Towards an Understanding of Convergent Terrorism

Running Head: UNDERSTANDING CONVERGENT TERRORISM

Toward an Understanding of Convergent Terrorism

UNDERSTANDING CONVERGENT TERRORISM 2

Abstract

Western society typically regards terrorism, both practically and conceptually, as emergent. To

specify, Western society prescribes terrorism as simply a ground-up, grassroots construct that

only non-governmental individuals, groups, or organizations may perform. This philosophy of

emergence-only terrorism limits our epistemological and ontological understanding of political

communication. To combat this limitation, this paper—by examining terrorism as rhetoric, me-

dia compliance in framing terrorism as only emergent, and previous understandings of state ter-

rorism--presents an argument for terrorism as convergent in conjunction with our current, emer-

gent conceptual framework. This argument compares the actions of the Police Department of

Ferguson, MO. in the aftermath of the death of Michael Brown to Schmid and Jongman’s (1988)

22 definitional elements of terrorism. Herein, the author argues the rhetorical significance of the-

se 22 definitional elements. Ultimately, this study seeks to create a new conceptual framework

for convergent terrorism, parallel to that of emergent terrorism. By doing so, the author rhetori-

cally justifies the necessity for a broader understanding. This paper also questions the epistemo-

logical and ontological assumptions inherent in the previous, emergent-centric belief, navigating

the biases necessary in our understanding for this rigid hegemonic framework of emergent-only

terrorism to occur.

Keywords: terrorism, ontology, epistemology, political communication, terrorism as communi-

cation


Western governments meticulously regulate the concepts and understanding of terrorism. Specif-

ically, these governments typically ascribe a violent motivation or action to the definition (Kainz,

1999). The concept, however, also exists enigmatically in an academic sense: over one hundred

different academic definitions of terrorism exist (Bruce, 2013). Many feature similar concepts,

such as the appearance of political (ideological) motivation or the appearance of violence. This

lack of academic (and legal) consensus illustrates the lack of a cohesive and unified narrative

about even the most basic conceptualization of the term. Our views of what constitutes terror-

ism—and subsequently terrorism as communication—remain inherently limited by an emergent

methodology for such actions. Conjunctively, groups, organizations, nation-states—even aca-

demics—each provide a definition of terrorism that suits their particular biases or understandings

(Bruce, 2013). The social, political, and academic consequences of this lack of consensus, com-

bined with the inherently limited view of emergence-centric terrorism and self-serving determi-

nations, needlessly restrain our understanding of terrorism, both conceptually and as a process of

communication.

While much research on the foci and definition of general terrorism exists (Bruce, 2013;

Schmid, Jongman, et al, 1988), the lack of cohesive understanding regarding many of the facets

of terrorism creates the impetus for this paper. Herein, this paper seeks to determine a unified

understanding of convergent terrorism. In addition, since many scholars, governmental organiza-

tions, nation-states, etc., have offered an emergent reasoning of terrorism, the impetus of aca-

demic research remains to devise a rational understanding of top-down terrorism. Consequently,

this paper examines a case study of convergent terrorism, existing suppositions, and other related

concepts to further our understanding of this burgeoning concept.


Using the Police Department of Ferguson, Missouri and their response to the Michael

Brown killing as a case study, this paper seeks to establish the understanding of terrorism from a

top-down methodological paradigm. To this end, this paper questions faulty epistemological and

ontological assumptions behind focusing on simply ground-up methodology. This argument in-

cludes defining terrorism as communication, seeking a general consensus of what constitutes

general terrorism, and to establish a consensus understanding of what may constitute state-

sponsored, or convergent terrorism academically. The next section of this paper covers a review

of literature pertaining to defining terrorism, existing philosophies and paradigms of state-

sponsored terrorism, and applicable rhetorical understandings through which the researcher will

examine the symbology of the case study. This review encompasses a research question, in

which the researcher examines pertinent data to understand terrorism as a multi methodological

construct. I study this particular case using rhetorical methods to understand specific symbologi-

cal meanings as well as important personal understandings.

Terrorism as Rhetoric. Communication remains a complex concept, one in which we

build relationships “around the exchange of information” (Schramm, 1983, p. 16). Communica-

tion as a cultural process and product (Nastasia & Rakow, 2006) tends to pass “ideas, infor-

mation and attitudes from person to person” (Ricoeur, 1971, p. 17). Our relationships add further

complexity when we consider the implications of terrorism as communication. The relationships

built by terrorism as communication typically base from the destruction caused by an attack—or,

how the terrorist communicates symbologically. Thus, the study of terrorism communication

through action, the symbology behind the action, or the impact of terrorist symbology relayed

through mass media organizations (i.e. broadcast news) rose to prominence an important focus of

current rhetorical studies (Gadarian, 2014).


Our understanding of communication confounds as a consequence of considering terror-

ism as a priori and a posteriori communication. Terrorism, as a priori, communicates through

the specific actions taken, meant as a form of coercion (i.e. blackmail, propaganda). If a terrorist

were to threaten to bomb a target if certain demands remain unmet, for example, this terrorist

would communicate with an a priori method. Terrorism, as a posteriori, communicates in a

more complex method, using cultural expectations of those partaking in the action of terrorism in

conjunction sociopolitical motivations behind such communication (Natasia & Rakow, 2006). A

terrorist communicating with an a posteriori method not simply use the terror as a method of

creating action or coercion (i.e., blackmail), but will conscientiously employ cultural motivations

as the reason for an action (i.e., religious or political ideologies). Because of the complex nature

of a priori and a posteriori methods of communication, one must examine the multidimensional

impact terrorism has on communication as a discipline, an action, and a cultural phenomenon to

understand its rhetorical significance.

The specific rhetorical constructs embedded in a terrorist action illustrate the action’s rhe-

torical significance. The rhetorical significance of terrorism emerges from procedure; specifical-

ly, terrorism operates procedurally under the sender-receiver model of communication. As Tu-

man (2010) notes, “a terrorist sends a message to a target audience … by engaging in an act of

violence or destruction” (p. 32). This statement, however, merely describes a process, or medium

of communication, the terrorist uses. A message embeds itself a terrorist action but does not exist

within the act of violence or terrorism itself. The message, in a sense, transcends the action. In-

terestingly, this process contains numerous symbological constructs which give the process a

“rhetorical dimension that is independent of the simple coercion associated with violence for its

own sake” (p. 32). Because such symbological and procedural encoding exists, great potential


exists for rhetorical scholars, as well as organizational dynamics scholars, to understand the per-

tinent messages, underlying values, and assumptions sent.

The transactional perception of communication also plays an integral role in understand-

ing the impact of terrorism on communication. Since terrorism exists as a transactional proce-

dure, the audience of the communicated message of terrorism will always produce some form of

message returned to the terrorist (Tuman, 2010, p. 33). Specifically, what we respond and how

we communicate the response inevitably encodes as a message back to a terrorists responsible

for the response, regardless of the intended audience. How one may communicate messages back

to those who commit the acts necessarily vary and completely rely on the particular communica-

tion sources available to those victimized by the attack. Media outlets, governments, and users of

social media craft responses that each not only return to the terrorist but also find new audiences

in viewers, interested parties, and/or the constituents of an affected state or government.

For example, in response to a terrorist action or threat, governments enact legislation

which allows them more readily to combat their perceived problem. The Parliament of the Unit-

ed Kingdom, in response to terrorists associating with the IRA (Irish Republican Army), enacted

the Terrorism Act 2000, which sought to explicate and further criminalize activity defined as ter-

rorism or activity “involving serious violence against a person, … damage to property, … serious

risk to the health or safety of the public…, etc” (Part I, Section 1, Subsection 2; legisla-

tion.gov.uk, 2000). Fascinatingly, those who initially comprise the audience then become the

sender, which then sends the terrorist’s initial message in conjunction with their own. Ultimately,

this message multiplies the audience with each message sent. The message then also recurrently

sends multiple times according to Tuman’s (2010) assessment.


Terrorism, as a symbol, has also tremendously affected our understanding of politics, cul-

ture, and security in western cultures. Gadarian (2014) makes note that symbols of terrorism

found in media broadcasts precipitously enhance a publics’ evaluation of political candidates or

of political decisions. For example, evocative imagery (i.e. the fall of the Trade Center towers)

enhanced affirmative beliefs about President George W. Bush and his party amongst all political

beliefs (Gadarian, 2014). President Bush’s speeches regarding the War on Terror also carry sig-

nificant political implications regarding the symbology of terrorism. Kephart (2004) illustrates

the symbols utilized by the president, regarding terrorist attacks as “a violation of American so-

cial order” (p. 9). Further, Kephart makes note of Bush’s use of American nationalism; the Unit-

ed States as an innocent and beneficent global leader “did nothing to provoke the attack” (p. 9),

thus warranting a response. As evidenced by Bush’s significant statements to the nation, terror-

ism plays a key symbolic and rhetorical role in United States sociopolitical discourse.

Especially since the attacks of September 11, 2001, this communication typically focuses

on a specific “they” responsible for acts in such a manner that portrays ostracism and dichotomy.

Bartolucci (2012) examined various speeches of the Bush administration regarding terrorist ac-

tions, finding the ostracizing dichotomy of “they” versus “our” as a common theme. Coupled

with emotive terms, such as “barbarianism, evil, or brutal,” this dividing technique sought to as-

sociate western forces with “good” and those they oppose with “evil” (p. 567). These dividing

techniques (i.e., “binary discourse”, p. 567) illustrate the government’s aptness at portraying “the

other” as one deserving eradication.

Bartolucci (2012) adds greater complexity to the context of “they.” To contextualize,

Bartolluci makes note of descriptors included within the dichotomous messages President Bush

that provide a basis for understanding what the government frames as “they.” Specifically, Presi-


dent Bush describes “they” as a group or a significant person responsible for terrorism. The

group necessarily “loosely affiliates” with one another or other groups (p. 568), acts belligerent

and not open to reason or discussion (p. 569), and one that readily threatens the safety of the

country (p. 571-572). More profoundly, however, the “they” found through Bartolucci’s (2012)

work never contains a governmental force, always affiliating as a non-governmental force or mil-

itary.

To further the dichotomy, President Bush differentiated the actions of terrorists from

governmental actions through the use of wartime rhetoric:

“I’m a war president. I make decisions here in the Oval Office in foreign policy matters

with war on my mind… And this is all in the context of war … And I made decisions

based upon that intelligence in the context of the war against terror” (p. 569).

Thus, Bush creates a rigid, “hegemonic ideological framework” (p. 562), through which security

takes precedence over civil rights and liberties (Anderson, 2003, p. 35 as cited in Bartolucci,

2012) that excuses similar actions taken by the US Government (i.e., bombings, raids) as a

method of war rather than an act of terrorism.

The “us” versus “them” mentality stands as a strong symbol within government rhetoric.

Its dichotomous and competitive structure seeks to lock constituents of a particular country or

ideology into an oppressive and limiting set of ideas. “Them,” “they,” or “the other” exist as

symbols for the government to persuade its citizens to do what it pleases (i.e., allow mass sur-

veillance, go to war, invade sovereign nations). “Them,” “they,” or “the other” typically seek to

oppress, destroy, or otherwise harm the populace; without “them,” “they,” or “the other,” how-

ever, governments cannot employ “security” tactics such as the aspects listed above.


Media Compliance. Media compliance in the frame of a dichotomy of “us versus them”

plays an important role in socializing a citizenry to accept these oppressive structures. Yarchi,

Wolfsfeld, Sheafer, and Shenhav (2013) explain that as a method of managing emotions after a

terrorist attack, media tend to frame conflicts in a similar way to the official response of the na-

tion (p. 272-273). Coverage of terrorism, specifically that of from United States media, tends to

follow the trend that governmental rhetoric creates. The empathy, as found in reports, illustrates

media complicity in framing terrorism as something that “the other” conducts. As President Bush

and the United States government framed terrorism through these characteristics, the media be-

comes likely to frame its messages similarly.

Further, the nature of the attacks directly influenced the media perception of the terrorist.

Yarchi, Wolfsfeld, Sheafer, and Shenav (2013) state that the more brutal or aggressive an attack

is, the more likely the media will present a narrative that closely aligns with that of the nation (p.

273). Thus, with an attack such as the September 11th attacks, media outlets use coping mecha-

nisms and rhetoric as aligned with the government under which they serve.

Bennet and Stohl (2012) further illustrate that governments hold a vested interest in con-

trolling and labelling pertinent symbols. Those who perceive a strong likelihood of another ter-

rorist attack, whether homegrown or domestically, typically allow a government to act more ag-

gressively. Media framing of terrorism has a significant impact on how the public interprets a

terrorist attack (p. 284). Therefore, since a high correlation exists between terrorist acts (terror-

ism as communication and public address) and media compliance of government and national

messages, this vested interest becomes readily apparent.

To specify media compliance in the context of convergent terrorism, media organizations

also complicitly frame terrorism as simply a ground-up phenomenon. A few articles from The


Washington Post (washingtonpost.com), Newsmax (a right-leaning news aggregate and reporting

site; newsmax.com), CNN.com, and ABCNews.com. The Washington Post extensively details

many different terrorist attacks and best illustrate this complicity in framing. The common and

unifying theme of their reports center around a rigid conceptualization of terrorism, provided by

law enforcement (i.e. ground-up only methodology) (Plumer, 2013). Newsmax, CNN, and ABC

News’ coverage each center around this same methodology (Newsmax, 2014; CNN Library,

2014; Meek, 2013). Even when state-sponsored actors (i.e. the Ferguson police department) use

intimidation tactics such as a large display of force against an otherwise unarmed populace, news

coverage tends to skew towards ground-up methodology (McLaughlin, et al, 2014;

ABCNews.com, 2014; CBSNews.com, 2014; Richter, 2014). Despite the political affiliation of

each respective outlet’s editorial content, each covered the stories with the same methodological

paradigm.

State Sponsored Terrorism. Inevitably, the issue of state-sponsored terrorism further

convolutes this lack of cohesive narrative. Law enforcement agencies (i.e. FBI, CIA) have great

interest in devising and/or procuring a definition of terrorism that suit the needs of their particu-

lar organizational mission. Other governmental organizations (i.e. US State Department, the

Australian Federal Government, Parliament of the United Kingdom) also have a vested interest

in maintaining a focus on how a terrorist acts, rather than why (Bruce, 2013). The modern under-

standing of terrorism typically does not include the actions of governmental organizations com-

plicit in similar acts of violence or coercion.

Specifically, the State Department of the United States has the capacity to designate for-

eign national governments as state-sponsors of terrorism. Their definition inherently limits the

scope of terrorism to ground-up methodology. The State Department defines state-sponsored ter-


rorism as a government or governments that provide for and sustain factions or individuals

committed to terrorism or terroristic acts (state.gov, n.d.). Because the State Department limits its

own scope, actions of a state or government cannot (or willfully interpreted as not) constitute ter-

rorism. This limitation stands as a prime example of a government bureau or department that re-

lies on a self-serving and limited definition of terrorism. Other governmental organizations, both

domestically and internationally, also utilize a self-serving definition of terrorism. The United

Nations, despite only covering a “very small aspect of terrorism” (Bruce, 2013, p. 26), focuses

on the methods of actors (i.e. economic losses, intimidation of a populace or of a government or

non-governmental organization).

An Academic Understanding of Terrorism. Academicians, in conjunction with politi-

cal and governmental organizations, also struggle to uniformly define terrorism. To illustrate,

Schmid and Jongman’s (1988) offer a unique chart with 22 different definitional elements of ter-

rorism. Their frequency of defining characteristics simultaneously celebrates two accomplish-

ments. Their work sufficiently confounds the reader—after all, over 100 different academic defi-

nitions exist.With so many different definitional elements of what may constitute a terrorist ac-

tion, it becomes difficult for the reader to place focus upon a singular definition. This confound-

ing nature, however, actually produces an environment of comprehensiveness which leads to the

second accomplishment inherent in their work. The comprehensiveness of their list provides a

full picture of the many different angles and elements of a terrorist attack. Many of Schmid and

Jongman’s (1988) list of definitional elements characterize terrorism as violence or force, politi-

cally motivation, emphasizing fear or terror, threatening, intimidation, innocence of victims, and

symbolism. This comprehensive academic assessment of the qualities of terrorist action brings

the reader one step closer to understanding what specifically would constitute a terrorist action.


Using the ideas of what constitutes terrorism present in Schmid and Jongman (1988), this

study examines the research question, do the actions of Ferguson, Missouri’s, Police Department

against protestors in the aftermath of Michael Brown’s death constitute terrorism?

Understanding Convergent Terrorism

The Ferguson, MO, Police Department acts as an extension of the executive branch of the United

States government for the purposes of keeping the peace, mitigating crime, and supplying ser-

vices to the citizenry (Jihong, Ni, and Lovrich, 2003). Specifically, in the city of Ferguson, MO,

they “provide protection of life and property in Ferguson through the enforcement of laws and

ordinances and assistance with emergency medical services” (fergusoncity.com, n.d., n.p.). Es-

sentially, and taken at an artifactual understanding, they state their purpose as to ensure the citi-

zenry follows the rule of law. Because the municipal, state, and federal governments supply the

laws and ordinances the police department enforces, the same governments under which the po-

lice department serves therefore endorse the actions they take.

The Ferguson, MO, Police Department reached international infamy with the slaying of

unarmed teenager Michael Brown. Drehle, Altman, Rogers, Sanburn, and Miller (2014) specify

two versions of this slaying: Dorian Johnson, a friend of Brown’s present at the time of the

shooting, states that Darren Wilson, the offending officer, shot Brown in the back as Johnson and

Brown fled from Wilson. The other, according to Drehle, et al. (2014), belongs to officer Wilson,

who the Police Department says fought the two men which led to a possible wound. Wilson,

then, fought back and shot at them, killing Brown. In response to Brown’s killing, many resi-

dents of Ferguson began to protest in the streets.

Using the definitions from Schmid and Jongman, the actions of the Ferguson Police De-

partment in response to these protests also begin to paint the picture of a top-down methodologi-


cal construct. This force exists as one well within our political reality, but one not readily under-

stood. As in the case of Ferguson, MO, terrorism presents itself as a psychological construct em-

bedded in the rhetoric of action, similar to a priori communication as espoused by Natasia and

Rakow (2006) and illustrated through their response to protestors. Using Schmid and Jongman’s

(1988) definitional elements of terrorism, the tale of the police unravels as one inherently en-

twined with the concept of terrorism.

In Ferguson, the police dressed in military garb and focused weapons directly at the pro-

testing citizens. They frequently demanded the citizens disperse, or face the full might of their

military-esque training and weapons taken specifically from warzones (coercion, demands made

on third party). The officers, adorned in kevlar-laden, camouflaged suits, replete with gas masks,

assault weapons, extra ammunition, and vehicles formerly used by the military in the deserts of

Iraq and Afghanistan (as illustrated in pictures 1, 3, and 5), fully intended to leave a distinct psy-

chological impact of the threat of force on the protesters (violence/force, threat, psychological

effects). The officers, illustrated in picture 5, utilize these weapons of war; this action should in-

still a sense of fear in an unarmed protestor. They should terrorize protestors enough by the sight

of a militarized force to comply with demands and cease protesting. If they choose, however, to

ignore this blatant psychological intimidation, the protestor would face the full might of a force

trained in methods—and tools—of war (fear/terror emphasized, intimidation, symbolic aspect).

This display of force arises from an inherently political nature. After Officer Darren Wil-

son slayed Michael Brown, the organization to which he belonged (the Ferguson Police Depart-

ment) faced international embarrassment (publicity aspect, organization as perpetrator). Not only

had Officer Wilson killed an unarmed minority, the force had responded in such radical form as

an entire, cohesive unit (extranormality, method of combat, and organized action). As illustrated


in pictures 2, 4, and 6, those the police were responding to overwhelmingly held noncombatant

status, conducting information seeking actions (civilians/noncombatants, innocence of victims

emphasized). While the police explained that they attempted to differentiate violent actors from

the peaceful protestors, their actions affected everyone at the protest sites—peaceful protestors,

media reporters, politicians alike (McLaughlin and Cabrera, 2014; Voorhees, 2014)—and over

many different days (Voorhees, 2014) (victim/target differentiation, indiscrimination, repetitive-

ness). Their explanation stemmed from actions of the individual police, who harbored biases of

their own before and after coming into the conflict. These biases manifested in malignant ways,

as illustrated in videos 1 and 2. Officers acted wildly: one officer labelled black protestors as

“animals” (The Week, 2014), whereas another indiscriminately waved around and pointed his

rifle at protestors—even telling protestors to “go fuck [themselves]” after requesting the name of

the offending officer (incalculability).

Ultimately, the actions of the Ferguson Police Department fulfilled twenty of the twenty-

two definitional elements as outlined by Schmid and Jongman (1988). Clandestineness/covert in

nature never quite applied to the Ferguson Police—they were quite overt in how they acted, es-

pecially with the inundation of media coverage from traditional news sources (i.e. CNN and Al

Jazeera) as well as social media outlets (i.e. UStream and Twitter). I did not consider criminality

as an element for the purposes of this study. It provides an interesting aspect well debated

amongst scholars and the general public. While many positives exist in favor of the action of Of-

ficer Wilson as one of a criminal, there similarly exists much in detraction of this belief. Because

of the heated debate present, criminality emerges as a controversial topic; because of its contro-

versial nature, I did not consider criminality as an element of analysis as to avoid further politi-

cizing an already heated issue. Further, discussing such an important issue would also divert at-


tention from the initial point of labelling the definitional elements in order to question the epis-

temological and ontological assumptions about the nature of terror as communication.

Epistemological and Ontological Problems

Epistemology focuses on how we know what we know: our understanding of knowledge, from

where it comes, and how we create it. Many factors impact this understanding of knowledge,

such as the society in which we live, the relationships we hold, or the culture in which we live.

This paper illustrates the impetus for an understanding or explanation of the impact society has

on our epistemological constructs. Jacobson (2007) offers us this understanding via social epis-

temology as the “study of social contours of knowledge” (p. 120), or, the study of how society

has outlined or molded our epistemological beliefs.

Society impacts our understanding of the concept of terrorism—and terrorism as commu-

nication—in innumerable ways. Governments (i.e. the federal United States government) and

media outlets (i.e. television, print, and burgeoning social media outlets), comprising two of the

key constituents of a society both in terms of political power and rhetorical, influential signifi-

cance, crucially regulate what we should regard—and, perhaps most importantly what we should

not regard—as worthy of thought. This remarkable power these entities hold over us shapes our

social epistemological understanding: the government or media outlets offer a comprehension of

a particular topic in one way. Thus, because of the significant power these entities hold over the

constituents they represent, society reflects the entities’ way of thought.

A significant conflict of interest arises in this socioepistemological understanding—one

that I sought to uncover in this rhetorical investigation. A government or entity that holds the

power to label an action as “terrorism” or a person as a “terrorist,” also hold the power to refrain

from labelling. Thus, when partaking in an action that regarded as potentially unsavory—one


that perhaps embraces the “definitional elements” of a terroristic action—the government or enti-

ty then utilizes this power for its own benefit by simply not wielding it. As illustrated, the actions

of the Ferguson Police Department—over the numerous days and through the actions of its indi-

vidual members—comprise and utilize nearly all of the definitional elements of terrorism. De-

spite the overwhelming elemental substance to the claim that their actions did, in fact, constitute

terrorism, those who hold the power to label their actions as such simply refused to wield it. This

stark hegemonic response from the entities responsible only serves to limit our socioepistemo-

logical understanding of the constitution of terrorism. Specifically, because these entities only

focus on a ground-up methodology of terrorism—or, that the individual or radical, grassroots

group conducts terror and that states (the geopolitical entities and their subordinate groups) can-

not conduct terror, but merely support it—and report only this understanding to the populace in

general, our epistemological understanding of terrorism inherently limits to this approach.

It, thus, becomes incumbent upon scholars and academicians, as well as policymakers

and media operatives, to understand terrorism via a broader lens—a lens inclusive of the possi-

bility that a government holds the capability to commit terrorist actions. Utilizing this expanded

lens holds broad implications for practical policy implementation, such as militarizing our police

forces. Symbologically, seeing weapons of war used domestically holds a great deal of power

over the citizenry. Using these weapons of war domestically naturally leads to actions similar to

what occurred in Ferguson: the weapons and active duty gear intimidate, incapacitate, or disperse

a crowd deemed too unruly to continue gathering and protesting. Consequently, as we begin to

move forward toward a new, broader socioepistemological understanding of terrorism—and ter-

rorism as communication—we must also begin to implement this understanding in a practical


sense (i.e. in the composition of policy and reports) as to avoid further travesties, such as that in

Ferguson.

The current epistemological mindset—wherein we only focus our attention on ground-up

methods of terrorism and we know this because of the elite, governmental understanding and

definition—utilizes a troubling ontology regarding the nature of government, society, and con-

stituents’ place in both. An assumption of beneficence on the part of governmental organizations

and a congenital lack of self-serving ideology on the part of those who serve within these organi-

zations characterize this epistemological mindset. Further, the mindset requires an assumption

that society, and thus its members and constituents in conjunction, exist wholly as those subju-

gated by governmental assumptions of terrorism. These assumptions carry necessarily problem-

atic consequences for both constituents of a nation and society, as well as a governmental force.

The necessarily problematic consequences manifest themselves in a number of ways.

First, state regulation of thought—through media complicity of government ideology—at a basic

level of defining terrorism should trouble academicians; the concept, in and of itself, restricts in-

tellectual inquiry by offering a finite, fixed definition. Second, at its very core, the notion of an

assumed beneficence, as best illustrated by the lack of reporting or academic focus on conver-

gent terrorism, that allows this assignment to occur becomes undone by the ontological assess-

ment of the self-serving bias. The nature of humans as selfish creatures creates a fatal flaw for

this ontological perspective. Coleman (2011) illustrates the nature of this bias: we tend to accept

responsibility for a favorable outcome, yet repudiate any personal involvement for a deficient

outcome (p. 345). Therefore, when applying self-serving bias theory to governmental actors, we

see the problems associated with this assumption. Specifically, when applied to governmental


rhetoric on the nature of terrorism, the irony of a government capable of creating terrorism, while

simultaneously constructing the meaning and constitution of terrorism becomes readily apparent.

This says nothing, of course, about the preposterousness of our allowing the government

to utilize this power to define terrorism in ways that benefit it and its actors. Because we have

allowed the government to wield this power, we see the most pertinent consequence to the con-

text of state sponsored terrorism: again, the militarization of our police forces. Ferguson stands

out as a particularly egregious example amongst an ever-growing crowd of militarized forces

nationwide. “For decades, the federal government has equipped state and local law enforcement

agencies with military weapons and vehicles, as well as military tactical training” (ACLU, 2014,

p. 16). This power manifests through the explicit use of militarization in local police efforts; be-

cause we, societally, follow the socioepistemological guide provided by actors such as the State

Department in their efforts to define terrorism. As a consequence, governmental forces freely

reign over its constituency through their self-serving ideology.

Militarization affects different socioeconomic groups disproportionately, as well. Milita-

rized police forces more likely affect or terrorize people of color than whites:

The use of paramilitary weapons and tactics primarily impacted people of color; when

paramilitary tactics were used in drug searches, the primary targets were people of color,

whereas when paramilitary tactics were used in hostage or barricade scenarios, the

primary targets were white. Overall, 42 percent of people impacted by a SWAT

deployment to execute a search warrant were Black and 12 percent were Latino” (ACLU,

2014, p. 5).


Militarization, and subsequent and consequential terrorism caused by heavily armed SWAT

raids, tends to negatively impact every community, however. The ACLU (2014) reports on sev-

eral cases of abuse and harm from white, black, and latino communities.

A new ontological and epistemological paradigm provided by understanding terrorism as

a multi-methodological construct can help to undo this preposterousness. Changing our assump-

tions from one of beneficence to skepticism, and of one more inclusive of different methodologi-

cal constructs of terrorism, will allow for a greater diversity of perspectives for the creation of

domestic and international policy. Specifically, assuming governmental actions those deserving

skepticism over beneficence will add at least some form of resistance when implementing pro-

grams, such as militarizing our police forces. Because militarization emerges ultimately a conse-

quence of assumed beneficence on behalf of the government and its subsidiaries and representa-

tives, programs such as these will ultimately face a much greater difficulty before implementa-

tion.

This ontological perspective liberates one’s understanding. Government would no longer

so tightly regulate our collective consciousness, especially in the context of discussing or at-

tempting to understand terrorism. Because our collective conscious understanding of terrorism

becomes a broader, all encompassing definition, the negative effects of already implemented

programs—i.e. militarizing our police forces—would accentuated the extent of their actions to

the fullest. The history of the United States illustrates a strong, visceral reaction to terrorist at-

tacks when conducted by foreign operatives both domestically (i.e., 9/11) and abroad (i.e., an

embassy); perhaps this new paradigm will allow for this strong, visceral reaction to extend be-

yond its current parameters to encompass domestic attacks when conducted by the state itself. As

Chomsky says, “People have a reaction” when they lose a loved one to an [action of the Ameri-


can government]. … They don’t say, ‘Fine, I don’t care if my cousin was murdered’” (Kirell,

2013). Society does care; this perspective will allow us to care—and appropriately express this

care—for many more.

Conclusion

Terrorism, both as rhetoric and action, exists as a multimethodological construct encompassing

both emergent and convergent methodologies. An emergent methodology encompasses a group

or individual causing terror without acting for the state in any official capacity. Concurrently, a

convergent methodology comes from the top, down: a state must readily cause the terror. Ac-

knowledging and adopting this multi-methodological paradigm allows for a more cohesive soci-

oepistemology. Concurrently, as we navigate the effect society has on our epistemological un-

derstanding, we see that it affects our ontological perspective positively.

Thus, we see the events regarding the Ferguson, MO, Police Department as a case study

of convergent terrorism: the police department, acting as official representatives of the state,

readily enacted terrorism to the protesting populace of the town. This paper allows for an

acknowledgement of the limitations inherent to the ontological and epistemological assumptions

made by viewing terrorism as a singular, emergent methodological construct, in conjunction with

acknowledging the benefits of assuming skepticism as healthy and necessary for government ac-

tions. Using the study herein, we liberate, broaden, and add greater complexity to our conceptual

understanding of terrorism. With the increasing militarization of our domestic police forces, this

complication exists both as a necessary critique of the overreach of government, as well as a

consequence of it.


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Appendix I: Images Analyzed

• http://static01.nyt.com/images/2014/08/14/us/MISSOURI/MISSOURI-master1050.jpg • https://assets-news.vice.com/images/articles/meta/2014/08/16/untitled-article-

1408225616.jpg?crop=1xw:0.8421052631578947xh;0xw,0.049707602339181284xh&resize=700:*&output-format=image/jpeg&output-quality=90

• http://static5.businessinsider.com/image/53ed34926da8111065c340e9-2316-1611/military1-ferg.jpg

• http://www.msnbc.com/sites/msnbc/files/styles/ratio--3-2--770x513/public/slideshow-photos/453722354_0.jpg?itok=GLNCT_zU

• http://assets.nydailynews.com/polopoly_fs/1.1908634.1408538277!/img/httpImage/image.jpg_gen/derivatives/gallery_1200/violence-erupts-ferguson-missouri.jpg

• http://lintvkoin.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/ferguson-missouri-police-2-08132014.jpg?w=541

Appendix II: Videos Analyzed

• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3AFia3Uo0TQ • The Week. (2014). White cop calls black protesters “animals” in Ferguson, Missouri.

TheWeek.com, retrieved from: http://theweek.com/speedreads/index/266242/speedreads- white-cop-calls-black-protesters-animals-in-ferguson-missouri, on Oct. 27, 2014.

• CBS News. (2014). Why Ferguson, MO., looked like a war zone this weekend. CBSNews.com, retrieved from: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ferguson-missouri- response-shows-police-use-of-military-equipment/, on Oct. 27, 2014.

Towards an Understanding of Convergent Terrorism

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