1

Necla Acik1

Title: Re-defining the role of women within the Kurdish national movement in

Turkey in the 1990s

1. Introduction

This chapter reflects critically on the roles of women reproduced within the Kurdish

national movement in Turkey2 in the 1990s and unravels the contradictions between

claims of emancipation and its underlying gendered discourses in the context of a

nation building process. It will particularly focus on discourses of women as political

activists, as peace mothers, as the icons of the nation and as transmitters of Kurdish

culture and language. These were the dominant discourses that were prevalent in the

1990s in Turkey, when the Kurdish national movement extended its appeal to a large

number of Kurds. The 1990s were also of particular significance because the

participation of women on a larger scale generated intense discussions and debates

about the role of Kurdish women within the national liberation movement. The

discussions were widely reflected in the political publications of various Kurdish

groups and organisations, particularly in Kurdish women’s magazines and other

booklets on the issue of gender that were published in this period. This chapter starts

with an analysis of the discourses of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) as it was

and has since been the main Kurdish political actor in the period and has managed to

mobilise a significant number of women. The discussions provided in the publications

of the Kurdish feminist women will also be analysed. Within the Kurdish political

spectrum the PKK and the Kurdish feminist groups represent ideologically opposing

positions. Yet both groups position themselves as Kurdish actors within the Kurdish

national movement and engage in debates on how these roles for women should be

played out within the movement. Despite the political changes that have occurred

since the 1990s, these discourses still explain a great deal about the role of women in

the Kurdish national movement and continue to be of relevance today.

1 To cite this article: Acik, N., (2013) “Re-defining the role of women within the Kurdish national movement in Turkey in the 1990s”, in Zeydanlioglu, W. and Gunes, C. (eds.). The Kurdish Question in Turkey: New Perspectives on Conflict, Representation and Reconciliation. Routledge Publishers. 2 The term ‘Kurdish national movement’ as used here refers to the processes and aspirations of various parties, organisations, groups and individuals that address the Kurdish question. This can range from armed struggle to a mere articulation of Kurdish identity.

2

Although Kurdish women have a long history of involvement in the national

liberation movement, their participation after the military coup of 1980 and the

oppressive regime that followed it has made them more visible and central (Çağlayan

2007). In this period, women become active as victims, mothers, sisters or wives of

the thousands of mostly male activist who endured horrific tortures, injustice, and bad

treatment in prisons (McDowall 1996, Zeydanlıoğlu 2009). Being generally

considered by the male-dominated society as non-political objects, women were the

only section of the society at the time who were able to be active during the military

occupation, where for example many women courageously demanded to be informed

about the whereabouts of their male relatives. The PKK launched its armed struggle in

1984 and throughout the 1980s and 1990s heavily recruited women as guerrilla

fighters. Within a decade of the start of the armed campaign, the Kurdish national

movement reached its peak with the Serhildans (Kurdish: uprising) that took place

during the period between 1990 and 1993. In these mass uprisings women became

even more visible in the public sphere, in particular as political activists. It was during

this period that women’s branches within established Kurdish organisations were

expanded or were formed if they did not have any yet. More importantly, for the first

time it led to the emergence of independent Kurdish women’s groups and

organisations in Turkey as well as in Europe, such as the Independent Women’s

Forums.3 These often loosely connected groups embarked on a feminist agenda,

criticising the instrumentalisation of women within the male-dominated Kurdish

organisations for the purpose of the national cause and petitioned for an independent

Kurdish women’s movement (Açık 2003). Thus, the 1990s witnessed the mass

mobilisation of Kurdish women as well as the emergence of independent feminist

initiatives. This was accompanied by deep political debates between the various

Kurdish groups as well as between Kurdish and Turkish women activists on the role

of women in society and in particular women as political subjects. These debates

found their way into journals and other publications and offer a rich resource to

explore the gendered discourses of the Kurdish nation building process and the

challenges that it faced.

3 Various women’s groups and journals have their origins in these forums. These include the National-Democratic Women’s Association (Ulusal Demokratik Kadın Derneği/UDKD), the Foundation for the Solidarity of Kurdish Women and Investigation of Women’s Issues (Kürt Kadın Dayanışma ve Kadın Sorunları Araştırma Vakfı/K.Ka.DaV), the women’s group ARJİN, the House for Women’s Culture Jiyan (JİYAN Kadın Kültürevi), and the journals Roza and Jûjin.

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This study is based in particular on the discourse analysis of three journals; Yaşamda

Őzgür Kadın (YÖK), Roza and Jûjin. They represent the only regular journals

published by Kurdish women in Turkey in the 1990s and take up different ideological

and political positions within the Kurdish national movement.4 The journals had

ceased to exist by the end of the 1990s. YÖK, for example, was banned by the Turkish

constitutional court in 2000. The other journals were not able to finance themselves

partly due to the persecution of their editors, some of which had to leave Turkey.

Moreover, the equipment and archives of these journals were often confiscated by the

authorities and fines were imposed on them, which eventually meant that the financial

and psychological pressures were too high to maintain these journals. Given that these

journals often operated between a thin line of legality and illegality, I was not able to

get hold of all the issues. While I was able to obtain almost all the editions of Jûjin

and Roza, from a total of 26 issues of YÖK I only had access to 11 issues.

YÖK was a monthly journal published between 1998 and 2000 in Istanbul and it

targeted women sympathising with the PKK and its armed struggle (5 Roza was the

first Kurdish feminist women’s journal published between 1996 and 2000 in Istanbul.

Following internal disagreements a group of women split away from Roza after its

fourth edition to found Jûjin, which was published between 1998 and 2000.6 The

editorial team of Roza envisioned themselves as a group of Kurdish women who

despite representing diverse views on women’s liberation and politics perceive their

common aim in speaking out as both Kurds and feminists. This political position was

new and important to Roza and Jûjin members, as they felt excluded as Kurds among

Turkish feminists, with whom they shared a common feminist agenda, and as

feminists among Kurdish groups, whom they criticised for lacking a feminist

4 Jin û Jiyan is another important journal of the period that was included in the analysis, however it has been excluded from this chapter as it does not provide a different perspective on the gender and nationalism debates in addition to the discourses already identified in YÖK, Roza and Jujin. Ideologically, Jin û Jiyan can be placed somewhere between the feminist journals and YÖK. They argue in favour of a separate women’s organisation, yet, as opposed to the feminists and similar to YÖK, they seek to do this in co-operation with their male associates. See Polat, Yeter. “Kadınlar İnisyatifsiz mi?“ Jin û Jiyan, Istanbul, no. 1(1999): 14-16. For a more detailed analysis of Jin û Jiyan see Necla Açık, “Nationaler Kampf, Frauenmythos und Frauenmobilisierung: Eine Analyse zeitgenössischer kurdischer Fraunezeitschriften aus der Türkei,” in Gender in Kurdistan und der Türkei, eds. Siamend Hajo, Carsten Borck, Eva Savelsberg and Şukriye Doğan. (Münster: Unrast-Verlag, 2004), 149-182. 5 Cf. “Yaşamda Őzgür Kadın’dan” Yaşamda Őzgür Kadın, no 2 (1998): 1. 6 Cf. “Sunuş,” Jujin, no.1(1996):1. Roza also expresses an opinion on the reasons for the fragmentation. See in addition Fatma Kayhan, “ROZA-JUJIN Ayrılığını Yazmak,” Roza, no.14 (1998): 43-46.

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perspective.7 Both, Roza and Jûjin have therefore been very outspoken about their

feminist positions arguing for a separate mobilisation of Kurdish women and

opposing in principle collaboration with men. Although YÖK also argues for a women

only organisation of Kurdish women, they emphasise the cooperation with men and

their common Kurdish national struggle. Moreover, while the feminists focus on the

politicisation of private issues effecting women’s life, YÖK focused primarily on

mobilising women for the national struggle and addresses issues resulting from this,

such as suicide bombings, self-immolations, the role of patriotic mothers and peace

mothers. Their focus is more on how Kurdish women can contribute to the national

struggle, while the feminist are primarily concerned with challenging sexist and racist

practices. Both of the feminist journals Roza and Jujin constituted politically a

marginal phenomenon in comparison to YÖK. Their female activists were loosely

organised, with only a sparse organisational network at their disposal, maintained

predominantly through personal contacts. For example, while the YÖK relied on party

resources and networks to finance and distribute their publications, the feminist

publications were able to fund themselves through short-term and one-off funds from

diverse European organisations, mainly women’s organisations and relied on loose

network of women to disseminate their publications. Yet, these feminist journals were

widely known within the Kurdish national movement, as their editors were also

engaged in political protest often occupying the same political platform in Turkey as

other Kurdish activists.

Discourse analysis methodology has been applied to identify the dominant discourses

on gender and nation in the major Kurdish women’s journals. Numerous articles

published in these journals were analysed for analogies on gender and nation and then

classified according to the different roles that women have historically played in

nation building processes, which is conceptualised more thoroughly in Yuval Davis

(1997). The advantage of discourse analysis is that it looks beyond the actual speech

or written text and attempts to identify its underlying ideology (van Dijk 1985).

Although the journals and other publications on Kurdish women examined here had

relatively small circulation, the discussions were not limited to these publications but

reflected the dominant discourses within the Kurdish national movement in general.

Thus, analysing the journals for the way Kurdishness and womanhood have been

7 Cf. “Çıkış”, Roza, no.1(1996) 1: 4-5.

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constructed helps to explain the practices of the Kurdish national movement and the

ideological justifications it deployed and continues to deploy for mobilising women as

well as the inherent contradictions contained in these dynamic processes.

As with other national liberation struggles, the Kurdish national movement relies

heavily on the mobilisation and support of all sections of the society, particularly the

women. The ideological justification for making women the forerunner of this

movement is often mastered by connecting national issues with the women’s issue

and promising the liberation of ‘the land’8 as well as that of ‘the woman’. The

ideology of the main actor within the Kurdish national movement, the PKK, has also

drawn on this analogy, which is typical for nation building processes (Aull-Davies

1996, Sharoni 1995). Kurdish national myths are reinvented to construct a reality that

makes the liberation of Kurdistan depended on the participation and transformation of

Kurdish women. This leads to a re-definition of the role of Kurdish women in the

society and has been perceived by many women as empowering and liberating,

particularly as it broke with traditional gender expectations (Temelkuran 1997).

However, as will be argued here, the fusion of the liberation of the Kurds and the

Kurdish women and the discursive necessity for both to be engaged in this struggle

has also legitimated and perhaps even paved the way for radical actions such as self-

immolations and female suicide bombings. But, women were also mobilised in less

militarised ways. The role of mothers as peace initiators is fundamentally different

from the role of women as fighters. Yet, this chapter will argue that the underlying

ideological justifications were ultimately the same. Women were defined as the bearer

of the nation and therefore responsible for its liberation as well as for initiating peace.

Moreover, women are often regarded as carriers of the national culture and identity,

which leads to the adaptation of an essentialist view of Kurdish women.9 This was not

only reproduced through discussions of ‘patriotic mothers’, as it is common to the

PKK and its affiliated publication the YÖK, but also through Kurdish feminists

practices of identity politics.

8 I use scare quotes here to indicate that these terminologies are employed widely by different actors of the Kurdish national movement and at the same time to point out the problematic nature of these terms. 9 By essentialist view I mean the attribution of fixed identities to women, which does not recognise the diversity of women’s interests and positions. This can be a source of conflict if women position themselves outside these ideologized gender roles and can lead to problems of recognition as equal contestants in a shared political space.

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Without doubt, women have taken a central role in the Kurdish national movement

and the levels of activism observed in the 1990s among Kurdish women bears witness

to this. However, I will argue that the involvement of women is underlined by an

essentialist and static understanding of Kurdish culture and gender roles. This often

reinforces traditional perception of the role of Kurdish women and casts doubt upon

the emancipative nature of women’s involvement in the Kurdish national struggle.

This critique does not mean that the Kurdish national movement did not bring about

any emancipative changes to the way gender roles have been perceived and

experienced. There are many studies demonstrating that it has indeed created more

spaces and opportunities for women to claim their rights and fight gender inequalities

in families, political organisations and the wider society. Yet, it is also important to

look at the underlying mechanism in order to be able to identify how far reaching

these changes go and to which extent they really transform traditional gender roles

prevalent in Kurdish society or just reproduce them in a new setting with a different

outlook.

This chapter is organised in two main sections. The first section focuses on discourses

particular to the PKK and YÖK. The second section focuses therefore on women as

transmitters and signifiers of the national culture and identity. It includes discourses

on patriotic mothers, on women as peace initiators and victims of war, on the effects

of assimilation and migration and sexual violence on the Kurdish identity. While the

second section focuses on the role of women within the nation building process in

general, it is not possible to differentiate neatly between YÖK and feminist discourses.

Although the narration of patriotic mothers and peace mothers is peculiar to YÖK, all

Kurdish women’s journals discuss the role of Kurdish women within the nation

building project, and express their views on how they perceive the role of women

within it.

2 Re-inventing women as freedom fighters

The first part of this section will outline the creation and the use of the myth of the

golden age of a liberated Kurdish nation. It will explore the gender dimension by

looking at its depiction of the women’s role in the loss of Kurdish freedom and power

in the past and how it can be re-regained through ‘revolutionary transformation’ and

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‘determination’ of contemporary Kurdish women activists, which receives ample

attention in YÖK. The re-invention of these myths served as catalysts for change and

placed women at the centre of the Kurdish national liberation. Following on in part

two, I will focus on the representation of the radical actions taken by female activists,

such as suicide bombings and self-immolations, and show their instrumentalisation in

cultivating the myth of free Kurdish woman and its links to the myth of the golden

age of the Kurdish nation.

2.1 The golden age: a symbiosis of gender and nation

The creation of a golden age or a Kurdish historiography is typical to nation building

processes and constitutes perhaps the fundaments of any nation-building project.

Kurds claim Mesopotamia to be their homeland for many centuries, which often

symbolises the golden era of the past. It is regarded as the birthplace of the ‘first

civilisation’, and is the temporal and spatial location onto which an ideal world is

projected (Hirschler 2001). While Kurdish political organisations are in tune about the

origins of the Kurds, there are different accounts on how they have lost their ‘natural

rights’ as a sovereign nation and more importantly how these rights can best be

regained. The PKK, which has been the largest and most dominant Kurdish

organisation in modern Turkey, has played a particularly important role in the

creation of a Kurdish historiography. It has reinvented the golden age in the late

1980s and early 1990s to give women a central role in the struggle for Kurdish

independence. These discourses are reflected in YÖK, yet they can be found more

openly in other legal and clandestine PKK publications that have been published

outside Turkey, such as The YAJK10 Report of the Second Middle-Eastern Conference

(Parti Merkez Okulu Yayınları 1998: 11-12). This PKK in-house publication was a

report that documented the main discussions of the PKK’s women’s conference in

1998 which was held among PKK members. The congress laid down the framework

of integrating gender issues into the national struggle and has therefore been an

important policy document for other affiliated organisations. Thus, as will be shown

10 YAJK (Yekîtîya Azadîya Jinên Kurdistan / The Unity of the Liberation of Kurdish Women) is the PKK’s women’s organisation.

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in this section, the debates identified in this report are also reflected in the legal

Kurdish women’s journal YÖK and other important PKK publications, such as

Serxwebun and Berxwedan, and this still continues in online PKK publications

today.11

In the historiography narrated by these PKK-affiliated publications, Kurdish

oppression was and continues to be considered to be analogous to the oppression of

women. Ancient Mesopotamia, the golden era of the Kurdish nation, is narrated as a

matriarchal society governed by fairness, attachment to the land and the equality of

both men and women. Due to their ability to give birth and close association with

nature and the earth, women in matriarchal Mesopotamia were believed to be in

possession of the secret of life itself. This guaranteed them decision-making roles in

the organisation of social life, which they exercised in favour of both sexes without

any domination or exploitation.12 However, according to this narrative, this ideal

situation came to an end despite fierce resistance by these women who eventually lost

their power. The matriarchal society was replaced by a patriarchal and oppressive

system. In the PKK narrative, this also marks the period of the end of Kurdish

liberation and the beginning of Kurdish oppression. The Kurds are said to have lost

their identity in the same way that the women of yore were robbed of their self-

determination as described in the following quote by YÖK: ‘Our country lost its self-

assurance, just as it happened to the women.’ (Parti Merkez Okulu Yayınları 1998:

11-12).

According to this narrative, Kurdish society is defined in its most natural state as a

free and non-patriarchal social order and as a result, the oppression of Kurds is

perceived as ‘un-natural’ and the current patriarchal society defined as ‘un-Kurdish’.

Equating women with nature, as portrayed in an ideal matriarchal society, is therefore

a strongly essentialist approach. Moreover, its connection to the Kurdish homeland

makes the women issue inseparable from the Kurdish national liberation. While this

might also be identified in other nation building processes (Aull-Davies and Abdo

1991), the uniqueness of the PKK discourse lies in how this equilibrium is used to

justify women’s radical actions and to mobilise women for the national struggle. The

11 Serxwebun, Ekim Şehitleri Tanrıça Kültürünün Çağdaş Mimarı Oldular. http://www.pkkonline.com/tr/index.php?sys=article&artID=586 (accessed June 8, 2011). 12 See Parti Merkez Okulu Yayınları, 11-12.

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YAJK report equates the societal disempowerment of the women with the subjugation

of the Kurds and ascribes passive characteristics to both of these. As a consequence,

due to their ‘broken will’ and ‘loss of belief’,13 neither women nor the nation put up a

fight. The continuous association of the situation of women with that of the Kurdish

nation develops in this construction into a common perspective of liberation. With

reference to this ideologically constructed projection of the past, contemporary

debates with the PKK narrate women and Kurds having been ‘humiliated’ and

‘enslaved for centuries’.14 Thus, the solution is prophesied though the combination of

both the gender and the national issue and the fierce struggle against the enemy. .

The quote below describes the beginning of the resistance or ‘awakening’ of Kurdish

women and the Kurdish nation by putting the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, at

the centre of this historical turning point:

Exactly as yesterday’s Mesopotamia, locked in a deep sleep and robbed of

everything and with humanity vanquished, our leader [Abdullah Öcalan] gave

life to Mesopotamia once again as he awoke the people. He started this

awakening with the most important link of the chain, the woman, since she is

the first to produce and create. That is why her awakening, or the splitting

asunder of the thick concrete on top of her, signifies the dawn of a new era.

The awakening of the woman in Mesopotamia means the people’s awakening

and taking control.15

In YÖK and in the YAJK report women are perceived as the key to liberation; their

fate intimately connected to that of the country and the nation. The liberation of

Mesopotamia, and indeed Kurdistan, is construed as being dependent on the

‘awakening’ and resistance of both. The subordinate role of women is associated with

national oppression and this statement of Kurdish nationalism coincides with a

demand to ‘re-instate’ gender equality. The ‘liberation’16 of women thereby gains a

greater significance for the Kurdish national movement. However, this also means

that a heavy burden is placed on women. Not only must they fight for their own 13 See Parti Merkez Okulu Yayınları, 56. Belief is used here not in the religious sense but in the sense of having an ideology and belief in liberation and equality. 14 See Parti Merkez Okulu Yayınları, 15. 15 Parti Merkez Okulu Yayınları, 12. Author’s translation from Turkish. 16 Liberation can have various meanings ranging from personal emancipation to the political independence of a Kurdish state.

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emancipation, but also for that of their people. They can emancipate themselves only

inasmuch as the liberation of the nation benefits from their emancipation. Their

interests are defined and gain importance only through the interests of the nation. This

harbours the potential problem that gender specific concerns are only addressed if

they are seen as decisive to the national movement. This is most evident in the

common usage of terms such as ‘issues specific to women’ and in the ‘interest of the

nation’.

2.2 Becoming Goddesses: Female Self-immolations and Suicide Bombings

The end of the 1990s witnessed an increase in the extreme practice of self-

immolations and suicide bombings by Kurdish activists as a form of protest.17 The

first suicide attack carried out by Zilan (Zeynep Kınacı)18 and other female self-

immolations such as those carried out by Zekiye Alkan and Rahşan Demirel19

received the most widespread coverage in YÖK and other PKK publications.20 These

actions were important in radicalising and mobilising Kurdish women and men.

Whilst suicide bombings and self-immolations are two very different forms of

activities, they have also commonalities. From the perspective of both the

protagonists and the PKK, both types of action achieve the goal of sacrificing one’s

own life for the ‘national cause’ and out of ideological conviction. They therefore

have the same political aim of protesting and raising awareness both among Kurds as

well as the international community and of mobilising Kurdish men and women to

17 Only a minority of these activists were women, yet it was the women’s activities that received greater coverage. For example, only 3 were women of the 30 Kurds who immolated themselves as a form of protest both in Turkey and in the Diaspora in November 1998. Through their actions they wanted to contribute to the granting of asylum to Abdullah Öcalan in Rome (See “Haberler”, Yaşamda Özgür Kadın, no.11 (1998): 26 and “Haberler”, Yaşamda Özgür Kadın, no.12 (1998): 22-23. 18 Zilan, a young PKK guerrilla-commandant, carried out the first act of suicide bombing in Turkey on the 30th June 1997. Dressed as a civilian she passed through to military barracks in Dersim and blew herself up by detonating a bomb she had attached to her body. Four soldiers and four corporals were killed. Zilan had written in her suicide note that she had decided to become a “suicide guerrilla” in order to give voice to the Kurdish people’s struggle for freedom, particularly that of Kurdish women. See “Zilan’ın Mektubundan,“ Yaşamda Özgür Kadın, no.6 (1998): 37. 19 Pelşin Tolhıldan, “Bir Gün Gelecek Bir Kürt Kızı Kalenin Güzelliğiyle Birleşti Diyecekler”. http://www.pajk-online.com/tr/ozgurluk_sehitleri/rahsan_pelsin_tolhildan.html (accessed 20 October 2011) 20 Although the numbers of suicide bombings by PKK militants have significantly decreased since the 1990s, they still occur, with the most recent attack taking place in October 2011.

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contribute to the struggle. Within the PKK, they are subject to the same discourses of

mythologisation.

In YÖK and in YAJK, the suicide bombings of young female guerrillas are represented

as resembling the struggle goddesses apparently gave in order to defend the golden

age of matriarchal Mesopotamia. According to this narrative, their struggle was in

vain, as patriarchy emerged in the end. In the contemporary era, the female suicide

bombers sacrificed themselves for the Kurdish liberation, which is analogous to the

sacrifices of the goddesses in Ancient Mesopotamia. Zilan is to this day celebrated as

the first of these goddesses. Through her suicide act in a military compound she

sacrificed her life for a just and free society in the same manner the goddesses did in

the golden age of Mesopotamia. She has therefore been given the status of a ‘goddess

of freedom’:

[…] And to be Zilan means to become a goddess to all women; to bring about

an explosion in their material lives and thereby leave their own traces behind

them in this epoch, and consequently to ascend into heaven.21

‘Explosion’ can have two meanings here. On the one hand, it can be understood

symbolically, as meaning a societal breakthrough, while on the other hand it can be

taken more literally, namely to blow oneself up in order to destroy ‘the enemy’. In the

quotation cited above, death is mythologised: the female combatants have a holy

assignment and will become martyrs if they fulfil it. The women who sacrifice

themselves are considered to be immortal, like the goddesses of ancient Mesopotamia.

The goddesses symbolise a just and equal society.22 Female ‘freedom fighters’ such as

Zilan are compared to these imagined courageous goddesses of the golden age and

serve as role models for the women of today.

The phenomenon of suicide bombings and self-immolations among women however

underlines another important discourse within the PKK. Again, with reference to the

past, the PKK narrates a homogeneous a-historical position for women in the society

as that of a subordinated subject. In this narrative it is argued that women are

considered to be the ‘weakest link in society’ as they have been subject to

21 Parti Merkez Okulu Yayınları, 13. Author’s translation from Turkish, emphasis in original. 22 Parti Merkez Okulu Yayınları, 10.

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subordination for centuries.23 As a result, they are thought to lack self-respect and

more importantly, they are perceived as being easy to manipulate by Kurdish men as

well as by the ‘enemy’.24 This is a very crucial point as women who are PKK

members are automatically a main target of the Turkish state and its security

intelligence, as any other member of clandestine organisation carrying out an armed

struggle would be. Nevertheless, as party members, and being defined as the ‘weakest

link’ in the society by the PKK, women are perceived to represent a dangerous

potential for the party, as they are thought not to have ‘freed themselves from the

possibility of being the basis for treachery and dissolution.’25 The discourses of YÖK

and the PKK about the historical and contemporary development of women in

Kurdish society sketched above fulfil the function of rectifying the weak points of the

struggle through its attestation of women’s strength. These weaknesses can, according

to the prevalent PKK view, be overcome through ‘courageous deeds’ and ‘drastic

measures’, such as those practiced by the suicide bomber Zilan. However, this

contributes to an atmosphere that raises the expectations among PKK activists to

prove that as women they are no longer weak, and that they have divested themselves

of their ‘slave mentality’, a terminology commonly used in these publications.

Moreover, through radical forms of actions such as suicide bombings and self-

immolations, they attempt to demonstrate their ‘strength’ and prove that they have a

‘strong will’ at their disposal. This is regarded as necessary in order to change their

‘pitiful’ situation and bring about revolutionary change.26 As a result, women have to

take on a mighty struggle in order to defend themselves against these charges and

against their ‘pitiful’ situation.27 This, however, would be no mean feat: even if it

23 Parti Merkez Okulu Yayınları, 47, 51-53. See also “Kadını Düşünceye Çekmek,“ Yaşamda Özgür Kadın, Istanbul, no.10 (1998): 14-19. 24 Parti Merkez Okulu Yayınları, 53. 25 Parti Merkez Okulu Yayınları, 56. 26 Within the PKK, it is expected from women as well as men that they should develop a ‘militant’ and ‘revolutionary’ personality under the leadership of the party. However, along with women’s increased participation in the armed conflict the focus has shifted to the activities of women. In the early years of the PKK and the beginning of the armed struggle, men were often represented in official part discourse in a similar vein as ‘enslaved’ Kurds who were ‘alienated’ from themselves. Similar ‘revolutionary’ actions and determination was expected from them to prove that they were capable of and willing to overcome this situation. 27 Parti Merkez Okulu Yayınları, 48.

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appears that women have accomplished a ‘revolutionary transformation’, for all

intents and purposes they are still thought of having retained their ‘slave mentality’.28

As it can be seen, self-immolations and suicide bombings were and continue to be

highly mythologised forms of activism. They were defined as ‘extremely

revolutionary’ activities, consistent with the image of the ideal ‘militant personality’.

They confirm both the protagonist’s commitment to the liberationist ideology of their

party and the steadfastness of their will. In addition, these forms of activism

demonstrate the ‘revolutionary’ turn which the women undertook, functioning as role

models for Kurdish women. The activists underwent an evolution: from being ‘pitiful’

entities ‘lacking in moral fibre’ and ‘tolerating everything’ to becoming ‘self-

confident’, ‘resolved’ and ‘courageous personalities’ and thereby the vanguards of

liberation. They blaze with the light of those ‘goddesses of freedom’ who sacrificed

themselves for humanity and are therefore immortal symbols of the liberation of

humankind.

There is clearly a contradiction here: on the one hand, women symbolise justice,

freedom and the determination to sacrifice themselves for these ideals. On the other

hand, they are ascribed a ‘slave mentality’ which means that they have no will of their

own and are likely to bow to anyone else’s will. This characteristic makes them

susceptible to all kinds of negative influences and treachery. This in turn means that

special attention is paid to their ‘revolutionary’ transformation. Women are under

particular pressure to prove that they are stronger than the men in the Kurdish

movement in order to liberate themselves from the passivity attributed to them. The

golden era was accredited to them and its end (the defeat) meant their demise more

than anyone else’s. Now they have the chance to redeem themselves by taking part in

the national struggle. Their participation is essentially obligatory, because of their

responsibility for carrying ‘the burden of humanity’: the transformation of the

conditions of society is portrayed as being dependent on their effective participation

in the struggle and their unwavering conviction. In short, they are the key to the

liberation of the Kurdish nation.

There is no evidence as to indicate that women are ordered to carry out these activities

by the party. However, these discourses emerged parallel to female self-immolations

28 Parti Merkez Okulu Yayınları, 47.

14

and suicide bombings. This demonstrates the power discourses and mythologies can

have on activists and their practices. Yet, the period in which these activities became

prominent has also been the period with the highest human rights violations in

Turkey, which ranged from the systematic evacuation of Kurdish villages to torture

and the extrajudicial killings of thousands of politicians, activists, journalists and

intellectuals. Thus, while these discourses might have played a role in explaining

female suicide bombings and self-immolations among Kurdish women activists, the

repressive political system in Turkey primarily targeting Kurdish dissidents played an

important part in this.

The discourses of goddesses relates stronger to women, in particular young activists

who joined the armed struggle. However, the success of the PKK lay in being able to

mobilise a wider spectrum of the society including students, workers, business

owners, religious leaders, land owners as well as farmers. It also managed to politicise

traditional Kurdish women by integrating them into the movement as mothers

demanding peace and as political actors in general taking part at demonstrations etc.

Thus, the attempt by the PKK to connect gender and national issues are not only to be

seen as purely an attempt to instrumentalise women for the national struggle. This

would be a narrow interpretation that does not pay tribute to the fact that many

women have joined the PKK on their own will and that the PKK’s success among

different sections of the Kurdish society lay in its ability to present a vision of a

Kurdish society that overcomes cleavages and breaks with traditional gender roles.

The PKK’s attempt to address and mobilise Kurdish women reflects a much wider

aim of the party, namely the creation of a ‘new revolutionary’ image of Kurdish

women in particular and the Kurdish society in general.

3 Women as Transmitters and Signifiers of National Culture

This section focuses both on the YÖK and the feminist discourses. Although the

journals take different positions on the roles of women in the nation building process,

their underlying arguments are similar. The issues discussed by these journals relate

to the effects of the assimilation policies of the Turkish state on Kurds and Kurdish

women in particular and how to maintain and strengthen the Kurdish identity. As I

15

will show in this section, these discourses are based on identity politics and leads

inevitably to the reproduction and construction of ideal types of Kurdish women and

the creation of a homogenous culture common to national building processes.

Claiming a common cultural identity can be empowering for members of such

communities particularly if they claims rights as a collective of which they have been

deprived. However, this also bears the danger of favouring certain cultural practices

over others and often silencing Kurdish women with different experiences and

dissident views.

3.1 Patriotic Mothers

In YÖK women as carriers are called upon to disseminate Kurdish culture and national

identity within their families and to convey national consciousness to their children. It

argues that because of the amount of time mothers spend with their children, it is

above all mothers who teach Kurdish children ‘values and morals’ prevalent in the

society. As the following quote in YÖK on The Role of Mothers in Bringing up

Children demonstrates, the responsibility of mothers is to convey ‘patriotic values’

and ‘national consciousness’ to their children:

It already becomes evident how massive a development has occurred when,

yesterday a mother would have tried to protect her child and bring it up

according to her own value system, today she actually encourages her child to

go into battle. […] Currently, she has come to an awareness of how the future

is made. […] The lullabies our mothers sing and the stories they tell are about

martyrs, revolution and resistance. Their moral guidelines and sense of

decency are no longer those of the family or those of the clan, but those of a

free society.29

YÖK argues that ‘patriotic mothers’ must re-orientate themselves towards the national

struggle in order to comply with the new demands of being ‘good’ or ‘patriotic’

mothers. The future of the nation is dependent on them having perceived this as their

role. Mothers are called upon to bring up and educate their children along with the

29 “Çocuk Eğitiminde Annenin Rolü Üzerine”, Yaşamda Özgür Kadın, no.2 (1998): 26. Author’s translation from Turkish.

16

values and needs of the Kurdish national movement. They are required to abandon

their maternal anxieties about their children’s lives and to teach them to ‘sacrifice’

themselves for the national cause. The ‘unpatriotic mothers’ represent the negative

counterpart of the ‘patriotic mothers’. Such individuals bring up their children far

removed from ideas of patriotism and national devotion and keep them at a distance

from the struggle, thereby making themselves into an ‘actual enforcer of the policies

of the dirty war’ against Kurds. Mothers whose behaviour does not comply with the

idealised roles of the ‘patriotic mother’ are therefore perceived as betrayers of the

national cause.30

These writings call upon women to perform the role of cultural transmitters. In ethnic

and national communities mothers are in general regarded as the bearers of the nation

and transmitters of culture. Culture here is to be understood as a process and product

of social interactions.31 Accordingly, cultural homogeneity is not to be thought of as a

given, but rather as the net result of repeated attempts at homogenisation. Often, the

question of which cultural concepts and practices come to be regarded as the norm,

and which remain outside the boundaries of culturally accepted behaviour, is a

question of power.32 In nation building processes and as shown here, culture is often

used in a static form and women are given a central role in the upbringing of children

and conveying the community’s culture to their children through the use of the mother

tongue. Through this and other practices, women become the active participants in the

production and reproduction of the national community.33

The traditional Kurdish women, whose first language is still Kurdish, are therefore

particularly regarded as the most suitable in transmitting an unspoiled Kurdish culture

and language to the younger generations of Kurds. As well as passing on the customs

and traditions of their forefathers, women also convey to their children the new

cultural elements which have gained significance through the national movement: the

honouring of the national leader and the martyrs as well as celebrated national

30 “Çocuk Eğitiminde Annenin Rolü Üzerine,” Yaşamda Özgür Kadın, no.2 (1998): 26. 31 Stuart Hall, “Cultural Identity and Diaspora,” in Identity and Difference, ed. Kathryn Woodward. (London: Sage, 1997), 51-58. 32 Yuval-Davis, 1997. 33 See also Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias, eds. Woman-Nation-State (London: Macmillan, 1998) and Deniz Kandiyoti, “Identity and its Discontents: Women and the Nation,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, no. 20/3 (1991): 429-443.

17

personalities, the celebration of national festivals, the recitation of stories about

national heroes etc. In order to be able to fulfil the role of cultural transmitters,

Kurdish women and particularly mothers are required to be involved in the national

movement and possess a national consciousness. In their role as bearers of culture,

language and identity, women are therefore obliged to do more than merely

disseminating the traditions and customs that have been passed down to them. They

transmit the national consciousness that has been redefined with renewed cultural

elements and national values. In this respect, women not only perform the role of the

passive conveyor, as Yuval-Davis and Kandiyoti argue, but also take up the active

role of producers of culture.34 YÖK makes clear that if mothers do not inculcate their

children with the values and norms of the national community, they can endanger the

national movement. This is most evident in the portraying of the ‘patriotic’ women

who are highly celebrated in PKK publications and the ‘non-patriotic’ mothers who

are perceived as traitors.

3.2 Assimilation and Migration

As a consequence of the civil war between the PKK and the Turkish state in the pre-

dominantly Kurdish areas, there was a mass emigration of Kurds to western part of

Turkey as well as to Europe by the end of the 1980s and the 1990s. This was

perceived by many Kurds as a serious threat to the Kurdish national identity

formation. These mass emigrations were seen by the Kurdish women’s journals as a

deliberate attempt by the Turkish government to disperse the Kurds and slowly

assimilate them into the dominant Turkish culture. As a result, attempts by the

government to provide literacy courses in Turkish and health education programmes

including birth control measures were countered with hostility by these journals.35

YÖK took an active stance in addressing Kurdish women to resists these assimilation

policies and praised women who, despite having emigrated away from their homeland

34 Yuval-Davis 1997, Kandiyoti, 1991. . 35 For example, the establishment of the Multi-Purpose Community Centres (Çok Amaçlı Toplum Merkezleri, ÇATOM) in 1995 in the pre-dominantly Kurdish areas led to a great debate between Turkish feminists in the monthly journal Pazartesi and the Kurdish journals about their intended aim. See Ayşe Düzkan, “Devletin Eli Uzanıyor Mu, Kalkıyor Mu?,” Pazartesi, no.37 (1998):2-5, Ayşe Gül Karayazgan, ”Biz Kadınlar’ Diyememek Bir Türlü...,” Pazartesi, no. 38(1998): 8-10, “Soğutma İşlemi’ ya da Asimilasyon,” Yaşamda Özgür Kadın, no.6 (1998): 2-4 and Fatma Kayhan, “Kürt Kadınlarına Batırılan Dikenler,” Roza, no.13 (1998): 4-5.

18

and having been subject to ‘compulsory assimilation’, rebelled against ‘self-

alienation’36 and preserved their links to tradition and their ‘true’ culture. While these

women were exalted as exemplary mothers, women who integrated into the dominant

Turkish culture were exposed to sharp criticism.37

The real reason for a woman’s endeavour to be accepted in her surroundings

lies in her fear of being dismissed and excluded. […] [This] constitutes an

important aspect of her life and is a fundamental reason for the negation of her

identity. This fear increasingly leads to changes in a woman’s outward

appearance. Through wearing the clothes, speaking the language and taking up

the traditions of another culture, she adopts an attitude contradictory to her

nature. She becomes virtually unrecognisable and it is possible for her to

regard this change as perfectly normal, because she does not know what it

means to be alienated from her real self. To her, these alterations are

unavoidable. But we know that this is the worst thing that can happen to a

woman.38

Here, migration out of Kurdistan is presented as a danger and as a cause of alienation

from the self. The struggle for recognition in Turkish society is perceived as leading

to the denial of Kurdish migrants’ cultural identity. Women are furthermore urged not

to lay the blame for marital problems on their husbands, but rather to see these

problems as a product of their state of uprootedness and as a result of migration. They

are expected to preserve the unity of the family after migration as well as

disseminating their culture and way of life. YÖK argues that the solution to their

problems will be found through returning to the ‘country of origin’ from which they

were forced to emigrate.39 It is prophesised that the answer to their problems lies in

the intact national community. In other words, the rejuvenation of national values will

guarantee social security and psychological well-being.

36 The concept of alienation, or self-alienation, is used here to describe being distanced from Kurdistan and the Kurdish issue. 37 See “Göç ve Kadın,” Yaşamda Özgür Kadın, no. 2 (1998): 4-5. 38 “Göç ve Kadın,” Yaşamda Özgür Kadın, no. 2 (1998): 4-5. Author’s translation from Turkish. 39 “Göç ve Kadın,” Yaşamda Özgür Kadın, no. 2 (1998): 4-5.

19

In national and ethnic projects, the mother tongue, or the language of the national and

ethnic community, gains in significance as language in this context is often used as a

boundary marker. Thus, speaking a particular language can either lead to access to a

community and its social and institutional structures, or limit it.40 One of the most

striking assimilation policies of the Turkish state has been the absolute ban on the

Kurdish language which lasted up the 1990s and the still ongoing denial of education

in Kurdish. Thus, the right to speak and education in Kurdish has developed into an

important signifier of Kurdish identity. An example of the relevance accorded to the

Kurdish mother tongue is made clear in the Roza article on Women and Mother

Tongue.

The fundamental thing that makes a person a person is their mother tongue. It

is the essential constituent part of a society and a nation. Mother tongue is a

question of sense and feeling. It is a question of self-identification, self-

understanding, self-perception, self -recognition and self-interpretation. The

prohibition of the mother tongue means […] to desire the destruction of the

person as an individual.41

This quote equates the loss of the mother tongue with the loss of identity itself. It

argues that the mother tongue forms the basis from which individuals can ‘healthily’

make sense of their world. In other words, women who are denied the use of their

mother tongue or who do not speak Kurdish are not able to express their feelings

‘well’, ‘truly’, ‘authentically’, and ‘from the heart’ 42This implies that if individuals

express themselves in a different language, they become alienated from themselves,

lose their self-respect and can not develop as individuals .

The article in Roza addresses the criminalisation of the Kurdish language in Turkey.

However, the arguments used have the tendency to anchor personal identity

exclusively to the mother tongue and to confer a specific and fixed identity onto an

individual. Within the Kurdish national movement, Turkish alongside Kurdish has

prevailed as the language of communication. Not having mastered the Kurdish

language has posed no obstacle to the development of the Kurdish national

40 See Joanna Thornborrow, “Language and Identity,” in Language, Society and Power: An Introduction, eds. Linda Thomas and Shan Wareing. (London: Routledge,1999), 135-150. 41 Canan: “Kadın ve Anadil” Roza, no.1 (1996): 24. Author’s translation from Turkish. 42 Canan, 1996: 24.

20

movement. Nonetheless, discussions on the Kurdish mother tongue as the basis for

Kurdish identity continues to be prominent. The Kurdish language thus becomes an

ethnic marker. Kurds who do not master Kurdish can be dismissed as being

‘assimilated’ and any claims they make can easily be disregarded as not representing

the true voice of Kurds. This often happens to politically independent and feminist

women who differ from traditional Kurdish women through their Turkish education

and by having being acculturated into the Turkish society.

3.3 Sexual Violence against Women

Sexual violence against and rape in custody of Kurdish women accused of supporting

the Kurdish national movement by the security personnel was a common practice in

the 1990s.43 Rape is common in conflict situations and wars. It is sometimes practiced

in order to symbolically humiliate male opponents as it happened in Bosnia.44 Men

can feel that their masculinity has been compromised through the assault on ‘their’

women as they have not been able to protect them. Because women are the ones who

hold the family, community and the nation together in war, their physical and mental

destruction through systematic sexual violence has far-reaching consequences on the

whole cultural community.45 All Kurdish women’s journals recognise the intention of

rape in custody and by pro-government Kurdish village guards as a sexualised torture

method of intimidation.46 Yet, they differ in their outlook as to how to encounter this

sexualised violence.

Roza argues that similar to the land, women are considered to be male possessions.

The enemy usually gains power through both the occupation of the land and the

43 See Amnesty International, Turkey: An End to Torture and Impunity is Overdue!, EUR44/072/2001, October 2001,42 and “Violations of Human Rights in NW Kurdistan (East and South East Turkey): Report Presented by the Kurdistan Committees in Europe to the Fifty-Fourth Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights Geneva, March - April 1998,” Kurdistan Informatie Centrum Nederland http://kicadam.home.xs4all.nl/artikel/unhright3.html (accessed June 8, 2011). 44 Human Rights Watch, The Human Rights Watch Global Report on Women’s Human Rights, 1995, 475. 45 See Joan Nagel, Race, Ethnicity, and Sexuality: Intimate Intersections, Forbidden Frontiers. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 46 For incest and violence against women in Nusaybin see Sibel Doğan “Evet, Erkekler Türk Devletinin Köleleri, ama Biz Bacılar Kölelerin Kölesiyiz”, Roza, no.2 (1996): 6. For rape withing the Kurdish community see Zelal, “Silah, Kürtler, Tecavüz, Kadınlar,” Jûjin, no. 7 (1997): 20-22. For a definition of rape by Jûjin see Canan, “Kadınlara Mahsus İşkence,” Jûjin, no. 8/9 (1997): 16-18.

21

‘capture’ of its women. Rape in national conflicts is therefore often employed as a

method of conducting warfare and a means of destroying women’s ethnic identity.47

Jûjin argues that the perpetrators are protected by the state and that in most cases no

charges are brought against them, whilst the victims are stigmatised as separatists and

enemies of the state. The journals maintain that the systematic sexual abuse and rape

of detainees and of women by pro-government village security guards needs to be

combated by making them public: open solidarity must be demonstrated with the

victims and trials against the perpetrators should be monitored. They aim to

encourage women to address the violence inflicted upon them and to press charges

against their torturers.48 The feminist journals Roza and Jûjin also emphasise rape

incidences within the Kurdish society and in connection with that raise issues of

honour and virginity.

YÖK on the other hand remains largely silent on sexual violence within the Kurdish

community and focuses instead on rape as a consequence of the ‘dirty war’ against the

Kurds and defines it more as a wider societal problem of injustice. This is also

reflected in their definition of rape. It is seen as a form of violence which, like every

other, aims to coerce human beings into obedience. They argue that this policy could

be rendered ineffective through resistance. Therefore, women who have been

traumatised through sexual violence should continue to offer resistance and fight for

the ‘dignity of humanity’ so that the intentions of the perpetrators backfire.

Numerous Kurdish women have been raped during this prolonged war. Yet

every time that violence has been used, they [the Turkish authorities] have

failed in their aim of bringing about obedience. Instead, they have been met

with resistance. The purpose [of the Turkish authorities] has been and will be

defeated through the renewed revolt of traumatised women and through their

steadfast attitude. Women who impart a societal dimension to sexual

harassment and rape are honourably offering their resistance in the name of

the whole of humanity.49

47 See Dilşah, “Tecavüz Bedenin Zorla Zaptı,” Roza, no.1 (1996): 17. 48 See, Eren Keskin and Canan Tanrıkulu, “Remziye’yi Yalnız Bırakmayalım,” Jûjin, no. 2 (1997): 6-7. 49 “Görüşler Görüşler...,” Emekçi Kadınlar Birliği Bülteni, no. 18: (2000): 5. Author’s translation from Turkish.

22

Here, against traditional perceptions of rape, sexual violence against women is no

longer perceived as an attack upon the honour of the affected person and her family

and ought therefore not to cause shame for the family and the victim. It is rather to be

seen as just another form of torture. Moreover, in comparison to the feminist journals,

YÖK does not regard sexual violence in custody as part of a sexist system perpetuated

and reproduced by society but solely as a consequence of the war, which, as they

argue, ought to be combated through effective resistance. They call upon the victims

of sexual violence not to allow these acts to break their will and continue to support

the national struggle. This call on women is part of a wider strategy to motivate

Kurdish activists to continue their resistance and not be intimidated by such targeted

violence.

The discourses of rape as identified in YÖK conceal the societal dimension of sexual

violence against women. This is done in the interest of portraying a unified image of

the Kurdish community; women are perceived as victims of the Turkish state violence

and its war of annihilation against Kurdish nationalists. Moreover, the sexual violence

women are confronted with is used in order to reinforce the line between ‘us’ and

‘them’, i.e. the enemy. At the same time it is defined as violence against all Kurds and

as something that can only be put to an end through Kurdish unity and resistance

against the ‘enemy’. Incidences of rape are drawn upon to convey the necessity of the

struggle and to mobilise the people once again. Even more importantly, the task of

‘elevating the dignity of the people’ falls on women. This new burden loaded upon

them does not differ fundamentally from their allocated role as bearers of the family’s

honour. Now though, they are made responsible for the honour and dignity of

humankind as well as that of the Kurdish nation. The discourse on rape victims

deployed by YÖK calls on women to take a greater part in the national struggle.

Again, similar to the discourse of goddesses, women are discursively constructed as

the enemy’s ‘deadliest weapon’ as their participation is seen as the best way of

rendering the ‘enemy’s weapon’ ineffective. Through doing this they strengthen the

position of the Kurdish national movement at the same time.

3.4 Women as Peace Mothers and Victims of War

23

In the discussions on war and peace, all three women’s journals examined in this

chapter represent women as victims of the war. Roza and Jûjin construct women as a

uniform, homogenous and defenceless group at the mercy of the war. Men, on the

other hand, are cast into the role of aggressors and represented as those who profit

from the war. According to this view, wars have as their consequence the

militarization of society, which in turn has a vast influence on the economic, political

and social situation of women. War leads to poverty and migration and increases

domestic violence, with women and children often being the hardest hit. In addition,

Roza argues that gender-specific claims are not being prioritised and would be

deferred until the end of the war.50 Along similar lines, Jûjin states that during warfare

women take up a different position to men because of their attributes such as being

‘weak’, ‘emotional’, and ‘timid’. This makes women ‘pacifist’ and ‘willing to

compromise’ whereas men are more prone to ‘war’ and ‘victory’.51

The ascription of certain immutable characteristics leads to the fixing of identities and

to the masking of power structures not only between men and women but also among

women. According to Elshtain, the interpretation of men as ‘violent’ and women as

‘peace-loving’ contradicts the actual ways in which men and women often function in

war. Essentialist interpretations like these reproduce and strengthen the image of men

as fighters and women as peace-loving and mean that dissenting voices and stories

can be overlooked, such as those of pacifist men and warlike women.52

Women in general and mothers in particular are associated with the role of instigating

peace. This is explained partially in terms of biology: because they bring children into

the world and nurture them ‘with great effort’, they are the most invested in their

well-being. As a result, it lies in their ‘nature’ to put themselves on the line in the

interests of an end to the war and the suffering of ‘their’ children who participate in

the national struggle and who confront torture and death. Whilst the image of

goddesses calls upon young women in particular as they are the least entwined in

family obligations, mothers and elderly women are called upon in particular to fight

for peace and to pledge themselves to aid children active in the struggle.

50 “Barış Kadınlar İçin Ne Anlam Taşıyor?,” Roza, no. 14 (1998: 4). 51 Saniye, “İlkesizliğin İlkelerini Düşünelim,“ Jûjin, no. 10 (1999): 3. 52 Jean B. Elshtain, Women and War (New York: Basic Books, 1987), p.4.

24

All the journals depict women and children as sections of the population that is most

affected by the civil war in Turkey. YÖK argues further that because women are most

deeply affected by the war, they also have the greatest interest in securing peace.

Hence, in comparison to the feminist journals, YÖK promotes actively the image of

women as ‘peace mothers’ and attempts to mobilise women for peace.53 In an open

letter to the parliament in Ankara in October 1999, the Mothers’ Initiative for Peace

(Barış Anneleri İnisiyatifi) expressed their desire for peace and depicted themselves in

press releases as ‘protectors’, ‘sufferers and weepers’ and ‘bearers of sorrow’.

The mothers’ initiative for peace maintains its hope for democracy and

freedom with determination, asserted Güneş [a speaker for the initiative] […].

Güneş noted that the attacks experienced in prison […] had re-ignited the fires

in the hearts of the mothers and said: ‘we as mothers wish […] to leave a free,

dignified, peaceful and hopeful future to our children.’54

The mothers’ commitment to peace is derived from their emotional connection to

their children and from their ‘maternal role of bestowing life and protecting it’.

Hence, their commitment to peace is primarily an emotional appeal and does not

equate to a political consciousness. According to Tickner, the association of women

with peace leads to the confirmation of an idealised masculinity that is built upon the

notion of the woman as a passive victim in need of protection. Tickner maintains that

as long as such myths continue to abound women will neither be recognised as social

agents with equal rights, nor will their contribution to societal change be

acknowledged.55 Similarly, in her book on mothers who fought for the rights of their

imprisoned children through protests such as hunger strikes in Turkey, Temelkuran

argues that these types of activities foreground the institution of motherhood. Yet, she

also sees emancipatory possibilities therein, because taking part in such activities

meant that these mothers left the domestic sphere (consisting of neighbourhood and

familial contacts) for the first time and gained experience through confrontations with

the state and with party officials. According to Temelkuran, they learnt to raise their

voices and make demands and discovered their own strength, gaining insight into

53 “Kadınlar Savaşta En Çok Acı Çeken Kesim Olarak Bugün Barış İçin Savaşan Birer Militan Olmalıdır,” Yaşamda Özgür Kadın, no.10 (1998): 7-13. 54 “Haberler, Amed/Istanbul,” Özgür Politika, 6 October, 1999. Author’s translation from Turkish. 55 Ann Tickner, Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security (New York: Columbia University, 1992).

25

political affairs. Thus, through their dedication to the cause these mothers became

rapidly politicised.56 Moreover, even if their political awareness might be highly

superficial, it nevertheless marks an important juncture along the way to women’s

emancipation. Çağlayan, for example, argues that due to the politicisation of Kurdish

women, a change in the voting behaviour of traditional Kurdish families has occurred

and voting as a block has become less prevalent. In the 2011 general elections in

Turkey, many women and young people voted against the candidates favoured

traditionally by their tribes and religious leaders and often also against the candidates

favoured by their husbands or fathers. Their votes went mainly to the pro-Kurdish

candidates, whereas traditionally a family would have voted for the same candidate.57

4 Conclusion

The mobilisation of women into the Kurdish national struggle in the 1990s was

accompanied by varying and often contradictory discourses. The feminist journals,

addressing a more educated, middle class audience, focused on women as

independent agents that fought against national oppression as well as against sexism

coming from their own ranks. For these feminists liberation included also personal

emancipation and the politicisation of the private life. YÖK on the other hand was

affiliated with the PKK that led an armed struggle. This was an organisation with a

high level of influence over the Kurdish population at its disposal. It successfully

mobilised Kurdish women from the rural areas and the big metropolis, sections of the

Kurdish society that had never been this politicised before. It delivered a solution both

to the problem of the national oppression and gender inequalities by re-construction

and linking a golden age, a matriarchal society, and goddesses with the current

struggle of the Kurds. In both past and present times they presented the plight of

women as a mirror of the Kurdish nation. This perspective gave women a key role in

the oppression as well as in the liberation of the Kurds and can be summarised as

follows: because women have historically been the ones most oppressed and

humiliated, they must possess the most steadfast will and determination and carry out

the greatest deeds in order to bring about a change in their situation. Because they

make the most vulnerable targets for the enemy they must fight hardest to overcome 56 Temelkuran, 1997. 57Handan Çağlayan , "Aşiret Bağları Çözülürken,” Bianet, 21 June, 2011,

http://bianet.org/bianet/print/130868-asiret-baglari-cozulurken (accessed 27 July 2011).

26

their weakness. Because they bestow life, they must work the hardest for its

preservation. These lines of arguments have been employed by PKK and used as a

powerful argument to justify and increase the mobilisation of women into the national

struggle. This is also reflected in the guiding theme of YÖK which appears on the

front page of every issue: Freedom of the Woman is Freedom of the Country (Őzgür

Kadın Őzgür Vatandır).

Yet, this is only one way of how gender and nationalism intersects in these journals.

The construction of women as patriotic mothers, as peace mothers and as the

transmitters and signifiers of the national culture and heritage all serve to construct a

vision of society with clear defined roles and responsibilities. Although the above

discourses are peculiar to the PKK and YÖK, all Kurdish women journals analysed

here adhered to an essentialist notion of identity and to a static understanding of

culture. Particular identities for women were emphasised, or, women were

alternatively reduced to only one specific identity. The universal identity of the

woman as mother was at the heart of this categorisation for YÖK. This allocation of

the maternal role to women and its accentuation were criticised by the feminist

journals. However, at the same time however they also reproduced fixed images of

‘womankind’ and identified women as possessing rigid features. The idea that women

are ‘pacifists’ by nature, whereas men are ‘warlike’ was particularly evident in the

discourse surrounding war and peace. From the woman-as-pacifist classification a

female identity is derived that possesses a better aptitude for peaceful co-existence

and tolerance than male identity does. This has a fundamental overlap with the

historical notion of the women in the ‘golden era’ and as such the feminist and non-

feminist journals in similar ways essentialised images of Kurdish women.

The celebration of a female culture and a female identity, which is what all the three

journals were trying to achieve, serves to form a basis for women’s systematic

organisation. Yet such definitions do not necessarily lead to the hoped-for

emancipation but can actually prove themselves to be detrimental to women’s

attempts to actively participate in political and societal processes. Essentialised

perception of men and women as identified in all the journals reproduced and

strengthened the position that women are peace-loving and that men are fighters. The

women who emerge from this picture are victims in need of protection. This

engenders the danger that women can neither be accepted as emancipated social

27

agents nor will their contributions to societal transformation be recognised and the

power differential between women, as well as between the sexes, will remain

concealed.