Tuan Guru, community and conflict in Lombok, Indonesia

Jeremy Kingsley

Submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

August 2010

Melbourne Law School The University of Melbourne

ii

To Ria my partner in an adventurous and mischievous life.

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Abstract

Violence is an ongoing issue of concern in Indonesia. Recent periods of political,

social and economic instability have seen outbreaks of violence across the

archipelago, often between rival religious or ethnic groups. This has also been the

case on the eastern Indonesian island of Lombok, which has both an ethnically and

religiously diverse population. Lombok’s capital, Mataram, and the surrounding area

of West Lombok form the focus of the field research for this thesis. Both have a

Muslim majority and large Christian and Hindu minority communities. This religious

and cultural diversity has at times been a source of tension.

This thesis explores two local communities in Mataram and West Lombok, as well as

looking more broadly at Mataram during provincial elections. The research examines

not only communal and political tensions that arose in these communities, but also

how conflict was successfully avoided or resolved. This thesis argues that

partnerships between state and non-state actors and institutions are integral to conflict

management. This cooperation is of particular importance given the relative weakness

of state institutions in Lombok, including the police and courts. Therefore, the value

of local communities and non-state actors in conflict avoidance and resolution cannot

be underestimated.

Local religious leaders, Tuan Guru, are key non-state actors who are essential to

conflict management processes in Lombok. Tuan Guru have a high degree of

influence in pious Lombok society. This means that they are able to act as social

stabilisers and mediators during periods of tension in local communities.

This thesis also points to the localised nature of dispute resolution, as highlighted in

case studies of conflict avoidance during the 2008 NTB gubernatorial elections and

dispute resolution in the West Lombok village that I have named ‘Bok’. These cases

demonstrate that social relationships both within and between communities, adat

(customary practices) and local leadership all play vital roles in resolving tensions and

protecting citizens from the effects of violence. Of particular importance are good

social relations, the absence of which can lead ethnic minorities to become

iv

marginalised and alienated from the rest of the community. Without strong social

relationships, minorities are vulnerable to violence should tensions arise.

This thesis demonstrates that conflict management in Mataram and West Lombok,

whether it be during local provincial elections or within a local community, is an

intricate process. Rather than creating ‘one-size fits all’ solutions, conflict

management in the highly localised context of Lombok draws upon local legal

culture(s) that offer a range of social and legal tools. These include drawing upon

sources of locally relevant authority, both state and non-state, such as religious

leaders, public servants and the police. Working together, these groups can assist in

facilitating community solutions to avoid or resolve conflict. The actors involved and

approaches used will differ from community-to-community and depend upon the

circumstance, but in most cases Tuan Guru are key to the outcome.

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Declaration

This is to certify that

i. the thesis comprises only my original work towards the PhD,

ii. due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used,

iii. the thesis is less than 100,000 words in length, exclusive of tables, maps,

bibliographies and appendices.

Signed: Dated:

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Acknowledgements

Writing a doctoral thesis is like the Tour de France. In many ways it is a very

individual activity, but without the encouragement, strategic guidance and support of

one’s riding team, no cyclist can take on the mountains and successfully complete the

event. I could not have sustained this four year journey alone. There are many people

whose assistance, love, guidance and encouragement has kept me going.

Throughout this journey, including my frequent and lengthy travels far from home,

one constant has been my family’s support. My parents’ patience and understanding

(despite often finding my trajectory in life perplexing) is something that I cherish.

Yotti, Ruthie, Ryan and little Daniel your love, support and technical assistance has

sustained me. Thanks must also be extended to my larger family, the Gonns, Platts

and Pressers. You have all created a warm and laughter-filled world for me.

My research was assisted by several university students in Mataram, whose expertise

and knowledge I relied upon everyday in Lombok. We learned together and they have

seen me at my best and worst. These four fantastic assistants were Zey Sahnan,

Herawati, Nurmala Fahriyanti and Muhammad Dimiati. My local sponsor, Bapak H.

Asnawi, and the staff and students of the State Islamic University of Mataram made

me feel welcome and at home from my first day on campus.

Life is about family and friends. In Lombok, I had the privilege of making some

wonderful friends, including Lalu Nurtaat, Kartini, Abdul Wahid, Atun Wadatun and

Mohammad Abdun Nasir. Your generosity of spirit and friendship during my time in

Mataram made life so much easier and more enjoyable. While in Lombok my family

in Kampung Lom provided me with a generosity that enriched my experience

exponentially. They became my second family. Their joy and tears gave this outsider

a glimpse of what Lombok is really about.

My principal supervisor, Tim Lindsey, helped me start this crazy venture and has

been there every step of the way. Whether it was our meetings in Jakarta or his ‘tough

love’ in Melbourne, his support and mentorship is more than appreciated. My two

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other supervisors, Abdullah Saeed and Michael Feener, have encouraged me along

this lengthy journey. I am thankful for their critical feedback and wisdom.

During my studies many people at the Asian Law Centre, Centre for Islamic Law and

Society and the Melbourne Law School have been there for me too. I would like to

make particular mention of Dina Afrianty, Melissa Crouch, Denny Indrayana, Quan

Nguyen, Helen Pausacker, Arskal Salim and Kerstin Steiner. Watching these scholars

take on their doctoral studies has been an inspiration.

The task of completing a thesis is an academic exercise, but with many administrative

hurdles. As a consequence, I would also like to thank several staff of the Melbourne

Law School Research Office and Asian Law Centre, particularly Kathryn Taylor,

Kelly McDermott, Jessica Cotton and Lucy O’Brien. They fielded my million and one

questions, often asked from thousands of kilometres away.

I was financially supported in my doctoral studies and field research by Tim

Lindsey’s ARC Federation Fellowship for a Doctoral Scholarship, an Endeavour

Australia Cheung Kong Fellowship, a Melbourne University Travelling Abroad

Scholarship, a Melbourne University Asia Fieldwork Scholarship, a Melbourne Law

School Research Support Fund Grant and the Bernard Lustig Scholarship. For this

generous support I am grateful.

Before leaving for the field, Tim Lindsey told me, almost tauntingly, that Indonesia is

addictive. I refused to believe him – I was no sentimentalist! This turned out to be one

of the many assumptions that was proven wrong while living in Lombok. As it turned

out, I was deeply affected. I remember going to the bathroom on the flight from

Lombok to Singapore at the end of my field research locking the door and then

crying… was it joy, relief or sorrow? The answer is that it was a cocktail of these

emotions. Whatever the case, Lombok and Indonesia are now part of me.

My final note of appreciation is the most important. I am lucky to have met my

partner in life, Maria Platt. We have done our doctoral studies in parallel, spending

over a year in the field together. From this experience we have come out stronger!

Maria, I would not have been able to complete this thesis without you.

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Table of contents Abstract ........................................................................................................................ iii

Declaration.....................................................................................................................v

Acknowledgements.......................................................................................................vi

Table of contents........................................................................................................ viii

List of tables, figures and illustrations...........................................................................x

Currency.......................................................................................................................xii

Photographs..................................................................................................................xii

Glossary ..................................................................................................................... xiii

Chapter 1 Weak state, strong communities?.............................................................1

Situating this research ...............................................................................................6

Weak state, strong communities?.............................................................................12

Interpreting Lombok society and legal structures – A view from outside ...............18

Chaotic harmony in difficult circumstances ............................................................26

Conclusion ...............................................................................................................31

Chapter 2 The troubled transition ...........................................................................33

The law enforcement void ........................................................................................35

Power shifts local.....................................................................................................46

Community responses to crime ................................................................................50

The economics of violence .......................................................................................58

The January riots – More than burning tyres..........................................................63

Conclusion ...............................................................................................................72

Chapter 3 Tuan Guru – guardians of religious traditions......................................75

Who are Tuan Guru?................................................................................................78

The historical emergence of Tuan Guru..................................................................94

Locating religion in Lombok....................................................................................98

Embedded power....................................................................................................109

Guardians of religious traditions – The key to social stabilisation.......................119

Conclusion .............................................................................................................125

Chapter 4 Adat, leadership and community ..........................................................129

Lom – Unity in diversity?.......................................................................................132

Adat – Lore of the local .........................................................................................139

Local leadership.....................................................................................................143

Communal relationships – The importance of mutual benefit...............................148

A time of riots – Testing a community’s resolve ....................................................154

Local security measures – Paid ronda and pamswakarsa.....................................158

Conclusion .............................................................................................................165

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Chapter 5 The art of conflict management............................................................167

Avoiding and resolving conflict .............................................................................167

Case study – provincial elections and the power of partnerships .........................169

Ethnic tensions and political violence in Lombok ......................................169

Political and religious cooperation ............................................................174

Implementation of conflict management.....................................................181

Case Study – Testing times in Bok .........................................................................186

The pressures of leadership ........................................................................186

Local political rivalries...............................................................................190

The temperature continues to rise...............................................................192

Powerful negotiations .................................................................................196

Conclusion .............................................................................................................200

Chapter 6 Chaotic harmony ...................................................................................203

The crux of conflict management...........................................................................205

Bibliography ..............................................................................................................209

Appendix 1 – Court data............................................................................................235

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List of tables, figures and illustrations Picture 1.1 An idul fitri parade ......................................................................................3

Picture 1.2 Scaffolding outside the front of Santa Maria Immaculate...........................4

Picture 1.3 The altar of Santa Maria Immaculate ..........................................................4

Picture 1.4 Santa Maria Immaculate during renovations...............................................4

Picture 1.5 Hindu celebrations in early 2007.................................................................8

Picture 1.6 A joget in Mataram....................................................................................10

Picture 1.7 Former NTB Governor, Lalu Serinata.......................................................28

Picture 2.1 A Mataram police station ..........................................................................37

Picture 2.2 The Magistrates Court in Mataram............................................................43

Picture 2.3 Amphibi post in central Mataram...............................................................45

Picture 2.4 A member of pamswakarsa, Satgas..........................................................57

Picture 2.5 Governor TGH Bajang and Deputy Governor Badrul Munir....................62

Picture 2.6 An anti-violence billboard .........................................................................70

Picture 3.1 Pondok Pesantren Abhariyah....................................................................75

Picture 3.2 TGH Sofwan Hakim..................................................................................81

Picture 3.3 TGH Mustiadi Abhar.................................................................................82

Picture 3.4 TGH Abdul Hamid ....................................................................................82

Picture 3.5 TGH Ulul Azmi .........................................................................................83

Picture 3.6 Pondok Pesantren Nurul Hakim................................................................89

Picture 3.7 TGH Subkhi Sasaki ...................................................................................91

Picture 3.8 A Mataram Mosque.................................................................................100

Picture 3.9 Pengajian in Memben, East Lombok......................................................102

Picture 3.10 Minaret in Jerneng, West Lombok ........................................................112

Picture 3.11 Crowds at an NW Pancor anniversary rally ..........................................113

Picture 3.12 TGH Bajang addressing the NW Pancor anniversary ...........................118

Picture 4.1 Komplek Lom..........................................................................................133

Picture 4.2 Komplek Lom..........................................................................................133

Picture 4.3 Kampung Lom.........................................................................................134

Picture 4.4 Kampung Lom.........................................................................................134

Picture 4.5 Common area in Lom..............................................................................136

Picture 4.6 Multi-purpose area in Lom......................................................................149

Picture 4.7 Komplek Cina Lom .................................................................................153

Picture 4.8 Kampung Lom’s musholla......................................................................157

Picture 4.9 Kampung Lom resident in Amphibi uniform...........................................162

Picture 4.10 Kampung Lom resident in Lang-Lang uniform ....................................162

Picture 4.11 Amphibi identity card.............................................................................163

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Picture 4.12 View of Lom from the fields .................................................................165

Picture 5.1 Gubernatorial campaign material ............................................................173

Picture 5.2 Polling booths in Mataram ......................................................................184

Picture 5.3 Bajang-Munir Posters ..............................................................................186

Picture 5.4 A sporting tournament in Bok .................................................................198

Picture 5.5 Santri at Pondok Pesantren Nurul Hakim...............................................201

Picture 6.1 A nyongkolan...........................................................................................204

Map 1.1 Indonesia, with Lombok circled ......................................................................7

Map 1.2 Lombok, with Mataram and West Lombok circled.........................................7

Map 4.1 Lom..............................................................................................................131

Table 2.1 Traffic-related matters lodged in the Magistrates Court Mataram. .............43

Table 3.1 Religious leadership in Bok.........................................................................81

Table 4.1 NTB government structure – 2008 ............................................................146

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Currency

At the time of undertaking the field research during 2007-2008, one Australian dollar

($AU) equalled approximately 8000 Indonesian Rupiah (Rp). Therefore, this will be

the exchange rate used throughout this thesis.

Photographs

All photographs used in this thesis were taken by the author while undertaking field

research in Lombok, Indonesia, in 2007-2008.

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Glossary

All Indonesian and Sasak words are indicated through the use of italics throughout

this thesis, except for place names. Sasak words are further denoted by the letter (S) in

this glossary. Words of Arabic origin which are in common usage in the Indonesian

language are not denoted with a specific marker.

abangan Indonesians who are nominally Muslim but also

observe aspects of adat and other cultural traditions

adat local custom and social expectations, akin to local rules

agama religion

akidah belief, faith

Aliansi Masyrakat Adat Nasional (AMAN)

National Alliance for Adat Societies – the word ‘aman’ means safety

Amphibi the name of the largest of Lombok’s pamswakarsa.

Bahasa Sasak Sasak language

berugaq (S) a traditional pavillion/sitting platform used for socialising

Bintara Pembina Desa (Babinsa)

military liaison officer in Indonesian villages

Babinmaspol police liaison officer in Indonesian villages

Bujak a pamswakarsa that is no longer active in Mataram and West Lombok.

Bupati Regent, Head of Regency

dakwah Islamic outreach or missionary activities

dana taktis a discretionary source of government expenditure outside normal accountability and audit requirements (also known as non-budgetar)

Departemen Agama Ministry of Religious Affairs

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desa rural village

Dharma Wisesa Hindu pamswakarsa in Lombok

dukun traditional healer

dusun hamlet

fatwa non-binding religious opinion of an Islamic scholar or organisation

Fiqh Islamic jurisprudence

Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama (FKUB)

Forum to Maintain Inter-religious Harmony

Hadith the prophetic traditions

Haj pilgrimage by Muslims to Mecca

halus cultured or refined

haram forbidden according to Islam

Hezbullah the Lombok pamswakarsa controlled by NW Anjani

ibadah religious devotion

idul fitri celebration marking the end of the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan

Institut Agama Islam Negeri Mataram (IAIN)

The State Islamic Institute Mataram

jilbab Islamic head scarf worn by women

joget traditional dance

jumatan Friday prayers

Kabupaten Regency

kampung urban village

kawin lari a form of spontaneous elopement

Kepala Camat head of kecamatan (sub-district)

Kepala Desa head of rural village

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Kepala Dusun head of hamlet

Kepala Lingkungan head of residential area

Kepala Polda (Kapolda) Police Chief, Provincial Police

Kepala RT / RW neighbourhood leaders

Kepolisian Republik Indonesia the national police

kerukunan social harmony

kekerasan violence, riots

Kesatuan Bangsa dan Perlindungan Masyarakat (Kesbanglinmas)

Office of National Unity and Community Protection. Essentially local intelligence

Ketua chair, chief of an organisation

khutbah sermon delivered during Friday prayers

kitab kuning literally ‘yellow books’ – religious texts used at Islamic schools containing commentaries on the Qur’an and Islamic law

Kiyai Islamic religious leader and teacher in Java. In Lombok, the word is also used to identify a village-level state-appointed religious official

komplek a housing development, typically inhabited by middle-class residents

Korps Brigade Mobil (Brimob) ‘Mobile Brigade’, national paramilitary police unit

kul-kul wooden drum which is struck to sound an alarm

Lang-Lang Jagad Titi Guna (Lang-Lang)

Mataram-based pamswakarsa

Lembaga Bantuan Hukum – Asosiasi Perempuan Indonesia Untuk Keadilan (LBH-Apik)

Legal Aid Foundation - Indonesian Women’s Association for Justice

Lembaga Dakwah The Muslim Outreach Institute (in Lombok)

Majelis Ulama The Ulama Association (in Lombok)

Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI)

Council of Indonesian Muslims – a quasi-state body that oversees religious matters and delivers

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fatwa

masjid mosque – Muslim place of public worship

masyarakat society

muamalah social relationships

Muhammadiyah an Indonesian modernist mass Muslim religious movement

mushawara consultative community meeting

musholla small mosque, no Friday sermon is given at these places of prayer

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) a traditionalist mass Muslim religious movement

Nahdlatul Wathan (NW) a local traditionalist mass Muslim movement in Lombok (similar to Nahdlatul Ulama)

Negara Hukum law-based state

nyongkolan (S) traditional Sasak wedding parade

ojek motorcycle taxi driver

Orde Baru literally ‘New Order’, refers to the era when President Soeharto’s government administered Indonesia

pamswakarsa community-operated militia or security groups

Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB) Crescent Star Party

Partai Daulat Rakyat (PDR) People’s Sovereignty Party

Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P)

Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle

Golkar literally ‘Functional Work Groups Party’

Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)

Prosperous Justice Party

Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)

National Awakening Party

Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)

United Development Party

Pastor Catholic Priest

xvii

pemuda youth

Penghulu a village-level state appointed religious official

Pendeta Reverend

Pengadilan Negeri Magistrates Court

Pengadilan Tinggi High Court

pengajian Qur’anic study group

Peraturan Daerah (PerDA) Regional Regulations

Perlindungan Masyarakat (Linmas)

unarmed police auxiliary

Polisi Daerah (Polda) Provincial Police

Polsek abbreviation for sectoral police – police operating at the sub-district level

pondok pesantren Islamic boarding school

pura Hindu temple

Qur’an the main religious text of the Islamic faith

Reformasi Reformation – the political reform process that brought democracy and decentralisation to Indonesia after the resignation of President Soeharto in 1998

ronda a traditional night watch, usually involving community members guarding their kampung

Rukun Tetangga (RT) a neighbourhood association that encompasses several streets

Rukun Warga (RW) a governmental unit that encompasses several RT

santri students of a pondok pesantren and religious followers of Tuan Guru

Sasak ethnic group indigenous to Lombok

Sasak Buda non-Muslim Sasak who adhere to animist and Buddhist beliefs

Satgas the Lombok pamswakarsa controlled by NW Pancor

xviii

satpam private security guards

suku literally ‘ethnic group’ or ‘tribe’

Sunnah behaviour of the Prophet Muhammad which acts as a guide for Muslims.

Syari’ah Islamic law

tabligh akbar mass religious meeting

Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI)

Indonesian National Army

tokoh adat adat (local customary rules) leader

tokoh agama religious leader

tokoh masyarakat community leader

Tuan Guru (TGH) a Sasak Islamic teacher and leader similar to Kiyai in Java

ulama Muslim religious leader

umat/ummah the Islamic community

Undang-undang statute produced by the national legislature (DPR)

Universitas Mataram (UNRAM)

The University of Mataram

upacara ceremony

ustadz (male)/ustadzah (female)

Muslim religious teacher

Waktu Lima refers to the orthodox Sasak Muslim majority in Lombok.

Walikota mayor

warga residents or citizens

warung food stall

Wetu Telu this is a syncretic Muslim group predominantly found in northern Lombok

zikir bersama group prayers

1

Chapter 1 Weak state, strong communities?

Research for this thesis commenced with a day of surfing the internet. I was searching

for stories of communal violence in Indonesia. What were the issues and where

should I undertake my research? I wanted to study the social instability and violence

that occurred in the wake of the fall of President Soeharto and his government in

1998. However, this topic was simply too large for a doctoral thesis and refinement

was necessary. So after several hours of trawling through dozens of articles covering

events as varied as the riots in Jakarta and ethnic conflict in Kalimantan, I stumbled

across a news report about five days of riots in Mataram and West Lombok that

occurred in January 2000. These events had seen Chinese and Christian Indonesian

residents flee the island for Bali or further afield, along with more than 4000 foreign

tourists. During these riots significant property damage and looting also occurred.

With this one news clipping my interest was piqued. This is where my research into

conflict management processes in Mataram and West Lombok began.

Flash forward just over one year later… and I am transfixed while seated in the small

office of Pastor Rosarius next to his church, Santa Maria Immaculate, in Mataram.

Causing this hypnotic effect were images of flames shooting across the computer

screen in front of me. These were images of Santa Maria Immaculate ablaze during

the January 2000 riots, when the church was razed by Muslim rioters.1 It was a potent

reminder of the continuing emotional effects of the riots. These five days saw an

anarchic and violent reality distant from the core teachings of Islam as understood by

many Muslim scholars in Lombok.2

There is, of course, significant support for the “peaceful and non-violent resolution of

conflicts” within Islamic teaching.3

1 Field notes, 11 October 2007. 2 Interview with TGH Ulul Azmi (Jerneng, West Lombok, 17 December 2007); Interview with TGH Mustiadi Abhar (Mataram, 23 July 2008); Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008); Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). “TGH” means Tuan Guru Hajji. 3 Mohammed Abu-Nimer, ‘A Framework for Nonviolence and Peacebuilding in Islam’ (2000) 15 Journal of Law and Religion 217, 219. See also Karl-Wolfgang Troger, ‘Peace and Islam: In Theory and Practice’ (1990) 1 Islam and Christian – Muslim Relations 24; Mohammad Abu-Nimer, Nonviolence and Peacebuilding in Islam – Theory and Practice (2003).

2

… The meaning of the word Islam, which is too often

translated quickly by the mere idea of submission but… also

contains the twofold meaning of “peace” and “wholehearted

self-giving.4

Listening to Pastor Rosarius, however, it was hard to avoid the question of where

peace or the humility of submission to God was during the January 2000 riots? The

capacity of the symbols of Islam to be mobilised to support communal violence was

recognised by the local Islamic religious leaders, Tuan Guru.5 With their followers

(santri), many Tuan Guru sought to provide restitution to their Christian neighbours

in the period following the January 2000 riots for what had happened. Several Tuan

Guru also told me of their personal shame about these events. They said that the

rioters’ behaviour was against the teachings of Islam, which dictates to Muslims that

at the core of their religion’s belief is the imperative to strive to be ‘good’.6 This

involves seeking to understand people of different backgrounds and religious

perspectives.7

O humankind, God has created you from male and female and

made you into diverse nations and tribes so that you may

come to know each other…

Qur’an, 49:13.8

Perhaps naively, I had not realised the extent to which religion can be a force in social

issues, but over the past decade the mainstream media has often pointed to its

troubling connection with violence. The Qur’anic verse above highlights an important

religious injunction for Muslims – the requirement of respect for plural religious and

ethnic realities. One interpretation of the verse, common on Lombok, is that God has

4 Tariq Ramadan, The Messenger – the Meanings of the Life of Muhammad (2008) 1. 5 Tuan Guru and their role as socio-religious leaders will be considered in Chapter 3. 6 For an in-depth account of this theological issue, see Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong (2000). 7 Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008); Interview with TGH Muharror (Electronic Interview, 11 May 2009); . Interview with TGH Wawan Stiawan (Electronic Interview, 18 July 2009). 8 Abdullah Yusuf Ali (translator), The Holy Qur’an (2000).

3

created this diversity among people and that there is, therefore, an obligation to

engage with people from various faiths and different backgrounds. It highlights that

despite the extreme opinions and the violence sometimes perpetrated by some radical

religious groups, at the heart of most religions, including Islam, peaceful coexistence

is an important objective. This Qur’anic verse has a high level of salience in

Lombok’s largest city, Mataram, and the surrounding area of West Lombok, because

they have a Muslim-majority with large Christian and Hindu minoritycommunities.

The symbolism of religious affiliation and ritual can be reflected in communal

celebration as seen, for example, in the photograph below. It can also be utilised,

however, for the purpose of mobilising communal tensions.

Picture 1.1 An idul fitri parade (the Muslim celebration at the conclusion of the fasting month of

Ramadan) in Mataram

The reconciliation process between religious groups in Lombok has been protracted

since the January 2000 riots. For instance, Santa Maria Immaculate only reopened in

early 2008, after nearly eight years of restoration work. It is from these difficult and

emotional events that this thesis emerges. The research investigates state and non-

state actors and organisations in Lombok involved with avoiding or resolving

communal tensions and conflict.

4

Picture 1.2 Scaffolding outside the front of Santa Maria Immaculate during renovations in 2007

Picture 1.3 The altar of the church during renovations

Picture 1.4 Santa Maria Immaculate during renovations

5

In this thesis I seek to develop an understanding of conflict management processes

Mataram and West Lombok, a place that has experienced limited communal conflict

over the past decade. Much of the literature on Indonesian social tensions have,

understandably, explored the worst examples of tragic mob brutality and conflict, with

significant deaths and violence reported, for example in Jakarta, Ambon and Poso.9 In

these places, sharp communal and political violence occurred. By comparison,

Lombok’s January 2000 riots (which will be considered in Chapter 2) were limited to

only property damage rather than murders and sexual assaults. In essence, this was an

example of a society that, although affected by the broader political and economic

instability, did not descend into violence to the same extent as in other parts of

Indonesia around this time. I was interested to consider why this was so, given that

Lombok is one of Indonesia’s poorest provinces; poverty and economic disparities

have been widely recognised as important precursors to communal and political

violence across Indonesia.10

To add substance to my analysis of Lombok’s conflict management processes, two

case studies are used to investigate the management of communal and political

tensions and conflict in Lombok (see Chapter 5). The events documented in these case

studies occurred during 2008. They aim to provide tangible examples of conflict

avoidance and resolution in order to answer the key question of this thesis: what are

the legal and social mechanisms that have prevented communal violence in Mataram

and West Lombok?

9 See Freek Colombijn and Thomas Lindblad (eds), Roots of Violence in Indonesia: Contemporary Violence in Historical Perspective (2002); Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia (2004); Kasuma Snitwongse and W. Scott Thompson (ed), Ethnic Conflicts in Southeast Asia (2005); Jemma Purdey, Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia 1996-1999 (2006); Charles A. Coppel (ed), Violent Conflicts in Indonesia – Analysis, Representation, Resolution (2006); John Sidel, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad – Religious Violence in Indonesia (2007); Jamie S. Davidson, From Rebellion to Riots – Collective Violence on Indonesian Borneo (2008). 10 Patrick Barron, Kai Kaiser and Menno Pradhan, ‘Local Conflict in Indonesia – Measuring Incidence and Identifying Patterns’ (Presented at the 75 Years of Development Research Conference, Cornell University, 7-9 May 2004) 5; Luca Mancini, ‘Horizontal Inequality and Communal Violence: Evidence from Indonesian Districts’ (Working Paper No. 22, Centre for Research on Inequity, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford, 2005) 8; Rizal Sukma, ‘Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia: Causes and the Quest for Solution’ in Kusuma Snitwongse and W. Scott Thompson, Ethnic Conflicts in Southeast Asia (2005) 19-20; David Brown and Ian Wilson, ‘Ethnicized Violence in Indonesia: The Betawi Brotherhood Forum in Jakarta’ (Working Paper No. 145, Asia Research Institute, Murdoch University, 2007) 13.

6

The key findings of this research relate to the crucial role of religious leaders, Tuan

Guru, in conflict management processes in Lombok as social stabilisers and

mediators. Consequently, this thesis is the first comprehensive study of Tuan Guru

and their role in conflict management, although their high social status and socio-

political influence on Lombok affairs has certainly already been covered by a number

of scholars.11

The remainder of this chapter provides an outline of this thesis. The next section

considers some basic geographic, social and economic background. Following this, I

review weaknesses in state function and practice on the island. I then describe the

research methodologies and theoretical underpinnings of this thesis. The final section

of Chapter 1 then investigates social tensions and violence in Lombok, while

evaluating the mechanisms for conflict management and the economic and social

‘price’ (effect on the community) of violence over the past decade. The central

argument of this thesis will be examined in the following sections, namely that non-

state actors, particularly Tuan Guru, play a vital role in the maintenance of social

harmony in Lombok.

Situating this research

I conducted on over 15 months of field research in Mataram and West Lombok during

2007–2008. While in the field, I conducted over 75 in-depth interviews, undertook

detailed observational research and reviewed the archives of the Lombok Post over

key years of social conflict (1999-2000 and 2007-2008).

11 See, for instance, Judith L. Ecklund, Marriage, Seaworms, and Song: Ritualized Responses to Cultural Change in Sasak Life (PhD Thesis, Cornell University, 1977); Judith L. Ecklund, ‘Tradition or Non-tradition: Adat, Islam, and Local Control on Lombok’ in Gloria Davis (ed.), What is Modern Indonesian Culture? (1979); Sven Cederroth, The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power of Mekkah – A Sasak Community on Lombok (1981); Bartholomew Ryan, Alif Lam Mim – Reconciling Islam, Modernity, and Tradition in an Indonesian Kampung (PhD Thesis, Harvard University, 1999); Erni Budiwanti, Islam Sasak – Waktu Telu Versus Waktu Lima (2000); Leena Avonius, Reforming Wetu Telu: Islam, Adat, and the Promises of Regionalism in Post-New Order Lombok (2004); John MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Soeharto Lombok (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2005); Asnawi, Agama dan Paradigma Sosial Masyarakat (2006).

7

Mataram is the capital city of the province of Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB). Along

with the island of Sumbawa, Lombok makes up NTB. The island of Lombok is

located east of the Indonesian islands of Java and Bali. Mataram is a multi-ethnic and

multi-religious city,12 with a population of over 350,000.13

The majority of Mataram’s population identify as Sasak, the indigenous ethnic group,

who are predominantly Muslim. There are also substantial minorities of Christians

(10%) and Hindus (15 – 20%).14 In Lombok, sources of social tension include

economic disparities and historical animosities, but the era of democracy and

decentralisation have also seen the emergence of local political tensions that often

coalesce around ethnic and religious ‘fault lines’.15

Map 1.1 Indonesia, with Lombok circled

Map 1.2 Lombok, with Mataram and West Lombok circled

12 Fathurrahman Zakaria, Mozaik Budaya Orang Mataram (1998) 9-14; Mustain and Fawaizul Umam, Pluralisme Pendidikan Agama Hubungan Muslim-Hindu di Lombok (2005) 91-93. See also Badrul Munir, ‘NTB Dalam Mozaik Keindonesiaan’, Lombok Post (Mataram), 9 November 2007. 13 Badan Pusat Statistik NTB, Mataram Dalam Angka (2008) 83. 14 ‘Meredam Konflik, Menghidupkan Kasadaran Multikultur’, Religi (Mataram, Lombok), 16 April 2007. 15 Hendardi, ‘Republik Pluralis’, Kompas (Jakarta, Indonesia), 14 August 2007; Abdul Wahid, ‘NTB Plural Perlu Gerakan Harmoni’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 11 August 2008.

8

Mataram’s residents are heavily involved in religious rituals and organisations. This is

reflected in the local government’s slogan ‘Mataram – Progressive and Religious’

(‘Mataram – Maju dan Religius’).16 Religious places of worship are highly visible in

Mataram. According to the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics, there are over 1898 places

of Muslim worship in Mataram and West Lombok alone.17 Complementing this are 17

churches, 307 Hindu temples, 10 Buddhist temples and one place of Confuscian

worship.18 The vibrancy of this cultural diversity, and the colour that it brings to

Mataram, is seen with the Hindu religious festival, Hari Nyepi. The parade that forms

a major part of the Nyepi festivities on Lombok is seen in Picture 1.5 (below).

There are two reasons for emphasising Mataram and West Lombok. First, these are

the places where the riots of January 2000 took place. Second, these areas are more

religiously and ethnically diverse than other parts of Lombok. This leads potentially to

more points of communal tension and conflict. Additionally, limiting my research to

Mataram and West Lombok ensured a more focused and manageable sphere of

research.

Picture 1.5 Hindus celebrate, Hari Nyepi, in early 2007

16 This government slogan is discussed in Lalu Agus Fathurrahman, Menuju Masa Depan Peradaban – Refleksi Budaya Etnik di NTB (2007) 23-33. The devout nature of Mataram, and Lombok more broadly, has been discussed in Bartholomew Ryan, Alif Lam Mim – Reconciling Islam, Modernity, and Tradition in an Indonesian Kampung (PhD Thesis, Harvard University, 1999); Asnawi, Agama dan Paradigma Sosial Masyarakat (2006). 17 Badan Pusat Statistik NTB, Lombok Barat Dalam Angka (2007) 133; Badan Pusat Statistik NTB, Mataram Dalam Angka (2008) 145. 18 Ibid.

9

To research the whole of Lombok is difficult because of significant political, cultural

and religious diversity.19 Adat practices, for instance, vary among the Sasak across the

island, in fact, “Sasak adat varies in each village”.20 An example of this is the

traditional Sasak dance party, known as a joget. These events are usually held in local

communities to celebrate upcoming weddings or other festive occasions. This cultural

practice comes from Bali – it is, in fact, part of the Balinese colonial legacy in

Lombok, discussed further below.21 This celebration involves two or three female

dancers performing a traditional dance with male members and guests of the

community, accompanied by a traditional Sasak orchestra. The beautifully dressed

woman dances seductively with male members of the community as seen in Picture

1.6 (below). This tradition is often referred to as seksi dansing (sexy dancing) because

of its provocative nature, although, no touching is allowed. At the end of each song

the women dancer is paid by the man who has had the privilege of dancing with a

beautiful woman. This is a broadly acceptable social activity in West Lombok,22

however, in East Lombok, which has been less influenced by Balinese practices,

many Tuan Guru actively discourage this practice.23

19 There has been recent scholarship on Lombok that considers the way that the local political elite has sought to create a politicised single cultural identity for the Sasak, but I feel that this overlooks the island’s cultural diversity. The following are articles detailing the politicised use of adat, see Leena Avonius, ‘Reforming Adat: Indonesian Indigenous People in the era of Reformasi’ (2003) 4 The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 123; Kendra Clegg, Ethnic Stereotyping by Local Politicians in Lombok Fails to Please All (2004) Inside Indonesia <http://www.insideindonesia.org> at 19 January 2010. 20 Ruth Krulfeld, ‘Fatalism in Indonesia: Comparison of Socio-Religious Types on Lombok’ (1966) 39 Anthropological Quarterly 180, 181. 21 The complex engagement between Balinese and Sasak cultural practices is discussed in David Harnish, ‘Isn’t This Nice? It’s Just Like Being in Bali: Constructing Balinese Music Culture in Lombok’ (2005) 14 Ethnomusicology Forum 3. 22 This emphasis upon Mataram and West Lombok means that Sasak minority groups, such as the Sasak Buda and Wetu Telu, will not be considered in great depth. These groups are predominantly found in northern Lombok outside the area covered in this field research. For greater discussion of these groups, see Sven Cederroth, The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power of Mekkah – A Sasak Community on Lombok (1981); Erni Budiwanti, Islam Sasak – Waktu Telu Versus Waktu Lima (2000); Leena Avonius, Reforming Wetu Telu: Islam, Adat, and the Promises of Regionalism in Post-New Order Lombok (2004); John MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Soeharto Lombok (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2005). 23 Field notes, 9 January 2008.

10

Picture 1.6 A joget held in Mataram

Another example of this cultural and religious diversity can be seen with wedding

parades (nyongkolan). Nyongkolan are a popular adat ceremony in Mataram and West

Lombok, but in East Lombok they face prohibition, or are at least frowned upon. TGH

Humaidi Zaen, a Tuan Guru Lokal24 from Memben, East Lombok, told me that he had

advised his community not to undertake nyongkolan, because these ceremonies were

unnecessarily expensive and disruptive to road users as they can cause traffic jams.25

There are many other differences, within Lombok itself, including linguistic diversity

– the Sasak language, for example, has at least five dialects.26

These differences among the Sasak can be linked to many factors, and include the

island’s geography and long period of colonial occupation. It has also been suggested

that this cultural, linguistic and religious particularity dates back to the period even

before Balinese imperialism, when Lombok was “divided into numerous minor

kingdoms”.27 The Balinese controlled Lombok from around 1677, and by 1740, they

24 Tuan Guru can be divided into Tuan Guru Lokal (local Tuan Guru) and Tuan Guru Besar (important Tuan Guru). These categories reflect their spheres of influence and will be discussed in Chapter 3. Put simply, Tuan Guru Besar are important religious leaders with influence across the island, while Tuan Guru Lokal are less significant religious leaders, whose influence tends to be restricted to their own, local communities. 25 Interview with TGH Humaidi Zaen (Memben, East Lombok, 9 August 2008). 26 Mahyuni, Speech Styles and Cultural Consciousness in Sasak Community (2006) 44. 27 Albert Leemann, Internal and External Factors of Socio-Cultural and Socio-Economic Dynamics in Lombok (Nusa Tenggara Barat) (1989) 23.

11

had taken over the whole island.28 There was, however, continual resistance in eastern

Lombok and a major revolt by the Sasak from there in 1891-94, supported by the

Dutch. This rebellion ushered in a Dutch phase of colonial rule.29 Balinese

colonialism of over 200 years had a cultual impact on the island. It was felt more

potently in west and northern Lombok, where Balinese control was most entrenched.

This led to importation of their cultural practices into these areas to an extent much

greater than in other parts of Lombok.

Additionally, Lombok’s eclectic nature extends to the influence of religious

organisations. Muhammad Dimiati, a young religious leader from Mataram, told me

something that I had heard several times, namely that different mass Islamic

movements are dominant in different parts of Lombok. For instance Nahdlatul Ulama

(NU) is stronger in West Lombok, while Nahdlatul Wathan (NW), currently split into

two rival factions NW Pancor and NW Anjani, are the foremost religious

organisations in East Lombok. However, all these groups conduct activities across the

island.30 Despite highlighting the socio-cultural differences, there is fluidity in

groupings and affiliations across the island. For instance, in the village I have called

‘Lom’ 31 in Mataram32 many of the religiously-active members of the community are

affiliated to NW Pancor in East Lombok, and they go there almost every week for

Friday prayers rather than attending major mosques nearby.33 Therefore, my choice of

Mataram and West Lombok had a substantive rationale – the cultural and political

diversity on the island. However, it was also necessary to limit the geographic

boundaries of the research, which provided a more manageable area for fieldwork.34

28 W. Cool, The Dutch in the East – An Outline of the Military Operations in Lombock [Lombok], 1894 (1897); Alfons van der Kraan, Lombok: Conquest, Colonization and Underdevelopment, 1870-1940 (1980) 16-58. 29 Robert Cribb, Historical Dictionary of Indonesia (1992) 269. 30 Field notes, 9 August 2008. 31 ‘Lom’ is a pseudonym used to protect the anonymity of one of the areas where I undertook research within. This is in compliance with the University of Melbourne Ethics Committee approval for this project. 32 This community is focused upon in Chapter 4. 33 Interview with Mukhsin (Mataram, 14 July 2008). 34 The effect of diversity across Lombok on research findings has been noted in Bianca J. Smith, ‘Stealing Women, Stealing Men: Co-creating Cultures of Polygamy in a Pesantren in Eastern Indonesia’ (2009) 11 Journal of International Women’s Studies 189, 192.

12

Weak state, strong communities?

My analysis of Lombok involves reflection upon the strengths and weaknesses of

national institutions, such as the police and courts. Local affairs are directly affected

by the national context. Since declaring independence in 1945, Indonesia has

undergone several periods of social and political instability. This includes the

transition from the first to second Indonesian President in 1965-67. This event saw

hundreds of thousands of Communists (and alleged Communists) murdered in a semi-

sanctioned outbreak of political violence.35 Another period of instability followed the

Asian economic crisis of 1997 and the subsequent collapse of the Soeharto

Government in 1998. It led to outbreaks of violence across the Indonesian

archipelago.36

Economic and political turmoil during 1997-99 led to serious instability in Lombok.

The island confronted a ‘crime wave’ involving high rates of theft, anti-Chinese riots,

often out-of-control private militia and community security groups (pamswakarsa),

and sporadic periods of politically-motivated conflict between ethnic groups.

Underpinning this social instability was a weakening of state institutions. When state

institutions failed to function adequately due to the collapse of the Soeharto

government, local non-state authority figures and community groups sought to fill the

‘law and order’ void, specifically in relation to the provision of law enforcement

activities. There were many visible examples of this, such as the emergence of large

pamswakarsa, including Amphibi and Bujak.37 The weakness of the Indonesian state

and its ineffectiveness in Lombok is dealt within Chapter 2.

One of the practical problems caused by state weakness is that, rightly or wrongly,

government officials are held in low regard by many people in Lombok.38 If conflict

35 See Robert Cribb, The Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali (1990); Fathurrahman Zakaria, Geger – Gerakan 30 September 1965 Rakyat NTB Melawan Bahaya Merah (2nd Edition, 2001). 36 For an in-depth exploration of various geographical outbreaks of violence and topics related to this period, see Charles A. Coppel (ed), Violent Conflicts in Indonesia – Analysis, Representation, Resolution (2006). 37 John M. MacDougall, Self-reliant Militias (2003) Inside Indonesia <http://insideindonesia.org> at 8 December 2009. 38 This was a common point made to me by informants when discussing perceptions of government officials. For instance, Interview with Herawati (Mataram, 7 October 2007); Interview with Imam (Mataram, 20 October 2007).

13

avoidance and dispute resolution partnerships discussed throughout this thesis are to

be strong and durable, then it is important that all parties, both state and non-state, are

respected and effective. The significant and valued role of non-state leaders will be

discussed in Chapters 3 – 5. One of the reasons for the importance of non-state actors

has been the relative ineffectiveness of state actors. There has, for example, been

widespread public criticism of government officials in Mataram (see Chapter 2). They

are seen as being akin to thieves, with people openly suggesting that many public

servants perceive themselves as being above the law.39 Local politicians have been

vocal for many years about the necessity for the provincial bureaucracy to be

‘slimmed’ down. They feel it to be ‘fat’ or bloated (gemuk). Public servants, it has

been suggested, need to change their attitude and no longer consider themselves to be

kings (raja) sitting above the community.40 During the worst periods of the political

transition to democratic governance, and the consequent ‘crime wave’ in Lombok,

people did not go to the police for assistance, but rather to pamswakarsa and non-state

leaders, particularly Tuan Guru.41 The police were not considered to be effective. In

fact, in many cases, people perceived that seeking their help would make the situation

worse.42

While I was in the field during 2007–2008, there were no significant reforms to the

performance of government departments and law enforcement agencies in Lombok,

although TGH Bajang made reforming the provincial public service a priority of his

incoming provincial administration.43 Dahlan Bandu, a senior provincial public

servant, felt that the NTB public service was slowly changing, but that the process

must be seen “as a marathon, rather than a sprint”.44

39 ‘Kinerja Aparat Hukum Patut Dikritik – Soge: Banyak Putusan di PN yang Selalu Dicurigai’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 27 December 1999; ‘Reformasi Birokrasi Menjadi Kunci Perubahan’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 3 November 2007. 40 ‘Reformasi, Baru Pada Tatanan Kepala dan Kaki – Taqiuddin: Belum Ada Wacana Demokrasi di Birokrasi’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 17 June 2000; ‘Birokrasi Yang Rigit, Ancam Iklim Democrasi’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 29 June 2000. Similar sentiments are also discussed by Denny Indrayana who considers the ‘feudal’ nature of the implementation of law and behaviour of the Indonesian judiciary which he felt fosters corrupt activities, see ‘Denny: Karakter Hukum Nasional Masih Feodal’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 3 June 2007. 41 ‘Perdamaian Disepakati, Lombok Selatan Aman Kembali’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 9 December 1999. 42 ‘Mengapa Kasus Pidana Tidak Dilaporkan ke Polisi?’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 27 December 1999. 43 TGH Bajang, ‘Pre-Inauguration Comments’ (Speech Delivered at Hotel Bukit Senggigi, 2 August 2008). 44 Interview with Dahlan Bandu (Mataram, 13 November 2007).

14

This thesis often emphasises non-state actors. However, when reflecting upon

governance reform, it is necessary not to lose sight of the day-to-day realities and

problems caused by poor management of government services. For instance, the

power grid is unreliable in Lombok. During the wet season power outages are a daily

occurrence – varying in duration from some minutes to several hours. Various reasons

are given for these problems, including the poor maintenance of the power

stations/electrical cabling or diversion of electricity to the hotels in Senggigi (a beach

resort town close to Mataram), which take too much power from the grid.45 Whatever

the true cause, it is seen locally as a continuing example, among many others, of the

state’s poor functioning in Lombok.

Today the Indonesian state remains weak. Arguably it is strengthening, but, even if so,

improvement is inconsistent and varies across the archipelago.46 In Lombok, there is

still a heavy reliance on non-state and local community organisations to fill gaps in

government activities, such as health, education and welfare services. This involves a

number of community organisations run by Tuan Guru and other community leaders.

The state in many ways does not play a significant role within people’s lives, or at

least not as significant a role as do Tuan Guru,47 whose socio-religious status and

function is discussed in greater depth in Chapter 3. This thesis, therefore, considers

how non-state players can augment state action and reinforce the Indonesian legal

concept of being a law-based state (Negara Hukum)48 by supporting state institutions

in conflict management.

As mentioned, these issues of conflict management are investigated through in-depth

analysis of local communities and two case studies. In all of these, partnerships

between state and non-state actors and institutions are emphasised. Chapter 4

considers the way that local leadership and community relationships operate,

particularly focusing on the area of Lom, Mataram, during and subsequent to the

January 2000 riots. The two case studies are presented in Chapter 5. The first case

study explores how the provincial government prepared for NTB gubernatorial 45 Field notes, 20 December 2007. 46 Christian von Luebke, ‘The Political Economy of Local Governance: Findings from an Indonesian Field Study’ (2009) 45 Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 201, 225. 47 Inflasi Tuan Guru (1976) Tempo < http://www.tempointeraktif.com/> at 18 May 2009; Muhammad Noor, Visi kebangsaan TGH Zainudin Abdul Madjid (2004). 48 This legal concept will be considered in greater detail in Chapter 2.

15

elections in July 2008. These preparations aimed to avoid religious, ethnic or political

conflict in the lead up to, and following, the elections. The second of these case

studies investigates events in the village of ‘Bok’ ,49 West Lombok, particularly

focusing on how state officials and communal leaders managed to defuse an outbreak

of social and political turmoil during July 2008. These chapters show how conflict

avoidance and dispute resolution mechanisms actually function ‘on the ground’.

Throughout this thesis the terms ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ leadership, actors and

organisations are used. When discussing state actors and institutions I refer to three

elements. The first are state institutions. These include government departments,

police and courts. The second element includes political leaders and public servants.

The final element covers legal instruments, such as legislation.50 When referring to

non-state actors and institutions I mean, first, social structures, rules and customary

practices or adat (predominantly Sasak adat).51 The second aspect of the non-state

category is leadership – communal (tokoh masyarakat) and religious leadership (tokoh

agama).52 This categorisation into state and non-state has become blurred in recent

years, as Tuan Guru have become actively involved in provincial and local politics.

For instance, TGH Bajang is now the NTB provincial governor, which makes him a

state actor, yet he is also a religious leader and head of the non-state religious mass

movement, Nahdlatul Wathan Pancor. I have found that this dichtomy of state and

non-state remains a useful typology for understanding socio-political affairs in

Lombok, even if the elements within them are often blurred and sometimes overlap at

their edges.

49 ‘Bok’ is a pseudonyms used to protect the anonymity of one of the areas where I undertook research within. This is in compliance with the University of Melbourne Ethics Committee approval for this project. 50 For a comprehensive explanation of Indonesia’s national legal structures, see Tim Lindsey and Mas Achmad Santosa, ‘The Trajectory of Law Reform in Indonesia: A Short Overview of Legal Systems and Change in Indonesia’ in Tim Lindsey (ed), Indonesia Law and Society (2008) 2-22. 51 In relation to the definition of adat, as a social process and form of local practices and rules, see M.B. Hooker, Adat Law in Modern Indonesia (1978) 50-51; Leena Avonius, ‘Reforming Adat – Indonesian Indigenous People in the Era of Reformasi’ (2003) 4 The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 123, 123; Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker (eds), Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia – A Contemporary Sourcebook (2006) xxxiii; Craig Thorburn, ‘Adat, Conflict and Reconciliation: The Kei Islands, Southeast Maluku’ in Tim Lindsey (ed), Indonesia Law and Society (2008) 116. 52 Adat leaders (tokoh adat) are not included in this leadership category because people in Lom and Bok saw these roles as being fulfilled by community and religious leaders. They do not form a discrete category of leadership in these communities. This was confirmed in several interviews: Interview with Mukhsin (Mataram, 14 July 2008); Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok, 16 July 2008). This was also the situation in other parts of Mataram, see Interview with Djalaluddin Arzaki (Mataram, 27 July 2008); Interview with Lalu Nurtaat (Mataram, 16 August 2008).

16

On the surface, conflict management in Lombok seems to ‘just happen’. However,

after closer scrutiny I realised that Lombok’s ‘chaotic harmony’53 is actually based on

a complex series of local relationships, leadership structures and social norms,

examples of which are highlighted in the following chapters. These strategies are not

perfect or neat ‘one-size-fits-all’ arrangements, but, rather, complex partnerships

based on networks and relationships between neighbours, religious leaders,

community figures and state actors. These partnerships are useful in two situations:

the first are ad hoc solutions to particular conflicts or potential problems. The second

involve ongoing conflict avoidance and dispute resolution processes.

Community relationships and the role of local non-state leaders, both of which

underpin the findings of this thesis, are explored in Chapter 4. An important aspect of

the local security mechanisms emerges not from a group or government agency, but

rather residents from different ethnic and religious groups protecting each other in

times of communal tension and violence. These social relationships are characterised

by regular communication and reliance on one and another. This role of community

relationships has been described to me by many informants as an important element of

Sasak adat.54 There are examples of communities in Mataram where relationships

were pivotal during difficult times – for instance, Kampung Sukaraja Barat in

Ampenan. This village is made up of Arab, Chinese and Sasak residents, who worked

together during the January 2000 riots to ensure each others’ protection. The local

press reported that community leaders from this kampung cooperated to ensure the

security and safe evacuation of those under threat.55

What will be seen time and again in the case studies is cooperation between state,

community and religious leaders to avoid or resolve disputes. How does this occur? A

community leader from East Lombok, Faharudin Hamdi, explained to me how, in

53 I use this notion of ‘chaotic harmony’ to identify the fluid and flexible nature of the maintenance of social harmony in Lombok, which operates in what sometimes seems to be chaotic environment. 54 The importance of communal relationships was discussed by many of the informants. They came from various social and class positions, as well as both community and religious leaders. See Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007); Interview with Pendeta Hasanema (Mataram, 12 December 2007); Interview with Djalaluddin Arzaki (Mataram, 27 July 2008); Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). 55 ‘Sukaraja Barat, Miniatur Kerukunan Antar Etnis’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 27 January 2000.

17

general terms, these leaders coordinate their efforts. He said that religious leaders,

particularly Tuan Guru, lay the groundwork for conflict resolution through their

actions. This is achieved by Tuan Guru visiting protagonists and tailoring their

teaching and sermons to facilitate an atmosphere that would create calm amongst the

protagonists. State and non-state community leaders then undertake the practical

activity of negotiating a resolution of the dispute. They often do this through a

community meeting (mushawara).56 An example of this process and the use of a

mushawara is considered in Chapter 5.

Conflict avoidance and resolution frameworks are a complex amalgam of activities,

communal relationships and leadership. Included in these responses is the use of ritual

to bring different ethnic and religious groups together. These activities can be used as

a “medium for celebrating unity and ties between groups”.57 An example of this is the

annual Lombok festival of Perang Topat (war of the rice cakes), which is held in

fields just outside Mataram. Youths from Lombok’s Sasak and Hindu communities

engage in a mock battle against each other. Their ‘weapons’ are rice cakes, which

they throw at each other. This has the affect of turning the sometimes tense

relationships between these two groups into a festive ‘game’. At the end of the ‘war’,

the two communities, led by their respective spiritual leaders, hold separate religious

ceremonies side-by-side.58 This reinforces a distinct, but respectful, communal

arrangement. Groups celebrating joint activities together have also been considered an

important element for maintaining social harmony elsewhere in Indonesia, for

example in Manado, North Sulawesi, where events such as “wedding feasts or funeral

ceremonies” based on “community and family linkages” help create relationships that

are later used to manage social tension and resolve disputes.59 The application of joint

activities and festivities cannot be underestimated (examples of this are discussed in

Chapter 4). People both working and having fun together often has a powerful

unifying effect in Lombok.

56 Field notes, 10 August 2008. The importance of these community meetings in Lombok within conflict management and local decision-making was also discussed by Mohammad Koesnoe, Musjawarah Een Wijze van Volksbesluitvorming Adatrecht (1969) 22. 57 Leena Avonius, Reforming Wetu Telu: Islam, Adat, and the Promises of Regionalism in Post-New Order Lombok (2004) 27. 58 Mustain and Fawaizul Umam, Pluralisme Pendidikan Agama Hubungan Muslim-Hindu di Lombok (2005) 209-265. 59 Karen P. Kray, Operasi Lilin dan Ketupat: Conflict Prevention in North Sulawesi, Indonesia (MA Thesis, Ohio University, 2006) 7.

18

Despite believing that Lombok has, for the most part, been successful in maintaining

communal harmony, I do not suggest that it is free of problems. As noted, riots

occurred in January 2000 (as is described in Chapter 2). Fights can also arise over the

smallest things, for instance, disputes between youth on the basketball court can

become inflamed and lead to larger disputes.60 In Lombok, communal norms

precipitate an almost automatic sense of social solidarity. In these conditions, when

conflict emerges, villagers often move without question to defend other members of

their community, regardless of whether they have acted appropriately or were in fact

fully or partially at fault.61

Interpreting Lombok society and legal structures – A view from outside

Central to this thesis is an investigation of how to maintain social stability or resolve

conflict at a time or in a place where the ‘state’ is weakened, dysfunctional or simply

not functioning. From a legal perspective this is difficult, because ‘law’ and legal

responses to issues normally assume state action. It is expected that a ‘problem’ will

be managed by legal instruments, such as legislation, which authorise the police or

courts to act. But what happens if these instruments and institutions are non-existent,

irrelevant or greatly weakened by changing local conditions?

Due to the weakened state structure in Lombok, my research is at an intersection

between the disciplines of law and political science. Essentially, I sought answers that

extend beyond ‘traditional’ legal responses to social tensions and communal conflict.

Further to this, interdisciplinary research methods became imperative, because of the

need to give depth to Lombok’s complex social, political and legal context.

60 Interview with Achand (Mataram, 6 August 2008). 61 Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) Mediation Center, Social Conflicts in Lombok 1998-2006 (2007).

19

This thesis uses the concept of ‘legal culture’62 developed by Lawrence Friedman as

its theoretical cornerstone.63 This notion is best expressed by Friedman himself when

he wrote that “the legal culture… is a general expression for the way the legal system

fits into the culture of the general society”.64 When using this theoretical framework

‘law’ is considered to be courts and state institutions engaging, and being affected by,

society and cultural factors (and visa–versa). This allows for the study of ‘law’ not

just through the lens of formal written law (textual analysis), commonly known as

‘black-letter law’, but also considers the relationship between a society’s members

and its legal structures and rules, that is, contextual analysis.65 American legal

comparativist, John Merryman, considered that comparative legal studies, or the study

of foreign legal systems, needed to be cognisant of context: “legal systems have been

formed, and are sustained, by the action of historical events, social imperatives and

cultural forces… law is more than a body of rules”.66 Legal scholars undertaking

cross-cultural legal research, such as this, need to move beyond embedded

assumptions in order to gain an understanding of a ‘legal culture’ other than their

own.67

In Lombok, I heard frequently-repeated statements that local leaders, social norms and

community rules were more important than the state. For instance, the owner of small

local food stall (warung) close to my home told me that to resolve disputes in her

kampung (urban village) people went to communal or religious leaders rather than the

police or other state players or institutions.68 Implicit in the concept of legal culture is

the need to move beyond undertaking a legal analysis that only considers state-

62 The utility of legal culture came to my attention while undertaking research for my Masters thesis, see Jeremy Kingsley, Subverting the Global and Listening to the ‘Local’ – Reclaiming the Stories With(in) Comparative Legal Studies (LLM Thesis, Melbourne University, 2005). 63 See, for instance, Lawrence M. Friedman, ‘On Legal Development’ (1969) 24 Rutgers Law Review 11; Lawrence M. Friedman, ‘The Concept of Legal Culture: A Reply’ in David Nelken, Comparing Legal Cultures (1997). See also: David Nelken, ‘Disclosing/Invoking Legal Culture: An Introduction’ (1995) 4 Social & Legal Studies 435; Jothie Rajah, ‘Policing Religion: Discursive Excursions into Singapore’s Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act’ in Penelope Nicholson and Sarah Biddulph, Examining Practice, Interrogating Theory: Comparative Legal Studies in Asia (2008) 273. 64 Lawrence M. Friedman, ‘On Legal Development’ (1969) 24 Rutgers Law Review 11, 29. 65 Lawrence M. Friedman, ‘Legal Culture and Social Development’ in Lawrence M. Friedman and Stewart Macaulay, Law and the Behavioral Sciences (1969) 1004. 66 Pierre Legrand, ‘John Henry Merryman and Comparative Legal Studies: A Dialogue’ (1999) 47 American Journal of Comparative Law 3, 38. 67 Lawrence M. Friedman, ‘On Legal Development’ (1969) 24 Rutgers Law Review 11, 56-57. 68 Field notes, 19 June 2007.

20

sanctioned laws and institutions.69 It is essential to understand the intricate socio-

political realities within which legal systems operate and tailor the analysis

accordingly.70 Therefore, the non-state actors and organisations, as well as adat

practices, important in Lombok, should be incorporated into an analysis of the local

legal culture(s). These non-state institutions can, depending upon the circumstances,

be more potent and relevant than legislation and state institutions. This perspective

correlates with observations made by Clifford Geertz, when he researched Bali half a

century ago. He asserted that investigating non-state factors is essential in order to

comprehend how Indonesian societies function and regulate themselves.71 My

research findings endorse this perspective by investigating the role of both state and

non-state actors and institutions in conflict management processes.

An example of the complexity of Lombok’s legal cultures emerged in the Mataram

community of Lom.72 One of their leaders, Sahnan, told me that during the January

2000 riots several local residents from his urban village, Kampung Lom, had become

involved in the disturbances. The kampung leadership and a majority of its members

were unhappy with this. When the rioters returned from “misbehaving”, as Sahnan

described it, they were detained by community members.73 They were then taken to a

small empty building at the edge of the community and held until the police came to

collect them two or three days later. From there they were then taken to prison where

they stayed for a few months – until they had “cooled down”.74

No formal charges were ever laid against these rioters, nor did they ever appear before

a court. Justice was perceived to have been done by combining non-state (local justice

in the kampung) with state action (police intervention) to provide an outcome that was

supported by many, if not all, Kampung Lom residents.75 This highlights an overlap in

activity of state and non-state actors, while also showing a blurring of authority and

69 What is defined as ‘legal’ and ‘non-legal spheres’ is a troublesome, but important element of a legal culture, see Michael King, ‘Comparing Legal Cultures in the Quest for Law’s Identity’ in David Nelken, Comparing Legal Cultures (1997) 132-133. 70 Lawrence M. Friedman, The Legal System – A Social Science Perspective (1975) 193. 71 Clifford Geertz, ‘Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight’ (2005) 134 Daedalus 56, 58 [Reprinted from (1972) 100 Daedalus 1]. 72 Discussed in Chapter 4. 73 Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007). 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid.

21

control. This example also identifies an inherent contradiction within the legal culture

of Lombok. The community and police cooperated to provide a ‘justice process’, but

to suggest it complied with formal legal processes or substantive Indonesian law

would be untenable.76

Roscoe Pound noted that law should not be considered ‘a stand-alone tool’, but as an

agent for achieving social control.77 In Lombok, social control emanates from both

state and non-state sources. This flexible use of ‘legal culture’ allows for an

exploration of the ‘baggage’ that exists underneath Lombok’s legal cultures.78 The

challenges and complexity of Lombok’s legal cultures require robust research

methods. But even before implementing these methodologies it is necessary to have

an attitude that is open to possibilities and unexpected findings.

That is what empathy does – it calls us to task...We are all

shaken out of our complacency. We are all forced beyond our

limited vision.79

One of the biggest challenges for me while in Lombok was to remain empathetic – to

try to perceive issues and situations through other people’s eyes. This approach

allowed me to develop better understandings of several dynamic Lombok

communities and slowly comprehend their social, political and economic

complexities.

An empathetic approach connects to an underpinning methodological framework

applied to this research: ‘immersion’ into the legal culture one is studying. Immersing

oneself into another culture requires a process of cultural and linguistic

76 Chapter 2 provides an exploration of the limited court cases that took place as a consequence of these riots. 77 Roscoe Pound, Social Control Through Law (1942) 18-21. 78 Gunther Frankenberg, ‘Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law’ (1985) 26 Harvard International Law Review 411, 441. Pierre Legrand used a similar phrase, “cultural baggage”, in his article, ‘The Impossibility of Legal Transplants’ (1997) 4 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 111, 114. 79 Barack Obama, The Audacity of Hope (2006) 68.

22

acclimatisation.80 In order to do this, I found it necessary to obtain linguistic

competence. Consequently, I undertook three months of intensive Indonesian

language training at the University of Mataram at the start of my time in Lombok in

early 2007.81 This provided me with basic foundations and was given specificity by

the topics to be studied in my research. It provided me with a vocabulary to build on

during interviews and casual discussions. Over the first few months in the field I also

spent hours talking to neighbours and local shop owners to hone my verbal skills, as

well as reading two or three Indonesian language newspapers each day to refine my

grammar and vocabulary. Language training was a pragmatic necessity, as not many

people in Lombok speak English, but I was also aware that languages open cultural

pathways for the researcher, and allow for personal intimacy. Essentially by learning

and using Indonesian, I was able to engage in a more personal and direct way with

informants.82 All of the interviews for this thesis were undertaken in Indonesian. This

allowed the interviewees to feel comfortable and able to communicate effectively.

Qualitative research methods to collect and analyse data are necessary for immersion

to be effective. The methodology that I applied is known as modified grounded

theory.83 This is a cyclical approach to the collection of data where each step of the

research process is informed by reflecting upon and analysing data that had been

previously collected.84 Findings and theoretical conclusions develop “during the

research process itself and is a product of continuous interplay between data

collection and analysis of that data”.85 This research methodology provides a flexible

approach to data collection and processing, which I judged to be appropriate for the

circumstances of Lombok and the topics covered.86

80 The importance and application of ‘immersion’ for comparative legal research was discussed in Vivian Curran, ‘Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S. Comparative Law’ (1998) 46 American Journal of Comparative Law 43. 81 This involved one-on-one classes five hours per day over a four day week. In addition, I undertook at least one hour of homework per day and a few hours over the weekend. 82 The connection between language and culture is discussed in more detail in Michael Wesley, An Australian Strategy for Asian Language Proficiency Report (2009) 13-14. 83 Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory (1967). 84 Kathy Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory – A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis (2006). See also Barney Glaser, The Grounded Theory Perspective: Conceptualization Contrasted with Description (2001). 85 Christina Goulding, ‘Grounded Theory: Some Reflections on Paradigm, Procedures and Misconceptions’ (Working Paper No. WP006/99, Management Research Centre, University of Wolverhampton, 1999) 6. 86 Ibid 7.

23

There are five steps in the modified ground theory research process being used in this

thesis.87 First, the collection and then analysis of data is uncovered through interviews

and observational research. Second, codes (labelling and grouping of data) that

emerged from the data collected are created, instead of relying on preconceived

categories. Third, a further collection of data takes place, combined with the

development of theoretical frameworks. Fourth, detailed field notes are kept to

articulate the experiences of the researcher to inform the findings. Fifth, literature

reviews are undertaken prior to and after fieldwork. This fifth step provides

background to the field research to be undertaken and also ensures that the literature

used complements findings from the field.

This methodological approach does not provide simple answers; the bottom line is

that “grounded theory will not appeal to the researcher in search of absolute

certainties, neatly defined categories and objectively measured explanations. Its

appeal is more to those whose view of behaviour allows for process, change and

ambiguities”.88 One of the key findings that emerged related to ‘partnerships’ between

state and non-state actors and institutions to avoid or resolve social tensions and

communal conflict. These may occur consciously but are sometimes simply matters of

subconscious ad hoc cooperation. Several chapters highlight these ‘partnerships’

through practical examples, which explore the different rationales for their occurrence

(see Chapters 4 and 5).

These ‘partnerships’, which are essentially a process of state officials and institutions

cooperating with non-state players (such as Tuan Guru) and their organisations,

corresponds to theories developed by John Paul Lederach.89 His theoretical

approaches have informed my perspectives on conflict management. Through an

intricate web of relationships these partnerships build off multiple levels of state and

non-state relations, from the provincial governor to junior public servants and from

Tuan Guru Besar to Tuan Guru Lokal.90 Consequently, these actors and their

87 Kathy Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory – A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis (2006) 5-6. 88 Christina Goulding, ‘Grounded Theory: Some Reflections on Paradigm, Procedures and Misconceptions’ (Working Paper No. WP006/99, Management Research Centre, University of Wolverhampton, 1999) 19. 89 John Paul Lederach, Building Peace – Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (1997) 37-55. 90 These different ‘levels’ of Tuan Guru are discussed in Chapter 3.

24

institutional linkages form webs of connection and action. As Lederach observed, “the

spider’s genius lies in his ability to adapt, reshape, and remake its web of connections

within the realities presented in a given space”.91 This allusion to intricate

relationships reflects, in many regards, the conflict management frameworks –

partnerships – that I identified in Lombok, which are constantly changing and

developing with circumstances.

Lederach argued that it was valuable to incorporate non-state actors, especially

grassroots leadership, into the processes used to avoid or resolve conflict, rather than

merely relying on state actors and institutions. Lederach’s approach, therefore,

emphasises moving beyond simply structural, or state responses, and acknowledging

the utility of non-state players and institutions for conflict management.92 Essentially

it is important to deploy and recognise leadership and institutions that are respected,

capable and strongly networked, whether state or non-state.93

This theoretical approach finds parallels in the strategy taken by NTB bureaucrats to

diffuse tensions in the lead up to the 2008 gubernatorial elections, when they

incorporated non-state players into their election planning (as is discussed in greater

detail in Chapter 5). This cooperative approach acknowledged the limitation of

provincial state-based institutions with public servants tactically basing their policy

response on the capabilities of non-state players. Religious leaders and their

organisations were deployed to ensure that provincial election plans were

communicated and made effective at the grass-roots in Lombok (and Sumbawa).94

Provincial authorities contributed training and support through police and bureaucrats,

while Tuan Guru and their organisations gave the strategy grounding within the

community.

91 John Paul Lederach, The Moral Imagination – The Art and Soul of Building Peace (2005) 83. 92 The importance of non-state players and institutions in relation to political affairs and situations of state weakness is also discussed by Robert Bates, When Things Fell Apart – State Failure in Late-Century Africa (2008) 75-77. He was looking at an extremely different socio-political context in Africa, however, he mentions the formative power and potential political role of non-state players. 93 John Paul Lederach, Building Peace – Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (1997) 114-115. 94 Ibid 38-55.

25

These findings were not anticipated. They were only uncovered through detailed field

research that used modified grounded theory. Three methods of data collection were

used: in-depth interviews, observational research and archival newspaper analysis.

Each of these will be considered in turn.

The first technique used was observational research, which involves recording

experience of places, events and discussions. These observations were recorded in

field notes.95 This allowed me to learn from circumstances such as in-depth

discussions in taxis or events such as watching a protest outside the Attorney-

General’s Department. Additionally, during the fifteen months of field research over

75 in-depth interviews were conducted. The duration of these interviews varied from

20 minutes to two hours (with the average length being one hour). All of the

interviews were electronically recorded and then transcribed. Subsequent to this,

thematic analysis of the interview transcripts was undertaken. This kind of analysis

involved reading and then re-reading the transcripts for emerging themes and

concepts.96

The transition from theory to practice with interviews requires careful preparation and

continual refinement. For instance, after the first three interviews in October 2007, I

realised that some subtle changes in approach were necessary. The interview format

and type of questions being asked were too structured.97 In order to allow for

informality during the interviews, while still effectively collecting data, I created

‘general interview guidelines’. This established a template for interviews that

identified several key themes, for instance, the activities of Tuan Guru and local

security concerns. Each of these themes had several questions that could potentially

be asked. Using these themes and the list of possible questions, each interview could

be adapted depending upon the answers given or the general inclination and

knowledge of the interviewee.98

95 For further information on this approach, see Uwe Flick, An Introduction to Qualitative Research (2009) 222-238. 96 See Steinar Kvale, Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing (1996); Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (eds), Handbook of Qualitative Research (2000). 97 Field notes, 6 October 2007. 98 Field notes, 6 November 2007.

26

Challenges occurred not only in preparing and undertaking interviews, but practical

obstacles also arose. For instance, in order to arrange an interview with the former

governor, Lalu Serinata, it took my assistant, Nurmala, dozens of calls and text

messages to his senior staff over a two month period to simply arrange an

appointment.99

The third major source of primary data was the archives of the Lombok Post. This is

the largest circulation Indonesian language newspaper published in Lombok. Also for

the period of my field research – 2007-2008 – the national newspapers Kompas and

Republika were reviewed. This aspect of my research aimed to review how the local

media covered social, political and security issues during two periods – 1999-2000

and 2007-2008. The first period considers the months prior and subsequent to the

January 2000 riots. The second period mirrors my time in the field and considers more

recent perspectives on issues affecting Lombok.

This analysis of the print media was made difficult by the fact that the archives were

incomplete. In fact, newspapers for most of January 2000 (the month of the Mataram

riots) and August to December 2000 were not available at either the Provincial

Library or the Mataram Municipal Library. Many reasons were given for the omission

of these months. However, it is worth separating these two periods. I am led to believe

that the January 2000 period was unavailable for ‘political reasons’, that is, because

there is still sensitivity within the police and political elite about these riots. By

contrast, the public libraries did not hold the later months simply because the local

authorities did not have the funds to collect and store the newspapers during this

period. This is another example of reduced state function in the period following the

fall of President Soeharto in 1998.100

Chaotic harmony in difficult circumstances

Why did two or three days of riots in Lombok in 2000

(leading to the evacuation of thousands of foreign tourists)

99 Field notes, 4 January 2008. 100 Field notes, 5 July 2008.

27

leave almost no fatalities while a short riot in Pontianak a year

later claimed some forty lives?101

This question poses one of the central conundrums that I faced when undertaking my

field research. My interest in communal conflict emerged out of the January 2000

riots in Mataram and West Lombok that are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.

Churches had been burned to the ground, shops had been looted and thousands of

tourists had fled for their lives.102 I was a little surprised, however, that this violence –

which had raged for five days – seemed to have received almost no academic

attention outside Lombok.103

My initial assessment of the riots was that these events were indicative of a deeply

troubled society where legal and social structures had failed. However, while living in

Lombok I came to realise that rather than being a failure, the island should be

considered a ‘success story’. Lombok has remained an essentially stable society,

which has its own imperfect and chaotic harmony, despite serious structural

impediments. This is a considerable achievement, considering that Lombok’s

approximately 3.2 million residents are among Indonesia’s most economically

disadvantaged. Approximately 25% of the population is designated as living in

poverty104 and the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics data has consistently rated NTB in

the bottom three provinces on the ‘Human Development Rankings’ for the period

1999-2005.105 With poverty comes the potential for communal violence based on

economic jealousies and distress.

101 Jamie S. Davidson, From Rebellion to Riots – Collective Violence on Indonesian Borneo (2008) 7. 102 ‘Meredam Konflik, Menghidupkan Kasadaran Multikultur’, Religi (Mataram, Lombok), 16 April 2007. 103 Limited scholarship has been undertaken on these riots. See Leena Avonius, Reforming Wetu Telu: Islam, Adat, and the Promises of Regionalism in Post-New Order Lombok (2004); John MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Soeharto Lombok (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2005). 104 ‘24 Persen Penduduk NTB Miskin’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 5 August 2007; ‘1,5 Juta Penduduk NTB Masih Miskin’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 18 October 2007; Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi NTB, Nusa Tenggara Barat Dalam Angka 2006/2007 (2008) 51. 105 These are the most recent statistics available – Human Development Index (HDI) 1999-2005 (2005) Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia <http://www.bps.go.id > at 27 May 2009.

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Picture 1.7 The former NTB Governor, Lalu Serinata, in January 2008.

The former NTB Governor, Lalu Serinata, pictured above, noted that poverty makes

people in Lombok susceptible to provocateurs who wish to ferment social tensions

and conflict.106 This usually involves the distribution of money to facilitate

participation in demonstrations, although others have also suggested that low levels of

education can lead people to move quickly to anger and aggression.107 One day early

in my time in Lombok I witnessed the distribution of money at a demonstration that

turned violent outside the Attorney-General’s offices in Mataram. Serinata also said

that during the January 2000 riots, government sources believed that money was being

distributed to people in order to secure their participation in the riots. On this occasion

the monetary payment was estimated to be Rp 5000 per person (less than $AU 1).108

A similar ‘rent a crowd’ situation was also believed to have occurred during the

demonstrations in Bok (see Chapter 5).

106 Ironically Serinata himself was not immune to the allure of money. Within months of our interview he was investigated and then prosecuted for corruption. He was eventually found guilty in June 2009 of using government funds to secure his election to NTB Governor and imprisoned for three years at the end of July 2010. See Panca Nugraha, ‘Former Governor Sent to Jail to Serve his Sentence’, The Jakarta Post (Jakarta, Indonesia), 29 July 2010. 107 Interview with Lalu Serinata (Mataram, 8 January 2008). 108 Ibid.

29

The structural realities of Lombok, therefore, have the potential to lead to devastating

violence like experienced elsewhere in Indonesia during the late 1990s and the early

part of this century. But this did not eventuate in 2000. Given the economic disparities

and levels of poverty that exist in Lombok why had there been no Christian or

Chinese deaths during the January riots? They had been the targets of the anger and

jealousy, but, in fact, the only casualties were among the rioters.109 TGH Abdul

Hamid Faisal, while reminding me of his deep upset over the riots, felt that one

positive aspect emerged – unlike elsewhere in Indonesia there were no murders or

sexual assaults, although there was significant property damage and looting. He said

that this represented the values (nilai-nilai ) of the Sasak. These values ensured that

even in the darkest of times certain moral boundaries were not crossed.110

Conceptualising Lombok society as a ‘success story’ is not without problems,

prompting three major questions. First, how can any violence be considered a

success? As a matter of principle, violence is deplorable and should be condemned.

But the avoidance of the worst excesses of violence by a community should also be

acknowledged, rather than overlooked. Lombok faced violence during the January

riots, but did not descent into total chaos. In fact, it was brought under control

relatively quickly (within five days). This point is deserving of recognition. Second,

did Lombok during the particular periods selected for this research merely represent

an anomalous situation? Mataram is a small city that may have been affected in ways

different to larger urban centres, or perhaps it just managed through sheer luck to

avoid the trauma experienced elsewhere in Indonesia. This may be correct, but in one

of the poorest provinces, and in a city that is ethnically and religiously diverse, one

might reasonably expect that tensions would have greater potential for violent

outcomes. But this did not occur and it is worth evaluating why not.

Third, in the first case study in Chapter 5, about the 2008 NTB gubernatorial

elections, it is noted that potential political conflict was avoided before, during and

immediately after the elections. The logical question which arises is how is it possible 109 Stein Kristiansen, ‘Violent Youth Groups in Indonesia: The Cases of Yogyakarta and Nusa Tenggara Barat’ (2003) 18 Sojourn 110, 123; International Crisis Group, The Perils of Private Security Groups in Indonesia: Guards and Militias on Bali and Lombok (2003) <http://www.crisisgroup.org> at 12 October 2006; ‘Meredam Konflik, Menghidupkan Kasadaran Multikultur’, Religi (Mataram, Lombok), 16 April 2007, 20. 110 Interview with TGH Abdul Hamid Faisal (Mataram, 19 July 2008).

30

to know whether violence would have occurred during this period? There had been

serious concerns about ethnic, religious and political tensions leading to violence

during the election period. Furthermore, there had been violence and unrest during

elections in Lombok during 1999 and 2003. Therefore, these fears were based on

recent history and led to an assumption that conflict was a strong possibility. In short,

the threat of violence was high and consequently political and religious leaders had

legitimate reason to worry.111

All outbreaks of communal violence result in ‘collateral damage’. This thesis is

premised on remembering that violence, whatever its scale, has a human cost. Even

though the January riots were less significant than elsewhere, the community

nonetheless paid a high price. In Mataram, the economic conditions deteriorated

badly, with the economy plunging in the aftermath of the riots as the tourism industry

collapsed.112 As a consequence, there was an increase in unemployment which saw

many families fall into serious financial hardship. Some of these families were then

forced to send their children out to work as beggars, thus swelling the number of

people panhandling on the streets of Mataram.113

The local political elite has recognised the high social and economic cost of

communal conflict in Lombok. The former NTB governor, Lalu Serinata, said that

provincial authorities placed a high premium upon the maintenance of social cohesion

in the years following the January 2000 riots.114 He felt that this was directly

connected to economic development on the island.115 This recognition of the

importance of social cohesion was based on Serinata’s knowledge of the economic

costs of the January 2000 riots, such as the massive drop in tourist arrivals, which

111 ‘Kalla: Pilkada Sumber Konflik’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 8 June 2008. 112 World Bank, Confronting Crisis: Impacts and Responses to the Bali Tragedy (2003) 15. 113 ‘Anak Jalanan Menjamur Pasca Kerusuhan Mataram’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 February 2000. 114 Moves to enhance inter-ethnic and inter-religious relationships have been ongoing since at least 1999, see ‘Pergaulan Pribumi dan Etnis Tionghoa Serasi’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 14 July 1999. 115 Interview with Lalu Serinata (Mataram, 8 January 2008). The importance of religious and ethnic diversity and social harmony was also highlighted in a DVD produced by NTB provincial authorities to promote investment and economic development – see Humas Setda Provinsi NTB, Profil Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat (2007).

31

have still not fully returned to the old levels.116 Yet, churches still require police

protection during major religious festivals. For instance, a protestant church117 near

my home in Mataram required four police officers to be posted outside it during

christmas 2007. They were there to keep the peace and manage traffic problems

outside the church.118 Thus, the need for managing ethnic and religious relationships

remains ongoing.

Conclusion

Chapter 1 has examined the theory underpinning this thesis, ‘legal culture’ and

consequently provided the social, political, economic, geographic and demographic

background to the situation in Mataram and West Lombok. This chapter has also

highlighted the interplay between social and legal factors, prioritising contextual

‘lived law’, rather than black-letter law. My analysis of conflict management

processes therefore moves beyond merely an analysis of police and court function.

This emphasis provides for a more comprehensive review of the social and legal

mechanisms that are involved in avoiding and resolving communal and political

disputes. Developing this background also allows for a clearer understanding of the

institutional figures and organisational structures utilised in conflict management

processes.

This broader approach to legal analysis which emerges from using Lombok’s legal

culture(s), is prefaced on the notion of state weakness and strong community in

Mataram and West Lombok, which is introduced in Chapter 1 and developed further

in Chapter 2. The state has never been particularly efficient or strong in Lombok, but

during the late 1990s and early part of this century it went through a particularly

difficult period. As mentioned, there was an economic downturn in Indonesia brought

on by the Asian economic crisis in 1997, and consequently, there was the demise of

the authoritarian Soeharto government in 1998. This political environment brought

116 Iem Brown (ed), The Territories of Indonesia (2009). There have been faint glimmers of hope for the tourism industry with potential Middle Eastern investment, see Janeman Latul, ‘Officials Throw Lombok Project a Final Lifeline’, The Jakarta Globe (Jakarta, Indonesia), 27 January 2010. 117 This church is part of the movement, Gereja Protestan di Indonesia Bagian Barat (GPIB), and the church is known locally as ‘GPIB’. 118 Field notes, 28 December 2007.

32

many budgetary, operational and leadership challenges for state actors and institutions

on the island.

State weakness in Lombok reflects a situation documented in other parts of Indonesia

where it has been suggested that the state often appears to be more of a facade than a

daily reality. Clifford Geertz described pre-Dutch Bali in these terms. The

neighbouring island of Bali, he argued was as a place where the state was often more

theatre than practical administration.119 Many of the gaps created by these weaknesses

of state function in Mataram and West Lombok have been filled by non-state religious

and community leaders and organisations (see Chapters 3 and 4). Particularly

important is the role of the local religious leaders, Tuan Guru, introduced in this

chapter and considered in more detail in Chapter 3. Their role in conflict management

processes is pivotal to the findings in this thesis.

The first chapter has provided the backdrop to this thesis. It has outlined important

factors influencing the lives of people on the island. Importantly, Mataram and West

Lombok are multi-ethnic and multi-religious areas. This creates cultural richness, but

simultaneously presents points of social tension that can explode into violence, as

happened during the January 2000 riots. This chapter has also highlighted the

significant poverty on the island. In fact, Lombok is one of the most impoverished

parts of Indonesia. Thus high levels of poverty can cause problems when money is

distributed to people for their participation in protests (‘rent a crowd’). Distribution of

money provides provocateurs with a method of assembling people to press their

claims and allows for situations to become quickly volatile. The second case study,

Bok, in Chapter 5 examines this sort of escalation of demonstrations. Context is vital

when attempting to understand the points of social tension and issues that need to be

monitored in order to avoid and resolve communal and political conflict. Despite

Lombok’s social and economic problems, the next chapter points to a ‘chaotic

harmony’ formed through partnerships between state and non-state actors and

institutions, which will then be examined throughout the remainder of this thesis.

119 Clifford Geertz, Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-century Bali (1980).

33

Chapter 2 The troubled transition

Anything can happen in this country… People are suffering,

and as long as they suffer like this, nothing is certain. This

crisis makes everyone so dizzy.

Jamari, an east Javanese farmer, commenting on the political

and social state of Indonesia during the late 1990s.120

Like the rest of Indonesia, Mataram and West Lombok went through a difficult time

from the late 1990s to the early part of this century. The troubles emerged out of the

Asian economic crisis121 and collapse of the authoritarian government of President

Soeharto.122 This chapter will consider the various sources of communal tension and

the state and non-state responses to this period of political and social instability in

Lombok.

The turbulent time around the turn of the century was seen as “an ujian (test) from

Allah”,123 according to Tuan Guru Lokal Ramli, which challenged his community

member’s ibadah (religious devotion). In this troubled environment, extra effort was

required from Tuan Guru and local leaders in Lombok to maintain community calm.

Tuan Guru did this, as Ramli explained, by continually reminding their followers of

the teachings of the Qur’an and Hadith (the prophetic tradition). Especially

emphasised were lessons about the maintenance of social harmony. To communicate

these messages Ramli offered extra pengajian (religious education classes) at his

home every night for years and he often visited people’s homes when things were

120 Richard Lloyd Parry, In the Time of Madness – Indonesia on the Edge of Chaos (2005) 99. 121 For an explanation of the reasons and nature for the devastating Asian economic crisis, see Thomas Clarke, ‘Haemorrhaging Tigers: The Power of International Financial Markets and the Weaknesses of Asian Modes of Corporate Governance’ (2000) 8 Corporate Governance 101; George Fane and Ross H. McLeod, ‘Banking Collapse and Restructuring in Indonesia – 1997-2001’ (ANU Economics Working Papers in Trade and Development No. 2, Australian National University, 2001); Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (2002); Benny Tabalujan, ‘Why Indonesian Corporate Governance Failed – Conjectures Concerning Legal Culture’ (2002) 15 Columbia Journal of Asian Law 141, 162-165. 122 See Jean Gelman Taylor, Indonesia Peoples and Histories (2003) 4; Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto – Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia (2005). 123 Interview with TGH Ramli (Mataram, 29 July 2008).

34

hard for a family or social tensions became exacerbated. He recalled feeling

exhausted by the demands of his community (ummah) during this period.124

The aim of the chapter is to consider how conflict management processes in Lombok

responded to these social pressures and the weakness of state institutions. The start of

the chapter will investigate the perceived ‘crime wave’, as well as other serious social

issues that emerged during the late 1990s. This leads to an analysis of the deficient

police, prosecutorial and court responses to these events and the community reaction

to this poor functioning of the state. This chapter will then review the economic

factors related to communal and political violence. For instance, what sort of financial

inducements could encourage people to riot? And what are the potential rationales for

the provocateurs distributing largesse to protestors? The final section of this chapter

then looks at the outbreak of riots in Mataram and West Lombok during January

2000. These riots are an example of what happens when volatile social circumstances

are combined with inflamed emotions, ethnic jealousies and provocation about

communal conflict elsewhere in Indonesia. This section also explores why the riots

did not lead to any murders, assaults or rapes of Indonesian Chinese, the focus of

these riots (although, the riots caused significant property damage, including for

Indonesian Chinese property owners).125

The operation of the state does affect people’s daily lives in Lombok through simple

things such as the provision of electricity and schools. For most people, however,

non-state leaders and institutions have played, and continue to play, an equal or

greater role. Therefore, state effectiveness can, and should, be supported by non-state

players and institutions on the island. Essentially, this thesis shows how state and non-

state actors and institutions often work in partnership to avoid or resolve political and

communal conflict. The analysis of state function (or dysfunction) and non-state

124 Ibid. 125 There were reports of serious episodes of violence against Indonesian Chinese during this time elsewhere in Indonesia. See James T. Siegel, ‘Early Thoughts on the Violence of May 13 and 14, 1998 in Jakarta’ (1998) 66 Indonesia 74; Freek Colombijn and J Thomas Lindblad (eds), Roots of Violence in Indonesia (2002); Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia (2004); Jemma Purdey, Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia 1996-1999 (2006); Charles A. Coppel (ed), Violent Conflicts in Indonesia – Analysis, Representation, Resolution (2006); John Sidel, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad – Religious Violence in Indonesia (2007).

35

responses to it in this chapter provides background to subsequent chapters, and more

broadly, conflict management strategies that are used in Mataram and West Lombok.

The law enforcement void

In this environment of uncertainty, political flux, confusion

about lines of authority and a reduced capacity for prompt,

coordinated and consistent state responses, longstanding

community tensions exacerbated by economic crisis have

easily mutated into violence, creating cycles of revenge.126

The end of Soeharto’s 30 years of authoritarian rule, referred to as the New Order

period (Orde Baru), and the political instability that followed, led to a time of

transition towards democracy and decentralisation, known as Reformasi

(Reformation). Authoritarian and centralised governance structures, a trademark of

President Soeharto’s reign, were deemed no longer appropriate.127 The ensuing period

of instability led many people to feel that their society was descending into

lawlessness. These dramatic national events filtered down to affect people’s daily

lives in Mataram and West Lombok and led to feelings of insecurity – both

economically and in relation to their personal safety.

The Indonesian state, and its leadership, were often unsure of appropriate tactical or

policy responses in this rapidly transforming political environment. In addition,

governmental re-organisation also pitted institutions against one and another. For

instance, the police, previously a branch of the military, became an autonomous

civilian-led organisation.128 The separation of police from the military was, and

remains, fraught with tension. A recent example of this type of conflict occurred

between members of the military and police in the province of Maluku Tengah in

2008. This conflict represented a ‘turf war’ over who would receive a lucrative

126 Tim Lindsey, ‘The Criminal State: Premanisme and the new Indonesia’ in Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith (eds), Indonesia Today – Challenges of History (2001) 284. 127 Ross H. McLeod and Andrew MacIntyre, ‘Introduction’ in Ross H. McLeod and Andrew MacIntyre, Indonesia – Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance (2007) 1-9. 128 Stein Kristiansen and Lembang Trijono, ‘Authority and Law Enforcement: Local Government Reforms and Security Systems in Indonesia’ (2005) 27 Contemporary Southeast Asia 236, 237.

36

contract to provide security services to a large local business.129 I have not heard of

similar issues occurring in Lombok, but financial constraints on the island’s

provincial and local governments, means that institutional rivalries are not an

unrealistic concern. As a consequence, policy-makers would be well-advised to

consider strategies to prevent these developing. These sorts of rivalries may create

points of conflict or they could be drawn into communal or political conflict.

Shaky governance reforms and Lombok’s economic downturn (due primarily to the

collapse of the local tourism industry) combined to create a social situation conducive

to criminal activity. These circumstances transpired to induce a ‘crime wave’ in

Lombok, during the late 1990s and the early part of this century, which was marked

by high levels of theft.130 The police response to increases in criminal activity was

perceived to be ineffective by the vast majority of the island’s residents, and therefore,

community security groups (pamswakarsa) took the lead in responding to these

events.131 A non-state response therefore overtook the state in reacting to local social

instability.132

These inadequate institutional responses in many ways reflect the technical

difficulties involved for the police in becoming a civilian institution. The transition

required modifications to command structures and policing practices.133 The ‘rules of

the game’ had changed and the Indonesian state infrastructure for law enforcement,

led by the national police (Kepolisian Republik Indonesia), simply did not function in

a manner that engendered public confidence.134 One of the major complaints against

129 ‘Kegagalan Pimpinan TNI-Polri’, Kompas (Jakarta, Indonesia), 9 February 2008. 130 Stein Kristiansen, ‘Violent Youth Groups in Indonesia: The Cases of Yogyakarta and Nusa Tenggara Barat’ (2003) 18 Sojourn 110, 119-122. 131 Interview with Lalu Nurtaat (Mataram, 25 October 2007); Interview with Eko (Mataram, 16 November 2007); Interview with TGH Mustiadi Abhar (Mataram, 23 July 2008). 132 Similar non-state responses to this perceived lawlessness occurred elsewhere in Indonesia, see Tim Lindsey, ‘The Criminal State: Premanisme and the new Indonesia’ in Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith (eds), Indonesia Today – Challenges of History (2001) 283. 133 See Singh Bilveer, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Democratizing Indonesia: Change Amidst Continuity’ (2000) 26 Armed Forces and Society 607, 619-624; Damian Kingsbury, ‘The Reform of the Indonesian Armed Forces’ (2000) 22 Contemporary Southeast Asia 302, 309; David Jansen, ‘Relations Among Security and Law Enforcement Institutions in Indonesia’ (2008) 30 Contemporary Southeast Asia 429, 431-434. For a recent evaluation of the activities of the police and some of their difficulties at a national level, see David Jensen, Snatching Victory (2010) Inside Indonesia <http://www.insideindonesia.org/> at 20 May 2010. 134 Stein Kristiansen, ‘Violent Youth Groups in Indonesia: The Cases of Yogyakarta and Nusa Tenggara Barat’ (2003) 18 Sojourn 110, 119.

37

the Indonesian police was, and still is, that their operations do not ensure the safety

and security of society.135 The need for policing tactics to be revised according to the

new organisational reality and political environment challenged police personnel.136

Prior to Reformasi, the police relied heavily on the potent and sharp use of force to

instill fear and awe in the community. These symbolic, almost theatrical, shows of

violence were applied to assert state power and prestige.137 The development of new

organisational structures and policing tactics reduced police capacity, at least

temporarily, as they implemented the operational reforms demanded of them.

Additionally, there was significant workplace cultural change in the police force

necessary in order to satisfy the demands of the new democratic political order. This

led to internal intransigence, and slow reform implementation, as many police officers

did not want to change long-held behavioural patterns and practices.138

Picture 2.1 A police station in Mataram, the front gate emblazoned with the slogan, “Police –

Partners with Society” (Polisi Mitra Masyarakat)

135 Makmur Keliat, ‘Polisi Melindungi Siapa?’, Kompas (Jakarta, Indonesia), 27 May 2008. 136 ‘Polri Yang Kini Tunduk Pada Hukum Sipil – Tak Lagi Bulan-Bulanan Ibu Tiri’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 22 August 2000. 137 Joshua Barker, ‘State of Fear: Controlling the Criminal Contagion in Soeharto’s New Order’ (1998) 66 Indonesia 7; Joshua Barker, The Tattoo and the Fingerprint: Crime and Security in an Indonesian City (PhD Thesis, Cornell University, 1999) 253-268; Tim Lindsey, ‘The Criminal State: Premanisme and the new Indonesia’ in Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith (eds), Indonesia Today – Challenges of History (2001) 286-287. 138 Adrianus Eliasta Meliala, Sensitive Policing: Indonesia’s Case (PhD Thesis, University of Queensland, 2004) vi-viii.

38

The police’s poor performance was a serious concern for many people during the

early part of the Reformasi era. The photograph above (Picture 2.1) shows police

promotional efforts to create the impression that they are becoming more engaged

with the community. However, a most poignant example of police deficiencies

occurred during the January 2000 riots in Mataram and West Lombok. Many

community leaders told me that they did not see any police during the riots or that the

troubles were over by the time the police arrived.139 Concerns over police operations

were also identified by Lombok’s political leaders in the weeks before the January

2000 riots. They ominously noted the lack of police presence in areas that were flash-

points of communal and social tension, arguing that police on the island had their

resources spread too thinly. This predicament was highlighted in December 1999

when Mataram’s mayor, Ruslan, called for additional police to respond to escalating

tensions between two Sasak communities in Karang Ganteng and Patemon in the lead

up to the Muslim holiday of idul fitri .140

Police were not entirely ineffective, but there was, and still remains, high levels of

public mistrust about their intentions and ability to act effectively. Nevertheless it

would be unwise to dismiss the role of police in security arrangements altogether in

Lombok. For instance, as things calmed down after the January 2000 riots, Brimob

(‘Mobile Brigade’, the national paramilitary police unit) were brought in from other

parts of Indonesia and helped restore a sense of calm and security in Mataram. Brimob

represented for many, a reassertion of state authority.141 Policing in Lombok has

arguably improved since the January 2000 riots. It is now more common for the police

to take on criminal ‘elements’, with major operations taking place regularly in

Mataram and West Lombok.142 However, the news reports about these raids were

unclear as to what criminal activities were being targeted.143 Despite, indications that

the ‘law and order’ situation is improving in Lombok144 there are still significant fears

139 The riots lasted five days and informants told me that the police were not seen until the third or fourth day – see Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007). 140 ‘Walikota Minta Tambahan Aparat’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 27 December 1999. 141 ‘Besar, Peran Brimob dalam Memulihkan Keamanan’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 13 February 2000. 142 ‘Polres Lobar Gencarkan Operasi Preman’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 4 March 2008. 143 Ibid. 144 ‘Kasus Kriminal di Loteng Menurun’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 October 2007. This improved situation was also noted in Stein Kristiansen and Lambang Trijono, ‘Authority and Law

39

within the community, fanned by the local media, in relation to violent crime. News

reports of lawlessness and trouble, such as armed and violent robberies in Mataram,

are frequent in local media.145

When discussing law enforcement it is worth acknowledging that these issues are as

much about social and economic problems as they are about policing capacity.

Problems emanating from the economic downturn placed additional pressure on

Lombok’s economically marginalised population. This pressure encouraged many to

move into criminal activity at the same time as state institutions were weakening.

Communal conflicts often emerge out of the failure of state institutions during periods

of economic and political instability allowing social tensions, economic jealousies and

communal rivalries to go unchecked.146 In the lead-up to the January 2000 riots

people were vulnerable to provocateurs who preyed upon the poor to stir up trouble.

In addition no effective state intervention was forthcoming to challenge them.147 This

point is further reinforced by Kasmiati, one of Lombok’s leading activists, who has

written about the intricate connection between economic problems and social

volatility in Lombok.148

Social and economic problems can increase emotional pressures upon people who

then have increased potential to act in violent and unpredictable ways. There are many

examples of this in Lombok. For instance, there has been a culture of larceny among

infamous thievery networks in different parts of Lombok. However, with the

economic stresses of the late 1990s, these criminal activities reportedly became more

violent, presumably as the economic pressures on those involved increased.149 More

recently the murder of Suranto, the owner of roadside food stall, also highlighted the Enforcement: Local Government Reform and Security Systems in Indonesia’ (2005) 27 Contemporary Southeast Asia 236, 247-248. 145 ‘Awas! Perampok Mulai Masuk Kota’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 3 March 2008. 146 This has been examined in Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh Thakur, Making States Work: State Failure and Crisis of Governance (2004). See also Rizal Sukma, ‘Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia: Causes and the Quest for Solution’ in Kusuma Snitwongse and W. Scott Thompson, Ethnic Conflicts in Southeast Asia (2005) 21-24. 147 Riyanto Rabbah, ‘171 Sebuah Catatan’ in Jeremy Kingsley and Abdul Wahid, Lombok: Menuju Masyarakat Multibudaya – Conference Proceedings (2007). ‘171’ is the local term for the January 2000 riots. 148 Kasmiati, ‘Pengembangan Ekonomi dan Stabilitas Sosial: Sebuah Pengalaman’ in Jeremy Kingsley and Abdul Wahid, Lombok: Menuju Masyarakat Multibudaya – Conference Proceedings (2007). 149 John MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Suharto Lombok (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2005) 249-250.

40

impact of social and economic stresses on daily life in Mataram. For several years,

Suranto had given free fried rice to a homeless man known as Dagul, who had a

history of mental illness. One night, after a misunderstanding that led Dagul to believe

he had to pay for his rice, Dagul turned on Suranto and killed him.150 This explosion

of anger may seem like a solitary act, but it is a symbolic reminder of the intricate

connection between law enforcement and socio-economic issues, such as poverty and

inadequate mental health services. In fact, any response to crime should not be

oversimplified, because even if the police become more effective criminality will not

disappear.151 More holistic answers are necessary – ensuring that the problems of

economic inequity and social marginalisation are confronted.

Economic instability and political transition was making life more difficult on the

ground with people struggling financially and feeling their personal safety was being

jeopardised in the late 1990s and early part of this century. These social, economic

and political circumstances were also affecting individual police officers. The police

strategy of resorting to shows of blunt force common in the Soeharto-era were no

longer considered appropriate. At the same time, the ‘crime wave’ during the late

1990s (and during the January 2000 riots) placed significant stress upon individual

police officers working in Lombok to act decisively. These pressures were blamed for

inappropriate police actions, for instance, a suspected motorbike thief was shot dead

when attempting to avoid arrest by fleeing his home. The police officer who shot him

confessed his actions and sought to apologise to the victim’s wife after complaints

were made against the police.152

Perceptions of widespread police corruption have also destabilised the police and their

effectiveness in Mataram and West Lombok. This alleged behaviour leads members

of the community to feel that police officers do not have their best interests at heart,

and they are, therefore, often unwilling to cooperate with law enforcement. The lack

of respect for police due to their notoriously corrupt behaviour is not necessarily

150 ‘Pedagang Nasi Goreng Tewas Dibacok Preman’, Saura NTB (Mataram, Lombok), 30 April 2007. 151 Research on the connection between social issues and criminal activity has lengthy lineage, see Richard Quinney, The Social Reality of Crime (1970). 152 ‘Petugas Mengaku Menjaga Keamanan – Pengakuan Tetannga Amaq Sukasih Sebelum Tragedi Telagawaru’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 8 May 1999.

41

accurate. Contrary to the stereotypes that I heard while undertaking research in the

field, not all police personnel are ‘bad eggs’, rather police officers are sometimes

forced into corrupt patterns of behaviour through necessity. For instance, during the

tough economic times of the late 1990s, police did not have proper equipment. In the

period immediately before Farouk Muhammad became the provincial police chief

(Kapolda NTB) in 2001, officers told him that they often lacked even petrol for their

motorbikes. In order to purchase petrol, some police officers engaged in corrupt

activities to pay for this basic necessity. Farouk felt that Indonesian police leadership

must ensure that police officers have the basics to undertake their responsibilities.153

This will not necessarily eliminate corruption, but will certainly remove one

motivation for it. A lessening of corruption is not only a desirable outcome in itself,

but also works to reassure the public that police are looking out for the community,

not just themselves.

Complex social, economic and political circumstances require multiple responses. As

a result, there are a diversity of state players and institutions, other than the police

involved in law enforcement and conflict management.154 An example of another state

institution involved in dealing with these issues is Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama

(FKUB or Forum to Maintain Inter-religious Harmony). FKUB NTB provides advice

to the provincial government, specifically the NTB Governor and Deputy Governor,

on inter-religious and inter-ethnic relationships.155 FKUB NTB is an initiative of the

national Ministry of Religious Affairs (Departemen Agama), of which there are

branches in every Indonesian province with a mandate to assist provincial

governments to maintain social harmony between religious groups. The aim of the

FKUB branches is to assist provincial authorities to prevent communal conflict,

avoiding the episodes of violence that followed the fall of President Soeharto.156

153 Interview with Farouk Muhammad (Mataram, 3 November 2007). 154 Another provincial government department intricately involved with conflict management is Kesbanglinmas (Kesatuan Bangsa dan Perlindungan Masyarakat or Office of National Unity and Community Protection). It will be considered in Chapter 5. 155 See ‘Sejuta Pelita Sejuta Harapan Ketua FKUB Berikan Dukungan’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 12 July 2007; ‘Digelar, Raker I FKUB NTB’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 September 2007; ‘Peran FKUB Akan Ditingkatkan’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 14 August 2008. 156 Interview with Mahfud (Kediri, West Lombok, 5 December 2007).

42

An example of FKUB NTB activities in Lombok arose during the controversy over

plans to significantly expand a Hindu temple near Mount Rinjani in northern Lombok.

The sensitivity of this proposal emerged because local residents were upset by the size

of the proposed project – the largest temple in Indonesia. FKUB representatives

mediated a resolution to this planning controversy, and the plan was withdrawn for

further modification (the project is still on hold).157 One lingering concern about this

outcome is that only a withdrawal of the plans for the expansion of the temple and the

effective shelving of the project resolved the issue. This does not sound like a

compromise, but rather a complete backdown.158

With instability in the late 1990s and early part of this century came perceptions of the

island being confronted by a ‘crime wave’, as mentioned. Presumably this should

have been reflected in the Mataram court data, but the Pengadilan Negeri Mataram

(the Mataram Magistrates Court) had its sights set elsewhere. In fact, it was

disproportionately focused on traffic offences. Over 94% of matters filed with the

court in 2006 fell into this category. This emphasis on traffic offences seriously

overshadows efforts to deal with more serious crimes against property or person.159 It

is hard to know why this imbalance exists, however, this unimpressive performance

by police and the judiciary was also reflected in other areas of the criminal justice

system, such as detention facilities, with 22 prisoners escaping from a Mataram prison

in June 1999.160

157 Ibid. 158 Concerns about the performance of FKUB NTB have also been made by Badrul Munir, NTB Deputy Governor, in the period immediately preceding his induction to office – ‘Peran FKUB Akan Ditingkatkan’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 14 August 2008. 159 In 2006, there was a total of 9246 cases brought to the Pengadilan Negeri Mataram with 8743 being traffic offences compared with 503 prosecutions for all other offences – see Appendix 1. 160 ‘Pelarian Lapasma Di-deadline Seminggu’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 22 June 1999.

43

Picture 2.2 The Pengadilan Negeri (Magistrates Court) Mataram

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

Table 2.1 Traffic-related matters lodged in the Pengadilan Negeri (the Magistrates Court)

Mataram – 1996–2006.161

The court data detailed in the graph above (Table 2.1) shows traffic offences lodged

for prosecution in the Pengadilan Negeri Mataram during the period 1996 to 2006.

The data starts during the New Order period immediately before the Asian economic

crisis and continues through the early phases of the Reformasi process of

decentralisation and democratic transformation. This graph shows a decrease in the

capacity of state institutions after the fall of Soeharto and then a steady increase in

policing and court activity (at least in relation to traffic offences) as the new

161 The court data was compiled by Jeremy Kingsley and Nurmala Fahriyanti from information provided by the Pengadilan Negeri Mataram.

44

governance structures stabilised. The graph suggests that state function started to

improve around the year 2000. The lowest figures came in 1999, with just under 4000

traffic-related matters lodged, compared to just over 12,000 in 2005. This

improvement in state function in Lombok is not reflected anywhere else in the court

data (see Appendix 1).

The court data presents an institutional history that reflects a disproportionate

emphasis upon a relatively minor area of law enforcement activity (traffic offences)

rather than more serious criminal prosecution priorities, such as theft or assaults. This

perception of a court with low levels of performance relative to community

expectations that it punish and deter serious crime has also been asserted by legal

insiders. The Chief Judge of the Pengadilan Tinggi (High Court) of Mataram,

Soerojo, in the early part of the Reformasi period harshly criticised the judicial

practices and performance of the Pengadilan Negeri Mataram.162 The former Chief

Justice of the Pengadilan Negeri, Mursidin Zuhdi, strongly disputed the accuracy of

these suggestions.163 Whoever was correct in this debate, the residents of Mataram

and West Lombok expected more from its judiciary during a time when the

community believed there was a serious ‘crime wave’ underway.

The problem with weak court performance, according to Lombok non-government

activists such as Umaiyah, is that courts are integral to obtaining legitimacy and

public support for the new democratic governance model.164 During the New Order

period, law enforcers, as mentioned, used sharp displays of deadly force to instill fear

in citizens. However, in the post-Soeharto democratic era it is vital for state

institutions, such as courts, to establish their legitimacy by being efficient and

transparent. Therefore, the need for judicial improvement is generally recognised

across the Indonesian court system, although court reform processes implemented at

the beginning of Reformasi are progressing slowly.165 Similar demands for an

162 ‘Hakim Harus Konsisten Dengan Tugasnya – Soerojo Hakim Tinggi Parbawa Asmadi’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 18 June 2000. 163 Interview with Mursidin Zuhdi (Mataram, 6 November 2007). 164 ‘Perlu, Reformasi Para Hakim di Indonesia’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 17 April 2000. 165 Tim Lindsey and Mas Achmad Santosa, ‘The Trajectory of Law Reform in Indonesia: A Short Overview of Legal Systems and Change in Indonesia’ in Tim Lindsey (ed), Indonesia Law and Society (2008) 18.

45

increased competence and performance by the local police in dealing with criminals,

such as thieves, have also been made.166

Inadequate judicial processes and state law enforcement activities have led many

local residents to rely upon non-state actors and institutions. As a consequence of the

perceived failure of institutions, the main non-state responses to the ‘crime wave’ in

Lombok were pamswakarsa and ronda (night watches). This response to law

enforcement deficiencies still remains decidedly evident. It is best reflected in the

highly visible Amphibi167 security post in central Mataram (see Picture 2.4 below),

which catches the eye immediately with its bright orange exterior. It is arguably more

noticeable than any police station in Mataram (see Picture 2.1) and has a strategic

position directly next to Mataram’s largest hotel in the city’s commercial heart,

immediately behind Mataram Mall. Proudly adorning the structure’s pinnacle and

interior is their logo of two knives cutting across the body of a roaring crocodile. It

sends a clear message – reinforced by their slogan – “Amphibi, defenders of the

people” (Amphibi pembela rakyat). The post is almost empty during the day, other

than a few ojeks (motorbike taxi drivers), but every night it comes to life with

Amphibi members who maintain a ronda (night watch) for the near-by kampung.168

Picture 2.3 An Amphibi post in central Mataram

166 ‘Aparat Kepolisian Harus Lebih Profesional – Syaiful: Masa Polisi Tidak Dapat Atasi Aksi Pencurian’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 25 June 2000. 167 Amphibi is the largest operational pamswakarsa (militia/community security group) in Lombok. 168 Field notes, 20 August 2008.

46

Such community security mechanisms developed as an initiative of the Indonesian

military. In late 1998, General Wiranto wanted to replace the “top-down military style

of authoritarian rule” used during the New Order period by empowering community

security groups.169 This state-initiated idea gained strong local support in Lombok.170

Even in the Reformasi era, where decentralisation has given more power to provinces

and local authorities, there is an intricate and on-going connection between national

events, ideas and policies on Lombok affairs.

Power shifts local

With Reformasi came increased provincial and local autonomy. This provided the

sub-national authorities, such as those administering NTB, with significantly more

legal jurisdiction and control over local purse strings.171 One of the motivating factors

that has provided grounds for political contestation, and sometimes violence, in

Lombok has been individuals and groups who have begun to compete for increased

social and political status in the new decentralised environment. Local political elites

have jockeyed amongst themselves to obtain strategic positions in the newly-

developing local power hierarchies.172 Consequently, it has been suggested that ethnic

tensions and religious antagonisms are sometimes more about political mobilisation

than being genuine statements of communal animosity. The 2000 riots, some have

argued, was a political conflict disguised as communal violence, with quarrelling

between politicians as the key issue motivating these events.173

169 Ian Douglas Wilson, ‘Continuity and Change: the Changing Contours of Organized Violence in Post-New Order Indonesia’ (2006) 38 Critical Asian Studies 265, 268; John M. MacDougall, ‘Criminality and the Political Economy of Security in Lombok’, in Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (eds), Renegotiating Boundaries – Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia (2007) 286-287; 292. 170 ‘Kriminalitas Meningkat, Walikota Imbau Aktifkan Ronda’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 13 April 2000. 171 Indonesia’s transition to democracy has been considered in Azyumardi Azra, Indonesia, Islam, and Democracy (2006) 71-86. In relation to the constitutional and legal challenges of provincial autonomy, see Tim Lindsey, M.B. Hooker, Ross Clarke and Jeremy Kingsley, ‘Sharia Revival in Aceh’, in Michael Feener and Mark Cammack (ed), Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia (2007). 172 John Sidel, ‘The Manifold Meanings of Displacement: Explaining Inter-religious Violence, 1999-2001’ in Eva-Lotta E. Hedman (ed), Conflict, Violence and Displacement in Indonesia (2008) 58-59. 173 This was noted in passing by many informants, however, a leading local non-government activist told me about this directly. Field notes, 2007 (date withheld to insure anonymity).

47

These rumours about the 2000 riots coincided with the political environment in

Mataram at the time, which involved fractious political forces and many calls for

them to reconcile their differences.174 Competing factions were struggling to gain

political ascendancy and attempts were made to create coalitions between political

parties,175 for example, between Golkar176 and PDI-P.177 Political contestation178 also

lead more directly to confrontations, with clashes occurring in the lead up to the

national parliamentary elections in 1999179 between supporters of the political parties,

PKB180 and PPP.181 The ongoing reality for politicians in Mataram is that they have to

continually seek compromises between a multiplicity of political and non-state

actors.182

The quality and skills of local politicians has also been a concern in Lombok.183 The

political transition across Indonesia has been challenging, as many of the skills

necessary for the art of governing had been centralised in Jakarta during the New

Order period. During Soeharto’s time there was a distinct lack of support for

developing and fostering local political and bureaucratic leadership capacity at

provincial and regency levels. There is even evidence of local politicians in Lombok

being punished for attempting to assert too much authority. For example, in 1986

members of the provincial parliament unsuccessfully tried to have a local politician

installed as governor over Soeharto’s Javanese nominee, Warsito, a former general.

Afterwards “special closed sessions were held [in the provincial parliament] to punish

its members” for “subversive primordialism” in seeking to install a local candidate as

174 ‘Bukan Zamannya Untuk Gontok-gontokan’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 28 April 2000. 175 ‘Dead Lock, Rapat Penentuan Figur Pimpinan DPRD I NTB’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 20 September 1999. 176 Partai Golongan Karya or Party of the Functional Groups. 177 Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan or Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle. 178 The issues of political contestation and its potential for causing violence will be discussed further in Chapter 5. 179 ‘Oknum TNI dan Polri Baku Hantam’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 3 May 1999. 180 Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or National Awakening Party. 181 Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or United Development Party. 182 I Ketut Putra Erawan, ‘Tracing the Progress of Local Governments Since Decentralisation’ in Ross H. McLeod and Andrew MacIntyre, Indonesia – Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance (2007) 62. 183 Tjok Suthendra Rai,‘Paradigma Memilih Pemimpin’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 29 July 1999.

48

governor and the renegade legislators were “dragged into military intelligence

headquarters and [their] political careers were ruined”.184

When addressing conflict management in Lombok it is necessary to recognise the

fluctuating strength of the state, due to Indonesia’s history of intermittent political and

economic instability. For instance, in 1965-66, Indonesia underwent a transfer of

power from the first President Soekarno to its second President Soeharto. During this

period, a wave of violence spread across the Indonesian archipelago. An estimated

100,000 to 2 million people were killed during this violence with the “most common

estimate” being 500,000 deaths.185 The violence was focused on eliminating activists

or sympathisers of the Communist Party, PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia).186 This

violence also affected Lombok where “local memories report 50,000 killings in early

1966”.187 This violence stemmed from an attempted communist coup on 30

September 1965 in Jakarta.188 Even before this time many Muslim activists in

Lombok had already begun to fear the growing role of PKI.189

The political threat of communism was used by some political, community and

religious leaders to undertake actions that would more properly be termed communal

violence. Mob violence forced most Indonesian Chinese residents out of East

Lombok. Many fled to Mataram and West Lombok and have never returned to their

former homes on the eastern side of the island.190 People in Lombok who were

connected, directly or even tenuously to PKI, were murdered or expelled to other parts

184 John M. MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Suharto Lombok (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2005) 76-77. 185 Robert Cribb, ‘How Many Deaths? Problems in the Statistics of Massacre in Indonesia (1965-66) and East Timor (1975-80)’ in Ingrid Wessel & George Wimhofer, Violence in Indonesia (2001) 82. 186 Annie Pohlman, ‘Women and the Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966: Gender Variables and Possible Directions for Research’ (Paper presented at the 15th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, Canberra, 29 June – 2 July 2004) 2. 187 Robert Cribb, ‘Problems in the Historiography of the Killings in Indonesia’ in Robert Cribb, The Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali (1990) 25. 188 The debate about the politics surrounding the events of 30 September 1965 is complicated, and although important, is not the domain of this thesis. 189 Fathurrahman Zakaria, Geger – Gerakan 30 September 1965 Rakyat NTB Melawan Bahaya Merah (2nd Edition, 2001) 60-67; 76-111. 190 This violence during the 1960s meant that there is no longer an Indonesian Chinese community in East Lombok, although there is still a strong presence in Mataram and West Lombok. See John MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Suharto Lombok (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2005) 54-55.

49

of island.191 These killings were not just undertaken by the military, but were also in

part facilitated by the youth wings of religious organisations, such NU,

Muhammadiyah and NW.192 Christian, Catholic and other religious groups were also

involved in the anti-communist actions in Lombok.193

Religious leaders and their organisations, although usually important for social

harmony have, in the past, been accused of participating in conflict. For instance, the

events of the mid-1960s show that religious organisations in Lombok have been

involved in tragic outbreaks of violence. This cautionary note about the role of

religious leaders and organisations needs both historical and social context. Fear of

the PKI emerged from many elements of Indonesian society who felt that Communist

Party activists and members had cut themselves off from traditional relationships,

social structures and community obligations.194 Therefore, they were perceived to not

be protected by normal social frameworks and communal leadership. In fact, PKI

members and sympathisers were actually perceived to be challenging these norms.195

When ‘traditional’ social roles are based on adat and religious obligations (vital

ingredients for personal safety), then cutting oneself off from these structures can

create significant vulnerability and social alienation. These ‘traditional’ structures are

discussed in Chapter 4 and the role of this form of social protection cannot be

underestimated. Yet Lalu Nurtaat told me that current-day Lombok is significantly

different from the mid-1960s, and the role of Tuan Gurus has changed. In many ways

their social position is now stronger, and therefore, there is less need for the flexing of

organisational muscle.196 I cautiously agree with this assessment, but suggest that

pamswakarsa with political and religious patronage, may have the potential for

significant socially disruptive behaviour and violence if not monitored properly.197

191 Ibid 53-60. 192 Ibid 55. 193 Fathurrahman Zakaria, Geger – Gerakan 30 September 1965 Rakyat NTB Melawan Bahaya Merah (2nd Edition, 2001) 86. 194 Many of those accused of being communists were merely involved in challenging or not confirming with local power structures, John Sidel, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad – Religious Violence in Indonesia (2007) 28-48. And “the slightest thing could get one accused of being a Communist” – Pipit Rochijat and Ben Anderson, ‘Am I PKI or non-PKI?’ (1985) 40 Indonesia 37, 46. In essence, political and economic rivalries were being played out and opponents eliminated under the guise of alleged communist affiliation. 195 David Levine, ‘History and Social Structure in the Study of Contemporary Indonesia’ (1969) 7 Indonesia 5, 8. 196 Interview with Lalu Nurtaat (Mataram, 28 July 2008). 197 This cautionary note about pamswakarsa is discussed later in this chapter and Chapter 6.

50

Community responses to crime

Thefts and aggravated burglary were nightly events in many

areas in the city [Mataram].198

During the late 1990s and early 2000s in Mataram, the tough economic conditions

were linked to an outbreak of violent crime, such as shopkeepers being held prisoner

during armed robberies.199 This section will particularly focus on non-state responses

to this period of instability. Residents in Mataram and West Lombok did not feel safe

and news reports fed these anxieties.200 Because of the political and economic

instability, which led to a weakening of state function, many people felt their only

option was self-reliance. There were extreme examples of citizens taking matters into

their own hands.201 The Lombok Post reported in 1999, how ojek drivers became

enraged when they discovered thieves trying to steal motorcycles and proceeded to

“beat-up the robbers who had to flee from the crime scene” to save themselves.202

Thieves caught today are still often beaten, sometimes badly enough to require

hospitalisation. In Kampung Enjak-Enjak in Praya, Central Lombok, for example,

residents almost beat an alleged thief to death in April 2008.203

This law enforcement vacuum created space for non-state organisations to respond to

crime by organising pamswakarsa.204 In Lombok, membership of these groups is

based on religious and ethnic affiliation.205 The largest community security group is

Amphibi. During 1999-2000, Amphibi was estimated to have had a registered

198 Stein Kristiansen and Trijono Lambang, ‘Authority and Law Enforcement: Local Reform and Security Systems in Indonesia’ (2005) 27 Contemporary Southeast Asia 236, 248. 199 ‘Rumah Dijebol, Pemilik Disekap’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 7 December 1999. 200 See ‘Mataram Tak Aman, Perampokan Merajalela’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 December 1999. News reports commonly described criminal acts in great detail, such as home invasions, even cataloguing what was stolen, including mobile phones, money and motorbikes. See ‘Pencurian, Usik Ketentraman Warga Mataram’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 1 December 1999. 201 Tim Lindsey, ‘The Criminal State: Premanisme and the new Indonesia’ in Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith (eds), Indonesia Today – Challenges of History (2001) 283. 202 ‘Perampok Bercadar, Gasak Dua Sepeda Motor Ojek’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 7 April 1999. 203 ‘Pencuri Nyaris Tewas Diamuk Massa’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 18 April 2008. 204 The rise of vigilantism across Indonesia, during the 1990s, has been considered in Joshua Barker, ‘Vigilantes and the State’ (2006) 50 Social Analysis 203. 205 International Crisis Group, The Perils of Private Security Groups in Indonesia: Guards and Militias on Bali and Lombok (2003) <http://www.crisisgroup.org> at 10 March 2010.

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membership of 220,000 in Lombok.206 Despite some arguing that pamswakarsa have

decreased in significance, in 2007, Amphibi reported that its membership had actually

grown to over 350,000 (approximately 10 percent of Lombok’s population).207 This is

probably an exaggeration, but regardless of the exact figure, they remain a large group

that is still relatively active. Groups of this size are capable of directly challenging the

authority of the police in Lombok.208

Pamswakarsa are perceived to have emerged as a legitimate response to a period of

instability and ‘crime wave’; however, many people in Lombok now view these

community security groups as no longer having a valid or helpful function. This is

because of an improved security situation across the island. This was confirmed by

non-government activist, Hardi, who thought that public support no longer exists for

these organisations in Mataram and West Lombok.209 This did not necessarily

conform with what I had witnessed – they still seemed active in my observation. In

Lom, for example, the community has a paid ronda, with local people employed as

night guards. Five out of seven of those involved are members of Amphibi (and one of

them is simultaneously a member of another pamswakarsa, Lang-Lang).210

These pamswakarsa are different in many ways from other militia found in Indonesia.

They are not as threatening as similar organisations elsewhere, such as Laskar

Pembela Islam (the Front Pembela Islam or Islamic Defenders Front’s militia) or

those active in East Timor at the time of the 1999 referendum that ushered in its

independence. Part of the reason for the difference is that they were not created to

206 Ibid. 207 ‘Anggota Pam Swakarsa Amphibi Banjiri Kota Praya’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 August 2007. 208 Stein Kristiansen, ‘Violent Youth Groups in Indonesia: The Cases of Yogyakarta and Nusa Tenggara Barat’ (2003) 18 Sojourn 110, 121. 209 Interview with Hardi (Mataram, 5 December 2007). A similar position was also noted in John M. MacDougall, ‘Criminality and the Political Economy of Security in Lombok’, in Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (eds), Renegotiating Boundaries – Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia (2007) 300-301. 210 Interview with Subuh (Mataram, 6 November 2007); Interview with Saonah (Mataram, 7 November 2007), Interview with Ciman (Mataram, 8 November 2007), Interview with Jupri (Mataram, 9 November 2007), Interview with Mukhlis (Mataram, 10 November 2007), Interview with Sahari (Mataram, 11 November 2007), Interview with Tumi (Mataram, 12 November 2007). [These are pseudonyms to protect the identity of the members and community that I undertook research within].

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pursue a political agenda, or at least, not directly.211 Rather pamswakarsa in Lombok,

such as Bujak,212 Amphibi and Lang-Lang,213 emerged as a response to Lombok’s

‘crime wave’. Essentially, they started more like an organised ronda (night-watch).

However, many people in Lombok now openly discuss how members of these groups

have become akin to ‘guns for hire’.214 Amphibi has several security posts in Mataram

still in operation. These include locations such as: Ampenan (just near the beach);

central Mataram behind the Mall (see Picture 2.3); Bertais (next to the market), and

several other key locations. Some of the posts have become institutionalised, such as

the Amphibi post at Beretais market, which has essentially become a satpam (private

security guard) post, protecting a commercial site.215 In this instance, their operation

seems to have transformed from that of a community security organisation into a

private security service.216 This situation raises questions as to Amphibi’s role,

function and ongoing purpose within the security landscape of the island. Are they

community security groups or private security contractors? And can these groups

remain responsive to the community, while also overseeing the security of

commercial enterprises?

Tuan Guru have mixed feelings about pamswakarsa. TGH Mustiadi Abhar spoke

positively of community-based security activities, such as pamswakarsa, because they

created a sense of safety during difficult times. Practical actions like creating or

supporting pamswakarsa were sometimes necessary. Having said this, his

organisation didn’t control or have links to a pamswakarsa. Nor did he think that in

Pagutan (on the outskirts of Mataram), where he lived and worked, it was necessary to

211 These other pamswakarsa had overt ideological agendas – see Ian Douglas Wilson, ‘Continuity and Change: the Changing Contours of Organized Violence in Post-New Order Indonesia’ (2006) 38 Critical Asian Studies 265, 284-285. 212 The pamswakarsa, Bujak, is now no longer active in Mataram and West Lombok. 213 Lang-Lang is a pamswakarsa that is limited in operation to Mataram. It remains operational and has close-connections with the Mataram Mayor, Ruslan. 214 International Crisis Group, The Perils of Private Security Groups in Indonesia: Guards and Militias on Bali and Lombok (2003) <http://www.crisisgroup.org> at 11 March 2010. 215 This metamorphosis from pamswakarsa to private security contractor has been seen elsewhere in Indonesia. For instance, Brigass (affiliated to political party PDI-P) was directly connected with the private security venture called Brigass Lustrilanang Security. See Ian Douglas Wilson, ‘Continuity and Change: the Changing Contours of Organized Violence in Post-New Order Indonesia’ (2006) 38 Critical Asian Studies 265, 271-272. 216 Field notes, 15 September 2007. This issue of the privatisation of Amphibi activities was also discussed by Lalu Nurtaat who is a Mataram academic and local community leader living nearby this market and transportation hub – Interview with Lalu Nurtaat (Mataram, 28 July 2008).

53

have such a group.217 Abhar’s support for non-state responses, such pamswakarsa,

was not shared by all Tuan Guru. TGH Ahmad Madani felt that security is

predominantly the role of government, although this can be aided by community

mechanisms, such as a ronda. However, the problem with pamswakarsa, Madani felt,

was that these groups often end up fighting each other.218 They may reduce theft, but

other problems can emerge, such as fighting between members of different

pamswakarsa.219 The two Tuan Guru both argue valid points and this identifies the

complexity of this issue.

Community protection measures, such as night watches and the like, are common

across Indonesia.220 Despite concerns about pamswakarsa, it is not necessary to see

them as a problem for the rule of law. There have been examples in Lombok where

the Attorney General’s department and police have worked closely with

pamswakarsa, providing them with training and operational support.221

Now that the economic and social situation on the island has stabilised and the

democratic transition appears to be progressing relatively smoothly there is an

important question for Lombok’s state and non-state leaders to ponder – are

pamswakarsa still necessary? One of the negative consequences of pamswakarsa,

according to some proponents of Negara Hukum (law-based state),222 is that these

organisations (or at least some of their members) do not always feel bound by state

laws.223 The local prosecutor for East Lombok at the turn of the century, Bambang

Subandrio, felt that these groups operated in a manner not conducive to Indonesia

217 Interview with TGH Mustiadi Abhar (Mataram, 23 July 2008). 218 Interview with TGH Ahmad Madani (Mataram, 21 August 2008). 219 Ibid. 220 International Crisis Group, The Perils of Private Security Groups in Indonesia: Guards and Militias on Bali and Lombok (2003) <http://www.crisisgroup.org> at 11 March 2010; Ian Douglas Wilson, ‘Continuity and Change: the Changing Contours of Organized Violence in Post-New Order Indonesia’ (2006) 38 Critical Asian Studies 265, 265-266 . 221 ‘Kaposkamling Membantu Pamswakarsa’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 15 June 1999. 222 This concept is discussed within the prism of Reformasi developments by many important Indonesian jurists, including Jimly Asshiddiqie, ‘Cita Negara Hukum Indonesia Kontemporer’ (‘A Contemporary Perspective of the Indonesian Law-based State’) (Speech delivered at the Fakultas Hukum, Universitas Sriwijaya, Palembang, 23 March 2004). 223 Interview with Dahlan Bandu (Mataram, 13 November 2007).

54

being a Negara Hukum. Pamswakarsa members, as he saw it, acted like ‘cowboys’,

outside the normal standards of society and its rules.224

It is worth reviewing some of these groups’ inappropriate actions and considering

whether they should still be functioning. In mid-December 1999, over 40 trucks

transporting an estimated 2000 Amphibi members from East Lombok raided a Hindu

area of Kuranji village, West Lombok, in search of an alleged thief.225 The raid was

not a disciplined affair, resulting in the death of one villager and the serious injury of

another.226 To cap off this inglorious event, one of the hands of the alleged thief, I

Gusti Ngurah, was amputated. As the Amphibi trucks headed home they passed by the

Beretais Market and did a victory lap, “waving the severed hand” around.227 This

event caused a flare-up in tensions between the Hindu and Sasak communities and led

NTB Governor, Harun Al Rasyid, to convene a meeting with senior government

officials, because conflict between these two communities would have been

potentially devastating and involved a large number of people. After this meeting the

leadership of Amphibi was pressured to meet with a Hindu pamswakarsa, Dharma

Wisesa, to discuss how to maintain security and communal harmony. Additionally,

Amphibi representatives made a public apology for the behaviour of their members in

Kuranji. However, there is no evidence of any of those involved being officially

prosecuted for the deaths or injuries emerging out of this raid.228

Another example of this sort of wild behaviour by pamswakarsa members occurred

when the Central Lombok local legislature was raided in late 1999 by 20 truckloads of

Bujak members. Apprarently Bujak members involved were angry about the role of

“money politics” in the election of the Central Lombok Bupati (head of the regency).

224 ‘Pamswakarsa Turunkan Drastis Kriminalitas’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 15 December 1999. See also ‘Amphibi Punya Hirarki Jelas’ , Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 14 February 2000. 225 ‘Kelompok Massa Hakimi Warga Kuranji’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 18 December 1999. 226 ‘Amphibi Minta Maaf dan Sepakat Kerjasama’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 31 December 1999. 227 John M. MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists?: Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak communities of New Order and Post-Suharto Lombok (PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, 2005) 260-261. 228 ‘Amphibi Minta Maaf dan Sepakat Kerjasama’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 31 December 1999. This issue was also covered in other sources – John M. MacDougall, ‘Criminality and the Political Economy of Security in Lombok’, in Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (eds), Renegotiating Boundaries – Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia (2007) 297-298. This story was confirmed by an interviewee who lives close to the Beretais Market – Interview with Zaini (Mataram, 16 July 2008).

55

Despite the extroadinary nature of this incident, luckily no deaths or injuries were

reported.229 Then in early 2000, it was reported that 200 Amphibi members had run

amok through the village of Jenggik in East Lombok, leaving three civilians and two

Indonesian soldiers in Mataram’s Public Hospital. Once again, they were allegedly

hunting for thieves, but they seemed to have caused more trouble than they

resolved.230 This event occurred just days after provincial authorities and Amphibi

leaders confirmed that they would work together to improve pamswakarsa

activities.231 People’s negative perceptions of pamswakarsa were further played upon

by what seemed, as TGH Madani noted earlier, to be an ongoing ‘turf war’ around the

turn of the century between Bujak and Amphibi.232 There are also allegations that

members of Amphibi were involved in the January 2000 riots, although, John

MacDougall is unclear as to the extent of pamswakarsa members’ participation.233

These events, although ostensibly undertaken to deal with criminals, were themselves

essentially criminal activities. These sorts of incidents are not merely of historical

interest, but are still occurring. This draws attention to whether pamswakarsa play a

productive role or ought to be disbanded. In mid-August 2007, Amphibi members

raided a police station in Sekotong, Central Lombok, where a police officer was

kidnapped and badly beaten.234 Senior provincial government official, Dahlan Bandu,

felt that many pamswakarsa members still often acted in an undisciplined manner.235

He reflected that “they do not respect the law, they do not respect the police and they

do not respect the state”.236 Former NTB Kapolda, Sukandri, said that the actions of

pamswakarsa often interfere with police work. Pamswakarsa flood an area with

dozens of members, yet this does not mean that they catch the criminals. Instead, it

229 ‘20 Truk Bujak Serbu DPRD II Loteng’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 24 December 1999. 230 ‘Kelompok Amphibi Serang Oknum TBI’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 18 November 1999. 231 ‘Administrasi Amphibi Cukup Teratur’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 November 1999. 232 ‘APRI Sesalkan Perang Bujak vs Amphibi’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 5 April 1999. 233 John M. MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Suharto Lombok (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2005) 263-265. 234 Interview with Dahlan Bandu (Mataram, 13 November 2007). 235 Dahlan Bandu is a senior public servant, who was in charge of assisting the former NTB governor, Lalu Serinata, with monitoring and managing provincial authority responses to communal and political conflict. His role is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 236 Interview with Dahlan Bandu (Mataram, 13 November 2007).

56

often means that they just get in the way of the police trying to perform their duties or

even become involved in criminal activities themselves.237

On the other hand, some local politicians support these groups and endorse efforts to

bring pamswakarsa into a closer relationship with state authorities. Former West

Lombok Bupati, Iskander, a close associate of former Governor Lalu Serinata,

supported residents of his regency joining pamswakarsa. Iskander’s argument was

that by expanding the membership there could potentially be an improvement in the

quality of cadre.238 Other politicians, such as the then NTB Governor, Harun Al

Rasyid, wanted state officials to work more closely with pamswakarsa. He felt that

this would not only ensure their operations were undertaken more effectively, but also

that provincial authorities would be able to monitor these groups more closely.239 This

issue is still relevant today in Lombok and elsewhere in Indonesia. An April 2010

report by the International Crisis Group called on the Indonesian government to

“consider a ban on paramilitary training by non-state actors, or at least subject such

training to strict regulation and control”.240 From my perspective, engagement is a

preferred policy position for state actors in relation to pamswakarsa in Lombok.241 It

allows state law enforcement agencies and other government departments to deal with

these influential non-state players, rather than competing with them or forcing them

underground.

Engagement between state and non-state entities, such as police and pamswakarsa,

provides many opportunities for creative law enforcement. However, this process is

also is open to problematic political interference. For instance, there will not be

opportunities for professional and constructive relationships if political or religious

interests use this engagement to merely strengthen the pamswakarsa to which they are

affiliated. This is of concern, because over the last decade pamswakarsa have become

237 ‘Kapolda NTB Ditentang Masyarakat dan Dewan’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 April 1999; ‘Kelompok Pamswakarsa Saling Bertentangan’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 21 December 1999. 238 ‘Orang Lobar Boleh Masuk Amphibi atau Bujak’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 16 December 1999. A similar position of engaging and working with pamswakarsa was taken by the leadership of the University of Mataram – ‘Unram Jalin Kerjasama Dengan Amphibi’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 10 February 2000. 239 ‘Gubernur Minta Bupati Bantu Pamswakarsa’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 29 December 1999. 240 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh (2010) <http://www.crisisgroup.org> at 22 July 2010. 241 An example of how this can be accomplished is considered in Chapter 6.

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politicised, developing close links with different factions of Lombok’s political

elite.242 Political connections to pamswakarsa include Lalu Serinata, the former

governor, who had strong (albeit informal) connections to Amphibi.243 The current

governor TGH Bajang is linked to Satgas, the militia controlled by NW Pancor (see

Picture 2.4 below).244 Powerful pamswakarsa connections also extend to other leading

Tuan Guru. For instance, Amphibi is controlled by TGH Sibaway245 and Hezbullah by

TGH Zainuddin Abdul Madjid.246

Picture 2.4 A member of pamswakarsa, Satgas, patrolling the NW Pancor anniversary celebration

in 2008

In this chapter, I have shown some of the effects and responses to the social,

economic and political instability in Lombok during the late 1990s and early part of

this century. The next section considers one of the key rationales motivating political

and communal conflict – money. The final section investigates the January 2000 riots

in Mataram and West Lombok and will highlight many of the issues raised throughout

this chapter.

242 These issues are also discussed in Chapter 6. 243 Lalu Serinata’s connections were noted by a reliable non-government informant; see Interview with anonymous non-government informant (Mataram, 16 November 2007). 244 SATGAS Hamzanwadi (2009) Nahdlatul Wathan Pancor < http://www.nw.or.id> at 29 May 2009. 245 John M. MacDougall, Self-reliant Militias (2003) Inside Indonesia <http://insideindonesia.org> on 29 May 2009. 246 Nahdlatul Wathan Anjani Website’ (2009) <http://www.nahdlatulwathan.org> at 29 May 2009; ‘Pemuda NW Konvoi Keliling Lombok’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 17 May 2010.

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The economics of violence

One issue underpinning this chapter is that of financial inducements can act as a

prelude to political and communal violence in Lombok. Financial inducements for

conflict can be seen as a matter of supply and demand. Provocateurs are willing to

supply money to potential demonstrators, ‘renting a crowd’, to leverage their own

political position, enhance their social status and gain greater access to the state

treasury. People are willing to accept this money out of necessity, due to high levels

of poverty (noted in Chapter 1) that make people susceptible to these inducements.

It has been argued that a strong economic environment provides the foundations for

political and social stability. President Wahid’s government, from late 1999 till mid-

2001,247 was struggling to manage the economy, it has been suggested that the result

was social instability and violence. In fact, the January 2000 riots in Lombok, like

other conflicts across the archipelago emerged as direct consequence of these

budgetary and economic problems, according to media reports.248 Therefore, financial

and economic circumstances need to be considered when evaluating conflict

management. The current political elite in Lombok, including the immediate-past and

current NTB governor, have both acknowledged the importance of economic

management and development in relation to the maintenance of social harmony.249

The economics of violence are not always direct. An example of the indirect role that

money plays emerges from within Lombok’s political elite. Candidates currently

running for political office in Lombok, as elsewhere in Indonesia, typically pay a

political party to endorse and support their election campaign. With this fee the

candidate is given access to the party machinery for campaigning purposes. This

includes the use of professional staff and party cadres for support and the provision of

other services, such as marketing. Some commentators have noted the corrosive effect

that this has on Indonesian politics. They argue that this situation ensures that 247 President Wahid was the second Indonesian president following President Soeharto’s resignation. He continued the democratic reform process instigated by President Habibie, who had taken over from Soeharto. However, Wahid’s administration was beset by administrative and political problems, combined with several scandals, and he was eventually dismissed from office by the MPR following impeachment. 248 ‘Brutality and Budgets in Indonesia’, The Economist (London, UK), 22 January 2000, 40-41. 249 Interview with Lalu Serinata (Mataram, 8 January 2008); TGH Bajang, ‘Pre-Inauguration Comments’ (Speech Delivered at Hotel Bukit Senggigi, 2 August 2008).

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politicians are almost automatically ensnared by corruption, due to the need to recoup

the costs of endorsement and campaigning.250 In this situation the debt is not owed by

the political party, but rather directly by the individual candidate. As a consequence,

an informant told me that the politician is frankly indebted to his or her backers. He or

she usually owes a major financial debt that needs to be repaid. This entanglement

makes it hard to avoid misusing the state treasury or allowing opportunistic cronyism,

such as the allocation of business contracts to financial backers.251

It has been alleged that candidates wanting to run for Governor in NTB in the 2008

elections were required to pay between Rp 15 billion to Rp 30 billion ($AU2 million

to $AU4 million) for political party endorsement. The figure varied depending on the

size, importance and capacity of the political party both nationally and locally. TGH

Bajang has directly refuted claims that he, or any member of his campaign team,

made such payments and it must be clearly acknowledged that there is no evidence

that Bajang or members of his team were involved in this practice. However,

information about the need to make payments to political parties, and the size of these

in NTB, came from a reliable informant and it is believed that other candidates did

make such payments. This informant, a prominent community leader, found out about

these payments because he was considering running in the gubernatorial elections. He

decided against it, believing he would financially compromise himself (or perhaps

because he couldn’t raise the money).252 Similar problems have been reported in other

parts of Indonesia where politik uang (money politics) has become a common factor

contributing to political tension and conflict.253

Financial rewards and opportunities for corrupt behaviour escalate during election

campaigns. The various campaign teams allegedly distributed money widely across

Lombok to gain political and public support prior to, and during, the 2008 NTB

gubernatorial elections.254 I heard about and saw the results of the distribution of

250 Marcus Mietzner, ‘Stable but Unpopular Political Parties after Suharto’, IIAS Newsletter, Spring 2008, 23. 251 Field notes, 4 June 2007. 252 Ibid. 253 Elizabeth Collins and Muhammad Sirozi, Blood or Money? Ethnicity now Plays a Role in Local Politics in South Sumatra but Money Still Rules (2004) Inside Indonesia <http://www.insideindonesia.org/> at 19 January 2010. 254 ‘Antisipasi Money Politic, Bentuk Satgas’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 July 2008; ‘Panwas Terima Laporan Dugaan Money Politics’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 7 August 2008.

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money by candidates and their campaign teams, before and after the 2008 elections.

To be clear, I did not personally see the supply of money by campaign teams to

religious or community leaders. However, at this time many major construction

projects commenced, such as the supply of electricity to a village and major

renovations to Islamic boarding schools. People openly talked to me about how these

projects were reportedly funded by the various campaign teams. The amount of

money distributed is difficult to assess, but considering the nature and number of

projects commenced it must have been considerable.

It is widely believed that electoral success brings financial dividends. These rewards

are the heart of the issue and the source of potential tensions and violence. Electoral

success brings career opportunities in the bureaucracy and direct financial reward for

one’s family, ethnic group and political clique, through access to the government’s

treasury and control of government departments. In the past, financial rewards

emanated from what has been called non-budgetar.255 These funds did not require the

same accountability or auditing processes as other items of the NTB budget. Non-

budgetar was intended to be a discretionary budget item intended to be used only in

emergency or exceptional circumstances. However, it is alleged that it became an

unaccountable slash-fund for many politicians and their entourages. This problem also

exists elsewhere in Indonesia, but non-budgetar had been estimated to be as much as

one-third of the annual NTB budget in the early part of this century, a sum that

equates to around Rp100,000,000,000 ($AU12,500,000).256

Non-budgetar is now technically prohibited but there are still treasury management

problems in provincial and local government that allow for financial ‘grey areas’,

where funds can be misused. This is particularly true for the provinces, according to a

consultant specialising in economic development.257 This allows money to leak from

the state treasury into politicians’ pockets, due to ‘grey areas’ in budget processes and

auditing deficiencies.258 The effect is the same as if non-budgetar still existed.259 The

255 The official title of this source of revenue was dana taktis or the tactical/operational part of the Indonesian budget. 256 Government sources in Mataram provided these estimates – Field notes, 4 June 2007. 257 Informal discussion with an anonymous foreign consultant (Jakarta, 16 March 2009). 258 These ‘grey areas’ in the operation of the Indonesian treasury are connected to reforming and developing the activities of bureaucrats and the departmental processes that are used. This will be a difficult and lengthy process – see Ross H. McLeod, ‘The Struggle to Regain Effective Government

61

German aid agency, GTZ, for example, has been working with provincial authorities

in Mataram to improve local treasury accountability and processes over the last

decade, yet in GTZ’s view “the core competencies needed for good local governance

are still lacking”.260

A telling indictment of these issues is that in the aftermath of the 2008 gubernatorial

elections, former governor Lalu Serinata and three other prominent local politicians

were charged and detained for corruption on 27 October 2008.261 The charges were

based on allegations that Serinata and his co-conspirators used money from the

provincial parliament – up to Rp 23 billion (just over $AU3 million) – for improper

political purposes. It is thought that these improper political purposes involved

inducing legislators to vote for Serinata in the 2003 election for governor.262 These

charges did not come as a surprise, as the media had been reporting on the allegations

for several months.263 President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had authorised the NTB

Attorney General’s Department to investigate allegations of corruption in April 2008,

four months before the provincial gubernatorial elections.264 Since his imprisonment

there has been high drama, with the former governor going on a hunger strike which

led to his hospitalisation.265 He was finally convicted of corruption in mid-2009 and

was recently imprisoned to serve a three year sentence.266

Under Democracy in Indonesian’ (2005) 41 Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 367, 377; Didi S. Damanhuri, Korupsi, Reformasi Birokrasi dan Masa Depan Ekonomi Indonesia (2006) 12-19. 259 Ibid. 260 Good Local Governance (2010) GTZ <http://www.gtz.de> at 25 March 2010. 261 Kejaksaan (Attorney General’s Department) Republik Indonesia, Kasus Dana APBD Kejaksaan Tahan Mantan Gubernur NTB (2008) <http://www.kejaksaan.go.id> at 12 December 2008. 262 Jeremy Kingsley, D-Day for Anti-Corruption Reform (2009) Inside Indonesia <http://insideindonesia.org> at 19 March 2010. 263 Panca Nugraha, ‘Prosecutors in NTB Send Red Light to Governor’ (2008) The Jakarta Post <http://www.thejakartapost.com> at 12 December 2008; Mahasiswa Aski Para Koruptor NTB (2008) Sumbawa News <http://www.sumbawanews.com> at 12 December 2008; Dewi Indriastuti, Permeriksaan Serinata Lancar (2008) Kompas <http://www.kompas.com> at 12 December 2008; Keluarga Serinata Lapor Ke Polda (2008) <lotengpers.wordpress.com> at 10 December 2008; Kasus Gubernur Serinata Kembali Dipertanyakan (2008) Nusa Tenggara News <http://www.nusatenggaranews.com> at 12 December 2008. 264 Irwan Nugroho, Gubernur NTB Diperiksa Kejagung 24 April Sebagai Tersangka (2008) Detik News <http://us.detiknews.com> at 12 December 2008. 265 Yusuf Riaman, Mantan Gubernur NTB Serinata Dilarikan ke RS (2008) Media Indonesia <http://www.media-indonesia.com> at 12 December 2008. 266 Panca Nugraha, ‘Former Governor Sent to Jail to Serve his Sentence’, The Jakarta Post (Jakarta, Indonesia), 29 July 2010.

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There have been many political and social responses to corruption in Lombok. One of

these was an increase in the political strength in Lombok of the Islam-oriented party,

PKS.267 It was part of the two-party coalition with another Islam-oriented party,

Partai Bulan Bintang,268 which supported the candidature of current NTB Governor

TGH Bajang.269 Some people have supported PKS because of its strong Islamic

credentials, but many others have decided to support this party predominantly because

it prioritises cleaning up politics and taking strong measures against corruption.270

TGH Bajang gave a speech prior to his inauguration highlighting his desire to combat

corruption. He wanted ‘amplop’ (envelope) culture to come to an end. The reference

to amplop culture denotes the practice of giving envelopes of money to people when

politicians come to visit a community or place of worship. His priority, he said, was to

have a clean and professional provincial government.271 TGH Bajang in a pre-

inauguration speech (see Picture 2.5) noted that the concepts underpinning this

principle were not just Islamic, but could also be found in Christianity, Hinduism and

Buddhism. Interestingly, religious pluralism was woven into his anti-corruption

rhetoric.272

Picture 2.5 R-L Governor TGH Bajang and Deputy Governor Badrul Munir, following Bajang’s

speech at Hotel Bukit Senggigi, 2 August 2008

267 Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or Prosperous Justice Party 268 PBB or Crescent Moon and Star Party. 269 Djoko Tjiptono, ‘PBB: Kemenangan TG Bajang akan Menginspirasi Rakyat di 2009’ (2008) Detik News <http://us.detiknews.com> at 13 January 2009. 270 Interview with Ustadz Abdul Qodir Jaelani (Mataram, 18 December 2007). See also Yon Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia – the Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) (2008) 3; Najwa Shihab and Yanuar Nugroho, ‘The Ties that Bind: Law, Islamisation and Indonesia’s Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)’ (2010) 10 Australian Journal of Asian Law 233. 271 TGH Bajang, ‘Pre-Inauguration Comments’ (Speech Delivered at Hotel Bukit Senggigi, 2 August 2008). 272 Ibid. See also ‘Pluralitas Jadi Komitmen Utama’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 7 August 2008.

63

It is worth considering one more, very significant element that contributes to the

demand for economic inducements – poverty. An anonymous informant told me that

during the January 2000 riots, people believed that not all the rioters became

spontaneously involved. Rather for a sizeable contingent, financial inducements for

participation were provided.273 Farouk Muhammad, former Kapolda NTB, also

believed that money was distributed to rioters during the January 2000

disturbances.274 This monetary incentive is an effective generator of noise, tension and

potentially violence, according to Ryanto Rabbah, editor of local social affairs

magazine Religi. There is a large number of economically-disadvantaged people in

Mataram and elsewhere in Lombok who are vulnerable to manipulation that leads

them to become “demonstrators (or rioters) for money”.275

The January riots – More than burning tyres

The events of January 2000 will not happen again. I will work

to ensure this.

TGH Bajang, Governor NTB.276

Although he was sparse on details TGH Bajang has publicly committed his provincial

administration to actively avoid a re-occurrence of events like the January 2000 riots.

These statements were made in one of his first addresses as Governor-elect and they

highlighted the ongoing local political resonance of these riots.

The January 2000 riots are an example of the convergence of many of the issues

considered in this chapter. This section will also consider why certain ‘lines in the

sand’ were not crossed by the rioters. As mentioned previously there was, for

example, property damage, but no reported serious assaults, sex attacks or murders.

Despite this, many people in Lombok feel that the riots are a stain on the island’s

273 Field notes, 2007 (date withheld to insure anonymity). 274 Interview with Farouk Muhammad (Mataram, 3 November 2007). 275 Interview with Ryanto Rabbah (Mataram, 3 October 2007). This was also mentioned by Pendeta Hasanema, see Interview with Pendeta Hasanema (Mataram, 12 December 2007). 276 TGH Bajang, ‘Pre-Inauguration Comments’ (Speech Delivered at Hotel Bukit Senggigi, 2 August 2008).

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good name; it is a kehilangan muka (loss of face) for them.277 The embarrassment was

clear when speaking with Tuan Guru Besar Sofwan Hakim who felt that youths

involved had disregarded the lessons of Islam. These youths according to Hakim,

urged on by provocateurs, became drawn into rioting, blindly following their

emotions and greed.278

The actual spark that kindled the riots is unknown, but events started on 17 January

2000, when a public rally assembled outside the military headquarters in Mataram.

Over 5000 people turned up to protest the Indonesian government’s inability to stop

violence in Maluku province that had cost over 1700 Christian and Muslim lives.279

At the conclusion of the rally provocateurs, allegedly from outside Lombok, whipped-

up the crowd into a wild frenzy280 and within hours local Christian and Chinese

homes and shops were burning.281 The rally, a tabligh akbar (mass religious meeting),

had been planned as a peaceful show of solidarity for fellow Muslims.282 However,

the riots were not simply an innate emotional response to the tragic events in Maluku

and the suffering of their Muslim brethren. Rather it has been suggested that the riots

reflected a calculated act of manipulation. It was alleged that in the preceding six

months before the rally, radical elements had distributed emotive videos calling for

Muslim solidarity in response to the conflict in Maluku. To generate these primal and

emotional responses the videos drew upon religious symbols combined with graphic

imagery of dead women and children in Maluku.283 Events were supposedly

aggravated further through the distribution of money, as already noted, to the

participants. In many respects, the looting and violence could also be viewed simply

as opportunistic, rather than religious or political. People knew that the local

277 ‘Kerusuhan Mataram, Keluguan Pemuda Yang Membawa Petaka’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 22 February 2000. 278 Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008). Islamic teachings about social harmony and the avoidance of violence are considered in Chapter 5. 279 British Broadcasting Corporation, Riots Hit Indonesian Resort (2000) <http://www.bbc.co.uk> at 12 October 2006. 280 Ibid. 281 Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Indon Military Shipped to Lombok (2000) <http://www.abc.net.au> at 12 October 2006. 282 John MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Suharto Lombok (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2005) 263-265. 283 John M. MacDougall, ‘Criminality and the Political Economy of Security in Lombok’, in Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (eds), Renegotiating Boundaries – Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia (2007) 299.

65

Indonesian Chinese in Mataram and West Lombok had fled and they used this as an

opportunity to raid their shops.284

Whatever the cause, the disturbances which lasted five days, led to significant

property damage. The riots resulted in the razing or demolition of 20 churches, 740

homes, 62 shops, 24 rumah makan (restaurants), 5 bar/restaurants, 36 cars and

motorbikes, 23 villas, 41 hotel bungalows, 11 ruko (shop/homes), 30 warehouses, 20

public buildings, 1 hairdressing salon, 2 banks, 2 medical clinics and 3 offices.285 This

damage was caused by an estimated 5000 rioters and the assessments of property

damage reached about Rp 60 billion ($AUS7.5 million).286

The riots also led to approximately 7,500 Indonesian Chinese (and other non-Muslim

residents) fleeing to Bali and further afield.287 Anecdotally it has been suggested that

this meant that at least 80% of entrepreneurs left the island. This subsequently

hampered efforts to recover from the riots, because many of the key economic drivers

were no longer present.288 As a consequence, the provincial authorities provided

compensation for people whose property was damaged or destroyed, in order to

persuade them to return.289 While many found their way back to Mataram and West

Lombok in the following months, it is recognised that hundreds did not. Furthermore,

many of those who returned still live with a high level of anxiety about their personal

and family security.290

During the violence several fatalities were reported. Those killed were all rioters shot

by police or the military. The exact number of fatalities is unclear. The International

284 Interview with Asnawi (Mataram, 5 August 2008); see Interview with Muhammad Dimiati (Mataram, 12 August 2008). 285 ‘Meredam Konflik, Menghidupkan Kasadaran Multikultur’, Religi (Mataram, Lombok), 16 April 2007. 286 ‘Kerusuhan Mataram, Keluguan Pemuda Yang Membawa Petaka’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 22 February 2000. 287 Jana Mason, Shadow Plays: The Crisis of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Indonesia (2001) United Nations Refugee Agency <www.unhcr.org> at 26 May 2010. 288 ‘Sebagian Besar Pengusaha Keturunan Alami Trauma’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 3 February 2000. 289 ‘Korban Kerusuhan Akan Dapat Bantuan’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 18 April 2000. 290 This was clearly expressed to me when I was looking for a rental property early in 2007. During the inspection of potential houses with Chinese Indonesian businessman, JT, he kept repeating the importance of personal security. He mentioned these issues with specific reference to the 2000 riots.

66

Crisis Group291 and the local social affairs magazine Religi292 placed the death toll at

five. Academic Stein Kristiansen believes, however, that the death toll was seven.293

There is also evidence from some informants suggesting that these figures are

underestimates.294 Additionally, 152 people were reportedly lightly injured, as a

result, of their participation in the violence.295

Those involved (the rioters) were fundamentalists for religion,

but not fundamentalists for religious knowledge.296

Religion was undoubtedly one of the factors motivating some of the rioters. Rather

than Islam, maybe it is better to identify the symbolism of religion as a powerful

motivator for violence. Pastor Rosarius felt that the affinity Sasak people felt for

Islam may have been manipulated through the provocateurs appropriating Islamic

imagery and sense of affiliation.297 It was not Islam’s teachings or principles being

used, he said, but its symbols.298 The rioters could be likened to soccer ‘hooligans’

who use a sporting team’s jersey to provide cover for their emotional outburst. TGH

Humaidi Zaen said that Islam teaches that two wrongs do not make a right. He felt

strongly that the righteous act of showing solidarity with co-religionists should not

have turned violent.299

An important element of Sasak responses to stress and conflict is the use of symbolic

violence. One of the political explanations for the January 2000 riots was that it was a

reflection of Sasak authority, or at least an attempt to assert it, in the newly

decentralised political environment – a flexing of socio-political muscle. This

correlates with the violence being limited to property damage rather than being

291 International Crisis Group, The Perils of Private Security Groups in Indonesia: Guards and Militias on Bali and Lombok (2003) <http://www.crisisgroup.org> at 12 October 2006. 292 ‘Meredam Konflik, Menghidupkan Kasadaran Multikultur’, Religi (Mataram, Lombok), 16 April 2007. 293 Stein Kristiansen, ‘Violent Youth Groups in Indonesia: The Cases of Yogyakarta and Nusa Tenggara Barat’ (2003) 18 Sojourn 110, 123. 294 My source for this is a key informant, JT, who told me that several rioters were shot by the military outside his Church (which happens to be on an Indonesian military base). 295 ‘Meredam Konflik, Menghidupkan Kasadaran Multikultur’, Religi (Mataram, Lombok), 16 April 2007. 296 Interview with Mukhtar (Mataram, 28 August 2008). 297 Interview with Pastor Rosarius (Mataram, 10 October 2007). 298 Ibid. 299 Interview with TGH Humaidi Zaen (Memben, East Lombok, 9 August 2008).

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directed at individual people – it was a show of power through political symbolism,

such as the torching of a church.300 Connected to this is speculation that the January

2000 riots may have been a calculated political strategy used to raise the local profile

of new governor Harun Al-Rasyid. The riots, the rumour goes, were instigated to

show that he could take strong and decisive steps during a crisis (he had been a

reasonably noteable figure in Jakarta politics, as Mayor of South Jakarta, and needed

to gain authority locally).301 In the year 2000, Lombok was beset with political tension

and competition. Consequently these allegations, whether correct or not, do have a

degree of local currency.302

There were also reportedly more base personal motivations for participation in the

violence, such as the settling of neighbourhood vendettas. A friend of mine, Atun, told

me how some locals from her kampung attacked a Hindu family’s large home on the

outskirts of their community. They told her that they burnt down the house because

they didn’t like the family’s aggressive dog, which had upset neighbours for a long

time.303 No politics, no religion, no economics – rather the riots gave cover to the

settling of personal grudges.

The manipulation of provocateurs was given added impetus by the difficult economic

circumstances of the time. Many Sasak believed that Indonesian Chinese in Mataram

and West Lombok dominated the economy over the whole island and subsequently

Sasak opportunities for economic advancement were limited.304 This is a common

perception grounded in the island’s economic reality, and the question that emerges is

how this disparity should be addressed. Community leader and Mataram academic,

Lalu Nurtaat, suggested that there are two alternatives. One is to become angry and

turn to violence, while the other is to improve Sasak access to education and the

300 Field notes, 6 July 2008. 301 Interview with Andi (Mataram, 4 August 2008). I had heard this rumour numerous times before this interview. The rumours were based on the circumstances of Al-Rasyid’s appointment and previous political activities. There was an alternative candidate for NTB governor in 1999 who was a locally-active Sasak, Lalu Mudjitahid. Many people saw Al-Rasyid, originally from Sumbawa, as virtually a Javanese import, because he had been active in Jakarta politics for such a long time. There was, therefore, a belief that he needed to obtain local credibility – see I Ketut Putra Erawan, ‘Tracing the Progress of Local Governments since Decentralisation’ in Ross H. McLeod and Andrew MacIntyre, Indonesia – Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance (2007) 61. 302 ‘Elite Politik Daerah Jadi Kambing Hitam’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 1 April 2000. 303 Field notes, 3 October 2007. 304 Field notes, 6 July 2008.

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opportunities that flow from this.305 The former governor, Lalu Serinata, felt that the

disparity was best tackled by focusing more directly on economic development.306

Having said all this, however, for many Sasak in January 2000, anger became a

mechanism for expressing their frustrations.

Despite these possible motivations of the rioters, TGH Humaidi Zaen, expressed

shock at the rioters’ behaviour. He felt that this outbreak was uncharacteristic of the

Sasak, who normally kept their emotions contained or closed (tutup) and were not

usually overcome by passion.307 An alternative perspective is that the Sasak are

emotional and that they express their opinions bluntly. Many people, including Tuan

Guru Besar Ulul Azmi told me that “Lombok” means “chilli” and that this

appropriately describes the Sasak temperament.308 Both perspectives are underpinned

by what seems to be Sasak self-generated, yet contradictory, stereotypes. These

accurately delineate elements of the diverse and complex cultural identity of the

Sasak, which defies simple or monolithic explanation, as therefore, do the rationales

and motivations of the rioters.

Many of the punitive responses to the riots were taken outside the state legal systems,

with communities dealing with matters in-house.309 There, however, were also a

limited number of court proceedings as a result of the January riots. Only 36 people

were charged and found guilty in the Pengadilan Negeri Mataram for theft-related

offences. For instance, three youths appeared before the court in late February 2000

charged with looting. They were accused of stealing cigarettes, clothes and DVD

players. On the same day, a 40 year-old faced court for stealing 50 kilograms of rice.

In these cases, all the accused were convicted and received sentences of 1–3 months

imprisonment.310 The longest of the sentences handed down by the Mataram court

305 Interview with Lalu Nurtaat (Mataram, 25 October 2007). 306 Interview with Lalu Serinata (Mataram, 8 January 2008). 307 Ibid. 308 Interview with TGH Ulul Azmi (Jerneng, West Lombok, 17 December 2007). 309 As discussed in Chapter 1. 310 ‘Hari Ini, Kembali Digelar Kasus Kerusuhan 171’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 23 February 2000. See also ‘Saad Akhirnya Dihukum 10 Bulan Penjara’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 7 March 2000; ‘Divonis 3 Bulan, Keluarga Terdakwa Menangis’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 3 May 2000.

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was five years for two thieves who stole motorcycles during the riots.311 All these

cases were conducted under tight security due to a concern that the situation had the

potential to spiral out of control, with the police setting up road blocks around

Mataram to monitor people’s movements during the trials.312

There was also an attempt to prosecute higher profile figures who may have acted as

provocateurs. An example of this was Zainul Asikin,313 one of the organisers of the

tabligh akbar. His supporters believed that he was used as a scapegoat in order to

satisfy the public demand for an apportionment of blame.314 It was also suggested that

even if he had participated in the provocation he was not alone, with many prominent

people participating in the tabligh akbar and potentially being provocateurs.315 Asikin

strenuously denied the allegations and participated in a reconciliation process with

Christian leaders.316 The charges were eventually dropped, however, why this

occurred is unclear. The only other example of an attempt to prosecute a provocateur

was Ishak Sasaki, who was in the end acquitted of all charges. As with Asikin, news

reports and further enquiries have unearthed no additional information about the

allegations against him, other than that they were serious. It was also difficult to

establish the legal arguments or factual reasons leading to his acquittal.317

Punitive actions emanating from the court system or community were important, but

the January 2000 riots also offered the opportunity for Lombok’s political elite and

general society, to reaffirm important social values. It allowed for the public assertion

by state and non-state leaders of the importance of strong inter-ethnic and inter-

religious relationships, and more broadly, social harmony.318 An example of this was

when Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (PMII or the Islamic Students

Movement of Indonesia) Mataram branch that supported the Catholic and Christian

311 ‘Dua Terdakwa Kasus 171 Diancam 5 Tahun Penjara’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 11 April 2000. 312 ‘Kejati NTB Minta Pengunjung Digeledah’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 20 February 2000. 313 When charged, Asikin was the Dean of the Law Faculty, the University of Mataram – see Leena Avonius, Reforming Wetu Telu: Islam, Adat, and the Promises of Regionalism in Post-New Order Lombok (2004) 68. 314 ‘Jangan Cari Kambing Hitam Atas Kerusuhan 171’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 March 2000. 315 ‘Kasus 171 Tidak Berdiri Sendiri’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 5 April 2000. 316 ‘Para Pendeta Berbela Rasa Kunjungi Asikin’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 2 April 2000. 317 ‘Ishak: Bebaskan Saya Pak Hakim’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 June 2000; ‘Ishak Sasaki Bukan Provocator’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 30 June 2000. 318 ‘Walikota Awali Hapus Coretan Tembok Gereja’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 22 April 2000.

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community’s attempts to ensure their churches were not moved in the wake of the

January 2000 riots. This student group felt that the government proposal to move the

churches would lead to the further ostracisation of these communities, when instead

they should be supporting church-goers to regain their sense of place in Mataram.

Forcing their places of worship to move when rebuilt would have made them feel

even further marginalised.319 Additionally, in the months following the riots,

communities close to areas affected by the riots often worked to repair and rebuild

property that had been damaged. An example of this was a gotong royong meeting

(community self help/working-bee) in the Senggigi resort area to help fix hotels and

tourism infrastructure.320 Reconciliation was also achieved in the post-riot period

through the formation of inter-religious and inter-ethnic forums by non-state and state

officials. In Mataram under the auspices of the mayor, Ruslan, representatives of the

various communities were brought together to generate dialogue immediately

following the riots with the aim to restore communal relationships.321 The provincial

and city authorities’ efforts to maintain social harmony remain active, with public

campaigns still visible in Mataram (see Picture 2.6 below).

Picture 2.6 Billboard in Mataram, which reads "There is no problem with different opinions, but

violence no way..."

There have also been other positive developments since these difficult times. In a

2005 survey, 76% Mataram residents sampled felt that the ‘security situation’ had

319 ‘PMII Mataram Tolak Relokasi Gereja’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 23 February 2000. 320 ‘Karyawan Hotel pun Gotong Royong’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 19 Fenruary 2000. 321 ‘Dibentuk Forum Bersama Antar Etnis’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 10 February 2000.

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improved since 2001.322 Despite these positive developments, many of the key

economic and social problems persist and consequently the window remains open for

‘mob’ violence in the future. As has been noted, over 1.1 million people in NTB live

in poverty.323 According to these figures, the largest proportion of this group resides

in West Lombok – the area surrounding Mataram.324

Endemic poverty is underpinned by continuing infrastructure and economic

deficiencies. The World Bank, in an assessment prepared in 2003, found that the

economic outlook for Lombok was not positive.325 The heart of the local economy,

the tourism industry, was seriously damaged following the January 2000 riots, and the

first Bali bombing of 2002 had reinforced the downturn in tourist numbers from

Japan, America, Australia and Europe.326 In fact, the post-riot downturn was estimated

to have reduced provincial tax revenue from tourism by approximately 30% in the

months following the violence in Mataram and West Lombok.327

There have been reports in recent times suggesting that the economic situation is

improving, with an increase in investor interest and business activity.328 However,

grand plans for re-developing southern Lombok have stalled, with Dubai-based

investors pulling out of a several hundred million dollar deal.329 Therefore, economic

uncertainty and problems still challenge Lombok’s policy-makers and business

leaders.

322 Stein Kristiansen and Trijono Lambang, ‘Authority and Law Enforcement: Local Reform and Security Systems in Indonesia’ (2005) 27 Contemporary Southeast Asia 236, 245. 323 ‘24 Persen Penduduk NTB Miskin’, Lombok Post (Mataram), 5 August 2007. 324 Ibid. 325 World Bank, Confronting Crisis: Impacts and Responses to the Bali Tragedy (2003) 15. This report is relatively outdated, written seven years ago, but it does highlight many of the ongoing economic problems for Lombok. 326 ‘Yang Tercecer Dari Peristiwa 171’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 23 April 2000. 327 Ibid. The riots turned tourist areas, such as Senggigi into ghost towns devoid of tourists, see ‘Senggigi Bagaikan Kota Mati’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 8 February 2000. 328 ‘Ekonomi NTB Mulai Membaik’, Lombok Post (Mataram), 11 March 2008. 329 Deborah Cassrels, Gold rush at the Other Kuta (2009) The Australian <http://www.theaustralian.com.au> at 14 March 2010.

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Conclusion

Chapter 2 has evaluated the functioning of state institutions in Lombok. The

performance of public servants is still inadequate and efforts to reform government

operations that have recently been implemented are not believed to be short-term

measures, rather they require years of difficult and complex bureaucratic

restructuring. Additionally, there are cyclical periods of political and economic

instability in Indonesia, which lead to periods of even greater state weakness on this

eastern Indonesian island.

This chapter particularly focuses upon a period of economic and political instability in

Lombok during the late 1990s and early part of this century. This period saw a

perceived ‘crime wave’, with theft and other criminal activities thought to be on the

rise. However, at the same time, police and other law enforcement agencies were in a

weakened position. This episode of instability was merely an exaggerated example, at

least from my perspective, of the peripheral role in Lombok of state law enforcement.

For instance, Mataram’s Pengadilan Negeri according to court data, is more interested

in traffic offences than any other category of criminal activity (see Appendix 1). I

argue that as a consequence of these deficiencies, non-state actors in Lombok

responded by developing pamswakarsa militias.

Despite these problems with the operation of the state, Chapter 2 introduced the

importance of partnerships between state and non-state entities. Their cooperation

provides strength and capacity for each other when attempting to avoid or resolve

conflict. The first case study about the 2008 NTB gubernatorial elections provided a

practical example of conflict avoidance partnerships (further elaborated upon in

Chapter 5). This chapter concluded with an investigation of the January 2000 riots.

The tumultuous violence in Mataram and West Lombok involved approximately 5000

people, lasted five days and caused significant property damage. However, unlike

riots elsewhere in Indonesia, there were no serious assaults, rapes or murders reported.

Although these important social boundaries were not crossed, the consequences were

still traumatic for residents. Additionally, there have been ongoing economic

consequences from the perceived insecurity, which Lombok’s tourism industry is still

only slowly recovering almost a decade after these events. This highlights the broader

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social and economic implications of conflict management in Mataram and West

Lombok.

The next two chapters will consider two key non-state categories central to this thesis:

religious leaders and local communities. These two groups are integral to efforts to

avoid or resolve communal or political conflict. The next chapter investigates the role

of Tuan Guru, and Chapter 4 follows on by examining the role of local communal

relationships and community leadership. These two chapters form a background to the

partnerships between state and non-state actors that are explored in the case studies

outlined in Chapter 5.

The remainder of this thesis considers the strengths and weaknesses of conflict

management frameworks in operation in Mataram and West Lombok. The hypothesis

of this thesis is that social, political and economic stability can quickly give way to

instability. This should be taken into account when investigating how to avoid or

resolve conflict in the area being studied. Therefore, the challenge posed is how to

maintain social harmony during cyclical bouts of state weakness, which can emerge

from political and economic instability. The answer to this question resides in the

partnership between state and non-state actors and institutions. The next chapter

investigates one of the key elements of these partnerships – Tuan Guru.

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Chapter 3 Tuan Guru – Guardians of religious traditions

Most of the people here [Lombok] would call themselves

‘santri’ (observant).330

TGH Mustiadi Abhar and I were relaxing under a berugaq at his pesantren. As we sat,

two students came up to the Tuan Guru kissing the palm and then back of his hand. A

little later another student came by, bowing and placing the back of the Tuan Guru’s

hand to his forehead. These were ritualised demonstrations of respect for the Tuan

Guru.331 This sort of behaviour is an important part of the theatre of deference, which

is an integral part of social ordering in Mataram and West Lombok. These practices

form part of Sasak communal practice and daily life.332

Picture 3.1 The kindergarten at Pondok Pesantren Abhariyah in Jerneng, West Lombok

This chapter focuses on the non-state religious leaders, Tuan Guru, and their socio-

political activities and influence in Mataram and West Lombok. It will investigate

these issues with regard to how Tuan Guru participate in conflict management

processes. This chapter thus leads on from previous chapters, which considered the

weakness of state actors and institutions and the consequent strength of their non-state

counterparts. Chapter 2 focused particularly on direct measures against crime, social

330 Interview with Asnawi (Mataram, 5 August 2008). 331 These ritualised demonstrations were observable when visiting any Islamic boarding school in Mataram or West Lombok and were obvious during my interviews with Tuan Guru Lokal and Besar, such as those with TGH Mustiadi Abhar, TGH Sofwan Hakim, TGH Ahmad Madani and TGH Ramli. 332 Field notes, 23 July 2008.

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instability and communal violence, predominantly through police and pamswakarsa.

Tuan Guru, using their social and religious status, have a role in conflict management

processes that is more subtle than the aforementioned law enforcers. Their role in

these frameworks is as respected mediators and social stabilisers.

Tuan Guru “represent the overwhelming majority of the Muslims” on Lombok, and

therefore, their role as religious leaders is without question important.333 One of the

reasons that they are significant socio-political players is the centrality of religion and

ritual on the island (discussed later in this chapter).334 Additionally, their importance

relates to the well-managed nature of their organisations, which have become like tiny

quasi-states. These organisations provide social, health, educational and security

services to the communities of Mataram and West Lombok (and elsewhere in

Lombok). My research on Indonesia’s religious leadership and organisations, such as

Nahdlatul Ulama, builds on existing work by scholars, such as Greg Barton and Greg

Fealy. However, my research shifts the emphasis from more general analysis of

Indonesian Islam or Javanese religious practices to Lombok.335

In relation to conflict management, this thesis argues that the role of Tuan Guru is

essentially positive, as they often use their social influence to assist in avoiding or

resolving communal and political conflicts. This position will be developed in the two

case studies (see Chapter 5), but their positive role is not an unqualified assertion.

333 Sven Cederroth, The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power of Mekkah – A Sasak Community on Lombok (1981) 287. 334 The prominent role of Tuan Guru on the island been acknowledged in popular culture with these religious leaders becoming central characters in fictional accounts of life on the island; see Salmon Faris, Tuan Guru (2007). 335 Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (eds), Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia (1996). See also: Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Indonesia’s Ulama and Politics: Caught Between Legitimising the Status Quo and Searching for Alternatives’ (1990) 49 Prisma – The Indonesian Indicator 52; Greg Barton, ‘Indonesia’s Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as the Intellectual Ulama: The Meeting of Islamic Traditionalism and Modernism in Neo-Modernist Thought’ (1997) 8 Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 323; Gregory J. Fealy, Ulama and Politics in Indonesia: A History of Nahdlatul Ulama, 1952-1967 (PhD Thesis, Monash University, 1998); Bahtiar Effendy, Hidayat Nurwahid, Masykuri Abdillah and Edy Syachrudin, NU dan Islam Politik Di Era Reformasi (2001); Jusuf Wanandi, ‘Islam in Indonesia: Its History, Development and Future Challenges’ (2002) 9 Asia-Pacific Review 104; Howard M. Federspiel, Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals of the 20th Century (2006) 27-43; Moch. Nur Ichwan and Noorhaidi Hasan (eds), Moving With the Times – The Dynamics of Contemporary Islam in a Changing Indonesia (2007); Andree Feillard, ‘From Handling Water in a Glass to Coping With an Ocean – Shifts in Religious Authority in Indonesia’ in Azyumardi Azra, Kees van Dijk and Nico J.G. Kaptein (eds), Varieties of Religious Authority and Challenges in 20th Century Indonesian Islam (2010); Martin van Bruinessen, New Leadership, New Policies? (2010) Inside Indonesia <http://www.insideindonesia.org/> at 31 July 2010.

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There are concerns about Tuan Guru potentially acting as instigators or provocateurs

in conflict situations, and these issues will be addressed later in this chapter.

This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section, ‘Who are Tuan Guru?’,

explores the emergence of this type of religious leader. It then proposes a taxonomy of

Tuan Guru (based upon their level of social influence) and explores their intellectual

and spiritual diversity. The next section, ‘The Historical Emergence of the Tuan

Guru’, investigates the ascendancy of these religious leaders over the last 100 years.

This historical analysis of the burgeoning role of Tuan Guru is followed by the

section, ‘Locating Religion in Lombok’, which considers the position of religious

observance, ritual and religious affiliation in Mataram and West Lombok.

The fourth section, ‘Embedded Power’, reviews the socio-political power of Tuan

Guru. This section also investigates the potential pitfalls of these religious leaders’

dominant position in a newly-democratising and decentralised political environment.

The fifth section, ‘Guardians of Social Order – The Key to Social Stabilisation’,

highlights how Tuan Guru’s religious and socio-political activities make them

legitimate authority figures within the Sasak community who are able able to act

effectively as mediators and social stabilisers during periods of tension and violence.

This chapter provides essential background to the role of Tuan Guru in conflict

management processes. Tuan Guru and their organisations have, in many ways, built

an atmosphere supportive of social harmony. For instance, Lalu Aksar Anshori, the

head of an NU-affiliated youth group strongly criticised the Front Pembela Islam

(FPI) in mid-2008 for their activities in Java, and elsewhere in Indonesia. The

problem he identified with FPI was that they used religion to justify violent

behaviour, such as raiding bars.336

336 ‘Kutuk Kekerasan Atas Nama Agama’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 3 June 2008.

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Who are Tuan Guru?

On a basic level Tuan Guru are akin to both Muslim religious teachers (ustadz) and

leaders (ulama) in Lombok, and are essentially similar to Kiyai in Java.337 Tuan Guru

are pivotal religious, social and political leaders on the island. They are the most

influential category of non-state actors in Mataram and West Lombok, and are

involved with the spiritual life, such as the leading of prayers, and educational

guidance of the Sasak community. Tuan Gurus’ pedagogic contribution is undertaken

through personal and institutional avenues. Primarily, Tuan Guru are religious

educators who provide Islamic teaching through Friday sermons (khutbah) and

Qur’anic education classes (pengajian). Their educational prowess is the key to

establishing credibility within the community.338 Tuan Guru may also oversee Islamic

boarding schools (pondok pesantren), and this becomes their contribution to

institutional education in Lombok.339

In the mid-1970s, Nahdlatul Wathan recognised the social and political potency of the

title Tuan Guru and sought to establish criteria for its use,340 but, this prescriptive

approach never gained broad acceptance, at least not in Mataram or West Lombok.

Accordingly, no definitive qualification or selection criteria for use of the title Tuan

Guru is available at the moment. It remains totally unregulated in a formal sense by

the state or by Islamic organisations.341 Yet it can be clearly said that the title Tuan

Guru is granted by Sasak society to a respected religious figure.342 Their status

emanates from their personal religious knowledge, social standing and charisma.343

One of the strongest features within the armoury of Tuan Guru is their close

relationship with society and the importance that the Sasak community of Mataram

337 Sven Cederroth, The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power of Mekkah – A Sasak Community on Lombok (1981) 81-88; Endang Turmudi, Perselingkuhan Kyai Dengan Kekausaan (2004). 338 Field notes, 7 August 2008. 339 Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). 340 Judith L. Ecklund, ‘Tradition or Non-tradition: Adat, Islam, and Local Control on Lombok’ in Gloria Davis (ed.), What is Modern Indonesian Culture? (1979) 253. 341 A Tuan Guru is not appointed by a government agency or department, nor do Islamic organizations designate people to become Tuan Guru, although, they may groom and promote people as such. 342 Interview with Ustadz Abdul Qodir Jaelani (Mataram, 18 December 2007). See also: Asnawi, Agama dan Paradigma Sosial Masyarakat (2006) 180; Interview with Mukhsin (Mataram, 14 July 2008). 343 Asnawi, Agama dan Paradigma Sosial Masyarakat (2006) 180.

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and West Lombok place upon religious ritual and affiliation. One way of

understanding this close relationship, which many Sasak told me about, was by

contrasting Javanese Kiyai and Tuan Guru. Interestingly, this contrast is in many

ways not about religious leaders, but rather about the presumed differences between

Javanese and Sasak society. TGH Mustiadi Abhar felt that the distinguishing features

are not the role or functions that these religious leaders undertake or their personal

character, but the way that the general public relates to them.344 For the Sasak, Abhar

asserted, religious practices and ritual are central to their identity and daily lives,

while to the Javanese, he said, religion does not necessarily have the same level of

importance (although, most Javanese would dispute this). In fact, he jokingly said that

many Javanese families have different religions within the one family – “one child

Muslim, one child Hindu, one child Buddhist”.345 The implication of this admittedly

absurd joke was that Javanese religious values are all mixed up, and by implication,

weak. This comparision is not intended to undermine Javanese religious practices, but

rather to highlight the way that the Sasak in Mataram and West Lombok place

significant value upon religious affiliation and ritual. Consequently, the Sasak place a

high degree importance upon religious leadership. The high social status ascribed to

Tuan Guru means that they are able to effectively engage in conflict management

processes.

TGH Ahmad Madani told me that Islam was central to Sasak social processes and

customary rules (adat).346 The centrality of religion in Lombok, Madani noted, could

be seen in the way that the Sasak prioritised Haj – the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca.

He explained to me that many Sasak believed that this pilgrimage is more important

for the Sasak than for the Javanese. Many Sasak, Madani noted, would go on Haj

344 Interview with TGH Mustiadi Abhar (Mataram, 23 July 2008). 345 Ibid. 346 The parallel, and connected, role of religion and adat in Lombok has been discussed in Erni Budiwanti, Islam Sasak – Waktu Telu Versus Waktu Lima (2000) 33. Similar research findings are found in the work of Judith L. Ecklund, Marriage, Seaworms, and Song: Ritualized Responses to Cultural Change in Sasak Life (PhD Thesis, Cornell University, 1977) 9; and Bartholomew Ryan, Alif Lam Mim – Reconciling Islam, Modernity, and Tradition in an Indonesian Kampung (PhD Thesis, Harvard University, 1999) 111-112. However, the research of Leena Avonius found that in northern Lombok there was a contrary position with a clear distinction between adat and religion (or at least a desire for this). As noted earlier, this is not undermining the point that I am making. Rather it highlights the eclectic nature of Sasak society in Lombok and the potential for different parts of the island to have distinct socio-religious realities (this is discussed in Chapter 1). See Leena Avonius, ‘Reforming Adat – Indonesian Indigenous People in the ear of Reformasi’ (2004) 4 The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 123, 130.

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when they were young, while the Javanese often left this till later in life (although,

again, he provided no data to support these claims).347 This commitment to their

religious beliefs went to extreme levels, with some Sasak “so eager to go on the Haj…

that they would sacrifice their children’s education and sell land if the need be”.348

Table 3.1 (below) indicates that the religious leaders in Lombok can be appointed by

the state or ‘appointed’ by society, or both. In broad terms, state and non-state Muslim

religious leaders in Mataram and West Lombok are not of the same social standing.

Tuan Guru are unquestionably held in higher esteem than their government-appointed

colleagues. Despite this, I have put Penghulu (state-appointed religious leaders) and

Tuan Guru (non-state appointed) at the same level in the table for the purposes of

explaining the operation of religious leadership, rather than suggesting that they are of

equal status. To assume that these positions are mutually exclusive roles is incorrect,

as sometimes Tuan Guru are also Penghulu. This emphasises the point made in

Chapter 1 that the distinction between state and non-state actors and institutions is

often blurred. However, understanding the basic distinctions between different types

and levels of religious leadership is useful when attempting to comprehend the

conflict management processes implemented in Bok (see Chapter 5). In this case

study, the role of religious leadership and the types of religious figures deployed

becomes central to the dispute resolution process.

347 Interview with TGH Ahmad Madani (Mataram, 21 August 2008). This was also noted by other interviewees, such as Mukhtar, see Interview with Mukhtar (Mataram, 28 August 2008). 348 Cynthia L. Hunter, ‘Local Issues and Changes: The Post-New Order Situation in Rural Lombok’ (2004) 19 Sojourn 100, 116.

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State Non-State

Penghulu – 1 per dusun (a sub-district of a village – desa)

Their official role encompasses being invited to lead religious ceremonies, such as deaths, marriages and zikir (collective prayer).

Appointed by the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs

Tuan Guru – Lokal and Besar

Religious leader with a role that encompasses acting as a teacher, spiritual leader, religious authority and organisational figure.

‘Appointed’ informally by social acceptance

Kyai – 3-5 per dusun.

This official position fulfils most of the same functions as the Penghulu.

Usually appointed by the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs

Ustadz/Ustadza

Religious teacher at an Islamic boarding school.

Appointed by non-state religious organisations or boarding schools

Table 3.1 Religious leadership in Bok

Picture 3.2 Tuan Guru Besar Sofwan Hakim in Kediri, West Lombok, 2008

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Picture 3.3 Tuan Guru Besar Mustiadi Abhar in Pagutan, Mataram, 2008

Picture 3.4 Tuan Guru Besar Abdul Hamid in Ampenan, Mataram, 2008

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Picture 3.5 Tuan Guru Besar Ulul Azmi in Jerneng, West Lombok, 2007

How Tuan Guru are ‘appointed’ is difficult to establish definitively. The answer to

this question is opaque in theory, however, in reality a practical and straightforward

communal process occurs. Having said this there are essentially no ‘official’ rules for

becoming a Tuan Guru,349 nor are there any criteria approved by government, as there

is for the position of Penghulu (see Table 3.1). Although the Penghulu is a respected

person in Lombok, they do not hold the same level of social authority within the

community as do Tuan Guru.350 According to ustadz Abdul Qodir Jaelani, the role of

Tuan Guru is simply an honour bestowed by society upon a respected religious figure

due to his religious knowledge and charisma.351

There are only two tangible criteria that I could firmly establish are required in order

to gain the title of Tuan Guru. First, all Tuan Guru must have made the Haj

pilgrimage to Mecca.352 Second, all are male.353 Other factors that determine who may

349 Ibid. 350 Interview with Imran (Bok, West Lombok, 26 August 2008). 351 Interview with Ustadz Abdul Qodir Jaelani (Mataram, 18 December 2007). See also: Interview with Mukhsin (Mataram, 14 July 2008); Interview with Muhammad Dimiati (Mataram, 12 August 2008). 352 Asnawi, Agama dan Paradigma Sosial Masyarakat (2006) 183.

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become a Tuan Guru are highly subjective and difficult to define with precision.

There are nonetheless common characteristics that are often shared by those who are

deemed worthy by their community to hold the title of Tuan Guru.

To become a Tuan Guru, prospective Muslim religious leaders in Lombok should

generally have a high-level of knowledge (ilmu) of Islamic teachings as they are

primarily considered religious mentors and educators.354 TGH Abdul Hamid Faisal

explained that Tuan Guru consider their role first and foremost to be communal

teachers and leaders, rather than being an institutionalised figure, such as the leader of

a pesantren.355 Recognition as a Tuan Guru, and consequently, socio-political

strength, rests with their community’s trust and support.356 This endorsement comes

from a religious leader’s ability to engage their community and the manner in which

the community accepts their opinions. Tuan Guru as educators establish their

credentials and solidify their communal support through Friday sermons and their

Islamic education classes. This role as educator sits comfortably within Sunni Muslim

tradition where ulama, as non-state religious leaders, act as jurists and teachers.357

Another point of difference between Tuan Guru and Javanese Kiyai can be seen when

it comes to the management and control of Islamic boarding schools. An assumed

criterion for being a Kiyai in Java is leadership of a pesantren.358 However, no similar

353 Interview with Muhammad Dimiati (Mataram, 12 August 2008). 354 Interview with Asnawi (Mataram, 5 August 2008); Interview with Muhammad Dimiati (Mataram, 12 August 2008); Interview with TGH Subkhi Sasaki (Kediri, West Lombok, 23 August 2008). 355 Interview with TGH Abdul Hamid Faisal (Mataram, 19 July 2008). 356 Interview with Mukhsin (Mataram, 14 July 2008). 357 Faud I Khuri, ‘The Ulama: A Comparative Study of Sunni and Shi’a Religious Officials’ (1987) 23 Middle Eastern Studies 291, 292-294. For a discussion of the intellectual, social and spiritual issues currently facing Ulama across the Muslim world, see Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam – Custodians of Change (2002). Also, for an analysis of the historical development of Indonesian and Malaysian ulama and how this fits into broader Islamic intellectual and political trends, see: Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Indonesia’s Ulama and Politics: Caught Between Legitimising the Status Quo and Searching for Alternatives’ (1990) 49 Prisma – The Indonesian Indicator 52; Gregory J. Fealy, Ulama and Politics in Indonesia: A History of Nahdlatul Ulama, 1952-1967 (PhD Thesis, Monash University, 1998); Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, ‘Towards a History of Malaysian Ulama’ (Working Paper No. 122, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 2007); Andree Feillard, ‘From Handling Water in a Glass to Coping with an Ocean – Shifts in Religious Authority in Indonesia’ in Azyumardi Azra, Kees van Dijk and Nico J.G. Kaptein (eds), Varieties of Religious Authority and Challenges in 20th Century Indonesian Islam (2010). 358 Endang Turmudi, Struggling for the Umma – Changing Leadership Roles of Kiai in Jombang, East Java (2007) 21-22.

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expectation exists for Tuan Guru.359 Essentially, Tuan Guru are scholars and teachers

rather than institution-builders, although to ignore the importance of their

organisational capabilities would be unwise. Religious leaders who have the backing

of organisations acknowledge that organisational support does augment community

perceptions of them and increases their socio-political influence. Organisational

backing creates an image of authority to the community and Tuan Guru are able to

advance their socio-political status through the provision of health, education and

social services. Having said this, the provision of these services is not merely a

tactical political matter. Rather most Tuan Guru perceive it to be part of their

responsibilities to their community (ummah).360

Not all Tuan Guru have equal status, and their levels of influence vary. Throughout

this thesis Tuan Guru are divided into Tuan Guru Lokal (local Tuan Guru) and Tuan

Guru Besar (important Tuan Guru). This categorisation emerged from my own

observations and many informal discussions and was further developed during an

interview with Asnawi, the Rektor of the State Islamic Insitute Mataram.361 Although

most Sasak would recognise the delineation they would not necessarily use the terms

‘Tuan Guru Lokal’ or ‘Tuan Guru Besar’.362 This taxonomy represents their spheres

of influence and where their authority has effect. Tuan Guru Lokal have influence

within a confined geographic area, for example a village. By contrast, Tuan Guru

Besar attract support from across the island, and in some cases they may have a

reputation outside Lombok, such as TGH Sofwan Hakim from Kediri363 and TGH

Bajang from Pancor.364

Despite the importance of lineage (which will be considered later in this chapter) there

is a strong element of meritocracy in deciding who is classified as a Tuan Guru and

359 Interview with TGH Ramli (Mataram, 29 July 2008); Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). 360 Ibid. 361 Institut Agama Islam Negeri Mataram or The State Islamic Institute Mataram. The position of Rektor is similar to University Vice-Chancellor or President elsewhere. 362 Interview with Asnawi (Mataram, 5 August 2008). 363 His prestige and social status is, for instance, recognised by a weekly column in the Lombok Post called ‘Dialog Jumat’ (Friday Dialogue) in which he answers questions from readers on religious practice and interpretation. 364 Both have santri (religious students) who come from across Lombok to attend their pondok pesantren and former students will often travel across the island for their Friday sermon. For instance, two or three cars from Kampung Lom and Komplek Lom each week head across to Pancor for Friday prayers – Interview with Mukhsin (Mataram, 14 July 2008).

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into which category he should fall. Religious leaders are not confined by birth to

being a Tuan Guru Lokal or Tuan Guru Besar. For example, Tuan Guru Besar

Sofwan Hakim was born to the late Tuan Guru Lokal Abdul Karim.365 There are also

networks of interconnected religious leaders. Tuan Guru Lokal are often part of

religious networks affiliated to more senior Tuan Guru. TGH Ramli, a Tuan Guru

Lokal from Lom, told me that he was closely affiliated with NW Pancor and that he

had studied at their principle educational facility, Pondok Pesantren Darun

Nahdlatain. He explained that his religious leader was, therefore, TGH Bajang who is

a Tuan Guru Besar.366

Tuan Gurus’ religious ‘empires’ have grown significantly over the past 100 years.367

Historically three religious centres hosted Tuan Guru Besar and their organisations –

Kediri (West Lombok), Praya (Central Lombok) and Pancor (East Lombok). More

recently this has expanded to several new centres, such as Pagutan (Mataram) and

Anjani (East Lombok). In each of these religious centres there are often several Tuan

Guru, for instance, there are now five Tuan Guru Besar in Kediri who are affiliated

with five large Islamic boarding schools.368 This steady historical rise of Tuan Guru

will be discussed in the next section.

In a local community a man is considered a Tuan Guru because of his religious

knowledge and his community’s willingness to learn from him. Beyond the

boundaries of a village or neighbourhood other people would not necessarily consider

him to be a Tuan Guru. This geographic restriction of influence marks a Tuan Guru

Lokal’s authority.369 Tuan Guru Lokal are more than simply a religious teacher

(ustadz) although this is the foundation to their role. They also have a position of

leadership within the community and are influential in shaping public opinion, as well

as offering counsel to other local leaders, such as Kepala Desa (village heads).

365 Email from Herawati to Jeremy Kingsley, 26 July 2009. 366 Interview with TGH Ramli (Mataram, 29 July 2008). 367 Sven Cederroth, The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power of Mekkah – A Sasak Community on Lombok (1981) 276-284; Erni Budiwanti, Islam Sasak – Waktu Telu Versus Waktu Lima (2000) 290-296; Asnawi, Agama dan Paradigma Sosial Masyarakat (2006) 180-189. 368 Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008). 369 Interview with Asnawi (Mataram, 5 August 2008).

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The Tuan Guru Lokal in Lom, TGH Ramli, is an elderly man with a calm and

sensitive nature. This was actually very much the way he described how Tuan Guru

should be – halus (cultured or refined). He emphasised this point at least three times

during our interview.370 When talking with Imran, the Sekretaris (a village official) of

Bok, he told me that in most village there may be several Tuan Guru Lokal. In Bok,

there was a Tuan Guru in each hamlet. However, this pattern of religious leadership

does not strictly follow official boundaries.371

Tuan Guru Lokal, such as TGH Ramli, do not necessarily have high-levels of

religious education. In fact, Ramli’s religious studies did not go beyond his time at

Pondok Pesantren Darun Nahdlatain.372 He had studied the Qur’an, Hadith and kitab

kuning (the ‘Yellow Books’ texts that provide commentaries on Islamic

jurisprudence) during his younger years, but other than his limited formal religious

education he is self-taught. Nonethless, Ramli is highly respected locally as a teacher

because of his insightful perspectives on religious and social issues.373

In contrast to Tuan Guru Lokal there is an expectation that Tuan Guru Besar will have

higher levels of religious education. As a result they will usually have studied at

religious institutions overseas. TGH Ahmad Madani received his religious education

at Pondok Pesantren Darul Falah in Pagutan on the outskirts of Mataram. He then

spent four years in Saudi Arabia furthering his religious education.374 TGH Subkhi

Sasaki had a similar trajectory of religious education, living for eight years at an

Islamic boarding school in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. It has been argued that Saudi Arabia,

and its state ideology Wahhabism, provides the intellectual and institutional support

for many forms of puritanical Islam.375 However, Sasaki, a prominent progressive

religious leader and advocate of women’s rights in Lombok, painted a different

picture of his experiences. His pesantren in Saudi Arabia was a plural institution with

scholars coming from across the Muslim world, covering most of the schools of

Islamic jurisprudence. He said it was a place of argument and debate, which was more

370 Interview with TGH Ramli (Mataram, 29 July 2008). 371 Interview with Imran (Bok, West Lombok, 26 August 2008). 372 Ibid. 373 Field Notes, 30 July 2008. 374 Interview with TGH Ahmad Madani (Mataram, 21 August 2008). 375 Noorhaidi Hasan, ‘Faith and Politics: The Rise of Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia’ (2002) 73 Indonesia 145, 147.

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open and tolerant than Saudi state universities.376 Another example of a Tuan Guru

who has had foreign religious education is TGH Bajang, who studied at the

prestigious Al-Azhar University in Cairo where he received his doctorate.377

Tuan Guru Besar usually find themselves to be incredibly busy. Their teaching and

religious guidance is often sought across the island, not to mention the obligations that

they may have within their own organisations, such as committees or supervisory

duties at their pesantren. For example, TGH Sofwan Hakim has a gruelling schedule.

He teaches pengajian every morning in Kediri to various groups of santri from the

pesantren and the broader community, while on Friday he also teaches a women’s

only class. Additionally, he travels nearly every day to different parts of Lombok to

provide religious teaching and assist his sizable community of followers (ummah).

This extensive list of teaching and pastoral activities does not include his

administrative tasks which are many.378

One method for judging the level of a Tuan Guru’s influence and public support can

be seen by the response and size of the audiences attracted to their sermons and

religious education classes. When a Tuan Guru’s knowledge is combined with

charisma he can draw large audiences, and consequently, becomes powerful. This

popularity allows Tuan Guru to guide public opinion and gain the devotion of

supporters.379

Despite noting that it is not necessary for Tuan Guru to run a pesantren, their

organisational muscle is another way of measuring whether a religious leader is a

Tuan Guru Besar or Tuan Guru Lokal. If a Tuan Guru has a large boarding school

and controls other institutional functions, such as health clinics, social services or

businesses then he can safely be categorised as a Tuan Guru Besar. Examples of the

size of some larger pesantren are TGH Sofwan Hakim’s Pondok Pesantren Nurul

Hakim in Kediri, West Lombok, which has over 3000 students,380 or TGH Munajid

376 Interview with TGH Subkhi Sasaki (Kediri, West Lombok, 23 August 2008). 377 ‘Akhirnya, HM Zainul Majdi Pimpin NW’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 20 September 1999. 378 Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008). 379 Interview with TGH Ramli (Mataram, 29 July 2008). 380 Ibid.

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Khalid’s Pondok Pesantren Al-Halimy in Gunung Sari, West Lombok, with 1200

students.381

Picture 3.6 Pondok Pesantren Nurul Hakim (led by TGH Sofwan Hakim)

A wide variety of religious leaders come under the title Tuan Guru. A taxonomy

based on the level and reach of their influence has just been explained, but there are

also other areas of difference among these religious leaders. Essentially, Tuan Guru

are not a homogenous group, but rather hold a diverse range of religious positions.382

This multiplicity of perspectives among Tuan Guru reflects the Indonesian context,

which is marked by a plurality of Islamic traditions, interpretations and practices.383

One of the major divisions in Indonesian Islam is between ‘modernist’ and

‘traditionalist’ approaches to Islamic thought.384 However, in Lombok, modernist

381 Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). 382 During an informal discussion with Dr Erni Budiwanti, a researcher at the Research Centre for Regional Resources, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (PSDR-LIPI), who is originally from Lombok, she stressed that Tuan Guru are an eclectic group. They hold a wide range of religious beliefs and political affiliations. 383 M.B. Hooker and Tim Lindsey, ‘Public Faces of Syari’ah in Contemporary Indonesia: Towards a National Mazhab’ (2002) 4 Australian Journal of Asian Law 259, 289; Peter Riddell, Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World (2001) 262-263; Geraldine Doogue and Peter Kirkwood, Tomorrow’s Islam – Uniting Age-Old Beliefs and a Modern World (2005) 268; Abdullah Saeed, ‘Introduction: the Qur’an, Interpretation and the Indonesian Context’ in Abdullah Saeed, Approaches to the Qur’an in Contemporary Indonesia (2005) 6; Kamrani Buseri, Humaidy and Ahmad Juhaidi, ‘Islam dan Keragaman Budaya Lokal di Kalimantan: Meneguhkan Visi Keindonesiaan’ in Komaruddin Hidayat and Ahmad Gauf, Menjadi Indonesia – 13 Abad Eksistensi Islam di Bumi Nusantara (2006) 257-292; Greg Fealy, Virginia Hooker and Sally White, ‘Indonesia’ in Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker (eds), Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia – A Contemporary Sourcebook (2006) 39-41. 384 Howard M. Federspiel, Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals of the 20th Century (2006) 27-43.

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Islamic theology is not particularly popular. The modernist interpretive approaches of

returning to the core sources of Qur’an and the Hadith and then construing them

within contemporary circumstances is embodied by the mass Islamic movement,

Muhammadiyah.385 Muhammadiyah is, however, nowhere near as influential as

‘traditionalist’ mass movements, Nahdlatul Ulama and Nahdlatul Wathan, in

Lombok. This position was noted by Tuti Harwati, et al, who said “Sasak Muslims

follow the religious conceptions which are taught by Tuan Guru who place a great

deal of belief in Sunnah and Shafi fiqh”.386 The orthodox ‘traditionalist’ approach to

interpretion in this quote relies on reading Islamic texts and traditions within their

historical context and following jurisprudential traditions that have developed over

centuries.387 Having said this, Lombok actually reflects a microcosm of Indonesian

diversity and religious eclecticism.388

It is often assumed by Muslim and non-Muslim alike that

‘Islam’ is some sort of monolith, but even momentary

reflection is sufficient to show that this is not true. On the

contrary, intellectual and social variation and variability is

the norm and has always been the norm throughout Islamic

history.389

Islam in Indonesia is not uniform or standardised – rather it is an eclectic and diverse

spiritual tent. Even using words such as Syari’ah, a concept broadly defined as

‘Islamic law’ – a fundamental concept within Islamic teaching, involves a disparate

array of interpretations.390 It must be understood that Islamic concepts are interpreted

and applied differently depending on one’s geography, cultural lineage, intellectual

385 Peter Riddell, Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World (2001) 87-89, 210. 386 Tuti Harwati, Mohamad Abdun Nasir, Nikmatullah and Siti Nurul Khaerani, Tradisi dan Transformasi Pemikiran Hukum Keluarga Islam di Lombok – Poligami, Kawin Cerai dan Kawin Sirri Muslim Sasak (2007) 41. 387 Peter Riddell, Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World (2001) 7. 388 Greg Fealy, Virginia Hooker and Sally White, ‘Indonesia’ in Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker (eds), Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia – A Contemporary Sourcebook (2006) 39-41. 389 M.B. Hooker, Indonesian Islam – Social Change Through Contemporary Fatawa (2003) 47. 390 The difficulties in defining ‘sacred law’ is a scholarly and political debate with hundreds of years of lineage, see Baber Johansen, ‘A Perfect Law in an Imperfect Society – Ibn Taymiyya’s Concept of Governance in the Name of the Sacred Law’ in Peri Bearman, Wolfhart Heinrichs and Bernard G. Weiss (eds), The Law Applied – Contextualizing the Islamic Shari’a (2008) 264-267.

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background and political aspirations.391 These differences have created an

intellectually rich interpretive history and practice across the Indonesian

archipelago.392 It is easy to consider this ethnic, religious and theological diversity

from a national perspective, but this plurality of perspectives and positions also exists

within Lombok.

Picture 3.7 TGH Subkhi Sasaki talking with me about different religious positions and practices

among the Sasak and Tuan Guru (Kediri, West Lombok, 2008)

There is cultural and religious diversity, for instance within the role and application of

adat, and organisational rivalry between religious groups in Lombok, such as

Nahdlatul Ulama and Nahdlatul Wathan, however, when talking with Tuan Guru

these cleavages did not play upon their consciousness actively (or at least they did not

discuss them directly with me). Rather, as TGH Subkhi Sasaki (photograph above)

has suggested that there are identifiable ‘groupings’ of Tuan Guru.393 He articulated

these as being based on three major streams of thought and practice among

mainstream Muslims in Lombok.

The first group, Sasaki said, are people whose religious practices focus on ‘textual

strictures’. This involves emphasising the key Islamic sources – Qur’an, Hadith, Fiqh 391 M.B. Hooker, Indonesian Syariah – Defining a National School of Islamic Law (2008) 1-3. 392 This is discussed in greater detail in R. Michael Feener, Muslim Legal Thought in Modern Indonesia (2007). 393 Interview with TGH Subkhi Sasaki (Kediri, West Lombok, 23 August 2008).

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(Islamic jurisprudence) and kitab kuning. They follow a strongly textualist and

traditionalist approach to the elucidation of Islamic principles,394 which undertakes

interpretation “that relies on text and tradition and at the same time approaches the

question of interpretation strictly from a linguistic perspective”.395 Essentially, they

focus upon a legalistic interpretation of their religion. This group, Sasaki felt, are

fixated on “Islam’s laws” (hukum Islam) and include most santri who have come

through an Islamic boarding school education.396

The second group comprises people who are mostly from villages and whose religious

practices are more spiritual (mystical) and emotional rather than intellectual (this can

be seen as religion coming from the heart rather than from the head).397 This practice

emphasises ritual and prayer rather than textual understanding. The third group is a

blend of the first two groups. This last group emphasises spiritual and ritual practices,

while also incorporating textual learning.398

Sasaki identified most closely with the third group – using text while also recognising

the importance of the local cultural context and mysticism.399 On the other hand, TGH

Ahmad Madani described himself as a conservative and strong traditionalist, but he

was also socially aware and progressive when developing his religious opinions and

communicating them with his community. Madani felt that primacy should be given

to the key Islamic texts, however, he also recognised that these texts should be

interpreted in order to accurately represent the cultural context and contemporary

environment faced by his community.400

These three categories are broad generalisations, with many Tuan Guru falling

somewhere in between, or even shifting between them over time. There is broad

sprectrum of approaches to religious jurisprudence, interpretation and ritual in

394 Asnawi, Agama dan Paradigma Sosial Masyarakat (2006) 180-181. 395 Abdullah Saeed, Interpreting the Qur’an – Towards a Contemporary Approach (2006) 42. 396 This approach to education through pesantren and the type of interpretive approach it creates has been discussed in Erni Budiwanti, Islam Sasak – Waktu Telu Versus Waktu Lima (2000) 290-296. 397 This spiritual and mystical approach to Islam among many Sasak is considered in Asnawi, Agama dan Paradigma Sosial Masyarakat (2006). 398 Tuan Guru Besar Muhammad Mutawalli has supported this combination of textual understanding, spirituality and traditional practices – see Fahrurrozi Dahlan, Sejarah Perjuangan dan Pergerakan Dakwah Islamiyah Tuan Guru Haji Muhammad Mutawalli di Pulau Lombok (2006) xiv. 399 Interview with TGH Subkhi Sasaki (Kediri, West Lombok, 23 August 2008). 400 Interview with TGH Ahmad Madani (Mataram, 21 August 2008).

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Lombok, yet the three groups I have described capture the broad trends and the kinds

of emphasis given by most religious leaders in Mataram and West Lombok in dealing

with Islamic ritual and teachings.

The two taxonomies above highlight the eclectic nature of Tuan Guru. They are based

on approaches to Tuan Gurus’ religious orientation and their levels of socio-political

and religious influence. Other differences between these religious leaders, such as

those related to political affiliation, will be discussed later in this chapter. The point to

be made here is simply that the multiplicity of perspectives and different levels of

social influence underscore the complex nature of Tuan Guru as a socio-political and

religious elite in Lombok.

The final part of this section considers the standards expected of Tuan Guru by Sasak

communities in Mataram and West Lombok. This, in many ways, is the counterpoint

to the criteria noted earlier in this section for becoming a Tuan Guru. The ambiguous

manner of appointment, combined with their high social status, leads to serious

expectations being placed upon Tuan Guru. In reality, Tuan Guru are not in a tenuous

position in constant fear of losing their role as religious leaders, however, they do

realise that they need to behave cautiously. Their community (ummah) watches what

they wear and how they behave. Essentially, Tuan Guru act as a “contoh” (example)

and are role models to society.401 On a basic level, they should not undertake certain

activities which may, in the minds of community members, reduce their standing,

such as riding a pushbike.402 This example may sound trivial, but there is an etiquette

and propriety expected of Sasak religious leaders. For many in Lombok, small acts

connected to one’s behaviour or dress are relevant to assessing a person’s character.

Consequently, if they “misbehave” many Tuan Guru feel that they are likely to lose

social support, or at least, have it reduced.403

Tuan Guru need to act with the best interests of their ummah in mind, because they

are seen as guardians of their respective communities.404 There are two logical

401 Interview with Muhammad Dimiati (Mataram, 12 August 2008). 402 Interview with Asnawi (Mataram, 5 August 2008). 403 Interview with TGH Ramli (Mataram, 29 July 2008). 404 TGH Muhammad Zainul Majdi (TGH Bajang), Islam & Masalah Keumatan – Khutbah Jum’at (2007) 173-180.

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explanations for their need to act responsibly. First, if society loses faith in a

particular Tuan Guru and believes that they are not acting in their best interests then

the Tuan Guru’s individual social status may be diminished. Second, if a Tuan Guru

loses sight of the high expectations placed upon him by his community (by becoming

corrupt, for example), he may jeopardise the overall reputation of Tuan Guru.

Therefore, to be considered a Tuan Guru and maintain one’s status, a bond of trust

and respect between the religious leader and their community needs to be carefully

nurtured.405

This section has considered the personal qualities, perspectives and expectations

placed upon Tuan Guru. In the next section consideration will be given to the

historical development of Tuan Guru and their organisations. These local religious

leaders are aware that their standing as individuals and a group has developed over a

lengthy period, however, if Tuan Guru abuse this influential position then their role

within the Sasak community could quickly diminish.

The historical emergence of Tuan Guru

The emergence of Tuan Guru as socio-political leaders has occurred through a

historical process that saw them eclipse other leadership figures on the island.

Throughout this thesis I argue that the importance of religion in Lombok underpins

Tuan Gurus’ socially and politically pivotal role. This is correct, but the rationale for

their pre-eminence as non-state actors is more complex than this assertion suggests.

Therefore, this section examines the historical rise of Tuan Guru and the rationale for

their high social standing. Their respected position in society and organisational

capacity is essential to their role in conflict management processes in Lombok.

The contemporary role of Tuan Guru needs to be read within the context of Lombok’s

history over the past 100 years. During this period, Tuan Guru overtook the mamiek

(Sasak nobility) as the leading non-state actors on the island.406 This competition

between rival political elites representing nobility and religious leadership also

405 Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008). 406 Judith L. Ecklund, Marriage, Seaworms, and Song: Ritualized Responses to Cultural Change in Sasak Life (PhD Thesis, Cornell University, 1977) 9.

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occurred in Java.407 During the Dutch colonial period in Lombok, Tuan Guru actively

challenged Dutch rule and established alternative institutional and social networks

outside colonial control which still remain active today.408 At the same time, their

noble rivals were part of the colonial governance structures.409

The ascension of Tuan Guru over mamiek was based on three key factors. First,

through the management of food stocks during cyclical drought periods Tuan Guru

and their organisations were able to provide sustenance via rationing to their

community.410 When discussing famines in Lombok it is essential to understand the

serious and cyclical nature of these events.411 For instance, in 1883 a famine that

affected Bali, Lombok and Sumbawa saw an estimated 117,000 people die.412

Droughts and food shortages have historically occurred every two to three years

leading to “starvation due to crop failure”.413 The last major famine in Lombok

occurred during 1966 when approximately 10,000 people died (the starvation was

concentrated in southern Lombok).414 Conditions have improved in recent times,

however, the World Food Programme still manages several food distribution

programs on the island.415 The suffering that resulted was not merely due to climatic

events or extraordinary circumstances. To a significant degree, these problems

emerged from the exploitative nature of colonial rule, for instance, heavy taxation.

407 In the colonial period, the rivalry in Java between religious leaders and the nobility was manifested in various arenas, such as the creation of rival educational institutions. The priyayi (Javanese nobility) supported Dutch colonial government schools, while the educational alternative was Islamic boarding schools. These two streams of school had significantly different content, pedagogy and linguistic requirements. See M.C. Ricklefs, ‘Religion, Politics and Social Dynamics in Java: Historical and Contemporary Rhymes’ in Greg Fealy and Sally White, Expressing Islam – Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia (2008) 118. 408 Asnawi, ‘Islam dan Visi Kebangsaan di Nusa Tenggara Barat’ in Komaruddin Hidayat and Ahmad Gauf, Menjadi Indonesia – 13 Abad Eksistensi Islam di Bumi Nusantara (2006) 327. 409 Kari Telle, ‘Spirited Places and Ritual Dynamics Among Sasak Muslims on Lombok’ (2009) 19 Anthropological Forum 289, 292. 410 See Alfons van der Kraan, Lombok: Conquest, Colonization and Underdevelopment, 1870-1940 (1980) 173; Sven Cederroth, The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power of Mekkah – A Sasak Community on Lombok (1981) 276-284; Sabirin, Respon Pemikiran Tuan Guru Terhadap Penetrasi Ajaran Wahabi Pada Etnik Sasak di Pulau Lombok (M.Phil Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2008) 17-24, 44-47. 411 Sven Cederroth, The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power of Mekkah – A Sasak Community on Lombok (1981) 284. 412 M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200 (3rd edition, 2001) 173. 413 Mary Poo-Mooi Judd, The Sociology of Rural Poverty in Lombok, Indonesia (PhD Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1980) 10 & 18. 414 Kari Telle, ‘Spirited Places and Ritual Dynamics Among Sasak Muslims on Lombok’ (2009) 19 Anthropological Forum 289, 298. 415 Indonesia (2010) World Food Programme <http://www.wfp.org/countries/indonesia> at 28 April 2010.

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This led to increasing shortages of food in Lombok, leaving people almost perpetually

close to starvation from 1900 to 1940.416 Tuan Guru and their organisations, were able

to reduce the severity of these events, through the management of food stocks and as a

consequence build a system of necessity-based patronage and loyalty.

Second, the Sasak created a distinct line of informal organisation and authority under

the control of Tuan Guru.417 I have seen their organisational prowess across the island

at pamswakarsa posts, medical clinics and Islamic boarding schools. This skill is also

seen in the development of local Islamic movements that have mass affiliation, such

as Nahdlatul Wathan (NW) and the local branch of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).418 NW

was formerly incorporated in 1953, while Lombok’s NU branch was established in

1955 (just before the 1955 national elections).419 These religious organisations (and

their predecessors) led by Tuan Guru became ‘shadow governments’ providing an

array of health, education and other services during the colonial and quasi-colonial

periods in Lombok. The influence of these organisations remains strong, in fact, to a

large extent undiminished.420 There was a lengthy period of colonial and quasi-

colonial rule in Lombok when the island was ruled by the Balinese, Dutch, Japanese

and the outside technocrats of the New Order administration. Over a period of three

centuries,421 the Sasak developed organisational methods to resist and exert their own

socio-religious identity.422

416 Alfons van der Kraan, Dutch Rule on Lombok 1900-1940: The Development of Underdevelopment (1980) 58-72. 417 Erni Budiwanti, Islam Sasak Wetu Lima versus Waktu Lima (2000) 119-121. 418 Lalu Djelenga, ‘Orang Sasak Dalam Perjalanan Sejarah Lombok’ (2002) 1 Journal Pemikiran Sosial Ekonomi Daerah NTB 5, 10. 419 Judith L. Ecklund, ‘Tradition or Non-tradition: Adat, Islam, and Local Control on Lombok’ in Gloria Davis (ed.), What is Modern Indonesian Culture? (1979) 255. 420 The extensive leadership and organisational capacity of NW has been explored in Masnun, Tuan Guru KH Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid – Gagasan dan Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam di Nusa Tenggara Barat (2007). 421 Lombok was subject to control by outsiders starting with Balinese rule in 1677 and ending with the fall of President Soeharto in 1998. See W. Cool, The Dutch in the East – An Outline of the Military Operations in Lombock [Lombok], 1894 (1897); Alfons van der Kraan, Lombok: Conquest, Colonization and Underdevelopment, 1870-1940 (1980) 16-58; Leena Avonius, Reforming Wetu Telu: Islam, Adat, and the Promises of Regionalism in Post-New Order Lombok (2004) 4-5; John MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Soeharto Lombok (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2005) 302-306. 422 Ibid 26-36.

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Third, strong and respected families have led to organisational continuity. This has

allowed some of the most prominent Tuan Guru to build upon the success of previous

generations.423 These familial and organisational networks rely upon developing up-

and-coming Tuan Guru. Typically this involves fostering young, bright students

considered to be future candidates for senior religious leadership positions, providing

them with high-levels of religious education in Java or further afield.424 Family ties

can also lead to rivalry as, for example, occurred within the local religious movement

Nahdlatul Wathan (NW). In 1998, this movement split during the NW Congress in

Praya, Central Lombok. The division was the result a power struggle between two

siblings, Rauhun and Raihanun, the daughters of NW’s founder, the late TGH

Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid, commonly known as TGH Pancor.425 NW

fractured into two organisations, NW Pancor and NW Anjani,426 arguably weakening

both.427 While speaking at the 73rd Anniversary of NW Pancor, in August 2008, TGH

Bajang indicated that he would be supportive of reconciliation moves, but at the time

of writing the separation still seemed solidly entrenched.428

This section considered the historical trajectory of religious leadership in Mataram

and West Lombok. This builds on the earlier section that examined the diversity of

Tuan Guru and how they gain their status and maintain it. The next section looks to

the foundation for Tuan Gurus’ high social standing – the religiosity of Sasak society.

423 Interview with TGH Mustiadi Abhar (Mataram, 23 July 2008). See also Mohammad Noor, Muslihan Habib and Muhammad Harfin Zuhdi, Visi Kebangsaan Religius – Refleksi Pemikiran dan Perjuangan Tuan Guru Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid 1904-1997 (2004) 108-111. 424 ‘Akhirnya, HM Zainul Majdi Pimpin NW’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 20 September 1999; Interview with Asnawi (Mataram, 5 August 2008); Interview with TGH Ahmad Madani (Mataram, 21 August 2008); Interview with TGH Subkhi Sasaki (Kediri, West Lombok, 23 August 2008); Interview with TGH Aminullah Abdul Hamid (Mataram, 25 August 2008). 425 Saipul Hamdi, ‘Reconciling Muslim Conflict in Nahdlatul Wathan in Lombok, Eastern Indonesia’ (Paper presented at the 4th Asian Graduate Forum on Southeast Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, Singapore, 15-17 July 2009) 3. 426 The reference to Pancor and Anjani identifies the towns in East Lombok where these rival NW organisations are now headquartered. 427 Saipul Hamdi, ‘Reconciling Muslim Conflict in Nahdlatul Wathan in Lombok, Eastern Indonesia’ (Paper presented at the 4th Asian Graduate Forum on Southeast Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, Singapore, 15-17 July 2009) 9-12. 428 ‘TGH Serukan NW Pancor-Anjani Bersatu’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 11 August 2008.

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Locating religion in Lombok

The importance of Islam to the Sasak people cannot be

overstated.429

When investigating conflict management processes in Mataram and West Lombok it

is essential to understand the social forces at play. One of the most important of these

is religious affiliation and ritual. As the quote above indicates, Islam plays an integral

role within the daily life of the Sasak. The implication of this is that the role of non-

state religious leadership, Tuan Guru, cannot be ignored. The respect accorded to

Islam among the Sasak is omnipresent. There are even inbuilt linguistic mechanisms

in Bahasa Sasak that identify this.430 For instance, when speaking to someone who

has been on the religious pilgrimage of Haj there are special forms of address and

ways to speak with them.431 Religion and its rituals are socially significant for the

Sasak in that they demarcate the social boundaries of life as “ritualized behaviour

circumscribes and delineates danger areas and marks cultural limits”.432

The centrality of Islam for the Sasak has been widely recognised by scholars, such as

Judith Ecklund, who wrote “that the idiom in Islam is proving to be an acceptable and

effective means of organizing and asserting local consciousness…”433 The contours of

daily life are given structure and meaning through religious ritual:

The vague movement of time is only punctuated by annual

rituals, the Friday prayer… and the five daily calls to prayer

issuing from the mosque.434

429 Mahyuni, Speech Styles and Cultural Consciousness in Sasak Community (2006) 89. Similar sentiments are also presented in Tadashi Kitamura, ‘Political Leaders and Rank Society in a Sasak Village, East Lombok, Indonesia’ in Toh Goda, Political Culture and Ethnicity – An Anthropological Study in Southeast Asia (1999) 97. 430 Bahasa Sasak is the language of the Sasak. 431 Mahyuni, Speech Styles and Cultural Consciousness in Sasak Community (2006) 89-93. 432 Judith L. Ecklund, Marriage, Seaworms, and Song: Ritualized Responses to Cultural Change in Sasak Life (PhD Thesis, Cornell University, 1977) 69. 433 Judith L. Ecklund, ‘Tradition or Non-tradition: Adat, Islam, and Local Control on Lombok’ in Gloria Davis (ed.), What is Modern Indonesian Culture? (1979) 262. 434 M. Cameron Hay, Remembering to Live – Illness at the Intersection of Anxiety and Knowledge in Rural Indonesia (2001) 105.

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Religion in the life of the Sasak is a physical and social reality in Mataram and West

Lombok. Each kampung has a small prayer house (musholla) and there is a mosque

(masjid) within one kilometre of the residents’ homes. Therefore, it is hard to avoid

religious participation.435 Lombok is known, at least locally, as the ‘island of 1000

mosques’. With over 3000 mosques on the island the slogan is an understatement.436

The ubiquitous nature of mosques in Lombok is symbolic of the importance of Islam

for the Sasak.437

TGH Sofwan Hakim felt that Islam was at the core of life for the Sasak. For him the

centrality of religion was rivalled only in other, very pious areas of Indonesia, such as

Aceh and Madura.438 This is a significant statement. Edward Aspinall has suggested

that “Islam and Aceh are two sides of the same coin”.439 ‘Lombok’, or ‘Sasak’, could

replace ‘Aceh’ in this quote and it would adequately represent the importance of

religion on the island.

Every Tuan Guru interviewed repeated, like a mantra, that the Sasak were a pious

ethnic group who adhered to their religious obligations. For instance, TGH Abdul

Hamid Faisal said “we are all santri” here in Lombok.440 Obviously, these

assessments of the importance of ritual and religiosity are coming from Tuan Guru

who have a biased perspective on local piety. However, it would be naïve to interpret

these assertions as simply self-serving, because the reality that I observed corresponds

to their assessment.441

The spiritual history of Lombok is a rich mosaic of religions and theological

influences. Prior to Islam arriving in Lombok, the Sasak were predominantly Hindu

and Buddhist.442 Islam has played an important role in Lombok since being brought to

the island by Sunan Prapen, an Islamic teacher (also locally recognised as a saint)

435 Interview with Asnawi (Mataram, 5 August 2008). This was also mentioned by TGH Humaidi Zaen, see Interview with TGH Humaidi Zaen (Memben, East Lombok, 9 August 2008). 436 Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi NTB, Nusa Tenggara Barat Dalam Angka (2008) 155. 437 Religious affiliation and ritual also plays a significant role in the life of members of other religious groups in Mataram and West Lombok, but this section focuses on the majority Sasak community. 438 Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008). 439 Edward Aspinall, Islam and Nation – Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia (2009) 10. 440 Interview with TGH Abdul Hamid Faisal (Mataram, 19 July 2008). Half a dozen other interviewees made almost exactly the same statement. 441 Field notes, 20 July 2008. 442 Erni Budiwanti, Islam Sasak – Waktu Telu Versus Waktu Lima (2000) 9.

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from Java in the 16th century.443 Lombok has also received Islamic influences from

Makassar and Bima during the early part of the 17th century.444 From the time of

Islam’s arrival on the island its social traction has progressively increased.445

Picture 3.8 A Mataram mosque

The importance of Islam in Lombok has meant that Tuan Guru play a role that is not

limited to the spiritual realm, but also have a pivotal social and political role within

Sasak society. Tuan Guru wield significant religious authority in their communities

and this is provides them with access to other leadership domains, such as political

office (discussed in further detail later in this chapter).446 As religious teachers and

leaders who are also politically active, the role of Tuan Gurus’ correspond to Islamic

jurisprudential traditions that have historically fused religion and state. This is a

complex relationship and the way that this is interpreted through legal structures, such

as Syari’ah-based codes, and religious principles, varies greatly.447

443 Asnawi, ‘Islam dan Visi Kebangsaan di Nusa Tenggara Barat’ in Komaruddin Hidayat and Ahmad Gauf, Menjadi Indonesia – 13 Abad Eksistensi Islam di Bumi Nusantara (2006) 308-309. See also W. Cool, The Dutch in the East – An Outline of the Military Operations in Lombock [Lombok], 1894 (1897) 59. 444 Robert Cribb, Historical Dictionary of Indonesia (1992) 269; M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200 (3rd edition, 2001) 45. 445 Sabirin, Respon Pemikiran Tuan Guru Terhadap Penetrasi Ajaran Wahabi Pada Etnik Sasak di Pulau Lombok (M.Phil Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2008) 44-50. 446 Bartholomew Ryan, Alif Lam Mim – Reconciling Islam, Modernity, and Tradition in an Indonesian Kampung (PhD Thesis, Harvard University, 1999) 98. 447 See Khaled Abou El Fadel , ‘Islam and the Challenge of Democracy’ in Khaled Abou El Fadel (ed), Islam and the Challenge of Democracy (2004) 12-16; Wael B. Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (2005) 178-193; Tim Lindsey and Jeremy Kingsley, ‘Talking in Code: Legal Islamisation

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To understand the religious and socio-political role of Tuan Guru it is worth

considering their practical activities and functions. These have already been touched

upon in earlier sections that discussed the criteria for becoming a Tuan Guru. In

earlier sections, I particularly focused upon the importance of their provision of

religious education classes and sermons. Through these activities they develop the

loyalty of pious students (santri) and create a following (ummah – their own religious

community).448

The educational activities of Tuan Guru can be seen across the island every day in a

multitude of ways, such as when they lead religious education classes, an example of

which is shown below (in Picture 3.9). The educational function of Tuan Guru is not

necessarily limited to their personal activities, but many also oversee educational

institutions (such as Islamic boarding schools). They can guide people’s activities and

attitudes through these learning processes. This educational role is one of the reasons

for their influential role in conflict management.449 They can do this, for example, by

presenting a sermon that calls for calm during tense times, or lead religious education

classes designed to reinforce Islamic concepts that warn against social anarchy. Tuan

Guru can also speak directly to protagonists in a dispute and counsel them about their

religious obligations in order to avoid or resolve a conflict.450

in Indonesia and the MMI Shari’a Criminal Code’ in Peri Bearman, Wolfhart Heinrichs and Bernard G. Weiss (eds), The Law Applied – Contextualizing the Islamic Shari’a (2008) 295-320. 448 Inflasi Tuan Guru (1976) Tempo < http://www.tempointeraktif.com/> at 18 May 2009; Mohammad Noor, Muslihan Habib and Muhammad Harfin Zuhdi, Visi Kebangsaan Religius – Refleksi Pemikiran dan Perjuangan Tuan Guru Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid 1904-1997 (2004). This was also discussed in several interviews, for instance, with TGH Sofwan Hakim and TGH Munajid Khalid – Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008); Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). 449 Sabirin, Respon Pemikiran Tuan Guru Terhadap Penetrasi Ajaran Wahabi Pada Etnik Sasak di Pulau Lombok (M.Phil Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2008) 14-16. 450 Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008).

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Picture 3.9 Pengajian in Memben, East Lombok

The functions of Tuan Guru are connected to specific religious objectives and

principles, as well as social priorities. TGH Muharror said that Tuan Gurus’

educational aims are focused on guiding their community’s religious activity through

reinforcing three important Islamic principles – akidah (faith), ibadah (worship) and

muamalah (relationships among people). They have “strong religious backgrounds

and knowledge which means that they are able to advise their ummat (community)”

on matters of religious instruction.451 An example of the teaching they undertake can

be seen in relation to the principle of ibadah. TGH Muharror felt that “Tuan Guru

help people to improve the quality of their worship”452 by helping members of their

community undertake their basic religious obligations, such as prayer (sholat) and

fasting. A Tuan Guru’s role as a guide for their community parallels their function

within conflict management processes. They perceive their goal as “actively helping

people find a way out of their problems”, consequently, avoiding conflict and

violence is part of this.453

The way that a Tuan Guru carries out his educational role also indicates his stature

and influence (as noted earlier when differentiating Tuan Guru Besar and Lokal).

After Friday prayers (sholat Jumat), Tuan Guru will give a sermon (khutbah). This

may be given at their local mosque, however, Tuan Guru Besar are also often invited

to other villages or communities. This shows how Tuan Guru Besar “do not only

belong to their own community”454 but also the broader society with their social

451 Interview with TGH Muharror (Electronic Interview, 11 May 2009). 452 Ibid. 453 Ibid. 454 Ibid.

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influence extending beyond their local community.455 This is also the case in relation

to the provision of pengajian, with TGH Sofwan Hakim often criss-crossing Lombok

to provide religious education and advice. People invite him to teach in their

community because of the high esteem in which he is held.456 This shows how Tuan

Gurus’ educational function is connected to their socio-political status – greater

demand for their teaching services is indicative of their high social standing, and as a

result, how far their influence and opinions travel.

Tuan Guru also exercise influence through the provision of fatwa, which are non-

binding socio-religious legal opinions that answer questions asked by members of

their community.457 This role as fatwa-maker solidifies their position as authoritative

interpreters of Islamic religious teaching and gives them social leverage within

people’s daily lives as guardians of local religious practice and interpretation (their

role as ‘guardians of religious traditions’ is reviewed later in this chapter).458 The

Sasak consider these religious opinions to be a vital mechanism for understanding

their social roles and delineating acceptable behaviour. There is a Qur’anic injunction

(Qur’an 2:285) to follow the prophet and religious leaders, “sami’na wa atha’na”

(“we listened and we obeyed”).459 The Sasak take this seriously, and as a

consequence, a fatwa from a Tuan Guru carries considerable weight.460 A 23 year-old

teacher, Herawati, told me “whatever a Tuan Guru says, we are loyal to it”.461

Therefore, these pedagogic and legal activities provide Tuan Guru with the ability to

act effectively in conflict management strategies.

This influential role as religious educator and interpreter is often reinforced by

institutional infrastructure, which generates strong informal mechanisms for

allegiance and sources of patronage. These educational activities are often framed

455 Ibid. 456 ‘Nurul Hakim Sebar Dai Pelosok Desa’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 21 August 2008. See also Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008). 457 Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker, Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia – A Contemporary Sourcebook (2006) xxxvii. 458 The importance of this role for ulama in Indonesia as the source of local interpretations of Islam is discussed in R. Michael Feener, Muslim Legal Thought in Modern Indonesia (2007) 151. 459 This verse was mentioned by every Tuan Guru interviewed. 460 Email from Herawati to Jeremy Kingsley, 30 July 2010. This is also noted by Maria Platt, one of whose informants told her that “If a tuan guru tells you to go home and scratch yourself you will”. See Maria Platt, Sasak Women Navigating Dynamic Marital Continuums: Patriarchal Institutions and Female Agency in Indonesian Marriages (PhD Thesis, La Trobe University, 2010) 46. 461 Ibid.

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within a broader organisational network, which also include educational institutions

(such as Islamic boarding schools), the provision of social services (such as medical

clinics) and businesses (including stores, catering services and quasi-banks).462

Institutional activities such as these create and increase a Tuan Guru’s social

engagement with the community through the provision of essential services.

Another barometer for comprehending the socio-political role of religion in Lombok

can be seen in the way that political loyalties have changed since the start of

Reformasi. To understand this approach to measuring the role of Islam, it is worth

considering some provincial election history. During the New Order period, the

regime’s political party, Golkar,463 dominated Lombok politics.464 In the last national

election of the New Order era in 1997, NTB voters strongly endorsed Golkar who

received 72% of the ballots cast.465 However, with Reformasi and subsequent

democratic reforms Golkar’s support dropped from 44% in 1999 to 30% in 2004. This

represents a 42% decrease within support in the first five years of the political

transition.466 Golkar support has slipped even further. While it remained the single

largest party in the 2009 provincial legislative elections Golkar now holds only 20%

of the seats (10 seats out of 55).467

The political movement from nationalist parties (such as Golkar) to Islam-oriented

political parties started almost as soon as Reformasi ushered in democratic reforms.

For instance, an estimated 5000 locals rushed to join Islam-oriented political parties,

462 Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008). See also: Mohammad Noor, Muslihan Habib and Muhammad Harfin Zuhdi, Visi Kebangsaan Religius – Refleksi Pemikiran dan Perjuangan Tuan Guru Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid 1904-1997 (2004); Masnun, Tuan Guru KH Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid – Gagasan dan Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam di Nusa Tenggara Barat (2007). 463 In Lombok, it was believed that allegiance to Golkar was necessary to enter and progress within the civil service – Sven Cederroth, ‘Traditional Power and Party Politics in North Lombok, 1965-99’ in Hans Antlov and Sven Cederroth, Elections in Indonesia - The New Order and Beyond (2004) 84. 464 John MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Soeharto Lombok (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2005) 61-62. 465 ‘Ribuan Massa Golkar Bakal Eksodus ke Masyumi Baru’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 4 June 1999. 466 Dirk Tomsa, Party Politics and Democratization in Indonesia – Golkar in the Post-Suharto Era (2008) 197. 467 Panca Nugraha, ‘55 New West Nusa Tenggara Councilors Inaugerated’, The Jakarta Post (Jakarta, Indonesia), 1 September 2009; Lalu Muhamad Jaelani, Daftar Nama Anggota Baru DPRD NTB (2009) <http://lalumuhamadjaelani.wordpress.com> at 6 July 2010.

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such as Masyumi Baru, moving away from Golkar in 1999.468 This was a significant

move as Golkar previously had held an extremely strong political position and had

impressive party machinery in Lombok.469

The post-Reformasi movement towards religious parties is, in many ways, history

repeating itself. Masyumi was one of the largest political parties, representing an

Islamic political perspective, during the brief period of Indonesian democracy in the

mid-1950s.470 In the 1955 elections, Masyumi had significant electoral success across

Lombok. They received 49.8% of the votes cast, with the next closest party being

Partai Nahdlatul Ulama with 20% and then PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia) with

15.2%.471 Most of the Masyumi voters came from rural areas, which constituted their

primary support base across Indonesia. Masyumi received significant support from the

religious leadership at the village-level across the archipelago.472

Tuan Guru have a reinvigorated role as a major force in mobilising political support

in the Reformasi era and are themselves politically active.473 At the moment, Islam-

oriented parties hold 23 of the 55 seats in the NTB provincial legislature

(approximately 40% of the elected representatives).474 The political influence that

Tuan Guru and Islam-oriented parties have in Lombok is best exemplified by TGH

Bajang who became NTB governor in 2008. He was endorsed by two Islam-oriented

parties, PKS and Partai Bulan Bintang. The strength of Bajang’s candidature was

seen by his margin of victory. He received 38.8% of the vote, while the second-placed

ticket led by former governor Lalu Serinata and Golkar-endorsed, received only

26.4% of the vote.475 The two other candidates for governor each received less than

468 ‘Ribuan Massa Golkar Bakal Eksodus ke Masyumi Baru’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 4 June 1999. 469Ibid. 470 Marcus Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia (2009) 77. 471 Judith L. Ecklund, ‘Tradition or Non-tradition: Adat, Islam, and Local Control on Lombok’ in Gloria Davis (ed.), What is Modern Indonesian Culture? (1979) 256. 472 Herb Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (1962) 134-138. 473 Tuan Guru were extremely visible during the 2008 election cycle, which included various rounds of legislative and executive elections across Lombok. They supported an assortment of campaign teams and political interests. See, for instance: ‘Sahur Janjikan Kemajuan Baji Lobar’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 25 August 2008. 474 Panca Nugraha, ‘55 New West Nusa Tenggara Councilors Inaugerated’, The Jakarta Post (Jakarta, Indonesia), 1 September 2009; Lalu Muhamad Jaelani, Daftar Nama Anggota Baru DPRD NTB (2009) <http://lalumuhamadjaelani.wordpress.com> at 6 July 2010. 475 Panca Nugraha, ‘West Nusa Tenggara Poll Body Names Governor’, The Jakarta Post, 15 August 2008.

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20% of the votes cast (approximately 17% each).476 This comprehensive victory in a

four way contest showed the strength of support that Bajang and the Islam-oriented

parties were able to receive in a highly competitive political contest.

Greg Fealy has commented that the performance of Islam-oriented parties in recent

national elections in Indonesia has been disappointing.477 An alternative perspective

has been offered by some Indonesian political commentators who highlight the

ongoing importance of these parties.478 Whatever one’s perspective is about Islam-

oriented parties at a national-level, in Lombok what is clear is that they are now

firmly entrenched as major political players in the legislative and executive branches

of the provincial government. The Islam-oriented parties control 40% of the NTB

provincial legislature compared to approximately 30% of seats in the national

legislature.479

This section has focused upon the importance of religion in Mataram and West

Lombok and how this been translated into the socio-political realm. But how is

religion actually practiced? TGH Abdul Hamid Faisal identified the Sasak as being

‘direct’ and ‘straightforward’ people, which translates to their connection with their

faith. He paralleled Sasak piety with one of the supposed root meanings of the word

“Lombok” – lurus, which means to be straight.480 The argument is that the Sasak have

a strong and direct connection with Allah (God).481 Being lurus, Faisal felt, led to the

generally high levels of ‘ibadah’ (individual religious devotion) in Lombok.482

Islam, as has been noted, is based upon fundamental universal principles,483 but it is

given life by local communities incorporating their cultural norms.484 Without

476 Ibid. 477 Greg Fealy, ‘Analysing the Indonesian Election Results’ (Speech Delivered at the Indonesia Study Group, Australian National University, Canberra, 30 April 2009); Greg Fealy, Indonesia’s Islamic Parties in Decline (2009) <www.inside.org.au> at 27 July 2009. 478 ‘Politik Islam Belum Mati’, Republika (Jakarta, Indonesia), 16 March 2008. 479 DPR-RI Factions (2010) Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia <www.dpr.go.id> at 6 July 2010. 480 Interview with TGH Abdul Hamid Faisal (Mataram, 19 July 2008. 481 Interview with TGH Ulul Azmi (Jerneng, West Lombok, 17 December 2007). 482 Interview with TGH Abdul Hamid Faisal (Mataram, 19 July 2008). 483 For a broad discussion of these universal principles and the way they are acculturated into the Indonesian context, see Nurcholish Madjid (ed), Islam Universal (2007). 484 Local cultural factors are incorporated into Indonesian approaches to Islam. See Fu’ad Jabali and Jamhari, ‘Introduction’ in Fu’ad Jabali and Jamhari (eds), Islam in Indonesia – Islamic Studies and

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question, local cultural factors and traditions colour the interpretation of Islam across

Indonesia and Lombok is no exception. There is a long history of a co-existence and

intertwining between Islam and these local social forces.485

Tuan Guru are perceived to be the ‘guardians of local religious traditions’.486 Their

authority in religious, social and political affairs stems from this. In many ways local

interpretations of Islam can be seen as a syncretic blending of orthodox Islamic

doctrine and local cultural practices and beliefs.487 Syncretism is “the amalgamation

of different religions, cultures, or schools of thought”,488 which in this context relates

to the bonding of classical Islamic teaching with local practices and understandings.489

For example, kawin lari, the local practice of secret elopement, does not fit

comfortably with strict Islamic interpretations of marriage processes, but in Mataram

and West Lombok, at least, this adat practice is still commonly accepted.490

Therefore, rather than seeing syncretism as counter to orthodox interpretations of

Islam, it can be seen as reflecting the plural cultural and religious realities that

influence the practice of Islam in the area being studied.491 The nature of Sasak piety

and its local foundations is, in fact, a key ingredient to conflict management processes

in Mataram and West Lombok. It provides an understanding of the way that religion

is ‘lived’. It helps, for instance, to explain the socio-political significance of Tuan

Guru. Social Transformation (2002) xii. For three studies of local Islamic practices and communities elsewhere in Indonesia, see AG Muhaimin, The Islamic Tradition of Cirebon – Ibadat and Adat Among Javanese Muslims (1995); Jamhari, Popular Voices of Islam: Discourse on Muslim Orientations in South Central Java (PhD Thesis, Australian National University, 2000); Endang Turmudi, Struggling for the Umma – Changing Leadership Roles of Kiai in Jombang, East Java (2007). 485 M.B. Hooker, ‘Introduction: Islamic Law in South-east Asia’ (2002) 4 Australian Journal of Asian Law 213, 215; M.B. Hooker and Tim Lindsey, ‘Public Faces of Syari’ah in Contemporary Indonesia: Towards a National Mazhab?’ (2002) 4 Australian Journal of Asian Law 259, 289-290. 486 Sabirin, Respon Pemikiran Tuan Guru Terhadap Penetrasi Ajaran Wahabi Pada Etnik Sasak di Pulau Lombok (M.Phil Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2008) Abstract. 487 Interview with TGH Zainal Arifin (Jerneng, West Lombok, 28 August 2008). 488 Syncretism (2009) Oxford Dictionaries <http://www.askoxford.com/> at 22 July 2009. 489 There are some groups, for instance, the Wetu Telu in northern Lombok, who have taken this blending of local traditions and practices with Islam far beyond orthodox practices - see ‘Datu Sudarman: Wetu Telu, Kelompok Masyarakat Adat Sasak’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 16 June 2000. The Wetu Telu were also discussed in Chapter 1. This group, particularly found in northern Lombok, has been considered by many scholars, see Sven Cederroth, The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power of Mekkah – A Sasak Community on Lombok (1981); Erni Budiwanti, Islam Sasak – Waktu Telu Versus Waktu Lima (2000); Leena Avonius, Reforming Wetu Telu: Islam, Adat, and the Promises of Regionalism in Post-New Order Lombok (2004). 490 Maria Platt, Sasak Women Navigating Dynamic Marital Continuums: Patriarchal Institutions and Female Agency in Indonesian Marriages (PhD Thesis, La Trobe University, 2010) 75-77. 491 Similar situations are seen in other parts of Indonesia. See AG Muhaimin, The Islamic Tradition of Cirebon – Ibadat and Adat Among Javanese Muslims (1995) 3-4.

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One of the broad trends in relation to Islam on Lombok, especially in rural parts of the

island, is mysticism and a belief in the supernatural. The role of the metaphysical

finds expression in Lombok through notions of supernatural powers and this

potentially plays a role within conflict situations.492 For instance, a male university

student told me how his village in West Lombok was famous for its constant clashes

with surrounding villages. This pattern of ongoing conflict was connected to a

tradition of using ‘magic’ during these fights. These powers were designed to protect

the combatants during the confrontation. Members of the village believed that if they

were stabbed nothing would happen to them. The only way that their strength could

be weakened was if they were attacked by naked women. The women’s nakedness

would remove their supernatural protections, and if stabbed, they could die. The story,

although strange for me, held real resonance among residents of this village.493 These

supernatural powers led members of this community to feel willing and able to enter

into conflict, believing that they would come out unscathed.

Supernatural powers and beliefs are often connected with religious practices on

Lombok. One afternoon after visiting a pesantren with one of my friends, Denny, he

had to rush off to attend a group prayer session (zikir bersama) with his family. They

were joining together to pray for his sister who had cancer. This did not surprise me,

but what was intriguing was that this prayer session also involved working with a

dukun (traditional healer).494 This exemplified a blurring of religious ritual and

mystical practice that is relatively common in Lombok.495 Therefore, supernatural

forces and their perceived connection to religion, or at least its local interpretations,

cannot be discounted when investigating conflict management processes in Lombok.

492 The role and power of the mystical is not limited to ‘superstitious’ rural communities, with Linda Rae Bennett detailing the use of “love magic” in Mataram – see Linda Rae Bennett, ‘Indonesian Youth, Love Magic and the in/visibility of Sexual Desire’ (2003) 37 Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs 135, 138-139. 493 Field notes, 6 July 2008. 494 Field notes, 23 August 2008. 495 John MacDougall has written that he knew of Tuan Guru who had been trained in ‘mystical’ beliefs (tasawuf) and were involved in ‘magical’ activities, such as giving his santri belts that made them invulnerable (sabuq). This is not something that I can say emerged directly in my findings. However, within the Sasak community the supernatural and mysticism does play an important role, therefore, that Tuan Guru might be involved in such activities is not inconceivable. See John MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Soeharto Lombok (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2005) 171.

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This is because religion and the supernatural world form part of the cultural milieu in

Mataram and West Lombok and are part of people’s outlook on the world.

Embedded power

The powerful role of Tuan Guru should not be underestimated in any analysis of

Lombok affairs.496 Their influential socio-political and religious status allows them

the ability to play a significant role in conflict management. In previous sections, I

have shown that Tuan Guru have significant influence and considered why this exists.

In this section, I consider how they use this social status. This analysis will also look

to the boundaries and nature of this authority. I will also explore how they use their

authority and how this impacts upon conflict management processes.

Tuan Guru are more powerful in many ways than state actors, a point that has been

highlighted by Judith Ecklund. She noted that “… religious leaders [Tuan Guru] have

established localised followings of villagers over which they have more effective

control than do representatives of the local government”.497 The dominant role of

Tuan Guru in Lombok has also been noted by Tuti Harwati et al., who said that

“Sasak society is a community that greatly respects the position of Tuan Guru”.498

Tuan Guru, it has been suggested, have a “cult-like” status.499 In short, the role of

Tuan Guru is deeply embedded into the communal life of Lombok.

The non-state source of authority for Tuan Guru emanates from being ‘accepted’ by

society indicates that their leadership is based on an intangible form of “power”. Yet

this has real effects in the community. Benedict Anderson has argued that power in

Java is manifested in a less concrete and more elusive manner than ‘western

496 Inflasi Tuan Guru (1976) Tempo <http://www.tempointeraktif.com/> at 18 May 2009. 497 Judith L. Ecklund, ‘Tradition or Non-tradition: Adat, Islam, and Local Control on Lombok’ in Gloria Davis (ed.), What is Modern Indonesian Culture? (1979) 254. See also Inflasi Tuan Guru (1976) Tempo < http://www.tempointeraktif.com/> at 18 May 2009. 498 Tuti Harwati, Mohamad Abdun Nasir, Nikmatullah and Siti Nurul Khaerani, Tradisi dan Transformasi Pemikiran Hukum Keluarga Islam di Lombok – Poligami, Kawin Cerai dan Kawin Sirri Muslim Sasak (2007) 63. 499 Judith L. Ecklund, ‘Tradition or Non-tradition: Adat, Islam, and Local Control on Lombok’ in Gloria Davis (ed.), What is Modern Indonesian Culture? (1979) 253.

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constructs’. For instance, spiritual potency is a considerable asset.500 In this sense Java

and Lombok are not dissimilar. Considering power as ethereal allows one to more

clearly understand the potency of Tuan Guru.

It is almost impossible to make social policy or gain public support for an initiative in

Lombok without the active (or at least tacit) support of a Tuan Guru Besar. For

instance, East Lombok has become one of Indonesia’s HIV-AIDS hotspots, but

anecdotal evidence from non-government agencies suggests that they have had little

success in developing awareness programs, due to a lack of support from any Tuan

Guru Besar. LBH-APIK NTB501 has recognised the importance of working with Tuan

Guru and has appointed a specific religious liaison officer, making NTB the only

Indonesian province where LPH-APIK has a dedicated staff member appointed to

foster relationships with ulama. This attests to the powerful role of these local

religious leaders.502 The political leadership on the island is also well aware of the

powerful role of Tuan Guru. I personally witnessed two Golkar members of the

provincial legislature, both men of high social standing, waiting for over an hour to

receive advice from a Tuan Guru Besar.503

With democratic reforms and decentralisation over the past decade, non-state leaders

such as Tuan Guru are now blending into state frameworks. For example, Tuan Guru

are beginning to play an increasingly important role within the legislative and

executive structures of the province. The most prominent example of this transition

into the formal structure is, of course, TGH Bajang, the religious head of NW Pancor,

who recently acquired the most senior political position in the province – that of NTB

Governor. Other Tuan Guru holding senior political and government positions include

TGH Abdul Hamid Faisal, who has become a legislator in the regional parliament,

TGH Mustiadi Abhar, the head of the Electoral Commission for Mataram and TGH

Mahally Fikri, the head of the Electoral Commission for NTB. This phenomenon, and

the possible harm that it could cause, will be discussed later in this section.

500 Benedict R. O’G. Anderson, ‘The Idea of Javanese Culture’ in Claire Holt (ed), Culture and Politics in Indonesia (1972) 4-8. 501 Lembaga Bantuan Hukum – Asosiasi Perempuan Indonesia Untuk Keadilan or Legal Aid Institute - Indonesian Women’s Association for Justice NTB Branch. 502 Field notes, 11 August 2008. 503 Field notes, 20 July 2008.

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As mentioned, Tuan Guru Besar deepen their influence in Lombok society through

their teaching activities and institutional operations, such as their leadership of Islamic

boarding schools. The Islamic boarding schools are the places where there is a

transmission of religious knowledge from religious leaders (ulama) to their followers

(santri). This provides the foundation for the development of a Tuan Guru’s religious

message and endows them with a platform to gain ongoing loyalty from their

followers. An example of this continuing allegiance is from Lom where several cars

each week head across the island to attend Friday prayers in Pancor (as is mentioned

in Chapter 1). This allegiance to particular Tuan Guru and their theological

perspectives emerges from the teaching methods used. Pedagogically, the Islamic

instruction provided in most pesantren demands students rote learn rather than

undertake critical thinking. It has been suggested that this form of learning is about

the passive consumption of information,504 and it has been argued that the cadre of

loyal followers of Tuan Guru and their organisations are developed through this

‘slow-cooking’ indoctrination.

Institutional muscle, not just religious authority, therefore, supports the status of a

Tuan Guru.505 Nahdlatul Wathan based their dakwah (Islamic outreach) strategies

over the past half century on developing an extensive network of pesantren. This

furthered their organisational reach and intensified support for their spiritual leader,

the late TGH Pancor.506 Similarly, TGH Sofwan Hakim explained that his

organisation controlled a pondok pesantren with over three thousand students, a

yayasan (charitable foundation), a medical clinic and businesses (including “their

own bank” and several shops). Although he did acknowledge his organisation’s

strength, he suggested that the late TGH Pancor was the strongest organisation-

building figure who had emerged from Lombok. The late TGH Pancor worked on

504 Many 20th century Muslim reformists believed that this approach was a form of ‘passive consumption’ of Islamic teachings in pesantren across the archipelago. For a discussion of this position, see R. Michael Feener, Muslim Legal Thought in Modern Indonesia (2007) 6. 505 For general discussion of this, see Judith L. Ecklund, Marriage, Seaworms, and Song: Ritualized Responses to Cultural Change in Sasak Life (PhD Thesis, Cornell University, 1977) 48; Erni Budiwanti, Islam Sasak – Waktu Telu Versus Waktu Lima (2000) 290-296. 506 Mohammad Noor, Muslihan Habib and Muhammad Harfin Zuhdi, Visi Kebangsaan Religius – Refleksi Pemikiran dan Perjuangan Tuan Guru Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid 1904-1997 (2004) 183-190. This is also discussed, in general, with Tuan Guru using pesantren to develop their social and religious influence in Asnawi, Agama dan Paradigma Sosial Masyarakat (2006) 181.

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creating his own institutional base: Nahdlatul Wathan.507 This institutional mastery

supports religious status and visa–versa. Strong Islamic knowledge and charisma

provides the core for someone to become a Tuan Guru, however, their institutional

activity provides a mechanism for broadening and strengthening their influence.

Picture 3.10 Minaret in Jerneng, West Lombok

The practical importance of religious affiliation and the penetration of Tuan Guru’s

influence and Islamic education infrastructure in Mataram and West Lombok is

apparent in the small village of Jerneng, West Lombok. This community of about

2000 residents has two Tuan Guru Besar and two pesantren (although the new one is

still small). It is the home town of TGH Ulul Azmi, and his Pondok Pesantren

Abhariyah, and the young TGH Zainal Arifin with his new Pondok Pesantren

Syamsul Falah. Arifin works closely with Tuan Guru Besar Mustiadi Abhar, and

concurrent to his activities in Jerneng, he is also the head educator at Pondok

Pesantren Darul Falah in Pagutan. Jerneng highlights the depth of the roots that Tuan

Guru have in Sasak society, and shows how religious activities have a dynamic nature

with the emergence of new pesantren and informal networks among religious leaders

(such as Abhar and Arifin).

Muslim religious mass movements have become quasi-states at different times and

places during Indonesia’s history. They have taken on the provision of services and

activities normally associated with the state, such as health, education and security.

507 Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008).

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The role of religious organisations and leadership in Lombok can, in this sense, be

seen as parallel to the role of Nahdlatul Ulama’s activities in East Java. During the

colonial period, for example, the members of Nahdlatul Ulama saw the colonial

authority as a reality, “but for them the colonial state was irrelevant” and disconnected

from the local people’s day-to-day activities. The colonial authorities did not have a

significant impact on their local religious life, health care or education which was

provided by Kiyai and Nahdlatul Ulama, the state was therefore essentially by-

passed.508 This situation continued under Japanese occupation and then after

independence509 and is, to a large degree, replicated in Lombok today. Tuan Guru

maintain an integral practical role in conflict management, because in many ways they

and their organisations are like miniature quasi-states, providing education and social

services relevant to their community’s needs. Therefore, Tuan Guru can act decisively

in times of trouble not just personally, but also through their network of supporters

and services.

Picture 3.11 Crowds at the NW Pancor anniversary rally in 2008

Religious leaders were essentially limited to spiritual and social roles during the New

Order era.510 However, over the past decade with the burgeoning democratic and

508 Jean Gelman Taylor, Indonesia – Peoples and Histories (2003) 295. 509 Ibid. 510 Greg Fealy, ‘The 1994 NU Congress and Aftermath: Abdurrahman Wahid, Suksesi and the Battle for the Control of NU’ in Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (eds), Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia (1996) 257-277; M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200 (3rd edition, 2001) 342-343.

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decentralised political environment in Indonesia there has been a realignment of

political players and influences across the archipelago. This has led Tuan Guru to

actively seek public office.

The recent movement of Tuan Guru into public office has many benefits and potential

pitfalls.511 Tuan Guru and public intellectuals in Lombok harbour a range of

perspectives on whether or not it is advisable for Tuan Guru to enter the political

arena, and if so, under what circumstances. IAIN Mataram Rektor, Asnawi,

differentiated between the role of religious leaders and politicians, but noted that there

is a degree of overlap. Asnawi felt that there was no problem with a Tuan Guru being

involved in politics, however, there is a need for them to be disciplined, in order not to

become corrupted by the inducements of political office.512 TGH Aminullah Abdul

Hamid held a similar position. He was anxious that public office would potentially

tarnish their reputation as a group, and as a result, diminish their religious and

educational leadership and consequently their overall status.513

The systemic nature of corruption in Lombok politics and the temptation that it offers

Tuan Guru worries many people. The negative aspects of politics could potentially

undermine Tuan Gurus’ moral authority, and consequently, reduce their socio-

political influence which has been described as acting like a social glue.514 A

reducation in the standing of Tuan Guru would also have negative effects upon their

role within conflict management processes, which is based on their respected

community position. With this said, there should be real concern about the nefarious

aspects of Lombok politics which can be seen with the former governor, Lalu

Serinata, who has recently been convicted and jailed for corruption (this will be

discussed in greater detail Chapter 5).515

511 The issues and challenges of religious leaders entering into public office have been considered elsewhere in Indonesia; see Ali Maschan Moesa, Kiai & Politik Dalam Wacana Civil Society (1999) 91-102. 512 Interview with Asnawi (Mataram, 5 August 2008). 513 Interview with TGH Aminullah Abdul Hamid (Mataram, 25 August 2008). 514 Interview with Lalu Nurtaat (Mataram, 28 July 2008). 515 ‘Izin Gubernur NTB’, Kompas (Jakarta, Indonesia), 8 August 2007; Jeremy Kingsley, D-day for Anti-corruption Reform (2009) Inside Indonesia <http://www.insideindonesia.org> at 6 July 2010; Panca Nugraha, ‘Former Governor Sent to Jail to Serve his Sentence’, The Jakarta Post (Jakarta, Indonesia), 29 July 2010.

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Concerns about corruption are not simply about the community distress that might

result, but are also because corruption is deemed prohibited (haram) under Islamic

law, according to TGH Mahally Fikri. The behaviour of the Prophet Muhammad

(Sunnah), he said, should act as a guide to Muslim politicians to make decisions

without undue influence of personal gain or acting in an unjust manner, hence the

prohibition of corruption.516

Beyond the problem of the corrupting influence that potentially exists in Lombok

politics, there are several practical reasons why some Tuan Guru do not want to enter

public office. Some are concerned that their ability to act as a community advocates

may be reduced. TGH Sofwan Hakim does not hold political office, despite his high

profile and significant social influence. He feels that Tuan Guru are the “people’s

delegates” and their role is to critique government, as they did during the late 1990s

and the early part of this century. They should, for instance, place constant pressure

on government about the ineffectiveness of police operations or the high levels of

crime. When someone becomes institutionalised as a politician, their role as critical

commentator and community advocate may be reduced. This doesn’t disqualify Tuan

Guru from political office, but it does highlight a serious tension between their

potential leadership activities.517 If they were to lose this role as community voice and

advocacy, their social position would potentially be reduced, and consequently, their

ability to influence their followers would diminish. One consequence of this could be

that, as noted before, their role as mediators and respected social figures able to

intervene during times of communal and political conflict might be constrained.

For other Tuan Guru, involvement with public office is a distraction from their core

religious and educational functions. TGH Aminullah Abdul Hamid was not averse to

Tuan Guru participating in politics if they were careful. He had himself been courted

by several political parties, but did not want to be distracted from his educational

focus, particularly the development of his Islamic boarding school, Pondok Pesantren

Darul Hikmah.518 The perception that politics could be a diversion from “religious and

social responsibilities” is not a new idea. In the 1950s, during an earlier period of

516 ‘TGH Mahali Fikri: Politik Uang Hukumnya Haram’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 15 March 2000. 517 Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008). 518 Interview with TGH Aminullah Abdul Hamid (Mataram, 25 August 2008).

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liberal democracy in Indonesia, senior Nahdlatul Ulama leader, Wahid Hasjim, felt

that people were becoming “too absorbed with politics” and neglecting their spiritual,

educational and social roles.519 If Tuan Guru were to become too distracted then not

only would their focus on core activities be reduced, but they would also not be as

readily available to intercede in conflict avoidance or resolution situations.

Tuan Guru are essentially faced with a balance of responsibilities and leadership

questions when considering whether to enter into politics. Many Tuan Guru have been

willing to enter into the political arena in order to advance their community’s interests

and the overall welfare of people in Lombok. TGH Mustiadi Abhar is one of the new

wave of Tuan Guru becoming politicians. He has been the Chair (Ketua) of the

Electoral Commission520 for Mataram. He was previously involved with Golkar,

however, he is now looking to affiliate politically elsewhere, as he feels that Golkar is

not focused enough on Islam. According to Abhar, Tuan Guru actively participating

in politics was a natural extension of their social, religious and community leadership

roles. However, he noted that his religious teaching and role as community leader

remained his primary function.521 The late TGH Pancor was also cautious about

involvement in politics, suggesting that participation should depend upon the political

climate and whether it was conducive to an Islamic perspective.522

Tuan Guru as a group of respected religious leaders are crucial to conflict

management in Lombok. Their high social status and role as interpreters of local

religious tradition is what provides them collectively with the legitimacy necessary to

act as mediators during social tensions and conflict. In the week preceding the 2008

elections for NTB Governor many people in Lom, a community in Mataram,523 were

discussing each candidate’s strengths and weaknesses. TGH Bajang was seen as a

charismatic candidate, but arguably more important to the Sasak residents of Lom was

his status as a Tuan Guru Besar and the leader of NW Pancor.524 Tuan Guru’s social

519 Gregory J. Fealy, Ulama and Politics in Indonesia: A History of Nahdlatul Ulama, 1952-1967 (PhD Thesis, Monash University, 1998) 110. 520 Komisi Pemilihan Umum or KPU. 521 Interview with TGH Mustiadi Abhar (Mataram, 23 July 2008). 522 Masnun, Tuan Guru KH Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid – Gagasan dan Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam di Nusa Tenggara Barat (2007) 222-239. 523 Lom is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. 524 Field notes, 6 July 2008.

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status, which has led them to political success, also provides them with legitimacy to

act in tense communal and political situations (see Chapter 5). Their function as social

stabilisers and mediators is predicated, therefore, on their social standing. The longer-

term issue is how to maintain this level of influence if they enter the ‘murky’ world of

politics. Some Tuan Guru have chosen a mid-way approach to their role in political

affairs in Lombok: they do not themselves enter into elections for public office, but

are actively involved with supporting political candidates. Therefore, they enter the

political arena with less risk.

Since the democratic transition, political campaign teams in Lombok have sought to

attach themselves to Tuan Guru Besar whose social networks and prestige are

considered an important element of contemporary campaign strategies in Lombok.

Political parties across the spectrum from the ‘nationalist’ (such as Golkar, Hanura

and Partai Democrat) to the ‘Islamic’ (such as Partai Bulan Bintang and PKS) have

sought to strategically rely upon Tuan Guru Besar to rally support.525 The outcomes

of these endorsements have been varied. TGH Ulul Azmi has shown his socio-

political strength by actively endorsing the successful candidates for Bupati (Regent)

and Wakil Bupati (Deputy Regent) in West Lombok, Zaini Arony and Nurdin

Ranggabarani. His involvement included giving speeches at their campaign rallies.526

This allows Tuan Guru to influence political life in a less direct manner. It potentially

provides them with close access to the political elite without necessarily entering

directly into the opaque world of Lombok politics, thus avoiding the pitfalls that have

been previously mentioned.

To understand this desire for political parties to form relationships with religious

leaders, it is worth considering the manner that Tuan Guru and their organisations

have the ability to mobilise thousands to their cause. This is a component of their

socio-political power and it highlights that religious affiliation is not merely about

spiritual connection, but rather has a strong organisational purpose within Sasak

society. Therefore, when attempting to understand the resonance of religion and 525 ‘Ulama dan Santri Iringi Pendaftaran Pasangan SUFI’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 9 April 2008; ‘Semarak, Haul Al-Az’am Syekh Abdul Kodir Jaelani’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 19 May 2008. 526 This was discussed in a blog connected to the Indonesian political party, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP or United Development Party): Dinamika Kegiatan PPP (2008) <http://dinamikappp.blogspot.com> at 12 January 2009.

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religious affiliation in Lombok, it is useful to look to public activities, events and

ceremonies as indicators of Tuan Guru’s ability to rally support. The importance of

religion on the island was emphasised for me one afternoon when walking through

Mataram’s Lombok Raya Hotel. I watched thousands of NW Pancor supporters

wearing green uniforms and carrying the green flag of their organisation essentially

taking control of the hotel through sheer force of numbers. They had been bussed into

Mataram from all over Lombok to participate in the annual general meeting of NW

Pancor. What startled me was the efficient mobilisation of thousands of supporters

and it showed the sort of mass support that Tuan Guru could muster.527 It also

highlighted the efficiency of Tuan Guru and their organisations.

Picture 3.12 TGH Bajang addressing the 73rd Anniversary of NW Pancor

I also witnessed another powerful show of organisational strength when thousands of

people were mobilised to show support for their religious organisation at the 73rd

Anniversary of Nahdlatul Wathan Pancor.528 It was held at the organisations

headquarters in Pancor, East Lombok, and was an enormous celebration, with an

estimated several hundred thousand people in attendance.529 The NW compound had

four or five major holding areas – mosques and open spaces – where people were

seated listening to the proceedings (see Pictures 3.11 and 3.12). Not only was the

527 Field notes, 4 January 2008. 528 The 73rd Anniversary of NW Pancor was a much anticipated event; see ‘Hari ini, Pawai Ta’aruf Hultah’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 9 August 2008. 529 ‘Perayaan Puncak Hultah NWDI dan Haul Maulanasyekh’. Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 11 August 2008.

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sheer weight of humanity involved overwhelming, but the huge NW compound,

including the large Pondok Pesantren Darun Nahdlatain, felt almost like a medieval

castle in the way that it physically dominated Pancor.530

Many important political and religious leaders were at this celebration, including

senior representatives of political parties from across the political spectrum and a full

range of religious organisations and their leadership from across the archipelago.

Even as an outsider, the event conjured extremely strong feelings for me and by the

end of the day I felt emotionally drained.531 Events such as this strengthen the

emotional bonds of a religious community and provide an affirmation of its members’

loyalty to a Tuan Guru. It is these bonds, and Tuan Gurus’ abilities to function as

mediators and social stabilisers, that provide them a pivotal role within conflict

management processes. The next section extends upon these functions and explains

how their role as ‘guardians of local religious traditions’ provides them with social

influence to engage with protagonists in times of tension and conflict.

Guardians of religious traditions – The key to social stabilisation

Tuan Guru have been able to gain significant social status in Lombok because they

are considered the “guardians of religious tradition”. As a consequence, they are

perceived to be the interpreters of local Islamic traditions and practices.532 This

provides them with social power because they have the ability to speak on religious

matters in an authoritative manner. As a result, they can influence public opinion in

the devout Sasak community.533 This social influence is part of their armoury when

Tuan Guru involve themselves in conflict management processes. Additionally, to

argue with a Tuan Guru is by implication, to dispute their religious authority –

something most Sasak would not be willing to do.534 This means that the role of Tuan

Guru as mediator is highly regarded and their legitimacy is not normally challenged.

530 Field notes, 10 August 2008. 531 Ibid. 532 Sabirin, Respon Pemikiran Tuan Guru Terhadap Penetrasi Ajaran Wahabi Pada Etnik Sasak di Pulau Lombok (M.Phil Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2008) Abstract. 533 R. Michael Feener, Muslim Legal Thought in Modern Indonesia (2007) 151. 534 Asnawi, ‘Islam dan Visi Kebangsaan di Nusa Tenggara Barat’ in Komaruddin Hidayat and Ahmad Gauf, Menjadi Indonesia – 13 Abad Eksistensi Islam di Bumi Nusantara (2006) 315.

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The influential role of Tuan Guru can sometimes cause problems. There is an

intensity that exists about the importance of Sasak religious traditions and these

feelings can make communities very protective of their practices. This sometimes

leads them to forcefully defend their religious traditions and leadership.535 For

instance, when mainstream Sasak beliefs were challenged by Lombok-based groups

known there as ‘Wahabi’,536 several local communities reacted badly to perceived

affronts to their local Islamic traditions and religious leaders.537 I am not suggesting

that Tuan Guru instructed the residents of these communities to act violently towards

these minority Muslim groups, but rather that the reactions were induced by the

importance of these local religious traditions and interpretations to these communities.

The Sasak can gain strength from being a pious community, but this can also be a

weakness if it leads to violence.

There were several violent attacks on so-called Wahabi groups during 2005 and 2006,

in Sesela, West Lombok, during November 2005; Repuk, West Lombok, during

March 2006; and Masbagig, East Lombok, during August 2006.538 It is worth

considering these conflicts to understand such emotional reactions and to comprehend

how religious dissent can raise the ire of many Sasak. One case of violence occurred

during November 2005, in the village of Sesela, West Lombok. It was triggered by

events during a funeral service. The main religious figure of the village was not

present at the time. As a consequence, a Wahabi religious leader led the burial service.

Traditionally in Lombok before the burial process begins, the leader of the rite reads

535 Sabirin, Respon Pemikiran Tuan Guru Terhadap Penetrasi Ajaran Wahabi Pada Etnik Sasak di Pulau Lombok (M.Phil Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2008) 25-27. 536 So-called ‘Wahabi’ groups in Lombok are understood by the mainstream Sasak community, rather than by the members of these groups themselves, to have an ideology and approach to Islam based on Middle Eastern-influenced puritanical views of Islamic teaching – Interview with Zey (Mataram, 3 October 2007). These groups do not adhere to local traditions or Islamic practices, preferring to focus their interpretations and approaches on the “early generations of Muslims” as their inspiration – Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker (eds), Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia – A Contemporary Sourcebook (2006) xivii. This means that they often deem local practices to be corruptions of Islamic theology and are seen to be at odds with local traditions. The ‘Wahabi’ groups are believed, by many Sasak, to hold views often intricately connected to the Saudi Arabian state religious ideology known outside Saudi Arabia as ‘Wahhabism’, but the term is often locally used to cover a broader range of Middle Eastern-influenced groups, see Sabirin, Respon Pemikiran Tuan Guru Terhadap Penetrasi Ajaran Wahabi Pada Etnik Sasak di Pulau Lombok (M.Phil Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2008) 51-60. 537 Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) Mataram Mediation Centre, Social Conflicts in Lombok, 2006. This material was provided by Mohamad Abdun Nasir, Lecturer, IAIN Mataram. 538 Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) Mataram Mediation Centre, Social Conflicts in Lombok, 2006.

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talqin (a prayer) for the dead, hoping that they live peacefully in the hereafter.

However, the Wahabi leader refused to read it, declaring that such a reading was

unknown during the prophet’s lifetime and was bid’ah (innovation in religion) – in

other words, a corruption of Islamic teaching. The family and the relatives of the

deceased were outraged. As a result of this omission, a large number of people

massed outside the Wahabi leader’s home and proceeded to destroy it. Other houses

belonging to Wahabi members nearby were also levelled, with order only being

restored after police intervened. The message was a clear and unequivocal support for

local Islamic leaders and religious practices. It showed the strong reaction against

those who challenge the status quo.

There needs to be an important caveat made in relation to the generally positive force

that Tuan Guru exert within conflict management in Lombok. When dealing with any

group that has a high level of social status there is always a possibility that they might

act nefariously. This could occur if their position is threatened, or if they can gain

significant status from inspiring or organising communal “trouble”.539 For some Tuan

Guru Besar, as discussed in Chapter 2, their control of pamswakarsa provides them

with a rapid ability to mobilise “trouble”, so this threat is real. This sort of situation

occurred in Situbondo, East Java, where Jemma Purdey noted that rivalry between

religious leaders was one of the local rationales for violence against Indonesian

Chinese in October 1996.540 The case studies in Chapter 5 provide two recent

examples of the overwhelmingly positive role that Tuan Guru play in bringing

conflicts to a peaceful conclusion or avoiding it altogether in Lombok, but it is worth

recognising potential weaknesses in conflict management processes.

Many Tuan Guru told me about how they worked to ensure toleransi through their

teaching in pengajian, sermons and when speaking to people privately.541 This is

where their role as guardians of religious traditions can be used as a force for social

539 ‘Kenapa Kiai Banyak Tapi Banyak Masalah?’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 26 December 1999. 540 Jemma Purdey, Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996-1999 (2006) 52-54. 541 Among those Tuan Guru who noted the particular need to focus on teaching about toleransi were TGH Subkhi Sasaki, TGH Munajid Khalid and TGH Sofwan Hakim. See Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008); Interview with TGH Subkhi Sasaki (Kediri, West Lombok, 23 August 2008); Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008).

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stabilisation. They found the need to continually work with their communities on the

issue of tolerance and social harmony, because several Tuan Guru said that sometimes

the Sasak were easy to anger. TGH Mustiadi Abhar noted that even the smallest

incidents, such as a minor motorcycle accident, could lead to a fight between drivers

that could escalate into a brawl involving large numbers of people from their

respective communities. This is negative aspect of communal solidarity is discussed

in Chapter 4. Therefore, Abhar felt that the role of Tuan Guru was to direct their

community away from such negative responses.542 Tuan Guru Besar Abdul Hamid

Faisal said that when the violence erupted during the January 2000 riots Tuan Guru

acted quickly: calling santri, making announcements over mosque loudspeakers and

walking the streets to calm things down.543 More coordinated efforts also occurred

amongst the Tuan Guru during these riots. An example of this occurred when several

groups of Tuan Guru met during these troubled events under the auspices of Majelis

Ulama (the Ulama Association) and Lembaga Dakwah (the Muslim Outreach

Institute) to coordinate their activities in order to restore calm.544

Those who believe (in the Qur’an), and those who follow the

Jewish (scriptures), and the Christians and the Sabians – any

who believe in Allah and the Last Day, and work

righteousness, shall have their reward with their Lord; and

work righteousness, shall have their reward with their Lord;

on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve.

Qur’an, 2:62.545

The role that Tuan Guru play as social stabilisers is embedded in Islamic doctrine

through several Qur’anic injunctions, such as the verse quoted above. TGH Munajid

Khalid told me that the role of Tuan Guru during conflicts was to follow Islamic

teachings and restore calm.546 When social tensions emerge, TGH Sofwan Hakim felt

that Tuan Guru can intervene at three points. These are: anticipating a conflict;

542 Interview with TGH Mustiadi Abhar (Mataram, 23 July 2008). 543 Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). 544 Interview with TGH Muharror (Electronic Interview, 11 May 2009). 545 Abdullah Yusuf Ali (translator), The Holy Qur’an (2000). 546 Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008).

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calming emotions once conflict starts; and mediating a resolution to the dispute.547

This outline of the process of conflict management shows how the social standing of

Tuan Guru is used to create networks of activity to avoid or resolve conflict

situations.548

In relation to the anticipation of conflict, this phase can involve various activities.

Tuan Guru may teach specifically about the importance of social harmony

(kerukunan) during sermons and pengajian. But, also if trouble is brewing, a Tuan

Guru can hold special pengajian that emphasise social stability and specifically

consider problems that are emerging. The substance of these lessons will be further

outlined in Chapter 5.549

When discussing the role of Tuan Guru during efforts to calm emotions, TGH

Sofwan Hakim talked about how he dealt with the January 2000 riots. He explained

how he needed to ‘cool down’ his emotional students.550 He had gone to the tabligh

akbar to show solidarity towards Muslims suffering in Ambon, but had noticed that

some people on the periphery of the large ceremony were getting too excited. He felt

that they there were being led astray by provocateurs – whom he described as being

criminals (preman). With this said, he had not realised the amount of anger that was

growing in the crowd or that it would explode into riots.551

When Hakim returned home his students came to him wanting permission to

participate in the riots. He sat them down and sought to calm their emotions. Then,

sensing the anger expressed by his santri, he decided to issue a statement to his

community making it clear that he did not approve of anyone participating in the

violence. He then deployed his students to spread out across Kediri to communicate

his message. The message transmitted by the students incorporated an explanation of

why not to participate and an implicit threat from Hakim – those partaking in the

violence would be disappointing him and acting contrary to their religious

obligations. People knew that this threat came with serious community sanctions if 547 The stages and processes for resolving conflicts involving Tuan Guru was raised by several informants. See Field notes, 10 August 2008. 548 See John Paul Lederach, The Moral Imagination – The Art and Soul of Building Peace (2005). 549 Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008). 550 Ibid. 551 Ibid.

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ignored (the form and type of communal punishment, such as social ostracism, are

discussed in Chapter 4).552 Additionally, to disobey the instructions of a Tuan Guru

may lead to punishment in the afterlife, they believed.553 There is a strong belief

among the Sasak that they need to behave properly and in accordance with Islam’s

injunctions, otherwise they will not be accepted into heaven. This corresponds to

general Islamic teachings, which have indicated that if you do wrong against your

religion then when attempting to enter through the gates of heaven you will be

forbidden passage.554

According to Hakim, the final point where a Tuan Guru can intervene is during the

resolution of a conflict. When explaining how to mediate the resolution of a dispute

Hakim told me an anecdote. A primary school teacher in Kediri was physically

disciplining his students. This is not something rare, but it was “getting out of

control” as he was hitting the students too much, and parents were no longer willing

to accept this level of punishment. They tried to persuade him to be less strict, but the

parents’ overtures were ignored, so, in despair, they held the teacher hostage in his

classroom. The police were unwilling to intervene, in fact, they were scared, and so

Hakim accompanied by a government official, went into the school in order to

negotiate a solution that would end the standoff. He had feared that the parents would

kill, or at least badly beat the teacher. Hakim talked to the parents and heard their

grievances, something that the teacher had refused to do. Thus listening was an

important element of resolving the dispute and provided a path to negotiating the

teacher’s eventual release.555

Tuan Gurus’ pivotal role in conflict management is not just through personal

involvement, but they can create networks to deal with troubled situations whether

through their santri or with government officials. Their social status gives those

participating in conflict the means of removing themselves or negotiating solutions

while maintaining their pride: they are able to keep face. Statements such as: “I would

have continued, but I wanted to show respect to Tuan Guru A” are common. This 552 Ibid. 553 Sven Cederroth, ‘From Ancestor Worship to Monotheism – Politics of Religion in Lombok’ (1996) 32 Temenos 7; Bartholomew Ryan, Alif Lam Mim – Reconciling Islam, Modernity, and Tradition in an Indonesian Kampung (PhD Thesis, Harvard University, 1999) 139-143. 554 Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought (2000) 487. 555 Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008).

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gives the protagonists a way out without showing weakness.556 Therefore, this thesis

argues that by and large Tuan Guru play an positive role in conflict management and

have been actively engaged in avoiding or resolving conflicts over the period 1998-

2008. However, as has been noted, this is not an absolute assertion. The challenges

posed by Tuan Guru have already been discussed in this section and in the last chapter

(in the context of their leadership of pamswakarsa). It has also been alleged role that

some Tuan Guru have made sermons that were instrumental in fermenting antagonism

towards the minority Ahmadiyah group (this situation is investigated in Chapter 5).

It is worth remembering that tolerance and social harmony also needs to be performed

in public. Unless Tuan Guru visibly show their relationship with leaders of other

faiths, communal conflicts are still likely in Mataram and West Lombok. During an

interview with Pendeta (Reverend) Jimmy Iroth from Mataram’s GPIB Church557 he

noted that he had a close personal relationship with several Tuan Guru, however, he

felt these relationships were too private. They needed to be more public and show to

the broader community that tolerance is a lived activity and not just talked about. Iroth

believed that this would lead to broader social changes in relation to Muslim

perceptions of Christians in Lombok. Otherwise, the friendships and what they

symbolise will not filter down to the grassroots of Sasak society.558

Conclusion

In conclusion, Tuan Guru play a fundamentally important role in contemporary

conflict management processes in Mataram and West Lombok. I have highlighted the

role of Tuan Guru as both religious and educational leaders who have significant

socio-political powers. Their high social status has led many Tuan Guru in the post-

Soeharto era to take positions of state office, such as TGH Bajang who recently

became NTB Governor.559 This chapter also divides Tuan Guru into Tuan Guru Lokal

556 Interview with Muhammad Dimiati (Mataram, 12 August 2008). 557 Gereja Protestan di Indonesia Bagian Barat (The Protestant Church of Western Indonesia). 558 Interview with Pendeta Jimmy Iroth (Mataram, 9 October 2007). 559 Although Tuan Guru have successfully sought political office I am unaware of any legislation that they put forward to promulate religiously-influenced local regulations. Even the failed attempt to enact a morality-based regulation for Mataram emerged from Golkar politicians rather than religious sources – Peraturan Daerah Kota Mataram Tentang Pencegahan Maksiat (1983) (Mataram Local Regulation Preventing Immoral Behaviour). However, Ustadz Abdul Qodir Jaelani did talk in detail about his

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and Tuan Guru Besar. This categorisation identifies different levels of communal

influence. The relevance of this taxonomy is seen in practical terms during the second

case study about social instability in Bok (see Chapter 5), where it was not until a

well-respected Tuan Guru Besar became involved that things settled down.

I have shown the historical development of Tuan Guru and their organisations. This

helps to explain their social status and activities, which go beyond merely being

religious leaders. Their social, political and economic interests reach into all levels of

Mataram and West Lombok society. This central position of Tuan Guru also emerges

from Lombok’s widely recognised religiosity. Islam plays an integral part in the daily

life of people on this island with some commentators noting that time is not measured

by clocks, but rather the call to prayer. This assessment is reinforced by the local

slogans, which have been mentioned earlier, such as Lombok being the ‘Island of

1000 mosques’, and Mataram’s official slogan being ‘Mataram – Progressive and

Religious’ (‘Mataram - Maju dan Religius’).560

In Chapter 3, I have also argued that Tuan Guru, and their organisations, operate as

‘quasi-state’ entities. They provide infrastructure and services from security to

education in a similar manner to the state. This powerful role can be seen as

challenging state authority and potentially creating social instability. However, as the

case studies in Chapter 5 identify, these religious leaders interests currently rely more

on continued social harmony and cooperation with state actors and institutions, in

order to maintain their high socio-political status. This has led to Tuan Guru playing

an important role within conflict management processes.

support for PKS being because of their calls for Syari’ah-based legislation - Interview with Ustadz Abdul Qodir Jaelani (Mataram, 18 December 2007). Also, TGH Mustiadi Abhar felt that religious voices needed to be heard in local legislative processes, but he was unclear as to whether this meant that he supported religiously-influenced local regulations - Interview with TGH Mustiadi Abhar (Mataram, 23 July 2008). 560 This slogan for Mataram is also used by one of Mataram’s pamswakarsa Lang-Lang (see Picture 4.10). These two uses of the slogan reflect the influence of Ruslan as Mataram Mayor and the head of this community security group. This heading also builds upon previous slogans for Mataram that adopted a similar line of thought– the former slogan was“Mataram – Religious City” (“Mataram – Kotaragama”) – see Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, Direktorat Jenderal Kebudayaan and Museum Negeri Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat, Pengungkapan Nilai Budaya Naskah Kuno Kotaragama (1995/1996).

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In the next chapter, the role of community relationships and local leadership will be

considered in more detail. The focus of Chapter 4 is upon the leadership structures,

approaches to community management and social relationships within a Mataram

community, Lom, and its leadership, including Tuan Guru Lokal. This chapter aims in

particular to understand how the community members protected each other during the

January 2000 riots and recovered a sense of community in the aftermath of these

events. It will also investigate the contemporary environment in this ethnic and

religiously diverse community. This acts to explain how community relationships and

local leadership are integral elements of the conflict management processes observed

in Mataram and West Lombok.

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Chapter 4 Adat, leadership and community

Why go to the police if you have a problem? You just create

another problem…

Ita, 20 year-old Mataram student.561

As Ita claims, police are not essential to the frameworks necessary for the

maintenance of social harmony in Mataram and West Lombok, although they should

not be dismissed altogether (see Chapter 5). But if they are not central to conflict

management and security, who is? This chapter looks at conflict management and the

pivotal role of local community leadership, relationships and adat processes in a

system from which the state is often absent. It includes an in-depth examination of the

Mataram community of Lom,562 noting the utility of communal relationships and local

leadership, particularly during the January 2000 riots.

In this chapter, I develop a narrative of the local situation in Lom and consider how it

fits into community-based conflict management processes, drawing on 15 months of

observational research and 25 interviews with residents. This analysis illuminates an

intricate, complex and sometimes chaotic picture of life in Lom, as well as the

realities of conflict management processes.

This chapter, is broken into six sections. The first section provides background to the

community of Lom. It outlines the strength and weaknesses of the three areas that

together constitute Lom. The analysis also considers the physical lay-out of the

community (see Map 4.1) and the effect that the built environment has upon

community dynamics. The next section of this chapter focuses on adat and explores

its impact upon conflict management processes.

The third section of this chapter looks at local community leadership. It highlights the

roles of the local non-state and state leaders, which are, at times, blurred. The function

of these local leaders is not just administrative, but is also central to the development

561 Field notes, 4 May 2007. 562 Lom, a community in Mataram, has been de-identified in accordance with the requirements of the University of Melbourne Ethics Committee for this research.

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of relationships within and between communities. In Lom, this involves community

leaders working together to solidify social relationships between the three residential

areas. In the fourth section, social relationships within and between communities in

Lom are examined. This section is underpinned by considerations of the notion of

mutual benefit, where relationships between people and communities are developed

and strengthened through reciprocity. In reviewing social interactions in Lom, it

becomes clear that this is not just a rosy picture of communal engagement. There are

some serious problems between the three Lom communities. For instance, the

Indonesian Chinese from Komplek Cina Lom have extremely limited contact with the

two other parts of Lom. Therefore, they tend not to be protected by security

mechanisms based on social relationships during periods of instability and violence.

This demonstrates the importance of social engagement and dialogue within and

between communities that I see as integral to conflict management processes in

Mataram and West Lombok. Social relationships can prevent the flaring-up of

disputes and allows communities to protect each other in times of communal or

political violence.563

The fifth section focuses on the January 2000 riots and provides a practical example

of strong local leadership, social processes and relationships in Lom. Following on

from this the sixth section then considers local security mechanisms that were put in

place as a result of the January 2000 riots, as well as the perceived ‘crime wave’ of

the late 1990s and early 2000s. This led to the development of new security

arrangements in Lom in the form of a paid ronda (night watch) and local connections

to pamswakarsa (community security group/militia).564 Komplek Cina Lom residents

would presumably receive protection from this paid ronda, but could not rely on the

social relationships, such as those that exist between Komplek Lom and Kampung

Lom.

563 Departemen Agama, Manajemen Konflik Umat Beragama (2003) 173-176. 564 The paid ronda (night watch) is an eclectic group of people from Kampung Lom. They provide a nightly security service across Lom. Ronda members are usually volunteers, but Lom’s ronda is a paid job. Unlike satpam (private security) guards, the members of the Lom ronda are not necessarily young or physically able. Therefore, I have called them a ‘paid ronda’ (a hybrid between a ronda and satpam operation). More details on this security arrangement in Lom are provided later into this chapter.

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MAP OF LOM

Map 4.1 Lom, which is situated in Mataram, Lombok

Notes: Common Space includes a berugaq and open meeting space. Multi-purpose space includes a basketball court and a small stage.

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Lom – Unity in diversity?

Lom is a community in Cakranegra, Mataram. In this thesis, I use Lom as an allegory

for conflict management more generally in Mataram and West Lombok. It is made up

of three separate, yet interconnected, communities with a combined population of just

over 700 people (see Map 4.1). In the middle of Lom is Kampung Lom, the

economically-disadvantaged residents are all Sasak. Geographically positioned on

either side of the kampung are two middle-to-upper class housing projects (kompleks).

Middle class Komplek Lom, consists of residents from all over Indonesia who are

affiliated with a variety of religions (including Hinduism and Catholicism). By

contrast, Komplek Cina Lom, an upper middle class area, is exclusively Indonesian

Chinese.

Family and community are not taken for granted and play a pivotal role in peoples’

daily lives in Mataram and West Lombok. The focus of society is not on the

individual, but rather the collective. Patrick Guinness noted that in a Javanese

kampung there is a sense of social solidarity. People stick firmly together and see their

lives as deeply intertwined.565 This sense of social solidarity is replicated in Lombok

and this colours almost every aspect of conflict management. Sasak society has been

described as a “community of families enmeshed in one another’s concerns”.566 A

sense of social solidarity within a community provides many benefits to members.

However, it can also turn minor disputes into sizeable clashes between communities.

A small dispute among some youths from two kampung can spark a larger fight as

members of the two communities go to the aid of their brethren.567

It is not uncommon to have 20 family members living under the same roof. Sasak

families typically extend to include uncles, aunts, cousins and people who may not

even be biologically related. Along with religious organisations, community and

family provide a social safety net for the Sasak. The strong communal relationships in

Kampung Lom are thus central to leadership activities and social relationships more

broadly in Lom.

565 Patrick Guinness, Harmony and Hierarchy in a Javanese Kampung (1986) 144. 566 M. Cameron Hay, Remembering to Live – Illness at the Intersection of Anxiety and Knowledge in Rural Indonesia (2001). 567 Interview with TGH Mustiadi Abhar (Mataram, 23 July 2008).

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Picture 4.1 The affluent Komplek Lom

Picture 4.2 Another part of Komplek Lom

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Picture 4.3 Kampung Lom

Picture 4.4 Children playing in Kampung Lom

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I initially chose Lom because of the particularly close relationships between Komplek

Lom and Kampung Lom. In many respects, the closeness of the relationship between

these two parts of Lom can be contrasted with the limited relationship that exists with

their neighbours in the Indonesian Chinese community of Komplek Cina Lom. There

are links between these communities, but they are less intimate and supportive.

The connections between these two communities are based on mutual benefit. An

example of this is a kampung resident, Hera, a high school student, who is only able to

attend school because one of her neighbours from the komplek, Ida, funds her

education. This generosity is reciprocated by Zey, Hera’s sister, who looks after Ida’s

house and children when she is away.568 This example of interconnection provides the

foundation for social harmony and relationships that can protect communities and

individuals during times of social instability and conflict.

There are many factors that support the relationships between these two communities.

One important factor is the physical lay-out of the two parts of Lom, which creates

several meeting points – see Map 4.1. This includes a joint multi-purpose

sporting/recreation facility and a common area between these two communities – see

Pictures 4.5 and 4.6. The close relationships are visible on a daily basis between

people from Komplek Lom and Kampung Lom. Walking around these two areas,

even late at night, children from the two communities can be seen running and playing

together while the older women meet outside each others homes or in the common

area next to Ibu Una’s small kiosk (warung). These physical spaces allow for

communal engagement. This can be contrasted to the limited physical connection

between Kampung Lom and Komplek Cina Lom. The weak social relationship

between these two communities is replicated in the built environment. The two

communities are connected by a stairway that is situated at the back of both

communities, and it bends in a manner that obscures any visual contact between the

neighbouring areas.569

568 Field notes, 6 September 2007. 569 Field notes, 1 and 13 October 2007.

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Picture 4.5 Common area between Kampung Lom and Komplek Lom

Relationships between the communities of Lom are not always marked by similarities

or common ground. Accepting diversity within and between communities can provide

social strength to places, such as Lom. This is recognises the plural reality of this

community which they often use as a tool for social connection. For instance, they

celebrate christmas or the end of Ramadan party, idul fitri , together.570 However, if

acknowledging differences leads to stereotyping, then there is potential for problems

to emerge between neighbours. Across Indonesia, the broad range of ethnic and

religious groups has meant that “an elaborate set of stereotypes or labels define the

characteristics of various Indonesian groups vis-à-vis each other”.571 It is not

uncommon when talking with people in Mataram that they will refer to one ethnic

group as ‘sinister’ or another as ‘rough’ or ‘uncouth’. In many ways, the community

in Lom is a microcosm of the ethnic and religious heterogeneity of Mataram and West

Lombok. One of the by-products of ethnic and religious diversity is that stereotypes

sometimes develop. As will be discussed in the next section, Sasak adat considers

570 This practice of joining together for major religious celebrations is interesting, as there has been controversy about such activities elsewhere in Indonesia. For instance, the quasi-state Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI or the Indonesian Council of Ulama) issued a fatwa (non-binding legal opinion) which forbade Muslims from attending Christmas celebrations. They justified this position because they believed that these are religious rituals rather than social celebrations – John R. Bowen, Islam, Law and Equality in Indonesia (2003) 235. However, for the leadership and residents of Lom, this is a social and community activity, essentially a means of showing social solidarity and sharing their lives with each other. They did not see it as a religious ritual per se. 571 Edward M. Bruner, ‘The Expression of Ethnicity in Indonesia’ in Abner Cohen, Urban Ethnicity (1974) 253.

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respectful relationships as a key to social harmony, yet, this can be dislodged by

prejudiced stereotypes.

Kampung Lom and Komplek Lom have positive social relationships. Despite this,

many of the non-Sasak residents within the komplek hold negative stereotypes about

the Sasak. There are also class-based points of social difference and potential

stereotypes. It was suggested to me by Andi, one of the leaders of Komplek Lom, that

educational disparities between these two communities sometimes cause difficulties

when resolving communal tensions. Although, I felt uncomfortable with this

argument, I could see that it did reflect a blunt appraisal of the two close, but different

communities. His argument was that there are generally lower-levels of education in

Kampung Lom compared with people from Komplek Lom and Komplek Cina Lom.

According to Andi this meant that Kampung Lom residents struggled with problem-

solving and could sometimes become angered quickly by situations. Patronisingly, he

said that the lack of education meant that people from the kampung often couldn’t see

beyond an immediate problem. This became apparent to Andi when Lom was

renovating their mosque (masjid) and problems emerged. The kampung residents just

wanted the job finished. Andi felt that they had a rigid vision. He claimed that no

matter what anyone from Komplek Lom said they would not alter their approach.572

While he was telling me about the educational differences between these communities

I felt that he was missing one significant possibility – maybe the kampung residents

merely had different priorities or values, or just didn’t appreciate being ‘bossed’

around by their neighbours? Also, I was uncomfortable with what seemed to be his

over-emphasis on the Sasak’s low-levels of education. Implicit in this was the

stereotyping of them as lazy and backwards. This sort of labelling has been observed

in previous studies of Sasak society.573 Such an analysis is too simplistic. The Sasak

have created intricate social networks and organisations, such as Nahdutul Wathan,

the religious organisation, discussed in Chapter 3. These religious organisations

mimic state institutions and they provide religious education of a relatively high

572 Interview with Andi (Mataram, 4 August 2008). 573 Jocelyn Grace, ‘Lacking Education, Young Sasak Women and Teenage Marriage, Divorce and Polygamy in Rural East Lombok’ (Paper presented at Biennial Asian Studies Association of Australia Conference, La Trobe University, Melbourne, 8-11 July 1996) 3; M. Cameron Hay, Remembering to Live – Illness at the Intersection of Anxiety and Knowledge in Rural Indonesia (2001) 148-149.

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standard.574 This does not mean that there is not a problem with the levels of secular

education and literacy on the island. It has been argued that improvements in this area

are key priorities of economic and social development for Lombok.575 However,

Andi’s comments merely follow stereotypes about class and ethnicity. It is true that

many of the older residents’ education does not extend beyond primary school.

However, many younger kampung residents do reach university level. I do not intend

to labour the point about education, rather I am seeking to highlight that stereotypes

may have basis in fact, but also demean communities and create the potential for

problems and conflict to emerge. The positive relationships between Kampung Lom

and Komplek Lom could deteriorate if these stereotypes became the dominant way

they look at each other.

Integral to social harmony in Lom is the protection and support that the communities

and neighbours give to one and another. However, the relationships within Lom are

not all close. The residents of Komplek Cina Lom are, in many respects, disengaged

from the two other communities. Many conversations I had with residents, for

example with Abdul from Komplek Lom, were riddled with generalisations about

Komplek Cina Lom and its residents. This highlights the corrosive aspects of

stereotyping just discussed. For instance, Abdul said that Indonesian Chinese “work

all the time” and “do not want to engage with their neighbours”.576 This may be true,

but it ignores why this estrangement exists. There are complex social and practical

reasons that will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. However the

estrangement of Komplek Cina Lom demonstrates that police and fences do not

provide security, but rather in my observation it is relationships and community that

are the most reliable form of personal and property security in Mataram and West

Lombok.577

574 See Jamilah, Peranan Tuan Guru Sebagai Pelopor Dalam Pengembangan Pendidikan Islam Di Kecamatan Gunung Sari (Honours Thesis, State Islamic Institute Mataram, 1998) 10-16; Lalu Darmawan Putra, Peranan Tuan Guru Kiyai Haji Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid Dalam Mensosialisasikan Pendidikan Islam Di Desa Pancor Lombok Timur (Honours Thesis, State Islamic Institute Mataram, 2001) 24-28; Masnun, Tuan Guru KH Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid – Gagasan dan Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam di Nusa Tenggara Barat (2007) 214-216. 575 Farid Tolomundu, Mampukah NTB Bangkit? (2007) 9-14. 576 Field notes, 8 August 2007. 577 This perspective was shared by Kampung Lom leader Sahnan; see Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007).

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The next section explores the place of adat within conflict management processes in

Lom. This provides background to community and leadership issues discussed

throughout this chapter.

Adat – Lore of the local

In this thesis, adat is defined as the social processes, communal expectations, ritual

practices and leadership structures within local areas. It can be seen as forming “the

character of our society”578 and changes according to the needs of a community.579

This section considers the effect of adat on local communities and conflict

management processes.

Adat is a contested notion with multiple interpretations and applications. It is,

therefore, worth considering its nature and definition. Adat is commonly defined as

“customary or traditional law”.580 This characterisation, although broadly correct,

arguably underestimates the complexity of meaning and political connotations

attributed to this term. By using the term law it is possible to take the view, as did

some Dutch colonial observers, that adat can be paralleled with western positivist

conceptions of ‘law’ (which assert that these social positions are able to be reified and

fixed into codified law).581 M.B. Hooker aptly described this Dutch approach as

“rather optimistic”. He believed that the distillation of adat in Indonesia into a

solidified and consolidated system was illusory. Local eclecticism and the nature of

these ‘rules’ does not lend itself to this form of reification.582 The Dutch during their

colonial reign also sought to use adat as a means of constraining Islam and its

authority, which they saw as potentially challenging their authority.583 As has been

noted previously, the full separation of Islam from adat is not practically possible in

578 Interview with TGH Ahmad Madani (Mataram, 21 August 2008). 579 Interview with Djalaluddin Arzaki (Mataram, 27 July 2008). 580 Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker (eds), Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia Asia – A Contemporary Sourcebook (2006) xxxiii. 581 For discussion of the intellectual problems and conundrums that this approach caused, see Peter Burns, The Leiden Legacy: Concepts of Law in Indonesia (2004). 582 M.B. Hooker, Adat Laws in Modern Malaya (1972) 1; M.B. Hooker, Adat Law in Modern Indonesia (1978) 50-51. 583 See Harry J. Benda, ‘Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Police in Indonesia’ (1958) 30 The Journal of Modern History 338; Karel A. Steenbrink, Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam – Contacts and Conflicts 1596-1950 (2006).

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Mataram and West Lombok. They are, according to the Sasak that I spoke with, and

in my own observation, intricately interconnected.584

There are other approaches to adat, although legitimate, which are not applicable to

this thesis. For example, Leena Avonius focused on adat in northern Lombok as a

ceremonial mechanism and form of political organisation.585 This emphasis emerges,

in many ways, from decentralisation and local politicians’ attempts to create a unified

‘Sasak’ identity and ceremonial adat to utilise this for their own political advantage

(see Chapter 5).586 This has some parallels with the Dutch use of adat as a vehicle for

their attempts to consolidate colonial political power, although, as noted, the political

objectives of the Dutch were to counter Islam and its possible political uses, rather

than reinforce local identity and ethnic political connections.

The definition utilised here emphasises adat as a fluid concept and its content is

interpreted in various ways within local communities depending on their cultural and

geographic realities.587 These social norms regulate the obligations that people have to

their community and what behaviour is acceptable.588 Therefore, when considering

social frameworks it is necessary to recognise that different Sasak communities in

Mataram and West Lombok function differently. The demands placed on their

members are not the same. Leaders and residents relate to each other based on

584 This was discussed at length by TGH Zainal Arifin, see Interview with TGH Zainal Arifin (Jerneng, West Lombok, 28 August 2008). The more general difficulty of separating Islam and adat as simply the Dutch sought to do is discussed in Roy F. Ellen, ‘Social Theory, Ethnography and the Understanding of Practical Islam in South-East Asia’ in M.B. Hooker (ed.), Islam in South-East Asia (1983) 51-58. 585 Leena Avonius, Reforming Wetu Telu: Islam, Adat, and the Promises of Regionalism in Post-New Order Lombok (2004). These recreated, and now becoming, institutionalised forms of adat were also discussed by Kendra Clegg, Ethnic Stereotyping by Local Politicians in Lombok Fails to Please All (2004) Inside Indonesia <http://insideindonesia.org> at 1 May 2009. See also David Henley and Jamie S. Davidson, ‘Introduction – Radical Conservatism – the Protean Politics of Adat’ in Jamie S. Davidson and David Henley, The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics – the Deployment of Adat From Colonialism to Indigenism (2007) 14-15. 586 See Kendra Clegg, Ethnic Stereotyping by Local Politicians in Lombok Fails to Please All (2004) Inside Indonesia <http://insideindonesia.org> at 1 May 2009. This is also occurring elsewhere in Indonesia, see Greg Acciaioli, ‘Grounds of Conflict, Idioms of Harmony: Custom, Religion, and Nationalism in Violence Avoidance at the Lindu Plain, Central Sulawesi’ (2001) 72 Indonesia 81, 92-93. 587 M.B. Hooker, Adat Law in Modern Indonesia (1978) 50-51. 588 Ibid 28 & 50.

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informal understandings.589 Adat in Lom and Bok is not comprised of prescriptive

rules, rather it is better described as ‘the way that things work’.590 The social

processes reflected in local adat provide an underpinning for conflict management

frameworks. Research by Farid Imran Muslim in the northern Lombok village of

Bentek came to similar conclusions, finding that local adat processes were effective in

resolving communal disputes due to their flexibility and social legitimacy.591 Articles

in the Lombok Post have also affirmed the value of Sasak social and cultural

mechanisms to ensure communal harmony.592

Adat regulates significant issues and also reasonably minor matters. For instance, I

went to the marriage of the daughter of one of my friends, Ani, and asked her why she

was standing well away from the wedding parade (nyongkolan). She explained that

adat in her community dictated that she had to stand in a specific place as the

wedding parade entered her kampung.593

Sasak adat, although fluid and variable between communities, is underpinned by two

common ingredients – respect for leadership (kepemimpinan) and solidarity among

society (masyarakat).594 One principle that emerged as a theme when discussing adat

among Sasak was the notion of respect (hormat).595 Respect can be conveyed through

simple acts of hospitality, such as the offering of tea to guests.596 Djalaluddin Arzaki

said that for the Sasak welcoming someone into your home or workplace with this

small gesture of tea and respect is an integral part of building relationships between

people and communities.597 It has been suggested that the principle of respect

exemplifies the overlap between adat and local Islam, as ‘respect’ is an essential

589 The effectiveness of this informal legal ordering has been considered an important element of social control in Indonesia, see Abdul Hakim G. Nusantara and Mulyana W. Kusumah, Aspek-Aspek Socio Legal Pendidikan Hukum Non Formal (1988); Hilman Hadikusumu, Pengantar Antropologi Hukum (2004) 19-24. 590 Field notes, 14 July 2008. 591 Farid Imran Muslim, Pembelajaran Otononomi dan Demokrasi Desa – Studi Tentang Peran Majelis Krama Pengelolaan Norma-Norma Sosial (MPhil Thesis, Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2008) 49-51, 72-83. 592 ‘Budaya Sasak Miliki Nilai Berlapis-lapis – Menjamin Harmoni Manusia, Alam dan Tuhan’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 15 June 1999. 593 Field notes, 27 August 2008. 594 Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). 595 Interview with TGH Ahmad Madani (Mataram, 21 August 2008). This was also mentioned by Djalaluddin Arzaki; see Interview with Djalaluddin Arzaki (Mataram, 27 July 2008). 596 Interview with Djalaluddin Arzaki (Mataram, 27 July 2008). 597 Ibid.

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element in Islamic teaching. This also connects to the Sasak’s emotional makeup,

according to TGH Aminullah Abdul Hamid, who felt that if Sasak believed they were

not being shown respect they can become offended, leading to conflict and

violence.598

Adat and local Islam are intricately connected in Mataram and West Lombok.599

However, Dutch colonial authorities historically felt that adat could be separated from

Islamic traditions and law, Syari’ah.600 The intertwined belief systems that I observed

in the field may explain why there does not appear to be any specific position within

local communities known as tokoh adat (adat leaders). A specific adat leadership

position has been formalised into local socio-political frameworks in other parts of

Lombok, but in Lom and Bok there was no such position.601 Instead in these two

communities adat is interpreted and implemented by community and religious

leadership.602 However, Maria Platt in her research on the West Lombok community

of Teduk did identify a tokoh adat.603 Whether a community has a tokoh adat or just

tokoh masyarakat is immaterial as the central point in Mataram and West Lombok is

that adat and Islam are intertwined. TGH Zainal Arifin, from West Lombok, told me

that his father was simultaneously a Tuan Guru and community leader highly

respected for his religious and adat knowledge.604 This highlights that it is possible to

have an understanding of religious and adat teachings and frameworks; and

acknowledges that the two are not opposed.

Breaches of adat do have sanctions in local communities, but these vary from area-to-

area. For instance, some communities make a person who has stolen from within their

community wear a sign around his or her neck identifying him or her as a thief or 598 Interview with TGH Aminullah Abdul Hamid (Mataram, 25 August 2008). 599 Judith L. Ecklund, ‘Sasak Cultural Change, Ritual Change, and the Use of Ritualized Language’ (1977) 24 Indonesia 1, 4. 600 Jan Prins, ‘Adatlaw and Muslim Religious Law in Modern Indonesia: An Introduction’ (1951) 1 Die Wlt Des Islams 283. 601 For a discussion of the role of tokoh adat elsewhere in Indonesia, see Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, ‘Forum Shopping and Shopping Forums: Dispute Processing in a Minangkabau Village in West Sumatra’ (1981) 19 Journal of Legal Pluralism 117; Craig Thorburn, ‘Adat Law, Conflict and Reconciliation: The Kei Islands, Southeast Maluku’ in Tim Lindsey (ed), Indonesia Law and Society (2008) 115-143. 602 Lalu Muhammad Azhar and Lalu Muhammad Sholeh Tsalis, Tuan Guru Lopan: Waliyullah Dengan Kiprah dan Karomahnya (2003) 27-30. 603 Maria Platt, Sasak Women Navigating Dynamic Marital Continuums: Patriarchal Institutions and Female Agency in Indonesian Marriages (PhD Thesis, La Trobe University, 2010). 604 Interview with TGH Zainal Arifin (Jerneng, West Lombok, 28 August 2008).

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wrongdoer. In other areas, they may not be allowed to attend community functions – a

social sanction that is potent in a communally-focused society.605 This social isolation

can go on for years; for instance, those from Kampung Lom who participated in the

January 2000 riots are still ostracised. This means that they are not able to attend

community functions or sit under the berugaq with the rest of the men.

The powerful role of localised adat, as observed in Lom, is more than a set of rules,

but a way to guide one’s daily life and relationship with neighbours. Additionally, it

provides a legitimate mechanism to reduce or resolve communal or political

conflict.606 An example of this will be considered in Chapter 5, with an analysis of a

period of social tension and conflict in the West Lombok village of Bok. This

consideration of adat leads into the next section about local community leaders,

because these social processes rely upon influential figures mediating and guiding

communal life, and consequently, conflict management frameworks.

Local leadership

The importance of local community leaders was obvious in Lom (and Bok). They are

highly influential as they are able to communicate across their community effectively

and lead by example. This section will consider their role and where they fit into

conflict management processes in Mataram and West Lombok.

During the January 2000 riots some communities of mixed ethnicity, consisting of

Sasak and non-Sasak residents, were able to protect each other.607 This reflected

cohesive social arrangements and strong leadership. When discussing close

relationships and friendships in Lom, I am referring to the cooperation between

Kampung Lom and Komplek Lom. The local level state leadership roles are shared

between these two neighbouring areas.608 The Kepala Rukun Tetangga (RT) oversees

605 Ibid. 606 Interview with Andi (Mataram, 4 August 2008). 607 See ‘Sukaraja Barat, Miniatur Kerukunan Antar Etnis’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 27 January 2000; Riyanto Rabbah, ‘171 Sebuah Catatan’ in Jeremy Kingsley and Abdul Wahid, Lombok: Menuju Masyarakat Multibudaya – Conference Procedings (2007). 608 See Table 4.1 later in this chapter for further details about where the RT and RW fit within the governance hierachy (they are the lowest two levels).

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Kampung Lom and Komplek Lom, while the Kepala Rukun Warga (RW) oversees

the larger Lom community (this also includes Komplek Cina Lom). Every few years

leaders from the two communities swap roles. At present the leader of the RW is from

Kampung Lom (Sahnan) and the leader of the RT is from Komplek Lom (Arifin). The

roles alternate between these two communities and leaders from each community are

nominated according to this arrangement to fill these two positions.609 Lom’s

communal leaders go together to life cycle events, such as births, weddings and

deaths. Adat is said to play a dominant role in this approach, leading to an active and

engaged communal leadership, based on respect and mutual benefit.610 Komplek Cina

Lom leaders play a less direct or influential role, acting predominantly as financiers,

and supporting activities such as Lom’s paid ronda. This means that the Komplek

Cina Lom residents are not protected by social relationships, but would be alerted to

problems by the paid ronda. Although, the paid ronda’s ability to do more than alert

people to problems is questionable.

Conflict management in Lombok is like a spider’s web, with a system of

interconnected community and organisational networks (see Chapter 1).611 In the last

chapter, I considered non-state religious leaders, Tuan Guru, and their role as socio-

political actors and creators of institution and spiritual networks. This section moves

to an assessment of local community leaders and their intricate personal relationships

within their communities. Leaders and their grassroots supporters create a web of

relationships that are essential during times of social instability to avoid or resolve

conflict, and importantly, to potentially shield people from violence. Leaders are

described by John Paul Lederach as “orb weavers”, and act metaphorically as the

spiders who weave the key strands of a social web. Their community then builds on

these strands producing the intricate netting of relationships that is necessary for

conflict management frameworks.612

I have defined community leaders (tokoh masyarakat) broadly in this thesis as

“respected local leaders”.613 This is an intentionally ambiguous definition that covers

609 Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007). 610 Ibid. 611 John Paul Lederach, The Moral Imagination – The Art and Soul of Building Peace (2005) 83. 612 Ibid 80. 613 Interview with Lalu Nurtaat (Mataram, 16 August 2008).

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a wide range of individuals. This thesis then divides communal leaders into two

interrelated categories that are not always mutually exclusive. The first category

covers non-state community leaders who, through their social standing, are recognised

as authority figures within their neighbourhood or village. They do not necessarily

have any official state function or role. The second category of leaders hold local

government positions, such as Kepala RT or Kepala Desa – see Table 4.1 below,

which outlines the structure of the NTB provincial government.614 They are on the

lower rung of the government hierarchy in Lombok. Their role is less bureaucratic

than other parts of the state and their function is more grassroots, making them

potentially effective participants in conflict management.

Common to both these categories is that these people work as local leaders within

villages and neighbourhoods. They usually have similar personal backgrounds, for

example that their parents were leaders, or that they are wealthy or educated (or a

combination of all of these).615 The categorisation used assumes a blurring between

state and non-state leadership at this local level. Although there is overlap between

state and non-state local leaders, it is the non-state players and institutions which are

arguably still more relevant in relation to conflict management processes in local

communities. For instance, pamswakarsa are more important in Lom’s security

arrangements than police (as highlighted later in this chapter).

614 Interview with Mukhsin (Mataram, 14 July 2008); Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok, 16 July 2008). 615 Interview with Lalu Nurtaat (Mataram, 16 August 2008).

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Level 1 Province (Provinsi): NTB – Head: Governor (EO)

Level 2 City (Kota) – Head: Mayor (Walikota) (EO).

1. Mataram

2. Bima

Regency (Kabupaten) – Head: Bupati (EO).

1. West Lombok; 2. Central Lombok; 3. East Lombok; 4. West Sumbawa; 5. Sumbawa; 6. Dompu; 7. Bima; 8. North Lombok (established in 2008).

Level 3 Kecamatan – Head: Camat (AO, by Walikota)

1. Ampenan; 2. Mataram; 3. Cakranegera; 4. Sekorbela (established in 2007); 5. Sandubya (established in 2007).

Kecamatan – Head: Camat (AO, by Bupati)

There are 16 Kecamatan in West Lombok.

Level 4 Kelurahan – Head: Lurah (AO, by Walikota).

Desa – Head: Kepala Desa (EO).

West Lombok has approximately 125 Desa.

Level 5 Lingkungan – Head: Kepala Lingkungan (Kaling) (AO, by Walikota).

Dusun – Head: Kepala Dusun (EO).

Desa Bok has six dusun.

Level 6 RW – Rukun Warga – Head: Kepala RW (approximately 300-700 people).

RW – Rukun Warga – Head: Kepala RW.

Level 7 RT – Rukun Tetangga – Head: Kepala RT (approximately 100-300 people).

RT – Rukun Tetangga – Head: Kepala RT.

Table 4.1 NTB government structure – 2008

Abbreviations: “EO” means “Elected Official”; “AO” means “Appointed Official”.

Local leadership plays an important role in reinforcing relationships between

Kampung Lom and Komplek Lom. The personality of leaders also has a significant

influence on the operation of their communities. When discussing leadership during

an interview with Arifin, the Kepala RT, he emphasised the important role of the

Kepala RT, RW and Lingkungan, the three lowest rungs of the governance structure

in Indonesia. They were not merely government officials, but also social facilitators

he said. Arifin felt that these leaders provided an ‘informal local’ touch to the

activities of government.616 He felt that these levels of government were the most

responsive to the community. Kampung Lom resident, Sahnan, who was the Kepala

RW told me that the most influential local player was the Kepala Lingkungan, Sani,

who came from a kampung adjoining Lom.617 The reason that he was so effective was

that people were afraid of him and his powerful personality acted as a deterrent to

616 Interview with Arifin (Mataram, 16 October 2007). 617 Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007). The importance of the Kepala Lingkungan was also discussed in other interviews; see Interview with Andi (Mataram, 4 August 2008).

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misbehaviour, or outsiders taking advantage of Lom.618 It was not made explicit as

why people were afraid of him, but possibly his official position as Kepala

Lingkungan and role as local Amphibi head, created an aura of ruthlessness. This was

reinforced by Sani himself when he told me that if people tried to steal or disregarded

local adat that he would have no hesitation in beating them up.619 The effectiveness of

these leaders thus emerges not just from title, but also from their communal activities

and personalities.

Even though there is a blurring of state and non-state roles, tensions can arise between

local communities and state institutions such as the police. When the police act

unilaterally they can cause social unease within a community and potentially create

further problems. For instance, in 1999 there was a conflict between two Lombok

villages – Penujak, West Lombok, and Ketara, Central Lombok – which the

communities themselves resolved.620 However, in the aftermath the police raided

Penujak, making two arrests in relation to the clashes between these two villages.

According to newspaper reports, these raids were part of the police efforts to ‘hunt’

down provocateurs within the two communities.621 This raid angered both

communities because they perceived the issue to have been resolved. Additionally,

many residents were distressed by the polices’ actions and felt frightened to return to

their homes.622 Consequently police behaviour, rather than being a constructive aspect

of conflict management, in this situation became a point of tension, which led

community leaders to hold discussions with members of the provincial parliament.623

Without question, police can play an important role within the maintenance of social

harmony in Lombok, but this should be done in coordination with local communal

leaders, otherwise their actions may simply make matters worse. Disputes in Lombok

are resolved by combining state and non-state leadership and organisations, rather

than unilateral action. An example of this will be considered in Chapter 5. The next

section moves from the role of local community leaders to investigate relationships

within and between communities. 618 Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007). 619 Interview with Sani (Mataram, 29 November 2007). 620 ‘Lagi, Sesepuh Sorot Tindakan Polisi’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 31 April 1999. 621 ‘Tersanhka Kasus Penujak Jadi Enam Orang’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 25 April 1999. 622 ‘Warga Trauma dan Tidak Berani Pulang’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 26 April 1999. 623 Ibid.

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Communal relationships – The importance of mutual benefit

They were our friends… If you know and like people you will

look after them no matter their religion or ethnic background.

Santi, a 27 year-old Sasak women living in Mataram.624

Relationships create an important foundation for conflict management as the quote

above suggests. Points of communal engagement and friendship allow for

communication that can overcome problems and protect people in times of crisis.

Pendeta (Reverend) Hasanema explained the importance of communal relationships

using the example of the former NTB Deputy Governor, Thamrin Rayes, who ran a

youth program focused on bringing children from various ethnic and religious

communities together to meet and learn. This, Hasanema said, allows participating

youths to meet people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds, hopefully

leading to longer term friendships. Hasanema hoped that these relationships would

protect people in times of trouble and social instability.625

High levels of cooperation and engagement are at the heart of the relationship

between Kampung Lom and Komplek Lom.626 The positives that emerge out of this

relationship are both tangible and intangible. These two communities provide each

other with mutual benefits, and as a consequence, they believe that this implies a

responsibility to one and another.627 The relationships are based on accepting the

differences between people from the two communities. People from the komplek are

middle-class Indonesians, many of whom have office jobs that demand reasonably

long hours of work. This means they are not as involved in community affairs as

residents of the kampung who often have more time to dedicate to these activities.628

624 Field notes, 16 April 2007. 625 Interview with Pendeta Hasanema (Mataram, 12 December 2007). 626 Field notes, 22 November 2007. 627 Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007). 628 Interview with Achand (Mataram, 6 August 2008).

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Picture 4.6 Multi-purpose recreational area which hosts many community activities in Lom

Mutual benefit in Lom is based on three elements, which community leaders felt

formed the basis of Lom’s adat. First, friendship underpins communal relationships,

for example, by sharing celebrations. Second, finances and work are used to bind the

community together. Many kampung residents are employed in Komplek Lom, for

example, in people’s homes as domestic helpers (pembantu) and caretakers, or by

residents of the komplek at their businesses. This sort of employment also leads to

pseudo-familial relationships. The final element is that at times of emergency people

in these two communities look after each other. For instance, when people from the

kampung need, but cannot afford, medical treatment people from Komplek Lom often

pay for them to go to hospital. This reflects a sense of social obligation towards their

less affluent neighbours. These relationships are reciprocated. For example, during the

January 2000 riots, the komplek residents found refuge in the kampung until they

could be evacuated.629 Therefore, these relationships are not just symbolic, but are

also based on practical mutual benefit. However, these communal relationships and

this reciprocity are not extended to the Indonesian Chinese in Komplek Cina Lom.

When undertaking research it is easy focus on the ‘big’ issues and forget the more

basic aspects of daily life, yet these have very great social force. For instance, when

sitting around one night in the berugaq discussing local politics with several men

629 Interview with Zey (Mataram, 3 October 2007); Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007); Interview with Andi (Mataram, 4 August 2008).

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from Kampung Lom and Komplek Lom it dawned on me that this was a very natural

and normal friendship. It showed bonds that were real, and in many ways, more

effective than high fences or the police.630 People from Kampung Lom often said to

me that they do not care about intellectual concepts, such as multiculturalism, but they

would do anything to look after their friends, whether they are from Komplek Lom or

Kampung Lom, and regardless of whether they were Muslim, Hindu or Christian.631

The engagement between these two parts of Lom needs to be continually worked

upon. I remember watching the preparations for Indonesian Independence Day

celebrations in 2008. Over 200 people attended this event giving it not just a festive

air, but also providing sustenance to the relationship between the kampung and the

komplek. The communities nominated two of their most energetic youths to organise

the event, Zey (from Kampung Lom) and Finna (from Komplek Lom). These two

young women, both in their early 20s, acted as joint leaders of a team comprising

people from both communities. They arranged a full day of events for the children and

then a performance in the evening. Leading this event together, Zey and Finna became

firm friends and helped unite their communities.632

An important point of communication in Lom is their weekly community meetings.

These mushawara are one of the methods for creating positive communal

relationships and allowing effective communication.633 This is a community meeting

for the RT (comprising of both Komplek Lom and Kampung Lom) and is usually held

in this RT once a week. It allows people to voice their problems and give vent to

emotions before these turn to anger. Community leaders are important at this stage to

ensure that things stay calm and constructive. The mushawara also discusses practical

issues of community concern, for example, the renovation of the masjid or

management of the paid ronda.634

The communal situation in Lom, up until this point, has been described as generally

positive. This reflects the relationship between Kampung Lom and Komplek Lom.

630 Field notes, 6 August 2008. 631 Interview with Tika (Mataram, 17 October 2007). 632 Field notes, 31 July 2008 and 19 August 2008. 633 Chapter 5 considers the use of a mushawara as part of the conflict management process in Bok. 634 Interview with Andi (Mataram, 4 August 2008).

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However, the situation in relation to their neighbour Komplek Cina Lom is a different

predicament altogether. This komplek does not really form part of the relational

networks shared by the two other parts of Lom, nor do most of the members of the

komplek feel protected by it.635 Most of the residents of Komplek Cina Lom are, in

fact, alienated from the rest of Lom. This is even though many Indonesian Chinese

residents of Lom have lived in the area for several generations. They are, by and

large, still seen as ‘newcomers’.636 Also, they are perceived as being exclusive and

uninterested in engaging with their neighbours. This alleged exclusivity of Indonesian

Chinese more generally has, unfortunately, led to a history of violence against

them.637 These negative perceptions are connected to the administrative techniques of

Dutch colonial authorities,638 which regulated social affairs by providing ethnic

groups with carefully defined and limited spheres of influence.639 This process

empowered Chinese traders and gave them economic advantage the result of which

continues to this day, and perpetuates stereotypes of their exclusivity.640

The isolation and perceived exclusivity of many Indonesian Chinese in Mataram and

West Lombok is a partly self-fulfilling prophecy. When visiting Gereja ROCK

(Representative of Christ’s Kingdom), a charismatic church popular with Mataram’s

Chinese community, I discussed with a friend, Tomi, his children’s education. He

confided that he did not feel comfortable sending them to a government school and

sent them to a private school instead. He told me about the “poor quality” of the

government schools, but when I pressed him further on this, he said that he felt his

children wouldn’t be fully accepted by other students and teachers. This sentiment

was replicated in other conversations that I had with Indonesian Chinese residents of

Mataram. Many do not feel part of mainstream Lombok society.641 Jemma Purdey has

highlighted this social isolation saying that “there is an ongoing need to acknowledge

635 Interview with Meme (Mataram, 23 October 2007). 636 Interview with Kong (Mataram, 12 November 2007); Field notes, 9 January 2008. 637 Masyhuri, Bakar Pecinan! Konflik Pribumi v Cina di Kudus Tahun 1918 (2006). 638 Daniel S. Lev, ‘Colonial Law and The Genesis of the Indonesian State’ (1985) 40 Indonesia 57, 62. 639 Charles A. Coppel, ‘Historical Impediments to the Acceptance of Ethnic Chinese in a Multicultural Indonesia’ in Leo Suryadinata, Chinese Indonesians – State Police, Monoculture and Multiculture (2004) 17-19. 640 James R. Rush, Opium to Java – Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise in Colonial Indonesia 1860-1910 (1990) 108-135. 641 Field notes, 17 March 2007.

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the fact that ethnic Chinese are still marked as different and ‘other’ in Indonesia and

as such remain highly vulnerable”.642

The social isolation of Indonesian Chinese from the ‘mainstream’ and their perceived

unwillingness to assimilate means that they are commonly labelled with “negative

attributes”.643 This allows for antagonism and the creation of stereotypes that further

reinforce their isolation.644 This creates a vicious circular logic, whereby through fear

of violence and anti-Chinese sentiments, Indonesian Chinese separate themselves

from the ‘mainstream’ society, thus contributing to notions of Chinese exclusivity

which further fuel anti-Chinese sentiments. The Chinese caution is not without

foundation, as the violence of the late 1990s in Jakarta against the Indonesian Chinese

showed. Jacques Bertrand has bluntly observed that “hundreds were killed. Dozens of

Chinese women were raped”.645 The Indonesian Chinese of Mataram are well aware

of this violence.

The relative wealth of Indonesian Chinese further fuels perceptions of their otherness.

In an impoverished island, such as Lombok, ‘economic jealousy’ can strengthen

barriers between the local Sasak and their affluent neighbours. This is reinforced, for

example in Komplek Cina Lom,646 with people living in large houses behind high

fences.647 The antagonism projected towards Indonesian Chinese and their decision to

live behind high fences is therefore part of a self-fulfilling, but understandable,

vicious cycle.648

642 Jemma Purdey, ‘Political Change Reopening the Asimilasi vs Integrasi Debate: Ethnic Chinese Identity in Post-Suharto Indonesia’ (2003) 4 Asian Ethnicity 421, 423. 643 Charles Coppel, Indonesian Chinese in Crisis (1983) 4. The Indonesian Chinese community’s fragile status is also discussed in Tim Lindsey and Helen Pausacker (eds), Chinese Indonesians – Remembering, Distorting and Forgetting (2005). 644 Ibid 4-26. 645 Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia (2004) 67. 646 The economic jealousies that can boil over were discussed by James Siegel in relation to the Indonesian city of Solo’s social disturbances of the early 1980s. See James T. Siegel, Solo in the New Order – Language and Hierarchy in an Indonesian City (1986) 236. 647 Most wealthy Indonesians live behind high fences. The issue is that in Lom, the Indonesian Chinese are the only ones who do so. 648 There are some areas of Mataram where the Indonesian Chinese have created close relationships with their neighbours, but these are exceptional situations. During the January 2000 riots these communities protected their Chinese neighbours - see ‘Sukaraja Barat, Miniatur Kerukunan Antar Etnis’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 27 January 2000.

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The social isolation of this minority has also been observed elsewhere in Indonesia

where the Indonesian Chinese community “tends to segregate itself socially and

residentially, a behavior they [other Indonesians] see as an arrogant expression of

feelings of superiority”.649 In Komplek Cina Lom, the high fences and razor wire feed

the notion of their perceived superiority and suspicion of their neighbours. Yet,

ironically it is these security mechanisms that alienate them from the wider Lom

community and deny them access from more communal forms of security and

relational protections. This was seen during the January 2000 riots, when the

Komplek Cina Lom residents were not provided shelter in the kampung and had to be

evacuated under police protection. The police did not arrive for several days. They

were therefore extremely vulnerable to attack by the rioters.650

Picture 4.7 The physical seperation is visible in Komplek Cina Lom

On top of these physical impediments, it seemed that there was little if any contact

between residents of Komplek Cina Lom and their neighbours in Lom. In fact, I had

great difficulty trying to make contact with members of this komplek myself in order

to explore their perspectives on living in Lom and being Indonesian Chinese in

Mataram. When I asked people from Komplek Lom and Kampung Lom to introduce

me to their neighbours they too found it challenging, because they did not have

ongoing friendships with them. I know of only a few practical connections, such as 649 Mély G. Tan, ‘The Social and Cultural Dimensions of the Role of Ethnic Chinese in Indonesian Society’ (1991) 51 Indonesia 113, 114. 650 Interview with Benny (Mataram, 30 October 2007).

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those forged by assisting with the financing of the paid ronda. Beyond this

arrangement, Komplek Cina Lom has limited contact with the two other

communities.651 This distinct and separate social position fed into stereotypes about

them – it is easier to ridicule someone you do not know.652

Eventually, people from Kampung Lom arranged for me to talk with ‘Meme’ from

Komplek Cina Lom. It was an extremely difficult and tense meeting. She specifically

requested that her identity be kept secret, even though this had already been promised.

This was the only time in my fieldwork that someone was so protective of their

anonymity. She appeared very anxious about discussing relationships and friendships

within Lom and would not talk about the January 2000 riots at all. Eventually the

interview was terminated after about 20 minutes as she was too uncomfortable. The

interview reflected the sensitivity of her social position. Interestingly, she said that

residents of Komplek Cina Lom did not talk much amongst themselves; she felt there

was little or no sense of community.653

The only other Komplek Cina Lom interview I had was an easier experience. This

interview was with elderly resident, ‘Kong’, who talked openly of feeling sensitive

about his social position. Consequently, he kept in regular contact with the kampung

leader, Sahnan, the Kepala RW. He recognised that without this relationship he would

be “in trouble” if there was ever a repetition of the January 2000 riots.654

A time of riots – Testing a community’s resolve

The cornerstones of local conflict management in Lom – adat, leadership,

relationships and strong community – have been considered in the previous parts of

this chapter. These issues will now be put into practical context by investigating how

Lom dealt with the January 2000 riots and its aftermath. The violence of January 2000

in Mataram and West Lombok was tragic, according to Lom’s Tuan Guru Lokal

651 Field notes, 22 October 2007. 652 Stereotyping between ethnic and religious groups has historically been an issue across the Indonesian archipelago. The difficulty in managing the problems and conflict emerging from this activity has been discussed in Suwarsih Warnaen, Stereotip Etnis Dalam Masyarakat Multietnis (2002). 653 Interview with Meme (Mataram, 23 October 2007). 654 Interview with Kong (Mataram, 12 November 2007).

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Ramli, but he was proud of the way that community members had generally looked

after one another. 655

It was not just the residents of Kampung Lom who were proactive, but also Muslim

residents of Komplek Lom. Mukhsin, a Muslim living in Komplek Lom, told me how

his home had become a storage facility for the belongings of his non-Muslim

neighbours, with his living room decorated with a whole wall of televisions.656 This

protection of property was organised by local leaders to make sure that if anything

happened to the non-Muslim residents’ homes, such as being burnt down or ransacked

by the rioters, at least their personal possessions would be protected.657

In Mataram and West Lombok people can become vulnerable if they do not have the

protection of their neighbours. This position is obviously more precarious during

periods of social tension and violence. For instance, there was limited police

protection for Lom residents. One Kampung Lom resident, Tika, said that during the

January 2000 riots two trucks of Brimob (police paramilitary mobile brigades) came

to Lom on the fourth or fifth day of the riots. This was well after the trouble had

started and when, according to Tika, the situation had already calmed down.

Interestingly, they only went to Komplek Cina Lom.658 Tika did not really say why

this occurred, but the way that I read his body language implied that this was the only

area that the police cared about protecting, or given the history of police corruption, it

is conceivable that the police were paid to come.659 This was despite looting and fires

occurring in Komplek Lom.660

Several homes of non-Muslim residents in Komplek Lom were looted or set ablaze. It

was believed that some of the kampung residents who had been participating in the

riots must have identified these homes. This is why when those who had joined in the

rioting were caught returning to the kampung they were ‘arrested’ by the community

and given a severe beating. The reason for this sharp response was not just their

655 Interview with TGH Ramli (Mataram, 29 July 2008). 656 Interview with Mukhsin (Mataram, 14 July 2008). 657 Field notes, 25 May 2007. 658 Interview with Tika (Mataram, 17 October 2007). 659 The accusation that the police only protected those living in Komplek Cina Lom was also noted by Ida – Interview with Ida (Mataram, 23 October 2007). 660 Field notes, 17 October 2007.

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participation in the riots, but perhaps more importantly, they challenged the local

leadership and adat by ignoring the social relationships between these two

communities. After the beating, those who participated in the riots were detained in a

vacant building on the outskirts of Lom until collected by police. As mentioned earlier

in this thesis, they were then taken to prison, and held without charge, in accordance

with the request of Kampung Lom’s leadership. This imprisonment was intended to

make them “cool down”.661 As has been noted, these kampung residents are still

ostracised from communal spaces and are not welcome at community festivities.

Some ambivalence exists in Lom regarding the events of January 2000. There was a

broad range of observations about how people responded to these events.662 To me it

felt like there was a ‘Rashomon’ effect in operation – a situation where different

participants’ recollections of events diverge greatly.663 This is not surprising, given

that during times of fear and anxiety events are often experienced subjectively, and

therefore recounted in contradictory ways.664 Initially, when visiting Lom many of the

communal leaders would tell me how positively Lom had operated during the January

2000 riots, painting an almost romantic picture. However, the reality was more

confused.665 For instance, during an interview with Ida, a member of Komplek Lom,

she told me that this depiction of people from the kampung defending Lom from the

marauding rioters was exaggerated. The situation was both positive and negative.

Kampung residents and Muslims from the komplek helped to protect the personal

belongings of their non-Muslim neighbours and brought them into the kampung until

they were able to be safely evacuated. At the same time, many kampung residents fled

to central and eastern Lombok. Additionally, the people who were attempting to

protect Lom were unable to stop several houses from Komplek Lom being vandalised,

looted and even burnt down.666

661 Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007). 662 Field notes, 30 October 2007. 663 See Karl G. Heider, ‘The Rashomon Effect: When Ethnographers Disagree’ (1988) 90 American Anthropologist 73. 664 Mike Sugimoto, ‘The Fifty-Year War: Rashomon, After Life, and Japanese Film Narratives of Remembering’ (2003) 7 Japan Studies Review 1, 6. 665 Field notes, 24 October 2007. 666 Interview with Ida (Mataram, 23 October 2007).

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Despite these multiple and competing narratives one point is clear – relationships are

vital for personal safety. Residents of Kampung Lom and Komplek Lom looked after

each other during these violent events,667 while those in Komplek Cina Lom were cut-

off from the rest of the area and waited anxiously for Brimob to arrive before being

evacuated.668 The benefits of this relationship between these two areas was

highlighted with non-Muslims from Komplek Lom being given refugee in the

kampung’s musholla (small Muslim prayer house) until they were evacuated – see

Picture 4.8 below.669 The seperation of Komplek Cina Lom heightened the potential

for serious attacks to have occurred, because they were not protected in a revered

space like a musholla or masjid. These are protected sanctuaries that I doubt Sasak

would have attacked, given the importance of Islam for this ethnic group (see Chapter

3).

Picture 4.8 Kampung Lom’s musholla where Komplek Lom residents were given sanctuary

There was real trauma caused to the non-Muslim residents of Lom. Dewi, from

Komplek Lom, told me that before the 2000 riots there were five protestant families

who lived in the komplek but now there are only one or two. She returned to Lom

from her family’s home in Bali six months after the riots, but only because her

667 Interview with Benny (Mataram, 30 October 2007). 668 This precarious position was noted by elderly Indonesian Chinese resident of Komplek Cina Lom, Kong, see Interview with Kong (Mataram, 12 November 2007). 669 Interview with Jupri (Mataram, 9 November 2007).

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husband had to return to his job in Mataram.670 Her anxiety was clearly visible in our

interview while she recounted her experiences of these events.671 Despite these

anxieties, she felt that Lom was a safe and strong community. She would prefer to live

in Lom than other parts of Mataram, because of the strong relationships between

Komplek Lom and Kampung Lom.672 Ida, another resident of Komplek Lom, despite

also being scared during these riots, told me that their community was based on close

personal relationships between people from these two parts of Lom. These firm

personal bonds gave her a real sense of security, because she felt that people from the

kampung would protect her if ever she were threatened.673

This troubled period brought many members of Kampung Lom and Komplek Lom

together to work on their community’s security arrangements, such as introducing a

paid ronda. The next section will investigate the rationale for, and responsibilities of,

the paid ronda, as well as the role of pamswakarsa in this part of Mataram.

Local security measures – Paid ronda and pamswakarsa

The social, political and economic instability around the turn of the century, including

the January 2000 riots and the perceived ‘crime wave’,674 presented many challenges

to Lom. As a consequence the community leadership felt that additional local security

measures were necessary.675 A paid ronda (night watch) reflects the most significant

‘official’ community response in Lom to the January 2000 riots. This night watch

involves seven guards patrolling Lom every night in shifts that start at 11pm and

continue until morning prayers.676 If anything untoward occurs, the members of the

night watch will alert the community by striking a kul-kul (drum made from bamboo

or wood which is struck to sound an alarm).677

670 Interview with Dewi (Mataram, 19 October 2007). 671 Field notes, 23 October 2007. 672 Interview with Dewi (Mataram, 19 October 2007). 673 Interview with Ida (Mataram, 23 October 2007). 674 Stein Kristiansen, ‘Violent Youth Groups in Indonesia: The Cases of Yogyakarta and Nusa Tenggara Barat’ (2003) 18 Sojourn 110, 122. 675 Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007); Interview with Arifin (Mataram, 16 October 2007); Interview with Subuh (Mataram, 6 November 2007). 676 Field notes, 16 October 2007. 677 Interview with Subuh (Mataram, 6 November 2007).

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As the quote suggests at the start of this chapter local people do not obtain a sense of

security from the police. Rather, the people in Lom rely upon the paid ronda, and

discussed later the pamswakarsa, to obtain a sense of personal and property safety.

These two community security mechanisms underpin the local security

arrangements.678 The covert nature of the pamswakarsa will also be considered.

The paid ronda initiative emerged for two reasons. First, it allowed for a more secure

community, preventing criminal activity, such as theft. It was also believed that this

would be the first line of defence for Lom if riots were to happen again.679 Second, the

creation of a paid ronda allowed for the employment of Kampung Lom residents and

this assisted the community financially. 680 Once again, this highlights a situation of

mutual benefit in Lom.

The paid ronda is an eclectic group of people who do not seem to fit any particular

age, physical or educational criteria. The only discernable requirements for

participation was that they be male and from Kampung Lom. Unlike the satpam

(private security) at Mataram Mall or other commercial facilities, the members of the

paid ronda are not necessarily young or physically strong. They range in age from

their early-30s to mid-60s and they were in various states of physical fitness, with two

of them having obvious disabilities (such as blindness in one eye or walking with a

limp). Educationally, two of the paid ronda members had not attended school at all,

and only one had finished high school.681

The physical abilities of those employed in the paid ronda helps explain the limitation

of its role to primarily act as a first-warning for the community, while satpam are

usually expected to be in good physical shape and able to respond effectively to

problems in the area they are protecting. Therefore, the nature of this group is more

like a night watch with salary, rather than a professional security service.This explains

my decision to call them a ‘paid ronda’ rather than satpam.682

678 The use of non-government militia, and the like, was a historical feature of Dutch Colonial East Indies and the early period of the Indonesian Republic – see Robert Cribb, Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People’s Militia and the Indonesian Revolution 1945-1949 (1991). 679 Interview with Ida (Mataram, 23 October 2007). 680 Interview with Subuh (Mataram, 6 November 2007). 681 Field notes, 14 November 2007. 682 Ibid.

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Alongside the paid ronda, pamswakarsa are also as an important element in the

security arrangements of Lom. This is primarily because most of the paid ronda

guards are also members of pamswakarsa. These community security groups have

played an important role in other parts of Lombok in relation to law enforcement

during the recent period of social instability in the late 1990s, and are still operative

(see Chapter 2). However, establishing the presence and activities of pamswakarsa in

Lom was initially difficult. Some of the communal leadership, Arifin, Sahnan and

Sani, were adamant that pamswakarsa have never played a role in Lom, although this

was clearly untrue.683

The rationale for these leaders’ denial of pamswakarsa activity in Lom was difficult

to understand. Maybe they thought that I wouldn’t be favourably inclined to such

groups. They were also trying to convince me that pamswakarsa were not needed in

their community, because they had harmonious relationships among themselves and

outsiders were scared to challenge them.684 One leader, Sahnan, told me that he ‘knew

all the local thieves’ and had talked them out of coming near Lom.685 Whatever the

reason, they did not want to convey the perception that pamswakarsa are needed in

their community.686 In fact, the contrary is true, pamswakarsa are active and the

community’s leaders are well aware of this. Far from not being involved, according to

several Lom residents, Lom’s leaders were actually the coordinators of pamswakarsa

activities. Sani, the Kepala Lingkungan, is allegedly the local Amphibi leader.687

Despite this, during our interview Sani denied that Amphibi was active or that he was

this group’s local leader.688 An alternative reason for the denial of pamswakarsa

operation among leaders in Lom was public debate over the past decade in Lombok

about the utility of such community security groups. The links between pamswakarsa

and criminal activity – which has led many leading figures to call for them to be

683 Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007); Interview with Arifin (Mataram, 16 October 2007); Interview with Sani (Mataram, 29 November 2007). 684 Field notes, 17 October 2007. 685 Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007). 686 Field notes, 17 October 2007. 687 Interview with Subuh (Mataram, 6 November 2007). This was confirmed during a later interview – Interview with Mukhsin (Mataram, 14 July 2008). 688 Interview with Sani (Mataram, 29 November 2007).

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banned – may also explain Lom leaders’ reticence to acknowledge their involvement

with these groups.

This denial of any pamswakarsa presence was quickly dispelled by a number of Lom

residents. One kampung resident, Zey, suggested that pamswakarsa had been active

for a long time.689 Another kampung resident, Tika, told me that two pamswakarsa,

Amphibi and Lang-Lang, were still active in Lom. He also pointed out that almost all

the paid ronda members were also pamswakarsa members.690

While most of the paid ronda were members of pamswakarsa, this is not a pre-

requisite either officially or unofficially. Involvement in these community security

groups is a matter of personal choice. Two members of Lom’s paid ronda, Saonah

and Sahari, are not affiliated to a pamswakarsa. The other five are affiliated to either

Amphibi or Lang-Lang (see Pictures 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11). The two who are not

members of either of these pamswakarsa told me that there are a number of

disincentives to becoming involved with them. For instance, a reasonably large

membership fee of Rp.150,000 (just under $AU 20)691 was required when signing-up

to Amphibi (this covered uniform and pamswakarsa identification card). An additional

fee is payable each month, which is Rp5000 (payable to the area ‘captain’ – the

Kepala Lingkungan, Sani).692 Saonah argued that this membership fee is like a

pyramid scheme in that the rewards to members were not great, but that the leaders

become rich from membership contributions.693 He also noted that there was no

specific training available for pamswakarsa members in Lom or strong connections

with near-by groups.694 Meanwhile, Sahari felt that membership in these groups was

unnecessary as the paid ronda looked after the community’s safety and security.695

None of the watchmen were concerned with past reports of violence or misbehaviour

by members of these groups.696

689 Field notes, 16 October 2007. 690 Interview with Tika (Mataram, 17 October 2007). 691 This was a significant fee for someone from the Kampung and could amount to several weeks’ wages for them. 692 Interview with Jupri (Mataram, 9 November 2007); Email from Zey to Jeremy Kingsley, 7 June 2010. 693 Interview with Saonah (Mataram, 7 November 2007). 694 Ibid. 695 Interview with Sahari (Mataram, 11 November 2007). 696 Field notes, 16 October 2007.

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Picture 4.9 Kampung Lom paid ronda member in Amphibi uniform

Picture 4.10 Kampung Lom paid ronda member in Lang-Lang uniform

In contrast, the remaining five paid ronda members saw their membership of

pamswakarsa not just as being practically important to their role as night watchmen,

but also a source of pride. It was considered to be an affirmation of their Sasak

identity.697 Their enthusiasm could be seen with the desire to wear their pamswakarsa

697 Field notes, 10 November 2008. Similar declarations of ethnic identity have been highlighted in other parts of Indonesia, for instance the Betawi Brotherhood Forum. Their leader, Fadloli el-Muhir, said “The first step we need to take post-New Order is to raise our heads, to stop cowering and take pride in our ethnicity.” Cited in Ian Douglas Wilson, ‘Continuity and Change: the Changing Contours of Organized Violence in Post-New Order Indonesia’ (2006) 38 Critical Asian Studies 265, 276.

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uniforms at the time they were being interviewed. They all did this without invitation

from me – their smile when wearing the bright orange windbreaker of Amphibi or a

Lang-Lang t-shirt demonstrated their pride in their membership of these groups.698

Paid ronda member Ciman stressed his “pride” in being connected with Amphibi,

which he saw as directly allied to his sense of Sasak identity. Amphibi showed him

how the Sasak could look after themselves and the people they cared for.699 These

Sasak assertions of ethnic identity and pride are noteworthy considering the lengthy

history of their preference for non-state forms of authority and control (see Chapters 2

and 3).

Picture 4.11 Identity card for Amphibi member from paid ronda in Lom [anonymity protected]

The debate about whether to be a pamswakarsa member or not took an interesting

twist when I interviewed Tumi, who was a member of not just one pamswakarsa, but

two – both Amphibi and Lang-Lang. When I asked him why he was a member of two

competing pamswakarsa he was surprised that I would think there could be conflict

between these two allegiances. Considering the intense rivalry among these groups

(see Chapter 2), I too was a little bewildered, although for different reasons. For Tumi

the divergent political connections and affiliations of these groups were irrelevant, as

both aimed to protect his community. This was interesting, as his argument seemingly

had an internal contradiction. His membership to Lang-Lang arose because of its

particular and direct political linkage to Mataram Mayor, Ruslan, who Tumi saw as an

698 Field notes, 8 and 14 November 2007. 699 Interview with Ciman (Mataram, 8 November 2007). The pride in self-reliance regarding Lom’s security was also raised by Jupri – see Interview with Jupri (Mataram, 9 November 2007).

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inspiration.700 Yet this meant that if there was a political conflict between Amphibi

and Lang-Lang he could be placed into a compromised position. These security

groups, although emphasising crime prevention, also have political connections, and

therefore, membership of two groups could see someone in a awkward position with

loyalties divided between the two groups. As was noted before, pamswakarsa have

been known to battle each other (see Chapter 2) and I doubt that either of these groups

would be happy with Tumi having dual membership.

There are operational motivations for paid ronda members to have connections to

pamswakarsa. For instance, if a guard is affiliated to Amphibi, then if they

experienced trouble with thieves or the like they could (according to Subuh) call upon

Amphibi members from nearby areas for assistance. This reinforces the ronda’s role

as ‘first warning’ with backup coming from others, such as pamswakarsa, although,

Subuh was not able to give any examples of pamswakarsa actually being called

upon.701

More specific explanations of the operational practices of the night watch was

provided by Ciman. He said that they would use adat if they caught a thief or

wrongdoer. When he referred to adat processes being used this seemed to imply the

use of swift justice with the alleged criminal being beaten up. In relation to theft, he

told me that whether they used state law or adat processes would depend on whether

the person was, in his words, considered to be a ‘small thief’ or a ‘big thief’. From

Ciman’s perspective a ‘small thief’ was someone who attempted to steal a t-shirt or

the like. On the other hand, a ‘big thief’ was someone who attempted to steal a

motorbike or something of more significant value. This was an elastic categorisation

that left significant room for discretion by the ronda and community leadership.

Those considered a ‘big thief’ would be handed over to the police. Those deemed to

be a ‘small thief’ would be dealt with according to adat. This involved taking them to

a vacant house close to the edge of the kampung where the paid ronda and community

leaders would “teach them a lesson” (read: give them a beating). Ciman said that the

700 Interview with Tumi (Mataram, 12 November 2007). 701 Interview with Subuh (Mataram, 6 November 2007).

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aim of this approach was to show them the error of their ways and dissuade others

considering such activities.702

The reason that they would hand a ‘big thief’ over to the police rather than handling it

in-house was unclear and Ciman could not, in fact, remember the paid ronda ever

handing anyone over to the police, although he noted that there were several ‘smaller

thieves’ in recent years whom had been dealt with by the watchmen and communal

leaders. The lessons seem to have been learnt by these wrongdoers and they did not

return to Lom to participate in criminal activities.703 This non-repetition of

wrongdoing is likely to be connected to the shame attached to being caught and

receiving a severe beating. Stigma has been found to have significant social resonance

in Sasak society.704

Conclusion

Picture 4.12 View of Lom from the fields

This chapter has documented the intricacy of social processes and adat practices that

guide communal leadership and communities in Lom, and Mataram and West

Lombok more broadly. Lom is a community that has obvious strengths and

weaknesses. Elaborate networks within and between communities form a web of

702 Interview with Ciman (Mataram, 8 November 2007). 703 Ibid. The beating of ‘thieves’ who are caught by members of the local community was also discussed by others who noted that it was used as a “lesson” or “warning” to the wrongdoer and potential criminals. See Interview with Andi (Mataram, 4 August 2008). 704 The use of ‘shame’ within Sasak society is discussed in Linda Rae Bennett, Women, Islam and Modernity – Single Women, Sexuality and Reproductive Health in Contemporary Indonesia (2005).

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relationships that provide personal and property security. There are also potential

points of weakness within these networks, such as the detrimental affects of

stereotyping and the problems that individuals or communities face when they are

outside these relational protections. This was most starkly reflected in Komplek Cina

Lom.

Lom’s leadership was aware that additional measures were necessary during and after

the tumultuous period of social, political and economic instability during the late

1990s and early part of this century. They therefore created a paid ronda which patrol

Lom every night and acts as a first-warning system for the community against

criminals or rioters. Most of the night watchmen are also members of pamswakarsa,

which has symbolic and operational consequences. This chapter also highlights the

limited role of state law enforcement agencies in these local security arrangements.

The next chapter outlines two case studies placing the material so far presented in the

thesis into context. The first case study in Chapter 5 involves the coordination of state

and non-state actors in order to avoid election-related violence during the 2008 NTB

gubernatorial elections. The second case study considers a West Lombok village,

Bok, which went through a period of social and political instability that threatened to

spiral into serious violence.

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Chapter 5 The art of conflict management

Avoiding and resolving conflict

… we needed to cool our emotions – conflicts will not make

us happy…

Satriawan, Mataram Electoral Commission Member.705

Satriawan explains in simple terms the futility of communal and political violence in

Lombok. The dangers of this violence and the importance of social harmony are

messages commonly communicated by local religious leaders. TGH Sofwan Hakim

regularly warns his santri (students) that becoming involved with violence is not just

in principle wrong, but also something that can have terrible and unexpected

consequences. One may think that they are just burning down a church in a symbolic

statement of Muslim identity, and they may have some personal rationalisation for

this, but what happens next could be unexpectedly tragic. Hakim asks, what if there is

a little child locked in the church, or if the spark leads to a fire that devastates a

nearby kampung? He maintains that violence is not to be played with, nor is it an

effective political tool.706

The two case studies investigated in this chapter highlight examples of the avoidance

and resolution of political and communal violence in Lombok. The first case study

investigates the strategy implemented by senior provincial government figures to

avoid potential conflict during the 2008 NTB gubernatorial elections. During the

campaign and in the lead up to the elections, state officials cooperated closely with

non-state religious leaders, Tuan Guru, to create an atmosphere designed to prevent

political competition between ethnic groups and political interests turning violent.

This approach was conceived due to several outbreaks of political and ethnically-

705 Asrori S. Karni, ‘Roots of Tolerance Sprang Out from the Ashes of Conflict’ in Asrori S. Karni, A Celebration of Democracy – A Journalistic Portrayal of Indonesia’s 2004 Direct Elections Amongst Moderate and Hardline Muslims (2006) 285. 706 Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008).

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related violence during election periods in Lombok since 1999. They were determined

to avoid a repetition of these past events.

The second case study reviews a serious period of social instability and

demonstrations that affected the West Lombok village of Bok during July 2008.707

During this time, there were serious allegations against a village official that led to

demonstrations which threatened to explode into violence. This example reflects the

methods deployed successfully and unsuccessfully by local state and non-state

leadership to bring these village tensions to a peaceful resolution.

The strength of the conflict management processes that I observed while in the field is

that they are fluid and adaptable to circumstances. The examples of conflict

management identified in this chapter are not about idealised visions of Sasak identity

or adat,708 but rather are about deploying techniques which utilise local leadership and

social processes congruent with local realities.709 When discussing idealised versions

of Sasak adat or identity, what is being acknowledged is the recreation for political

purposes of a reified version of ‘Sasak’ ethnicity. This has emerged, to a degree, with

political manoeuvring during the decentralisation of political power over the past

decade.710 However, as has been noted, this thesis considers adat as the localised

social patterns of behaviour and expectations, guided by local community and

religious leaders. These localised approaches have been used effectively in the case

studies of conflict management in this chapter. They operate efficiently and with high-

707 Bok is a village in West Lombok and has been de-identified in accordance with the requirements of the University of Melbourne Ethics Committee for this research. Accordingly, all names in the second case study are pseudonyms. 708 This politicisation of Sasak adat has been discussed in several articles, see Leena Avonius, Reforming Wetu Telu: Islam, Adat, and the Promises of Regionalism in Post-New Order Lombok (2004); Leena Avonius, ‘Reforming Adat – Indonesian Indigenous People in the era of Reformasi’ (2004) 4 The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 123; Kendra Clegg, Ethnic Stereotyping by Local Politicians in Lombok Fails to Please All (2004) Inside Indonesia <http://insideindonesia.org> at 1 May 2009. 709 For discussion of adat and conflict management processes elsewhere in Indonesia, see Greg Acciaioli, ‘Grounds of Conflict, Idioms of Harmony: Custom, Religion, and Nationalism in Violence Avoidance at the Lindu Plain, Central Sulawesi’ (2001) 72 Indonesia 81; Craig Thorburn, ‘Musibah: Governance, Intercommunal Violence and Reinventing Tradition in the Kei Islands, Southeast Maluku’ (Working Paper No. 125, Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, 2005); Craig Thorburn, ‘Adat Law, Conflict and Reconciliation: The Kei Islands, Southeast Maluku’ in Tim Lindsey (ed), Indonesia Law and Society (2008). 710 See Kendra Clegg, Ethnic Stereotyping by Local Politicians in Lombok Fails to Please All (2004) Inside Indonesia <http://insideindonesia.org> at 1 May 2009.

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levels of social legitimacy. In periods of state weakness, a partnership between state

and non-state actors means that even if judicial processes or policing are weakened,

social harmony does not disappear, although it may become more precarious. The

next section provides an example of this kind of partnership.

Case study – Provincial elections and the power of partnerships

Ethnic tensions and political violence in Lombok

Early on the morning of 21 July 2003, a police cordon surrounded the provincial

legislative buildings in Mataram. This protective barrier marked the first-ever

legislative elections for NTB Governor. The local political elite were being given an

opportunity to select the provincial governor. The police commanders were concerned

that the supporters of rival candidates who were rallying outside the legislative

buildings would clash, and that the compound would be stormed. These concerns

were proven correct, in part at least, with fights occurring between the supporters of

rival gubernatorial candidates.711

The incident above, along with several other incidents of political conflict that will

soon be discussed, provided the rationale for provincial authorities developing a

conflict avoidance strategy for the 2008 NTB gubernatorial elections. The first direct

election of provincial governor precipitated concerns that an outbreak of politically-

motivated violence could occur. Consequently, the provincial intelligence department,

Kesbanglinmas,712 was delegated the responsibility for designing and implementing a

conflict avoidance strategy for this election.

The plan devised by the department to avoid political competition turning violent was

based on three elements. First, a partnership was developed between provincial

authorities and Tuan Guru so that the message of social harmony was communicated

effectively and authoritatively to local communities across the island during the

elections. The transmission of this information was done through Tuan Guru and their 711 Rosiady Husaenie Sayuti and Muhammad Faqih Langitan, Perjalanan Orang Sasak Menjadi Gubernur (2006) 55-62. 712 Kesbanglinmas means Kesatuan Bangsa dan Perlindungan Masyarakat (Office of National Unity and Community Protection) – essentially local intelligence.

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organisational networks.713 These religious leaders supported this strategy due to their

religious beliefs, which emphasised social harmony, as well as a realpolitik approach

to the maintenance and enhancement of their socio-political role. The government

strategy reinforced Tuan Gurus’ high-social standing through their overt reliance

upon them. Second, a compromise was negotiated between elements of the political

elite from Lombok and Sumbawa to avoid ethnic clashes. Essentially, they negotiated

a division of the potential political and economic rewards of political success along

ethnic lines. They did this through the distribution of places on the campaign tickets,

with the Sasak candidate being given top position on each gubernatorial ticket and

each candidate for deputy being from Sumbawa. Third, local security groups,

pamswakarsa, were kept inactive during the election campaign as a result of

negotiations between state officials and the non-state leadership of these groups.

The politically-motivated violence of 2003 was part of Lombok’s recent history of

social instability and turbulent local political competition.714 The volatility

corresponded with the collapse of the island’s tourism industry, a casualty of the 1997

Asian economic crisis. In the period since this economic turmoil and the collapse of

the Soeharto government, the residents of Mataram and West Lombok have faced a

series of destabilising events. These have included a ‘crime wave’, anti-Chinese riots,

often out-of-control pamswakarsa (private militia), and violence during elections at a

Mataram university.

It should also be recognised that the 2008 gubernatorial elections came during a

period of political transition for NTB. Until the end of the Soeharto era, Lombok had

been under almost constant colonisation or quasi-colonialisation for over 400 years –

the Balinese, the Dutch and the Japanese, and then by outside ‘New Order’

713 This reflects the ‘web of relationships’ concept discussed by John Paul Lederach, which was considered in Chapters 1 and 4. 714 The nature of, and concerns caused by, political competition in Lombok were discussed in Asrori S. Karni, ‘Roots of Tolerance Sprang Out from the Ashes of Conflict’ in Asrori S. Karni, A Celebration of Democracy – A Journalistic Portrayal of Indonesia’s 2004 Direct Elections Amongst Moderate and Hardline Muslims (2006) 275-295. The broader canvas of local political rivalries that developed across Indonesia during Reformasi have been discussed in Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, ‘Introduction: Decentralisation, Democratisation and the Rise of the Local’ in Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, Local Power and Politics in Indonesia – Decentralisation and Democratisation (2003) 9.

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technocrats.715 Over the last decade, Indonesia’s process of democratisation and

decentralisation brought local political empowerment to Lombok.716 This seismic

political change in Lombok created competition between local political elites for the

opportunities and spoils that decentralisation produced, leading to the potential for

conflict during election periods (see Chapters 1 and 2).717

The rapid political transition, and consequent development of new avenues for

political competition, led to serious concerns among government officials about the

potential for violence to emerge during the direct election of NTB governor in mid-

2008. In August 2007, provincial authorities held a meeting of government agencies

and local non-government groups to discuss potential points of communal conflict in

NTB. One of the main concerns aired at this meeting was the 2008 gubernatorial

elections.

State institutions are still relatively weak in Lombok, although the situation is

arguably improving. With this said, institutional weakness provides an opportunity for

state institutions, such as the police and other government departments. They can

partner with non-state leaders, such as Tuan Guru, to avoid or minimise violent

confrontation motivated by the elections. These ‘partnerships’ between state and non-

715 Alfons van der Kraan, Lombok: Conquest, Colonization and Underdevelopment, 1870-1940 (1980); Sven Cederroth, The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power of Mekkah – A Sasak Community on Lombok (1981) 90; John MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Soeharto Lombok (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2005) 76-78. 716 There has been a proliferation of literature and research on decentralisation, and related issues, in Indonesia. It has taken various perspectives on this issue from more general to localised analysis. See Harold Crouch, ‘The Key Determinants of Indonesia’s Political Future’ (Working Paper No. 7, ISEAS, 2002); Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gusti Asnan (eds), Indonesia in Transition – Work in Progress (2003); Marcus Mietzner, ‘Local Elections and Autonomy in Papua and Aceh: Mitigating or Fueling Secessionism?’ (2007) 84 Indonesia 1; Leo Schmit, ‘Decentralisation and Legal Reform in Indonesia: The Pendulum Effect’ in Tim Lindsey (ed), Indonesia Law and Society (2008) 146-190; Coen J.G. Holtzappel and Martin Ramstedt (eds), Decentralization and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia – Implementation and Challenges (2009); Michelle Ann Miller, Rebellion and Reform in Indonesia – Jakarta’s Security and Autonomy Policies in Aceh (2009); Michael Buehler, ‘Decentralisation and Local Democracy in Indonesia: The Marginalisation of the Public Sphere’ in Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner, Problems in Democratisation in Indonesia – Elections, Institutions and Society (2010) 267-285. 717 ‘Problematik Pilkada Dalam Kacamata Publik’, Kompas (Jakarta, Indonesia), 18 February 2008; ‘Kalla: Pilkada Sumber Konflik’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 8 June 2008; ‘Unrest Colors Regional Elections in Tana Toraja’, Jakarta Post (Jakarta, Indonesia), 25 June 2010. This was also discussed during a recent speech by Jusuf Kalla, ‘Making Good Economic and Social Policy in a Democratic Indonesia: An Insider's Perspective’ (Speech delivered at the Indonesia Study Group, Australian National University, Canberra, 10 June 2010). See also Leo Suryadinata, Elections and Politics in Indonesia (2002) 3.

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state actors and institutions corresponds to theories developed by John Paul Lederach

(see Chapters 1 and 4).718 The provincial authorities built an intricate web of

relationships with non-state actors to confront the issues emerging from this potential

point of communal and political conflict. The approach adopted included multiple

levels of leadership, from the provincial governor to junior public servants and Tuan

Guru Besar to Tuan Guru Lokal. These leaders combined with their constituent

government departments and supporters (santri) to implement the conflict avoidance

strategy.

The cooperative approach that was adopted acknowledged the limitation of provincial

state-based institutions. The provincial authorities, therefore, based their policy

response on the capabilities of non-state leaders and their organisations.719 Provincial

authorities contributed training and support, through police and bureaucrats, while

Tuan Guru and their organisations gave the strategy grounding within the community.

There are specific ethnic rivalries that have played an important part in the local

political competition. The provincial government’s conflict avoidance strategy was

based on not inflaming these ethnic tensions. A significant portion of political

competition in Lombok is between local politicians representing the Sasak (from

Lombok) and the Bimanese (from Sumbawa). Both groups are Muslim. Normally the

Sasak and Bimanese who reside in Mataram live together peacefully, but tensions

have emerged during recent elections.

This rivalry is prefaced on local political elite’s increased access to state office in

recent years. The opportunities to gain financial and political rewards from these

positions have caused tension between ethnic groups. It is a commonly-held

perception in Lombok that the election of a Sasak or Bimanese politician to a senior

position leads to advantages for members of their ethnic group in relation to jobs and

potential business opportunities.720 Ethnic tensions also rise in Mataram during

election periods due to the influx of people from other parts of Lombok and Sumbawa

718 John Paul Lederach, Building Peace – Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (1997) 37-55. 719 Ibid. 720 Concern about the apportionment of roles in the NTB public service and its impact on ethnic relations have been reported since early in the Reformasi period, ‘Ada Kecemburuan Etnis Penempatan PNS’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 19 December 1999.

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to work on campaigns. With increased numbers, and the political and economic gains

that election success can bring, there is an amplified possibility for conflict.

To understand how these ethnically-focused tensions developed it is essential to

consider recent developments in provincial politics. The tensions between these two

ethnic groups developed during the decade preceding the 2008 gubernatorial

elections. In 1999, the central government in Jakarta appointed Harun Al-Rasyid, a

politician of Bimanese origin, although he had been active in Jakarta politics for a

lengthy period of time prior to this appointment. In many ways he was still considered

an outsider, despite being originally from the province.721

Picture 5.1 Gubernatorial campaign material in Lombok

Then in 2003 came the election to the position of NTB governor of the first Sasak and

locally-active politician, Lalu Serinata.722 Serinata’s appointment was not by direct

election, but rather by a vote of the provincial legislature. The election of Serinata

721 Rosiady Husaenie Sayuti and Muhammad Faqih Langitan, Perjalanan Orang Sasak Menjadi Gubernur (2006) 15-20. 722 Lalu Serinata had previously been the Ketua (Chair) of the provincial legislature. For further details about the events leading to Serinata’s election, see Rosiady Husaenie Sayuti and Muhammad Faqih Langitan, Perjalanan Orang Sasak Menjadi Gubernur (2006).

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caused clashes between supporters of these two politicians who were essentially split

down ethnic lines – the Bimanese supporting Al-Rasyid and the Sasak supporting

Serinata. These clashes led to an unknown number of casualties and injuries. The lack

of detail about these events stems from the fact that local people still seem reluctant to

talk about this period, in many ways, more so than in the case of the January 2000

riots. Asking about these events would often elicit only silence, or a quick change of

topic.

Ethnic clashes also occurred in connection with the election of a Sasak Rektor

(University Vice-Chancellor) at a major Mataram university723 during the mid-2000s.

Bimanese students had actively protested against the declared election result. The

demonstrations only stopped when the Rektor allegedly brought in some hired preman

(thugs), resulting in the death of one student and the injury of several others.724

Clashes such as this heightened anxieties among provincial authorities about the 2008

gubernatorial elections. The concern about ethnic rivalries leading to violence was an

important risk factor incorporated into the conflict avoidance strategy. The next

section will investigate the mechanics of the conflict management process adopted.

Political and religious cooperation

Concerns about the potential for election-related violence were felt at the highest level

of NTB provincial government and this led them to act in preparation for the first

direct election of NTB governor. The former governor, Lalu Serinata, delegated

primary responsibility to devise methods for conflict avoidance and resolution to a

team of provincial bureaucrats. This group was led by Dahlan Bandu, who at that time

was Senior Staff, Kesbanglinmas NTB. He was well suited to this task, as his regular

duties included gathering intelligence on potential points of social tension and conflict

in Lombok.725

723 The name of this educational institution will remain anonymous considering the nature of the allegations outlined. 724 Interview with anonymous informant (Mataram, 6 August 2008). 725 Dahlan’s role in these efforts was pieced together through several informal discussions during 2007–2008 and a lengthy interview: Interview with Dahlan Bandu (Mataram, 13 November 2007). For additional information, see Yusuf Riamon, Banyak Mengaku Intel di NTB (2006) Media Indonesia <http://www.media-indonesia.com> at 29 May 2009.

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The strategy that emerged was based on three central elements as highlighted earlier.

First, the development of a close working relationship between Kesbanglinmas and

many Tuan Guru. The second element was an ‘agreement’ within the local political

elite that ensured that there was representation of political interests from Lombok and

Sumbawa on each ticket for the 2008 elections. Third was that localised security

arrangements were negotiated to ensure that pamswakarsa were sidelined.726 Dahlan’s

approach of creating a web of relationships and agreements between key socio-

political players mirrored the conflict management strategies that John Paul Lederach

and other scholars have advocated.727 Lederach suggested that the avoidance or

resolution of communal or political conflict is best served by social and political elites

combining their activities with grassroots organisations.728 Local intellectuals came to

similar conclusions. Abdul Wahid, for example, wrote an opinion piece in the Lombok

Post endorsing partnerships between state and non-state leaders and their

organisations in order to avoid and resolve communal disputes. He argued this sort of

partnership was a constructive way to manage local social tensions and conflicts.729

Tuan Guru played a crucial role in maintaining social harmony during the election

campaign. The socio-political and religious authority of Tuan Guru was used by

Dahlan’s team to underpin this state initiative. Tuan Guru communicated clear

messages during sermons (khutbah) and religious education classes (pengajian), with

the specific aim of avoiding political tension.730 They supported this strategy, despite

Tuan Guru having a variety of political affiliations and supporting different

gubernatorial candidates.731

726 Also several political leaders and public figures urged that campaigning remain positive so as to avoid conflict, ‘Tuan Guru Bajang: Hindari Black Campaign’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 7 April 2008; ‘Diintimidasi, Ismail Husni Ajak Semua Pihak Arif’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 24 April 2008. 727 John Paul Lederach, The Moral Imagination – The Art and Soul of Building Peace (2005) 83. 728 John Paul Lederach, Building Peace – Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (1997) 38-55. 729 Abdul Wahid, ‘NTB Plural Perlu Gerakan Harmoni’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 11 August 2008. 730 One community leader told me that because there was a positive atmosphere during the campaign this allowed the different political tickets to visit his community, Lom, without any problem – Interview with Drun (Mataram, 28 July 2008). 731 Interview with Muhammad Dimiati (Mataram, 12 August 2008).

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When teaching about the importance of social harmony, Tuan Guru used the Islamic

principle of silaturrahim (maintaining good social relations).732 The lesson, TGH

Muharror said, is “not only related to fellow Muslims, but also requires people to keep

peaceful relations with people from other religions”.733 There is no religious

prohibition (in fact far from it) for making friends with anyone, he said, as long as

they respect each other’s beliefs.734 These religious lessons from Tuan Guru to their

followers acted as important reminders of behavioural expectations during the

campaign.

Many Tuan Guru told me that election tensions can lead to violence. They pointed to

election-related violence that had occurred elsewhere in Indonesia and several Tuan

Guru felt particularly passionate about avoiding communal violence in the aftermath

of the January 2000 riots.735 Therefore, when Dahlan sought assistance from Tuan

Guru, their support was, by all accounts, quickly provided.736 Tuan Guru cooperated

with the state to communicate religious messages to reinforce the provincial

government’s efforts to reduce election-related tensions. The almost universal

message that Tuan Guru highlighted was the importance of maintaining social unity

and building ta’awwun (an atmosphere of helping each other), and once again, not

exclusively amongst Muslims, but also with non-Muslims.737

The role of Tuan Guru was essential to the dissemination of the provincial authority’s

message and they were integral to maintaining social unity. Dahlan worked with Tuan

Guru Besar and Tuan Guru Lokal to coordinate their statements and actions, but each

Tuan Guru tailored his message and the way it was presented as he saw appropriate

for different audiences.738 Another pivotal message emphasised was tolerance and

respect within the Muslim community (ummah) and between Muslims and people of

732 Interview with TGH Muharror (Electronic Interview, 11 May 2009). 733 Ibid. Very similar sentiments were expressed by TGH Wawan Stiawan; see Interview with TGH Wawan Stiawan (Electronic Interview, 18 July 2009). 734 Interview with TGH Muharror (Electronic Interview, 11 May 2009). 735 Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008); Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). 736 Tuan Guru have participated with state authorities in a similar strategy to avoid outbreaks of violence during the first direct election of Indonesian President in 2004 – see Asrori S. Karni, ‘Roots of Tolerance Sprang Out from the Ashes of Conflict’ in Asrori S. Karni, A Celebration of Democracy – A Journalistic Portrayal of Indonesia’s 2004 Direct Elections Amongst Moderate and Hardline Muslims (2006) 275-295. 737 Interview with TGH Muharror (Electronic Interview, 11 May 2009). 738 Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008).

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other faiths. The importance of social harmony was deliberately incorporated into

their teachings during this period and they specifically focused upon the challenges

that the election process was raising.739 Incorporated almost universally into lessons

about social harmony was the assertion that “Islam is a peaceful religion” with good

relationships between communities being important and that Muslims should follow

this basic principle.740 These religious teachings are derived directly from Qur’anic

injunctions. TGH Muharror and TGH Wawan Stiawan, for example, both pointed to

Qur’anic verse 49: 10–13 (see below), which they both considered central to their

teaching about social harmony.741

10: The Believers are but a single Brotherhood: so make peace

and reconciliation between two (contenting) brothers; and fear

Allah, that ye may receive Mercy.

13: O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male

and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye

may know each other (not that ye may despise each other).

Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of Allah is (he

who is) the most righteous of you. And Allah has full

knowledge and is well acquainted (will all things).

Qur’an, 49: 10 and 13.742

This Qur’anic verse, in their view, reinforces the message that relationships between

Muslims needs to be maintained and that Muslims should also protect members of

other religions.743 It reminded people, they felt, that during the election process

disagreements were appropriate, but they should act with integrity and respect

towards fellow-Muslims and non-Muslims. TGH Muharror divided his interpretation

of this verse into two parts. First, he said, Muslims are brothers and sisters and should

treat each other well. Second, the Qur’an says that Allah created all people giving

them different religions and ethnic backgrounds and Muharror said that this verse

highlights that people should get to know and respect each other. His interpretation 739 Interview with TGH Wawan Stiawan (Electronic Interview, 18 July 2009). 740 Ibid. 741 Interview with TGH Muharror (Electronic Interview, 11 May 2009); Interview with TGH Wawan Stiawan (Electronic Interview, 18 July 2009). 742 Abdullah Yusuf Ali (translator), The Holy Qur’an (2000). 743 Interview with TGH Muharror (Electronic Interview, 11 May 2009).

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simply reinforces the message of tolerance that was important during the election

process.

Beyond reinforcing these religious messages, Tuan Guru were prepared to take more

direct steps if violence seemed imminent or had occurred during the campaign and

election process.744 This intervention would usually involve two types of action. First,

they would engage with protagonists and attempt to comprehend their position while

also seeking to calm emotions. Second, they would take direct action to avoid or

resolve a conflict by forcing protagonists to sit down together and negotiate (see the

second case study). An example of Tuan Guru’s role in such conflict situations was

demonstrated by TGH Wawan Stiawan:

The first time that I confront a conflict I have to examine the

case, what is its cause, why has it happened, etc. Most

conflicts in society happen because of misunderstandings. And

after finding what triggers it, then I ask the people to discuss it

with me and together to find out the solution. Usually I ask

representatives from each group which are fighting to come to

me (or I go to them) and ask them what they want, and then

try to find out the best way to satisfy all of them.745

Similarly other Tuan Guru have not shied away from directly intervening in conflict.

For instance, TGH Subkhi Sasaki said he would go to the mosque to make statements

over the loudspeaker urging restraint, while TGH Munajid Khalid told me about

‘hitting the street’ to ensure that potential provocateurs were calmed down during the

January 2000 riots.746 These religious leaders stressed that they were prepared to

directly confront people in order to try to dissuade them from participating in

violence. TGH Munajid Khalid told me that during the riots, “I went walking around

744 Interview with TGH Subkhi Sasaki (Kediri, West Lombok, 23 August 2008); Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). All these interviewees told me that in normal circumstances, and not just during the elections, a direct approach to intervention in communal or political conflict would be taken if necessary. 745 Interview with TGH Wawan Stiawan (Electronic Interview, 18 July 2009). 746 Interview with TGH Subkhi Sasaki (Kediri, West Lombok, 23 August 2008); Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008).

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my community, with government officials, trying to cool people down and at night I

called on the mosque loud speakers for people to stop their bad behaviour”.747

Tuan Guru commonly back their theological rhetoric with action. TGH Wawan

Stiawan said that “The first time I call upon them [the protagonists] and give them

advice about appropriate behaviour according to Islamic teachings. But if after this

advice they continue to create problems and ferment social disorder I will give them a

punishment”.748 He did not specify what this would be. However, one of the most

serious sanctions that a Tuan Guru could issue, according to TGH Humaidi Zaen (and

many other people with whom I spoke to informally), was to ostracise someone from

their community.749 This means that they are typically excluded from communal life.

In Sasak society, given the high levels of poverty and consequently the need to rely on

friends and family as a ‘social safety net’, this has significant ramifications.

The effects of social exclusion can be seen in Kampung Lom. Members of the

kampung who rioted in January 2000 were detained by the community.750 They were

taken to a building on the edge of the kampung, locked in, and not allowed out until

the unrest had ended. The rioters still live in the area, but eight years later are still not

able to attend community events and celebrations, such as weddings, or sit under the

berugaq (Sasak pavillion) in the main parts of Kampung Lom. The effect of this latter

prohibition means that they cannot attend their community’s nightly informal

gatherings. Consequently, when job opportunities are discussed or community

decision-making occurs they are not present, further perpetuating their social and

economic exclusion. In short, the social stigma attached to their participation in the

riots remains strong nearly a decade after these events.

The partnership between Kesbanglinmas and Tuan Guru was supported by other

members of the local political elite in the lead-up to the 2008 gubernatorial elections.

The provincial authorities worked with the political elite of Lombok and Sumbawa to

avoid political tensions turning violent between ethnic groups from these respective

islands. The result of this cooperation was that they came to an ‘understanding’

747 Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). 748 Interview with TGH Wawan Stiawan (Electronic Interview, 18 July 2009). 749 TGH Humaidi Zaen (Memben, East Lombok, 9 August 2008). 750 This community’s response to these events was discussed in Chapter 4.

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amongst themselves to establish a power-sharing arrangement. Each political ticket,

as mentioned earlier, agreed to appoint a Sasak as calon (candidate) for the position of

governor and a politician from Sumbawa as wakil (deputy).751 All the political tickets

participating in the gubernatorial elections held to this compromise. While there is no

formal document outlining this compromise, it has been confirmed anecdotally by

several campaign teams. A senior NTB Golkar official, for example, confidentially

acknowledged the need for an “ethnic balance” in gubernatorial tickets.752 The

rationale for this ballot paper hierarchy reflects the demography of the two islands –

there are just over three million people in Lombok compared to approximately one

million people in Sumbawa.753

This compromise seems to be working for the time being as a means of allocating of

the financial and political rewards of office between interests from Lombok and

Sumbawa. Ensuring this political compromise works has direct economic and political

consequences for Lombok. However, I am unsure if it will be sustainable in the

future, as it is an inequitable arrangement , because residents of Sumbawa are

effectively barred from becoming governor. This has the possibility of leading to

increasing calls for Sumbawa to become a separate province, a proposal that is

already actively supported on websites such as www.sumbawanews.com.754 The

website’s slogan is ‘Masa Depan Kami Provinsi Sumbawa’ (In the future we will be

the Province of Sumbawa). This separation would have a direct economic affect on

Lombok, because a significant portion of provincial revenue comes from the

Newmont gold mine in Sumbawa. Politicians in Lombok are well aware of this

economic reality and this provides part of the impetus for the compromise.755

751 Several members of the campaign teams described how an ethnic balance between leaders from Lombok and Sumbawa was a political reality. 752 Email from anonymous Golkar political operative to Jeremy Kingsley, 19 May 2009. 753 Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi NTB, Nusa Tenggara Barat Dalam Angka (2008) 51. 754 In the short term this is not going to be possible, as the Indonesian government has halted the establishment of new provinces until the end of 2010 – see Moratorium on Regional Autonomy (2009) Tempointerative <http://www.tempointeractive.com> at 5 August 2009. 755 The Newmont Mine provides over 35% of the provinces Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is over 10% more than any other sector of the economy, such as tourism or farming – BAPPEDA Provinsi NTB and Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi NTB, Tinjauan Perekonomian Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat 2006 (2007) 14.

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Implementation of conflict management

In order to prepare for the elections, the staff of Kesbanglinmas and other government

departments were involved in intensive consultations with local community and

religious leaders. They did this so that these leaders participated in the provincial

authority’s conflict avoidance strategy and were fully briefed on how the policy

worked. Dahlan attended seminars, liaised with Tuan Guru and ensured that the police

had carefully negotiated security arrangements with local authorities.756 I observed

Dahlan discuss the upcoming elections with communal and religious leaders at a

September 2007 seminar run by Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (AMAN).757 He

outlined a variety of ways that they could ensure calm within their communities

during the gubernatorial elections. This was an active engagement that saw him

address the audience while symbolically seated next to a prominent Tuan Guru

Besar.758

The provincial authority’s strategy not only recognised the importance of Tuan Guru,

but also one of their key political motivations: the desire to protect their social

standing. Tuan Guru generally have vested interests in maintaining social stability, as

violence has the potential to destabilise Tuan Guru’s current powerful position. If a

situation gets out of control, the prestige (and consequently influence) of a Tuan Guru

is at risk, if it is perceived that they are not able to control their community. However,

the response of Tuan Guru is not just a political calculation. Their actions are

underpinned by the doctrinal requirement for Muslim religious leaders to ensure that

their followers fulfil their obligation to forbid wrong. TGH Sofwan Hakim, along with

several other Tuan Guru,759 stressed this religious message, distilling it into a simple

point: every Muslim has an obligation not to act anarchically or violently, as some did

during the January 2000 riots.760

The participants who are involved with conflict management strategies in Mataram

and West Lombok depends upon the nature of the issues. During the 2008 elections

756 ‘Kodim 1606 Lobar Gandeng Pamswakarsa’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 7 July 2008. 757 Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara means Adat Society Alliance of the Indonesian Archipelago. 758 Field notes, 10 September 2007. 759 See, for instance, Interview with TGH Ramli (Mataram, 29 July 2008); Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). 760 Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008).

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Tuan Guru were peacemakers. They do, however, have the potential to become peace-

breakers. Erni Budiwanti has suggested that some Tuan Guru have acted in a

provocative manner during Ahmadiyah-related violence.761 The problems arose

because Ahmadiyah, a minority Muslim group, was deemed to be a ‘deviant’ sect by

the quasi-official Majelis Ulama Indonesia.762 As a response to a series of MUI fatwa

mobs in Lombok and Java rioted at Ahmadiyah’s places of worship and residence.763

In fact, the violence in Lombok against Ahmadiyah would better be described as a

slow reign of terror, with violence occurring sporadically over a lengthy period of

time between 1998 and 2006.764 The violence varied in nature and level across the

island, but the uniform aim was the removal of Ahmadiyah members from their local

communities.765 Budiwanti asserted that some Tuan Guru provoked their followers

with inflammatory language during “sermons and preaching”, and this spurred their

followers into violent action.766

Tuan Guru need to be careful with their selection or omission of words in khutbah and

pengajian as these have a powerful ability to influence their followers. Tuan Guru

may not intend to be provocative, but a lack of caution may have the same affect.

Their followers may, for example, perceive it as tacit acceptance of an aggressive

response to Ahmadiyah.767 The notion that Tuan Guru need to use their social

authority carefully is supported by Lombok scholar Sabirin, who believes that Tuan

761 Erni Budiwanti, ‘Pluralism Collapses: A Study of the Jema’ah Ahmadiyah Indonesia and its Persecution’ (Working Paper Series No. 117, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, 2009). 762 MUI issued two fatwa to this affect in 1980 and then 2005 – see Erni Budiwanti, ‘Pluralism Collapses: A Study of the Jema’ah Ahmadiyah Indonesia and its Persecution’ (Working Paper Series No. 117, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, 2009) 13-19. 763 ‘Tangani Ahmadiyah, Pemprov Tunggu Regulasi Pusat’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 30 April 2008; ‘Tak ada Pengamanan Khasus Untuk Jemaat Ahmadiyah’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 30 April 2008. 764 There are reports of violence against Ahmadiyah communities in Keruak, East Lombok, in 1998; Bayan, North Lombok, in 2001; Pancor, Medas, Sukamulya and Sembalun in East Lombok during 2002; Ketapang, West Lombok, in 2005; and then Praya, Central Lombok, in 2006. See Institut Agama Islam Negeri Mataram (IAIN) Mediation Center, Social Conflicts in Lombok (2006). 765 Ibid. 766 Erni Budiwanti, ‘Pluralism Collapses: A Study of the Jema’ah Ahmadiyah Indonesia and its Persecution’ (Working Paper Series No. 117, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, 2009) 17. 767 Interview with Muhammad Dimiati (Mataram, 12 August 2008).

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Guru must act with sensitivity in relation to minority Muslim groups because of the

propensity for the Sasak to respond negatively towards them.768

As mentioned, Tuan Guru can act as either peacemakers or peace-breakers, depending

on the circumstances. It is important to recognise that this fluid position is similar to

ulama across the Muslim world, whose role and status change and develop

continually as circumstances change.769 Tuan Guru do not have a static or unchanging

role. However, my observations indicate that Tuan Guru in Lombok generally seem to

desire the maintenance of the status quo that social harmony brings, and this position

is currently stronger than the allure of any alternative and more disruptive course of

action.

One of the major achievements of those working on preparations for the 2008 NTB

gubernatorial elections was ensuring that pamswakarsa groups were nowhere to be

seen during the campaign or on election day.770 These groups could have easily

mobilised thousands and caused a law enforcement problem of significant

proportions.771 Several informants from the political campaign teams said that

politicians involved in their tickets used their close connections with the pamswakarsa

to ensure they remained out of sight. This was meant to avoid confrontations between

rival supporters backed by different pamswakarsa.

There are significant connections between local politicians and pamswakarsa. One

concern that I heard several times while talking with local activists was these

relationships could, given appropriate circumstances, lead community security groups

into conflict with rival political factions. Political and religious leaders have extensive

connection to pamswakarsa (see Chapter 2). The control or patronage of all of the

pamswakarsa by Tuan Guru indicates the potential for them to become peace-

breakers as they have control over a large numbers of pamswakarsa members who

768 Sabirin, Respon Pemikiran Tuan Guru Terhadap Penetrasi Ajaran Wahabi Pada Etnik Sasak di Pulau Lombok (M.Phil Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2008) 2-3. 769 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam – Custodians of Change (2002) 10. 770 The elections were held on 7 July 2008. 771 John M. MacDougall, ‘Self-reliant Militias’ (2003) Inside Indonesia <http://insideindonesia.org> on 29 May 2009; John M. MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Soeharto Lombok (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2005) 252-262.

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they could mobilise to participate in communal conflict if they desired. Therefore, the

significance of arrangements to minimise the presence of pamswakarsa during this

period cannot be underestimated.

Picture 5.2 Polling booths in Mataram

With all these measures in place, the elections of 7 July 2008 saw the NTB Provincial

government’s conflict avoidance strategy put to the test. The strategy succeeded, with

the elections held in a calm atmosphere without any incident. The social control

emanating from communal and religious leaders meant that a large police presence

was not necessary. In fact, I noticed fewer police than usual while criss-crossing town

that day by motorbike. The only time I saw a police officer that day was when a local

community leader and Tuan Guru Besar visited a polling station accompanied by a

high-ranking police officer.

The police had trained and organised themselves in case large-scale protests and civil

disturbances occurred during the elections.772 This meant that police officers, and the

police auxillary (Linmas),773 were prepared to deal with any trouble. For instance, in

Central Lombok there was 510 police officers on duty on election day, supported by

2558 Linmas members, with similar arrangements being made in other parts of

Lombok and Sumbawa.774 Linmas formed the core of the visible police strategy with

772 ‘Amankan Pilkada, Polda NTB Terjunkan Kekuatan Penuh’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 17 June 2008. 773 Perlindungan Masyarakat (Community Police Auxiliary). 774 ‘Pengamanan Pilkada, Korem Siapkan 10 SSK’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 19 March 2008; ‘Show Force Pasukan Pengamanan Pilkada Lombok Timur’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 19

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unarmed Linmas officers present at polling stations, while police officers were in

barracks.

This calm is actually astonishing when one considers that in October 2008, almost

immediately after losing office, Lalu Serinata, the former governor, was charged,

detained,775 tried and then sentenced to three years jail for corruption.776 The

investigation into these allegations had started well before the election campaign, so

the avoidance of violence was a particularly significant accomplishment.777 The

allegations of corruption against Serinata had the potential to incite anger and

violence among his supporters, some of whom faced not only losing their source of

patronage, but may have also feared being implicated and potentially charged

themselves. The pressure on political figures was also intense, with political parties

including Golkar seeing the gubernatorial election as a test of their local relevance.778

With this said, on 1 September 2008, power changed hands peacefully with the

inauguration of TGH Bajang. There was no violence reported during the transition of

Governor from Golkar’s Lalu Serinata to TGH Bajang from Partai Bulan Bintang and

PKS.

Prior to, and during, the 2008 NTB gubernatorial elections state institutions

(coordinated by Kesbanglinmas) cooperated with non-state leaders, particularly Tuan

Guru, in order to preempt communal or political violence. The strategy discussed in

this case study does not provide a perfect or neat one-size-fits-all solution to conflict

avoidance or resolution. Rather, it highlights a complex series of relationships and

arrangements within the local political elite that allowed for flexible responses to

Lombok’s intricate realities. This approach of state and non-state cooperation can be

applied to general conflict management processes or used to deal with specific

tensions that can arise, for instance, during elections. These sort of partnerships do,

however, need to be continually reassessed according to the problems confronted and

April 2008; ‘Pilkada, Polres Loteng Siapkan 3068 Personil’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 19 June 2008. 775 He spent approximately nine months in prison prior to the conclusion of his trial. 776 ‘Mantan Gubernur NTB Lalu Serinata Ditahan’ (2008) Tempointeraktif <http://www.tempointeraktif.com> at 29 May 2009; Jeremy Kingsley, ‘D-Day for Corruption Reform’ (2009) Inside Indonesia <http://insideindonesia.org> at 29 May 2009; Panca Nugraha, ‘Former Governor Sent to Jail to Serve his Sentence’, The Jakarta Post (Jakarta, Indonesia), 29 July 2010. 777 ‘Izin Gubernur NTB’, Kompas (Jakarta, Indonesia), 8 August 2007. 778 ‘Pilkada NTB Adalah Ujian’, Lombok Post (Mataram), 9 September 2007.

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local circumstances. The next case study moves from strategic programs for conflict

avoidance across the island to a more locally focused analysis of a period of social

conflict and its resolution in a West Lombok village.

Picture 5.3 Bajang-Munir posters in the NW heartland of Pancor, East Lombok

Case study – Testing times in Bok

The pressures of leadership

I am tired. Very tired! I just want the demonstrations and

threats to be over…

Zaini, an exhausted Bok community leader.779

Zaini made this comment as he slumped down on the couch next to me. The usual

smiling face that would have greeted me remained, but it was strained. His exhaustion

was the result of over two weeks of rolling demonstrations that took place in July

2008 in the village of Bok, West Lombok. These protests were taking a toll, and he

felt under siege.780 Zaini is one of the senior non-state community leaders in Bok.

Along with several other local leaders, such as Eni, the Kepala Desa (village head) of

779 Field notes, 28 July 2008. 780 Ibid.

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Bok, he was at the epicentre of the social tensions and demonstrations that are being

considered.781

This case study investigates the processes that Bok’s leadership used to put an end to

several weeks of demonstrations and social conflict. It provides an example of how

state and non-state leaders combined to develop an intricate, and yet, at points,

chaotic, conflict management process. The events in Bok exemplified dispute

resolution in Mataram and West Lombok, where adat was integral to the eventual

resolution of the situation. This was seen, for instance, when the local leadership used

a mushawara (community meeting) to finally negotiate a resolution of these issues.782

When this forum was combined with the social influence of religious leaders, the

dispute resolution framework was able to acquire significant legitimacy within Bok.

The village of Bok is situated in West Lombok (just outside Mataram). The social

troubles that are considered in this case study relate to attempts to remove one of

Bok’s Kepala Dusun.783 These efforts to get rid of the village official led to rolling

demonstrations that threatened to become violent. The rationale for this was believed

to have been political manoeuvring within the village in the lead-up to the election for

a new Kepala Desa. The current Kepala Desa, Eni, was not standing for re-election,

so there was an open field for contenders, and the politics became decidedly dirty with

the potential candidates positioning themselves and trying to discredit their possible

adversaries (one of whom was the Kepala Dusun).784 Several community leaders told

me that the protests were merely a manipulation of emotions with the aim of obtaining

political advantage in the lead up to the village elections.785

781 Interview with Imran (Bok, West Lombok, 26 August 2008). 782 The dispute resolution mechanisms used in this case study indicate a localised approach to conflict management. A similar localised approach was also identified in Lom. However, Mohammad Koesnoe thought that local villages in Lombok did not have this sort of authority to convene and maintain conflict management processes as they were not within adat terms a “legal community” capable of undertaking these processes – see Mohammad Koesnoe, Report Concerning a Research of Adat Law on the Islands of Bali and Lombok 1971-1973 (1977) 72-73. This does not correlate with my findings that these localised dispute resolution mechanisms are an effective tool for avoiding or minimising violence. The difference of views may reflect changes on the ground in Lombok over the nearly 40 years since Koesnoe’s field work and mine. 783 The Kepala Dusun is the head of one of Bok’s hamlets. 784 Interview with Eni (Bok, West Lombok, 16 August 2008). 785 Field Notes, 28 July 2008.

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The case study is the result of interviews with four key local community leaders from

Bok, whom were central to the community’s response to the demonstrations. The

interviewees were the Kepala Desa Eni; the Sekretaris Imran; one of the local

Penghulu Abdullah; and non-state community leader, Zaini. These leaders had an

intimate knowledge of the events and the processes that led to the resolution of the

social disturbances. I also had the opportunity to observe some of these events as they

occurred.

The protests in Bok emerged without warning in early July 2008 and lasted several

weeks. In response, leading state and non-state community figures created a

leadership group to react to these events. It was an ad hoc arrangement that formed

the backbone of the conflict management processes that were used.786 The leadership

group was made up of the Kepala Camat, the Kepala Desa, the local police liaison

officer, the local military liaison officer, two key non-state community leaders

(including Zaini), one of the village Penghulu (Abdullah), and several staff of the

Desa office (including the Desa Sekretaris, Imran). The Tuan Guru Lokal and a Tuan

Guru Besar who became involved in calming tensions down were not part of this

leadership group. Rather these religious leaders were called upon to help out at

strategic moments. They were used to assist with soothing emotions and to ensure the

participation of all parties in the conflict management process.787

The roles taken by leaders within this group depended on their individual strengths

and socially-accepted roles. For instance, religious leaders, such as the Tuan Guru and

Penghulu,788 took on the task of calming the situation once events became more

serious in the second and third week. Their role was to take the heat out of the issues

for the main protagonists and their followers.789 Then community leaders, with the

786 Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok, 16 July 2008); Interview with Eni (Bok, West Lombok, 16 August 2008); Interview with Abdullah (Bok, West Lombok, 26 August 2008). 787 Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok, 16 July 2008). 788 See Table 3.1 in Chapter 3, for an explanation of the differences between these two types of religious leader. 789 This role as social stabilisers is also discussed during interviews in Lom, see Interview with Mukhsin (Mataram, 14 July 2008); Interview with Andi (Mataram, 4 August 2008).

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assistance of the religious leaders, worked on mediating a reconciliation between the

parties.790

An important feature in the state and non-state partnership that developed was the

influential involvement of a local military liaison (Babinsa) officer and local police

liaison (Babinmaspol) officer. These two officers were stationed in the village and

supported the leadership of Desa Bok during these tense times. They provided a

bridge between state law enforcement and security institutions and the village

leadership. The officers advised the local leadership group and communicated with

police headquarters in Mataram. This was something that would become important as

events intensified and the local leaders themselves needed protection from the

aggressive crowds.791 The police liaison, in particular, played an influential and

constructive role – contrary to many of the negative perceptions about state law

enforcement agencies and their inadequate performance (see Chapters 1, 2 and 4).792

Part of the rationale for the officer’s proactive role was that he was closely engaged

with the local leadership before these events and had in-depth knowledge of village

affairs.793 It was this close engagement of the police liaison officers over a lengthy

period which was believed to have provided him with legitimacy and the ability to

have an effective role in the leadership group.794 This approach to community-

engaged policing has acceptance at senior levels of the police, but it is not often

implemented on the ground, at village level.795 Former Kapolda NTB, Farouk

Muhammad, told me that police would only be effectual when they fully engaged

their operations into a community’s life. He felt that they have not done this yet.796

This situation exemplifies the possibility of more effective approaches to policing

than those currently used in many parts of Lombok.

790 Field notes, 10 August 2008. 791 Field notes, 10 July 2008. 792 Concerns about the role and operation of police liaisons in local villages in other parts of Indonesia have centred on them pressuring or bullying villagers on behalf of political or commercial interests. See Anthony Bebbington, Leni Dharmawan, Erwin Fahmi and Scott Guggenheim, ‘Local Capacity, Village Governance, and the Political Economy of Rural Development in Indonesia’ (2006) 34 World Development 1958, 1969. 793 The role of negotiation in social disputes, rather than the use of force, and close engagement between police and local community leaders has been considered a priority by many leading Indonesian police officers in relation to conflict avoidance and resolution, see Andi Masmiyat, Konflik SARA – Integrasi Nasional Terancami (2007) 29-36. 794 Interview with Eni (Bok, West Lombok, 16 August 2008). 795 ‘Polisi Berjiwa Reformis’, National News (Jakarta, Indonesia), 24 September 2007. 796 Interview with Farouk Muhammad (Mataram, 3 November 2007).

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Local political rivalries

As previous sections demonstrate, decentralisation and the devolution of power has

meant that greater scope for conflict has emerged in recent times between leadership

rivals at all levels of government, including local village politics.797 The social

tensions that developed in Bok, and the demonstrations that threatened to spiral out of

control, were connected to this localised political competition. Similar situations have

occurred elsewhere in Lombok. For instance, early in 2008 the village of Sukamulia,

East Lombok, was affected by a dispute over village subsidies and transportation that

led to violent protests.798 Also in early 2008 the village of Spakek, Central Lombok,

was the site of an intense local dispute about electoral procedures during local

elections for Kepala Desa.799 Another example during June 2008, in the village of

Kateng, Central Lombok, saw police intervene to stop demonstrations over alleged

corruption and malfeasance in this village’s administrations.800

The problems in Bok stemmed from accusations against one of the Kepala Dusun801

who was alleged to have either inflated the price of government subsidised rice or

failed to distribute the rice properly among poor villagers. The exact nature and detail

of these initial allegations were sketchy. These accusations, if proven true, were very

serious. Rice is the basic staple for villagers and rice subsidies are one of the most

important anti-poverty measures taken by the national and provincial governments

across Indonesia.802 As a consequence of the allegations, some local residents were

demanding the Kepala Dusun’s resignation. These accusations came to the attention

of Bok’s leadership on the morning of the first day of demonstrations. By late

afternoon two trucks of demonstrators had been mobilised and begun rallying to the

cause.803 The action took place outside the home of the Kepala Desa, Eni, with

797 Achmad Maulani, ‘Pilkades, Otonomi, dan Kemandirian Desa’, Kompas (Jakarta, Indonesia), 15 August 2007. 798 ‘Masyarakat Sukamulia Nyaris Hakimi Kadesnya’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 25 April 1999. 799 ‘Konflik Pilkades Spakek Bermuara di PTUN’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 5 March 2008. 800 ‘Lagi, Massa Segel Kantor Desa Kateng’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 14 May 2008. 801 See Table 4.1 in Chapter 4, for the Kepala Dusun’s status within the Indonesian governance hierarchy. 802 Anne Daly and George Fane, ‘Anti-Poverty Programs in Indonesia’ (2002) 38 Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 309, 310-312. 803 Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok, 16 July 2008).

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demonstrators keeping a large part of the village up all night with their boisterous and

vitriolic protests.804

On the first evening of the protests there was initially a dispute within the leadership

group about how to respond to the protestor’s demands. Two alternative strategies

were developed at the impromptu meeting held at Eni’s home. One group argued that

there was a need for a quick resolution. Those advocating this position wanted to

dismiss the Kepala Dusun and just move on. The remainder wished to allow

temperatures to cool down before considering the demonstrators’ allegations and

responding to them in a thoughtful manner.805

The key advocate for quick (immediate) resolution of the dispute was the Kepala

Camat.806 He was new to the job and was concerned that if there was an escalation of

the situation he could be marked as weak and unable to take effective action. The

Kepala Camat even told the leadership group that an intensification of the

demonstrations and an explosion of violence would reduce his capacity to confront

social tensions in the future.807

On the other side of the debate were Eni and Zaini. They thought that in the next two

or three days things would probably calm down and a solution would emerge.

Additionally, if there was any truth to the allegations about the misuse of subsidised

rice these could be carefully investigated.808 One further factor supporting the ‘wait

and see’ strategy was legal in nature: the Kepala Dusun could only be sacked if

serious malfeasance was shown according to Provincial regulations. At this stage, the

allegations were still sketchy and this did not provide legitimate grounds for the

Kepala Desa to act. Several people in the leadership group also expressed the view

that sacking the Kepala Dusun without proper investigation was simply unfair. After

lengthy deliberation, the leadership group resolved to adopt the approach of Eni and

804 Interview with Eni (Bok, West Lombok, 16 August 2008). 805 Interview with Imran (Bok, West Lombok, 26 August 2008). 806 The Kepala Camat is immediately senior to the Kepala Desa on the Indonesian governance hierarchy. Despite this, in many ways, the Kepala Camat is a less significant position, because it is appointed rather than elected. See Table 4.1 in Chapter 4. 807 Ibid. 808 Ibid.

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Zaini: they would hold off deciding upon anything at this early stage to avoid making

mistakes by acting too hastily.809

During this period of instability, the leadership group met regularly at the Kepala

Desa’s house to plan strategy and also to ensure that the protestors did not behave

recklessly and attack Eni’s home. At this point, the military and police liaison officers

played a critical role in ensuring community safety, as well as protecting Eni (and her

family). The liaison officers saw their role as part of the local leadership and they also

reported to Mataram police headquarters. These links between village and police

headquarters allowed requests for police assistance to be made quickly. The need for

police assistance was something that became necessary as tensions escalated.810 This

will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

The temperature continues to rise

The problems did not stop after the initial demonstration, and the protestors came

back two days later. This time, the demonstrations were outside the village office

rather than Kepala Desa’s home. Over two hundred people arrived on the back of

trucks. Some of the leadership group began to wonder whether the crowds were being

‘rented’ by provocateurs, as many protestors were unfamiliar faces (see Chapters 1

and 2).811

At this demonstration the protestors provided a letter to the Kepala Desa outlining

their grievances. The letter demanded the sacking of the Kepala Dusun for two

reasons. First, the Kepala Dusun was alleged to have “stolen” subsidised rice from

members of his community. Second, the embattled leader was supposedly

“egotistical”, because he often revved up his motorbike too loudly, particularly at

nights.812 Allegations that the Kepala Dusun had stolen rice came without any details.

While the leadership group was concerned, internal investigations found that there

were no problems with the rice allocation within Kepala Dusun’s hamlet. In fact, the

809 Interview with Eni (Bok, West Lombok, 16 August 2008). 810 Field notes, 14 July 2008. 811 Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok, 16 July 2008). 812 Interview with Eni (Bok, West Lombok, 16 August 2008).

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rice subsidy for eligible families had risen from three kilograms per family per month

at the start of his incumbency, to over to nine kilograms by the time of the

demonstrations. As to the second accusation about the Kepala Dusun’s arrogance, this

was, at worst, a dispute between neighbours, but not an issue that warranted his

dismissal.

The letter from the demonstrators proved problematic in other respects. For instance,

questions surrounded the veracity of the 200 signatures. Many of the signatures

attached to the letter looked to have been made by one person (the handwriting

appears to have been the same).813 Yet, the most significant outstanding issue was that

the protest leaders still had not identified themselves. When the Kepala Desa spoke to

the protestors she asked their leaders to come forward, but they did not. There was a

feeling among the leadership group that they knew who was behind these actions, but

this could not be confirmed. Eni wanted to know with whom she could negotiate.814 In

many ways the phantom provocateurs of the demonstration gave credence to a belief

among the leadership group that the protests were linked to the local elections rather

than any legitimate allegations against a village official. According to Eni, the protests

were actually a ‘character assassination’ of the Kepala Dusun.815

During the next wave of demonstrations over the following days, the behaviour of the

protestors became increasingly threatening. One afternoon, the Kepala Camat and

police vehicles were surrounded and not allowed to leave the Kepala Desa’s office.

The situation became serious when demonstrators stopped the cars and started rocking

them until the occupants were forced to jump out. These officials were threatened, but

not hurt. The crowds only dispersed when the police liaison officer stood on the

bonnet of his car and negotiated a compromise. He stated that if the demonstrators

were able to find more signatures of support then the leadership group would pay

further attention to their claims. This compromise took the heat out of the immediate

situation allowing the leaders to leave safely.816

813 Interview with Imran (Bok, West Lombok, 26 August 2008). 814 Interview with Eni (Bok, West Lombok, 16 August 2008). 815 Ibid. 816 Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok, 16 July 2008).

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The following day, Eni decided that she needed to make her intentions clear to the

protestors. From the patio of her home she told demonstrators that she would not be

threatened and that she refused requests to remove the Kepala Dusun. From her

perspective this was a matter of principle. She was not going to be forced by mobs

who wanted to make her act outside her authority (as specified in local regulations).817

Unless there were serious breaches of his duties, which she believed there were not,

then she was not permitted to remove the Kepala Dusun. She told the crowd that

Indonesia is a Negara Hukum and she was not going to be politically blackmailed.818

During this time, she was coming under serious political and emotional pressure from

the demonstrators, which was affecting her health.819

As the situation intensified, the local religious leadership was deployed. As the

crowds dispersed once again, the TGH Lokal accompanied by two local Penghulu,

including Abdullah, swung into action. They started to visit the homes of people

believed to be connected with both sides on behalf of the leadership group. Their aim

was to reduce tension by reminding people of their religious obligations to refrain

from violence or aggression (see the previous case study). The leadership group

thought that these local religious leaders would likely be able to settle emotions, but

despite their efforts over several nights, things did not appear to be returning to

normal.820

The demonstrations continued, and in many ways worsened, over the next week.

There were two further ‘letters of demand’ from the protestors – one of these had

more signatories (over 150 additional signatures were tendered). Interestingly, in the

second of these letters, the allegation of corruption was removed and all that remained

was the accusation that the Kepala Dusun was ‘egotistical’. Zaini was not satisfied

with the veracity of the signatures, as he recognised only a few names. Yet, each of

these letters created the impetus for another round of rallies.821

817 For discussion of the legal status and requirements of Desa administration, see Deddy Supriady Bratakusumah and Dadang Solihin, Otonomi Penyelenggaraan Pemerintahan Daerah (2004) 24-29. 818 Interview with Eni (Bok, West Lombok, 16 August 2008). 819 Field notes, 28 July 2008. 820 Interview with Abdullah (Bok, West Lombok, 26 August 2008). 821 Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok, 16 July 2008).

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One positive factor to emerge was that finally with the second of these new letters

came the identification of the provocateurs. This allowed Eni and the leadership group

to confirm who it was they needed to talk to. The political angle of the protests also

became clearer – the leaders of the demonstrations were potential rival candidates for

the position of Kepala Desa at the upcoming local elections.822

Despite identifying who was leading the campaign against the Kepala Dusun the

situation escalated. As tension built and the demonstrations grew larger a change in

tactics was necessary. It was at this point that Zaini, at the behest of the leadership

group, visited a Tuan Guru Besar from Kediri. Zaini sought his advice and asked if he

would intervene.823 The seriousness of the situation was also highlighted by the fact

that the police liaison officer in Bok, after consultation with police headquarters in

Mataram, had 12 (Polsek) police officers deployed to guard the office and home of the

Kepala Desa (the Kepala Dusun and his family had temporarily sought refuge outside

the village). The rallies were now attracting over 350 aggressive protestors and there

were fears at one point that the village office was going to be overrun.824 Because of

this tense situation, the Tuan Guru Besar agreed to act with the support of local

religious leaders. His assistance came in two parts. First, he gave a Friday sermon

about the importance of ‘social harmony in the democratic era’. Second, he made

private visits to all of the key protagonists. One of the Penghulu, Abdullah, explained

that the message he presented at these private meetings was simply a reminder of the

religious obligation of social harmony. He also made a personal request for them to

find an amicable resolution at the mushawara that Eni was attempting to organise.825

The Tuan Guru Besar’s intervention was a decisive turning-point two weeks into the

crisis. It is believed that the only reason that the key protagonists attended the

mushawara was that Tuan Guru Besar had personally invited them.826 Additionally,

the statements and assertions of the Tuan Guru Besar indicated to all involved in the

dispute that they were not just expected to attend the mushawara, but also to find a

822 Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok 28 July 2008). Eni also considered local political manoeuvring to be the rationale for the demonstrations, Interview with Eni (Bok, West Lombok, 16 August 2008). 823 Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok 28 July 2008). 824 Interview with Imran (Bok, West Lombok, 26 August 2008). 825 Interview with Abdullah (Bok, West Lombok, 26 August 2008). 826 Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok, 28 July 2008).

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resolution to the conflict. To refuse a direct instruction of this nature from a Tuan

Guru Besar would be considered disrespectful and inappropriate behaviour (see

Chapter 3). This provided the various leaders with izin (permission) to talk and

compromise.827

The role of the Tuan Guru Besar did not just influence the protest leaders, but also

supporters on both sides. They understood their leaders were now obliged to be

flexible and come to a solution.828 This active engagement of the Tuan Guru Besar

reveals the strength that can be gained by blending local communal dispute resolution

mechanisms with religious authority. This was further shown by the fact that the

mushawara was held at the village mosque.829 This exemplified how cultural and

religious “patterns of behaviours” and leadership were combined to facilitate an

atmosphere where resolution of the dispute in Bok was possible.830 The next section

will review how the dispute resolution processes were undertaken.

Powerful negotiations

At the core of the conflict management process applied in Bok, were direct

negotiations between the protagonists. The mushawara, convened by Eni831 was the

heart of the dispute resolution process. This meeting allowed the parties to air their

grievances and to hear the other side’s arguments.832 Mushawara have become part of

Indonesia’s legal culture(s) and have even been received into formal legal

structures.833 These community meetings have also been considered to be part of the

“social contract” within communities across Indonesia. These forums definitely play

an important role in decision-making and dispute resolution in Bok (and Lom).

827 Ibid. 828 Interview with Eni (Bok, West Lombok, 16 August 2008). 829 Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok, 28 July 2008). 830 Ahmad Salehudin, Satu Dusun Tiga Masjid: Anomali Ideologisasi Agama dalam Agama (2007) 10-12. 831 A Kepala Desa’s role is to facilitate communication within a community. This is particularly important at times of social instability and crisis. See Made Wahyu Suthedja and I Gusti Ketut Swalem, Management Pembangunan Desa (1981) 32-35. 832 These community meetings are a pivotal part of problem solving in Mataram and West Lombok – Konsortium Pengembangan Nusa Tenggara Untuk Kepentingan Pendidikan Politik Masyarakat, Kelola Alam Bersama-sama Partisipasi Masyarakat di Era Otonomi Daerah (2007) 18-19. See also the discussion of mushawara in Chapter 4. 833 Mohammad Koesnoe, Musjawarah Een Wijze van Volksbesluitvorming Adatrecht (1969) 22.

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Mohammad Koesnoe correctly points out the localised nature of this activity – that is,

the way a mushawara functions varies from community to community.834

The approach taken in Bok is consistent with a dispute resolution framework known

as ‘principled negotiations’.835 In this theoretical approach parties articulate their

interests and then listen to the perspectives and arguments of the other side. By

moving beyond merely seeing their own position to actively listening to their

opponents, negotiations can lead to new avenues for resolving a conflict.836 Common

to both principled negotiations and mushawara is the fact that all parties have the

opportunity to express their views (and emotions). This allows the air to be cleared

and validates all perspectives.837 The aim of principled negotiations is to achieve a

resolution that provides “mutual gains”, with all sides to a dispute walking away with

something.838 As will be seen, the mushawara in Bok incorporated these two steps –

the articulation of positions; and listening to each other in order to obtain an outcome

that involves mutual gains.

The mushawara reinforces an important Islamic principle outlined by leading

Indonesian Muslim scholar, Nurcholish Madjid, who wrote, “man has a duty to listen

to other people’s ideas, and then to examine those ideas critically in order to

determine which is the best to follow”.839 Like principled negotiation, listening and

expressing a position is integral to resolving disputes, allowing all parties to resolve

their differences.

The mushawara allowed the airing of grievances between the protagonists ensuring

that they felt heard, while also forcing them to listen to the other side of the argument.

This forum gave people the space for negotiating solutions.840 Although, the Tuan

Guru Besar was present, he did not say anything. His presence was an implicit

834 Ibid. 835 Marc Howard Ross, ‘Creating the Conditions for Peacemaking: Theories of Practice in Ethnic Conflict Resolution’ (2000) 23 Ethnic and Racial Studies 1002, 1011-1013. 836 Ibid 1011. 837 Ibid 1012. 838 Ibid 1012-1013. 839 Nurcholish Madjid, ‘Interpreting the Principle of Religious Pluralism’ in Abdullah Saeed (ed), Approaches to the Qur’an in Contemporary Indonesia (2005) 217. This assertion is based on Qur’anic verse 39:17-18. 840 Interview with Eni (Bok, West Lombok, 16 August 2008).

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reminder to those involved that a conclusion to these troubles was expected.841 Silence

is a powerful form of communication within Sasak society. For instance, when issuing

directives Sasak of high social status do not necessarily need to make their instruction

explicit. Silence often provides an understood non-verbal expression of instruction.842

After several hours of in-depth discussion an agreement was reached. The Kepala

Dusun, whose alleged wrongdoing had caused the protests, would step down before

October (approximately two months after the mushawara) and approximately two

months before village elections. This outcome was seen as a ‘win–win’ result for all

parties. The significance of this compromise cannot be underestimated as it ensured

that the protagonists left the mushawara with their dignity intact and calm returned to

Bok.843 Both sides of the confrontation could claim victory. The Kepala Dusun did

not resign immediately, but it was understood that he would soon step down soon.

The result was not disadvantageous for the Kepala Dusun as he had political

ambitions to become the Kepala Desa. According to local regulations, if he wanted to

run for the position of Kepala Desa it was necessary for him to resign prior to the

village elections in any case.844

Picture 5.4 A sporting tournament in Bok in the week after the mushawara. Calm was restored

and life returned to normal quickly

841 Interview with Abdullah (Bok, West Lombok, 26 August 2008). 842 Mahyuni, Speech Styles and Cultural Consciousness in Sasak Community (2006) 155-158. 843 Pusat Penelitian Bahasa dan Kebudayaan Universitas Mataram dan Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, Konflik dan Harmoni Dalam Masyarakat Indonesia: Insight Dari Lombok, Nusa Tenggara Barat (2004) 53-55. 844 Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok, 28 July 2008).

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This period of social instability in Bok was resolved through discussion relying on a

Sasak cultural practice – the mushawara. Despite the tenuous nature of the situation,

there was no need to resort to a forceful police intervention. TGH Madani said that

forceful police tactics were often counter-productive in Lombok. While using force

may disperse a crowd, it doesn’t necessarily solve problems. In fact, an aggressive

police response has the potential to make those involved even angrier. In tight-knit

Sasak society which has high levels of social solidarity, friends and fellow kampung

members may enter the fray, resulting in an escalation of the situation. This could lead

to a rise, rather than a reducing, of tensions.845 The police liaison in Bok implemented

a minimalist approach, limiting the police’s role to protecting the leadership group.

The liaison officer thus became part of the community’s response, rather than acting

unilaterally, as had occurred in the village of Penujak, West Lombok (see Chapter 4).

The conflict management processes utilised in Bok demonstrate the coalescing of

state and non-state forces to resolve conflict. Integral to this dispute resolution process

were the efforts of religious leaders and their ability to change the dynamics of the

situation at a crucial moment. This was particularly important when the protagonists

needed to be forced to the negotiating table. The religious leadership created an

atmosphere where people felt obliged to participate in good-faith negotiations. The

participants knew their actions were being watched by the Tuan Guru Besar and that

they would be judged sternly if they did not participate with appropriate respect and

effort. This is an example of the authoritative role of Tuan Guru, which has been

acknowledged in other research as being pivotal for conflict management processes in

Mataram and West Lombok. Tuan Guru have been observed also in other tense

situations as ensuring the participation of protagonists in social and legal processes

connected to the avoidance and resolution of conflict.846

The religious leaders underwrote the process ensuring that the protagonists attended

the mushawara, came to an agreement and felt obliged to adhere to it. They did this

through their social influence, rather than direct involvement in the mushawara. The

Tuan Guru Besar increased the legitimacy of the process itself, as “… mediation, will

845 Interview with TGH Ahmad Madani (Mataram, 21 August 2008). 846 Lalu Said Ruhpina, Menuju Demokrasi Pemerintahan (2005) 231-233.

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build no more than superficial temporary truce unless the process is managed to allow

the parties to discover a common bond deeper than the process alone”.847 That

common bond was the watchful eye of the Tuan Guru Besar.

Conclusion

These two case studies are not templates for conflict management. Rather, they

incorporate many of the key ingredients discussed throughout this thesis. They

underline the ability of local conflict management processes to prevent social tensions

from turning violent, as well as highlighting methods for the resolution of political

and communal conflict. Across Lombok, the possibility of social and political

tensions sparking violence is not uncommon.848 Therefore, the importance of conflict

avoidance and effective resolution of disputes should not be underestimated. Both

case studies highlighted the potential for effective conflict management by combining

state and non-state actors and institutions, while also noting the importance of these

frameworks being fluid and flexible.

When considering conflict management in post-Soeharto Lombok, state legal

responses, such as statutes or court cases are important. Yet, the strategy used for the

NTB gubernatorial elections illuminated a method for maintaining social stability

through partnerships between state and non-state actors who have high-levels of social

standing, such as Tuan Guru. These religious leaders’ abilities and social roles were

put to good use during the gubernatorial elections, as well as in Bok. Yet, a cautionary

note is needed, as Tuan Guru also have the potential to be peace-breakers. This is

most apparent from their control of pamswakarsa and the allegations of their role in

marginalising minority groups, such as Ahmadiyah. Despite this, the violence that had

marred earlier election processes in Lombok did not occur during the 2008

gubernatorial elections, and Tuan Guru played a significant part in this. A Tuan Guru

Besar was also vital to resolving the problems in Bok through his guidance and

847 Robert M. Ackerman, ‘Disputing Together: Conflict Resolution and the Search for Community’ (2002) 18 Ohio State Journal of Dispute Resolution 27, 89. 848 Violence often occurs during election periods in Lombok. This has also been seen as a problem elsewhere in Indonesia where elections have become flashpoints for pre-existing socio-political issues. See ‘Unrest Colors Regional Elections in Tana Toraja’, Jakarta Post (Jakarta, Indonesia), 25 June 2010.

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influential role in bring the protagonists together. In an overall sense, the role of these

religious leaders should be read as providing a positive contribution to the avoidance

and resolution of violence in Mataram and West Lombok.

Conflict management processes adopted at the grassroots level in the village of Bok

emphasised the stress that these sorts of events can cause to those involved and the

flexibility required. The leadership group was aware that despite the stressful nature

of events they needed to respond without rigidity and if one approach, such as the

initial intervention of religious leaders, was unsuccessful, then new tactics were

applied.

These case studies emphasise the role of Tuan Guru, adat and communal relationships

which are at the heart of conflict management processes in Mataram and West

Lombok. All these factors intersect through the development of networked

relationships that are time and again seen as essential to avoiding or resolving social

tensions and conflict. These case studies also highlight the importance of partnerships

between state and non-state actors in effective conflict management. This is further

explored in next chapter which concludes this thesis and provides an overall analysis

of its findings.

Picture 5.5 Santri at TGH Sofwan Hakim’s Pondok Pesantren Nurul Hakim

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Chapter 6 Chaotic harmony

We cannot allow minorities to continuously feel threatened.

Nurcholish Madjid, 1999.849

The beach resort of Senggigi, just north of Mataram, had gone quiet. By February

2000, the formerly bustling tourist town was a ghost town. Over the course of the

previous month, the town had seen the departure of 4000 tourists fleeing the riots and

chaos of January 2000. These events bring us back to the start of this thesis and

Pastor Rosarius’ screen saver of his Church ablaze during the January 2000 riots.

Both the deserted resort and the image in Pastor Rosarius’ office are salient reminders

of the personal trauma that communal and political violence can have. As Nurcholish

Madjid has pointed out, minorities should be able to live without fear. With the

images of a silent Senggigi and Pastor Rosarius’ flaming computer in mind, along

with Madjid’s ideas, this thesis has investigated conflict management processes and

how they have contributed to people in Mataram and West Lombok being able to live

without fear.

The question underpinning the doctoral research is: what are the legal and social

mechanisms that have prevented, or could have prevented, communal or political

violence in Mataram and West Lombok? To answer this question, my research has

focused on events that occurred on this eastern Indonesian island during the period

1998 to 2008.

The detailed primary research undertaken has led me to a series of key conclusions

about conflict management processes. At the centre of these findings are the

relationships between the state, such as police and public servants, and non-state

actors and institutions, for instance, Tuan Guru and their organisations. Their

cooperation, which I often refer to as a partnership, has foundations in local

communities and their adat processes, such as mushawara, which provide

mechanisms for resolving communal and political disputes.

849 Peter Riddell, Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World (2001) 239.

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Whether talking to local people at a warung (food stall) or interviewing senior

provincial politicians, the complex nature of Lombok’s social, legal and political

ordering become apparent in the course of my research. It became clear to me that the

art of conflict management on Lombok requires an awareness of the intricacies of

local affairs. The findings of this thesis therefore draw on Lombok’s history, which

has seen non-state actors and institutions gain significant socio-political influence

over the years. These historical legacies, which saw the development of powerful non-

state actors and institutions, are also influential in the rapidly changing political

environment of post-Soeharto Lombok. This can be seen with the large number of

Tuan Guru who now hold legislative and executive office due to their significant

support bases (see Chapter 3).

Picture 6.1 A nyongkolan for Lom highlights the vital role of adat and community in Mataram

and West Lombok

This research contributes, through an in-depth analysis of Lombok, to broader

discussions of the cyclical communal and political violence in Indonesia. This has

been witnessed in different parts of the archipelago during periods of social, economic

and political instability, for instance, during the mid-1960s and late 1990s. This thesis

has identified conflict management frameworks used in Mataram and West Lombok.

These may have broader application in other parts of Indonesia, but this thesis leaves

that further enquiry to others.

205

The crux of conflict management

The central argument of this thesis is that conflict management in Mataram and West

Lombok primarily involves a partnership between state and non-state actors and

institutions. All the examples of conflict avoidance and resolution identified in this

thesis have combined these two elements. For instance, the January 2000 riots saw

Lom residents capture and hold rioters until police collected them for a ‘cooling

down’ period in jail.

The legal culture(s) of Lombok are reflected in the central arguments of this thesis –

the creation of partnerships between state and non-state actors and institutions. The

cooperation of these elements highlights a legal culture that is premised on combining

the strengths of the state and non-state, rather than simply relying on the police to

enforce the law and courts to adjudicate. The weaknesses of the Pengadilan Negeri

Mataram are transparent, with their focus barely extending beyond traffic offences

and most people believing that police create more problems than they solve.

State law enforcement unquestionably has significant room for improvement. Despite

this, the case study of Bok showed police engaged at a community-level, responding

in a measured and focused manner (see Chapter 5). The difficulty is finding examples

of this occurring elsewhere. This situation does not exist, for instance, in Lom. Having

said this, pamswakarsa also have serious problems with their performance.850 They

may have protected their community, but simultaneously they are often seen as out of

control and violent. There have been serious problems with their behaviour. This

includes, for example, their involvement in a violent raid on a West Lombok village

in 1999; storming the Central Lombok local parliament in the same year; their alleged

involvement in the January 2000 riots and more recently, kidnapping and seriously

beating a police officer in Central Lombok during 2007 (see Chapter 2).

One way of improving state function would be to assist the police engage more

closely with the community, as occurred in the Bok case study. A new initiative of

850 For broader consideration of the problems that these groups have caused in recent years elsewhere in Indonesia, see Ian Douglas Wilson, ‘Continuity and Change: the Changing Contours of Organized Violence in Post-New Order Indonesia’ (2006) 38 Critical Asian Studies 265.

206

this kind is being run by the national police in Lombok, known as Polmas (Polisi

Masyarakat – community policing). This program aims to bring police officers and

their operations into closer contact with the community. The aim is to create an

Indonesian version of ‘community policing’.851 The efficacy of Polmas has yet to be

determined, but its logic is consistent with the findings of this thesis, as it implicitly

recognises the need to partner with non-state community and religious actors and

institutions at a local-level.

State and non-state partnerships that have been observed in conflict management

processes in Mataram and West Lombok have two particular benefits. First, they

provide each other with complementary skills. This was seen in the Bok case study

where without the protection of the police liaison officer, and the back-up brought in

from Mataram, the leadership group could not have been able to function safely and

through mushawara eventually resolve the dispute. Police officers played an essential

role but the dispute itself would not have been resolved without the involvement of

the non-state Tuan Guru Besar who forced the protagonists to the mushawara. This

highlights the network of relationships that through cooperation allow local

communities and religious organisations to use their skills to assist the conflict

management processes.

Second, during times of social instability or state weakness, state and non-state actors

and institutions can support each other. During the January 2000 riots, for example,

TGH Munajid Khalid and government officials walked the streets together to bring

calm. They supported each other during the riots. This was also seen at other points,

such as during the preparations for the 2008 NTB gubernatorial election investigated

in the first case study of Chapter 5. Tuan Guru were intricately involved in

communicating the need for social harmony, while the police were prepared and

waiting in barracks in case trouble occurred on election day.

Partnerships allow for the ‘webs of relationship’ to have significant strength. State and

non-state cooperation provides a depth of support across community and government

institutions. The government has financial resources, for instance, that the community

851 Interview with Farouk Muhammad (Mataram, 3 November 2007).

207

may not have, but the state often lacks the legitimacy and broad access at the

grassroots. During the gubernatorial elections, the state planned the conflict avoidance

strategy but it needed the support of Tuan Guru to implement it effectively.

When exploring conflict management processes in Mataram and West Lombok it is

hard to ignore adat processes, religious and communal leadership and the fostering of

relationships between communities. Adat provides the fluid and tangible ‘rules’

(perhaps more appropriately termed as ‘parameters’) for conflict resolution, while the

religious and community leaders have social legitimacy to underwrite these

frameworks. Tuan Guru, in particular, are fundamental to avoiding or resolving social

conflict in Lombok. At the centre of this thesis are these religious leaders and their

socio-political role. Their operation as religious educators and spiritual guides is

complemented by their practical role as grassroots organisers, quasi-state leaders and

senior political figures.

There are attempts currently being trialled to support these local approaches. These

emphasise mediated responses to social and political conflict. For instance, Pusat

Studi Pembangunan,852 a leading Lombok non-government group, has been

developing a program called Rumah Harmonis (Harmonious House). This project has

started to establish 40 mediation centres across Lombok (with several in Mataram),

which aim to provide mediation training and places where negotiations can be

undertaken if the protagonists desire or require this. This is only a new program, but it

provides tools to potentially strengthen conflict management processes by

emphasising local approaches.853

Fluidity and flexibility marks the approaches to conflict avoidance and resolution that

were observed in Mataram and West Lombok. These conflict management processes

are built on the capabilities of local communities using respected religious leadership

and partnerships between state and non-state actors. This supports a law-based state

(Negara Hukum) by utilising the local legal culture(s) strengths effectively rather than

dismissing or marginalising them. The current approaches to conflict management

that I observed provide networks of relationships that can weather the storm of

852 PSP or The Centre for the Study and Development of Human Resources. 853 Interview with Syukri Al Faruk (Mataram, 21 November 2007).

208

political and social instability by providing mutual support during periods of state

weakness and calmer times.

This thesis considers ulama who are actively involved in Indonesia’s democratic

transformation. The Tuan Guru of Lombok have proved pivotal to the maintenance of

social harmony during the difficult post-Soeharto period, marked by economic

instability and political transition. The Tuan Guru have been involved broadly across

conflict management processes in Mataram and West Lombok as social stabilisers and

mediators. In playing these roles Tuan Guru have relied upon their social legitimacy

and high standing, both deeply embedded in Sasak society.

209

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Theses

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223

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Ryan, Bartholomew, Alif Lam Mim – Reconciling Islam, Modernity, and Tradition in an Indonesian Kampung (PhD Thesis, Harvard University, 1999).

Sabirin, Respon Pemikiran Tuan Guru Terhadap Penetrasi Ajaran Wahabi Pada Etnik Sasak di Pulau Lombok (MPhil Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2008).

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‘Petugas Mengaku Menjaga Keamanan – Pengakuan Tetannga Amaq Sukasih Sebelum Tragedi Telagawaru’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 8 May 1999.

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224

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‘Akhirnya, HM Zainul Majdi Pimpin NW’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 20 September 1999.

‘Administrasi Amphibi Cukup Teratur’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 November 1999.

‘Kelompok Amphibi Serang Oknum TBI’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 18 November 1999.

‘Pencurian, Usik Ketentraman Warga Mataram’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 1 December 1999.

‘Mataram Tak Aman, Perampokan Merajalela’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 December 1999.

‘Rumah Dijebol, Pemilik Disekap’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 7 December 1999.

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‘Orang Lobar Boleh Masuk Amphibi atau Bujak’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 16 December 1999.

‘Kelompok Massa Hakimi Warga Kuranji’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 18 December 1999.

‘Ada Kecemburuan Etnis Penempatan PNS’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 19 December 1999.

‘Kelompok Pamswakarsa Saling Bertentangan’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 21 December 1999

‘20 Truk Bujak Serbu DPRD II Loteng’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 24 December 1999.

‘Kenapa Kiai Banyak Tapi Banyak Masalah?’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 26 December 1999.

‘Kinerja Aparat Hukum Patut Dikritik – Soge: Banyak Putusan di PN yang Selalu Dicurigai’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 27 December 1999.

225

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‘Walikota Minta Tambahan Aparat’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 27 December 1999.

‘Gubernur Minta Bupati Bantu Pamswakarsa’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 29 December 1999.

‘Amphibi Minta Maaf dan Sepakat Kerjasama’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 31 December 1999.

‘Brutality and Budgets in Indonesia’, The Economist (London, UK), 22 January 2000.

‘Sukaraja Barat, Miniatur Kerukunan Antar Etnis’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 27 January 2000.

‘Sebagian Besar Pengusaha Keturunan Alami Trauma’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 3 February 2000.

‘Anak Jalanan Menjamur Pasca Kerusuhan Mataram’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 February 2000.

‘Senggigi Bagaikan Kota Mati’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 8 February 2000.

‘Unram Jalin Kerjasama Dengan Amphibi’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 10 February 2000.

‘Dibentuk Forum Bersama Antar Etnis’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 10 February 2000.

‘Besar, Peran Brimob dalam Memulihkan Keamanan’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 13 February 2000.

‘Amphibi Punya Hirarki Jelas’ , Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 14 February 2000.

‘Karyawan Hotel pun Gotong Royong’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 19 February 2000.

‘Kejati NTB Minta Pengunjung Digeledah’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 20 February 2000.

‘Kerusuhan Mataram, Keluguan Pemuda Yang Membawa Petaka’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 22 February 2000.

‘Hari Ini, Kembali Digelar Kasus Kerusuhan 171’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 23 February 2000.

‘PMII Mataram Tolak Relokasi Gereja’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 23 February 2000.

‘Jangan Cari Kambing Hitam Atas Kerusuhan 171’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 March 2000.

‘Saad Akhirnya Dihukum 10 Bulan Penjara’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 7 March 2000.

‘Elite Politik Daerah Jadi Kambing Hitam’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 1 April 2000.

‘Para Pendeta Berbela Rasa Kunjungi Asikin’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 2 April 2000.

226

‘Kasus 171 Tidak Berdiri Sendiri’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 5 April 2000.

‘Dua Terdakwa Kasus 171 Diancam 5 Tahun Penjara’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 11 April 2000.

‘Kriminalitas Meningkat, Walikota Imbau Aktifkan Ronda’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 13 April 2000.

‘Perlu, Reformasi Para Hakim di Indonesia’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 17 April 2000.

‘Korban Kerusuhan Akan Dapat Bantuan’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 18 April 2000.

‘Walikota Awali Hapus Coretan Tembok Gereja’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 22 April 2000.

‘Yang Tercecer Dari Peristiwa 171’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 23 April 2000.

‘Bukan Zamannya Untuk Gontok-gontokan’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 28 April 2000.

‘Divonis 3 Bulan, Keluarga Terdakwa Menangis’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 3 May 2000.

‘Ishak: Bebaskan Saya Pak Hakim’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 June 2000.

‘Reformasi, Baru Pada Tatanan Kepala dan Kaki – Taqiuddin: Belum Ada Wacana Demokrasi di Birokrasi’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 17 June 2000.

‘Hakim Harus Konsisten Dengan Tugasnya – Soerojo Hakim Tinggi Parbawa Asmadi’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 18 June 2000.

‘Aparat Kepolisian Harus Lebih Profesional – Syaiful: Masa Polisi Tidak Dapat Atasi Aksi Pencurian’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 25 June 2000.

‘Birokrasi Yang Rigit, Ancam Iklim Democrasi’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 29 June 2000.

‘Ishak Sasaki Bukan Provocator’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 30 June 2000.

‘Polri Yang Kini Tunduk Pada Hukum Sipil – Tak Lagi Bulan-Bulanan Ibu Tiri’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 22 August 2000.

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‘Denny: Karakter Hukum Nasional Masih Feodal’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 3 June 2007.

227

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‘24 Persen Penduduk NTB Miskin’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 5 August 2007.

‘Anggota Pam Swakarsa Amphibi Banjiri Kota Praya’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 August 2007.

‘Pluralitas Jadi Komitmen Utama’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 7 August 2008.

‘Izin Gubernur NTB’, Kompas (Jakarta, Indonesia), 8 August 2007.

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‘Pilkada NTB Adalah Ujian’, Lombok Post (Mataram), 9 September 2007.

‘Polisi Berjiwa Reformis’, National News (Jakarta, Indonesia), 24 September 2007.

‘Kasus Kriminal di Loteng Menurun’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 October 2007.

‘1,5 Juta Penduduk NTB Masih Miskin’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 18 October 2007.

‘Reformasi Birokrasi Menjadi Kunci Perubahan’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 3 November 2007.

Badrul Munir, ‘NTB Dalam Mozaik Keindonesiaan’, Lombok Post (Mataram), 9 November 2007.

‘Kegagalan Pimpinan TNI-Polri’, Kompas (Jakarta, Indonesia), 9 February 2008.

‘Problematik Pilkada Dalam Kacamata Publik’, Kompas (Jakarta, Indonesia), 18 February 2008.

Lalu Mara Satria Wangsa, ‘Pilkada: Madu Atau Racun?’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 19 February 2008.

‘Awas! Perampok Mulai Masuk Kota’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 3 March 2008.

‘Polres Lobar Gencarkan Operasi Preman’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 4 March 2008.

‘Konflik Pilkades Spakek Bermuara di PTUN’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 5 March 2008.

‘Ekonomi NTB Mulai Membaik’, Lombok Post (Mataram), 11 March 2008.

‘Politik Islam Belum Mati’, Republika (Jakarta, Indonesia), 16 March 2008.

‘Pengamanan Pilkada, Korem Siapkan 10 SSK’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 19 March 2008.

‘Tuan Guru Bajang: Hindari Black Campaign’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 7 April 2008.

228

‘Ulama dan Santri Iringi Pendaftaran Pasangan SUFI’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 9 April 2008.

‘Pencuri Nyaris Tewas Diamuk Massa’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 18 April 2008.

‘Show Force Pasukan Pengamanan Pilkada Lombok Timur’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 19 April 2008.

‘Diintimidasi, Ismail Husni Ajak Semua Pihak Arif’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 24 April 2008.

‘Tangani Ahmadiyah, Pemprov Tunggu Regulasi Pusat’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 30 April 2008.

‘Tak ada Pengamanan Khasus Untuk Jemaat Ahmadiyah’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 30 April 2008.

‘Lagi, Massa Segel Kantor Desa Kateng’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 14 May 2008.

‘Semarak, Haul Al-Az’am Syekh Abdul Kodir Jaelani’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 19 May 2008.

Makmur Keliat, ‘Polisi Melindungi Siapa?’, Kompas (Jakarta, Indonesia), 27 May 2008.

‘Kalla: Pilkada Sumber Konflik’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 8 June 2008.

‘Pilkada, Polres Loteng Siapkan 3068 Personil’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 19 June 2008.

‘Antisipasi Money Politic, Bentuk Satgas’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 July 2008.

‘Kodim 1606 Lobar Gandeng Pamswakarsa’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 7 July 2008.

‘Amankan Pilkada, Polda NTB Terjunkan Kekuatan Penuh’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 17 June 2008.

‘Panwas Terima Laporan Dugaan Money Politics’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 7 August 2008.

‘Hari ini, Pawai Ta’aruf Hultah’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 9 August 2008.

‘Perayaan Puncak Hultah NWDI dan Haul Maulanasyekh’. Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 11 August 2008.

Abdul Wahid, ‘NTB Plural Perlu Gerakan Harmoni’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 11 August 2008.

‘TGH Serukan NW Pancor-Anjani Bersatu’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 11 August 2008.

‘Peran FKUB Akan Ditingkatkan’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 14 August 2008.

Panca Nugraha, ‘West Nusa Tenggara Poll Body Names Governor’, The Jakarta Post (Jakarta, Indonesia), 15 August 2008.

229

‘Nurul Hakim Sebar Dai Pelosok Desa’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 21 August 2008.

‘Sahur Janjikan Kemajuan Baji Lobar’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 25 August 2008.

Mahasiswa Aski Para Koruptor NTB (2008) Sumbawa News <http://www.sumbawanews.com> at 12 December 2008.

Keluarga Serinata Lapor Ke Polda (2008) <lotengpers.wordpress.com> at 10 December 2008.

Kasus Gubernur Serinata Kembali Dipertanyakan (2008) Nusa Tenggara News <http://www.nusatenggaranews.com> at 12 December 2008.

Dewi Indriastuti, Permeriksaan Serinata Lancar (2008) Kompas <http://www.kompas.com> at 12 December 2008.

Panca Nugraha, ‘Prosecutors in NTB Send Red Light to Governor’ (2008) The Jakarta Post <http://www.thejakartapost.com> at 12 December 2008.

Irwan Nugroho, Gubernur NTB Diperiksa Kejagung 24 April Sebagai Tersangka (2008) Detik News <http://us.detiknews.com> at 12 December 2008.

Yusuf Riaman, Mantan Gubernur NTB Serinata Dilarikan ke RS (2008) Media Indonesia <http://www.media-indonesia.com> at 12 December 2008.

‘Mantan Gubernur NTB Lalu Serinata Ditahan’ (2008) Tempointeraktif <http://www.tempointeraktif.com> at 29 May 2009.

Janeman Latul, ‘Officials Throw Lombok Project a Final Lifeline’, The Jakarta Globe (Jakarta, Indonesia), 27 January 2010.

Djoko Tjiptono, ‘PBB: Kemenangan TG Bajang akan Menginspirasi Rakyat di 2009’ (2008) <http://www.detiknews.com> at 13 January 2009.

Panca Nugraha, ‘Former Governor Sent to Jail to Serve his Sentence’, The Jakarta Post (Jakarta, Indonesia), 29 July 2010.

Moratorium on Regional Autonomy (2009) Tempointerative <http://www.tempointeractive.com> at 5 August 2009.

Panca Nugraha, ‘55 New West Nusa Tenggara Councilors Inaugerated’, The Jakarta Post (Jakarta, Indonesia), 1 September 2009.

Deborah Cassrels, Gold rush at the Other Kuta (2009) The Australian <http://www.theaustralian.com.au> at 14 March 2010.

‘Pemuda NW Konvoi Keliling Lombok’, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 17 May 2010.

Andi Hajramurni, ‘Unrest Colors Regional Elections in Tana Toraja’, Jakarta Post (Jakarta, Indonesia), 25 June 2010.

Interviews, electronic communications

Interview with Riyanto Rabbah (Mataram, 3 October 2007).

Interview with Zey (Mataram, 3 October 2007).

230

Interview with Herawati (Mataram, 7 October 2007).

Interview with Pendeta Jimmy Iroth (Mataram, 9 October 2007).

Interview with Pastor Rosarius (Mataram, 10 October 2007).

Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007).

Interview with Arifin (Mataram, 16 October 2007).

Interview with Tika (Mataram, 17 October 2007).

Interview with Dewi (Mataram, 19 October 2007).

Interview with Imam (Mataram, 20 October 2007).

Interview with Meme (Mataram, 23 October 2007).

Interview with Ida (Mataram, 23 October 2007).

Interview with Lalu Nurtaat (Mataram, 25 October 2007).

Interview with Benny (Mataram, 30 October 2007).

Interview with Farouk Muhammad (Mataram, 3 November 2007).

Interview with Mursidin Zuhdi (Mataram, 6 November 2007).

Interview with Subuh (Mataram, 6 November 2007).

Interview with Saonah (Mataram, 7 November 2007).

Interview with Ciman (Mataram, 8 November 2007).

Interview with Jupri (Mataram, 9 November 2007).

Interview with Mukhlis (Mataram, 10 November 2007).

Interview with Sahari (Mataram, 11 November 2007).

Interview with Tumi (Mataram, 12 November 2007).

Interview with Kong (Mataram, 12 November 2007).

Interview with Dahlan Bandu (Mataram, 13 November 2007).

Interview with Eko (Mataram, 16 November 2007).

Interview with anonymous non-government informant (Mataram, 16 November 2007).

Interview with Syukri Al Faruk (Mataram, 21 November 2007).

Interview with Sani (Mataram, 29 November 2007).

Interview with Mahfud (Kediri, West Lombok, 5 December 2007).

Interview with Hardi (Mataram, 5 December 2007).

Interview with Pendeta Hasanema (Mataram, 12 December 2007).

Interview with TGH Ulul Azmi (Jerneng, West Lombok, 17 December 2007).

Interview with ustadz Abdul Qodir Jaelani (Mataram, 18 December 2007).

Interview with Lalu Serinata (Mataram, 8 January 2008).

Interview with Mukhsin (Mataram, 14 July 2008).

231

Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok, 16 July 2008).

Interview with TGH Abdul Hamid Faisal (Mataram, 19 July 2008).

Interview with TGH Mustiadi Abhar (Mataram, 23 July 2008).

Interview with Djalaluddin Arzaki (Mataram, 27 July 2008).

Interview with Lalu Nurtaat (Mataram, 28 July 2008).

Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok, 28 July 2008).

Interview with Drun (Mataram, 28 July 2008).

Interview with TGH Ramli (Mataram, 29 July 2008).

Interview with Andi (Mataram, 4 August 2008).

Interview with Asnawi (Mataram, 5 August 2008).

Interview with Achand (Mataram, 6 August 2008).

Interview with anonymous informant (Mataram, 6 August 2008).

Interview with TGH Humaidi Zaen (Memben, East Lombok, 9 August 2008).

Interview with Muhammad Dimiati (Mataram, 12 August 2008).

Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008).

Interview with Lalu Nurtaat (Mataram, 16 August 2008).

Interview with Eni (Bok, West Lombok, 16 August 2008).

Interview with TGH Ahmad Madani (Mataram, 21 August 2008).

Interview with TGH Subkhi Sasaki (Kediri, West Lombok, 23 August 2008).

Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008).

Interview with TGH Aminullah Abdul Hamid (Mataram, 25 August 2008).

Interview with Imran (Bok, West Lombok, 26 August 2008).

Interview with Abdullah (Bok, West Lombok, 26 August 2008).

Interview with Mukhtar (Mataram, 28 August 2008).

Interview with TGH Zainal Arifin (Jerneng, West Lombok, 28 August 2008).

Informal discussion with an anonymous foreign consultant (Jakarta, 16 March 2009).

Interview with TGH Muharror (Electronic Interview, 11 May 2009).

Email from anonymous Golkar political operative to Jeremy Kingsley, 19 May 2009.

Interview with TGH Wawan Stiawan (Electronic Interview, 18 July 2009).

Email from Herawati to Jeremy Kingsley, 26 July 2009.

Email from Zey Sahnan to Jeremy Kingsley, 7 June 2010.

Email from Herawati to Jeremy Kingsley, 30 July 2010.

232

Speeches, conference papers

Asshiddiqie, Jimly, ‘Cita Negara Hukum Indonesia Kontemporer’ (‘A Contemporary Perspective of the Indonesian Law-based State’) (Speech delivered at the Fakultas Hukum, Universitas Sriwijaya, Palembang, 23 March 2004).

TGH Bajang, ‘Pre-Inauguration Comments’ (Speech Delivered at Hotel Bukit Senggigi, 2 August 2008).

Grace, Jocelyn, ‘Lacking Education, Young Sasak Women and Teenage Marriage, Divorce and Polygamy in Rural East Lombok’ (Paper presented at Biennial Asian Studies Association of Australia Conference, La Trobe University, Melbourne, 8-11 July 1996).

Fealy, Greg, ‘Analysing the Indonesian Election Results’ (Speech Delivered at the Indonesia Study Group, Australian National University, Canberra, 30 April 2009).

Hamdi, Saipul, ‘Reconciling Muslim Conflict in Nahdlatul Wathan in Lombok, Eastern Indonesia’ (Paper presented at the 4th Asian Graduate Forum on Southeast Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, Singapore, 15-17 July 2009).

Kalla, Jusuf, ‘Making Good Economic and Social Policy in a Democratic Indonesia: An Insider's Perspective’ (Speech delivered at the Indonesia Study Group, Australian National University, Canberra, 10 June 2010).

Pohlman, Annie, ‘Women and the Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966: Gender Variables and Possible Directions for Research’ (Paper presented at the 15th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, Canberra, 29 June – 2 July 2004).

Field notes

Field notes, 17 March 2007.

Field notes, 16 April 2007.

Field notes, 4 May 2007.

Field notes, 25 May 2007.

Field notes, 4 June 2007.

Field notes, 19 June 2007.

Field notes, 8 August 2007.

Field notes, 6 September 2007.

Field notes, 10 September 2007.

Field notes, 15 September 2007.

Field notes, 1 October 2007.

Field notes, 3 October 2007.

Field notes, 6 October 2007.

Field notes, 11 October 2007.

233

Field notes, 13 October 2007.

Field notes, 16 October 2007.

Field notes, 17 October 2007.

Field notes, 22 October 2007.

Field notes, 23 October 2007.

Field notes, 24 October 2007.

Field notes, 30 October 2007.

Field notes, 6 November 2007.

Field notes, 8 November 2007.

Field notes, 10 November 2008.

Field notes, 14 November 2007.

Field notes, 22 November 2007.

Field notes, 20 December 2007.

Field notes, 28 December 2007.

Field notes, 2007 (date withheld to insure anonymity).

Field notes, 4 January 2008.

Field notes, 6 August 2008.

Field notes, 9 January 2008.

Field notes, 5 July 2008.

Field notes, 6 July 2008.

Field notes, 10 July 2008.

Field notes, 14 July 2008.

Field notes, 20 July 2008.

Field notes, 23 July 2008.

Field notes, 28 July 2008.

Field Notes, 30 July 2008.

Field notes, 31 July 2008.

Field notes, 7 August 2008.

Field notes, 9 August 2008.

Field notes, 10 August 2008.

Field notes, 11 August 2008.

Field notes, 19 August 2008.

Field notes, 20 August 2008.

Field notes, 23 August 2008.

Field notes, 27 August 2008.

234

Other

Court Data, Pengadilan Negeri Mataram (1996-2006).

Dinamika Kegiatan PPP (2008) <http://dinamikappp.blogspot.com> at 12 January 2009.

DPR-RI Factions (2010) Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia <www.dpr.go.id> at 6 July 2010.

Good Local Governance (2010) GTZ <http://www.gtz.de> at 25 March 2010.

Human Development Index (HDI) 1999-2005 (2005) Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia <http://www.bps.go.id > at 27 May 2009.

Humas Setda Provinsi NTB, DVD – Profil Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat (2007).

Indonesia (2010) World Food Programme <http://www.wfp.org/countries/indonesia> at 28 April 2010.

Kejaksaan (Attorney General’s Department) Republik Indonesia, Kasus Dana APBD Kejaksaan Tahan Mantan Gubernur NTB (2008) <http://www.kejaksaan.go.id> at 12 December 2008.

Lalu Muhamad Jaelani, Daftar Nama Anggota Baru DPRD NTB (2009) <http://lalumuhamadjaelani.wordpress.com> at 6 July 2010.

Nahdlatul Wathan Anjani Website (2009) <http://www.nahdlatulwathan.org> at 29 May 2009.

Peraturan Daerah Kota Mataram Tentang Pencegahan Maksiat (1983) (Mataram Local Regulation Preventing Immoral Behaviour).

Syncretism (2009) Oxford Dictionaries <http://www.askoxford.com/> at 22 July 2009.

SATGAS Hamzanwadi (2009) Nahdlatul Wathan Pancor < http://www.nw.or.id> at 29 May 2009.

Sumbawa News (2009) <www.sumbawanews.com> at 17 July 2010.

235

Appendix 1

Pengadilan Negeri (Magistrates Court) Mataram Criminal matters lodged – 1996-2006854

Offence ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 Total

Kejahtan terhadap ketertiban umum (public order offences)

- - - - - 2 1 4 7 - - 14

Kejahatan yang membahayakan keamanan umum bagi orang atau barang (public order and safety offences)

- - - 1 - - 1 - - - 1 3

Kejahatan terhadap penguasa umum (offences against public authority – insulting a state official)

- - - - - - - - - - 2 2

Sumpah/ keterangan palsu (giving false evidence or oath – perjury)

- - - - - - - 4 - 1 - 4

Pemalsuan uang (forgery of money)

2 5 3 3 - 4 2 1 - - - 21

Pemalsuan materi/merk (copying of products)

- 3 - - - 1 - - - 2 1 7

Pemalsuan surat (forgery of official documents)

3 1 - 2 1 - 2 - 4 6 5 24

Kejahatan terhadap asal usul dan perkawinan (Offences

- - - 3 2 2 1 - 1 1 - 10

854 Prepared by Jeremy Kingsley and Nurmala Fahriyanti.

236

Offence ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 Total

relating to legitimacy and parentage – claiming someone to be your child when they are not, altering birth records, etc).

Kejahatan kesusilaan (morality offences)

7 9 2 5 3 5 7 7 10 8 33 96

Kejahatan perjudian (gambling)

7 27 3 5 6 31 7 21 73 120 - 300

Meninggalkan orang yang perlu di tolong (failing to render assistance to persons in need)

- - 2 - - - - - - - - 2

Penghinaan (defamation)

27 1 1 4 1 2 2 2 5 3 13 61

Membuka rahasia (divulging of state secrets)

1 1 - - - - - - - - - 2

Kejahatan terhadap kemerdekaan orang lain (human trafficking offences)

- - - 2 - - - 2 3 2 - 9

Kejahatn terhadap nyawa (murder)

3 5 5 - 8 6 3 3 7 8 22 70

Penganiayaan (assault)

35 17 15 22 15 22 20 27 21 46 29 254

Menyebabkan mati/ luka karena alpa (causing accidental injury or death)

31 45 35 37 15 17 15 13 58 12 16 294

Pencurian 180 109 147 192 176 111 84 84 106 133 71 1309

237

Offence ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 Total

(theft)

Pemerasan dan pengancaman (extortion)

22 45 59 - - - - 6 3 - 2 137

Penggelapan (embezzlement/ fraud)

9 14 26 9 7 18 15 20 26 19 23 186

Penipuan (deception)

15 15 11 9 15 15 12 12 19 43 73 239

Merugikan pemuitang atau orang yang berhak (insolvency offences)

1 - 3 - - - - - - - - 4

Menghancurkan atau merusak barang (destruction of goods)

12 5 5 14 11 9 1 2 - - - 59

Kejahatan jabatan (misuse of position)

2 1 - - - - - - - - - 3

Kejahatan pelayaran (shipping offences)

- - - 3 - - - - - - 4 7

Penadahan (possession of stolen goods)

21 6 13 27 10 7 10 13 13 23 22 165

Kejahatan penerbitan dan pencetakan (publication of offensive material)

- 1 5 - - - - - - - - 6

Tindak pidana korupsi (corruption)

- - 1 6 3 3 8 1 7 9 - 38

Tindak pidana senjata api/ sajam (firearms offences)

- - - - 1 - - - 1 - 2 4

Tindak pidana narkotika/

2 2 16 23 14 32 25 34 35 65 57 305

238

Offence ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 Total

psikotropika (use of illegal drugs)

Tindak pidana agama (offences against religion)

- - 1 1 - - - - - - - 2

Tindak pidana imigrasi (immigration offences)

- - - - - - - - - 1 - 1

Tindak pidana lingkungan hidup (environmental offences)

7 - - 4 - 3 - - - - - 14

Lalu lintas (traffic offences)

4719 5613 4219 3955 2156 6179 8604 7328 9703 12547 8743 73.766

Minerva Access is the Institutional Repository of The University of Melbourne

Author/s:

KINGSLEY, JEREMY JACOB

Title:

Tuan Guru, community and conflict in Lombok, Indonesia

Date:

2010

Citation:

Kingsley, J. J. (2010). Tuan Guru, community and conflict in Lombok, Indonesia. PhD thesis,

Law, The University of Melbourne.

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http://hdl.handle.net/11343/35693

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Tuan Guru, community and conflict in Lombok, Indonesia

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