Untitled - Illinois Commerce Commission

STATE OF ILLINOIS

ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION Illinois Commerce Commission : On Its Own Motion :

: 01-0662 Investigation concerning : Illinois Bell Telephone Company’s : compliance with Section 271 of : the Telecommunications Act of : 1996. : Phase 2

PHASE 2 INITIAL AFFIDAVIT OF SHERRY LICHTENBERG

ON BEHALF OF WORLDCOM, INC.

WORLDCOM EX. 3.3

February 21, 2003

Phase 2 Initial Affidavit Sherry Lichtenberg

Docket No. 01-0662 February 21, 2003

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I Sherry Lichtenberg, being of lawful age and duly sworn upon my oath, do hereby 1

depose and state as follows: 2

1. My name is Sherry Lichtenberg. My business address is 1133-19th St., N.W., 3

Washington, DC 20036. I am employed by WorldCom, Inc., (referred to herein 4

as either “MCI” or “WorldCom”). I am part of the MCI local services team where 5

I am Senior Manager for Operations Support Systems Interfaces and Facilities 6

Testing and Development. MCI is the WorldCom business unit that provides 7

long distance and local service to residential and small business customers. 8

9

Professional Experience and Background 10

2. I have twenty-two years experience in the telecommunications field –seven years 11

with MCI in Mass Markets, Local Product Development and Marketing, and 12

fifteen years at AT&T. My AT&T experience included working on the 13

development of the System 85 and System 75 (major Private Branch Exchanges 14

(“PBXs”)), product marketing and product management in both the large business 15

and federal areas. My special expertise is in testing and requirements analysis. 16

3. My current job duties include facilitating MCI’s interaction with the incumbent 17

local exchange companies (“ILECs”) to establish commercially viable Operations 18

Support Systems (“OSS”). In addition, I oversee MCI’s commercial relationship 19

with the ILECs from the business perspective. My responsibilities include 20

designing and implementing local service testing as well as market entry 21

preparation and support. 22



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4. I have helped to oversee MCI’s mass market entry into the local service markets 23

via UNE-P in the SBC states of Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, and Wisconsin. 24

In addition to these states, MCI is providing mass market residential local service 25

in many other states, including New York, Texas, Pennsylvania, Florida, 26

California, and Georgia, and I helped to oversee MCI’s entry in these states as 27

well. 28

29

Purpose and Scope of Affidavit 30

5. I will address certain WorldCom concerns with respect to SBC Illinois’ 31

Operations Support Systems (“OSS”). In particular, I will comment on 32

WorldCom’s recent commercial experiences with SBC’s OSS and I will also 33

discuss the results of BearingPoint’s (f/k/a KPMG) and Ernst & Young’s audits of 34

SBC’s performance measures. With respect to WorldCom’s commercial 35

experience, my affidavit will focus on the following OSS related issues: (1) 36

SBC’s failure to render accurate and reliable wholesale bills; (2) continuing 37

problems with Line Loss Notifications (“LLNs”); (3) outages in SBC’s pre-order 38

systems; (4) SBC’s transmission of incorrect completion notices; (5) unjustified 39

cancellation of WorldCom orders; (6) problems processing orders for new lines 40

due to “working service conflicts”; (7) SBC errors in provisioning features as 41

requested by WorldCom; (8) SBC’s failure to process WorldCom’s deactivate 42

orders; and (9) general OSS defects. As discussed in further detail below, 43

WorldCom’s commercial experience, and the BearingPoint and Ernst & Young 44



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audits of SBC’s performance measures, clearly indicate that SBC Illinois’ OSS 45

does not function as it should, that performance measures are not reported 46

accurately, that controls over the development and calculation of those measures 47

are inadequate. Because of the dearth of reliable data, SBC has failed to 48

demonstrate that its performance in providing wholesale service is non-49

discriminatory, even after hiring its own performance auditor in an attempt to 50

gloss over the problems found in the open testing performed by BearingPoint. 51

Moreover, SBC lacks performance measurements necessary to prevent 52

“backsliding” after it receives authority under Section 271 of the 53

Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“TA96”) to provide in-region interLATA 54

services. 55

6. For the foregoing reasons, and as discussed more fully below, I recommend that 56

the Illinois Commerce Commission (“Commission”) withhold any 57

recommendation that the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) grant 58

authority to provide in-state, interLATA services unless and until SBC’s OSS 59

problems, including the deficiencies in SBC’s performance measure data and 60

reports, are addressed and fully resolved, including a “clean bill of health” from 61

BearingPoint on the performance metrics systems and processes. Until that time, 62

there can be no credible finding that SBC Illinois’ local market is fully and 63

irreversibly open to competition. 64

I. SBC Illinois’ OSS Does Not Function Properly 65

A. SBC’s Wholesale Billing Is Inaccurate And Unreliable. 66



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7. While I am not an attorney, it is my understanding that in order to win approval of 67

a request to receive in-state, interLATA authority, SBC Illinois must prove that it 68

has “fully implemented the competitive checklist” contained in section 69

271(c)(2)(B).1 Section 271 states that, among fourteen other checklist items, 70

“access or interconnection provided or generally offered by a Bell operating 71

company to another telecommunications carrier [must] include[] . . . 72

[n]ondiscriminatory access to network elements in accordance with the 73

requirements of sections 251(c)(3) and 252(d)(1).”2 This is checklist item 2. 74

75

8. With respect to wholesale billing, the FCC has found that “[u]nder checklist item 76

2, a BOC must demonstrate that it provides non-discriminatory access to . . . 77

billing.”3 The FCC’s Pennsylvania Order states that “[i]n previous section 271 78

decisions, the Commission has held that, pursuant to checklist item 2, BOCs must 79

provide competitive LECs with . . . complete, accurate and timely wholesale 80

1 In the Matter of Application of Verizon New England Inc., Bell Atlantic Communications Inc. (D/B/A Verizon Long Distance), NYNEX Long Distance Company (D/B/A Verizon Enterprise Solutions), and Verizon Global networks Inc. for Authorization to Provide In-Region InterLATA Services in Massachusetts, 16 F.C.C. Rcd. 8988, ¶ 11 (2001) (“Massachusetts Order”). 2 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B). 3 In the Matter of Application by Verizon Pennsylvania Inc., Verizon Long Distance, Verizon Enterprise Solutions, Verizon Global Networks Inc., and Verizon Select Services Inc. for Authorization To Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in Pennsylvania, (CC Docket No. 01-138), ¶ 12 (“Pennsylvania Order”). See also Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3989, ¶ 82.



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bills,”4 and that “the BOC must demonstrate that it can produce a readable, 81

auditable and accurate wholesale bill in order to satisfy its nondiscrimination 82

requirements under checklist item 2.”5 83

84

9. Based on what the FCC has said, it is critical that SBC Illinois prove and that the 85

Commission find that SBC Illinois’ wholesale bills are readable, auditable and 86

accurate before the Commission can find that SBC has met its OSS (checklist 87

item 2) obligations. The FCC recognized in the Pennsylvania Order the critical 88

role that wholesale bills play in local competition, identifying four ways in which 89

“[i]naccurate or untimely wholesale bills can impede a competitive LEC’s ability 90

to compete.”:6 91

First, a competitive LEC must spend additional monetary and 92 personnel resources reconciling bills and pursuing bill corrections. 93 Second, a competitive LEC must show improper overcharges as 94 current debts on its balance sheet until the changes are resolved, 95 which can jeopardize its ability to attract investment capital. 96 Third, competitive LECs must operate with a diminished capacity 97 to monitor, predict and adjust expenses and prices in response to 98 competition. Fourth, competitive LECs may lose revenue because 99 they generally cannot, as a practical matter, back-bill end users in 100 response to an untimely wholesale bill from and incumbent LEC. 101 Accurate and timely wholesale bills in both retail and BOS BDT 102

[electronic] formats thus represent a crucial component of OSS.7 103 4 Pennsylvania Order at ¶ 13. 5 Id. at ¶ 22. 6 Id. at ¶ 23 (citations omitted). See also id. at ¶ 13 (“Wholesale bills are essential [to competitors] because competitive LECs must monitor the costs they incur in providing services to their customers.”). 7 Id. at ¶ 23 (citations omitted). “BOS-BDT” refers to the “Billing Output Specification (“BOS”) Bill Data Type (“BDT”) electronic billing format.



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104 The Commission must view SBC Illinois’ wholesale bills against the backdrop of 105

the FCC’s pronouncements about the importance of wholesale billing. 106

107

10. It is abundantly clear from the wholesale bills that WorldCom receives from SBC 108

on a monthly basis – including those generated by SBC’s Carrier Access Billing 109

System (“CABS”) in BOS-BDT format – that SBC is charging WorldCom 110

incorrectly for Unbundled Network Elements (“UNEs”), combinations of UNEs 111

and activities related to provisioning of those items. Outputs from monthly 112

CABS bills that WorldCom receives for UNE Platform-based services include a 113

Universal Service Order Code (“USOC”) with an abbreviated description of the 114

UNE or activity that the USOC purports to reflect, a rate associated with that 115

UNE or activity, and the number of times for that particular month that SBC 116

Illinois has charged WorldCom for the UNE or activity related to that USOC. 117

The bill does not provide cite any source document (e.g., tariff or interconnection 118

agreement). Thus, based on SBC’s billing for wholesale services, it is impossible 119

for Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (“CLECs”) to cogently discern what 120

they are being charged for, the basis of the charges, and why the charges are 121

being applied. 122

123

11. A review of CABS bills sent by SBC to WorldCom for UNE Platform-related 124

services in Illinois from August 2002 through January 2003 reveals that SBC 125



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routinely charges WorldCom for the following USOCs (the USOC descriptions 126

are as they appear in the CABS bills that WorldCom receives): 127

USOC USOC DESCRIPTION (NONRECURRING) RATE 128

NR9F6 SVC ORD CHRGES-RECORD ORD-BASIC PORT $15.97 129 130 NR9UU SERVICE ORDER CHARGE-INIT BASIC PORT $17.37 131 132 NR9UV SUBSEQ CHANGE CHRGE C ORD $ 1.08 133 134 NR9UY SUBSEQ CHANGE CHRGE R ORD $14.60 135 136 SEPUC LINE CONNECT SVC ESTABLISHMENT $25.08 137 138 SEPUP PROCESSING CHG-ESTABLISH $13.17 139 140 UJR BASIC LINE PORT-RESIDENCE $53.01 141 142 UPC BASIC LINE PORT-BUSINESS $53.01 143 144 NHCHG UNE-P MIGRATION LINE PORT SIDE $ 1.02 145 146 V1N SPCL-VISIT CHARGE ASSOCIATED WITH INSTLN $85.00 147 148 VRP SPCL-VISIT CHARGE ASSOCIATED WITH REPAIR $(varies) 149 150 MVV MISC-MAINTENANCE OF SERVICE $(varies) 151

USOC USOC DESCRIPTION (RECURRING) RATE 152

153 CXC9X CROSS CONNEC SVC $ 0.14 154 155 NSR LOCAL NUMBER PORTABILITY $ 0.28 156 157 Q2HBC 2 WIRE ANALOG LOOP START $ 7.07 158 159 Q2HCC 2 WIRE ANALOG LOOP START $11.40 160

Q2HCD 2-WIRE ANALOG LOOP START $11.40 161 162 163



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U2HXA AREA A $ 2.59 164 2 - WIRE BUSINESS 165

166 U2HXB AREA B $ 7.07 167

2 - WIRE BUSINESS 168 169 U2HXC AREA C $11.40 170 2 - WIRE BUSINESS 171 172 UJR BASIC LINE PORT-RESIDENCE $ 5.01 173 174 UPC BASIC LINE PORT-BUSINESS $ 5.01 175 176

UPZ GROUND START LINE PORT-PBX 2W $ 5.788 177

178

12. In an effort to understand these USOCs and the rates associated with them, 179

WorldCom requested SBC to identify for each of the forgoing USOCs and 180

associated rates the activity, product or service to which the rate identified 181

applies, and the citation to the tariff, interconnection agreement or other 182

document which contains the description of how and in what circumstances the 183

rate is to be applied. WorldCom sent that request to SBC on February 11 and 184

asked for a response by February 14, 2003. SBC sent a partial response to that 185

request to on February 19 and its response to the remainder of the request after 186

the close of business on February 20, 2003. It is clear from the answers that 187

SBC provided concerning specific rates, USOCs and specific rate application 188

8 In addition, WorldCom receives on a monthly basis from SBC Illinois bills not in the CABS format that include charges associated with more than four-hundred USOCs. As with the limited number of USOCs and associated nonrecurring and recurring charges that appear above, the abbreviated descriptions and associated rates for these USOCs do not allow a CLEC to coherently understand what they are being charged for, the basis of the charges, and why the charges are being applied.



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scenarios that many of the above-cited rates should not apply to UNE Platform 189

scenarios under any circumstances. For example, in response to the question 190

“under what circumstances does SBC charge USOC UJR to a CLEC which serves 191

a customer via UNE-P,” SBC stated that “UJR on a recurring basis is charged for 192

all residential ports. On a non-recurring basis, UJR is only applied to stand-alone 193

ports and is currently zero rated for UNE-P.”9 In each month since August 2000 194

WorldCom has been charged the $53.01 nonrecurring charge well over a 195

thousand times. To my knowledge, WorldCom has never ordered a port on a 196

stand-alone basis from SBC Illinois and therefore there is no basis for such a 197

charge. 198

199

13. Many other non-recurring rates do not make sense and/or appear to be outdated. 200

Until late November 2002, WorldCom did not provide “new” services to 201

customers and therefore should not have had any line connection charges assessed 202

for services it provided using the UNE Platform. Yet CABS bills WorldCom 203

received for the months of August, September and October 2002 include 204

hundreds of charges for USOC SEPUC, which appears to be an outdated line 205

connection charge of $25.08. The commercial reality is that WorldCom only 206

provided UNE Platform services to customers who migrated from SBC to 207

WorldCom during that time period and thus should only have been charged a 208

9 See Response of SBC Illinois to a portion of the data requests contained in WorldCom letter from Darrell Townsley to Karl B. Anderson, Counsel for SBC Illinois, dated February 19, 2003, response to request No. 2.8.



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$1.02 migration charge during that time. 10 Moreover, as I understand it, the 209

$25.08 line connection charge was an interim charge that was superseded by a 210

$20.21 line connection fee that resulted from the order issued on October 16, 211

2001 in Docket 98-0396, the Commission’s TELRIC Compliance proceeding.11 212

Thus, the $25.08 makes absolutely no sense based on the line connection rates 213

that the Commission has deemed just and reasonable. Many of the nonrecurring 214

charges listed above fall into the same category as the $25.08 rate – they simply 215

do not make sense where CLECs provision services to their end users via the 216

UNE Platform, and/or appear outdated and untraceable to source documents such 217

as tariffs or Commission orders. For example, WorldCom has been charged for R 218

(record) orders (NR9F6) despite the fact that CLECs cannot request record order 219

activity from SBC Illinois using any OSS system with which I am familiar. 220

Indeed, record orders are generated internally by SBC Illinois personnel to correct 221

errors made in their own internal process and should have no billing impact to 222

CLECs at all. Clearly, SBC’s systems appear to be billing CLECs for items they 223

not only did not order but cannot order. 224

225

10 See Response of SBC Illinois to a portion of the data requests contained in WorldCom letter from Darrell Townsley to Karl B. Anderson, Counsel for SBC Illinois, dated February 19, 2003, response to request No. 2.1. 11 SBC Illinois’ UNE Platform tariff indicates that nonrecurring charges for “new” UNE-P, i.e., establishment of UNE Platform services for a 2-wire basic analog loop with basic line port, should be $1.02 UNE-P Record Work Only charge plus a $20.21 Line Connection Charge. Tariff ILL.C.C. No. 20, Part 19, Section 15, Original Sheet 12, effective July 12, 2002.



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14. On the recurring charge side, SBC Illinois apparently continues to bill the 226

“interim” $5.01 charge for unbundled local switching that was set by the 227

Commission’s February 17, 1998 TELRIC Order despite the fact that the interim 228

rate was substantially reduced (to $2.18) as a result of the Commission’s actions 229

in Docket 00-0700 where it required changes to SBC’s unbundled local switching 230

and shared transport rates. The Commission’s Docket 00-0700 Order was issued 231

July 10,2002. In each of the CABS bills that WorldCom has received from SBC 232

from August 2002 through January 2003, SBC has charged WorldCom the UJR 233

recurring USOC for a basic line port at the $5.01 rate instead of the lower 234

Commission approved rate.12 Clearly, the wholesale bills that SBC Illinois 235

provides to WorldCom contain substantial errors. Moreover, a review of SBC 236

Illinois’ tariffs reveals that it contains no USOCs that would allow a CLEC to 237

review its bill in order to determine the items for which it is being charged and the 238

basis for the charges. 239

240

15. It is my understanding that on or about February 6, 2003, SBC indicated that 241

WorldCom would be receiving a credit from SBC to reflect a “reconciliation” of 242

UNE Platform charges. It is my further understanding that SBC has yet to explain 243

in any detail what rates, USOCs and specific bills are implicated by the 244

“reconciliation.” All I can discern from SBC’s indication that there will be a 245

12 WorldCom purchases UNE-P and Unbundled Local Switching and Shared Transport from the SBC Illinois tariff.



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reconciliation is that SBC acknowledges that its wholesale bills contain 246

substantial errors.13 I have no reason to believe that the reconciliation that 247

apparently has been proposed will accurately reflect what WorldCom should have 248

been charged. In addition, I have no basis to believe that SBC will render 249

readable, auditable and accurate wholesale bills on a going-forward basis, 250

particularly since both BearingPoint and E&Y found problems with the SBC 251

Illinois billing accuracy metric and did not make any attempt to true-up rates to 252

the current wholesale tariff. 253

254

16. WorldCom’s real world experience with SBC’s wholesale bills demonstrates that 255

to date SBC Illinois has not been able to provide WorldCom with wholesale bills 256

in a readable, auditable and accurate manner. SBC purported through Mr. 257

Silver’s affidavit to comply the Commission’s Order in Phase 1 to “demonstrate 258

that its UNE rates are clearly defined by providing examples of typically 259

requested UNE arrangements and explaining how services and products are billed 260

under tariffs, the GIA or agreements.”14 Given WorldCom’s commercial 261

experience, Mr. Silver’s efforts to explain how typically requested UNE 262

arrangements are billed are woefully inadequate. For all of the foregoing reasons, 263

I recommend that the Commission withhold any favorable recommendation on 264

13 To my knowledge, this reconciliation is not related to the line loss database reconciliation and refund associated with SBC Illinois’ line loss problems. WorldCom understands that other CLECs have been contacted by SBC about a reconciliation so it appears as though this is not an isolated problem experienced only by WorldCom. 14 Phase 1 Interim Order on Investigation, Docket 01-0662, February 6, 2003, ¶ 713.



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SBC’s request for Section 271 authority unless and until SBC demonstrates that it 265

provides CLECs with complete, accurate and timely wholesale bills that are 266

readable, accurate and auditable. Absent such a showing, SBC cannot 267

demonstrate that it satisfies the nondiscrimination requirements under checklist 268

item 2. 269

270

B. Line Loss Notification (“LLN”) Problems Continue. 271

17. In Phase 1 of this proceeding, SBC witness Cottrell attempted to leave the 272

Commission with the impression that LLN problems had been solved. SBC 273

continues in its efforts to leave this impression despite that fact that real world 274

commercial experience indicates that LLN problems persist. Indeed, in a written 275

answer that SBC provided to a Staff’s request for “a list of all January system 276

changes made to correct line loss notification issues” SBC indicated that: 277

278 SBC Ameritech experienced no instances of undelivered line loss 279 notifiers (LLN) in January, and therefore made no system, process, 280 or procedure changes or table updates resulting from such 281 incidents. As part of the normal operation of its LLN cross-282 functional team, certain steps were taken to enhance the timeliness 283 of LLN transmission. These steps included the updating of one 284 CLEC's profile table regarding its preferences for method of LLN 285 transmission, and the coaching of individual service 286 representatives. One system change was made to correct a rare, 287 intermittent formatting problem with the LLN circuit ID field. 288 This problem had affected approximately 50 LLNs transmitted to 289 SBC Ameritech’s retail organization between November 2002 and 290 January 2003.15 291

15 See Responses to 2/13/03 Workshop questions directed to Mark Cottrell, ICC-5, sent to parties in Docket 01-0662 on February 19, 2003.



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292

18. An unsuspecting reader might infer from Mr. Cottrell’s answer to this question 293

that there were no LLN problems in the month of January 2003. But that would 294

be a mistaken inference. Perhaps the biggest OSS problem that WorldCom has 295

faced in the former-Ameritech region involves SBC’s failure to transmit line loss 296

notifications for thousands of customers. Line loss notifications inform CLECs 297

when a customer has left them to migrate to another carrier and without them the 298

CLECs do not know to stop billing the customers. 299

300

19. SBC has repeatedly said that it fixed the problem with line loss notifications and 301

the problem has repeatedly reappeared. Over the last couple months, the problem 302

with line loss notifications did appear to be largely fixed. But then on January 31, 303

2003, WorldCom stopped receiving line losses from SBC in the proper format, 304

rendering these line losses effectively useless. Apparently, SBC mistakenly 305

changed the format of the line loss information it transmits to WorldCom but 306

never notified us that it had done so. As a result, WorldCom was not able to 307

process over 5,000 line losses.Needless to say, it was WorldCom that reported 308

this problem to SBC, not vice versa. While SBC has spent much time and energy 309

creating its line loss reporting teams, these teams apparently look only at whether 310

a line loss is generated and not whether that line loss can actually be used by a 311

CLEC. Given the substantial number of LLNs impacted, one would think that 312

Mr. Cottrell would have been aware of this particular LLN problem, but his 313



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answers to questions from Staff and others leaves the impression that he, and 314

presumably the entire cross-functional LLN team, were totally unaware of this 315

customer impacting problem. 316

317

318

20. Based on communications with SBC, WorldCom and SBC worked out a fix for 319

the problem and that fix appears to be working as of today. But the problem 320

should never have arisen in the first place. According to SBC, the problem was 321

caused when SBC’s EDI mistakenly changed the WorldCom profile stored in its 322

production systems to LSOG 5 while WorldCom was testing LSOG 5 in the SBC 323

test environment. This problem shows that SBC continues to lack the most basic 324

controls over its change management process, even when it impacts an issue that 325

has been the subject of significant ICC scrutiny. SBC has promised to correct this 326

problem going forward by ensuring that its test personnel are not able to make 327

changes to the production environment, but SBC should have made this change 328

the last time that this sort of a problem occurred rather than after it impacted over 329

5000 customers. It appears that the line and change management processes are 330

still not strong enough to support commercial activities, despite SBC’s 331

protestations otherwise. 332

333

21. In its order conditionally supporting SBC Michigan’s request for Section 271 334

authority, the Michigan Commission stated the need for further improvements 335



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with change management, based in part on SBC’s failure to announce recent OSS 336

changes prior to implementation.16 The Michigan Commission also stated the 337

need for further action on line losses and ordered SBC to “immediately provide[] 338

appropriate notice” if it changes line loss procedures.17 It is now clear just how 339

much these improvements are needed not after, section 271 approval. The 340

Illinois Commission needs to be confident that customer impacting LLN 341

problems have been resolved and that SBC follows change management 342

processes before it can conclude that SBC is providing nondiscriminatory access 343

to OSS. 344

345

C. Outages in SBC’s Pre-Order Systems. 346

22. SBC’s pre-order interfaces have experienced outages on a regular basis. That 347

problem has continued in recent months. In November 2002, WorldCom was 348

unable to access SBC’s pre-order systems 8 times, with outages averaging more 349

than an hour. In December 2002, WorldCom was unable to access SBC’s pre-350

order systems four times, with each outage averaging more than an hour. And in 351

January 2003, WorldCom was unable to access SBC’s pre-order systems four 352

times, with outages averaging approximately 20 minutes. 353

354

16 MI PSC Order at 10. 17 MI PSC Order at 6.



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23. While the January numbers represent somewhat of an improvement, they are still 355

far too high. Without access to pre-order information, WorldCom cannot place 356

orders. Pre-order interfaces should be available almost all of the time, with 357

outages occurring very rarely. Unfortunately, WorldCom’s commercial 358

experience indicates that this is not the case with respect to SBC’s pre-ordering 359

systems in the SBC Midwest region. 360

361

D. SBC’s Transmission of Incorrect Completion Notices. 362

24. SBC recently has informed WorldCom that it transmitted completion notices on 363

some orders that had not actually been completed. In early January, SBC 364

transmitted to WorldCom via e-mail a list of six orders on which it had 365

erroneously transmitted a completion notice. SBC then transmitted a similar e-366

mail on January 28, 2003 with an additional seven orders.18 SBC originally told 367

WorldCom that the problem of erroneous completion notices had been corrected 368

on January 9 but without a root cause other than “manual rep error”, it is not clear 369

that this problem has been corrected. On February 20, 2003, WorldCom received 370

yet another e-mail identifying additional erroneous completion notices. A root 371

cause, other than manual handling, has still not been provided. 372

373

18 For most of these customers, SBC explained that WorldCom’s orders should have been rejected because the customer should not have been permitted to migrate to WorldCom for a variety of reasons (i.e. “The PON should have been rejected because there was a pending order in the system to migrate the account to another carrier,” or “PON should have been rejected because you cannot assume a TN with DSL service,” or “Customer migrated to another CLEC prior to WC’s change order completion date.” ).



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25. WorldCom is quite concerned about this problem in part because the errors that 374

SBC has acknowledged likely are not the only such errors. I say this for two 375

reasons. First, it now appears that either the event that triggers transmission of a 376

completion notice is something other than completion of an order or that SBC’s 377

service representatives are still not adequately trained in the business rules and 378

processes necessary to support local competition. In either case, SBC needs to 379

explain what triggers transmission of a completion notice and how SBC protects 380

against transmission of inaccurate notices. Second, WorldCom’s own experience 381

bolsters the notion that SBC may be transmitting substantial numbers of 382

inaccurate completion notices. Last Fall, as a result of repeated problems with the 383

LLN that SBC transmitted to WorldCom, SBC and WorldCom reconciled their 384

databases to ensure that both SBC and WorldCom knew what customers belonged 385

to each carrier. They found thousands of customers in the five state SBC 386

Midwest region who were SBC customers but who WorldCom believed were its 387

customers as a result of erroneous information received from SBC. Much of the 388

problem was caused by SBC’s failure to send LLNs, but some of the problem 389

likely was also caused by transmission of erroneous completion notices. (On 390

many orders, SBC was not able to provide a root cause of the problem.) The 391

recent problem with SBC’s notification of erroneous completion notifications 392

suggests that this problem may be continuing. 393

394

26. The impact of erroneous transmission of completion notices is severe. It results 395



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in double billing of customers. WorldCom begins billing customers as soon as it 396

receives a completion notice. If the customer has not actually been migrated to 397

WorldCom, however, the customer is also being billed by SBC or by another 398

CLEC. 399

400

27. Moreover, because SBC is notifying WorldCom of erroneous completions via e-401

mail, there is no simple way for WorldCom to stop billing the customers. SBC 402

should be sending line loss notifications to inform WorldCom of erroneous 403

completions, as these are the notifications set up to automatically stop billing in 404

WorldCom’s systems. By instead informing WorldCom of erroneous completion 405

notices via e-mail, SBC forces WorldCom to ensure the proper employees receive 406

SBC’s e-mails and then use manual processes to remove customers from the 407

billing systems. SBC has provided no explanation for the failure to send a line 408

loss for these “erroneously migrated accounts;” nor has it assured CLECs that the 409

problem is a random one that will soon be fixed. Indeed, SBC has recently 410

announced that it will disband the special team that is apparently responsible for 411

ensuring that problems of this type (including line loss problems) are investigated 412

and corrected. As far as SBC is concerned, there is no more problem, a 413

conclusion not supported by recent events. 414

415

28. SBC’s e-mail transmissions are only one example of a more general issue – 416

SBC’s use of non-automated processes to send some notices to WorldCom. SBC 417



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continues to send a miscellaneous line loss notifications via e-mail at the rate of 418

several a week, and, as noted below, sends some “working service conflict” 419

notifications via fax. SBC must eliminate the use of ad hoc processes that are 420

entirely outside the normal flow of automated notices. SBC must also eliminate 421

transmission of erroneous completion notices. 422

423

424

E. Unjustified Cancellation of WorldCom Orders. 425

29. In addition to sending erroneous completion notices on some orders and failing to 426

process disconnect orders, SBC repeatedly cancels some WorldCom orders 427

without justification and without sending proper notice to WorldCom. It also 428

fails to send reject notices on some orders that it properly cancels. 429

430

30. Every day, WorldCom calls SBC to report orders on which it has not received 431

expected completion notices. After SBC researches the issues, it often reports 432

that it erroneously cancelled the orders. Or it reports that it should have sent 433

reject notices on the orders but failed to do so. SBC provides a variety of 434

explanations for these cancellations including both manual errors19 and systems 435

19 For example, sometimes SBC service representatives must cancel service orders internally as a result of internal issues but then are supposed to create new service orders so that the WorldCom Local Service Request (“LSR”) is not cancelled. They sometimes fail to create the requisite service orders. Or, if they are supposed to cancel the LSR, they fail to send the notice informing WorldCom of that fact.



21

errors.20 But the result is the same regardless of the cause. The WorldCom 436

orders are not processed, but SBC fails to inform WorldCom of this fact. 437

438

31. While the number of LSRs that SBC erroneously cancels is not high in percentage 439

terms,the problem is important nonetheless. When SBC incorrectly cancels an 440

LSR, the customer does not receive service from WorldCom until WorldCom 441

detects the problem and calls SBC to determine what went wrong. If the order is 442

for a new line, the customer does not receive service at all until WorldCom 443

detects the problem. 444

445

446

32. At present, WorldCom checks each day to determine whether there are any 447

completion notifications that it has failed to receive within three days of the due 448

date on an order. Based on such checks, WorldCom presently has approximately 449

490 missing completion notices in the 5 state SBC Midwest region as of February 450

18, 2003. Two hundred and two of these missing notifications were in 451

Illinois.21 452

20 SBC also cancels some orders because WorldCom did not respond to the “working service conflict” form that is described below. But the reason WorldCom did not respond is that SBC failed to send the form to the correct location. And, in any case, SBC needs to notify WorldCom if it cancels an order. 21 Until the week of February 3, the impact of the problem was exacerbated because the method SBC insisted on for correcting each error was unnecessarily time consuming. Beginning in October, SBC unilaterally insisted that WorldCom had to call SBC to report missing notifiers rather than using the previously established process under which WorldCom would transmit



22

453

33. Before the Commission can reasonably conclude that SBC provides 454

nondiscriminatory access to OSS, SBC must stop canceling orders erroneously 455

and must notify WorldCom when it does cancel orders, regardless of the cause. I 456

urge the Commission to withhold any favorable recommendation with respect to 457

SBC Illinois’ 271 application unless and until it demonstrates that this problem is 458

resolved. 459

460

F. New Line Order Problems Due To “Working Service Conflicts.” 461

34. WorldCom has recently begun submitting orders for new lines in Michigan. Until 462

now, WorldCom has been submitting only migration orders. Unfortunately, 463

however, SBC has a significant problem processing new lines, a problem that 464

AT&T previously highlighted in state proceedings, and that WorldCom too is 465

experiencing now that it is submitting orders for new lines. 466

467

35. When a CLEC transmits a request for new service, or additional service such as a 468

second line, SBC needs to determine whether to dispatch a technician to install 469

the new line. SBC may be able to install service without dispatching a technician 470

if the customer is moving into a home and the previous resident left without 471

spreadsheets that included all missing notifiers. SBC would only discuss five orders during a phone call, and it generally took approximately an hour to discuss these five orders. Last week, however, SBC agreed that it would permit WorldCom to provide a trouble ticket directly to the account team if it included more than 15 orders. Hopefully, this will alleviate some of the impact of the cancelled orders.



23

turning off the telephone service. SBC may also be able to avoid a dispatch when 472

a customer orders a second line because frequently SBC will have built a second 473

line to the home in order to have spare capacity for a second line order. SBC 474

seems to believe it can determine from the CLEC whether the order should be 475

provisioned using an existing line to the home or an entirely new line. SBC 476

therefore transmits a “working service conflict” form to the CLEC asking for this 477

information. 478

479

36. There are two problems with asking CLECs whether to reuse existing service, 480

however. First, it is not at all clear what information SBC really is asking the 481

CLEC to provide. The CLEC cannot know if there is an extra line in the ground 482

that can be turned up to serve a customer without the need to dispatch technicians. 483

The CLEC may be able to find out from its customer whether he ever had a 484

second line before, but even if he did not, there may well be a second line in the 485

ground that can be used to serve the customer. Moreover, if the CLEC ordering a 486

second line for a customer does tell SBC that it is acceptable to reuse existing 487

service, it risks having SBC reuse the primary line, thus disconnecting the 488

customer. Thus, the information a CLEC can provide regarding the availability of 489

an existing line is likely to be of little use to SBC. Indeed, no other BOC requests 490

such information from CLECs to WorldCom’s knowledge. The BOC itself 491

should know if there is service at a premise since the loop is connected to the 492

BOC’s switch. It should also know if the service is working since the switch is 493



24

generating call records. 494

495

37. Second, at present, SBC sends its “working service” requests by fax and CLECs 496

must respond by fax. Thus, after years of efforts to automate ordering, CLECs 497

have been forced to return to the days of processes that are entirely manual. Fax-498

based processes proved disastrous in the early days after the Act was passed and 499

they have not improved since. Indeed, until last week, SBC was not even 500

managing to send faxes to WorldCom at the number that it requested. As a result, 501

SBC cancelled many WorldCom orders for failure to respond to the working 502

service conflict request and did not even inform WorldCom that it had done so. 503

504

38. SBC should eliminate its requests for working service conflict information. And 505

if there is some reason WorldCom does not now understand that it cannot do so, it 506

must at least be required to automate that process. The Commission should 507

require SBC Illinois to do so before it advises the FCC that Section 271 approval 508

is warranted. 509

510

511

G. Errors In Provisioning Features Ordered By WorldCom. 512



25

39. During the third-party test, BearingPoint found that SBC often fails to provision 513

the features requested by CLECs. That problem continues. 514

515

40. BearingPoint determined that SBC provisions orders accurately only 92 % of the 516

time.22 SBC often provisions the wrong features or blocking options. Even 517

worse, SBC often transmits the completion notice and billing information to the 518

wrong CLEC because it includes the wrong reseller ID on the CSR. This means 519

that customers are billed by the wrong carrier. In addition, when a customer 520

experiences problems with his line and calls the CLEC that he believes is his 521

carrier, the carrier will not have a record of the customer and will not be able to 522

help him. 523

524

525

41. SBC’s own performance numbers provide no basis for concluding its performance 526

is now acceptable. SBC assesses order accuracy as a percentage of all orders, not 527

just manually processed orders. But order accuracy should really be measured 528

only for manually processed orders, as flow-through orders should never be 529

processed inaccurately. 530

531

42. And SBC’s own performance data is flawed not only because it includes flow 532

22 This fact was referenced by the Michigan Commission in its Section 271 Report. See MI PSC Report at 67. If SBC’s OSS systems are common throughout the five state SBC Midwest Region, as SBC has contended in the past, this finding holds true for Illinois as well.



26

through orders but also because SBC apparently compares SBC’s internal service 533

orders to the Customer Service Record (“CSR”) instead of comparing the CLECs’ 534

Local Service Request to the CSR, as SBC explained in a metrics call on January 535

30. Thus, SBC never determines whether the provisioned order matches the order 536

received from the CLEC. This is so even though nothing in the business rule for 537

PM 12 permits SBC to check order accuracy without comparing provisioned 538

service to the order actually transmitted by the CLEC.23 539

540

43. As I understand it, SBC’s position is that its failure to update CSRs accurately is 541

no different than what occurs in its retail business, but I am unaware of any data 542

that SBC relies upon to back this claim. What is clear is that SBC failed the third-543

party test and SBC refused to permit a retest.24 Indeed, in the Michigan Public 544

Service Commission found that the method SBC set forth in its proposed 545

Compliance Plan for correcting the problem was inadequate. SBC indicated that 546

it will fix the problem with order accuracy by better training service 547

representatives. But the PSC demanded a more detailed plan for fixing the 548

23 Ernst & Young’s so-called transaction testing also compared the SBC generated service order to the information in the metrics systems. Thus, Ernst & Young’s data on accuracy metrics has no relationship to accuracy at all. 24 On November 19, 2002, BearingPoint posted on its web site the following statement regarding Exception 31: “BearingPoint stated that Ameritech is not passing this benchmark, but stated that Ameritech has requested that BearingPoint not retest this Exception Report.” There are many other exceptions for which SBC also refused to permit retesting – Exception 113 (calculation of PM 2 (% responses received within X seconds) does not follow the business rules); Exceptions 29, 44 and 48, 116 (late transmission of completion notices); Exception 30 (late transmission of mechanized rejects); Exception 171 (late responses to order status query), and Exception 112 (late responses to pre-order queries).



27

problem.25 Given the serious nature of the problem, however, this Illinois 549

Commission should require a fix to be in place prior providing a favorable 550

recommendation that SBC Illinois 271 application be granted. The Commission 551

should require commercial evidence of a successful fix based on a metric that 552

compares provisioned orders to LSRs and includes only manually processed 553

orders. 554

555

H. SBC’s Failure To Process WorldCom’s Deactivate Orders. 556

44. Beginning in early December 2002, it became clear that SBC was unable to 557

process deactivate orders transmitted by WorldCom for its customers. Thus, 558

where a WorldCom customer moved away and called WorldCom to disconnect 559

service, WorldCom was unable to disconnect the customer. When this was 560

happening, WorldCom was transmiting deactivate orders to SBC and SBC was 561

rejecting the orders and continuing to transmit wholesale bills to WorldCom for 562

those customers. Because it had not received a completion notice on the 563

deactivate order, WorldCom was continuing to transmit retail bills for those 564

customers. 565

566

45. At the height of the problem, WorldCom had some 745 deactivate orders that it 567

could not successfully transmit and as a result WorldCom received numerous 568

customer complaints for continued billing. SBC initially promised to correct the 569



28

problem on January 3, then promised to do so on January 29, then promised to do 570

so on February 12, and then, after WorldCom escalated the problem to SBC upper 571

management, a fix was purportedly implemented on February 6. To date, 572

WorldCom has not received from SBC a root cause analysis detailing the cause of 573

the problem and the manner in which it was supposedly resolved. Consequently, 574

WorldCom has no confidence that this customer impacting problem will not 575

recur. I urge the Commission to require SBC to provide a detailed root cause 576

analysis and explain exactly how this problem was fixed prior to recommending 577

that SBC Illinois be granted section 271 approval. 578

579

I. General OSS Defects. 580

46. The cumulative effect of problems caused by SBC’s OSS can be seen in part by 581

viewing the defect report that SBC has posted on its website. SBC includes on 582

this report OSS defects in each of its regions -- the former Ameritech region, 583

SWBT region, Pacific Bell region, SNET region, and California specifically. 584

Well over half of the defects listed on the February 5 report (42 of 77) are from 585

the former Ameritech region. And of the 42 defects for the Ameritech region, 40 586

are listed as severity 2, meaning they have a high impact on CLECs.26 In my 587

view, this is a very strong indication that the OSS in the SBC Midwest region 588

remains significantly below standard. 589

25 MI PSC Order, at 8. 26 To access these self-reports go to https://clec.sbc.com/clec and select the “Change Management” gold bar, then select “ALL REGIONS.”



29

590

II. BearingPoint And Ernst & Young Performance Measure Audits 591 Demonstrate That SBC Cannot Yet Accurately Measure Its Performance. 592

593

47. The most fundamental reason that the Commission should refrain from advising 594

the FCC that 271 approval is appropriate is the fact that SBC Illinois’ 595

performance data is not yet trustworthy. Both BearingPoint and Ernst & Young 596

found substantial problems with SBC’s control over the underlying data and its 597

application of business rules to calculate performance based on the data. Many of 598

those problems have not yet been corrected. As a result, SBC lacks the reliable 599

data needed to demonstrate that its performance in providing wholesale service is 600

non-discriminatory. It also lacks the measurements needed to prevent backsliding 601

after section 271 authority is granted. 602

603

48. In May of 2000, the Illinois Commission retained BearingPoint (then KPMG) to 604

test SBC’s performance metrics reporting and OSS. BearingPoint began 605

evaluating SBC Illinois performance metrics in October 2000 and issued a 606

detailed interim report on its OSS test and performance metrics test to the Illinois 607

Commission on June 18, 2002. SBC delayed completion of the testing, 608

however, by failing to provide BearingPoint with complete business rule 609

documentation until August 2002, more than two years after testing began, and by 610

repeatedly delaying provision of responses to BearingPoint questions. 611



30

Nonetheless, after extensive testing, BearingPoint released two interim reports 612

concerning it OSS test and performance metrics test on December 20, 2002. 613

BearingPoints December 20, 2002 performance metrics report found severe 614

deficiencies with SBC’s performance reporting. On page 8 of the December 20, 615

2002 Illinois performance metrics report, BearingPoint provides a table that 616

shows that SBC has only satisfied 63 of the 303 criteria for Performance 617

Measurements Reporting. That level of failure is stunning. 618

619

49. Because it understood that it was unlikely to quickly satisfy BearingPoint’s 620

concerns, SBC hired Ernst & Young to conduct a separate audit. Ernst & Young 621

evaluated metrics from March, April and May 2002 and found many of the same 622

problems as BearingPoint. Indeed, Ernst & Young concluded that “certain 623

processes used to generate performance measurements, primarily related to the 624

manual collection and processing of data and computer program coding and 625

modifications, did not include certain controls to ensure the accuracy of the 626

reported performance measurements.”27 Ernst & Young also specified 128 627

instances (including sub-issues) of non-compliance with business rules, as well as 628

listing 48 interpretations of business rules that did not generally agree with 629

business rule as written.28 It is noteworthy that for many of these issues Ernst & 630

27 January 17, 2003 Report of Independent Accountants, Ehr Affidavit, Attachment S. 28 Ehr Affidavit, paragraphs 222-232. With respect to the business rule issues, SBC states that CLECs have now agreed to modify many of the business rules to accord with SBC’s interpretation. While this is true, CLECs did so in exchange for modification of certain remedies



31

Young did not reveal problems it had perceived because when Ernst & Young 631

asked about the problem, SBC provided an interpretation which Ernst & Young 632

deemed reasonable despite the fact that it never checked with CLECs to verify 633

whether SBC’s explanation was or was not reasonable. 634

635

50. SBC argues that many of the issues found by BearingPoint and Ernst & Young 636

have now been corrected. And it cites January 2003 reports from Ernst & Young 637

concluding that corrective action has occurred in many instances. But it is 638

WorldCom’s understanding that in evaluating whether SBC took corrective 639

action, Ernst & Young only looked to see whether SBC had made coding changes 640

– it did not determine whether the coding changes resulted in correct calculation 641

of metrics in subsequent months. In other words, Ernst & Young did not 642

determine that the coding changes actually corrected existing problems or were 643

implemented without causing additional problems. More importantly, E&Y 644

conducted no regression testing to determine if the SBC fixes caused errors in 645

other parts of the system. This is a serious deficiency in any review of OSS 646

implementation. Indeed, no facts about the effectiveness of corrections made in 647

October or later will be available until and unless there is an audit of data from 648

succeeding months when the new software is actually generating reports. 649

650

and other changes. But this does not mean that SBC’s performance reports accurately showed whether it met the benchmarks agreed upon at the time. Moreover, SBC’s failure to calculate these metrics correctly underscores its general problem with performance reporting, a problem that is not corrected by negotiating with CLECs to change the rules for these particular measures.



32

651

51. Moreover, Ernst & Young did not engage in end-to-end transaction testing, as its 652

report implies. It is clear from the record that Ernst & Young did not itself send 653

any transactions. Rather, Ernst & Young merely evaluated transactions provided 654

to them by SBC after those transactions were processed through the SBC EDI 655

gateway. This method provides no assurance that the transactions reviewed by 656

E&Y were sent by CLECs in the first place or represent the actual local service 657

request initiated by the CLEC. More importantly, it provides no way to test 658

whether certain CLEC transactions were dropped or excluded before they reached 659

the SBC order processing systems. Because E&Y relied on transactions provided 660

by SBC, it had no way to determine the number of transactions that CLECs had 661

actually sent into SBC’s OSS systems and therefore had no basis on which it 662

could determine, for example, whether the number of transactions that it 663

evaluated and which were already SBC systems matched-up with the number of 664

actual transactions that had attempted to enter the system. In other words, if 665

CLECs attempted to send 5,000 orders to SBC and only 100 orders made it 666

through the SBC’s gateway, Ernst & Young only looked at the 100 orders and 667

assumed that was the entire universe of orders to be assessed. It evaluated only 668

those orders of which it was aware and did not conduct an end-to-end transaction 669

test. As a result, Ernst & Young’s so-called transaction test is virtually of no 670

value. In contrast to BearingPoint, Ernst & Young never evaluated whether the 671

data to which SBC applied its metrics actually included all of the orders 672



33

transmitted by CLECs. Clearly, E&Y’s use of the term “transaction testing” is a 673

total misnomer. 674

675

52. In addition, it appears from the issues list contained in the Ernst & Young 676

workpapers that Ernst & Young did not report all of the issues that it found. 677

Unlike the BearingPoint test, Ernst & Young’s test was largely closed to public 678

scrutiny. Based on the issues list that SBC and Ernst & Young contend is 679

confidential, it is clear that there are many important problems with SBC’s 680

performance measurements that were not even raised publicly because Ernst & 681

Young simply accepted assertions of SBC management. 682

683

53. In any event, even accepting Ernst & Young’s reports at face value, Ernst & 684

Young itself concludes that there are many issues that were not resolved until 685

recent months -- and thus would have affected the performance measures on 686

which SBC relies to prove section 271 compliance. And there are many other 687

critical issues that remain unresolved at this timeThere are seventeen exceptions 688

that Ernst & Young concluded had not been fixed as of December 2002. SBC 689

failed, for example, to include certain valid LASR transactions in its performance 690

metrics thus affecting 8 measures and 15 sub-measures. SBC also excluded 691

certain wholesale transactions from its measure Ordering MI 12; it used 692

customer-requested due dates instead of customer-offered due dates in calculating 693

Provisioning PMs 27, and 28; it incorrectly reported certain internal orders as 694



34

wholesale orders affecting Provisioning PMS 28-33; it incorrectly reported 695

certain LNP with loop orders as loop orders affecting Provisioning PMs 96 and 696

97, and made numerous other errors. Although SBC argues the errors likely have 697

little impact, it has no way of knowing this without fixing the problem and 698

recalculating the results. Moreover, Ernst & Young has not said that SBC 699

corrected the general problem Ernst & Young found with lack of controls over 700

collection and processing of data. 701

702

54. The open exceptions from BearingPoint are even more troubling. They include, 703

for example, Exception 19 (Ameritech’s data retention policies do not enable 704

thorough and complete audits to be conducted); Exception 20 (procedures and 705

controls for performance measurement calculation and reporting are inadequate); 706

Exception 41 (SBC’s metrics change management process does not require 707

communication of changes to source data systems); Exception 133 (SBC does not 708

have adequately defined procedures or tools to test changes to calculation 709

programs, processes and systems involved in the production and reporting of 710

performance metrics); Exception 134 (incorrect population of product name as 711

unknown for approximately 6.2% of total records, affecting as many as 29 712

performance metrics);29 Exception 169 (11 percent of transactions needed to 713

validate integrity of 11 Ordering Performance Metrics were missing)); Exception 714

29 Ernst & Young found this issue as well but simply accepted SBC’s assertion that this problem was not important.



35

174 (use of incorrect data in calculation of PM MI 11 (average interface outage 715

notification)); Exception 175 (use of incorrect data in calculation of PM 114 (% 716

of premature disconnects) and PM 115 (% of SBC caused delayed coordinated 717

cutovers)); Exception 176 (failure to include access records in DUF metrics and 718

use of incorrect business rules); Exception 182 (records used in calculation of 719

time to unlock 911 record do not match unprocessed records);30 Exception 183 720

(interface outages calculation wrong), Exception 184 (missing trouble reports 721

used in calculation of seven maintenance and repair PMs), and Exception 185 722

(124 of 767 ordering transactions not found in performance measurement data 723

provided by SBC). Despite ongoing dialogue with SBC, BearingPoint still is not 724

satisfied that SBC has resolved these problems. 725

726

55. The absence of a third-party determination that performance reporting is reliable 727

is critical. CLECs generally are unable to determine based on their own data 728

whether SBC is accurately reporting its retail data that is used to determine parity. 729

And even with respect to CLEC data, CLECs often are able to evaluate SBC’s 730

reporting only in very broad-brush terms. That is because it would be 731

prohibitively expensive for any individual CLEC to duplicate SBC’s reporting 732

system with all of the business rules and sub-metrics. WorldCom, for example, 733

30 Ernst & Young found this issue as well but simply accepted AIT’s statements that the problems with the E911 metrics are the result of data collection errors and do not result from real problems with E911 data. Since neither BearingPoint nor Ernst & Young checked that E911 records are correct, the Commission must be certain that the Exception does not represent real problems in the E911 process before it grants its approval.



36

has developed reporting systems that use the same business rules for the whole 734

country and that are designed primarily to ferret out the existence of major 735

problems. WorldCom therefore cannot precisely compare its data to SBC’s 736

reports and has not attempted to do so. It is therefore essential that WorldCom be 737

able to rely on SBC’s reports. Indeed, the FCC has explained that “SBC’s failure 738

to follow the Business Rules could lead to inaccurate and unreliable results which 739

would compromise the Commission’s ability to monitor effectively SBC’s 740

conduct towards other carriers. . . . In addition, inaccurate results will make it 741

difficult for CLECs to determine independently whether there are discrimination 742

problems. Therefore, we must insist on rigorous adherence to the Carrier-to-743

Carrier Performance Plan.”31 But rigorous adherence does not yet exist. 744

745

56. The Michigan Commission recently concluded as much. It explained that “work 746

remains to be done to assure that all aspects of SBC’s performance measure 747

reporting system will operate smoothly, adequately, with stability and as expected 748

to assure reliability and timeliness of reported results.”32 It added that “[a]t this 749

time, the Commission cannot conclude that SBC’s performance metric reporting 750

process has fully achieved a level of stability and dependability which will be 751

required in the post-Section 271 environment to permit continued monitoring and 752

31 SBC Order ¶ 11. 32 MI PSC Report at 14.



37

assurances against discriminatory behavior.”33 The Michigan PSC nonetheless 753

concluded that this work did not need to be completed prior to approval of SBC’s 754

section 271 application in part because this Commission approved BellSouth’s 755

application in Georgia when a review of BellSouth’s performance metrics 756

remained incomplete. But in Georgia, the state had ordered three audits of 757

BellSouth’s performance metrics as additional measures were adopted. 758

Georgia/Louisiana Order ¶ 16, note 47. The first two audits had been completed 759

by the time of BellSouth’s section 271 application and only two exceptions 760

remained open. In contrast, in Michigan, the only audit ordered by the state 761

commission has not been completed, and a multitude of critical exceptions remain 762

open. 763

764

57. The Michigan Commission has ordered SBC to complete performance testing 765

with BearingPoint and Ernst & Young. That is important. But it is also 766

insufficient. It does not mean that SBC has the data needed to demonstrate 767

section 271 compliance today. Nor does it ensure that SBC has in place today the 768

compliance plan needed to prevent backsliding. The FCC has previously 769

explained that the “reliability of reported data is critical,” and “properly validated 770

metrics must be meaningful, accurate and reproducible.”34 Those conditions do 771

not yet exist in Illinois. 772

33 Id. at 22. 34 Texas Order ¶ 428.



38

773

58. For all of the foregoing reasons, the BearingPoint and Ernst & Young audits of 774

SBC Illinois’ performance metrics indicate that SBC cannot yet accurately 775

measure its performance in provisioning wholesale service. Because of the dearth 776

of reliable data, SBC has failed to demonstrate that its performance in providing 777

wholesale service is non-discriminatory. Moreover, SBC lacks performance 778

measurements necessary to prevent “backsliding” after it receives authority under 779

to provide in-state, interLATA services pursuant to Section 271 TA96. For these 780

reasons, the Commission should withhold making a positive recommendation to 781

the FCC concerning SBC Illinois’ 271 application unless and until SBC’s data 782

can be deemed trustworthy and it performance accurately and reliably measured 783

in a manner that can be reproduced by independent third parties. 784

785

Conclusion 786

59. SBC’s performance reporting is incontrovertibly deficient. Both BearingPoint 787

and Ernst & Young concluded as much. Indeed, the Michigan Commission 788

agreed, explaining that “[a]t this time, the Commission cannot conclude that 789

SBC’s performance metric reporting process has fully achieved a level of stability 790

and dependability which will be required in the post-Section 271 environment to 791

permit continued monitoring and assurances against discriminatory behavior.”35 792

Without dependable performance reporting, there is no basis to conclude that 793

35 MI PSC Report at 22.



39

SBC provides non-discriminatory OSS today, much less that there is sufficient 794

assurance against future backsliding. 795

796

60. In addition, in its commercial operations, WorldCom continues to experience a 797

number of important OSS problems. In particular, SBC erroneously returns 798

completion notices on orders it has not completed – and informs WorldCom of 799

this fact via e-mail rather than via fully automated processes, unnecessarily 800

requests additional information from CLECs on requests for new lines – and 801

transmits these requests via fax, erroneously cancels WorldCom orders – without 802

informing WorldCom of this at all, often fails to provision the features and 803

options requested on CLEC orders, fails to process WorldCom orders to 804

disconnect service, makes repeated mistakes in transmission of line loss reports, 805

and provides WorldCom with very inaccurate wholesale bills. While some of 806

these problems may not seem critical individually, collectively they substantially 807

hinder WorldCom’s ability to compete in the local market in Illinois. 808

809

61. The burden is on SBC to demonstrate nondiscriminatory access to OSS at the 810

time it applies based on dependable and accurate performance measures, and to 811

show that it has in place a plan that will prevent future backsliding. It has not 812

done so. As a result, the Commission should refrain from making any positive 813

recommendation to the FCC concerning SBC Illinois 271 application unless and 814

until this shortcomings are resolved. 815



40

816

62. This concludes my affidavit. 817

818

819

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