Virando o Jogo: the problems and possibilites of social mobilization in Brazilian football

Journal of Sport and Social Issues201X, Vol XX(X) 1 –20© The Author(s) 2013

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DOI: 10.1177/0193723513515887jss.sagepub.com

Article

Virando o jogo: The Challenges and Possibilities for Social Mobilization in Brazilian Football

Christopher Gaffney1

AbstractThe progressive commercialization of football in Brazil has been accompanied by the emergence of social movements that seek increased visibility and power over decision-making processes in the sport industrial complex. These groups are responding to rapid changes in the political economy of Brazilian sport, particularly football. While many of these processes were well underway before FIFA selected Brazil to host the 2014 World Cup in 2007, the event preparations are accelerating the trends toward corporatization, privatization, and mercantilization of football culture. In the years leading up to the 2014 World Cup, social movements have formed to respond to these changes in the political economy of football. This article will analyze the emergence and decline of the National Fans’ Association (Associação Nacional dos Torcedores, ANT) as an attempt from Brazilian civil society to insert more progressive social agendas into the rapidly neo-liberalizing framework of Brazilian sport. I contextualize this movement with the larger frames of fandom and fans’ rights, the role of activist academics within social movements more generally, and explore the successes and failures of the ANT. The conclusion suggests that even short-lived experiments in the formation of social movements are worthwhile as they can take future shapes and directions that can eventually bring about the desired change.

KeywordsBrazil, Associação Nacional dos Torcedores, World Cup, football, political economy, social movements

1Universidade Federal Fluminense, Niterói, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Corresponding Author:Christopher Gaffney, Escola de Pós-Graduação em Arquitetura e Urbanismo, Universidade Federal Fluminense, Passo da Patria 120, Campus da Praia Vermelha, Rio de Janeiro, Niterói 24210-240, Brazil. Email: [email protected]

515887 JSSXXX10.1177/0193723513515887Journal of Sport and Social IssuesGaffneyresearch-article2013

2 Journal of Sport and Social Issues XX(X)

Introduction

This paper discusses the formation and history of an urban social movement that emerged in the context of the major restructurings currently underway in Rio de Janeiro for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics (C. Gaffney, 2010). The literature regarding urban social movements in Brazil is scant and current sport-related social movements are pioneering efforts on the part of Brazilian civil society to insert “popu-lar” agendas into governance regimes. The current conjuncture in which these move-ments have formed is defined by major architectural changes to Brazil’s football stadiums (beyond the 12 associated with the World Cup) and a distancing of the sport’s governing institutions from the population (Jacobs, 2006). This distance has grown to the point where many Brazilians now actively cheer against their national team (“Felipão e ministro reconhecem distanciamento do torcedor,” 2013). As Brazil moves deeper into its mega-event cycle, the conflicts over sport in Brazil will only increase. These conflicts are not limited to stadiums and policing, but have to do with transpor-tation policy, housing, and a suite of institutional changes and new arrangements of power (Omena, 2013).

The Brazilian case presented here should be considered within a wider literature that examines the commodification of football and sport, and the responses of civil society and fan groups to those changes (Alvito, 2007; Free, 2006; Giulianotti & Robertson, 2007; Steinbrink, Haferburg, & Ley, 2011). This study also dialogues with writings on the militarization of urban spaces and the shifting socio-spatial dynamics of neo-liberalizing cities, especially in the context of global mega-events (Graham, 2011; Minton, 2009; Shin, 2012; Sinclair, 2012). The methodology has been borrowed from several disciplines but is based in geographic urban scholarship (Harvey, 2010; Lefebvre & Frias, 2008; Santos, 2004) and what anthropologists have called “activist scholarship” (Hale, 2008). The narrative core of the paper is a first-hand account of the formation, function, and decline of a sports-related social movement in a city that is undergoing rapid neo-liberal transformations as it prepares for the world’s biggest sporting events. I am an active agent in the creation and telling of this story and am exploring my own role on the stage of the city, working through (and out) the frictions of social resistance.

Before entering into the case study of the ANT, I reflect on my positionality and examine the role of social movements more generally in the context of Brazilian cities. The paper will then examine the shifting political economy of Brazilian football as it relates to fans. I then explore the history, strategies, and articulations of the ANT before reflecting on some of the lessons learned. In the conclusion, I re-situate the ANT within a larger framework of sports-related social movements in Brazil.

Positionality and Activist Research

According to the feminist geographer Gillian Rose, it is important that researchers identify and situate themselves within their research frames to develop a reflexivity that can serve as “a strategy for situating knowledges: that is, as a means of avoiding

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the false neutrality and universality of so much academic knowledge. Thus under-stood, ‘situating’ is a crucial goal . . .” (Rose, 1997). This situating may be particularly important for researchers who are working outside of their own cultural contexts as we bring different ideas of cultural normativity that can lead to frustrations and judgments that (at best) have deleterious effects on the project as a whole. The tendency is for researchers from “more developed” regions of the world or country to analyze “down-ward,” casting aspersions (whether intentional or not) on the people, places, and dynamics under observation. In this work, I attempt to frame the production of knowl-edge by first explaining myself in the context of the movements by making my posi-tion, “known rather than invisible and to limit one’s conclusions rather than making claims about their universal applicability” (Mattingly and Falconer-Al-Hinhi, quoted in Rose 1997, p. 308)

After a 6-month period of doctoral fieldwork in 2004, I returned to Brazil in 2009 as a visiting professor in the Geography department at the State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) through a Fulbright Scholar Award. I was pursuing a research and teaching agenda related to the social and spatial changes underway for the 2014 World Cup. Through my previous academic and social contacts, I began participating in the weekly meetings of the Comitê Social do PAN (CSP, the Pan American Games Social Committee). My previous work had focused on the role of stadiums in the cultural and political life of Rio de Janeiro and so I was already well-acquainted with the impor-tance of the issues that the CSP was addressing (C. Gaffney, 2008).

The CSP formed in late 2005 as a response to the projects undertaken by the munic-ipal and state governments in conjunction with the Brazilian Olympic Committee (COB) and private interests as they reshaped Rio de Janeiro for the 2007 Pan American Games (PAN). The CSP was the primary organization that brought together a wide range of activists and social movements that were resisting projects associated to the PAN.1 By 2009, the CSP was still active, but had no consistent focus or wide appellate base as the Pan American Games had passed and the 2014 World Cup projects had not yet started.2 My position as a foreign academic studying mega-events in Brazil made me somewhat of an anomaly in the CSP. I sought to gain knowledge about the situation in Rio de Janeiro without ever having the intention of making the organization itself or urban social movements associated with sport a site or object of research. Because of my previous work in Rio de Janeiro and my knowledge of the impacts of mega-events on host cities, I felt I could make meaningful contributions to the CSP.

During the initial months of my involvement with the CSP, I began to publish my observations of the major challenges that Brazilian civil society was facing and would face with the upcoming mega-events (C. Gaffney, 2009, 2010; C. Gaffney & de Melo, 2010). My research turned quickly from academic analysis to participant observation to activist scholarship (Hale, 2008) in which I leveraged my position as an academic to effect social change. As my understanding of the workings of Rio’s urban politics and the role that mega-events would play in reformulating space and social relations deepened, my writing took an ever more political and polemic tone. The CSP became a vehicle through which I could draw attention to injustices undertaken as Brazil pur-sued its version of “development through sport” (Black, 2010). In Brazil, my role as


foreign academic gave me a privileged position that I would not have had if I had been a Brazilian in the United States. I do not distinguish between my roles as an activist researcher, a football fan, or a citizen-subject concerned with human rights.

Political Economy of Sport in Brazil

The progressive commercialization of football in Brazil over the past decade has been accompanied by a retrenchment of the political interests that have long dominated the game as well as the emergence of social movements that are challenging the status quo (C. Gaffney, 2013). This Brazilian sport governance structure is dominated by a rela-tively closed group of wealthy businessmen that have traditionally controlled football and Olympic sports in Brazil (Aidar, Leoncini, & de Oliveira, 2000; Carrano, 2000). Known as cartolas, or top hats, the back room deals and shady characters of Brazil’s football world have provided ample fodder for foreign journalists and frustration for Brazilians (Bellos, 2003; Foer, 2005; Jennings, 2006; Kfouri, 2010; Mason, 1994). Despite the economic growth of Brazil’s football industry over the past decade, there has not been a commensurate professionalization of people involved in the sport busi-ness in Brazil. This situation has created an unregulated institutional framework that results in terrible abuses of youth and a weakening of football culture (“Judge Reprimands Vasco, Shutters Youth Lodging—SI.com,” 2012). The institutional cul-tures of Brazil’s sports ministry, the Brazilian Football Confederation (CBF), and the Olympic sports federations (controlled by the Brazilian Olympic Committee, COB) are notoriously opaque and their governance closed to public scrutiny (Jennings, 2013). Historically, there have been no rigorous oversight or transparency mecha-nisms and no institutional mechanisms that encouraged popular participation.

The general shift in Brazil`s political economy of sport is connected to the expan-sion of the Brazilian economy writ large in the first decade of the 21st century (Andrade, 2002; Dias & Costa, 2009; Dobson & Goddard, 2001). As Brazil reemerged as an international economic force, the pursuit of a developmental model predicated on the service sector, and high levels of consumption took firm root under the Cardoso

Table 1. Changes in the Political Economy of Brazilian Football, 2007-2012.

Year Total public Average publicTotal gate

receipts (R$)Average ticket

price (R$)

2007 6.582.976 17.461 80.040.848 12.22008 6.439.854 16.992 101.241.490 15.72009 6.766.471 17.807 125.764.391 18.62010 5.638.806 14.839 112.873.893 20.02011 5.660.987 14.976 117.665.714 20.82012 4.928.827 12.970 119.100.000 22.92% Change −15.2 −15.8 +49 +88

Note. Author elaboration. Data from Conferderação Brasileria de Futebol.

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and da Silva governments (Leitão, 2010). In football, the 2000s saw the expansion of cable television, the increased sale of Brazilian players abroad, and the consolidation of the coalition of interests formed by the Brazilian Football Confederation (CBF) and the Group of 13, a consortium representing Brazil’s 13 largest clubs (Kfouri, 2010, p. 13). As ever more money flowed through the football industry, the abuses of power that resulted from opaque governance structures amplified. There were several federal laws passed to restructure Brazilian sport, but they have had little impact on the gov-ernance structures themselves (Estatuto do Torcedor, 2003, Lei de Incentivo ao Pratica Desportivo 2004, Lei Pele, 1998). There have also been a series of governmental enquiries, including one by the Rouseff administration´s Minister of Sport (Rebelo & Torres, 2001) and another by former footballer turned federal deputy Romario (CartaCapital, 2012), but they have so far failed to result in convictions or structural changes to an aloof and amateurish system of Brazilian sport governance (Kfouri, 2010).

These were the prevailing conditions when FIFA chose Brazil to host the World Cup in 2007. In FIFA’s analysis of the Brazilian bid, it is clearly stated that no stadiums in Brazil met FIFA criteria for hosting a World Cup match (FIFA, 2007). This meant that at least eight stadiums would have to be built or reformed to host the tournament. Since that time, as table one demonstrates, the attendances for Brazilian matches have declined even as prices and profits have increased (Articulação Nacional dos Comitês Populares da Copa, 2012).

On one hand, this has limited the public’s access to recreation guaranteed in the 1988 Brazilian Constitution but has also concentrated the claims of Brazil’s organized fan groups (tocidas organizadas) to be the “authentic” representatives of club identity (Hollanda, 2009). The influence of a small minority of violent fans (thought to com-prise no more than 3% to 5% of the large torcidas organizadas) has resulted in the progressive militarization of urban and stadium space.3 The ostentation of lethal force on the part of the state and the practice of ritualized violence on the part of the torcidas organizadas threatens all fans, as nonlethal weapons or pacific forms of crowd control are rarely used in policing public space in Brazil.4

There is evidence to suggest that Brazilian clubs do not have strong motivations to attract fans to stadiums. Historically, Brazilian clubs gained a significant amount of their revenue from ticket sales, advertising, and player transfers (Aidar et al., 2000). In the current era (post-2001),5 this calculus changed significantly, reflecting larger global trends in the game. In 2011, ticket revenues accounted for only 11% of total club receipts, while broadcast rights and player sales were as much as 60% (Fundação Getulio Vargas, 2010). The expansion of pay-per-view and cable coverage has had negative impacts on attendances in Brazil. This created an ironic situation in which profits increased with fewer fans in the stadiums. This new financial structure has put clubs increasingly at the mercy of broadcasters who give lump sum payments to the league (CBF) in exchange for control over the league schedule. One result of this is that some week-day Brazilian league matches do not begin until 9:50 p.m., after the 9:00 p.m. novella has ended.


The crisis dynamics of Brazilian football have not been discussed much in the English language literature (though see Alvito, 2007; Gordon & Helal, 2001), and there is a dearth of literature that treats the responses of “ordinary fans” to the chang-ing political economy of sport. I build, therefore, on the emergent international litera-ture regarding social movements that have formed in response to changes in the political economy of sport (Giulianotti & Robertson, 2012; Hamil, 2001; Kuhn, 2011). In the Brazilian context, there is an extensive literature that examines the formation of organized fan groups and the culture of individual relationships with teams, stadiums, and sport more generally (Agostino, 2002; Bruhns, 2000; Carrano, 2000; Hollanda, 2009; Mattos, 2007). To position the trajectory of ANT in the context of Brazilian social movements, I identify similarities and differences with the strategies used by the Movimento Sem Terra (MST) and the well-established urban squatter movement in Brazilian cities (Caldeira, 2008; Mayer, 2009; Schuurman & van Naerssen, 2011; Wolford, 2005). When considering the role of urban social movements in a neo-liber-alizing urban political economy, I use a macro-level framework, a category of analysis that Lefebvre and others denominate as The Right to the City (Benko & Strohmayer, 1997; Lefebvre and Farias, 2008; Mayer, 2009) and larger paradigms of urban resis-tance and political power (Castells, 2007; Harvey, 2010; Schuurman & van Naerssen, 2011; Zizek, 2012).

Associação Nacional de Torcedores, ANT

On October 10, 2010, in a response to the sea-change in the political economy of Brazilian football described above, a group of fans gathered at a bar across from Rio de Janeiro’s iconic Maracanã stadium to discuss the formation of the Associação Nacional de Torcedores (ANT, National Fans’ Association). The meeting was led by Marcos Alvito, a professor of history at the Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF). The majority of the participants were undergraduate students who had taken a course on football history with Alvito. In the weeks leading up to the initial encounter, I had spoken with Alvito at some length regarding the formation of a formal institution to represent the interests of Brazilian football fans. Our positions as professors at one of Brazil’s federal universities added significant cultural capital to the organization. Alvito and I positioned ourselves as provisional president and vice-president, respec-tively, and recruited new members from among our friends, colleagues, and students.

Alvito, with contributions from me and others, crafted the foundational statement of the ANT. The “seven points” that served as the organizing principles of the ANT addressed many of the economic and governmental trends in Brazilian football, while asserting the democratic and constitutionally guaranteed rights of citizens’ access to sport and leisure. These points were published in Portuguese and English on a blog created and maintained by Alvito (www.respeitamofutebol.wordpress.com)6:

OUR MISSION in seven points, to honor Garrincha, the joy of the people7

Create a non-profit organization to fight against:

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1. The exclusion of the Brazilian population from football stadiums, which has resulted from a deliberate policy of diminishing stadium capacity, eliminating popular sections, and an abusive increase in ticket prices.

2. The disrespect shown for Brazilian football culture with the extinction of pop-ular areas like the geral where there was a tradition of watching games while standing, as happens in Germany, Argentina, and other major football nations. For example, the Maracanã has suffered massive and expensive reforms under-taken without consulting fans.8

3. The lack of transparency in Brazilian football which has been controlled for decades by corrupt and incompetent directors; for example, the Brazilian Football Confederation has been controlled by the same person for nearly two decades. We demand that Brazilian football be democratized.

4. The political exploitation of football for political ends, abusing the sport’s popularity to use in creating public policies that work against public interests.

5. The control of the football schedule and times by a television network that for decades has retained a lucrative monopoly over the broadcast of football matches. Matches should begin no later than 8 p.m. during the week and 5 p.m. on Sundays, the traditional hours for Brazilian football.

6. The end of forced removals for lower-income communities in the name of the World Cup and Olympics.

7. The lack of decent public transportation on match day; we demand special transportation to bring fans to and from the stadium.

There is not sufficient space for a narrative history of the ANT, which rose to as many as 5,000 associates within a year of its foundation. By mid-2012, however, the ANT was down to a handful of active members and decided to close its website and cease formal communication. To remain faithful to Garrincha’s number, I explore seven points that can be taken as lessons for the organization of social movements. I offer these points in a roughly chronological order so as to give a sense of how lessons were learned progressively and how the closing of the ANT website in August of 2012 brought to an end a very intense and frustrating, but ultimately rewarding experiment in social mobilization to advance social justice in sport.

Seven Lessons for Social Movements

1. Strategic planning is essential at all stages of the formation of social movements.

The ANT formed as the result of a collective sense of desperation and indignation from its founding associates. While many had participated in social movements or col-lective actions, ANT did not set out with a medium- or long-term strategic vision. The strategy was to accumulate as many associates as possible and to communicate with the media as widely as possible. This inevitably led to major organizational problems during the first 6 months as the ANT attracted associates throughout Brazil. The


success of the ANT in spreading its message was largely due to a November 2010 interview with Alvito and Gaffney with Juca Kfouri, one of Brazil’s most respected sport journalists on his nationally televised program (Alvito & Gaffney, 2010). Following this broadcast, requests for information, interviews, and the growth of Internet-based membership exploded. As there was no institutional framework for dealing with governance issues at the local or national levels, the few people tasked with the production of media material, organization of contacts, communications with members, website maintenance, and the organization of public acts became quickly overwhelmed. This led to fatigue and the concentration of responsibilities in ever-fewer hands.

2. Effective communication strategies and rules of media engagement are paramount.

After the initial meeting, the ANT formed an online community on the social net-work site ning, a blog and a website. All of the ANT members (called formigas, ants) were encouraged to use their twitter and Facebook accounts to spread news and infor-mation about ANT. The usage rates of social media sites in Brazil is among the highest in the world, and it became very clear from the outset that this would be one of the critical components of the ANT’s activities. However, without a professional journal-ist or media relations expert to organize the external communications of the ANT, the (over) use of social media ended up diluting the effectiveness of communications. Because Twitter and Facebook are individual networking sites, their use in divulging messages about the ANT as a collective was never satisfactorily resolved.9 Internally, the ANT used Google Groups for communications at several levels. The “message control” of the organization was inconsistent and the promiscuous use of social media gave an external appearance of unprofessionalism that may have negatively affected the seriousness with which the political message was considered by the public at large.10 The use of social media as means to attract new members and disseminate political messages turned out to be too democratic and quickly escaped the control of those working to organize the ANT at a national level. Without the use of social media, however, the ANT could not have had as much initial success as it did in attracting members and “traditional” media attention.

3. Direct civil actions with large numbers of people on the streets are fundamen-tal to drawing media attention. The personal relationships that develop from direct encounters are what carry a movement forward.

The ANT engaged in direct social action such as pamphleteering and protesting at stadiums throughout Rio and Brazil. These events were billed as ManiFESTAções (or Party-manifestations) and involved multiple elements taken from Carnaval celebra-tions and the vibrant football terrace culture. The pacific, nonconfrontational nature of these events involved coordination and planning some weeks ahead of time as well as fund-raising to buy materials for the production of banners, costumes, and so on. As

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the ANT gained in experience and expanded to include nuclei in other parts of the country, coordinated actions across the country were planned for the last day of the Brazilian football calendar during 2010 and 2011. On both occasions, the ANT regis-tered a presence in all of the cities hosting the last round of matches. The physical presence of the ANT at all of the stadiums in the last round of league matches brought significant media attention.

The ANT quickly expanded to have dozens of regional associations principally because of the outreach and tireless work of Alvito, but also because several members in the Rio de Janeiro nucleus (which was also the seat of the national committee), were able to travel around Brazil to meet with groups of interested fans. On the ANT website were instructions about how to form a regional formigueiro (anthill), communicate with media, and organize more generally on a local level. I personally went to São Paulo on two occasions to meet with people interested in forming a nucleus of the ANT. By and large, the most successful and organized formigueiros incorporated into their friends and colleagues that had already participated in other social movements or who were part of other football-related organizations. In Brazil, the importance of personally con-necting with others to establish relationships of trust and commitment necessitated con-stant personal interaction. Alvito was assiduous in his pursuit of these relationships which greatly fortified the ANT on a national scale. However, the task of building of social capital to attain political goals was concentrated in a very limited group.

4. A consistent, consensual politics is necessary; conflicts within the organization are inevitable.

One of the principal directives of the ANT was that no direct links be established with specific clubs, torcidas organizadas (because of their tight relationships with the clubs), or with political parties (who could use private financing to shape a political agenda). This positioning, especially in regard to the torcidas organizadas, limited the potential of the ANT to gain more expression within stadiums, raise funds, and connect with existing organizations. Positively, the lack of association with existing movements or parties allowed the ANT to remain free of compromise with dominant power struc-tures. As a new movement, in form and kind, the ANT sought to carve out a new politi-cal space that directly confronted the status quo and the adherence to a politically independent organization gave a strong moral position to the politics of the ANT.

As the ANT expanded nationally, it attracted individuals and groups that had very different ideas about how to best move a democratic agenda forward. Some of the individuals attracted by the ANT had long histories of militancy within the Worker’s Party (PT), syndical and anarchist movements. While these individuals were able to bring their preexisting networks into play, there was always difficulty in incorporating labor movements, anarchists, academics, activists, students, lower-income and middle-class professionals under the same banner. This became evident as the ANT increased its membership base across the country.

In the local contexts, it proved to be nearly impossible to convince fans of different teams to put aside their historic rivalries for a common cause. The idealistic goals of


the ANT contradicted a fundamental element of football culture—the naturalized antagonism between teams. The difficulty in articulating a movement that positioned itself above a culture of opposition ended up legitimizing the cultural paradigms that the ANT was calling into question.

The appellate nature of the ANT’s seven points called attention to what was wrong with Brazilian football, something that most fans across the country could identify with. However, the limited proposals of the ANT became a source of criticism that played out in the ANT chat-o-sphere. Critics noted that the ANT were only working against current realities and not agitating for particular goals. There was also criticism that ANT was too academic and that the leadership lacked experience in direct social action. As the ANT evolved, the seven initial points were not changed, but the dis-course shifted to include a more prospective agenda.

5. Democracy does not mean consensus. Consensus building is a better, slower way to assemble a more inclusive politics.

Part of the problem in the legal structuring of an organization that envisioned a national scale articulation (but that had no effective way of knowing how diverse and distant nuclei would function) was in the conceptualization and legalistic structuring of several levels of organizational dynamics. Striking a legal and institutional balance between a national directorship that could steer a general political course and yet be flexible enough to allow meaningful contributions from local or regional nuclei proved to be a difficult task.

Prior to the initial meeting, the ANT had not taken an institutional form yet would eventually seek to gain legal status through the formulation of a constitution. The ANT’s motivation for gaining legal status was to be able to enter Brazilian stadiums as a legal entity in the same ways that Brazil’s larger torcidas organizadas do. Also, legal status could be used as a kind of “shield” against repressive police action. The process of formulating this constitution led to a rupture within the organization before it had a chance to coalesce.

This rupture appeared in the first (and only) elections held for national office. The two opposing tickets represented very different groups with appellate bases in differ-ent parts of the country. The ticket led by Alvito and I, with its base in the Rio–São Paulo axis won by a wide margin over a group with a base in Porto Alegre. Everything about the process was fraught with difficulty and the election resulted in the exit of the losing ticket and its supporters from the ANT. This is not to suggest that there was no space in the ANT for oppositional ideas, but during the process of establishing parlia-mentary rule so many negative sentiments had been expressed in both directions that reconciliation was not desirable or possible. The ANT consolidated its leadership and continued to pursue a national-scale project, while the defeated ticket left and formu-lated a separate fans’ association, the Frente Nacional dos Torcedores (FNT, National Fans’ Front). The zero-sum nature of democratic elections will always leave one group in power at the expense of another. This does not represent the kind of progressive politics that urban social movements should strive for.

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A possible solution to this problem would have been the decentralization (or region-alization) of the ANT’s power structure. One of the recurring problems with establish-ing a vertical and fixed institutional framework was that one person became responsible for increasingly complicated and time-consuming tasks. An example of this was when the communications secretary stopped his ANT activities to concentrate on his mas-ter’s thesis, leaving no one in his place to assume the critical articulations with the media.

6. Charismatic leadership is a necessary but not sufficient element for successful mobilization.

The ANT grew rapidly though the individual and collective effort of its members, but this growth was particularly attributable to the efforts of Alvito. After a year of frenetic action, Alvito had to take a break for health reasons. As the ANT lost a charis-matic, energetic leader, the challenges of organization and mobilization depended on the institutional momentum that had developed during the first year. The responsibility for communication and organization came to reside more completely with the local formigueiros, some of which had only two or three active members. Strong, central-izing leadership had been necessary to get the ANT off the ground, but that very same presence in some degree prohibited the development of a robust participatory structure that could continue with the momentum generated during the first year.

Without a project for a national conference to solidify personal ties between regional organizations, the ANT began to languish. The difficulties of making a national move-ment in Brazil were exacerbated by geography. It was simply not feasible to extend scarce resources connecting with more groups outside of the large southeastern cities. The problem of attracting ever more members to the ANT through media campaigns could not be resolved by individuals acting on an ad hoc, volunteer basis.

This institutional condition, coupled with the difficulty of convincing unknown individuals to join a movement where they had no prior personal connections in an era in which social activism is frequently seen as clicking “like” on Facebook or signing an online petition, within a political context that prior to June 2013 was marked by extreme passivity made the necessary task of getting live bodies into urban space that much more difficult. As 2012 progressed, ANT began to lose space in the media and struggled to regain lost momentum. The active members of the executive committee that had won the 2010 election held multiple meetings in São Paulo, Rio, and via Skype to discuss strategies.

7. Closing the social movement is better than letting it fall slowly to pieces. The real gains obtained can be picked up and carried forward by other organizations.

The ANT was able in a short period of time to agglomerate a number of social actors throughout Brazil in a relatively short time span. As the association grew, it lacked the flexibility to attend to more specific issues such as governmental transpar-ency and corruption that would appeal to the Brazilian middle class. The


university-based nature of the ANT was such that it could never effectively reach the lower classes. The closed, opaque, and politicized nature of all Brazilian football insti-tutions (including the torcidas organizadas) limited the potential access to the spaces of maximum exposure and the very site of discontent—Brazilian football stadia.

However, ANT was hugely successful in bringing together a wide range of actors over a national territory. The rapid expansion of the first association in the history of Brazilian sport to fight for the rights of fans was warmly and widely received in the media and among other social movements. ANT began strong articulations with the Comitê Popular da Copa e das Olmipiadas in Rio de Janeiro, and worked closely within this new space of articulation to organize acts and movements that were at least partly responsible for the ousting of Ricardo Texeira from the CBF.11

Despite these successes, as 2012 progressed, the momentum and media space of ANT diminished. It became increasingly difficult to mobilize individuals to take 10 hours out of their week to organize for manifestations at stadiums, or to contribute time and energy to other pressing institutional concerns. Through long discussions, the national leadership decided in August of 2012 to call an end to the ANT experiment in the following terms:

Two questions brought us to rethink the future of the ANT and consequently its end:

1. The difficulty of involving fans physically, that is, despite the recognition of the importance of the tools of the Internet in public debate, we always re-enforce the necessity and demand the participation of members in public acts, seminars, pamphleteering, etc. that we undertake and

2. The necessity, at whatever cost, of preserving our principles of non-partisanship and democratic participation.

Football is a sport of the masses and whichever entity that has the intention to discuss and represent fans should be supported by the participation of its members. We could very well carry the ANT forward in the mold of other entities that count on combative discourses, but in practice transform themselves into an organization of one person, or a small group of people that have practices and interests distinct from those that were promised. Our desire is that the historical trajectory of the ANT serves as a point of reference in the fight for the democratization of Brazilian football and that its dissolution frees us to fight for the realization of this goal. (www.torcedores.org.br, accessed March 17, 2013, author`s translation)

Re-Contextualization: Urban Social Movements and the Politics of Dissent in Neo-Liberal Space

Beginning with the protests against the WTO in Genoa, Seattle, Davos, Washington, Cancun, and other cities, there has clearly been a general re-articulation of social movements in urban spaces on a global scale in recent years. The most impactful of these movements have been the revolutions of the 2011 Arab Spring. In the Occupy Wall Street movement of the same year, the politics of social movements and public

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space became acutely visible in the global media. Urban public spaces became, per-haps for the first time since the 1960s, global arenas for expressing discontent with the neo-liberal articulations of private finance capital with the state (Zizek, 2012).

The waves of speculative capital that crash unevenly around the globe have destroyed livelihoods and signaled the end of the traditional guarantees that the Keynesian welfare state had erected over previous decades (Gibson-Graham, 2006; Harvey, 2010). This is felt particularly keenly in Brazil, which has some of the worst income-disparity in the world and a weak civil society (Arias, 2006). Brazil’s fledging democratic institutions have been under attack since their passing of the 1988 constitu-tion (Roda Viva—Marcelo Freixo, 2012). Added to this is the prevalence of the idea that rights of citizenship and participation are privileges bestowed by a distant power and not a priori rights that pertain to all citizens (Fischer, 2011).

This situation is coupled with a generalized political passivity that is a legacy of the decades of suppression of dissent under the 1964 to 1985 dictatorship, an ideological regime that supports a developmental model based on ever-increasing consumerism and a general fatalism regarding the actions of the state (Soares, 2012). If meaningful resistance to the dominant paradigm unfolding in Brazilian football is to come from any sector of Brazilian society, it will have to be from the middle classes. However, the difficulties of social mobilization among this sector are complicated by a generalized desire to distance themselves from a regime of rights that extends equally to all citi-zens (Soares, 2012). Many within the Brazilian middle class are in favor of privatization(s) and a suite of rights based on market values. While not enshrined explicitly in the Brazilian constitution, the right to football culture in all of its manifes-tations was what the ANT was fighting for.

Alonso’s theorization of social movements in Brazil suggests that social move-ments are postmaterial collectives motivated by a symbolic order. This particular form of collective action depends on the structuring and interpretation of symbols to attract heterogeneous members (Alonso, 2009). The movements in and of themselves are never solid, but rather flexible spaces within which the agents that comprise the col-lective negotiate fluid identities. The so-called “new social movements” seek to insert themselves into the arena of public opinion to convince the public at large to exert the necessary pressures on politicians (Alonso, 2009). The emergence of the Comitê Social do PAN and the Comitês Populares da Copa as “spaces of articulation” for vari-ous interest groups speaks to the potential flexibilization of social movements in Brazil that are able to respond more quickly to emergent social issues. These new movements have replaced the syndicalist movements that have now been co-opted and incorpo-rated into the Brazilian state. The implication here is that flexible mobilization is used to counteract flexible accumulation.

Flexible mobilization has the advantage of being able to bring together a wide range of social actors and social movements to confront specific issues. The strategic uses of social media and new technologies of communication have been essential to the hori-zontal organization of urban social movements during the 21st century. This horizontal-ity, however, depends on the vertical organization of some social movements, political parties, or fans’ groups (Dorsey, 2013). This is not dissimilar to the ways in which


global capital interests with their vertical management structures temporarily form con-sortiums to undertake large-scale projects. The vertical organizations are able to plan strategically, while their horizontal activities attend to shorter-term projects.

In the case of Brazil, flexible accumulation takes the form of national-scale civil engineering firms forming consortiums to complete state-financed, multibillion dollar mega-projects. To resist these projects and the political regimes that support them, tra-ditional forms of Brazilian social movements with their vertical organizational struc-tures have flattened into horizontal movements such as the Popular Committee of the World Cup. While more research needs to be done on the tactics and strategies of this hybrid form of social organization, it is clear that social movements around the world come together over a touchstone issue such as the elimination of public space (Taksim Square in Istanbul), bus fare increases (São Paulo) or forced removals of lower-income neighborhoods (Rio de Janeiro). In these cases flexible mobilization allows for the spontaneous inclusion of multiple agendas. One of the problems with this kind of flex-ible mobilization is that it is difficult to develop long-term strategic plans that will be proactive in the pursuit of social justice and not only reactive to crisis situations.

In hindsight, the ANT would have benefitted from a more horizontal institutional framework and a more patient approach to attaining long-term goals (Ganz, 2005). The attempt to build an institutional framework to carry the movement from an academic to a broad-based social context not caused damaging tensions within the nascent organiza-tion and overburdened key figures with too much responsibility. While it is necessary to have strong leadership and a clearly articulated message, the relatively static, hierar-chical model of the ANT was partially responsible for its parabolic trajectory.

Emerging from an academic context, ANT was a unique experiment in social mobi-lization that responded to macro-scale political, economic, and cultural trends in Brazilian football. The lessons outlined above have been incorporated into the urban social movements in Brazil that have gathered strength in recent years. However, to achieve meaningful reform within the world of Brazilian football, the torcidas orga-nizadas will have to be integrated into the broader social movement. It is unlikely that highly masculine, authoritarian, mutually antagonistic, and de-politicized fan organi-zations will collaborate with sports-based social movements in Brazil. This tension reflects the conflictual, de-politicized nature of football itself and remains one of the biggest challenges for sport-based social movements to overcome.

Post-Script

I finished writing this article on the eve of the 2013 Confederations Cup in June of 2013. That month marked the beginning of a series of nationwide protests that self-consciously used the international media platform of the football tournament to communicate dis-satisfaction with the status quo. While the protests had their origin in a simmering dis-pute over the poor quality and high cost of public transportation, the massive public expenditures on “FIFA-standard” stadia were also a central focus of protests.

The escalating violence and conflicts in the streets of Brazilian cities did not always take FIFA as their target. However, in the cities of the Confederations Cup there were

Gaffney 15

always protests calling for an end of FIFA’s sweetheart financial package. Protesters around Brazil chanted “Não vai ter Copa!” (There will not be a World Cup) and made demands for “Educação e saúde padrão FIFA” (FIFA standard education and health care). This was a demand from the Brazilian middle class that the government stop investing more in FIFA-standard stadiums than in their own people.

As the tournament progressed, conflicts in public space came ever closer to disrupt-ing the tournament. During the final, several of the Brazilian players complained of feeling the acrid burn of tear gas in their throats on the field of play. This happened because outside the Maracanã stadium, there were running battles between military police and protesters. FIFA was faced with an unprecedented series of security ques-tions, the majority of which were answered by excessive use of nonlethal force against largely peaceful protests.

The Brazilian protests of 2013 have called into question the political economy of FIFA’s signature tournaments and the accountability of local governments to their citi-zens. FIFA has offered few concessions on the terms of their contracts with the host cities, but offered to leave behind $100 million dollars of their profits with Brazil. There is every indication that the current model of mega-event hosting is facing an existential crisis and that this crisis was precipitated by the collective actions of Brazilian civil society actors in public space at a critical moment. Underlying the ability of these actors to make visible demands for accountability, transparency, and change are the daily actions of Brazil’s social movements. While they may appear disarticulated and diffuse, these movements keep the fires of discontent alive in the public consciousness. This consciousness will continue to grow as the 2014 World Cup approaches. When the floodlights once again light up Brazil’s 12 World Cup cities, there will be a more expe-rienced coalition of social actors rushing to take center stage.

Acknowledgments

This work would not have been possible without the dedicated work and participation of hun-dreds of Brazilians who helped form the Associação Nacional dos Torcedores. In particular, I thank Marcos Alvito, Erick Omena, Crys Peres, Rafael Serrano, Mandioca, students from the Universidade Federal Fluminense and others who were quite active in the national leadership of the ANT. The histories of the organization would certainly be told differently from each of our perspectives, and I have tried to encapsulate our collective experience. This article, as with the ANT, can be considered a collaborative effort that is continually pressing toward the goal of democratization in Brazilian football.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.


Notes

1. The CSP was never registered as an organization with legal attributes. The legal condition of the organization allowed for more flexibility in planning collective action as police permits are not required of legal nonentities. At the same time the lack of formal institu-tionalism allowed for a wider range of social society actors to join forces with the CSP at moments and in places that were strategically valuable.

2. The reactive nature of Brazil’s urban social movements has greatly limited their effective-ness. I will take up this issue in the discussion of the case study.

3. There is no way to determine exactly the percentage of violent fans in any given torcida organizada or in the fan groups as a whole. The 3% to 5% of tocidas organizadas is a figure that is cited by members within the groups themselves, and those that study football in Brazil. For more information about the rise of the torcidas and their influence on clubs and football culture see, Hollanda (2009).

4. The Rio State Military Police only acquired tazers in 2012. The use of pepper spray and rubber bullets has become increasingly common to disperse protests, but these nonlethal mechanisms also cause significant bodily harm. The willingness of the police forces to use violence against all fans, regardless of their involvement in violent acts, has been registered on multiple occasions by the author.

5. The current running points system has been in place only since 2001 in Brazil. For the first 31 years of the tournament, the Brazilian league operated under 31 different championship structures.

6. It is important to note the use of electronic communication in calling the ANT into being. Along with Castells (Castells, 2007) we found that, “the processes challenging institution-alized power relations are increasingly shaped and decided in the communication field.” This field, however, requires clear strategies for navigation and the attainment of maxi-mum power within a multi-dimensional network. The story of the ANT can largely be told through its communication structures and patterns.

7. Mané Garrincha was one of Brazil`s most-famous and most-loved players. He wore the number seven for Brazil and Rio`s Botafogo Football Club. His nickname Alegria do Povo (Joy of the people) came from his carefree style and apparent joy at toying with his oppo-nents and teammates. The reality, of course, is somewhat sadder as Garrincha died of alco-holism (Castro, 1995).

8. The geral at the Maracanã was a standing-only section that was eliminated with the 2005 to 2007 reforms undertaken for the Pan American Games. This was a vibrant cultural space at one time and permitted even the poorest members of society to have access to professional football.

9. This has begun to change as more organizations use these mechanisms to attract clients. This is particularly true in the realm of social movements in Rio that have made increas-ingly effective use of social media to draw attention to events, alert civil society and media outlets, and to articulate more generally the group’s concerns. The collection and selling of email lists by “social movements” mirrors the techniques of commercial marketing.

10. This is consistent with Castells’ finding that, “[W]hat does not exist in the media does not exist in the public mind, even if it could have a fragmented presence in individual minds. Therefore, a political message is necessarily a media message. And whenever a politically related message is conveyed through the media, it must be couched in the specific language of the media” (Castells, 2007, p. 241).

11. Ricardo Texeira was ousted from his presidency of the CBF and the 2014 World Cup orga-nizing committee and forced into exile in 2012. Texeira, ex-son in law of disgraced ex-FIFA

Gaffney 17

boss João Havelange, was at the head of the CBF for two decades and was involved in a series of corruption and mismanagement scandals.

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Author Biography

Christopher Gaffney is a visiting professor in the Graduate School of Architecture and Urbanism at Brazil´s Universidade Federal Fluminense. He has studied the urban and social contexts of football for more than a decade. His website, Hunting White Elephants www.geo-stadia.com, tracks the unfolding challenges for Brazil and Rio de Janeiro as they prepare for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics.

Virando o Jogo: the problems and possibilites of social mobilization in Brazilian football

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