Understanding and Tracing Accountability in the Public Procurement Process

Public Performance & Management Review, Vol. 36, No. 2, December 2012, pp. 290–315.© 2012 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved. Permissions: www.copyright.com

ISSN 1530-9576 (print), ISSN 1557-9271 (online)DOI: 10.2753/PMR1530-9576360207290

UNDERStANDINg AND tRAcINg AccOUNtAbIlIty IN thE

PUblIc PROcUREMENt PROcESS

Interpretations, Performance Measurements, and the Possibility of Developing Public-Private Partnerships

SchNEqUA N. DIggS AlExANDRU V. ROMANFlorida Atlantic University

AbstrAct: How do public procurement specialists define accountability? Are public-private partnerships possible in public procurement? Is there an accountability nexus between public-private partnerships and public procurement? Using data collected from semistructured interviews, it is determined that public-private partnerships in public procurement are possible only under rigid constraints. Findings suggest that there are two decision-making patterns—the broker and the purist—correlated with length of employment by the same organization and the political context of the agency. Understanding accountability within public procurement requires consideration of a complex decision-making process at the individual and organizational levels and also of the political environment, because public procurement is not immune to politics.

Keywords: accountability, decision-making, performance measurements, public procurement, public-private partnerships

the concept of accountability is currently the focal point of significant academic attention within the field of public administration. both academics and practitioners hope that an understanding of accountability dynamics can suggest an acceptable solution for satisfying the contradictory imperatives of efficiency and democracy. While the debate around accountability is far from over, there is already a solid body of literature that current and future research can build upon.

A number of scholars have provided in-depth discussions of the complexity associated with developing an understanding of accountability in demanding and shifting environments (Acar, guo, & yang, 2008; Agranoff, 2007; behn, 2001; Dubnick, 1998; Kettl, 2002, 2005; Koliba, Mills, & Zia, 2011; Koppel, 2010; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987; Scott, 2006). their works are a suitable framework

Diggs & Roman / UNDERStANDINg AND tRAcINg AccOUNtAbIlIty 291

for constructing the meaning of the concept of accountability. Dunn and legge (2001), Wang (2002), and yilmaz, beris, and Serrano-berthet (2010) all discuss accountability from the perspective of local governance, while barberis (1998), halachmi (2002), Moynihan and Ingraham (2003), Koppel (2010), and Page (2004) provide detailed explanations of the relationship between accountability, operational effectiveness, and performance measurement.

the current body of literature in the field is well developed in terms of provid-ing an understanding of accountability and the links between accountability and performance within classical administrative structures. there is, however, much to be done in regard to developing a theoretical perspective of accountability out-side traditional administrative dimensions. this is particularly true for complex, dynamic, and evolving relationships, and environments such as public-private partnerships (PPPs). the latest research in the context of PPPs and networks sug-gests that it is not sufficient or appropriate to depend on hierarchical constructs and rigid organizational mappings in developing an acceptable understanding of accountability (Acar & Robertson, 2004; Agranoff & Mcguire, 2001; Roberts, 2002; Whitaker, Altman-Sauer, & henderson, 2004).

Although financial and budgetary constraints have made PPPs an important research consideration, the same cannot be said about public purchasing. Until recently, public procurement and public-private partnerships in public procure-ment (P5s) attracted only a limited amount of empirical research. Most of the literature on public procurement is descriptive and nonempirical, lacks strong theoretical backing, and often implicitly assumes a politics-procurement di-chotomy (Murray, 2009; thai, 2001). thus, the literature consistently fails to provide useful academic or practical suggestions (Murray, 2009; thai, 2001). For example, Mccue and Prier (2007) assert that there is a lack of conceptual and theoretic coherence within the understanding of public procurement along the cooperative procurement initiatives. Ramsay and caldwell (2004) maintain that procurement discourse is full of metaphors that lead nowhere and simply increase the chance of misunderstandings. In terms of accountability in public procurement, most scholarly and reform efforts are concerned with achieving efficiency gains and developing anticorruption mechanisms (Kling, 2008; Mur-ray, 2009; Oluka & Ssennoga, 2008; Organization for Economic cooperation and Development, 2005, 2007, 2011; thai, 2001)—rarely do any of these studies address broader theoretical aspects.

this article presents the results of original research that posed two key ques-tions: how do public procurement specialists make decisions, and how do they define accountability? More specifically, to whom do they feel accountable? the research also addressed the questions of whether public procurement specialists feel that PPPs have a place in public procurement, and whether the way they construct accountability would change within such partnerships.

292 PPMR / December 2012

traditional Hierarchical vs. Nontraditional Partnerships and Networks

the academic efforts that have been undertaken until now to develop an account-ability framework can be understood within three sometimes overlapping sets: (1) literature that provides an understanding of accountability dynamics within traditional hierarchical constructs, (2) literature that discusses accountability out-side the traditional forms of organization within more complex and demanding environments, and (3) academic efforts that link accountability to other areas of administrative interest, such as performance measurement, democratic preroga-tives, or general normative goals.

It is important not to segregate these subsets into distinct and rigid academic zones, since it is implausible to reach a complete understanding of accountability without simultaneously considering all aspects involved. Everything from specific meaning to narrative implications is important when developing a theoretical per-spective of a concept. Such a looping approach is particularly vital when studying public procurement due to the relatively limited body of literature in the area, but also due to the inherent complexity of the decision-making processes.

A discussion of accountability in the public sector cannot fail to make reference to the Friedrich/Finer debate. Friedrich (1940) believed that administrators are capable of self-control within boundaries imposed by social norms and professional expectations. Finer (1941) asserted that accountability can only be constructed within a frame of strong external structures (Romzek, 1996). In a broader sense, the debate can be placed within two distinct perspectives regarding accountabil-ity: accountability as answerability, and accountability as managing expectations (O’loughlin, 1990). the idea of accountability as answerability emphasizes over-sight and control of public bureaucracies through elected officials (Aberbach & Rockman, 1997; O’loughlin, 1990; Romzek & Dubnick, 1998). Within this lens, accountability is interpreted by public officials as consideration of and compliance with a regulatory environment established by elected officials. Accountability is understood and upheld through performance measurement, procedure enforce-ment, and budget review (balla, 1998; behn, 2001; Moe, 1991; Roberts, 2002). Kearns (1994) argues that performance standards are a core factor in implementing and defining dimensions of accountability. Failures of public servants to meet the performance criteria are regularly attributed to shortcomings in establishing clear accountability frameworks (Koliba, Mills, & Zia, 2011). the criteria for evaluating performance and success will vary depending on who or what account is given (Radin, 2006). caught in between contradictory demands, administrators find it difficult to create value, be innovative, or act proactively (Moore, 1995).

Accountability as managing expectations is an angle that is well suited for shift-ing and uncertain environments. Rethinking the meaning and role of government


and governance has led to the need to place accountability within more dynamic and less rigid structures based on personal, social, and professional norms and expectations (Kearns, 1994; Kettl, 2002, 2005). the transformation of governance has made notions of authority and hierarchy neither fully necessary nor sufficient to capture the complexity of accountability (Kettl, 2002). Directing and prompt-ing change in public agencies only through contractual agreements based on a principal-agent framework is now perceived as increasing the risk of accountability shortcomings (Dicke, 2002; Roberts, 2002). Defining accountability as managing expectations raises the challenge of delineating and qualifying the human factors needed to ensure high ethical standards (Miller, 2000).

In the end, it is more appropriate to discuss accountability as a web of relations, beliefs, and overlapping dimensions that come through professional requirements, external mandates, organizational compliance, and willingness to uphold both self-imposed and external expectations (Dubnick & Romzek, 1993; gamm, 1996; Klingner, Nalbandian, & Romzek, 2002; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987). the chal-lenges faced by public administrators within the overlapping constructs of hier-archy, professionalism, politics, job performance, and public interest suggest that discussions of accountability should inevitably account for the social environment (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987; Fry, 1995). In managing these competing and at times conflicting prerogatives, administrators have to be more proactive and attempt to satisfy all stakeholders (Kearns, 1994, 1996; Kettl, 2002, 2005). Unfortunately, in many instances, such as in the case of PPPs, it is not only accountability, but also the identification of stakeholders, that becomes difficult.

Public-private partnerships are commonly defined as basic or complex col-laborative efforts involving public, private, and nonprofit organizations (Acar et al., 2008). Savas (2000) makes the case for a more restrictive definition that places the partnerships in the context of their historical roots—privatization and managing urban condition. Along the same lines, yescombe (2007) supports a more recent manner of defining PPPs—that of project-based partnerships. the latter way of defining PPPs would include public procurement as an integral part of the process. For the purposes of the present research, the broader approach to defining PPPs was found appropriate because (1) it offers the flexibility to ac-count for the complexity of the dynamics of PPPs, suggesting that accountability cannot be captured within traditional hierarchical approaches (Acar et al., 2008; bardach & lesser, 1996; Milward, 1996; O’toole, 1997; Weber, 1999); and (2) it was important not to lead the respondents to the survey by providing an exacting definition of the concept.

the divergent behavioral and motivational configurations of the stakeholders of a PPP make constructing an understanding of accountability extremely challeng-ing. It has been suggested that public and private organizations differ significantly with regard to their expectations, decision-making processes, and motivational


frameworks (clemens, 2006; Douglas, 1987; Koppel, 2010; Mirvis, 1992). this would explain the inability to develop an accountability construct solely framed on a traditional hierarchical approach (Acar & Robertson, 2004; Agranoff & Mcguire, 2001; O’toole, 1997). Partnerships are not rigid; they evolve and are transformed. changes in the relationships among parties lead to renegotiations of the accountability delimitations, and who is held accountable for what becomes fuzzy (Kettl, 2002). With time, as long as there are no major systemic failures, it is assumed that someone is responsible and the presence of accountability is taken for granted.

Roberts (2002) and Whitaker, Altman-Sauer, and henderson (2004) believe that the best way to generate accountability within a PPP would be through an emphasis on a dialogue process in which the parties involved are willing to engage, communi-cate, and learn along the way. It is crucial in such an environment to clearly demarcate goals, structures, processes, evaluation criteria, expectations, and communication channels (Acar et al., 2008; bardach & lesser, 1996; Kearns, 1994; Page, 2004; Roberts, 2002; Whitaker et al., 2004; Wohlstetter, Smith, & Malloy, 2005). In es-sence, identifying one single definitional dimension of accountability is difficult if not impossible, and might not even be necessary (Fry, 1995; gallo & thompson, 2000; Kettl, 2002). For example, Mashaw (2006) supports a hybrid accountability construct, whereas Scott (2006) suggests spontaneous accountability.

sample, data, and Methods

the discussion in this section presents some of the results of a broader project that deconstructs the decision-making process within public procurement. the questions that the research efforts addressed were: (1) how do public procure-ment specialists define accountability? (2) to whom do public procurement specialists feel accountable? (3) Is there a place for PPPs in public procurement? (4) Within what theoretical framework does the procurement decision-making process fall? (5) how important is politics in the procurement process? (6) What are some of the most pressing concerns and trends? (7) how are decisions made in public procurement? (8) can performance be measured in the context of public purchasing?

Answering these research questions is somewhat challenging, because pro-curement is an extremely intricate process. One of the respondents captured this complexity when she stated: “I practiced law before I got into procurement . . . and trust me . . . procurement is much, much more complex than law. Every day you see something you’ve never seen before, and there is something new you have to learn.” In order to manage the empirical challenges posed by the theoretical density of studying decision-making, the researchers relied on a mix of qualitative and quantitative methodological approaches.


Semistructured interviews, field research, and content analysis were em-ployed for data collection (babbie, 2010; Denzin & lincoln, 2005). A total of 41 public employees who identified themselves as procurement specialists were interviewed. their primary job responsibilities were related to procurement functions, and they were regularly involved in public procurement decision-making. For purposes of cross-verification, transcripts of commission meetings, procurement guidelines, rules, and ordinances at the county/city/town/village/agency level (for those interviewed) were also analyzed. Whenever available or possible, commission meetings were attended and procurement-related au-dit reports were reviewed. All information gathered was publicly available or relatively easy to access.

Five in-person interviews were used as pilot interviews. two interviews, one in-person and one over the phone, were removed from the final sample due to the limited usefulness of the responses. In one case, the respondent failed to provide reasonably acceptable in-depth answers or a genuine discussion. In the other case, the respondent was unable or unwilling to answer several key questions within the core set of questions. In the latter case, the respondent was fairly new to the position and field.

Of the 34 interviews in the final sample, 24 were conducted in person, and 10 were conducted over the phone. the shortest interview was approximately 35 minutes, and the longest was approximately 180 minutes. the average time for an interview was 70 minutes. In cases when specialists were available and deemed necessary, the respondents were approached for an additional session(s). these sessions were used for member checking and validation purposes (Rubin & bab-bie, 2011; Schwartz-Shea, 2006). A reflexive approach was used that allowed the respondents to become participants in knowledge creation (hardy & Williams, 2011; Smith, 2002). Every interview was based on the core set of 22 questions presented below in the Appendix, but in all cases responses led to additional ques-tions or comments not related to the core questions.

the respondents were encouraged to qualify perspectives within stories (hum-mel, 1991; yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006). In the event that the discussion touched on any sensitive issue (e.g., corruption, administrative errors, inefficiency), the respondents were asked to hypothesize what they would do, how they would re-act, or what would be the outcome of certain scenarios. Reasonable efforts were undertaken not to permit learned theoretical perspectives to influence the inter-pretations (lather, 1986; lincoln & guba, 1985). there was never a deliberate intention to confirm or reject existing theoretical beliefs in terms of accountability, accountability within public procurement, or the possibilities of PPPs in public procurement. Respondents were not offered any definitions and were allowed to discuss everything in terms of their own perspectives and experiences. categories, patterns, and themes were traced from available data.


Methodologically, the importance of interpretive sensitivity was emphasized (Schwartz-Shea, 2006), and tolerance of high levels of ambiguity was crucial (Patton, 2002). For the success of the research, it was essential to develop trust in respondents’ ability to be participants in knowledge creation and, maybe above all, to be open and prepared for flashes of research serendipity (hardy & Wil-liams, 2011).

those interviewed are (or were until recently) active in one of three south Florida counties: broward, Miami-Dade, or Palm beach. there are 104 municipalities in this area as well as many unincorporated areas, with a total population of slightly more than 5.5 million (U.S. census bureau, 2010). Drawing from what was sug-gested by the informants and according to estimates based on professional chap-ter membership rosters, there are approximately 650 procurement professionals active in the area. this estimate does not include employees of public agencies, who perform procurement functions “among other things” and do not think of themselves as procurement specialists.

In all, 343 procurement specialists were contacted for the purpose of setting up interviews. the contacts were obtained by using a snowball technique. No ef-fort was made to target a specific segment of the population. the interviews were conducted during the period of March–June 2011. At the time of the interviews, seven municipalities were implementing procurement reform efforts or were in the process of audit or investigation initiatives. this, juxtaposed with what one of the respondents described as “the suspicious nature of procurement people,” led to a lower participation rate of 11.95%.

the size of the sample could be considered a weakness that restricts the abil-ity of the researchers to transfer the findings to a broader context. Nonetheless, given the nature of in-depth interviews, a sample size below 50 observations is often sufficient to provide “theoretical saturation” (Acar et al., 2008; Ritchie, lewis, & Elam, 2003; Strauss, 1987). Also, in August and September 2011, the researchers were invited to present and discuss their findings at regional meet-ings, and they used these occasions to address concerns regarding the possible participation rate bias. Attendees at the meetings, both research participants and nonparticipants, were able to easily associate with the conclusions of the research, and confirmed the reliability and credibility of the suggestions. In addition, the researchers asked 18 public procurement specialists who were aware of the study but had decided not to participate about their reasons for not participating. Nine of them stated that they did not have the time to take part in the research dur-ing the months that the interviews were conducted, but otherwise would have participated. Five said they chose not to respond because a representative(s) of their agency was already participating, and on four occasions the individuals were not interested or felt uncomfortable about being interviewed. While the researchers are confident that there is only minimal concern regarding probable


nonparticipation bias, scholars should be conscious of the danger of overen-thusiastic generalizations. Future research that would test the findings within a more extensive scope is warranted.

table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the sample.In four instances the specialists interviewed were county employees, in 3 cases

they were employed by village or town procurement offices, 9 were employed by state, regional, or other government agencies, and 18 were procurement specialists working for cities. In three instances, two more procurement specialists from the same organization were interviewed.

the respondents were employed by municipalities that ranged from those with only a few thousand citizens and relatively small procurement spending (less than $1 million) to those who worked at the state and county levels (pro-curement spending above $200 million). there was also a good mix of respon-dents from both historically wealthy and traditionally poor municipalities. the sample was lightly skewed in terms of respondents representing municipalities that were traditionally perceived as “well run.” Sixteen of the interviewees had worked during their careers for two or more governmental agencies. twelve had private sector experience or had worked in other states before their current position. As such, given the employment mobility of procurement specialists and the diverse mix in the final sample, the data are found to be representative of the broader population, and thus certain generalizations based on the find-ings are possible.

table 1. sample descriptive statistics

In-person interviews (phone) 24 (10)

Average interview time 70 minutes

Female (male) 14 (20)

Respondent over 30 years old (under) 32 (2)

With current organization more than 5 years (less than 5 years) 19 (15)holds some procurement certification (does not hold any procurement certification) 19 (15)Position: director/manager/nonmanagerProcurement is undertaken in: centralized/decentralized/hybrid formProcurement department is independent (within other department such as finance)

16/8/1025/5/418 (16)

Approximate mean spend (approximate median)Approximate maximum procurement spending for the sample (minimum)

$91 million ($53 million)

$375 million ($200,000)Average years of experience in public procurement for the set of respondentshighest number of years of experience in public procurement (lowest)

20

43 (1)


results and Implications

Following an inductive approach as well as by verifying understandings of key dimensions with respondents, it was possible to identify patterns, categories, and eventually themes (creswell, 1994; creswell, hanson, clark-Plano, & Morales, 2007; Denzin & lincoln, 2005). the key concepts were delineated and developed through the interpretations of the procurement specialists rather than by attempting to fit what was said into preexisting concepts. Once the core dimensions of the meaning-building constructs were identified, patterns and relationships were traced within the framework given by the concepts. Personal and professional values sets were found to play a critical role in the decision-making process.

Accountability defined

For public procurement specialists, accountability encompasses the idea of conducting public procurement in a manner that can be traced and defended, is transparent and consistent, satisfies and manages stakeholders’ expectations, is fair and equitable, and follows ethical norms set within organizational and societal contexts in order to maximize the benefit obtained from spending public funds.

this manner of defining accountability fits within the dimensions offered by Shafritz:

accountability: 1. the extent to which one must answer to authority legal or organizational—for one’s actions in society at large or within one’s particular or-ganizational position. . . . 2. An obligation for keeping accurate records of property documents and funds . . .

accountability, administrative—the aspect of administrative responsibility by which officials are held answerable for general notions of democracy morality as well as for specific legal mandates. (2004, pp. 1–2)

based on the participants’ responses and on cross-validation using secondary data, we concluded that the manner in which public procurement specialists define accountability is a process of diachronic management of variable influence streams. the types and intensity of these streams vary with one’s position or with shifts in the political climate surrounding the organization. this aspect was previously emphasized in the literature by Romzek and Dubnick, who stated that “account-ability involves the means by which public agencies and their workers manage the diverse expectations generated within and outside the organizations” (1987, p. 228). Much the same was stated by Scott, who defined accountability as “the obligation to give an account of one’s actions to someone else, often balanced by responsibility of that other to seek an account” (2006, p. 175).

What is intriguing in the way public procurement specialists define account-ability is that no evidence of anticipation of “the other to seek account” was identified. those expectations were implicitly present within other elements but


not salient. this finding is attributed to the success of the initiatives to increase administrative transparency, the role of the media as a watchdog of procurement speeding, and the ongoing audits and reforms (within the three counties, at least 12 procurement-related corruption cases in the period from 2008 to 2011 trig-gered reform and audit initiatives). One of the respondents stated, “citizens are not shy about demanding transparency and being involved by requesting public records. Most of the time, such requests are warranted.” Or, as described by an-other respondent, “We are exposed to our citizens and vendors.” thus, in order to establish accountability, it was important to emphasize the other to seek account when seeking account was cumbersome. the increased saliency of the area and the ability to easily access information, however, have made seeking account an implicit and perhaps an indirect expectation, as was previously pointed out by Kearns (1996).

Public procurement specialists rely heavily on personal and professional net-works to shape their interpretations of accountability within the broader societal expectations, or in their decision-making when ambiguity is present. For example, one respondent defined being accountable as “being able and ready to answer to the community . . . [you have to] make sure that you use funds wisely—and that you make a difference.” In another case, accountability was defined as “doing things in a manner that allows you to sleep at night,” or as “being like caesar’s wife: aside from doing the right thing, you also have to make sure that you make it appear right. you have to communicate with people, and educate them about the process.”

the attempt to predict the implications of a proposed administrative change or a political choice is an important part of the procurement decision-making process. A public procurement specialist who has to make a decision attempts to foresee, to the extent possible, the reaction of the stakeholders. this also includes pathways and expectations in regard to accountability. theoretically, this lends support to the idea that the dimensions offered by Friedrich (1940) and Finer (1941) are not sufficient as an understanding of accountability. their reconciliation does, however, offer an appropriate base on which to build an adequate understanding (Acar et al., 2008; gruber, 1987).

Overall, the manner in which public procurement specialists define account-ability evolves and varies with their experience within the wider organizational culture, but also it is shaped by their personal and professional associations and career aspirations. thus, the construct of the meaning of accountability in public procurement carries a strategic character—which lends support to Kearns’s (1994) expectations about accountability within the administrative context.

there are three grand, overarching aspects to the manner in which public procurement specialists define accountability: (1) It emphasizes the dynamic, complex, and evolving character of the procurement process. their definitions


of accountability depend on the time frame, the environment, and constraints they are facing. (2) competing and contradicting prerogatives are omnipresent in their decision-making processes. (3) While everyone agrees that the procure-ment process and procurement specialist need to be responsive and responsible to the stakeholders, be fair and equitable, and maximize the benefit obtained by spending public funds, there are great differences on how each of these key ele-ments is delineated.

It is in the manner that these ideas are interpreted and how specialists man-age the decision-making process based on their professional and personal values that two distinctive interpretation types emerge: (1) broker and (2) purist. the meanings of these terms are entirely derived from the specialists’ interpretations within their decision-making and accountability prerogatives. Although the two words have certain connotations in their vernacular usage, these undertones or normative beliefs should not be applied here. the terms were suggested by the specialists themselves. In order to avoid possible confusion from the normative connotations, “purist” and “broker” should be considered here only within the framework developed in this article.

It is not assumed that there is no overlap of the two interpretations or that they are not sensitive to time. It is possible to “jump” from one interpretation spectrum into another at some (or several) point(s) in the course of a career as a procurement specialist. For visualization purposes, the two patterns can be seen as clustering around attractor points formed by an ideal broker and an ideal purist, thus forming spaces within a broader set of interpretations. the ideal-type construct that was employed to generate the concepts of broker and purist is methodologically similar to Weber’s use of the ideal type when discussing bureaucracy. the description of the ideal phenomenon is meant to emphasize a clean and logical representation of reality—in order to facilitate theory-building efforts. because of the tremendous range of variation in human nature and behavior, the ideal type is rarely met and on most occurrences will differ in some way from the ideal description. Figure 1 represents one possible mapping (the axis labeling is discussed in greater detail below).

the decision-making patterns of the ideal broker and the ideal purist are placed in an interpretation space that is shaped by their political and organizational en-vironments. the circular porous shapes around the ideal types capture the set of variations that are found in reality but ultimately evolve toward one ideal type. An important aspect of the figure is the permeable character of the spaces. this sug-gests that (1) they are diachronically flexible and, depending on the environment, can change their relative sizes, (2) it is possible for purists or brokers to influence the political and organizational contexts, thus leading to shifts in the interpreta-tion spaces, and (3) changes in interpretation can result both from external and internal shocks.


Although a certain level of association between personality and decision-making pattern was identified, this is not always the case. Some character profiles may be “more inclined” toward one of the interpretations, but nonetheless individuality is not found to be a dominant force in determining how public procurements spe-cialists define accountability or make decisions within an organizational context. this is exemplified by instances when procurement respondents characterized a colleague or superior as “totally different outside of work” or “when I had a drink with the guy—years later—he turned out to be a funny guy. . . . I didn’t know that when I worked for him.”

the approach taken here is similar to the mappings of accountability dimen-sions by Romzek and Dubnick (1987) (legal, political, bureaucratic, and profes-sional within internal and external controls), gruber (1987) (policy and programs continuum), Rubin (1990) (legal standards, ethical standards and administrative responsibilities, technical responsibilities), Kearns (1994) (tactical or strategic internal response system, implicit or explicit external mandate control), Mashaw (2006) (accountability regimes), and Koliba, Meek, & Zia (2010) (democratic, market, and administrative accountability frames). Different from previous efforts, the mapping process used here emphasizes fluidity and focuses on the individual level of interpretation and decision-making. It is posited herein that accountability cannot be understood outside a broader decision-making context. While general-ization beyond the sample’s restrictions is possible, this is not the primary intent. As O’toole (1995) and terry (1999) elegantly maintain, an additional theoretical interpretation will only add value to the already existing knowledge base.

Figure 1. Visualization of broker-Purist Framework

interpretation overlap


brokers and (or vs.) Purists

the differences between the two interpretations cluster around several broad dimensions: (1) the number of accountability pathways, (2) the role and interpre-tation of guidelines and ordinances within the decision-making process, (3) the decision-making pattern under pressure and when ambiguity is present, and (4) the perception of the “self” within and outside the organization. table 2 presents a summary of the sample broken down by interpretation type and offers the detailed distinctions between the two dimensions:

From a purist perspective, the respondents generally feel accountable to just one single dimension. Adding additional accountability pathways to the accountability construct is perceived as adding confusion, increasing ambiguity, and decreasing efficiency. Purists view brokers as “bastardizing the process” and believe there is no inherent strain between discretion and accountability. they see themselves as “enforcers” or “defenders” of the process. For them, discretion is limited by the

table 2. description of Interpretations

Broker Purist

total number of respondents interpreting accountability as:

16 18

Female 8 6Male 8 12Director 9 7Manager 4 4Nonmanager 3 7Feels accountable to: Always more than one focal point In most cases only one focal point

of accountabilitycharacterizes self as: Facilitator/helper/upgrader of the

processDefender/enforcer of the process

characterized by the “other” type

“bastardizer” of the process blind, clerk

When guidelines are ambiguous, relies mainly on (ranked by importance):

(1) Experience (2) Professional networks (3) Personal values (4) Staff (5) Vendors

(1) commission/director/manager (2) Staff (3) Experience

Manner of identifying taxpayers and vendors/contractors

Do not distinguish between taxpayers and vendors. Vendors are considered taxpayers.

Do not think of vendors as taxpayers.

Describes procurement process as:

“Adding value” “buying by the book”

believes that procurement specialists should be mainly held accountable for:

Who they are as professionals the job they do


guidelines, and most of the time there is a single way to interpret the guidelines. Pur-ists believe that there is usually one best solution, even in ambiguous situations.

In contrast, the broker interpretation sees several pathways of accountability. brokers see themselves as accountable to more than one factor simultaneously. thus, a procurement specialist should be accountable to the citizens, the organiza-tion, the vendors, the procurement guidelines, and the commissions or supervisors (without delineating levels of importance among them). brokers see procurement’s purpose as “adding value” to administration, whereas purists see value solely in procuring “by the book.”

brokers see themselves as facilitators. When ambiguity is present, they rely on communication channels and learning mechanisms to develop a solution. these dynamics appear similar to those suggested by Stivers (1994), who proposed com-munication, with an emphasis on listening, as an accountability-building mecha-nism. “listening responsively may, therefore, help promote accountability on the part of public officials as they begin to see citizens as inhabitants of the same public square they themselves occupy and as they engage them in dialogue” (p. 366). For brokers, the procurement process and guidelines are not sufficiently detailed to provide answers to the complexity they are facing. As one respondent stated, “On routine purchases, the process will make the decision for you. For complex procurement spends, the process will not make the decision for you. you’ll have to make the decision.” Negating the presence of discretion within the guidelines and ordinances is characterized by brokers as being “blind” or behaving like a “clerk.” thus brokers often find themselves dealing with the tension between the discretion they perceive to be present under the guidelines and the accountability prerogatives. harmon (1995) argues that this strain between discretion and ac-countability requires continuous negotiation of meaning in terms of the sets of personal and institutional values.

It is difficult to place the broker perspective on accountability within exist-ing frameworks. this type is, to some extent, similar to the idea of professional accountability (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987); it falls somewhere in between dis-cretionary and positioning accountability (Kearns, 1994), and in part overlaps collaborative (Mashaw, 2006), community (Acar et al., 2008), and citizen, profes-sional, collaborative accountability constructs (Koliba et al., 2011). brokers appear to be able to identify with different pathways and dimensions, thus suggesting a hybrid, evolving interpretation of accountability comparable to the one suggested by Mashaw (2006). Purists, to the contrary, are easy to place within frameworks already present in current literature. this type of accountability interpretation fits the traditional bureaucratic or administrative accountability frameworks, as purists emphasize group accountability and trust along the lines suggested by golembiewski (2001) and by langfred and Shanley (2001).

both brokers and purists identify ethics, trust, and the tested reliability of the


professionals within their networks as core dimensions. thompson (2003) argues that this would be a fundamental requirement within horizontal ties. Purists, how-ever, place more emphasis on trust within the organizational environment, whereas brokers focus on trust within the larger community. brokers emphasize the idea of building a reputation “for being fair” and “that I am not only doing what’s right. I also make sure that it is perceived that I am doing it.” For brokers the professional and social perceptions of what a public procurement specialist does are as important as the job itself. this aligns with Morris, Morris, and Jones’s (2007) suggestion that perception is a factor in establishing directional and collaborative capacities in networks. thus, it can be argued that brokers use communication within a social context as a strategic mechanism. Purists do not always share brokers’ valuation of reputation outside their work environment. they believe that reputation is directly associated with upholding the procurement process.

No statistically significant relationships were identified between a respondent’s gender, position, years of experience, agency employed by, procurement spending by the agency, or years of experience in the private sector, and whether individuals had a broker or purist perspective. Similarly, procurement guidelines, ordinances, whether procurement was centralized, hybrid, or decentralized, or whether the pro-curement department was independent or part of another department (e.g., finance) were not confirmed as significant variables in explaining the difference between the two decision-making patterns and the way they defined accountability.

however, all the respondents agreed that public procurement is political, and that it sometimes takes a strong personality or a well-developed “protection” mechanism to “deal with the pressure” and to avoid biases. As one respondent characterized it, “In government . . . procurement is probably the fastest way to prison.” Depending on whether the respondents believed that they had experienced relatively low or high political pressure (their responses were cross-validated with the results of the content analysis), there was a statistically significant relation-ship between the political contexts and whether the procurement specialist was identified as a broker or a purist. In environments characterized as highly political, there was a higher probability that the respondent would define accountability in a purist perspective. the results are presented in table 3.

level of comfort with the organization was also identified as statistically sig-nificant. those who had been with their current organization five years or longer were more likely to have a broker-type interpretation. Results are presented in table 4.

If these results are confirmed by future research, it would be of great import in terms of designing procurement policy. the presence of statistically significant relationships does not confirm the generalizability of the associations, nor does it necessarily imply causality. It does, however, suggest that it is highly unlikely to have identified such a strong correlation between environments perceived as highly


table 3. Association between Perceived Level of Political Volatility and Interpretation

Interpretation

Broker Purist Total

level of political pressure felthigh low

3 14 1713 4 17

total 16 18 34

Value dfAsymp. Sig. (two-sided)

Exact Sig. (two-sided)

Exact Sig. (one-sided)

Pearson c2 11.806a 1 0.001 0.002 0.001continuity correctionb 9.563 1 0.002Fisher’s Exact test 0.002 0.001N of Valid cases 34

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. the minimum expected count is 8.00.

b. computed only for a 2 × 2 table.

table 4. Association between Length of employment with the organization and Interpretation

Interpretation

Broker Purist Total

years with current organizationless than 5 More than 5

2 13 1514 5 19

total 16 18 34



Exact Sig. (one-sided)


a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. the minimum expected count is 7.06.b. computed only for a 2 × 2 table.


political with lower comfort levels, using number of years with the agency as a proxy, with the organizational contexts, and a purist decision-making pattern. the nonpara-metric tests are known to be overly conservative, so finding statistically significant relationships suggests the possibility of a certain level of broader generalization.

Interestingly, it was not possible to confirm a link between procurement spend-ing and whether the environment could be described as highly political or not. One of the respondents claimed, “Where there is money, it [politics] will come.” Other respondents expressed variations of this idea. We expected to be able to statistically confirm it within during data analysis, but this was not the case.

Possible Partnerships in Public Procurement

the concept of PPPs in public procurement is not well developed. While histori-cally public procurement functions have often been outsourced, there are few cases of public procurement departments working directly with a private partner toward a common goal. the intricacy of the procurement process makes the development of partnerships difficult. the limited number of successful partnerships identified, five, was related to procurement in construction projects or with the provision of complex services (e.g., system management, financial services, health services). temporary partnerships develop only when the procurement office does not pos-sess the expertise necessary to make viable decisions or when both parties, public and private, share the benefits from the final outcome. It is important to note that these will act as partnerships only if the private party also acknowledges the com-mon goal. Otherwise, the relationship is one of outsourcing or contracting. In the five cases identified as PPPs, the “selection of the partners” was made through competitive processes.

Despite localized success, procurement specialists found it difficult to envision the development of P5s, other than on a temporary basis or with the imposition of rigid constraints. twenty-four of the respondents believed that P5s are possible. Nevertheless, even those who were open to the idea of P5s or had experienced “good partnerships” at some point in their careers expressed concern about the long-term implications of such partnerships. twenty-five of the respondents believed that the “public side” of a P5 would be held accountable regardless of contract stipulations. they also believed that there is too large a motivational gap between the partners for long-term trust relationships to develop. table 5 provides a summary breakdown of the perceptions/descriptions given by respondents in regard to the possibility of developing P5s.

those identified as brokers were more likely to believe in the possibility of such partnerships. Purists in many instances disliked the idea, showed reserva-tions, and at times even became emotionally charged when discussing the danger of partnerships. the results are in table 6.


Performance Measurement

Measuring performance in the public sector is a daunting task in general, but in some cases it might be possible. the procurement process is more complex than is generally suggested in the literature and often is undertaken in environ-ments dominated by ambiguity (Mccue & Prier, 2007). Measuring performance in public procurement may be almost impossible (Mccue & Prier, 2007). In such cases, accountability will become a central issue because of the need to pursue distinct and at times contradictory goals, with heavy policy implications (Dewatripont, Jewitt, & tirole, 1999; lohmann, 1998; Stone, 2002). Procure-ment specialists are exposed to such challenges on a constant basis. One of the respondents stated: “they want us to buy at the lowest possible price; they want us to buy locally—and fast; and they want high-quality products. . . . If you tell me how I can do all that at once—I will hire you right now.” Such contradictions are common at all procurement levels. For instance the U.S. government Ac-

table 5. Possibility of P5s

Possibility of P5s: Number of times mentioned

Possible 12

Dangerous/tricky/political/sensitive to steering 9

Difficult/tough/challenging/not preferred 8

handy/useful in localized manner/practical 5

Impossible/has no place in procurement/I hate it 4

good/makes a lot of sense 2

table 6. Association between Perception of P5s and Interpretation

Interpretation

Broker Purist Total

Are P5s possible?No yes

1 9 1015 9 24

total 16 18 34





a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. the minimum expected count is 4.71.b. computed only for a 2 × 2 table.


countability Office (2011) pointed out the contradictory and mutually exclusive goals in regard to fleet purchasing provisions that were implemented as a result of the effort to reduce reliance on petroleum-based fuels. Some current vehicles with the lowest greenhouse emissions do not qualify as alternative-fuel vehicles; thus, while procuring alternative-fuel vehicles, public agencies actually increase greenhouse gas emissions.

Overall, both brokers and purists were found to be quite skeptical about the possibility that performance measurements can be useful or can increase the quality of decision-making in public procurement. One respondent elegantly summarized his feelings: “Procurement is not a production function.” he argued that there is no clear way of measuring or defining outputs, inputs, preferences, or outcomes. Some research participants acknowledged strong dislike of the idea of performance measurement and its ability to capture “the value we [procure-ment specialists] are adding to the process.” One of the respondents stated: “this performance measurement thing is total [expletive]. It is useless. What are they trying to measure? how fast I got the contract done? Every contract is different; every bid is different . . . you cannot count what I do!”

Fifteen respondents stated that their agencies had or that they were aware of specific procurement (not human resources) performance measurements. In five of those cases, the performance criteria were self-imposed. the performance mea-surements were primarily qualitative, such as satisfaction reports from vendors or internal customers and acknowledgments of overall reputation. One procurement director stated: “you know when the guy does a good job. you cannot really mea-sure that. In procurement, if he would do wrong by someone, you would hear it right away. here [procurement], you cannot hide bad performance. It is too demanding, too transparent, and way too political for you to mess up.” In the cases when the respondents claimed concrete quantitative performance criteria, the measurements were still broad and basic (counting) in nature, and dealt either with processing times or cost savings relative to the previous year’s spending.

conclusions

the fact that accountability cannot be easily molded into a construct that can rigidly differentiate “what is accountable” from “what isn’t accountable” does not mean that the pursuit of such understanding is futile. the evolving nature of how we un-derstand accountability in governance makes the idea a critical and necessary part of administration (Kettl, 2002). Many recent administrative failures can be attributed to the inability to uphold accountability prerogatives (cigler, 2007; Ink, 2006). Within complex partnerships and networks, even minor failures in accountability can lead to disastrous results (Derthick, 2007; Kettl, 2005; Koliba et al., 2011). Public procure-ment is especially sensitive to such minor failures (Mccue & Prier, 2007).


We approached the research with a limited number of assumptions about how accountability is understood in public procurement. We determined that the way public procurement specialists define accountability fits into the context of existing knowledge in public administration literature. At the same time, the need for situational flexibility in understanding accountability is paramount. Organizational and institutional differences among public, private, and nonprofit entities might lead to different interpretations of the critical dimensions of accountability, but the underlying nature of the concept may be similar across sectors.

Within a holistic view, the purist approach to accountability appears to fit a perspective that can be characterized as a mix between the interpretations of ac-countability under the old public administration and the New Public Management. this accountability construct is developed mainly within hierarchical structures and is believed to be “simple” (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000, 2007). the broker interpretation seems to fall under what Denhardt and Denhardt refer to as the new public service, where the approach to accountability is “multifaceted”—meaning that “public servants must attend to law, community values, political norms, pro-fessional standards, and citizen interests” (2000, p. 554).

the nature of the two decision-making patterns—broker and purist—suggests that accountability prerogatives in certain procurement departments (organizations) would respond differently to identical reform efforts. In a department dominated by a purist perspective, a change in the regulatory environment and the tightening of responsibility demands through hierarchical constraints will lead to increased accountability. In the case of brokers, change is possible only through the devel-opment of communication and multilateral learning channels.

Results suggest that political interests are omnipresent in the procurement process. this aspect is often understated (and underreported) in procurement research and in the literature, which implicitly assumes a politics-procurement dichotomy. given the local and national impacts of procurement choices, it is crucial to develop an appropriate awareness of the administrative and economic benefits of improved accountability within procurement practices.

In the words of one of the respondents: “Public procurement specialists are not magicians.” they cannot be held accountable for failures within a broader political context. the procurement process will meet normative goals only if the complex-ity of the process is properly addressed and considered. treating procurement as a simple clerical formality would be detrimental to efforts to develop a body of theoretical and practical knowledge. In the absence of such a base, future reform and educative efforts are doomed to failure and inconsistency. As Denhardt and Denhardt state: “Accountability isn’t simple” (2000, p. 555).

this study suggests that while accountability is vital at the individual level, an accountability nexus within the milieu of P5s is at best in its developing stages.


Successful partnerships are constructed within frameworks built on trust, com-mon goals, authentic communication, and the ability to evaluate and examine performance. the complexity of public procurement juxtaposed with high levels of discretion makes building such constructs highly challenging. Unless expecta-tions and performance within partnerships are unambiguously defined and upheld, it is difficult to envision P5s achieving accountability outcomes superior to those under traditional administrative structures.

references

Aberbach, J.D., & Rockman, b.A. (1997). bureaucracy: control responsiveness, perfor-mance. In A.I. baaklini and h. Desfosses (Eds.), Designs for democratic stability: Studies in viable constitutionalism (pp. 73–94). Armonk, Ny: M.E. Sharpe.

Acar, M., & Robertson, P. (2004). Accountability challenges in networks and partnerships: Evidence from educational partnerships in the United States. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 70, 331–344.

Acar, M., guo, c., & yang, K. (2008). Accountability when hierarchical authority is ab-sent: Views from public private partnership practitioners. American Review of Public Administration, 38(1), 3–23.

Agranoff, R. (2007). Managing within networks: Adding value to public organizations. Washington, Dc: georgetown University Press.

Agranoff, R., & Mcguire, M. (2001). big questions in public network management research. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 11, 295–326.

babbie, E.R. (2010). The practice of social research (12th ed.). belmont, cA: Wadsworth.

balla, S. (1998). Administrative procedures and political control of the bureaucracy. American Political Science Review, 92, 663–673.

barberis, P. (1998). the New Public Management and a new accountability. Public Ad-ministration, 76, 451–470.

bardach, E., & lesser, c. (1996). Accountability in human services collaboratives: For what? And to whom? Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 6, 197–224.

behn, R.D. (2001). Rethinking democratic accountability. Washington, Dc: brookings Institution Press.

cigler, b.A. (2007). the “big questions” of Katrina and the 2005 great flood of New Orleans. Public Administration Review, 67, 64–76.

clemens, E.S. (2006). the constitution of citizens: Politic theories of nonprofit organiza-tions. In W.W. Powell & R. Steinberg (Eds.), The nonprofit sector: A research handbook (2nd ed.; pp. 207–221). New haven: yale University Press.

creswell, J.W. (1994). Research design: Qualitative and quantitative approaches. thou-sand Oaks, cA: Sage.

creswell, J.W., hanson, W.E., clark-Plano, V., & Morales, A. (2007). qualitative research designs. Counseling Psychologist, 35, 236–264.

Denhardt, R., & Denhardt, J.V. (2000). the new public service: Serving rather than steer-ing. Public Administration Review, 60, 549–559.

Denhardt, R., & Denhardt, J.V. (2007). The new public services: Serving, not steering. Armonk, Ny: M.E. Sharpe.

Denzin, N.K., and lincoln, y.S. (2005). Handbook of qualitative research (3rd ed.). thousand Oaks, cA: Sage.


Derthick, M. (2007). Where federalism didn’t fail. Public Administration Review, 67, 36–47.

Dewatripont, M., Jewitt, I., & tirole, J. (1999). the economics of career concerns. Part II: Application to missions and accountability of government agencies. Review of Economic Studies, 66(1), 199–217.

Dicke, l. (2002). Ensuring accountability in human services contracting. American Review of Public Administration, 32, 455–470.

Douglas, J. (1987). Political theories of nonprofit organization. In W.W. Powell (Ed.), The nonprofit sector: A research handbook (pp. 43–54). New haven: yale University Press.

Dubnick, M.J. (1998). clarifying accountability: An ethical framework. In c. Sampford, N. Preston, & c.A. bois (Eds.), Public sector ethics: Finding and implementing values (pp. 68–81). leichhardt, Austria: Federation Press.

Dubnick, M.J., & Romzek, b.S. (1993). Accountability and the centrality of expectations in American public administration. In J.l. Perry (Ed.), Research in public administra-tion (pp. 37–78). greenwich, ct: JAI.

Dunn, D., & legge, J. (2001). U.S. local government managers and the complexity of responsibility and accountability in democratic governance. Journal of Public Admin-istration Research and Theory, 11(1), 73–88.

Finer, h. (1941). Administrative responsibility in democratic government. Public Admin-istration Review, 1, 335–350.

Friedrich, c.J. (1940). Public policy and the nature of administrative responsibility. In c. Friedrich & E.S. Mason (Eds.), Public policy (pp. 3–24). cambridge: harvard University Press.

Fry, R.E. (1995). Accountability in organizational life: Problem or opportunity for non-profits? Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 6, 181–195.

gallo, J., & thompson, P.R. (2000). goals, measures, and beyond—In search of account-ability in federal hRM. Public Personnel Management, 29, 237–248.

gamm, l.D. (1996). Dimensions of accountability for not-for-profit hospitals and health systems. Health Care Management Review, 21(2), 74–86.

golembiewski, R.t. (2001). Handbook of organizational behavior. New york: Marcel Dekker.

gruber, J.E. (1987). Controlling bureaucracies: Dilemmas in democratic governance. berkeley: University of california Press.

halachmi, A. (2002). Performance measurement, accountability, and improved perfor-mance. Public Performance & Management Review, 25, 370–400.

hardy, c.A., and Williams, S.P. (2011). Assembling e-government research designs: A transdisciplinary view and interactive approach. Public Administration Review, 71, 405–413.

harmon, M.M. (1995). Responsibility as paradox. thousand Oaks, cA: Sage.hummel, R. (1991). Stories managers tell: Why they are as valid as science. Public Ad-

ministration Review, 51(1), 31–41.Ink, D. (2006). An analysis of the house select committee and White house reports on

hurricane Katrina. Public Administration Review, 66, 800–807.Kearns, K. (1994). the strategic management of accountability in nonprofit organizations:

An analytical framework. Public Administration Review, 54, 185–192.Kearns, K. (1996). Managing for accountability: Preserving the public trust in public and

nonprofit organizations. San Francisco: Jossey-bass.Kettl, D.F. (2002). The transformation of governance. baltimore: Johns hopkins Univer-

sity Press.Kettl, D.F. (2005). The global public management revolution (2nd ed.). Washington, Dc:

brookings Institution Press.


Kling, R. (2008, August). Taxpayers are fighting back: Transparency and accountability does not mean inefficiency. Paper presented at the third International Public Procure-ment conference, Amsterdam.

Klingner, D.D., Nalbandian, J., & Romzek, b.S. (2002). Politics, administration, and markets: conflicting expectations and accountability. American Review of Public Administration, 32, 117–144.

Koliba, c., Meek, J.W., & Zia, A. (2010). Governance networks in public administration and public policy. boca Raton, Fl: cRc Press.

Koliba, c., Mills, R.M., & Zia, A. (2011). Accountability in governance networks: An as-sessment of public, private, and nonprofit emergency management practices following hurricane Katrina. Public Administration Review, 71, 210–220.

Koppel, J. (2010). World rule: Accountability, legitimacy and the design of global gover-nance. chicago: University of chicago Press.

langfred, c.W., & Shanley, M.t. (2001). Small group research: Autonomous teams and progression issues of context and level of analysis. In R.t. golembiewski (Ed.), Hand-book of organizational behavior (pp. 81–111). New york: Marcel Dekker.

lather, P. (1986). Research as praxis. Harvard Educational Review, 56, 257–277.lincoln, y.S., & guba, E.g. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry. beverly hills, cA: Sage.lohmann, S. (1998). An information rationale for the power of special interests. American

Political Science Review, 92, 809–827.Mashaw, J.l. (2006). Accountability and institutional design: Some thoughts on the gram-

mar of governance. In M.W. Dowdle (Ed.), Public accountability: Designs, dilemmas and experiences (pp. 115–156). cambridge: cambridge University Press.

Mccue, c., & Prier, E. (2007). Using agency theory to model cooperative public purchasing. In P. gustavo & K.V. thai (Eds.), Advancing public procurement: Practices, innovation and knowledge-sharing (pp. 45–70). boca Raton, Fl: Academic Press.

Miller, g. (2000). Above politics: credible commitment and efficiency in the design of public agencies. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 10, 289–327.

Milward, b.h. (1996). Symposium introduction—Symposium on the hollow state: capacity, control and performance in interorganizational settings. Journal of Public Administra-tion Research and Theory, 6, 193–195.

Mirvis, P. (1992). the quality of employment in the nonprofit sector: An update on em-ployee attitudes in nonprofits versus business and government. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 3(1), 23–42.

Moe, t. (1991). Politics and the theory of organization. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 7, 106–129.

Moore, M.h. (1995). Creating public value. cambridge: harvard University Press.Morris, J.c., Morris, E.D., & Jones, D.M. (2007). Reaching for the philosopher’s stone:

contingent coordination and the military’s response to hurricane Katrina. Public Ad-ministration Review, 67, 94–106.

Moynihan, D., & Ingraham, P. (2003). look for the silver lining: When performance-based accountability systems work. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 13, 469–490.

Murray, g.J. (2009). Improving the validity of public procurement research. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 22(2), 91–103.

O’loughlin, Michael. (1990). What is bureaucratic accountability and how can we measure it? Administration & Society, 22, 275–302.

Oluka, N., & Ssennoga, F. (2008, August). Tackling corruption in public procurement: A case of local governments in Uganda. Paper presented at the third International Public Procurement conference, Amsterdam.


Organization for Economic cooperation and Development. (2005). Fighting corruption and promoting integrity in public procurement. Paris.

Organization for Economic cooperation and Development. (2007). Integrity in public procurement: Good practice from A to Z. Paris.

Organization for Economic cooperation and Development. (2011). The call for innovative and open government: An overview of country initiatives. Paris.

O’toole, l.J. (1995). Diversity or cacophony? the research enterprise in public adminis-tration. Public Administration Review, 55, 293–297.

O’toole, l.J. (1997). treating networks seriously: Practical and research-based agendas in public administration. Public Administration Review, 57, 45–52.

Page, S. (2004). Measuring accountability for results in interagency collaboratives. Public Administration Review, 64, 591–606.

Patton, M.q. (2002). Qualitative research and evaluation methods (3rd ed.). thousand Oaks, cA: Sage.

Radin, b.A. (2006). Challenging the performance movement: Accountability complexity and democratic values. Washington, Dc: georgetown University Press.

Ramsay, J., & caldwell, N. (2004). If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail: the risks of casual trope usage in purchasing discourse. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 10(2–3), 79–87.

Ritchie, J., lewis, J., & Elam, g. (2003). Designing and selecting samples. In J. Ritchie & J. lewis (Eds.), Qualitative research practice: A guide for social science students and researchers (pp. 77–108). london: Sage.

Roberts, N. (2002). Keeping public officials accountable through dialogue: Resolving the accountability paradox. Public Administration Review, 62, 658–669.

Romzek, b.S. (1996). Enhancing accountability. In J.l. Perry (Ed.), Handbook of public administration (pp. 97–114). San Francisco: Jossey-bass.

Romzek, b.S., and Dubnick, M.J. (1987). Accountability in the public sector: lessons from the Challenger tragedy. Public Administration Review, 47, 227–238.

Romzek, b.S., and Dubnick, M.J. (1998). Accountability In J.M. Shafritz (Ed.), Inter-national encyclopedia of public policy and administration (pp. 6–11). boulder, cO: Westview.

Rubin, A., & babbie, E.R. (2011). Research methods for social work. belmont, cA: brooks/cole.

Rubin, h. (1990). Dimensions of institutional ethics: A framework for interpreting the ethical context of the nonprofit sector. In D. gies, S. Ott, & J. M. Shafritz (Eds.), The nonprofit sector: Essential readings (pp. 211–216). Pacific grove, cA: brooks/cole.

Savas, E.S. (2000). Privatization and public-private partnerships. New york: chatham house.

Schwartz-Shea, P. (2006). Judging quality: Evaluative criteria and epistemic communities. In D. yanow & P. Schwartz-Shea (Eds.), Interpretation and method: Empirical research method and the interpretive turn (pp. 5–26). Armonk, Ny: M.E. Sharpe.

Schwartz-Shea, P. (2006). Judging quality: Evaluative criteria and epistemic communities. In D. yanow & P. Schwartz-Shea (Eds.), Interpretation and method: Empirical research method and the interpretive turn (pp. 89–113). Armonk, Ny: M.E. Sharpe.

Scott, colin. 2006. Spontaneous accountability. In M.W. Dowdle (Ed.), Public account-ability: Designs, dilemmas and experiences (pp. 174–104). cambridge: cambridge University Press.

Shafritz, J. (2004). The dictionary of public policy and administration. boulder, cO: Westview Press.

Smith, J.A. (2002). Evolving issues for qualitative psychology. In J.t.E. Richardson (Ed.),


Handbook of qualitative research methods for psychology and the social sciences (pp. 189–202). Malden, MA: blackwell.

Stivers, c. 1994. the listening bureaucrat: Responsiveness in public administration. Public Administration Review, 54, 364–369.

Stone, D. (2002). Policy paradox: The art of political decision making. New york: W.W. Norton.

Strauss, A.l. (1987). Qualitative analysis for social scientists. cambridge: cambridge University Press.

terry, l.D. (1999). From greek mythology to the real world of the New Public Manage-ment and democratic governance. Public Administration Review, 59, 272–277.

thai, K.V. (2001). Public procurement re-examined. Journal of Public Procurement, 1(1), 9–50.

thompson, g.F. (2003). Between hierarchies and markets: The logic and limits of network forms of organization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

U.S. census bureau. (2010). census data. Available at http://2010.census.gov/2010census/data/, accessed June 1, 2011.

U.S. government Accountability Office. (2011). Report to congressional addresses: Op-portunities to reduce potential duplication in government programs, save tax dollars, and enhance revenue. Available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d11318sp.pdf, accessed April 10, 2011.

Wang, x. (2002). Assessing administrative accountability: Results from a national survey. American Review of Public Administration, 32, 350–370.

Weber, E.P. (1999). the question of accountability in historical perspective: From Jackson to contemporary grassroots ecosystem management. Administration & Society, 31, 451–494.

Whitaker, g., Altman-Sauer, l., & henderson, M. (2004). Mutual accountability be-tween governments and nonprofits. American Review of Public Administration, 34, 115–133.

Wohlstetter, P., Smith, J., & Malloy, c.l. (2005). Strategic alliances in action: toward a theory of evolution. Policy Studies Journal, 33, 419–442.

yanow, D., & Schwartz-Shea, P. (Eds.). (2006). Interpretation and method: Empirical research method and the interpretive turn. Armonk, Ny: M.E. Sharpe.

yescombe, E.R. (2007). Public-private partnerships: Principles of policy and finance. burlington, MA: Elsevier.

yilmaz, S., beris, y., & Serrano-berthet, R. (2010). linking local government discretion and accountability in decentralisation. Development Policy Review, 28, 259–293.


Appendix

1. Please take a few minutes to discuss your work experience. What are some things that are important to know about you?

2. For how many years have you been working in the public sector? 3. For how long have you been involved with public procurement functions? 4. how did you get into public procurement? 5. Do you hold a certification? 6. Is your procurement office independent or within another department? Please discuss the

implications of that. 7. Is your agency’s procurement process reactive or proactive (that is, do you purchase in expectation

of events or do you wait for the need to appear)? Please give us an example or discuss the implications.

8. Are you currently operating in a centralized or a decentralized manner? 9. how much is spent on procurement within your jurisdiction/agency/department?10. how would you define accountability?11. What does it mean to you? Please give an example in which the concept of accountability would

be made clear.12. As a public procurement professional, who do you feel accountable to? What do you feel

accountable for? Please define/associate.13. What if there is ambiguity present (guidelines, goals, etc.)? how do you make your decisions?

What do you rely on? Please discuss the patterns in your decision-making process.14. Is there such a thing as public-private partnership in public procurement? can we talk about it?

If yes, please describe.15. how much experience do you have with PPPs?16. Who should be more accountable in a PPP? Accountable to whom? What if the relationship is

over a long period? Are decisions made differently in partnerships?17. Do you have performance measurements? Does your procurement performance get evaluated?

Please specify.18. Please name the entities/organizations/individuals/matters that you pay the most attention to

when you make your decisions. Why? Please discuss a hypothetical scenario.19. Does it matter how many people are involved in the procurement decision-making process? Does

this complicate or ease the decision-making process?20. Is public procurement political? how much political pressure do you believe your organization

is under? Relatively high or low? how much political pressure do you feel yourself? Relatively high or low? Please explain.

21. Any trends in public procurement that you have been noticing? E-procurement?22. Is there anything that we have missed that you would like to discuss?

Schnequa N. Diggs is a Ph.D. candidate in public administration in the School of Public Administration at Florida Atlantic University.

Alexandru V. Roman is a Ph.D. candidate in public administration in the School of Public Administration at Florida Atlantic University.

Understanding and Tracing Accountability in the Public Procurement Process

Documents

Transcript of Understanding and Tracing Accountability in the Public Procurement Process