COLLEGE OF EUROPE

BRUGES CAMPUS

EU INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY STUDIES

Turkey’s Neo-Ottoman policy on the

Balkans: does it clash or match with the

EU?

Supervisor: Paul Meerts Thesis presented by

Sena Marić

for the

Degree of Master of Arts in EU

International Relations and Diplomacy

Studies

Academic Year 2010-2011

ii

Statutory Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis has been written by myself without any external unauthorised

help, that it has been neither presented to any institution for evaluation nor previously

published in its entirety or in parts. Any parts, words or ideas, of the thesis, however limited,

and including tables, graphs, maps etc., which are quoted from or based on other sources,

have been acknowledged as such without exception.

Moreover, I have also taken note and accepted the College rules with regard to plagiarism

(Section 4.2 of the College study regulations).

Word Count: 18 209

iii

Abstract

The present thesis analyses Turkey‟s energetic foreign policy in the Western Balkans and

examines whether it is compatible with the EU‟s policy towards this region. It argues that

even though both the EU and Turkey share the same vision of this region and promote the

same values, their foreign policies towards the Balkans are actually conflicting. Arguably,

the main reason why the EU is reserved towards Turkey‟s engagement in this region is

because of the nature of its Balkan policy, which we labelled as neo-Ottoman. By neo-

Ottomanism, we imply the following features: 1) amplified foreign policy activities -

diplomatic, economic, cultural; 2) insistence on the positive aspects of the Ottoman heritage

as an inspiration for the future; 3) Turkic-Islamic synthesis; 4) pragmatism; 5) egotiation,

understood as the importance given to the country‟s perceived grandeur, which is manifested

in Turkey‟s sporadic emotional and irrational performance; 6) rhetorical neo-imperialism;

and 7) potential neo-imperialism in practice. In fact, the EU considers Turkey‟s enhanced

presence in this region as a threat to its own influence, given that this region should be part

of the EU‟s future enlargement. Moreover, it is reluctant to Turkey‟s proposals concerning

the establishment of foreign policy consultation mechanism for this region. This is somewhat

surprising and confusing, bearing in mind the level of institutionalisation of relations

between the two.

iv

Keywords

Neo-Ottomanism

Turkey

Western Balkans

Diplomacy

Enlargement

Credibility

v

Table of Contents

Statutory Declaration ............................................................................................................. ii

Abstract .................................................................................................................................. iii

Keywords ................................................................................................................................ iv

List of Tables .......................................................................................................................... vi

List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................ vii

1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1

2 Theoretical Framework: Conceptualizing Turkey’s current foreign policy ............ 4

2.1 Concept of national interest ...................................................................................... 4

2.2 Concept of soft power .............................................................................................. 6

3 Turkey in the Balkans: Introducing the concept of Neo-Ottomanism ...................... 9

3.1 Attempts to define neo-ottomanism ......................................................................... 9

3.2 Turkey‟s neo-Ottoman rhetorical vision of its role in the Balkans – to what extent

is it neo-imperialistic? ........................................................................................................ 13

4 Turkish WB Foreign Policy: Neo-ottomanism in practice ....................................... 18

4.1 Balkan Muslims: the axis of Turkish Balkan policy .............................................. 18

4.2 Strategic Partnership between Serbia and Turkey- to what extent can it be

„strategic‟? .......................................................................................................................... 21

4.3 Turkey viewed by skeptics: the Republic of Srpska ............................................... 26

4.4 Turkey‟s partiality towards the Balkan Muslims: an obstacle to become more

prominent actor in the region? ............................................................................................ 28

5 Turkey and EU in WB: a complementary approach? .............................................. 31

5.1 EU‟s problematic engagement in the WB .............................................................. 31

5.2 Turkey-EU Strategic Dialogue over the WB: why is EU not interested? .............. 36

5.3 Assessing EU‟s and Turkey‟s strengths and weaknesses: case of BiH .................. 39

6 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 45

Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 50

vi

List of Tables

Table 1: Comparative display of assets and flaws of the EU and Turkey. ...................... 44

vii

List of Abbreviations

BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy

COWEB Council Working Group on the Western Balkans

CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy

EDA European Defence Agency

EEAS European Union External Action Service

EU European Union

HR High Representative

ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former

Yugoslavia

OHR Office of High Representative

PIC Peace Implementation Council

RS Republic of Srpska

SAP Stabilisation and Assossiation Process

TIKA Turkish International Cooperation and Development

Agency

WB Western Balkans

1

1 Introduction

Turkey‟s foreign policy towards the Western Balkans (WB henceforth) has been

increasingly active in the recent years. Turkey is reconciling the quarrelling peoples in the

region, making lucrative investment contracts and rebuilding monuments from the Ottoman

age. Being aware of its geopolitical position in the post-Cold war context and the ever

greater uncertainty about its European Union (EU) perspective, Turkey has significantly

diversified its foreign policy partners and activities, inter alia by focusing special attention to

the regions surrounding it- the Middle East, the Caucuses, the Balkans. Accidentally or not,

all of them were part of the former Ottoman Empire.

But out of the three mentioned regions, it seems that the Turkish foreign policy

towards the Balkans is the most intriguing but the least explored. Analyzing Turkey‟s

growing engagement in the Balkans1 is important for two main reasons. Firstly, this region

bears great symbolic importance to Turkey, as its centuries-long presence in the Balkans and

the traces left behind represent the proof of Turkish European identity. Secondly, this region,

as well as Turkey itself, is part of the EU enlargement policy, thus, it is important to

elucidate whether the EU membership perspective of these countries is contradictory to

Turkey‟s approach to the region of the WB.

Actually, this will be the core of our analysis: the nature of Turkey‟s Balkan policy

and whether the approaches of the two actors towards this region clash or correspond.

In order to answer this question, we should first define our perception of Turkey‟s

policy towards the WB. We labelled it as neo-Ottoman. Nowadays, this neologism is very

popular but highly controversial. Bearing in mind the diverse ethnic composition of this

region and different interpretations of the common Ottoman past, the mere mention of the

word „Ottoman‟ provokes many contradictory sentiments and reactions. Therefore, it implies

both positive and negative connotations.

Our aim is to make this notion unambiguous and neutral. Namely, we coined our

definition of neo-Ottomanism on the basis of somewhat modest academic contributions in

this respect and by analyzing rhetorical and „real‟ performance of Turkey in the Balkans.

Therefore, while utilizing this neologism, our aim is not to be provocative, but rather

constructive and useful. Since this notion is becoming so frequently used, we seek to

1 The terms „Western Balkans‟ and „Balkans‟ will be alternatively used.

2

establish an objective and comprehensive basis which would be beneficiary for its future

observation.

Not surprisingly, in view of their complex diversity, the Balkan peoples perceive

Turkish enhanced presence either positively, as the factor which contributes to the

stabilization of this region, or negatively, as the old exploiter who is coming once again to

re-conquer its former Empire.

What is surprising, however, is the EU‟s approach to this issue. At first glance, the

EU‟ and Turkey‟ Balkan policy are complementary. In fact, the two have the same vision of

this region – it is in the interest of both to see the stable and prosperous Balkans. Moreover,

in order to achieve this goal, they are promoting the same values, such as tolerance, good

neighbourly relations and peaceful resolution of the contested issues. Furthermore, by

promoting the same values as the EU, Turkey is demonstrating its maturity and readiness to

become part of the EU „Christian club‟. Hence, as far as the Balkans is concerned, the

presented image puts the two actors in harmony with one another.

However, our main argument is that despite the shared vision of this region and the

commonality of values they are both promoting, the policies of the two actors towards the

WB region are conflicting. In reality, the EU actually is not very keen to see such frenetic

Turkish Balkan policy. This is astonishing considering that the two actors have exceptionally

institutionalized relations dating since the middle of the 20th

century. Nevertheless, the EU

seems to be worried that the neo-Ottoman Turkish policy might mitigate its own influence in

this region. That is one of the reasons why the EU is reticent about Turkey‟s proposals to

establish policy consultation mechanisms with regards to the Western Balkans. Yet, our

argument is that the proposed consultation framework would have a completely opposite

effect, as it would be beneficial for all the actors involved.

In that light, comparative analysis of Turkey‟s and the EU‟s WB policies is also

relevant because it demonstrates that the strength of the one is the weakness of the other. For

instance, the EU possesses the power of attraction but falls short of diplomatic initiatives,

whereas Turkey does not seem plausible in the whole region but has proven to be a very

successful mediator.

The present thesis is divided into six chapters. Following the introduction, the second

chapter provides the theoretical framework. We consider the concepts of national interest

and soft power as most suitable for explaining Turkey‟s and EU‟s policies towards the

Balkans. The third chapter introduces the concept of neo-Ottomanism, by exploring and

3

evaluating the main academic contributions in this respect. The fourth chapter deals with the

neo-Ottomanism in practice, i.e. how it is manifested and perceived in the countries of the

WB region. The fifth and the most important chapter tests the main argument, that is to say,

analyzes the assets and the flaws of the two in their approach towards the WB, clarifies why

the common dialogue on the WB is not possible and puts forward the arguments for the

benefits of possible coordination of Turkey‟s and the EU‟s Balkan policies. Finally, the last

chapter presents the conclusions and suggests what might be the future steps of both actors

with regards to the countries of the Balkans.

As regards the methodological tools, this thesis will utilize the content analysis,

interviews and case study methods.

4

2 Theoretical Framework: Conceptualizing Turkey’s current

foreign policy

The comparative analysis of Turkish and the European Union policies towards the

region of the Western Balkans will be examined through the concepts of national security

and soft power.

2.1 Concept of national interest

For this purpose, we will treat the concept of national interest as an “analytic

construct to describe and explain the sources of state preferences in foreign policy”2. Realist

and constructivist schools of international relations treat this concept differently.

On the one hand, realists adopt objective approach to national interest, claiming that

the sources of the state preferences are clearly discernable, omnipresent and universally

applicable.3 Namely, power maximization and security maximization represent the main

sources of state preferences according to the classics of the realist school, H. Morgenthau

and K. Waltz respectively.4

Having acknowledged the distorted international environment subsequent to the end

of the Cold War, the objective approach of national interest is useful for analyzing Turkey‟s

attempts to lead pro-active and more independent foreign policy in the last two decades.

Turkey is not a „wing country‟ any longer- today, it is a regional power which seeks to

conduct a vigilant foreign policy towards its neighbouring regions, the Middle East,

Caucuses and the Balkans, which were dramatically affected by the changes in the post-

Cold War global architecture. Because of its fragile direct environment, Turkey maintains a

powerful military. Therefore, in order to secure itself against potential instability in its

surrounding regions, Turkey adopts a so-called „zero problems towards neighbours‟ foreign

policy approach5, aiming at boosting diplomatic, economic and cultural relations within its

near-abroad.

Moreover, for the Western countries, Turkey continues to be the most important ally

in Islamic world, but at the same time Turkey is also consolidating its relations with Russia,

2 V. Danilovic, “The National Interest”, in: Martin Griffiths, Ed., The Encyclopedia of International Relations

and Global Politics, Routledge, London, 2008, p. 557. 3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 A. Davutoglu, “Turkey‟s Zero-Problems Foreign Policy”, Foreign Affairs, 20 May 2010.

5

Iran, Syria, etc. In that sense, it is pursuing to develop in a „trade state‟6. Namely, only in the

last decade, Turkey has concluded more than fifty free trade agreements and increased the

volume of exports over twenty times.7 As for the foreign direct investments, in 2008 they

represented 2.2 percent of Turkey‟s GDP, comparing to the period of 1993-2002 when it was

less than 1 percent.8

Overall, by diversifying the international partners and by amplifying its foreign

policy activities (the so-called „multi-dimensional foreign policy‟ principle9), Turkey is

aiming to increase its security as well as the leverage it can exercise in the region and in the

wider world.

As for the EU, notwithstanding the fact that the EU is not a state, it is however

comprised of the member states [emphasis added] which developed a common foreign

policy program in the form of the European Security Strategy (ESS) from 2003. This

strategy identifies threats and challenges inherent to all the member states, since today‟s

security challenges are transnational and require a joint action.10

As some of these threats,

such as regional conflicts11

or organized crime12

, might emerge from the WB region, it is in

the EU‟s „national interest‟ to mitigate them. In other words, it is in the EU‟s interest to see

the WB politically and economically stable, as that context diminishes security threats to the

EU coming from this region. The EU is doing so by providing this region with the

“European perspective”, i.e. the potential EU membership, which, at the same time, offers

these countries “a strategic objective and an incentive for the reform”13

.

Constructivists, on the other hand, conceive state preferences as changing and

subjective while addressing the concept of national interest.14

In fact, they emphasize, inter

alia, the impact of transnational identities on the formation of state preferences.15

This will

serve us to explain how the Turkish foreign policy is guided by its identity considerations.

Namely, Turkish foreign policy is significantly shaped by its multiple and competing

identities - Nationalist, Western, Islamic, Kemalist, neo-Ottoman, Turkic. Furthermore, the

6 See K. Kirişci, “The transformation of Turkish foreign policy: The rise of the trading state”, New Perspectives

on Turkey, no.40, 2009, pp. 29-57. 7 Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Economic Outlook of Turkey”.

8 Ibid.

9 Davutoglu, loc.cit.

10 European Union, “A Secure Europe in a better World-European Security Strategy”, Brussels, 2003, pp. 1-2.

11 Ibid, pp. 4.

12 European Union, “Report of the Implementation of the European Security Strategy- Providing Security in a

Changing World”, Brussels, 2008, p. 4. 13

ESS, op.cit, p. 8 14

Danilovic, loc.cit. 15

Ibid, p.558.

6

power of Turkish economy, which makes it appealing to the developing world, makes it as

also being identified as an „emerging power‟16

, which adds another layer to Turkish complex

identity.

Even though officially Turkey considers its diverse foreign policy priorities as

compatible with one another17

, the plethora of Turkish identities impedes it to conduct a

coherent foreign policy, which is also manifested in its approach to the Balkans. Elaborating

this concept further, it can also serve to explain Turkey‟s „egotiation‟18

, i.e. how the roles of

Turkish multiple identities, national pride and self-perception incite it to react emotionally in

relation with the WB countries.

2.2 Concept of soft power

This well-known concept is developed by Joseph Nye, which can be most concisely

defined as the “ability to shape the preferences of others”19

. In other words, it is “getting

others to want the outcomes you want”20

, through co-opting people, rather than coercing

them21

. Therefore, its main element is the ability to attract.22

Nye further identifies three

sources of one country‟s soft power, which are its culture, the government‟s politics- i.e. its

political values, and the country‟s foreign policy, if it is seen as legitimate and moral by

other countries.23

So, one country can be perceived as a soft power if it can, on the basis of

these three sources, change the behaviour of the other countries by virtue of its attractiveness

and gained credibility.

This concept is helpful for explaining the shift in Turkish overall foreign policy, as

well as to analyze to what extent Turkey and the EU are seen as legitimate actors in the

Balkans.

As we have explained, the fact that Turkey was surrounded by unstable regions just

after the end of the Cold War induced it to strengthen its hard power; however, gradually,

Turkish foreign policy started showing particular soft power features. Namely, certain

16

Bertrand Badie : "La revanche des émergents réside dans l'invention de solutions autres que militaires", Le

Monde, 26 Avril 2011. 17

Davutoglu, loc.cit. 18

P. Meerts, “Egotiation” in PIN Points, no.35, International Institute for Applied Systems Studies, 2010, p. 28. 19

J. S. Nye, Soft Power: The means to Success in World Politics, Public Affairs, New York, 2004, p. 5. 20

Ibid. 21

Ibid. 22

Ibid, p.6 23

Ibid, pp. 11-15.

7

internal and external developments raised the credibility of Turkey in the eyes of both the

West and the East.24

Internal factors include the current government‟s approach to the resolution of the

Kurdish question and the overall multilateral and cooperative approach in the foreign

policy.25

In the words of Turkish foreign minister, Turkey adopted “[…] a new language in

regional and international politics that prioritizes Turkey‟s civil-economic power”26

.

Moreover, the circumstances in the global context helped Turkey raise its credibility. That is

to say, Turkey has become a more prominent actor thanks to the fact that it is the winner of

economic globalization and is seen by the West as an ally to tackle radical Islam and

terrorism.27

In practice, Turkey‟s soft power has manifested itself through successful diplomatic

initiatives and mediation, operationalised in the principle of “pro-active and pre-emptive

peace diplomacy”28

. In that light, Turkey mediates between Israel and Syria, participates in

the reconstruction of Darfur and Somalia, etc; in the Balkans, Turkey has played a key role

in normalizing the relations between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), it has very

lucrative investment contracts and finances the projects aimed at restoring the Ottoman

cultural legacy.

As for the EU, the concept of soft power is extremely useful for the comprehension

of its engagement and role in the WB. In this region, EU is a de facto soft power. Its main

soft power tool is positive conditionality, by which it stimulates the WB countries to reform

and comply with the EU standards by keeping them in line for the EU membership. More

precisely, in the framework of the soft power concept, for this particular region, the EU can

be described as a „normative power‟ being able to shape the conceptions of „normal‟ by

merely promoting its values29

. The EU‟s normative power is manifested both in bottom-up

and top-down level.

On the grass-root level, public opinion polls conducted in the WB countries are

illustrative evidence of the EU‟s attractiveness. For example, when questioned about what

24

T. Oğuzlu, “Soft power in Turkish foreign policy”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, March 2007,

p. 86. 25

Ibid, pp. 88-89. 26

Davutoglu, loc.cit. 27

Oguzlu, op.cit, pp.89-91. 28

Davutoglu, loc.cit. 29

See I. J. Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?", Journal of Common Market

Studies, 2002, vol. 40, no. 2.

8

they associate the EU with, the majority of the Serbian citizens responded with “a path

towards better future for young people”, “more employment opportunities”, “possibility to

settle the overall situation in the country”, “a guarantee of the long-lasting peace in the EU”

and “a way to protect citizens‟ rights”30

. Only the minority questioned in the same poll (21

percent) viewed the EU as a “risk of losing cultural identity”31

.

At the political elite level, the EU‟s soft power is even more visible. Namely, in order

to even consider becoming EU members, WB countries are obliged to fulfil not only the

Copenhagen criteria, but also the sensitive political ones, which are full cooperation with the

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and development of good

neighbourly relations. There are many examples that demonstrate how, for the sake of EU

membership, those countries are willing to reform- take, for example, the arrest of war crime

suspects in Serbia and Croatia, or the moment Serbia decided to enter into dialogue with

self-proclaimed Kosovo.32

Indeed, if there was no EU carrot on the table, those countries

would be much more reluctant to face and deal with the issues from the recent troubled past.

From the analytical point of view, it seems that EU‟s overall policy towards the

Western Balkans is much more explored, transparent and predictable than Turkey‟s Balkan

policy. For this reason, the next two chapters will focus merely on Turkey‟s approach

towards this region.

30

European Integration Office, Government of Serbia, “European Orientation of Serbian Citizens Trends”,

June 2010. 31

Ibid. 32

Croatian general Ante Gotovina was arrested 3 months after the EU opened accession negotiations with

Croatia, in December 2005. The continuation of negotiations was conditioned by his arrest; Bosnian Serb

leader Radovan Karadzic was arrested just several days after the creation of a pro-European government in July

2008, which accelerated Serbia‟s membership prospects; after showing constructive approach with regards to

the Kosovo issue in 2010, the EU „rewarded‟ Serbia with forwarding its membership application to the

Commission.

9

3 Turkey in the Balkans: Introducing the concept of Neo-

Ottomanism

How can we best theorize the current Turkish foreign policy towards the Western

Balkan countries? The concepts of the national interest and soft power described above

each partially contribute to its understanding. Having in mind the main characteristics of

Turkish foreign policy, those concepts can also be applied to this particular region. But one

catchy and controversial concept goes beyond the current discourse by putting in a nutshell

the main features of what Turkey is doing in its near abroad. This concept is called neo-

Ottomanism. Without its understanding, it is difficult to speak objectively of Turkish interests

and policy in the WB region.

3.1 Attempts to define neo-ottomanism

This neologism was coined during Turgut Ozal‟s presidential term in the early 1990s

by secular intellectuals, who saw the pluralist character of the Ottoman Empire as a model

and source for managing the ongoing domestic issues33

, particularly the Kurdish question.34

Moreover, the era of Ozal, which coincided with the end of the Cold War, can be considered

as a turning point in reorientation of Turkey‟s foreign policy and a starting point for

comprehension of neo-Ottomanism.

Being aware of the new circumstances in global political and security system, Ozal

abandoned passive foreign policy approach characteristic of Turkey during the Cold War

period, by enhancing Turkey‟s relations with the countries in the region. Namely, Black Sea

Economic Cooperation, an organization aimed at fostering the relations between the

countries in the Black Sea region, was founded in 1992 on Turkey‟s initiative. In the same

year, the Turkish Government founded Turkish International Cooperation and Development

Agency (TIKA), with the main aim to provide “development assistance foremost to

developing countries where Turkish is spoken and countries that border Turkey as well as

improving cooperation through projects and programs in economic, commercial, technical,

33

N. Fisher Onar, “Neootomanism, Historical Legacies and Turkish Foreign Policy”, Centre for Economics

and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM), October 2009, p.11. 34

O. Tasnipar, “Turkey‟s Middle East Policies- Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism”, Carnegie Papers,

2008, p. 3.

10

social, cultural and educational arenas”.35

Moreover, Turkey‟s foreign policy was very

active during the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Nowadays, with the AKP party in power, the notion of neo-Ottomanism is

extensively used by political analysts, journalists and random people. Most often, it refers to

Turkish foreign policy in its near abroad, having both positive and negative connotations.

Alternatively, it refers to recognizing something new in Turkish foreign and domestic policy

that is opposed to the Kemalist ideology, the cornerstone of the modern Republic of Turkey.

O. Taspinar identifies three factors that help to define neo-Ottomanism in the current

government‟s policy. The first is the recognition of Turkey‟s Ottoman and Islamic heritage

and the attempt to come to terms with it at home and abroad.36

Namely, this does not imply

renewed imperialism, as some might fear, but rather an active foreign policy, with particular

accent on exercising „soft power‟ in the countries under the former Ottoman Empire.37

Taking up Ozal‟s approach, domestically Neo-ottomanism seeks for a more moderate

version of secularism and “more multicultural conceptualization of citizenship”.38

The

second characteristic of neo-Ottomanism is the return of self-confidence in the foreign

policy, very ambitious goals therein, which can be achieved only by acknowledging the

nation‟s multiple identities, including its Ottoman past.39

Finally, the third feature of neo-

Ottomanism is the insistence on the Turkish European identity and favourable reception of

both Western influence and Muslim legacy40

.

Indeed, recognizing the last factor explains why Turkey gives such great importance

to the countries of the Western Balkans. The former Ottoman Rumelia that was spread on

today‟s Balkan Peninsula gives Turkey legitimacy to claim that it is culturally and

geographically part of Europe. As Turkish Prime Minister Davutoglu put it, “It should not be

forgotten that the destiny of the Ottoman Empire was decided on the Balkans”41

. In

comparison to other neighbouring regions in which Turkey has been active recently- Middle

East, South Caucasus, Russia- the region of the Balkans probably carries the biggest

symbolic significance.

35

TIKA website, “About TIKA”, retrieved 5 March 2011. http://www.tika.gov.tr/EN/Icerik.ASP?ID=345 36

Tasnipar, op.cit, p. 14. 37

Ibid, p. 15. 38

Ibid. 39

Ibid. 40

Ibid, p. 16. 41

A. Davutoglu, Stratejik derinlik: Türkiye'nin uluslararası konum, Küre Yayınları, Istanbul, 2001, p. 322.

11

Those three features of neo-Ottomanism can also serve as a tool to demonstrate

Turkey‟s shift from Kemalism. Namely, the basic principles of modern Republic of Turkey,

which was founded in 1923, such as uncompromising secularism and assimilationist Turkish

nationalism, are now being challenged. Kemalists fear that the light version of secularism

advocated by neo-Ottomans is a threat since, they argue, the expression of different national

and cultural identities might result in the loss of loyalty to the Republic.42

Moreover,

Kemalists are very sceptic about the high aspirations of Turkey‟s current foreign policy,

claiming that Turkey should conduct a passive foreign policy aiming only at defending the

legacy of the Kemalist revolution.43

In this light, Kemalists are also sceptical about the

Western countries, considering them as naïve and too lenient about the growing influence of

Islam inside the Turkish society and in its foreign policy.44

On the basis of changing internal developments in Turkish society and politics,

which are also manifested abroad, Tanasković tried to define neo-Ottomanism as an

“ideological amalgam of Islamism, Turkism and Ottoman imperialism”45

.

Islamism is inherent to internal developments in Turkish society and politics. For

Tanasković, this notion incorporates two tendencies: the government‟s attempt to give the

Islamic character to state and social institutions, as well as the phenomenon of increasing

number of secular Turks becoming religious46

.

Turkism, on the contrary, is the product of Kemalist revolution and the keystone of

contemporary Turkish republic. Namely, Ataturk adopted the concept of nation-state similar

to the French model, in which all the citizens, no matter what their ethnic and religious

background is, are all Turks. This Kemalist concept of state is not contested by neo-

Ottomans. In fact, strong sense of patriotism as well as the state-centric view of the world

and of the Turkish national interests is one of the rare points on which both neo-Ottomans

and Kemalists agree.47

Interestingly, during the Ozal‟s era, Turkey‟s role as a bridge between the West and

the Muslim world in the post-Cold War context was explained through oxymoronic thesis of

„Islamic-Turkic syntheses‟. Namely, as an important geopolitical partner and military ally,

the Western world tried to represent Turkey as a proof of sustainability between Islam and

42

Tasnipar, op.cit, p. 15. 43

Ibid. 44

Ibid, p. 16. 45

D. Tanasković, Neoosmanizam: povratak Turske na Balkan, Službeni Glasnik, Beograd, 2010, p. 19. 46

Ibid, p.11. 47

Taspinar, op.cit, p.17.

12

democracy, by which it should be the role model to other Muslim countries.48

Thus, neo-

Ottomanism embraces both rival concepts of Turkism and Islamism. In the foreign policy,

this synthesis is manifested through Turkey‟s attempts to guide and protect other Muslims.49

Illustrative of this is Ataturk‟s quote, who once said: “Today, the Soviet Union is our friend,

our neighbour and our ally. […] But no one today can predict what tomorrow brings. [...] We

have brothers who live under that administration. Those brothers have the same faith and

religion as we do. We have to be ready to support them.”50

Therefore, neo-Ottoman approach seeks to interfere with the existing world order and

tries to take most of it. As some analysts argue, the rise of neo-Ottomanism is a direct

consequence of the inability of the Kemalist doctrine to respond to the challenges of

globalization and thus adapt to the changing internal and external circumstances.51

The proof

of its pragmatism is the fact that it grasps something out of many diverging ideologies- from

Kemalism to pan-Turkism to Islamism. Neo-ottomanism thus becomes “[…] imperial

nostalgia combined with the ultimate pragmatism”52

.

Given the mosaic of peoples in the WB countries and their contradictory sentiments

towards the Ottoman period, not surprisingly neo-Ottomanism sounds provocative as soon as

it is pronounced. Namely, if neo-Ottomanism seeks inspiration in multiethnic character of

the Ottoman Empire and relative religious tolerance therein, for Christian Balkan population

this sounds absurd, since they are taught in schools how 500 years of Ottoman age were

repressive and resulted in moral and cultural regression of the population and seclusion from

Europe where their civilizations always belonged.53

Therefore, divergent views on neo-

Ottomanism actually stem from different interpretations of history, and thus still lead to

many controversies.

Moreover, what makes additional confusion is the Turkish foreign policy in the

Balkans itself. So, is the neo-Ottoman imperialism benign, seeking only to exploit the best

features of the Ottoman Empire, as Tasnipar suggests, or do we have reasons to believe that

behind it lays a hidden agenda?

48

Tanasković, op.cit, p. 17. 49

G. Dorronsoro, Que veut la Turquie? Ambitions et stratégies internationales, CERI, Paris, 2009, p. 35. 50

Bayram Balci, “Missionaires de l‟islam en Asie centrale », Paris, 2003, pp.65, cited in Dorronsoro, op.cit, p.

25. 51

Tanasković, op.cit, p.15. 52

N. Kecmanović, foreword to Tanasković, op.cit. 53

This would be the main impression after having studied for 16 years under Serbian educational system.

13

3.2 Turkey’s neo-Ottoman rhetorical vision of its role in the Balkans – to

what extent is it neo-imperialistic?

This part will present the main rhetorical discourse of the neo-Ottoman question from

the Turkey‟s point of view. Even though many of the features described above will be

noticed in the following academic works it seems that, at least when the Balkans are

concerned, a more comprehensive theoretical approach is needed for better understanding of

the neo-Ottoman concept. Indeed, one can conclude that the main reason why neo-

Ottomanism remains enigmatic is many inconsistencies in the proclaimed Turkish foreign

policy. The most visible inconsistency arises from the interaction and the thin line between

the emotional and the pragmatic/rational in Turkey‟s approach to this region.

While evaluating the outcomes of the civil war in BiH during the 1990s and Turkey‟s

role therein, Turkish political scientist Kılıçbay wrote: “The war in Bosnia was an attempt to

throw Turkey out of Europe, to send it to the East where it never belonged and which it

always considered as marginal. That was a historic war, led by fascists in order to revenge

for Kosovo [epic battle in 1389, when Turkey conquered Serbia]. We are from the Balkans,

we are the Europeans. Denial of our own roots can bring no good.”54

That is to say, if the

Bosnian Muslims are the human basis of the Turkish European identity, Turkey itself is

responsible to act and prevent the suppression of its Muslim brothers.55

This emotional approach to Balkan Muslims and the strategic and symbolic

importance that Turkey gives to this region was elaborated further by the current

practitioners of foreign policy. Namely, the incumbent Turkish foreign minister Davutoglu

(2009- ) addressed in details how Turkey should engage in the Balkans in his famous work

“Strategic Depth”. It is interesting to note that since it was published in 2001, this book has

had forty three editions, but has not yet been officially translated into English.

After having read the section on the Balkans, the reader immediately notices two

points: first, that Davutoglu pays special attention to BiH and Albania, by ardently

advocating the increase of Turkish influence in these countries, and second, that out of all

the Balkan countries, Davutoglu has not elaborated any plan for engagement with Serbia and

Greece.

54

M.A. Kılıçbay,“Biz Zaten Avrupaliyiz”, Istanbul, 1997, pp.17-18, cited in Tanasković, op.cit, p. 89. 55

Tanasković, op.cit, p. 89.

14

Generally speaking about the Balkans, Davutoglu argues that Turkey should establish

diplomatic and „real‟ tools that would enable it to intervene in the region.56

Furthermore,

Turkey should establish a certain cultural organization for the Balkans that would restore and

preserve Ottoman cultural legacy.57

What may sound striking is that he explicitly says that

the EU should be kept aside as much as possible from this region.58

More specifically, as regards Albania the foreign minister says that Turkey should

strengthen its ties with this country as much as possible, in order to eradicate Italy‟s

influence.59

Furthermore, he claims that any problem related to Albania immediately

mobilizes Serbia and Greece, so Turkey should be more cautious.60

With regards to

Macedonia, he says that Macedonia‟s Albanian minority should be encouraged to use its

citizen rights, otherwise Macedonia risks falling into the hands of potential Serbian-

Bulgarian-Greek block.61

Consequently, Turkey should improve its relations with Bulgaria62

.

When it comes to the question of BiH, Davutoglu‟s visions seem to be

complementary with Kılıçbay‟s. Namely, he sees the constitutional order established by the

Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) as a threat to Bosniaks, since it gave the status of republic

for the Serbs [through Republic of Srpska entity] without guaranteeing such status for the

Muslims63

. Furthermore, he explicitly mentions the „ex-Ottoman factors‟ which should

always be ready to be used against the threats and should reach military, strategic and

diplomatic prevalence in order to reform the DPA64

.

Therefore, in order to protect Bosniaks, Davutoglu elaborates a thorough geopolitical

analysis of the most important strategic toponyms in BiH. Probably the most intriguing point

is the importance he gives to Eastern Bosnia and the river Drina. Namely, he claims that

these territories are crucial for the ex-Ottoman peoples; that is why the Serbs were focused

so much on this point when they were doing ethnic cleansing65

. He continues by saying that

the complete control of this region by the Serbs is dangerous for all Balkans; that is why it is

important to preserve the control of the Goražde region[the most eastern part of Bosnian-

56

Davutoglu, op.cit, p. 316. 57

Ibid, p. 320. 58

Ibid, p. 321. 59

Ibid, p. 320. 60

Ibid. 61

Ibid. 62

Ibid. 63

Ibid. 64

Ibid. 65

Ibid.

15

Croat federation]; if this line is broken, one part will be left to the Serbs, the other to the

Croats66

.

For this reason, Davutoglu explicitly claims that the arc that stretches from Bihać [in

north-western Bosnia, part of Bosnian-Croat federation], through Middle and East Bosnia,

through Sandzak [region linking Serbia and Montenegro], Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia,

Kirjali [southern Bulgaria], until Eastern Thrace [European part of Turkey], represents

“Turkish Balkan geopolitical and geocultural lifeline”67

.

In this work, one can notice that pragmatic/rational features of neo-Ottomanism

prevail. But certainly the most fascinating example of the fusion of the emotional and the

pragmatic in Turkish neo-Ottomanism in the Balkans is the speech Davutoglu delivered at

the conference “Ottoman legacy and Muslim communities in the Balkans” in Sarajevo in

October 2009.

The first remarkable feature of this speech is Davutoglu‟s interpretation of the

Ottoman history, which can reassure the sceptics about Turkey‟s intentions in this region.

Here are the most interesting parts:

“The Balkan region became the centre of world politics in the 16th

century. This is the golden age of the Balkans.[…] Who ran world politics in

the 16th century? Your ancestors. They were not all Turks, some were of Slav

origin, some were of Albanian origin, some were even converted Greeks, but

they ran world politics […] Like in the 16th century, which saw the rise of the

Ottoman Balkans as the centre of world politics, we will make the Balkans,

the Caucasus and the Middle East, together with Turkey, the centre of world

politics in the future. This is the objective of Turkish foreign policy, and we

will achieve this. We will reintegrate the Balkan region, the Middle East and

the Caucasus, based on the principle of regional and global peace, for the

future, not only for all of us but for all of humanity. […] People are calling

me neo-Ottoman, therefore I will not refer to the Ottoman state as a foreign

policy issue. What I am underlining is the Ottoman legacy [emphasis added].

The Ottoman centuries of the Balkans were success stories. Now we have to

reinvent this”68

.

66

Ibid. 67

Ibid. 68

G. Knaus, “Multikulti and the future of the Turkish Balkan policy”, European Stability Initiative, 4

December 2010.

16

From this part of the speech, one can conclude that the main purpose of Turkey‟s

allusion to the Ottoman past is to draw inspiration from the successful multicultural

existence in it as a formula for projecting the future of the Balkans. Therefore, Turkey has no

imperialist intentions in the Balkans. But after listening to the second part of the speech, one

remains unconvinced, if puzzled:

“Turkish identity is partly Balkan, partly Middle Eastern and partly

Caucasian. We have more Bosnians who live in Turkey than in Bosnia! More

Albanians that live in Turkey, than in Albania! […] Why is it so - because of

the Ottoman legacy. For all the different nations on the Balkans, Middle East

and Caucuses, Turkey is a safe haven, their homeland. You are welcome!

Anatolia belongs to you, our brothers and sisters! And we are sure that

Sarajevo is ours! […] What is happening in BiH is our responsibility. […] For

the other diplomats, Bosnian issue is a technical issue. For us, it is a matter of

life or death. It is that important [emphasis added]. For us, territorial integrity

of Bosnia and Herzegovina is equally important as territorial integrity of

Turkey. This is not only the feeling among the Turkish state officials. This is

what every single Turk feel, no matter where he lives in Turkey.”69

If we merely observe the emotional qualities in those texts, we get the feeling that

Turkey is willing to exercise significant influence on this region, which overcomes the

proclaimed „leaning-on-the-Ottoman-legacy-as-an-inspiration-for-the-future‟ discourse.

Even the Turkish most important ally in the region, the USA, remained perplexed after

Davutoglu‟s Sarajevo speech, as the leaked US diplomatic cables reveal:

“[…] for the neo-Islamic AKP ruling party in Turkey, this new

approach provides a relatively low cost and popular tool to demonstrate

influence, power, and the „we‟re back‟ slogan, for the Turkish public … This

„back to the past‟ attitude so clear in Davutoglu‟s Sarajevo speech, combined

with the Turks‟ tendency to execute it through alliances with more Islamic or

more worrisome local actors, constantly creates new problems.”70

However, as we explained above, there is considerable evidence that Turkey is

pragmatic rather than idealistic while it exercises the foreign policy, so one can assume that

the emotional tone serves Turkey only to gain political points at home as well as to raise its

credibility in the eyes of the Balkan Muslims. But, on the other hand, this type of rhetoric

69

Dani, Sarajevo: “Šta Turska hoće- obnovićemo otomanski Balkan”, Novi Standard, 28 October 2009. 70

Knaus, op.cit.

17

raises concerns in non-Muslim Balkan population, who are worried about the ultimate

intentions of Turkey in the Balkans.

Bearing in mind presented connotative and rhetorical ambiguities concerning the

debate on neo-Ottomanism, the next chapter will examine to what extent neo-Ottoman

features are manifested in practice, i.e. in Turkey‟s practical approach towards Western

Balkans. What is evident, however, is that at least rhetorically, Turkey‟s Balkan agenda

seems neo-imperialistic.

18

4 Turkish WB Foreign Policy: Neo-ottomanism in practice

On the basis of what has been previously demonstrated, we can identify three core

reasons why Turkey is present in the Balkans. The first is the geographic factor, since this

space represents for Turkey its ‘European gate’. The second is the human factor, given that

on the one hand, roughly one fifth of the Turkish population originate from the Balkans, and

on the other, the Balkan Muslims feel cultural, religious and emotional bonds with Turkey.

The third is the historic factor, i.e. the fact that Turkey was present in this region for more

than 500 years. Those three reasons give Turkey justification to believe that any

developments in the Balkan countries may have implications on Turkey as well.

4.1 Balkan Muslims: the axis of Turkish Balkan policy

If one takes into account the place that the incumbent Turkish foreign minister gives

to BiH, Albania and Macedonia in his work “Strategic Depth”, the actual foreign policy of

Turkey towards these countries certainly matches his thoughts. Indeed, many features of

Turkish neo-Ottomanism are manifested in the case of Turkey‟s approach to Muslim-

dominated Balkan countries [BiH and Albania], as well as towards Balkan Muslims in

general.

If we assume that one of the features of neo-Ottomanism is Turkey‟s intention to

restore and revive the Ottoman legacy, Turkey‟s cultural and public diplomacy in this matter

is very effective. Namely, through Turkish International Cooperation and Development

Agency (TIKA), Turkey finances various projects in BiH, Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo,

such as restoring mosques, opening cultural centres, rebuilding hospitals, etc.71

Moreover,

Turkey is providing local Balkan Islamic communities with significant expert and logistic

support via the Presidency for Religious affairs of Republic of Turkey, the government‟s

official agency.72

71

See: TIKA website, “Projects and Activities, Projects by Country”. 72

Tanasković, op.cit, p. 95.

19

When it comes to the economy, Turkey has significantly increased its activities in the

past several years. It has signed free trade agreements with Macedonia in 199973

and BiH in

200274

. As for Albania, the level of foreign trade between the two countries has increased by

ten times since 200375

. Moreover, in 2008 Turkey has established diplomatic relations with

Kosovo76

; in fact, after Serbia and Macedonia, Turkey is the biggest supplier to the Kosovo

market77

.

Macedonia, for instance, bears significant symbolic importance for Turkey. Namely,

Ataturk‟s father was born in today‟s western Macedonia, while Ataturk himself lived and

studied at the military university in Bitola [southern Macedonia]. Moreover, Turkish national

minority represents four percent of Macedonian population; they have the right to primary

education in the Turkish language and are organized in two political parties.78

Furthermore,

it is estimated that around six million Turks have Macedonian ancestry; Turkey was the

second country to recognize Macedonia‟s independence in 1991 and remains Macedonia‟s

biggest ally with regards to its name dispute with Greece.79

Generally, the impression is that

the Turks perceive the Macedonians with unreserved friendship, as “[…] one of the smallest

and most beloved children”80

.

Interestingly, despite mutual religious and cultural heritage, the Albanian minority in

Macedonia, which represents roughly one fourth of the total population, considers Turkish

influence in this country as a threat to their identity, claiming that the Turks are more

credible in the eyes of the ethnic Macedonians than the Albanians.81

Indeed, the Albanian

public considers the Ottoman legacy as a part of the past, which certainly should not serve as

an inspiration for the future; actually, the main reason why Albania strives greatly to

integrate into Euro-Atlantic institutions is merely because by doing so it is irreversibly

alienating itself from the influence of the Ottoman legacy.82

However, after Italy and Greece,

73

Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkey‟s economic and commercial relations with

Republic of Macedonia”. 74

Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkey‟s economic and commercial relations with

Albania”. 75

Lj. Staletović, “Širenje Turske imperije”, Akter, 7. June 2010. 76

E. Tabak, “Turkey upgrades status of office in Kosovo to embassy”, Today’s Zaman, 18.September 2008. 77

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkey‟s economic and commercial relations with Kosovo”, 78

D. Duridanski, “Macedonia-Turkey: The Ties That Bind”, Balkan Insight, 10.February 2011. 79

Ibid. 80

Ibid. 81

Ibid. 82

Knaus, loc.cit.

20

Turkey is the largest investor in Albania, while around eighty Turkish companies are

operating in this country.83

As an illustrative example of neo-Ottomanism, on the occasion of being granted an

honorary citizenship of the city of Prizren [in Kosovo], the current Turkish Prime Minister

Erdogan stated that Turkey aims to protect all historical traces, “from the old Turkish

inscriptions in Mongolia to the monuments in Sarajevo, from the mosques in Macedonia to

the tombs in Jerusalem”84

. He also declared that “Prizren constitutes a great model for its

atmosphere of tolerance and culture of co-existence”85

, which is also a typical neo-Ottoman

mantra.

Furthermore, Turkey also pays a lot of attention to the education. Namely, Erdogan

was also granted the honorary doctorate of Sarajevo University, for his contribution to the

development of cooperation in the field of science and inter-university exchange between

Sarajevo University and Turkish universities86

. In that light, Turkey is giving scholarships to

the Balkan Muslim students in the various fields of study.87

Conversely, Turkey is

systematically and strategically training experts on a range of activities related to re-

affirming the Ottoman and oriental legacy.88

With the aim to legitimize itself in the eyes of the Balkan Muslims, Turkey also plays

the emotional card. The above-cited speech by Turkish foreign minister Davutoglu is one

example. The other instructive speech was given by PM Erdogan at the commemoration of

15 years of Srebrenica massacre in July 2010. This speech is relevant for analysis in terms of

its content, the tone and its length. Namely, the speech was very moving and sympathetic89

,

as one might have expected. What is interesting to stress, however, is the fact that Erdogan

monopolized the stage, speaking at least twenty minutes without any notes or written speech,

unlike other officials, who spoke in average five to ten minutes. Moreover, the impression is

that he spoke in a very assertive and arrogant manner.90

83

L. Hamidi, “Turkey‟s Balkan Shopping Spree”, Balkan Insight, 7 December 2010. 84

Agencies, “Erdogan in Kosovo vows to protect all historical traces”, Diplomacy, World Bulletin, 4.

November 2010. 85

Ibid. 86

“Turski premijer počasni doktor Univerziteta u Sarajevu“, Sarajevo X, 25 March 2008. 87

Tanaskovic, op.cit, p. 95. 88

Ibid. 89

See Agencies, “Turkey‟s PM pledges backing for Srebrenica massacre victims”, Diplomacy, World Bulletin,

11 July 2011. http://www.worldbulletin.net/index.php?aType=haber&ArticleID=61213 90

See YouTube, “Başbakan Erdoğan Srebrenica katliamını anma töreninde... 12. 07. 2010”, retrieved 22 April 2011.

21

Bearing in mind the policy that Turkey developed towards the Balkan Muslims, we

can conclude that they are the ideal proof of Turkish soft power in the region. For the Balkan

Muslims, Turkey represents a homeland and safe haven. On the other hand, Turkey is taking

advantage of its attractiveness and credibility it enjoys in the eyes of the Balkan Muslims in

order to increase its political leverage and presence in the region. Therefore, the neo-

Ottomanism à la Balkans is manifested through Turkey‟s attempts to be seen as a soft

power, but in fact Turkey uses it to attain its national interests in general.

But do „Turkish national interests‟ include some imperialistic pretensions? Where is

the thin line between exercising significant influence and being „exercised‟? For Prof. Simic,

Turkey treats the Balkan Muslims as orphans and in a certain way feels responsible for

them.91

On the one hand, the fact that Turkey gives special place to Balkan Muslims is

understandable and expected, considering the historic, religious and cultural ties between

them. But on the other hand, one cannot yet be certain if Turkey has a neo-imperialist

agenda, especially in the view of a very emotional rhetoric it uses in relation to the Balkan

Muslims. As we will show in the fifth chapter in the case of BiH political crisis, Turkey does

not behave constructively and rationally enough, which does not allow us to neglect the

emotional elements in Turkish position towards the Balkan Muslims.

4.2 Strategic Partnership between Serbia and Turkey- to what extent can it

be ‘strategic’?

If Turkey only played the BiH and Albania card in the region, it would have been

somewhat predictable; the hypothesis of Turkey‟s neo-imperialist pretensions in the region

would have been much easier to prove. However, this is not the case, since Turkey is giving

so much attention to one Christian country that, if one reads Davutoglu‟s “Strategic Depth”,

it leaves the impression that Turkey considers it as an enemy. That is Serbia; Turkey and

Serbia are about to become „strategic partners‟92

.

What is more striking is the speed of intensification of mutual relations. Namely,

Turkey is one of the first countries to recognize the self-proclaimed independence of Kosovo

of 17 February 2008.93

As a consequence, Serbia temporarily withdrew its ambassador from

91

Staletović, loc.cit. 92

A. Davutoglu, “Srbija i Turska ključne zemlje Balkana, Politika, 23.July 2009. 93

Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Statement of H.E. Mr. Ali Babacan, Minister of Foreign

Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Regarding the Recognition of Kosovo by Turkey, 18 February 2008”.

22

Ankara, which was the official policy of Belgrade towards the countries that have recognized

Kosovo‟s independence.94

Surprisingly, less than three years after the lowest point of mutual

relations, the presidents of the two countries characterized the relations between Serbia and

Turkey as “the most developed so far”.95

What has caused such a shift?

Turkish officials have repeated again and again that Serbia is a key country in the

region; without its constructive approach, they claimed, peace and stability in the region is

not possible.96

Or, as the Turkish foreign minister Davutoglu declared:

“Turkey, which is positioned on the far east of the Balkans, and Serbia, on

the west, both represent the key countries of the peninsula. Together, our

countries could mostly contribute to greater stability, peace and prosperity of

the Balkans. Despite certain differences, Serbia and Turkey see mutual

relations as the strategic partnership, meaning the following: in accordance

with the common goals, Serbia and Turkey declare that their bilateral

relations, but also the regional cooperation, will be conducted within a

constructive agreement and honest dialogue”97

.

As regards the Kosovo issue, the point where the two countries have different

positions, Turkey adopted a remarkably constructive approach. Namely, according to the

Turkish ambassador in Serbia, Turkey understands Serbia‟s position on this question and

considers that Serbia should not be pressured to recognize Kosovo; instead, Turkey is

advocating the solution that would be acceptable for both sides; the Kosovo issue is not

closed as long as Belgrade and Priština do not find a common position.98

In that light, if the

two sides are willing, Turkey is ready to offer its good services and mediation.99

This

approach probably contributed significantly to the relaxation of relations between Serbia and

Turkey.

In the meantime, economic relations between Serbia and Turkey have been fostered

considerably. In September 2010, a free trade agreement between the two countries came

into force, which, as stated by the former ambassador of Turkey in Serbia, offers very

94

A. Stanković, “Balkans stability impossible without Serbia”, Balkan Insight, 7 October 2010. 95

B. Jakšić, “Srbiju ne treba pritiskati”, Politika, 11 July 2010. 96

Stanković, loc.cit. 97

Davutoglu, Politika, loc.cit. 98

Jakšić, loc.cit. 99

Ibid.

23

favourable conditions for Serbia‟s exporters.100

Moreover, this trade agreement is aimed at

attracting Turkish foreign direct investment in Serbia, also under very positive conditions.101

Interestingly, this trade agreement caused rage from the EU side, which claimed that

by giving favourable position to Serbian products, Turkey is discriminating the goods

coming from the EU102

.

Moreover, as Serbia is intending to privatize its remaining state-owned corporations,

Turkey appears to be one of the most interested buyers. Namely, Turkish national air

company „Turkish Airlines‟ is currently negotiating buying the majority of shares of the

Serbian state airline.103

In addition, Turkey is also interested in buying Serbia‟s state-owned

national operator „Telekom Srbija‟ and its biggest producer of trucks and buses, „FAP

Korporacija‟.104

These projects are so far still in the phase of speculations. However, Turkey is

economically already present in the region of Sandzak. Namely, in October 2010, three giant

Turkish firms have signed agreements to build a highway from Belgrade to Bar

[Montenegro] via Sandzak, as well as two more roads in that region.105

In the light of the discussions on Turkish neo-Ottomanism, it is interesting to note

that the region of Sandzak is dominantly populated by Serbian Muslims, or Bosniaks, who

represent the second biggest national minority in Serbia after the Hungarians. Following the

break-up of the Ottoman Empire, Sandzak is the region geographically placed in both Serbia

and Montenegro where the Turks stayed the longest; they left only after the Balkan Wars in

1912-1913. As a consequence, many of today‟s Sandzak residents have relatives in

Turkey.106

If one recalls Davutoglu‟s „Strategic Depth‟, for him Sandzak represents the part of

Turkish “lifeline” in the Balkans, as it is situated on the axis on which Turkey should build

its influence in this region. So, one can speculate that Turkey‟s main interest in having such

developed relations with Serbia is exactly because of the region of Sandzak.

100

Stanković, loc.cit. 101

“Cvetkovic‟s Turkey visit”, TRT, 11 March 2011. 102

Ibid. 103

G. Kurtaran, “Serbian PM presents privatization package to Turkish firms”, Hürriyet Daily News, 11 March

2011. 104

Ibid. 105

Stanković, loc.cit. 106

Ibid.

24

Apart from the economic activities in the region of Sandzak, Turkey is very active in

the field of culture. The day after the commemoration of 15 years of Srebrenica massacre,

Turkish Prime Minister visited Sandzak, where he opened the Turkish cultural centre

„Ataturk‟107

. On the same occasion, Serbian president announced that such cultural centre

shall be built in the surroundings of Belgrade, by which, he declared, Serbia will prove its

multiethnic and multi-religious character, as well as the bonds it has with Turkey.108

With

regards to this visit, Turkish PM declared that the region of Sandzak should be the “bridge

between Serbia and Turkey”.109

Moreover, in the light of Turkey‟s cultural policy which is aimed at rebuilding the

Ottoman legacy, Turkey is planning to reconstruct the old city of Novi Pazar in Sandzak,

resembling Sarajevo‟s Old Town, as well as to reconstruct the mosques from the Ottoman

times in Eastern Serbia.110

Furthermore, the Embassy of Turkey in Serbia is financing the

restoration of the Ottoman monuments in Belgrade such as Sheikh Mustafa‟s tomb and is co-

founding the construction of the memorial house on Čegar near the city of Niš, which was

the place of the epic battle in the First Serbian Uprising against the Turks in the 19th

century.111

Last but certainly not the least; the year 2010 was tremendous when it comes to

Turkey‟s diplomatic initiatives in Serbia. Namely, Turkey gave its contribution in

formulating the Declaration on condemnation of the Srebrenica massacre by the Serbian

National Assembly, interceded in the conflict between two Islamic communities in Serbia,

mediated in the appointment of the ambassador of BiH in Serbia, and finally, brokered the

so-called „Istanbul declaration‟ which is seen as an enormous step in improving the relations

between Serbia and BiH.112

To conclude, Serbia and Turkey have more developed relations than one would

expect. Both have interest to promote regional stability, which, in return, facilitates their

road to the EU membership. But, given the dynamics of Turkey‟s EU membership

perspective, what could be its particular reason for a strategic partnership with Serbia?

In the future, we will see whether Turkish investors are interested to invest in Serbia

in general, or if they are particularly interested in the Sandzak region. As one would expect,

107

Beta, “Tadić, Ergogan: Počela nova era u saradnji”, Blic, 12 July 2010, retrieved 20 April 2011. 108

Ibid. 109

Ibid. 110

Jakšić, loc.cit. 111

G. Andrić, „Turkey Breathes New Life Into Serbia's Ottoman Relics“, Balkan Insight, 17 July 2010. 112

Ibid.

25

Turkey is undoubtedly interested in this region because of cultural, religious and emotional

ties. In the broader context, Turkey is aware that as the biggest country in the region, Serbia

should be treated with greater attention. With regards to Turkey‟s possible „hidden agenda‟,

Turkish ambassador to Serbia reassures that neo-Ottomanism is nonsense, and that Serbia‟s

and Turkey‟s place is in the EU113

.

On its part, Serbia is willing to see Turkey involved because it wants to be perceived

as constructive with regards to improving relations with its neighbours. The above

mentioned foreign policy accomplishments in which Turkey was involved contributed to the

creation of a more positive political discourse in the region, and brought Serbia „extra points‟

from the EU. Moreover, Serbia desperately needs to boost its economy, therefore it considers

Turkish capital as more than welcome. Finally, Serbia needs Turkey to appease the tensions

between its two conflicting Islamic communities. Namely, Turkey does not favour any side

in this conflict, but considers that religion should not be used for accomplishing political

aims.114

By claiming this, Turkey implicitly denounced the populist mufti in Novi Pazar,

who, having political aspirations, has lately ignited the hatred rhetoric and thus raises

concern in Belgrade.

Not everyone in Serbia is happy about its foreign policy towards Turkey. Some raise

rational arguments, saying that this intensity of relations is not necessary, since Serbia enjoys

special relations with Russia and China. Others still perceive Turkey emotionally, as we

have described before, reminiscing about the alleged difficult position of Serbs under the

Ottoman occupation115

. Moreover, some are astonished to see the revival of Islamic heritage

in Serbia, knowing that, allegedly, building Orthodox churches would not be possible in

Istanbul.116

Interestingly, it seems that this rapprochement is not only somewhat unpopular in

Serbia, but also within the EU. Namely, Turkish ambassador in Serbia stresses that some

European countries are also concerned about Turkey‟s involvement in Serbia, which he does

not understand, given that both Turkey and the EU wish peace and stability for this region.117

The same feeling was expressed by the former Turkish ambassador in Serbia.118

113

Ibid. 114

G. Janićijević, “Adem Zilkić: Politika ne sme da se meša u veru”, Pravda, 17.4.2011. 115

J. Rose, “Jedna Srbija i dalje pravda „osvetu Turcima”, Deutsche Welle, 29 May 2010; 116

B. Radun, “Osmanlije ponovo jašu”, Pečat, 17. November 2009. 117

Ibid. 118

Stanković, loc.cit. Ambassador Susha Umar was in post until October 2010.

26

As a final point, as political analyst A. Fatic suggests, since both Turkey and Serbia

are laggards in the EU accession process, given their vague and long-term EU perspective, in

the existing context it is useful for Serbia to have good relations with Turkey.119

But having

in mind the words of Turkish ambassadors, it still remains to be seen why the EU is worried

about Turkey and Serbia getting closer.

4.3 Turkey viewed by skeptics: the Republic of Srpska

If one gets the general impression from the previously mentioned the idea that

Turkey‟s neo-Ottoman policy is likely to be successful in the Balkans, it is important to shed

light on the position of Republic of Srpska (RS), a Serb-dominated entity within BiH. Only

then will we be able to discuss the possible range of Turkish „power of attraction‟ and

leverage on the WB.

In fact, the position of this entity towards the Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans is

important since BiH as a whole has been struggling for years with political and institutional

impasse, which cannot be resolved without the involvement of RS. However, considering the

overall impression that Turkey, from the Bosnian civil war to nowadays, is favouring

Bosniak people within BiH, Turkey is in RS seen as an actor who can by no means

constructively contribute to finding a solution for/to a current stalemate in BiH.

Basically, there are two main reasons that give RS right to claim that Turkey is

protecting Bosniaks on the detriment of this entity. The first is related to the symbolic of

diplomatic visits. That is to say, in the last nine years [up to September 2010] Turkish

officials have met only twice with the officials from RS, only to discuss some technical

questions, notes the former Prime Minister of RS Dodik.120

Moreover, he adds, the fact that

Turkish president and Prime Minister only meet with Bosniak member of BiH Presidency

during their visits to this country is the proof of Turkish „sponsorship‟ of the Bosniaks121

.

The second reason lies in the fact that by advocating the „turning BiH into a

functional state‟ approach, Turkey is trying in every possible way to compromise RS.122

Namely, Turkey has always defended the position of Bosniaks in the Peace Implementation

119

J. Cerovina, “Turska važan partner Srbije”, Politika, 12 July 2010. 120

“Dodik na skupu o neosmanizmu: cilj Turske da u BiH dominiraju Bošnjaci”, Biznis.ba, 10 September

2010. 121

Ibid. 122

Ibid.

27

Council (PIC)123

; implicitly, it is cleverly using the „functional state‟ mantra which means

the creation of a unitary BiH state, which further implies the abolition of RS.124

This

approach is unacceptable for RS, since it goes directly against its national interests.125

Therefore, as Turkey does not respect the national interests of RS, it cannot be seen as

credible in this entity.126

As one would expect, the famous Davutoglu‟s speech on the Ottoman legacy in

Sarajevo provoked strong reactions in RS. Its officials claim that controversial statements by

the Turkish foreign minister are inadequate for one foreign minister and create the negative

atmosphere that threatens to cause the instability in the country and the wider region.127

Moreover, the public in RS are very critical about Serbia with regards to its relations

with Turkey. They see the intensive amelioration of Serbia‟s relations with Turkey as

entirely unnecessary, since it puts RS in a very difficult position as regards to its legal status

and protection of national identity.128

However, the latest developments may indicate that Turkey is starting to adopt a

more constructive approach towards RS. Following the unease in Turkey caused by German

active engagement in finding a solution to a current stalemate in BiH129

, Turkish foreign

minister decided to officially visit RS in January 2011, where he met with the incumbent

president of the entity M. Dodik130

. By visiting RS, Turkey tactically made a good move, as

it implicitly admitted that without a dialogue with RS, it cannot contribute to the relaxation

of the current situation in BiH.131

Moreover, the statements of Dodik and Davutoglu after the

meeting were very cordial, the former declaring that the intention of Turkey to support the

inter-Bosnian dialogue without favouring any side is encouraging, since it is creating the

atmosphere of trust, while the latter declared that Ankara respects the territorial integrity of

BiH and wants to contribute to the economic and overall prosperity of the country.132

123

PIC is the international body composed of 55 countries that veils the implementation of the Dayton Peace

Agreement from 1995 that ended the war in Bosnia and established the constitutional framework. Moreover,

PIC defines the progress that has been made in the state-building process as well as the further steps of to be

made in this respect. 124

Interview with Mario Djuragić, Representation of Republic of Srpska in the Kingdom of Belgium, Brussels,

10 March 2011. 125

Ibid. 126

Ibid. 127

M. Filipović, “Cilj Turske uspon Otomanskog Balkana”, Glas Srpske, 25 September 2009. 128

Staletović, loc.cit. 129

Interview, Djuragić, op.cit. 130

Beta, “Dodik: Ohrabruje podrška Turske dijalogu u BiH“, Time MK, 30 January 2011. 131

Djuragić, op.cit. 132

Beta, loc.cit.

28

Nevertheless, the cancelation of the meeting between Davutoglu and the Member of

the Presidency of BiH from the Republic of Srpska – at the time Chairman of the BiH

Presidency put a shadow on the previous seemingly successful meeting. Supposedly, the two

did not meet because Davutoglu team explicitly conditioned this meeting by the removal of

the flag of RS133

, the fact that Turkish minister was already late for the meeting with Dodik

and due to Davutoglu‟s prolonged visit to the Ferhadija mosque.134

Yet, this can also be

interpreted as a deliberate incident by Turkish foreign minister aimed at satisfying the

Bosniaks, i.e. to demonstrate that Bosniaks are not in any way neglected by Turkey.135

Overall, as for RS, Turkey would be seen as a credible actor in appeasing the current

situation in BiH if it considered the national interests of RS at all; so far, it has not shown the

will; however, when it comes to economy, Turkey is welcome to invest in RS.136

Therefore,

for Turkey, RS continues to be the biggest foreign policy challenge in the Balkans.

4.4 Turkey’s partiality towards the Balkan Muslims: an obstacle to become

more prominent actor in the region?

On the basis of what was previously said, two main questions arise: one, can

Turkey‟s foreign policy in the Balkans become credible and accepted in the whole region?;

and two, what are Turkey‟s ultimate intentions in this region?

The official Turkey claims that it does not favour any country in the region; Turkey

makes no distinction between Muslim and Christian Balkan countries, with Turkey-Serbia

excellent relations as an example of this claim.137

Moreover, Turkey does not consider its

policy towards the Balkans aggressive, but rather equilibrated; Turkey‟s motivations in the

region are sound and honest.138

However, the reality seems to be somewhat different. On the one hand, it is absurd to

say that Turkey does not make any distinction between the Muslims and the Christians-

Turkey‟s bonds with the Balkan Muslims are in a way natural and expected. One cannot

133

D. Maksimović, “Turcima smetala zastava Republike Srpske!”, Deutsche Welle, 30 January 2011. 134

Phone interview, Danilo Petrović, Foreign policy adviser to H.E. Nebojsa Radmanovic - Chairman of the

Presidency of BiH, 28 April 2011. 135

Djuragić, op.cit. 136

Ibid. 137

Interviews, Turkish officials no. 1 and no.3, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Ankara,

11 March 2011 and 13 March 2011. 138

Interview, Turkish official no. 3, op.cit.

29

escape the common past, religion and culture. Thus, these unchangeable facts determine the

present and reflect considerably on the now- one might just think of the emotional

component in Turkey‟s performance in the Balkans, and the amount of reactions it inflames

both within Muslim and Christian Balkan population.

So, it is not fair to say that Turkey makes no distinction between the Muslims and

Christians. It is natural that Turkey is partial towards the Muslims in the Balkans, but in the

meantime, it should definitely seek to improve the image of the „honest broker‟ among the

Balkan Christians. In fact, Turkey should have a more sensible attitude towards them,

especially in the light of the completely opposite interpretations of the common history. So

far, the story of tolerance and religious co-existence simply does not hold among them.

On the other hand, Turkey‟s ultimate intentions in the region could be challenged. Is

it a benign actor with honest motivations or has it got a neo-imperialistic agenda? What is

striking is the fact that neo-imperialistic suspicion is raised not only in the concerned circles

in the Balkans, but also among the Turkish officials within its Ministry of Foreign Affairs.139

Yet, those who fear the neo-imperialistic Turkish agenda fall short of defining it.

What exactly do they mean when they refer to Turkish neo-imperialist pretentions? The

sections of neo-imperialistic rhetoric in the present Turkish foreign policy discourse do not

imply that neo-imperialism exists in practice. As long as the sceptics are not able to elaborate

on their view of Turkish neo-imperialism, and demonstrate how it is manifested in practice,

this debate will remain on the level of speculations and propaganda.

What can Turkey do to be seen as more legitimate? One of the options is, as we said, to

act more sympathetically towards the Balkan Christians. But, what if it does not want to?

Perhaps it fears that by approaching the Christians, it would lose credibility in the eyes of the

Muslims. As this is probably the case, arguably the best way for Turkey to gain more

leverage is to increase economic activities in the region, especially the foreign direct

investments, by which the population would be directly positively affected.

Therefore, we can conclude that as long as it is perceived as partial and imperialistic

by a significant proportion of the Balkan population, Turkey‟s leverage and legitimacy in

this region will remain limited. Moreover, in the case of the Balkans particularly it is clear

that Turkey cannot be a soft power if its foreign policy principles are not in harmony with its

139

Interview, Turkish official no. 2, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Ankara, 12 March

2011.

30

internal politics. Indeed, it is hypocritical of Turkey to give lessons on Srebrenica when it

does not want to open the issue of the genocide over the Armenians.140

We labelled Turkey‟s Balkan policy as being neo-Ottoman. On the basis of what has

previously been said, we consider that the neo-Ottomanism à la Balkans implies the

following features:

1) Amplified foreign policy activities – political, economic and cultural;

2) Insistence on the positive aspects of the Ottoman heritage as an inspiration for the

future;

3) Pragmatism;

4) Turkic-Islamic synthesis;

5) Egotiation, understood as the importance given to the country‟s perceived

grandeur, which is manifested in its sporadic emotional and irrational

performance;

6) Rhetorical neo-imperialism;

7) Potential neo-imperialism in practice.

140

Djuragić, interview, op.cit.

31

5 Turkey and EU in WB: a complementary approach?

When it comes to proclaimed politics at least, it is evident that both Turkey and the

EU share the same vision of the region of the Western Balkans. That is to say, both actors

want to see the Balkans stabilized once and for all. In that sense, both are engaged in a role

of ‘relaxator’ of the existing tensions as well as of a dialogue facilitator. Actually, each of

them contributes positively to a certain extent in this matter. However, even though at first

glance the interests and approaches of both match and complement each other, there is no

mechanism of dialogue or coordination between Turkey and the EU on the issues linked to

the WB. In fact, Turkey proposed such mechanism to the EU, but the EU is ignoring it. Why

is that the case? Is the EU’s refusal connected with suspicions it has towards Turkey’s neo-

Ottoman policy? What can be an added value to the common EU-Turkey approach towards

the WB?

5.1 EU’s problematic engagement in the WB

Given the geographic proximity of this region to the EU, as well as the rather

shameful and minor role it has played during the break-up of former Yugoslavia and the

Kosovo crisis, WB region bears significant symbolic importance to the EU. In fact, the EU

developed the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and today‟s Common Security

and Defence Policy (CSDP) following its negative experience in this region. In the light of

discussions whether the EU can become a more influential actor on the global scene, the

current challenges deriving from the WB can be seen as a test for the EU‟s potential global

„actorness‟.

Indeed, as it has been many times repeated, the precondition for the EU to become

more visible globally is to be able to resolve the issues „in its own backyard‟ independently.

It did not succeed in the nineties, while today it is „struggling‟ with the USA, Russia and

Turkey to become a predominant player in the region. For this purpose, it seems that the

EU‟s existing mechanisms at its disposal are not sufficiently nor successfully enough

exploited. Namely, the EU exercises its influence in this region mainly through its

Enlargement policy, by which the WB countries are affected, and through its CSDP

operations and missions present in this region.

32

In the year 2000, the EU created the so-called Stabilization and Association Process

(SAP), which represents EU‟s enlargement mechanism tailored for this particular region. Its

aims to include helping the WB countries in the transition to market economy, promoting

regional cooperation among them and giving them prospect to the EU membership141

. Three

years later, on the European Council‟s Thessaloniki Summit, the EU clearly stipulated „the

European perspective of the Western Balkans‟142

, which enabled those countries to apply for

the EU membership.

When compared with the previous „Eastern enlargement‟, we notice certain features

that make us believe that the EU is not willing enough to expand to this region. In fact, the

mere process of enlargement to the Western Balkans is much more complex and demanding.

Firstly, this is due to the fact that apart from fulfilling the well-known „Copenhagen criteria‟,

the countries from the Western Balkans are obliged to fulfil two more conditions before

becoming a candidate for the EU. Those conditions are the full cooperation with the

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the promotion and

enhancement of the good neighbourly relations143

. Both conditions are politically very

sensitive, and are directly linked to the resolution of the issues deriving from the break-up of

the former Yugoslavia.

Secondly, the technical process of negotiating on the EU membership has become

more complicated. Namely, the EU has developed new mechanisms such as the annual

progress reports or the benchmarks for opening and closing the negotiating chapter;

moreover, it asks from these countries not only to implement the acquis communautaire, but

also to comply with it, i.e. “the effective and efficient implementation”144

.

Finally, the EU itself is imposing its „internal conditions‟, namely the „integration

capacity‟145

, by which it refers to its institutional framework and its capabilities to handle the

future enlargements. Even though this is the only „formal‟ internal condition, it seems that it

is not the only one. That is to say, the EU‟s „enlargement fatigue‟ is in many ways

141

European Commission, Enlargement, “Stabilisation and Association Process”. 142

Council of the European Union, “Thessaloniki European Council 19 and 20 June 2003- Presidency

Conclusions”, Brussels, 1 October 2003, p.12. 143

Europa, “Communication from the the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 5 March

2008 - Western Balkans: enhancing the European perspective [COM(2008) 127 – Not published in the Official

Journal], Brussels, 2008. 144

D. Phinnemore, “The changing dynamics of EU enlargement”, Written version of presentation to the

conference:

South East Europe: The EU‟s Next Enlargement , St. Antony‟s College, University of Oxford, 29 April 2005,

p.4. 145

Fakiolas, Efstathois T. & Nikolaos Tzifakis, „Transformation or Accession? Reflecting on the EUs Strategy

Towards the Western Balkans‟, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 13, no. 3, 2008, pp.392.

33

manifested on the region of the Western Balkans. For example, the EU‟s commitment to WB

enlargement is much weaker than in the previous „Eastern enlargement‟- one can just

compare the official documents of the EU and the language nuances146

. While the Central

and Eastern European countries were guaranteed the EU membership, the WB countries only

get „the European perspective‟. Moreover, when it comes to the EU‟s financial assistance,

the WB states receive lesser funds compared to the Eastern countries at the same stage on

their EU „road‟.147

It is important to underline the previously described differences in the Eastern

Enlargement in terms of the content and the strictness of the proscribed criteria because it

seems that the EU‟s „harshness‟ towards the WB has significant consequences for its

popularity in this region. On the basis of the dynamics of accession process in each of the

country in the region, we can conclude that the closer the country is to the EU membership,

the lower the popular support is for the entry of the given country in the EU, and vice versa.

Take Croatia, for instance, as a proof of this claim. It is the most advanced country in

this respect in the region, but if the question of the EU accession was put on referendum, the

majority of its citizens would vote „no‟.148

Moreover, the euroscepticism in Croatia has

drastically increased following the recent verdict of the ICTY on the main Croatian warlord

Gotovina, who is considered a national hero.149

On the other side, the EU‟s popularity in

Kosovo, which has not yet reached any stage in the process of accession, is eighty seven

percent.150

As for Serbia, which has not yet become a candidate country but on whom the EU

applies strict conditionality, as of January 2011, the popularity of the EU dropped below

sixty percent for the first time ever.151

Therefore, the EU‟s strict conditionality coupled with the overall impression that the

EU is not willing enough to integrate this region fully in the EU bring about the decline of its

credibility.

Apart from the issue of the EU‟s popularity, another consequence of the nature of

WB enlargement is the general feeling that the region is progressing very slowly, if not

stagnating. Macedonia has not advanced since it obtained the status of candidate country in

146

Compare the content and language of the „Europe Agreements‟ tailored for Central and Eastern European

countries with Stabilization and Association Agreements made for the Western Balkans. 147

Fakiolas, Tzifakis, op.cit, p. 390. 148

D. Stavljanin, “Galup: Zemlje Balkana skepticne prema EU”, Slobodna Evropa, 15 November 2010. 149

A. Willis, “Croatian burn EU flag following Hague court ruling”, EUobserver, 18 April 2011. 150

Stavjanin, loc.cit. 151

“Istrazivanje: sve manje Srba hoce u EU” Vesti Online, 15 January 2011.

34

2005 due to the Greek blockage over the name dispute. In November 2010, Albania was

given a rather negative avis on its membership application while for Montenegro the avis

was encouraging, but not completely positive152

. Serbia is stagnating because of the

insufficient cooperation with ICTY153

. Finally, BiH is still an international protectorate,

which impedes its application for the EU154

.

It would not be fair only to blame the EU for the lengthy progress of the WB; the

pace of inevitable reforms that those countries have to make is also very slow. However, if

the accession prospect is postponed continuously, it may undermine the progress made on

peace and stability in the region.155

That is to say, the long-term EU accession perspective

does not provide these countries with enough incentives to reform. In the countries that are

still facing the issues of fragile stability, such as BiH or Macedonia, the lack of incentives

may result not only in the drop of EU‟s leverage, but also in a potential revival of instability

by which the EU would be directly affected.

For this reason, it seems rather surprising that the EU is not engaged more in the

region. For the EU, it would be much less costly to use the EU‟s enlargement tools more

effectively, such as questionnaire and early screening, than to handle financially another

potential crisis of instability in the Balkans.156

At the same time, EU‟s attractiveness is

decreasing in Croatia and Serbia, it has no consensus among its member states on a common

approach towards BiH crisis and Kosovo, no answer on Greek blockage of Macedonia and it

is not very enthusiastic about membership applications of Albania and Montenegro.

However, the role of EU‟s positive conditionality should also be pointed out,

especially concerning the political issues relating to facing the burden of the nineties.

Particularly in cases of Serbia and Croatia, where the EU has contributed significantly to the

reconciliation process between those countries and an overall more positive atmosphere in

the region by providing them with the EU-„carrot‟ incentive, and in return by insisting on

fulfilment of ICTY and good neighbourly relations conditions. The same could be said for

152

See European Commission, “Communication of the European Commission to the European Parliament and

the Council-Commission Opinion on Albania‟s application for membership of the European Union”, Brussels,

9 November 2010 and European Commission, “Commission Opinion on Montenegro‟s application for

membership of the European Union”, Brussels, 9 November 2010. 153

If Serbia wants to get the status of a candidate country, a full cooperation with ICTY is required. So far,

Serbia is failing to arrest the two remaining Hague fugitives. See Tanjug, “EU ministers forward Serbia‟s

candidate bid”, B92, 25 October 2010. 154

The formal condition for Bosnia to apply for the EU membership is the closure of the Office of High

Representative (OHR). 155

H. Grabbe, G. Knaus, D. Korski, “Beyond wait-and-see policy : the way forward for EU Balkan policy”,

European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR), May 2010, p.2. 156

Ibid, p. 4.

35

the visa liberalization issue, which had a win-win scenario for everyone. By making certain

institutional reform in this respect, the governments gained the points from their electorate,

the citizens could travel while at the same time the attractiveness of the EU was boosted.

When it comes to the EU‟s CSDP missions and operations, the region of the WB is in

many ways a precedent for the EU. Namely, the first EU‟s CSDP mission ever, EUPOL

BiH, was launched in January 2003 in BiH.157

This mission is still in force as well as the

military operation EUFOR Althea in BiH, whose mandate is extended until the end of

2011.158

Furthermore, the EU has its Special Representative for BiH who is at the same time

the High Representative of the United Nations.159

Thus, in BiH the EU has deployed three

different types of CSDP mechanisms at its disposal. Moreover, the EU‟s biggest mission

ever, both in terms of the area of competences and the staff employed, is on the WB soil, and

that is EULEX Kosovo. This rule of law mission covers judicial, police and customs

branches and has direct executive powers.160

Apart from those existing ones, the EU had two

police missions and one military operation deployed in Macedonia.161

Given the amount of financial and political capital it has invested so far in the region

of the WB, one might expect a bigger prominence and influence of the EU in this region.

While the enlargement dynamics for this region do not go in the EU‟s favour in terms of its

leverage, still there are certain signs that the EU feels ready to take over the role of the most

influential actor. That can be noticed through its mission EULEX, or its role as a facilitator

in the current dialogue between Belgrade and Priština. Moreover, the EU has finally started

considering a more strategic plan for its future engagement in BiH. Yet, the EU‟s policy

towards WB has many flaws and much space for improvement. Arguably, one of the ways to

make it more successful is to start consultations on this subject with Turkey, whose

capabilities, as we have demonstrated, should not be overlooked.

157

European Union, External Action, CSDP, “EUPM/BiH;

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=585&lang=fr 158

European Union, External Action, CSDP, ALTHEA/BiH;

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=745&lang=fr 159

European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, « EUSR Introduction »,

http://www.eusrbih.org/gen-info/?cid=1012,1,1 160

European Union, External Action, CSDP, EULEX Kosovo;

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1458&lang=fr 161

European Union, External Action, CSDP, “Overview of the missions and operations of the EU, April 2011”;

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=en

36

5.2 Turkey-EU Strategic Dialogue over the WB: why is EU not interested?

Nowadays, it seems that the EU is neglecting Turkey in every possible sense. The

negotiations on accession are in a stalemate, with thirteen negotiating chapters being open

and only one temporarily closed.162

The right-wing and populist parties across Europe are

becoming parts of the governments; this might have consequences on Turkey‟s future in the

EU. Even the moderate right wing parties in power, such as those in France and Germany,

are opposing Turkey‟s EU membership. The European population in general is highly

critical about Turkey joining the EU. The level of interaction between the EU and Turkey

has decreased significantly. As an example, the EU does not consult anymore with Turkey

on its foreign policy moves, as the current situation in Libya demonstrated, even though

Turkey is aligned in more than eighty percent of the cases with EU‟s common positions

within CFSP.163

Turkey is no longer invited to the EU meetings; the EU is cancelling most of the

regular coordination meetings with Turkey that were common in the past.164

Actually, this is

one of the reasons why Turkey had to develop its near abroad policy.165

Therefore, if Turkey

is frustrated with the EU, which consequently led to Turkey‟s intensification of its relations

with the neighbouring regions, and Europe is not enthusiastic about seeing Turkey doing so

(at least in the case of the Balkans, as was expressed by the ambassador of Turkey in Serbia),

and both Turkey and the EU share the same vision of this region, would the missing part of

this puzzle be exactly the common dialogue between the two actors concerning the WB?

Actually, Turkey already proposed to the EU certain methods for enhancement of

„Strategic Turkey-EU Political Dialogue‟ in 2009166

and again in 2010167

, but received a

rather timid and disappointing answer from the EU, which accepted only a few modifications

to these proposals.168

Namely, they included the following: participation of Turkey‟s

political leaders in the meetings of the European Council, as well as the meetings between

162

V. Pop, “Croatia moves closer to EU membership, Turkey stalls”, EUobserver, 20 April 2011. 163

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, “49th

Turkey-EU Association Council, Statement by

H.E. Ahmet Davutoglu, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Statement by H.E. Egemen Bagis, Minister of State for

EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator of the Republic of Turkey”, Brussels, 19 April 2011, p.3. 164

Interview No.3, Ankara, loc.cit. 165

Ibid. 166

A. Akcanoka, “Turkish foreign policy- between East and West?”, European Policy Centre, Brussels,

October 2009, p. 4. 167

49th

Association Council Statement, op.cit, p.3. 168

S. Ulgen, “How to Operationalize the Foreign Policy Dialogue Between Brussels and Ankara?”, The

German Marshall Fund of the United States, Brussels, April 5, 2011, p.3.

37

the Political Directors and candidate countries- both had already been the practice until

2005; participation of Turkey‟s foreign minister in the Foreign Affairs Council meetings,

whenever the consultations on the questions of mutual concern are needed; regular meetings

between Turkish Permanent Delegate to the EU with the Chair of Political and Security

Committee; establishment of ad hoc working groups defining the modalities of cooperation

and strategic dialogue; informal consultations at Political Directors level on regional issues

of mutual concern like WB [emphasis added]; and finally the political dialogue meetings

with Council Working Group on the Western Balkans (COWEB) [emphasis added].169

What is more, the creation of the European Union External Actions Service (EEAS)

allows many possible formulas for the proposed dialogue. But, despite the compatibility of

the given proposals with the EU post-Lisbon opportunities and the willingness of the Ashton

team to accept and develop them, Brussels responded negatively.170

Even the proposal on the

meetings with COWEB was rejected171

. This seems surprising, given that this proposal can

be considered as the „lightest‟, having in mind the already mentioned similarities that Turkey

and the EU hold with regards to the WB.

Interestingly, not only were the countries who oppose the Turkish membership to the

EU reluctant to discuss those proposals, but also the „pro-Turkey‟ ones. In fact, their

argument was that Turkey would become satisfied with this enhanced dialogue and thus de-

motivated to seek the EU membership.172

Apart from this argument, which does not seem

convincing enough, what could be the other reasons that make the establishment of this

dialogue so difficult?

Certainly, one of the reasons stems from the unresolved Cyprus issue, the problem

that has further implications on the relations between the EU and NATO, and on EU-Turkey

relations in general. On its part, Turkey is blocking any idea concerning Cyprus participation

within NATO, while Cyprus opposes Turkey‟s participation in the European Defence

Agency (EDA). Turkey used to be consulted on defence matters within the framework of the

Western European Union (WEU), whereas now in the existing EU‟s CFSP mechanisms, it

has no say.

The consequences of the Cyprus issue on the overall relations between the EU and

Turkey were quite obvious at the occasion of adopting the new NATO Strategic Concept in

169

Ibid. 170

Ibid. 171

Ibid. 172

Ibid.

38

November 2010 in Lisbon. Namely, the final language of the concept was rather

dissappointing, due to Ankara‟s unwillingness to make concessions unless it is involved

more in the EU decision making process with regards to security matters.173

So, we can

speculate that certain member states are reluctant to consider any kind of common approach

with Turkey on the security matters as long as the Cyprus question is unsolved.

Surprisingly, the paradox of this situation is the fact that Turkey is the biggest

non-EU contributor in the EU‟s CSDP missions and operations.174

That is to say, in BiH,

Ankara contributes with more than two hundred and fifty military personnel in operation

„Althea‟ as well as with around fifty law enforcement officers in the EUPOL mission.175

Moreover, it is contributing to the EULEX mission in Kosovo and has plans to increase its

presence therein with one hundred fifty personnel in 2011.176

Moreover, in the past, Turkey

participated in the EU‟s missions and operations in Macedonia.177

Therefore, if the EU and Turkey manage somehow to overcome the formal

difficulties concerning Turkey‟s contribution to the EU‟s CSDP in the Balkans, the non-

existing reaction from the EU‟s side to Turkey‟s proposals becomes more pertinent.

Possibly, the EU is unhappy to see the growing Turkish presence in the region because the

WB is the area of the EU‟s future enlargement. Unlike in the case of the Middle East, where

the EU praises Turkish growing involvement, in the WB, the EU wants to make sure that it

is the most influential actor. But, the next part will show on the example of BiH that the

collaboration between the two actors would be the win-win formula for all. So far, the EU

has seen Turkey‟s presence in this region as a threat to its influence, but the outcome of such

presence might actually turn out to be exactly the opposite.

As we can conclude, the EU‟s reluctance to engage more with Ankara over the WB

partly arises from its reservation towards Turkish neo-Ottoman policy towards this region,

especially in terms of Turkey‟s dynamic and intensive foreign policy; partly because of the

unsettled issues that Turkey has with certain EU member states; and partly because Turkey is

simply not the central topic on the EU agenda at the moment. This situation unnecessarily

complicates the already difficult relations between Turkey and the EU at this point in time.

173

V. Pop, “ „Intense‟ discussion on EU-NATO relations at Lisbon summit”, EUobserver, 21 November 2010. 174

H. Grabbe, S. Ulgen, “The way forward for Turkey and the EU”, Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace, December 2010, p.9. 175

Ibid. 176

Ibid. 177

Ibid.

39

Once again, we will cite the Turkish foreign minister: “[…]We should seriously

question the sustainability of this situation. We are a part and parcel of Europe and we will

make every effort to continue and to speed up the accession process. However, we need to

see the same resolute stance from the Union. […]”178

5.3 Assessing EU’s and Turkey’s strengths and weaknesses: case of BiH

If one wants to challenge the EU‟s influence and credibility in the WB, probably the

best way would be to test its policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unlike in the case of

Serbia and Croatia, where the EU‟s positive conditionality has been efficient and continues

to be so, in BiH, this method is not sufficient enough to stimulate the country‟s leaders to

progress on the EU agenda. The Bosnian case demonstrates two tendencies inherent to the

EU: first, that there is no consensus between the EU member states on the EU‟s future

engagement in BiH; and second, that there is not enough political will from the EU part to

overcome those differences. These two trends question EU‟s credibility not only in BiH, but

also in the WB as a whole.

The first trend affects directly EU‟s bid to be the most dominant actor in the region.

Namely, the question on which the EU member states do not agree is the conditions under

which BiH can apply for the EU membership. Until recently, there was a consensus that the

closure of the Office of the High Representative (OHR)179

is a condition sine qua non for the

EU application, since the EU cannot negotiate with an international protectorate. However,

nowadays, given the aggravating situation in the country, some EU members are advocating

a more flexible approach.

Actually, for more than five years this country has been paralyzed with the

institutional and political crisis; currently, more than two hundred days since the general

178

Association Council, op.cit, p.1. 179

OHR was created in 1995, under the framework of the Dayton Peace Agreement, with the aim to oversee the

civilian implementation of this agreement. In 1997, in the light of the difficulties of the state-building process,

Peace Implementation Council (PIC), the international body charged with giving political guidance to OHR,

attributed the High Representative with the so-called „Bonn Powers‟ which gave him executive powers, i.e.

enabled him to enact laws and dismiss the problematic ones. Over the years, these powers have been used

extensively, which was justified as a necessity, for the sake of the state-building process. However, the

legitimacy of his actions has been increasingly contested, especially in the entity of RS. In that respect, in 2008

PIC stipulated two conditions and five objectives necessary for the closure of the OHR. The two conditions

include the signing of the SAA and the positive assessment of the situation in Bosnia by PIC. The SAA was

signed in 2008. Out of the five objectives, four have been fulfilled, with the resolution of the state property

remaining as the most difficult issue to address.

40

elections, it has no government.180

The local politicians are not able to agree even on the

simplest issues; they tend to politicize any debate, raise the nationalist rhetoric and thus lead

the country to potential instability. Even though all relevant political groups are unanimous

that the entry into the EU should be the strategic goal of the country, the reforms in that

direction remain limited; the accession perspective of the country is rather vague and long-

term, thus for the politicians it is more profitable at the moment to play the nationalistic card

than the EU one.

In this context, the closure of the OHR seems unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Indeed, it appears that the current situation is a „vicious circle‟, with the entrapped

international community not having any vision of alternative solutions. The burden falls

certainly on the EU, having in mind the „European perspective‟ of BiH and its countless

declarations regarding its concern about this country.

Having realized the gravity of the situation and the need for the exit strategy, some

EU member states, such as France and Italy, are encouraging the idea of not conditioning

BiH EU application with the closure of the OHR, i.e. letting BiH apply for the EU

membership even if this formal condition has not yet been met.181

Namely, it is assumed that

receiving the Commission‟s questionnaire, as well as the process of answering the questions,

would be a tangible incentive for BiH politicians to advance with the necessary reforms.182

Eventually, this process would coincide with the closure of the OHR, given that it would

resolve the issues required for it.

However, certain member states, like the UK, are resolutely against this proposal.183

Therefore, without a common position on this question, the EU cannot expect to be seen

as a credible actor neither by the Bosnians, nor by the international community involved

in BiH, i.e. the USA, Turkey or Russia. Thus, the EU is likely to remain entrapped in BiH in

two parallel processes: one, in attempting to appeal to the local politicians; and two, in

assuring the rest of the international community that it can handle the situation in the country

independently. Yet, in both aspects, it falls short of the political will.

Illustrative of this are sporadic proposals by the EU and the USA on constitutional

changes that would accelerate BiH road to the EU. The last attempt was made in 2009 under

the Swedish presidency, in Butmir military base. This proposal failed because the mediators

180

As of April 2011. 181

G. Tirak, “The Bosnian hiatus- a story of misinterpretations”, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS),

No. 219, November 2010, p. 8. 182

See Grabbe, Knaus, Korski, op.cit. 183

Tirak, op.cit, p.8

41

were ill-prepared, had little to offer in exchange of the reform and implied that by convening

the talks outside the regular institutional mechanisms, quasi-coercive means could be used in

reforming BiH political system.184

The impression was that the EU initiated the talks merely

to show the engagement. Therefore, as long as the EU does not show preparedness to

commit additionally, both in terms of the tactics and the substance of the proposals, it cannot

expect from the local politicians to be collaborative and constructive.

On the other side, it cannot expect from the rest of the international community to

„hand‟ BiH to the EU when there is no internal unity within the EU itself. Therefore, the

biggest challenge for the EU will be to find a formula of the future engagement that would

be a common denominator for a plethora of different views and interests inside the EU and

of the international community. Probably the most difficult issue would be to assure the

USA that it is ready to assume the responsibility „in its own backyard‟.185

In March this year,

the EU announced it is preparing to establish the reinforced, single EU Representative, in

accordance with the broader international community.186

This is a positive indicator that the

EU countries are finally about to find a consensus on the EU‟s future role in BiH.

Seemingly, Turkey‟s current diplomatic engagement in BiH has developed as a

reaction to the fact that it was left out from the EU-US led mediation.187

Namely, Turkey‟s

perceived partiality towards the Bosniaks was seen as the main reason for the EU not to

include Turkey in the talks.188

Consequently, Turkey initiated the establishment of a trilateral

consultation mechanism with Serbia and BiH.189

This mechanism proved to be very fruitful,

as Turkey was praised for a constructive role of appointing the ambassador of BiH to Serbia,

calming political tensions in the Sandzak region and during the formulation of the text of

Srebrenica Declaration adopted in the Serbian Parliament (see supra, part III).

184

F. Bieber, “Constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: preparing for EU accession”, European Policy

Centre, April 2010, p. 2. 185

It was argued that one of the main reasons for the visit of the American Vice-President to this region is

exactly because “the Americans are not satisfied with the Brussels leadership in the Balkans”. See P. Mitchell,

“Biden in the Balkans: US asserts interests in shattered region”, Global Research, 21 May 2009. 186

Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Brussels, 21 March

2011.

In 2002, the EU appointed the Special Representative for Bosnia, who is double-hated, i.e. also has the function

of the High Representative. The solution of giving two such functions to one person appears not to be

productive, since the function of the EUSR was shadowed by the one of the HR. 187

B. Yinanc, “Excluded by US and EU, Turkey undertakes own mediation in Bosnia”, Hurriyet Daily News,

15 January 2010. 188

Allegedly, Swedish FM Bildt advised Davutoglu not to bypass RS, i.e. that he should also establish contacts

with RS authorities. See “Interview: The EU, Turkey, and Neighbours Beyond-Carl Bildt”, Turkish Policy

Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 3, p.21. 189

Yinanc, loc.cit.

42

This initiative culminated in Istanbul in April 2010, when Turkey managed to bring

together the Serbian President and the presiding member of the Bosnian Presidency, coming

from the Bosniak people, who until then had refused to have any official meetings with

Belgrade. Moreover, this meeting resulted in signing the so-called „Istanbul declaration‟,

that reiterated the need for the continuation of the dialogue in order to reassure regional

cooperation, peace and stability; furthermore, it institutionalized the occurrence of the

trilateral meetings at the level of Heads of State at three times in two years. 190

This event

was largely seen as crucial in terms of reducing the tensions between Belgrade and Sarajevo

and it created a more positive „atmosphere‟ in the region.

Interestingly, no one from the EU came forth with any official or unofficial

declaration to welcome this occasion which, in terms of the content and purpose,

corresponds with the values that the EU is promoting in this region.

Not surprisingly, there were also certain circles that perceived this Declaration with

immense consternation. For instance, one Serbian nationalist weekly commented that Serbia

should not let itself become a part of the future re-arrangement of the continent and the

establishment of a third-rate „Ottoman Commonwealth‟.191

More importantly, this

Declaration was considered as void in RS, since the Bosniak member of the Presidency who

attended the meeting did not inform the other two present about his intention to go to

Istanbul, and thus did not have the official authority to sign the Declaration and to claim that

it was signed in the name of BiH as a whole.192

What is more, for RS the biggest disappointment was the fact that the official

Belgrade did not inform them on the planned meeting, even though their cabinets are in

constant contact.193

As for Turkey, by initiating this process, it demonstrated that it

deliberately bypassed the communication with RS entity, which again challenges Turkey‟s

role as a mediator and reconciler in the region. However, it looks as if Turkey finally

realized that, if it wants to raise its credibility in the region, this approach is unsustainable.

Actually, the first signs that Turkey is changing its strategy towards RS could be

noticed at the occasion of the above-described FM Davutoglu‟s visit to this entity in January

190

South-East European Cooperation Process, Turkish Chairmanship-in-Office 2009-2010, “24 April Istanbul

Triletaral Summit Declaration, Istanbul, 24 April 2010- Istanbul Declaration”. 191

A. Vulin, “Otomanski Komonvelt”, Pečat, 01 May 2010, http://www.pecat.co.rs/2010/05/otomanski-

komonvelt/ 192

Dz. Karabegovic, “Republika Srpska negoduje zbog Istambulske deklaracije”, Slobodna Evropa, 26 April

2010. 193

Interview, Petrović, op.cit.

43

2011. In the light of the persisting political crisis in BiH, Turkey has become conscious that

the dialogue with RS is inevitable, which it finally acknowledged by convening the high

level meeting in Serbia in April 2011. This time, all the members of BiH Presidency were

present, with the currently presiding member coming from the Serbian people. It is important

to stress that this trilateral summit was not organized in the framework of „Istanbul

Declaration‟, which RS considers as illegal, but represents a continuation of the existing

bilateral and trilateral relations.194

The impression was that the trilateral meeting between the

heads of state of BiH, Serbia and Turkey went in a highly constructive and friendly

atmosphere.195

Moreover, at this meeting, Turkey proposed a declaration which mentioned the

Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the region, the formulation which was unacceptable for the RS

entity given their reluctance to be part of the NATO; Turkey acknowledged that and this part

was removed from the final joint statement.196

Moreover, Turkey understood the objection

made by the RS representative relating to the principle of non-interference in the internal

affairs, as one particular section on BiH was intended to be part of the proposed

declaration.197

Following this meeting, one can notice two likely shifts in Turkey‟s strategy. First,

Turkey finally realized that normal and productive communication with RS is possible, so it

will continue to develop the relations with this entity.198

Second, once Turkey directly

witnessed the constructiveness from the side of RS, it will almost certainly consider altering

its approach towards Sarajevo [i.e. the Bosniaks].199

Arguably, by changing its approach

towards RS, Turkey wants to change the created impression that it is one-sidedly present in

BiH.200

Therefore, on the basis of the presented case, we argue that in the current context,

which sees the EU disunited and not motivated enough to assume the bigger role in the

region, and Turkey, who is finally on a good way to be perceived as impartial, the biggest

chance for both actors to have a successful policy in this region and at the same time to

improve their mutual relations is to coordinate, or at least to consult each other.

194

Ibid. 195

Ibid. 196

Tanjug, “Radmanović: Turski preglog odbačen”, B92, 29 April 2011. 197

Ibid. 198

Petrović, op.cit. 199

Ibid. 200

“Dodik: Turska bi da popravi utisak”, B92, 28 April 2011.

44

EU TURKEY

Power of attraction

Institutionalized

approach

Best

outcome

Mediation

Diplomatic

entrepreneurship

Disunity

Lack of diplomatic

initiatives

Weaknesses Lack of credibility

Emotional approach

Table 1: Comparative display of assets and flaws of the EU and Turkey.

What is the one‟s strength is the other‟s weakness; that is why they should take advantage of the

coordinated approach.

45

6 Conclusion

Throughout this thesis, it was shown that Turkey and the EU certainly have the same

vision and approach when addressing the Western Balkans. Both believe that it is in their

interest to contribute to the stabilization and consolidation of this region. To achieve this

goal, both are using „soft power‟ methods, the EU mainly focusing on positive conditionality

and the attractiveness of potential EU membership, whereas Turkey is increasing its

diplomatic, economic and cultural activities.

However, after thoroughly analyzing the nature of Turkey‟s Balkan policy, the EU‟s

perception of it and the overall context of the current EU-Turkey relations, this thesis has

demonstrated that, notwithstanding the converging visions and approach of the two towards

the WB, the EU is actually very reserved, if not unfriendly, with regards to Turkey‟s WB

policy.

In order to prove this claim, firstly the concept of neo-Ottomanism was examined.

On the basis of what was already written on this subject and the analysis of Turkey‟s policy

towards the WB, the main features of this concept were identified. The aim was to go

beyond the current discourse on neo-Ottomanism and provide a comprehensive overview,

which would contribute to a better understanding of this notion.

Therefore, we consider that these seven qualities together define the neo-Ottomanism

in the Balkans: 1) amplified foreign policy activities - diplomatic, economic, cultural;

2) insistence on the positive aspects of the Ottoman heritage as an inspiration for the future;

3) Turkic-Islamic synthesis; 4) pragmatism; 5) egotiation, i.e. the importance given to the

country‟s perceived grandeur, which is manifested in its sporadic emotional and irrational

performance; 6) rhetorical neo-imperialism; and 7) potential neo-imperialism in practice.

It was noticed that Turkey‟s foreign policy activities are predominantly focused on

the Balkan Muslims, which justifies the Turkic-Islamic synthesis feature. This is in a way

natural, given that it is estimated that one fifth of today‟s Turkish population has Balkan

origins so Turkey is attached to the Muslims in this region and somehow feels responsible

for them. This is why the performance of Turkey‟s officials is frequently quite emotional and

excessive, which may lead to the conclusion that Turkey has neo-imperialistic pretentions in

the region.

46

However, Turkey‟s approach to Serbia, with whom it has recently developed

exceptional relations, challenges the previous claim, and demonstrates that Turkey actually

has a very pragmatic policy. Turkey is aware that if it wants to have a fruitful Balkan policy,

even if it might be a neo-imperialistic agenda (which we have not succeeded to prove), it has

to communicate with all the countries in the region. In that sense, Turkey is at present

investing itself in ameliorating its image in the BiH entity Republic of Srpska, where its

engagement is perceived rather negatively.

Therefore, we have shown that despite certain success of Turkey‟s diplomacy aiming

to improve the „climate‟ among the Balkan countries, it still lacks credibility, as it is seen by

a significant proportion of the Balkan population as biased and potentially imperialistic.

After examining Turkey‟s neo-Ottoman policy in this region, we focused on the EU‟s

engagement in the Balkans and its reactions to Turkey‟s energetic Balkan policy. It was

shown that the nature of the EU‟s enlargement policy towards the WB has significant

implications on its credibility and popularity in this region. Namely, in comparison to the

previous „Eastern Enlargement‟, the EU is imposing much stricter conditionality for the

countries of the WB and is certainly less committed and motivated to pursue this

enlargement process. This is important to stress since the EU‟s lack of impetus has opened

the doors for Turkey‟s more active presence in these parts.

In that light, it was shown that the EU is very sceptical about the enhanced Turkish

presence in the Balkans. For instance, it did not want to engage Turkey in talks over the BiH

crisis since it perceived Turkey as overly partial, it questioned the legality of certain

economic contracts between Serbia and Turkey, and it did not react with any declaration that

would welcome Turkey‟s diplomatic achievements in this region.

Perhaps the best indicator of the EU‟s reluctance to Turkey‟s Balkan policy is its

negative answer to Turkey‟s proposal regarding the establishment of a consultation

mechanism on the foreign policy issues of mutual concern, including the WB.

We identified three main reasons that justify the EU‟s rejection of this proposal.

Firstly, the EU is concerned about Turkey‟s Balkan policy since it considers it a threat to its

influence in this region, bearing in mind that this region should be part of the EU‟s future

enlargement. Secondly, certain EU member states are blocking any possibility of

cooperation with Turkey on foreign policy issues due to their bilateral disputes with Turkey,

for example Cyprus and its unresolved status. Thirdly, there are many signals that indicate

47

that the EU has lost interest in Turkey. Certain EU member states oppose Turkey‟s EU

membership perspective, the accession negotiations are in a stalemate, therefore the whole

context of EU-Turkey relations is important. Finally, we can speculate that the EU is not

much inclined to the current Turkish government, with its foreign minister Davutoglu who

wrote in his influential “Strategic Depth” that the EU should be kept aside from the Balkans

as much as possible.

Finally, the case of the EU‟s and Turkey‟s approach towards BiH political crisis was

chosen in order to elucidate the strengths and weaknesses of both actors, which can be

generalized into their approach towards the whole region. On the one hand, the EU possesses

the power of attraction, as the membership remains BiH‟s long-term priority, but it still lacks

a common vision and initiative. On the other hand, Turkey is diplomatically active and

successful, but still lacks credibility in the whole region, due to its somewhat emotional

approach towards the Balkan Muslims. Interestingly, it can be noticed that potential

contributions of the two actors match. The EU falls short of diplomatic initiatives, whereas

this is Turkey‟s strength. Conversely, Turkey‟s soft power methods do not appeal to

everyone in the Balkans while the EU‟s positive conditionality has proven to be a very

successful tool.

This is one of the reasons why we think that the consultation and coordination of the

WB policies of the two would be a win-win combination. If, for instance, the EU praised

Turkish diplomatic efforts in this region, Turkey would in return feel more confident about

its EU perspective and more motivated to continue with the reforms. Therefore, the common

dialogue would certainly improve the currently fragile political relations between the EU and

Turkey. The EU would certainly not lose its influence in the region if it acknowledged

Turkey‟s unquestionable importance and contributions. In a way, it is cynical from the EU to

underestimate Turkey‟s rising role in the region when the EU itself is at the moment

disillusioned and divided on its future role in the Balkans.

Knowing how difficult it is for the EU-27 to coordinate and reach a consensus on the

foreign policy issues, it may be argued that the consultations with Turkey would only further

complicate things. We claim, though, that when it comes to the WB, Turkey would bring

impulsion to the EU and strengthen its position in relation to other big powers present in the

region, such as Russia or the USA. Most importantly, EU-Turkey tandem would accelerate

the progress of the WB countries to the EU, as new initiatives would provide them with

incentives to reform. Integration of the whole region in the EU will be the proof that the EU

48

is finally ready to take its own responsibility independently „for its own backyard‟, and

engaging Turkey more might be one of the means.

Nevertheless, being aware that this is not a very likely scenario, we can at least try to

guess what the EU‟s and Turkey‟s Balkan policy will look like in the foreseeable future.

Turkey will in all probability carry on with its neo-Ottoman policy. In the light of the

growing tensions with the EU, it is expected to increase its engagement further, especially in

terms of economic activities. On the political level, we can notice Turkey‟s efforts to

improve its image of being biased, still at the rhetorical level. However, as long as it does not

engage more in the practice to reassure the Christian Balkan population about its intentions

in the region, Turkey will have problems with the credibility, which would hamper its

attempt to be more influential in the Balkans.

As for the EU, it is believed that it will enhance its presence in the region following

the establishment of the EEAS, especially in BiH, where it has already announced that it is

elaborating a plan for further engagement, or with regards to Kosovo, where the EU is

already in charge of facilitating the dialogue between Belgrade and Priština. However, the

repercussions of its internal problems and „enlargement fatigue‟ are felt in the WB region,

as there are still no clear signs of its commitment to enlarging to this region. At any rate, it

seems unimaginable for the EU to enlarge to this region without first finally reaching a

decision about Turkey‟s possible future in the EU. If, for instance, the EU enlarged to the

WB without having resolved the question of Turkey, this would significantly harm its

credibility and legitimacy, bearing in mind the length and the history of the EU-Turkey

relations. To sum up, in the case of the WB and as regards to its relations with Turkey in

general, it is essential that Turkey be paid urgent attention by the EU.

49

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Interview with Mario Djuragić, Representation of Republic of Srpska in the Kingdom of

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Phone interview with Danilo Petrović, Foreign policy adviser to H.E. Nebojsa Radmanovic -

Chairman of the Presidency of BiH, 28 April 2011 Danilo Petrović, Foreign policy adviser to

H.E. Nebojsa Radmanovic - Chairman of the Presidency of BiH, 28 April 2011.

Interview with Official Number 1, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey,

Ankara, 11.03.2011. (interview conducted by Paul Meerts)

Interview with Official Number 2, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey,

Ankara, 12.03.2011. (interview conducted by Paul Meerts)

Interview with Official Number 3, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey,

Ankara, 13.03.2011. (interview conducted by Paul Meerts)

54

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