What challenges do Russia’s ambitious plans for the restructuring of its

military by 2020 face?

In 2010, Putin set out his government’s plan for the restructuring of the military to

become a twenty-first century fighting force. If Russia is successful in her military

reform she could become a serious global player in the world militarily. Russia’s

economy is much better than under the latter decades of the Soviet Union and any

attempt made by Russia to do this would have serious implication on the world

stage and the study of politics and international affairs. However, many of the aims

were ambitious to say the least and Russia faces numerous high hurdles it has to

overcome. This essay will focus on the challenges Russia will face in attempting to

implement them. Specifically, this essay will evaluate the challenges Russia faces in

the ‘modernisation’ of military (predominantly the army) training and the improving

the military image. The reason for this is fairly straightforward; as US General Patton

Junior famously stated “No army is better than its soldiers”1. It is also one of the

more overlooked aspects when discussing military transformation and

restructuring. As this essay will be focussing on the ‘soldier’ aspect of military

restructuring it is important to define certain terms. When discussing

‘restructuring’, this essay refers to the aims set out by Russia’s Military Doctrine of

2010 most relevant to that of the actual ‘soldier’ and the modernisation of them,

their role and their equipment. Thus the essay will be divided into three chapters

discussing each aim of Russia’s military doctrine related to the aforementioned: 1)

“improve the quality of [soldier] training”; 2) “produce servicemen who are highly

professional”; 3)“boost the prestige of military service”; and 4)“Acquisition [ and]

1 Patton, G.S, General, Quoted by: goodreads, http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/143214-the-soldier-is-the-army-no-army-is-better-than, accessed 14/03/2014.

high quality familiarisation with… up-to-date models of armaments and specialised

equipment”2. This essay will focus on each aforementioned aim in turn, and the

challenges Russia may face in the immediate future.

Chapter One: Producing soldiers who are highly professional

The first challenge Russia will face in ‘producing soldiers who are highly

professional’ is the calibre of the army’s recruits. Mass conscription, by definition

cannot ‘pick and choose’ recruits to anywhere near the same efficiency as a

volunteer force3. Conscription lacks the “rough sieve, separating the unsuitable

persons from those who are better fitted, mentally and physically, to stand the

strain of war” that a volunteer service with high entry standards create4. Therefore

for Russia, having a conscript army will make it more challenging to produce

professional soldiers universally. Looking at NATO states for comparison, countries

which rely heavily on conscription (as Russia does) are less likely to draw out plans

to abolish conscription (see table5). Furthermore any plans to lessen the size of the

army in previous years in Russia have been met with hostilities within the Armed

Forces as they look at reducing the numbers of ‘draft-dodgers’.6 A Conscript army

does not necessarily mean that a military will only have ‘low lives’ as those who

2 Russian Presidential edict, The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation approved by Russian Federal presidential edict 5/02/2010, translated and published by, Carnegie endowment, 2010, accessed 14/03/2014: carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf

3Thomas W.Ross, Raising an Army: A Positive Theory of Military Recruitment, HeinOnline 37 J.L & Econ. 109, University of British Columbia, 1994, P129.

4 K.D Rivett, The Case Against Conscription, Australian Quarterly, Vol 14, No2, June 1942, P95.

5 Table: Williams, From Conscripts to Volunteers, p37.

6 Facon, I, Sources of the Modernisation of the Russian Military: The Ambitious and Ambiguities of Vladimir Putin, Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2005, p10.

would make good soldiers are conscripted too. However the situation in Russia is

that many who would make ‘professional and devoted soldiers’ are normally able to

avoid the draft7. Russian society and government is also highly corrupt, which helps

explain why those from higher socio-economic backgrounds who would make good

soldiers (especially officers) are not enlisted. Instead conscription has the

unfortunate effect in Russia of hiring “only on the most deprived and disadvantaged

young Russians, in terms of health, intellectual ability and social position”8. Of

those soldiers called up during the spring of 2013 draft, only 65 percent were

considered “fit” for military service9. This by no means reflects the overall health of

the country. The situation in regards to the population is getting worse; the overall

population is declining whilst the median age continues to rise (and expected will

continue to do so for the immediate future) suggesting a fall in youth numbers10.

This will further weaken Russia’s attempt to ‘pick and choose’ suitable recruits. As

plans to shrink the size of the army are constantly vetoed by the military, Russia will

have to actually lower its entry requirements to avoid shortfalls in recruitment.

Naturally this will be detrimental to the aim of producing professional soldiers and

thus will be a major challenge in the coming years.

7 Ibid.

8 Facon, I, Sources of the Modernisation of the Russian Military: The Ambitious and Ambiguities of Vladimir Putin, Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2005. p10.

9 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook, Central Asia, Russia: accessed 14/03/2104, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html

10 Russia’s median age change; from 24 years in 1960 to 35 in 2010 (male): Vassin,S.A, The Determinants and implications of an Aging population in Russia, Rand Corperation, accessed 14/03/2014, http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF124/CF124.chap6.html

Chapter Two: Improve the Quality of Soldier Training

This relates to creating soldiers who are highly professional and so the debate shall

continue here. The first aspect in regards to producing a professional soldier, after

recruiting them (detailed in the previous chapter) would be the quality and

sophistication of the training they receive. Russia has identified this as an issue in

their military, with the aim to “improve the quality of… training” for soldiers, and so

this will be a challenge Russia will need to overcome11. How to deliver high quality

training is the subject of military debate, though most militaries, especially Western

forces (notably Britain, USA, France, and Germany) rely on the experience that

veteran, Non-Commissioned Officers can give in delivering such training12. NCOs

can offer training that is specific to each regiment allowing for the specialisation of

training from an early stage. According to the British Army, from the beginning,

compulsory basic training is commanded by NCOs “from a battalion [the soldier] is

likely to join”13. Similarly the United States Army has an “established doctrine” of

NCOs as trainers, and “training is now a primary duty of NCO’s” in the United States

military14. If Russia plans on producing professional soldiers through effective and

specialised training then it has to have a well-populated and professionalised

population of NCOs in the military. The challenge Russia faces then is, unlike the

other aforementioned states, Russia lacks a large NCO component in their military

11 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation approved by Russian Federal presidential edict 5/02/2010, translated and published by, Carnegie endowment, 2010, accessed: carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf

12 Isabelle Facon. Sources of the Modernisation of the Russian Military: The Ambitious and Ambiguities of Vladimir Putin, Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2005, p4.

13 British Army, ITC Catterick, Ministry of Defence (UK), accessed 14/03/2014, https://www.army.mod.uk/training_education/24422.aspx, video, 00.56 – 1.00

14 Rush, R.S, The Evolution of Noncommissioned Officers in Training Soldiers, The Land Warfare Papers, Association of the United States Army, October 2009, P10

due to “serious retention… problems” amongst the army population; most soldiers

leave as soon as their conscription contract expires15. (This is discussed in more

detail in Chapter Four). Those NCOs which remain in the army also face leadership

problems. The dedovshchina is essentially ‘prison culture’ and began when convicts

from the gulags were drafted into the army in the Second World War and is a

problem the Soviets/ Russians have not been able to stamp out and will likely

continue to be problematic for the future16. Under this system, superiority is based

on years served, not formal rank, making some NCOs informally subordinate to

privates because the latter have served longer17. This undermines the whole rank

system and the ability for NCOs to train privates. A lack of NCO’s / NCO’s

informally inferior to the soldiers they are supposed to be training in the military

can mean poor qualitative and little quantitative training for soldiers, this also

prevents the Russians training the soldiers in the most modern tactics and

strategies. Indeed during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the “poor quality of

NCO[s]… were identified as [a] key [reason] why Soviet troops were performing

poorly on the modern battlefield” and the situation continues today18. This was a

problem for the Americans in the First World War as the US military lacked veteran

NCOs. However the US was able to rely on British and French NCOs to train their

soldiers19. But even if Russia trains its soldiers the way America did in the First

World War, i.e. using NCOs from foreign but highly professionalised militaries to

15 Major Marybeth Peterson Ulrich (USAF), Democracy and Russian Military Professionalism, Airpower Journal –Special Edition, 1996, p81.

16 Andrew Spivak and William Pridemore offer a detailed and highly interesting examination of such living conditions and endemic corruption in the Russian Military in : Conscription and Reform in the Russian Army, National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, Washington DC, 2004, P3

17 Ibid.

18 Major Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, USAF, Democracy and Russian Military Professionalism, Airpower Journal, Special Edition 1996, p83

19 Rush, R.S, The Evolution of Noncommissioned Officers in Training Soldiers, The Land Warfare Papers, Association of the United States Army, October 2009, Pp4-5.

train their own soldiers, they will still face problems (other than those previously

listed). There is a strong correlation between soldiers and officers in the Russian

military that have been trained by or even worked alongside Western counterparts

and the chances of being passed over for promotion due to a culture of mistrust in

the Russian military of anything ‘Western’20. This will also be problematic if Russia

continues to purchase high tech equipment from abroad as soldiers from those

countries may be the only ones who know how to use the equipment (this is

discussed in more detail in chapter three). Moreover, the entire premise of army

‘promotion’ in the Russian Army is a problem in of itself. Instead of promotion to

NCO status being based on meritocracy, the Russian promotion system has been

“compromised by patronage networks” as well as the aforementioned dedovshchina

system21. Even if Russia could get more soldiers to stay on, those promoted to

NCOs will be based on who they know, not what they know and thus it is unlikely

Russia will attain the calibre of NCOs that is required for effective training. Even if

they did have high quality NCOs, many will still face restrictions due to the

dedovshchina system. This is unlikely to disappear in the near future and so will

hamper Russian aims at improving the quality of their soldiers.

Lastly, the training programme as well as the entire strategic outlook of the Russian

military is outdated with most of it “aimed at countering threats in the past” such as

fighting a conventional war with a force such as NATO, rather than training to fight

asymmetrical warfare which would be more common in the present international

climate22. This is unlikely to change in the future. Whilst Russia has accepted the

20 Isabelle Facon. Sources of the Modernisation of the Russian Military: The Ambitious and Ambiguities of Vladimir Putin, Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2005, p9.

21 Major Marybeth Peterson Ulrich (USAF), Democracy and Russian Military Professionalism, Airpower Journal –Special Edition, 1996, p81.

22 Isabelle Facon. Sources of the Modernisation of the Russian Military: The Ambitious and Ambiguities of Vladimir Putin, Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2005, p3.

need to focus more on asymmetrical warfare such as counter-terrorism, in the

official document The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2010), chapter

two discusses “The Military dangers and military threats to the Russian Federation”.

In the document, Russia notes that “the spread of international terrorism”

constitutes a threat. However, this is labelled as article ‘J’, and is second to bottom

on the list. At the top, article ‘A’ states that NATO continues to pose the greatest

threat to Russia23. With training still being based predominantly on fighting a

symmetrical war with NATO, Russian tactics and the incorporated training will fail to

counter the threats of the 21st century.

Chapter Three: Acquisition and Familiarisation with modern military

equipment

The ‘research and development’ aspect of weapons is very expensive, states have

to pour billions into such programmes in order to develop and build ‘modern

military equipment’. Money Russia does not necessarily have. The United States, by

far the state with largest defence expenditure and most modern military, spent 74

Billion USD (equivalent to 82% of Russia’s entire defence budget) on ‘research and

development’ in 2011.24 Comparatively while France and Britain have defence

budgets set at two thirds the size of Russia’s, they both have militaries with well-

23 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation approved by Russian Federal presidential edict 5/02/2010, translated and published by, Carnegie endowment, 2010, accessed: carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdfPart Two, Chapter 8.

24 Plumer, B, America’s staggering defense budget, in charts, The Washington Post 7/01/2013, accessed: 14/03/2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/07/everything-chuck-hagel-needs-to-know-about-the-defense-budget-in-charts/

equipped, modern armaments25. However both states have the benefit of having to

only equip militaries much smaller than those states which spend more (USA, China,

Russia), so their budgets can afford to be lower and still have a personnel to

expenditure ratio is much higher than Russia’s; the United Kingdom for instance

spends 6.5 times more per soldier than Russia does26. China provides an excellent

example of the challenge of having such a large military brings when it comes to

the modernisation and familiarisation of equipment. Since 1997 China has had to

increase defence spending exponentially (now second only to the US) in terms of

defence to be able to both build as well as provide the training for, modern

weapons27. Yet despite such an increase in spending China still faces problems with

outdated equipment as only“25% of its surface combatants [and] 40% of its surface-

to-air missiles… are deemed by the US Department of Defense to be modern” 28.

Despite a surge in spending this has only allowed China to update a minority of its

arsenal. Even if Russia could afford to spend the equivalent to China or the United

States on defence (which it cannot), it faces the same problem as China, a large

army population size and a huge pre-existing arsenal of outdated equipment. The

sheer size of the Russian army means that building/ buying and training of its

entire military with modern armaments costs an astronomical and therefore

prohibitive cost. To explain this problem it is best to use an example. If

metaphorically, Russia wanted to update from the standard AK-47 rifle and equip

25 Richard Bitzinger, Modernising China’sMilitary 1997-2012, China Perspective, 2011, p9.

26 Russia frontline forces 766,000 – source: Writer, S, Russia Military Strength, Global Fire Power (GFP), last updated 14/02/2014, last accessed 14/03/2014, http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=RussiaBritish Army, full time soldiers – 102,000 – Berman G, Rutherford, T, Defence personnel statistics, Sep 2010, Parliament (UK), last accessed: 14/04/2014, www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/sn02183.pdf p5. . British spending ratio = ($62,000,000,000 / 102,000 personnel) =$60,7843 per soldierRussian spending ration = ($72,000,000,000 / 766,000 personnel) = $93994 per soldier

27 Richard Bitzinger, Modernising China’s Military 1997-2012, China Perspective, 2011, p9.

28 Ibid. p14.

its 1.6 million army personnel (2013 size) with the British Army’s standard issue

assault rifle (SA-80), the cost would cost 1.64billionUSD, more than the annual

Russian budget on research and development29. That is the cost of simply updating

the comparatively inexpensive part of armaments – ‘small arms’. Items such as

fighter jets and warships cost millions of dollars each. Russia either would have to

cut its force population by approximately 70% (to emulate the British / French

model), or spend 6.5 times more to achieve ‘spending to soldier population ratio’

parity with Britain, double defence spending to achieve parity with China or seven

hundred times to achieve parity with the USA. These options are all highly unlikely

and so: the size of the Russian Army, the lack of funding, an outdated domestic

arms market and a huge pre-existing arsenal of outdated weapons will all be

obstacles to Russia’s aim at acquiring modern military equipment.

One of the chief problems Russia faces is in acquiring modern arms, for which it

desperately needs. Russia’s own military-industrial complex has changed little

since the Soviet era and thus suffers from “low effectiveness and productiveness…

[and] 70% of equipment [it produces] is obsolete”30. It therefore has had to rely on

imports to attain the most ‘modern military equipment’, the most notable and

recent example is the purchase of French mistral class warships in 201131.

However, the importing of weapons is politically risky and the Russian MoD was

recently criticised for “damaging the interests of Russian arms makers” when it

29 Cost of the SA-80 Assault Rifle 400GBP, source: Rayment, S, Scrap British Rifle and buy Heckler, say the generals, The Telegraph, Published 07/07/2002, last accessed 14/03/2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1400622/Scrap-British-rifle-and-buy-Heckler-say-the-generals.html, Estimate total population of Russian Army 2013 and cost of Research and Development: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/publications/unpubl_milex/military-expenditure-in-the-russian-federation-2012-2015

30 Isabelle Facon, Sources of the Modernisation of the Russian Military: The Ambitious and Ambiguities of Vladimir Putin, Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2005, p3.

31 Irina Bystrova, Russian Military-Industrial Complex, Aleksanteri Papers, 2/2011, accessed 14/03/2014, http://www.helsinki.fi/aleksanteri/julkaisut/tiedostot/ap_2-2011.pdf, P19.

failed to lessen Russia’s dependence on weapon imports32. To avoid further political

damage, the Russian government has plans to modernise its own military industrial

complex so it can produce modern equipment domestically rather than having to

rely on imports33. This process will be costly, slow and inefficient as many state

have the technology that Russia needs. Regardless, this will continue to be a

challenge in modernising Russia’s military.

The affordability of such weapons is one challenge, training soldiers on how to use

them is another issue Russia will face. India faced a similar problem in the

modernisation of her military, the Indians had purchased modern British combat

aircraft but no-one in the Indian military knew how to fly them! Fortunately for

India, the United States military used the same aircraft and aided in the training of

Indian pilots34. As in any industry, the purchasing of ‘outside equipment’ often

requires someone from outside the organisation to teach how to use it. A challenge

Russia is going to face then is that if any modern equipment is to be bought from a

NATO country as per India’s aircraft, it will also rely on such powers to aid in the

training of the equipment. Whilst Russia may be lucky in striking a deal with a NATO

state in the purchasing of old, ‘modern’ military equipment, it is unlikely such

states would train Russian personnel as well. Even if NATO was willing it is unlikely

the Russian military would want to train with the west as, previously stated, the

west is viewed with suspicion in the Russian military, those that have experienced

any contact with western forces are treated as tainted individuals35.

32 Utkin, A, Russian Ex Chief of Staff Defense Minister Aide job, Rianovosti, published 04/03/2013, accessed 14/03/2014, http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20130304/179804307.html

33 Irina Bystrova, Russian Military-Industrial Complex, , Aleksanteri Papers, 2/2011, p19. http://www.helsinki.fi/aleksanteri/julkaisut/tiedostot/ap_2-2011.pdf P18.

34 Stephen P. Cohen, Sunil Dasgupta, Arming Without Aiming: India’s Military Modernization, p174.

35 Isabelle Facon. Sources of the Modernisation of the Russian Military: The Ambitious and Ambiguities of Vladimir Putin, Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2005, p9.

Chapter Four: Improving the prestige of the Russian Army (domestically)

Russia’s military is not very prestigious amongst the general population, the fact

that The Kremlin continues to rely heavily on conscription highlights this fact. There

is no single theory in how to improve the prestige (a subjective term) of a state’s

military. Thus we will use examples in how other states improved the prestige of

their military; specifically how states who could no longer rely on conscription

enticed people to join voluntarily. The United States military suffered a ‘prestige’

problem after the end of the highly controversial Vietnam War, compounding this

problem was the end of conscription during this period. Helping to overcome this

though was a policy of “good pay… and improved conditions of military life”36. This

is going to be a challenge for Russia. First, pay. Russia does not pay its conscripts

at all. Secondly, the quality of life in the Russian army is shockingly low. The

Russian Army is endemic with harassment and there is a culture of serious bullying

to those of lower rank. Beatings with whips, belts and even shovels are common

with allegedly five hundred soldiers killed as a result of beatings by their ‘comrades’

in 2002!37. The situation is also getting worse and will further degrade the prestige

of the military38. Furthermore, funding in the 1990s was so low that soldiers were

36 Cindy Williams, From Conscripts to Volunteers, NATO’s Transition to All-Volunteer Forces, Navy War College Review, pp35-6.

37 Anna Politkovskaia, Putin’s Russia, Harvill, London, 2004, p3.

38 Major, Ulrich, M.P, (USAF), Democracy and Russian Military Professionalism, Airpower Journal –Special Edition, 1996, p83.

told by commanding officers that they had to supplement their food rations by

collecting “berries and mushrooms in local forests” and soldiers are often used as

free labour by their commanding officers for non-military activity – corruption in

the military is endemic from top to bottom39. Huntington states that the Russian

authorities do not have to worry about coup proofing the military (despite a failed

coup attempt in 1991!) because it is a “disorganised and demoralized military…. so

divided against itself that it is, in all probability, incapable of conducting a coup”40.

The lack of a coup in Russia is not down to loyalty, but because of internal

fractionalisation, a breakdown of an organised and internally respected chain of

command and chronic underfunding that has persisted since 1991 if not longer.

This information cannot be kept from the Russian people. Despite a surge in

funding to the military under Putin and Medvedev in the last fourteen years and

other policies to try and incorporate the policy of increased prestige, perceptions

have changed little amongst the Russian people. In January 2010, when polled, 42%

of Russians would convince a member of their family to avoid the draft if called up

(this being illegal act may have lowered the numbers) and 54% of Russians when

39 The full details on disorganisation and terrible living conditions in the Russian Army is beyond the scope of this essay. For a greater exploration of Russian Army living conditions, Andrew Spivak and William Pridemore offer a detailed and highly interesting examination of such living conditions and endemic corruption in: Conscription and Reform in the Russian Army, National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, Washington DC, 2004. Crutcner, The Russian Armed Forces at the Dawn of the Millennium, PA: Centre for Strategic leadership, U.S Army War College, p146, Quoted in: Andrew Spivak and William Pridemore, Conscription and Reform in the Russian Army, National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, Washington DC, p6.

40 Samuel P. Huntington, Reforming Civil-Military Relations, Journal of Democracy, National Endowment for Democracy and the Johns Hopkins University Press, 6.4, 1995,P14

polled in 2010 wanted conscription to be entirely abolished41. Furthermore, 50% of

those polled believed the army should “decisively cut numbers” so that Russia could

afford modern weaponry, which evidences that many Russians are aware of how

underequipped the Russian military is42. The public’s low perception of the military

is understandable considering the dire quality of life for the service personnel, low/

zero pay, mass disorganisation, poor training, underfunding of equipment and if

Russia wants to increase the prestige of the military, it will have to improve on all of

these areas, which is going to be a serious challenge.

Conclusion

- Draft set to continue which is causing the majority of the problems as well as

being unpopular amongst the Russian electorate.

- Prestige improvement difficult because of the low pay and the bad quality of

life in the army as well as a publicly recongnised lack of modern equipment

- Struggling to recruit good candidates, Russia’s population ageing and those

who are needed the most can often dodge the draft

- Training poor, lack of NCOs, poor leadership (lack of modern equipment?)

41Russia votes, Q2: If someone from your family was called up to serve in the army, would you rather that he served or would you look for some way to avoid serving in the army? 42% of respondents in Jan 10 voted “Would look for ways to avoid serving in the army”Q1: “Do you think it would be better to keep compulsory universal military service (the draft), or do you think that it would be better to move to the formation of a contract [volunteer] army composed of those who wish to serve in the army for pay? January 2010, 54% of respondents voted: “Go over to a contract [volunteer] army.”Both survey questions: Russia votes, National Issues: Military: Trends: The Levda Center, Moscow, accessed 13/03/2014: http://www.russiavotes.org/national_issues/military_trend.php#630

42Russia Votes, Levada Center, Moscow, accessed 14/03/2014, http://www.russiavotes.org/national_issues/military_trend.php#630

- Outdated equipment, expensive to be replaced especially with a million man

army

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