Key informants are critical to providing in-depth information that permits a fullerappreciation of local perceptions of the nature and extent of corruption, helping tocross-check on findings from surveys and other documentation, and making availableinformation not found elsewhere.

• Anti-corruption laws must be adequately enforced, the key “watchdog” institutionsmade strong and sufficiently funded, and corrupt practices visibly punished.

• A fully adequate salary level, adequate pensions and a higher degree of accountabil-ity are a must for the civil service. The absence of these features creates a strongpressure for petty corruption at the lower end of the wage scale and grand corrup-tion at the top.

• The judicial arm of the government needs to be adequately paid, well staffed andwell qualified. Otherwise, a weak and corruptible judiciary cannot enforce contractsand property rights, prosecute wrongdoers, etc.

• Improved public sector financial management is essential. Enforcement of financialdiscipline and prevention of the diversion of public resources become difficult in theface of budgetary over-commitment in relation to available resources, weak internalaccounting, reporting systems and follow-up. The greatest problem areas are, on thepublic revenue side, in the collection of customs duties, and on the expenditure side,in public procurement.

• An inefficient state sector contributes to periods of economic decline or stagnationand fosters extensive “rent-seeking”. Economic liberalization, unless carefully man-aged, can open new avenues for corruption.

• Civil society needs to be better organized and equipped to hold governments tohigher standards of transparency and accountability. Internal checks and balanceswithin government need to be stronger. Decentralization, for example, could, givenlimited resources and weak control systems, expand corruption at the local level.

• Strong and clear ownership—demonstrated political will—of the anti-corruptionprogramme by the concerned country is absolutely essential.

Source: World Bank (b).


categories: problem, who benefits from the problem, who loses, actionsalready taken, actions to take, expected results, and by when. These matriceswere filled out for subjects covering the rule of law, financial management,civil service reform, public procurement, customs, and others. For the rest ofthe paper, I focus on the rule of law elements. As shown in table , thesematrices appear to have been filled out by only – participants from eachcountry and generated between and proposed activities covering therule of law. In general, a good “balance” exists between public and privatesector “representatives” of the country. Yet, their representativeness of thelarge countries they supposedly represent can be called into question.

As mentioned previously, each of these rule-of-law action planning pointscan be evaluated according to its specificity and relevance for anti-corruption.Specificity refers to the degree to which the proposed recommendationaddresses a well-defined, concrete and bounded issue or problem. Generalrecommendations such as “improve integrity” are clearly non-specific while“ensure asset reporting by middle-level civil servants in the ministry offinance every month” is much more specific. A score of indicates therecommendation is completely non-specific and addresses a broad principle.A score of notes that the action refers to a general mandate and a generaldirection for fulfilling the mandate. A score of indicates the recommendation

Table

General characteristics of anti-corruption lessons learned in Africa

Main problema

Trait Description S R F

Generality Do not make reference to a specific context and can be used to describe a wide variety of other fields.b •

Depoliticization Draw attention away from the actor implementing the recommendation. Ignore the interests and passions behind recommendation treating society as a “machine”.c • • •

Disconnection Fail to cite where the lesson was learned and whether lesson supports or contradicts wider body of evidence. •

Mandate creep Provides recommendations or lessons learned in one field in the name of another.d • •

Malapropist Uses jargon and obscures meaning behind recommendation. •

TINAist Suggests that There Is No Alternative. •

aS stands for specificity, R for relevance, and F for fit.bAnti-corruption projects in Africa are not the only donor-sponsored projects exhibiting these traits; see Nelson and Wright () or Cooke and Kothari ().cPolzer () discusses this aspect with regard to anti-corruption.dEinhorn () discusses such mandate creep more generally.


does define broadly who, what, where, when, or how to reduce corruption.A score of is given for recommendations that are reasonably specific andapply only specifically to anti-corruption. A score of is given for a modelrecommendation which would be seen in a highly detailed planning document.

Specificity, however, is not the same as relevance. A recommendationadvocating improved access to health in a particular province for youngpersons is specific but more relevant to a health sector programme than ananti-corruption project. A score of indicates the article is not highly rele-vant for fighting corruption as opposed to pursuing other goals (like spread-ing democracy, improving state “capacity” or some other goal). A score of refers to a recommendation which is related to corruption, but only tangen-tially. For example, proposed actions promoting civil society development arerelated to corruption but would probably be better placed in a programmeon civic development or even decentralization! A score of indicates theproposed measure is often one component of a “standard” anti-corruptionprogramme, but the article does not directly discuss anti-corruption. A scoreof indicates the proposed action is directly related to anti-corruption, butis not a key action to take in the fight against African corruption. A score of indicates the recommendation is directly related to anti-corruption andvery important.

Table shows the specificity and relevance scores for the countriescovered in the rule of law part of the Bank action plans.18 While country rank-ings cannot be determined due to the subjectivity of the estimates, in generalBenin appears to have the “least bad” action plan and Ethiopia the worst.

Overall, the action plans do appear to be specific to the countries and,while following a general design, display high variation in both presentationand outcomes.19 Benin’s anti-corruption action plan includes action pointssimply labelled as “pressure” and “information”—which are both non-specific and can be relevant to a wide range of social problems. Other

Table

Characteristics of action planning groups

Country Number of participants

cited

(Government) (Civil society) Number of action plan

components for rule of law

Benin* Ethiopia Ghana Kenya Malawi Tanzania Uganda

*One participant was not identified.


actions, such as disclosure of revenue staff ’s assets and liabilities, are specificand relevant to Benin. Finally, some actions, such as promoting tariff harmo-nization with the West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) orinformation dissemination about correlation between rule of law and corrup-tion, require greater precision about targets of the policy and details aboutthe action. Ethiopia’s action plan scores low because recommendationssuch as “mobilize resources”, “research on existing system” and “raise funds”are non-specific and can apply to a wide range of issues. Ghana’s action planis more specific than Ethiopia’s only because it mentions “rule of law” inits proposed actions. An unusual recommendation is the need to “amendobnoxious laws”, while the recommendation to “sensitize about dangers ofnot complying with the rule of law” fail to define what such sensitizationwould consist of ! Kenya’s action plan is the most heterogeneous. Somepoints clearly define the legislation to be addressed and specific steps forbuilding capacity (such as computerizing supply equipment). Yet, other rec-ommendations are cryptic, such as “using umbrella organs to strengthenmembers individually and collectively”.

Why might proposed actions be so non-specific and relevant? In the ortho-dox view, these recommendations reflect “learning by doing” or “rationalambiguity” whereby local actors are given relatively broad mandates in orderto reflect local conditions (Sabatier ). A radical view would see the policydialogue and actions emanating from it as carriers of a struggle for powerand resources—a broad canvas upon which can be drawn post-WashingtonConsensus policies restricting African political and economic sovereignty.Both views are partially wrong and partially right.

Separating Discourse from Knowledge Management

If the anti-corruption discourse of the s focused on results and if anti-corruption projects obtained their legitimacy through result-oriented dis-course, then by the late s and s, legitimacy was gained through aself-reflexive discourse. Anti-corruption projects no longer needed to refer to

Table

Specificity and relevance of World Bank-sponsored anti-corruption programmes

Country Specificity Relevance

Benin . .Ethiopia . .Ghana . .Kenya . .Malawi . .Tanzania . .Uganda . .

Note: Lowest score = ; highest score = .


results attained (because few had any).20 Instead, new anti-corruptionprojects attained their legitimacy from previous ones. Like a hall of mirrors,the anti-corruption discourse had moved from referring to corruption—andtoward “best practice”, “new approaches” and “new frontiers”. As figure shows, if anti-corruption projects in what I have previously referred to as the“first wave of anti-corruption” derived their legitimacy from a supportingdiscourse and the expectation of actual reductions in corruption, by the“second wave”, additional legitimacy was gained by a reference to priorprojects (Michael ).

As previously mentioned, there are both orthodox and radical views of thisevolution. The orthodox view would stress the learning side of the increas-ingly self-referential nature of anti-corruption while the radical view wouldsee it as a way of legitimizing a neo-colonialist enterprise. If there is roomfor both views, then formulaically the anti-corruption project A consists ofdiscourse D and accumulated knowledge K or

A = βD + ( − β )K

where β is a simple weight of elements of the anti-corruption project whichare inexplicable by “earnest” knowledge management and elements whichare explicable by discursive practices.21 A perhaps overly simplistic represen-tation of the action plan points previously referred to, then, would be to use

Figure

Schematic of anti-corruption action planning


the specificity and relevance weights as the β. Namely, if an action receivesa for specificity and relevance, there is no room for uncertainty—the actionlives up to its orthodox and positivistic ideal. However, if the action itemrates a , then it largely reflects the prevailing discourse of the time withoutclear indication of what to do or how to accomplish the goal the recommen-dation seeks.

If the increasingly self-referential nature of anti-corruption is accountedfor, then previous anti-corruption projects affect the value of current ones,such that

A = β[γD + − γD′] + ( − β )K

where D′ is the discourse which is “useful” in the sense that it attempts toextend the results of previous actions or learns from them. An orthodox viewwould find that D′ is the “useful” bit of the discourse—the part which objec-tively lowers corruption—and D is the “dirty” political and manipulative bitto be minimized. A radical view would argue that both D and D′ are dis-course though conceding that D′ does reduce corruption (while questioningthe ends and means of D′ ). Orthodox observers would view D′ as the “good”bit of the discourse, while radical observers would be at best ambivalentabout D′ and probably claim that D′ is simply part of the larger D.

If a D′ exists, it would by definition extend from previous anti-corruptionresults. In other words, D′ would “fit” with prior activities while D wouldhave less fit. Again, a -point scale can be used to assess this “fit”. A scoreof indicates little correspondence between previous and proposed activities—they are very different. A score of indicates that the new activities pro-pose “more of the same” as the old activities. New activities do not extendas much as repeat prior activities. A score of indicates that new pro-grammes repeat previous programmes but to some degree extend them. Ascore of indicates significant extension, while indicates a well-designedprogramme.

Several indicators are shown in table . With the exceptions of Kenya andTanzania, “fit” scores are rather low. These scores should be treated withscepticism, though, as establishing correspondence with prior actions wasdifficult given the poor reporting of prior activities. As shown in table ,previously reported activities ranged from to . Such poor reporting initself shows the relative inability to extend off to prior lessons and relianceinstead on other discursive elements of the anti-corruption field. The ratioof new to old programmes is a rough measure of the proposed expansion ofanti-corruption in Africa. The largest proposed expansion was in Ghanawhile the least were in Kenya and Uganda.

The degree of fit for the rule of law indicators of the anti-corruptionaction plans differed significantly across countries.22 For Benin, fit in generalis weak. For the problem of “state and people use other rules”, the actionplan noted that no prior actions had been taken about this problem—aclearly false statement in light of Benin’s (albeit superficial) approach to fight-ing corruption. In the case of Ethiopia, the correspondence was evenweaker—while a design to develop a Code of Conduct was mentioned as a


previous action, the elaboration and implementation of the Code of Conductis not mentioned as a proposed action. Kenya’s (and Tanzania’s) fit is difficultto assess because, while activities are not broken down by specific problems,there is clear extension between past actions and proposed activities. Malawihas the largest action plan ( items), also reflecting high heterogeneity in thespecificity and relevance of items. Some items such as “meet the high courtregistrar” are certainly specific, but probably not highly relevant. In somecases, low fit stems from the large number of activities undertaken with littleproposed follow-up (as in the case of insufficient judicial officers).

Both the orthodox and radical perspectives should be taken into accountfor analysing anti-corruption programmes. The relative “looseness” of spe-cificity, relevance and “fit” in African anti-corruption action plans suggeststhat anti-corruption is clearly the extension of broader discursive fields. Yet,the “tightness” of some items suggests an earnest attempt to reduce corrup-tion. If both perspectives are applicable in theory, how might they be usedin practice?

Making Rule-of-Law Action Plans Better: The UN Programme in Nigeria23

While less than perfect specificity, relevance and fit will exist with every anti-corruption, some programme designs are more specific, relevant, and showhigher fit.24 An example of a project in Africa with higher specificity, rele-vance and fit is the Nigerian Judiciary Integrity and Capacity Project. Thisproject was started in April by the United Nations Centre for Interna-tional Crime Prevention, in collaboration with Transparency Internationaland the Supreme Court of Nigeria. A group of chief justices and high-leveljudges was invited to a preparatory meeting in Vienna, Austria, to formulate

Table

Correspondence of New Action Plan items and their “fit”

Country Number of previous elements mentioned

Ratio of new to old

Fit

Benin . .Ethiopia . .Ghana . .Kenya . .Malawi . .Tanzania . .Uganda . .

Note: Ratio of old to new found by dividing Number of previous elements mentioned column from this table with the Number of action plan components from table . The ratio indicates the extent to which new activities outnumber old ones.


a programme to strengthen Nigerian judicial integrity.25 The experts inde-pendently assessed the types, levels, causes, locations and remedies of judicialcorruption in three representative pilot states.

The First Federal Integrity Meeting for Chief Judges assessed the recom-mendations from the April meeting. Chief judges defined and agreedupon objectives which were to be implemented over a -month period. Thegroup was asked to identify measurement indicators. A full-time NationalProject Coordinator was engaged for two years and a local research institutewas engaged to conduct corruption assessments. After the completion of theassessments, state-level integrity workshops for the judiciary were planned inthe three pilot states. Based on the assessments, an action plan for streng-thening judicial integrity was planned for development. After months,depending on the expected availability of additional funding, another roundof assessments within the three pilot states was planned. Adjustments couldthen be made and the project could be extended if necessary.

The relevance of the programme was bolstered by preliminary assessments.Out of participants in the April meeting, filled out and submitteda questionnaire which identified priority areas in Nigeria. As shown in table, the police and prosecutors were high-priority segments of the justice sys-tem, whereas judges were seen as less corrupt. The specificity of the projectwas bolstered by having judicial experts identify priorities rather than gener-alists. As shown in table , out of areas, the participants rated five as toppriorities: court records management, judicial training, public confidence inthe judiciary, judicial control over delays caused by litigant lawyers, and amerit-based system of judicial appointment. Fit was bolstered by looking atpast successful efforts. The most effective measures implemented in thecourse of the past five years were providing the criminal justice system withbasic funds, equipment, facilities and adequate remuneration (see table ).Efforts made to increase the integration of the criminal justice system werealso rated as highly effective.

Having identified specific and relevant segments of the justice system, andhaving assessed the fit of the programme with prior work, proposed actions

Table

Corruption perceptions in Nigeria

Very low and low corruption High and very high corruption

Judges Court administrators Prosecutors Police Prison personnel Lawyers

Source: Langseth and Michael ().


could be focused on narrowly geographically and temporally bound para-meters. These proposed actions for the most important improvements neededoutside the court system are shown in figure . The police emerged as thesingle institution most mentioned and improvements needed included bettertraining, improvement of investigative/forensic skills and equipment, and theestablishment of a central data bank on crime.

The UN programme in Nigeria shows higher specificity, relevance and fitthan other “action plans” in Africa for a number of reasons. The programmeis narrowly focused and tightly defined and appears to be elaborated byexperts in the field rather than “anti-corruption generalists” who may bemore persuaded by the anti-corruption discourse than by the technical find-ings of their discipline. While the discourse of the anti-corruption field doesappear to have significantly influenced the project, the discourse appears tohave provided the political legitimacy for the programme and contours forproject design. Orthodox observers of the project might view D as low rela-tive to D′—in other words the specificity, relevance and fit is high—and seethis as “better” project design. Radical observers would claim that theproject reflects the anti-corruption discourse and refuse to accept that itcould be a “better” project (especially given the lack of recorded results thusfar! ). However, both orthodox and radical observers would acknowledge the“mix” of discourse and learning which inspired the project—even if theymight make different value judgements about the existence of this “mix”.26

Table

Judicial anti-corruption priorities

Key problem areas Priority rating Very high

Judicial training Merit-based judicial appointments Public confidence in the judiciary Court records management Credible and effective complaints system Adequate and fair remuneration Enforcement of code of conduct Increased judicial control over delays created

by litigant lawyers Court delays Case assignment system Case management Abuses of procedural discretion Generation of reliable court statistics Case-load management Abuses of substantive discretion Sentencing guidelines Communication with court users (e.g. court user committees)

Source: Langseth and Michael ().


Table

Most successful measures in the last five years

Categories chosen Responses

Improved facilities and equipment and funding Recruitment of more judges and prosecutors Improved coordination and dialogue within the judiciary and with the other

criminal justice institutions Regular and adequate salaries for judicial officers Fast justice delivery exercises in prisons Reducing delays (decongestion exercises) Law reform (e.g. amendment of civil and criminal procedure law) Reorganization of existing, and creation of new, court divisions

(delivery of justice close to the people) Improved training and training institutions Improved working conditions, human resources management, including

appointment process and security Improved punctuality and time limits on case hearing Establishment of the National Judicial Council Improved monitoring of judges and case flow Improved case-assignment system Other

Source: Adapted from Langseth and Michael ().

Figure

Most important improvements needed outside of the court system

Source: Langseth and Michael ()


Conclusion

International donor-sponsored anti-corruption projects in Africa reflect both“discourse” and results-focused learning by doing. While donors have seem-ingly partially responded to high prevalences of corruption, other factorsappear to motivate the decision to engage in anti-corruption activity in anyparticular African country. If objective and positivist rationale were the onlycontributor, then such programmes would have a high degree of specificity,relevance and fit. They should have a specific task and fulfil it efficiently.They do not. These programmes have sometimes significantly low specificity,relevance and fit. Longer-term and intensive programmes such as the NigerianJudiciary Integrity and Capacity Project suggest that programmes can bedesigned with higher specificity, relevance and fit (though their effectivenessat reducing corruption remains to be seen). If differing specificities, rele-vances and fits exist, then both orthodox and radical views of anti-corruptionproject design must be partially valid.

Appendix: Action Plan Points Used for Scores

Benin

Action Specificity Relevance Fit

Authorities are above the law Political will Judge for embezzlement Pressure Information about rule of law Lobbying with Parliament Information dissemination on correlation between rule of

law and corruption People and state use other rules

Act for the rule of law Information () Sensitize through workshops

Judiciary is not independent Reform the judiciary appointments process Pressure Lobbying with Parliament

Untitled Enforce existing laws and regulations Law against illegal enrichment Disclosure of revenue staff ’s assets/liabilities Training for revenue staff Provide incentives for honest taxpayers Depoliticize and professionalize revenue collection Harmonize customs duties with UEMOA

Total Country Scores . . .


Ethiopia

Ghana


Lack of skill in handling corruption cases/Inadequate judicial system and procedures/Lack of technological support/ Inadequate criminal law controlling corruption Mobilize resources Draft efficient procedure and evidence law Create efficient judiciary by organizational restructuring Training Revise penal code and criminal procedures Participation in stakeholder meetings Research on existing system Publicize problems and solutions Create fora for public participation Design projects Raise funds Recruit consultants Coordinate government and society activities Approve draft legislation and send to bodies

Total Country Scores . .


Cynicism and lack of confidence in law enforcement Enforce discipline in law enforcement and government Insist on rights and rule of law Sensitize about dangers of not complying with rule of law

Authorities act as if above the law Government officials comply with law and become more

transparent Civil society demands greater transparency and interaction

with government officials Advocate greater participation with government and civil

society Weak judiciary/lack of independence

Provide resources to improve adjudication procedures, computers

Improve judge and judicial staff salaries Transparency in judge appointments Amend obnoxious laws Coordinate media and civil society Provide fora for action



Kenya

Malawi


Inadequate legal framework and weak enforcement Review pertinent legislation including Prevention of

Corruption Act . . . Build legal capacity by improving remuneration,

computerizing supply equipment, improvement of record management and physical facilities

Develop codes of conduct Encourage meritocracy Advocacy for effective legal and institutional frameworks Using networks and dissemination channels (e.g. media) to

expose lapses in diligence and acts of corruption Using umbrella organs to strengthen members individually

and collectively Lobby Govt for necessary legal changes and enhanced

resource allocation to law enforcement agencies Collaborate in draft and design of National

Strategy to fight corruption Strengthen coordination within civil society



People and state use other rules Training of additional judicial officers Provision of more court facilities Simplification and rationalization of laws Survey of perceptions of corruption and independence of

judiciary Translation of laws into vernacular Prepare survey questionnaire Meet High Court Registrar Meet Legal Reform Committee Widely publicize the work of the LRC Check on funding gaps for WB assistance Identify administrative bottlenecks in government

interventions and eliminate them Build coalitions to ensure no one above the law

Weak laws and lack of laws Train prosecutors and investigators Further awareness-raising campaigns on ills of corruption Coordinate civil society


Tanzania

Excessive discretion in Administrative Law Reduce discretion by regulators Media revelations of corruption Lobby government

Lack of expertise in prosecution Increase recruitment of prosecutors and investigators Mount further and corruption-focused campaigns against

political interference Lack of expertise in investigation

Create security of tenure and incentives Awareness campaigns against disrespect for court decisions

Insufficient judicial officers Better awareness campaigns Better infrastructure

Lack of appreciation for the concept and ills of corruption None

Total Country Scores . . .


Rule of law and legal framework Strengthening the judiciary Strengthen law enforcement agencies Improve salaries and pensions for judiciary and law

enforcement staff Creation of Human Rights Commission Constitutional amendment separating Chief Justice and

President of Court of Appeals Establish rule of law and separation of powers in Constitution Constitutionally separate politicians and civil servants Public education of citizens’ legal rights Provide for alternative dispute resolution Legal aid for indigent Provide machinery for acting against the corrupt “Diagnostic surveys” Make a case for public hearings Workshops addressing legal entitlements



Malawi

(Continued)


Uganda

Notes. There are a number of texts which cover this highly differentiated perspective,

including Seligson and Passe-Smith () and Meier and Rauch (). Peet() puts this view into perspective by offering other views of development andScott () provides a focused critique of this view. Of course, the brief reviewhere cannot do justice to the complexity of the field.

. As with the “orthodox” view, the radical view comprises a wide range of ideasand thinkers who may be classified together only on the grounds that they offera critique of the formerly predominant view of development. The radical schoolincludes a number of scholars including Harriss (), Hobart (), Manzo(), Sachs (), and Rahnema and Bawtree ().

. For the rest of the paper, I will refer to sub-Saharan Africa as “Africa” excludingNorth Africa and South Africa.


Weak law enforcement Further strengthening of law enforcement agencies through

training, payment of adequate salaries, provision of facilities, e.g. vehicles, computers, awareness raising by Judicial Service Commission, IGG, etc.

Review by Parliament and the execution of some of the laws that have not yet been reformed, e.g. Leadership Code, Auditor General, IGG, procurement system

Bringing high-profile cases to successful conclusions through prosecution

Awareness raising Strengthening of NGOs individually and through

coordination with each other Repressing corruption by the media, religious and cultural

leaders and institutions Put pressure on Govt to implement what has not yet been

done Individual team members to implement their respective

assignments Coordinate more with civil society

Passive/weak civil society Build better relationships with media Lunch with agencies Civil society should take over the agenda Build better relationships with civil society Use media/local councils to deliver government programmes Encourage government to create and work with civil society



. According to figures presented by a variety of anti-corruption donor agencies ata UN meeting in Vienna on May , $ million appears to be a “lowerbound” estimate for the value of anti-corruption activities of, principally, the UN.

. The belief in participation and decentralization has become almost canonical inanti-corruption practice. See Transparency International () and World Bank() for more.

. See Stiglitz (), Drache (), and Ahrens () for more.. I am aware that there are advocates of both schools of thought who view any

orthodox and radical theory as irreconcilable. Positivistic practice will remain aservant of post-Enlightenment discursive fields for radical thinkers. “Inefficient”discursive practices must ultimately fall away for orthodox thinkers as rationalpeople see some practices as more effective than others at accomplishing certaingoals. Both views remain open for debate—a debate which this paper hopes tobroaden.

. I will not undertake a discussion of corruption in Africa which many authors seeas pivotal to African political and social life (Bayart et al. ; de Sardan ;Flanary and Watt ; Bankole ; Chabal and Daloz ).

. For more information on these “diagnostic instruments” as well as a manual forimplementing your own “diagnostic” in the African country of your choice, see:http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/capacitybuild/diagnostics.html#guide

. These data are taken from Utstein Anti-corruption Database (http://www.u.no/projects/region.cfm) and cover projects from Norway’s NORAD,the UK’s DFID, Germany’s GTZ, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, andthe Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The database omits important donorsincluding the World Bank, the UN and USAID ( listed roughly in order of impor-tance). The database was chosen to provide a semi-non-biased sample of anti-corruption programmes in the region. Other approaches would have trawled thewebsites of Transparency International, the World Bank, USAID, and others—possibly introducing bias. While the Utstein database probably has biases as well,it is the most complete database known to the author of anti-corruption projectscovering Africa.

. For the complete index, see: http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive//...cpi.en.html.

. The point estimates used in the graph refer to Kaufmann et al.’s () estimates.See their paper for more information on the derivation of these estimates. Thereare a wide range of data concerning corruption, rule of law and governance.These data were chosen because they represent an “index of indices” supposedlyencapsulating estimates from a range of other data sources.

. These proportions are obtained by using Kaufmann et al.’s () point estimates,by calculating the proportional discrepancy between each region and the OECDaverage.

. Fifteen countries are shown due to the lack of Transparency International indexvalues for Burkina Faso, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho,Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and The Gambia.

. Generally, the TI index is considered a poor indicator because it measuressubjective perceptions of corruption rather than actual, objective corruption.In this case, though, perceptions of corruption are the important variable as anti-corruption project spending would be based on perceptions of corruption (giventhat the underlying corruption is largely immeasurable).

. The principles of specificity, relevance and “fit” are not new criteria for assessingthese lessons learned but comprise the basis of any policy or project evaluation(Weimer and Vining ; Chambers ).


. For more information on each country, see country project reports available at:http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/

. See the Appendix for a detailed assessment.. I will refer to action plans by their country as World Bank () does, even

though a plan devised by fewer than people can hardly lay claim to being anationally representative or binding instrument.

. There have been many evaluations of anti-corruption project design and imple-mentation such as van Gils et al. () or Marra (). However, few studieshave attempted to measure decreases in perceptions of objective corruption dueto donor-sponsored programmes.

. The value of A is set exogenously. I would not suggest that these values becalculated, but use this equation as a demonstration of a way of thinking aboutthe more general point of the paper.

. See the Appendix for a detailed assessment.. Much of this section is adapted from Langseth and Michael ().. As the previous discussion does not address the actual impact of these anti-

corruption programmes on corruption, this discussion focuses on design issuesand also ignores the impact of the programme.

. The group was formed of chief justices or senior judges from Bangladesh, theState of Karnataka in India, Nepal, Nigeria, Uganda, Tanzania and SouthAfrica.

. I would not argue that the Nigerian project is “better” or offers lessons, as Iwould be falling into the same trap as the peddlers of lessons learned.

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