Theoretical and Methodological Problems in Cross-Cultural Psychology

Cross-Cultural Psychology 67

© The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003© The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 33:10021–8308

Theoretical and Methodological Problemsin Cross-Cultural Psychology

CARL RATNER AND LUMEI HUI

Cross-cultural psychology has demonstrated that psychological phenomena aremanifested differently in different locales, and it has identified certain culturalfactors that foster these diverse manifestations. However, theoretical and meth-odological limitations have curtailed the progress of cross-cultural psychology.These limitations must be identified and corrected if we are to comprehend thecultural nature, origins, characteristics, formation, and functions of psychologicalphenomena.

Our present focus is to identify problems in cross-cultural psychological re-search which impede this comprehension. We consider such a critique to be aconstructive step in advancing the science of psychology. We disagree with thosewho espouse an eclectic acceptance of diverse approaches and who regard cri-tiques as mean-spirited. Miller espouses this position in her statement that “it isimportant to avoid a position that privileges one particular theoretical approachor mode of understanding as the sole direction to be taken in future research,dismissing other approaches as providing little or no insight . . . Theoretical andmethodological heterogeneity may be expected to be a permanent feature ofcultural approaches to psychology and not merely a reflection of temporarygrowing pains. Such heterogeneity not only represents a strength of culturalapproaches to psychology but constitutes a feature that is required to provideanswers to the complex problems motivating work in this field” (Miller, 1997,p. 118).

The problem with eclecticism is that it leaves us bereft of any principles ordirection for understanding cultural aspects of psychology. Pluralism forces us toaccept any theory and methodology that comes along because we dare notsuggest that it lacks insight. Heterogeneity does not encourage a principled,systematic approach that would reduce errors. In fact, it suppresses critical evalu-ation of errors under the banner of tolerance.

We maintain that scientific disciplines advance through discussion and debateof competing ideas in which some are rejected and others are accepted. In this

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68 Carl Ratner and Lumei Hui

© The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003

article we seek to repudiate certain deleterious theories and methods in cross-cultural psychology. We explain how they obscure and overlook important cul-tural issues that bear on psychology; they misunderstand the manner in whichcultural factors shape psychology; they mystify the relation between biology,culture, and psychology; they inadequately define and measure cultural factorsand psychological phenomena; they produce fault analyses of data and errone-ous conclusions about the cultural origins, characteristics, and functions of psy-chological phenomena. While our criticisms are pointed, we do not impugn allcross-cultural psychological research as contaminated by these errors. Nor do wedoubt the good intentions of the researchers we critique. We discuss kinds, orcategories, of errors which are fundamental and widespread. We are not takingcheap shots at a few unrepresentative minor figures. We select examples fromthe work of prestigious scholars in leading publications to demonstrate howtypical and insidious these errors are. Some of the criticisms we direct at cross-cultural psychology have been directed by others at mainstream psychology (cf.the discussion of operationism in Theory and Psychology, 2001, 11,1, pp. 5–74;Billig, 1996). We utilize these criticisms in a novel manner to address issuesconcerning culture and psychology. We also broaden and deepen critiques byother scholars which have been leveled at cross-cultural psychology.

THEORETICAL PROBLEMS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY

Inadequate theories neglect or misconstrue what culture is, how it bears onpsychology, and how it interacts with biological processes.

Flawed Conception of the Interaction between BiologicalAnd Cultural Factors

The interaction between biological and cultural influences on psychology is typ-ically presented in two formulations. One approach presents them as a potpourriof diverse factors which are all connected to psychological phenomena. Thistypically takes the form of a schematic diagram where biological and culturalfactors are connected by arrows to psychological phenomena. Berry, et al. (1992,p. 58) present a diagram of variables leading to gender differences in behavior.The variables include sex organs, child rearing, size and weight, sex role ideo-logy, ecological context, and socio-political context. The authors urge that “indi-vidual behavior can be understood across cultures only when both cultural andbiological features of our species are taken into account” (ibid., p. 13).

In this eclectic approach, diverse factors are listed without any coherent, sys-tematic integration. No discussion illuminates the specific role that each factorplays in psychological phenomena, or the systematic interrelation of culture,

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biology, and psychology. In Berry, et al., for example, some studies are presentedwhich emphasize cultural variability in psychological processes, while others claimuniversal psychological phenomena based upon species-wide biological processes.Such a haphazard, fragmented presentation precludes a systematic understandingof the cultural nature, origins, characteristics, formation, and functions of psy-chological phenomena.

Some cross-cultural psychologists avoid this eclecticism and attempt to integratebiological and cultural factors. This usually takes the form of privileging biologicalfactors over cultural ones. Universal biological mechanisms are deemed to deter-mine essential psychological characteristics while cultural factors are relegated toaffecting peripheral aspects. This formulation minimizes cultural aspects of psy-chology and contributes little to understanding them.

Matsumoto’s (2001) piece on culture and emotions articulates this approach.His chapter is heavily oriented toward a universal conception of emotions. Mostof the studies cited claim that the feeling quality and the expression of emotionsare universal. Thus, humans everywhere are able to recognize a given emotionfrom its facial expression. According to this universalistic view, emotions areprimarily determined by pan-human biological mechanisms. Matsumoto citesEkman & Levenson’s conclusion that distinct autonomic responses exist for eachof six emotions (ibid., p. 178).

Matsumoto does acknowledge another orientation in cultural psychology whichemphasizes the cultural organization and variability of emotions. However, thisposition receives considerably less attention than the biological viewpoint—only1/4 of the chapter is devoted to the cultural psychological standpoint. In addi-tion, Matsumoto only agrees that culture can affect the manner in which peopleexpress and judge/recognize emotional expressions; he claims that the quality,or feeling, or emotions is natural (Matsumoto, 2001, p. 173).

Matsumoto even minimizes the importance of culture in affecting judgmentsof emotions. He proposes many non-cultural factors to explain differences in therecognition of emotions (ibid., p. 182). He says, for example, that the expressionof different emotions contains overlapping elements so that people sometimesjudge a given element to represent different emotions. The confusion in judgmentsis thus due to the natural overlap of expressions, not to any cultural factors. Thisis like saying that people sometimes judge red as orange because there is someoverlap in the wavelengths of red and orange. Matsumoto also proposes thatpersonality biases in social cognition are another source of disagreement (“error”)in emotional judgments. This also leaves culture out of the picture.

Matsumoto never explains how biology and culture interact in judging emo-tions. He suggests a “neurocultural mechanism” which mandates that “judgmentsof emotions are affected by (a) a facial affect recognition program that is innateand universal, and (b) culture-specific decoding rules that intensify, deintensify,mask, or qualify the perception” (Matsumoto, 2001, p. 185). This formulationraises questions rather than answers them. To what extent do the cultural rules

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override the innate program? How do they do so (what is the mechanism thattriggers the override, how does it suppress the program, doesn’t the programresist tampering)? Why do they override it (why doesn’t the program exist byitself without cultural alteration)? Is it easy or difficult for cultural rules to over-ride the universal program? Are particular experiences necessary for this tooccur? What happens to the program while it is overriden? Matsumoto providesno answers to these questions. He simply states that cultural display rules areinvoked in social situations but not when individuals are alone.1

Matsumoto allows that culture can intensify-deintensify, mask, or qualify aperception of emotions. These are all quite different from one another. Which ofthese is more common? Why is it more common? How do cultural decodingrules sometimes intensify, sometimes mask, and sometimes qualify an emotionaljudgment?

When cross-cultural psychologists consider the relation of biology and cultureto psychology they deny a fundamental, systematic role to culture. They typic-ally regard biology as setting basic characteristics of psychology which culturesimply moderates. Lonner & Adamopoulos (1997, pp. 76–77) point out theimplications of relegating culture to the status of a moderating variable: “Whendealing with culture as a moderator variable one provides arguments for those‘mainstream’ psychologists who have traditionally challenged the necessity ofincluding culture in psychological theory. After all, the essential theoretical vari-ables remain the same, and culture simply adds refinement.” This is why “cross-cultural research is normally not very different from so-called mainstream andessentially experimental and reductionistic research” (ibid., p. 55).

Psychological Differences Among Groups Are Described with Little Attentionto Cultural Factors that Explain Them

Most cross-cultural psychology focuses on describing the psychology of differentpeoples without attempting to explain the cultural basis of these psychologicaldifferences. A typical conclusion is that Liberians recall things in context and havedifficulty with “free recall” (remembering things individually, out of context), whileAmericans readily employ free recall. Descriptions of mnemonic strategies, per-ception, emotions, mental illness, and modes of conflict resolution are fascinating,however, they are uninformative about how psychological phenomena are cultural.They are silent about what culture is and how it generates psychological differ-ences among people. Culture is construed as a platform on which psychologyrests—which is external to psychology—rather than as constituting psychology—i.e., penetrating into psychology. We may say that this approach to cross-culturalpsychology studies psychology in culture rather than culture in psychology. Theplatform model requires little understanding of culture (in general or in particular)because culture is not brought into contact with psychology.

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Explanatory Cultural Factors Are Misconstrued or Misidentified

When researchers attempt to identify cultural factors which organize psychologicalphenomena, a number of errors crop up.

The Influence of Cultural Factors on Psychological Differences Is Presumed on the Basis of

Faulty Logic. The faulty logic is:

1) Country A & B score differently on a social value.2) Psychological differences are found between country A & B.3) Therefore, psychological differences are due to differences in the social value.

For instance when Chinese and Americans have different views of injustice,the difference is attributed to individualism-collectivism (IC) because China andthe US score differently on IC. In other words, Chinese are from a collectivisticculture so collectivism explains their psychology. However, China and Americadiffer in many ways besides individualism-collectivism. To put it differently, ICcorrelates with many attributes such as wealth, educational level, and politicalsystem. Consequently, the psychology of individuals from individualistic culturesmay be due to any of these other factors. What seems to be a relationshipbetween psychology and IC is spurious; it is really a relationship between psy-chology and country. IC is a proxy for country and provides no more informa-tion than the country’s name. To say that Chinese come from a collectivisticculture is to say that they come from China; to say that Americans come from anindividualistic culture is to say they come from America. Whatever individualismor collectivism may exist in these two societies has not been differentiated fromother factors which also distinguish the two societies (Oyserman, Coon, &Kemmelmeier, 2002, pp. 41–44).

Cultural Factors Are Construed as Abstract Rather Than Concrete. Many of the culturalvariables proposed by cross-cultural psychologists are abstract in that they aredevoid of concrete content which reflects a specific social system (Lonner &Adamopoulos, 1997, p. 57). Abstraction results when a factor is misconstrued asa discrete variable with a singular, fixed character. (The definition of a variableis a factor that is qualitatively invariant and only varies quantitatively.) In con-trast, a cultural factor that interlocks with other factors is modulated by themand possesses a complex, contextualized, concrete quality.

Van de Vijver & Poortinga (2002) laud abstraction in cross-cultural research.They reject “the dogma that the description of the cultural context should bemaximized in order to advance our understanding” (ibid., p. 253). Instead, “Thedescription of the cultural context should be minimized as long as this does notmake the behavior studied incomprehensible or irrelevant . . . It is only byabstracting from daily contexts and reducing culture to a set of core variables for

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the construct under study that we can carry out culture-comparative studies”(ibid., p. 253).

The question is, how relevant and comprehensible are abstract variables forilluminating the cultural quality and origins of psychological phenomena? Rogoff(2002) argues that abstract variables are limited because they ignore the concretecultural quality that factors have by virtue of being integrated within a socialsystem. For example, education has very different qualities depending upon thespecific social system of multiple factors in which it resides. Abstracting it as acore variable—e.g., as transmitting information—diminishes its cultural signi-ficance. Van de Vijver & Poortinga’s rationale for abstraction is specious. Itis possible to compare the effect of different educational systems on psychology.It is not necessary to reduce education to abstract generalities to make suchcomparisons.

The inability of abstract variables to capture the rich cultural content of socialfactors is illustrated in Hofstede’s (1980) conception of social values. Hofstedeproposed three social values as significant cultural influences on behavior. Theyare avoidance of uncertainty, collectivism-individualism, and power distance.These three social values continue to be the main cultural factors which cross-cultural psychologists study in relation to psychological phenomena. Consequently,it is important to examine them in detail.

“Avoidance of uncertainty” obscures the myriad ways that people achieve it.One can avoid uncertainty by being outgoing or self-protective; by barricadingoneself in a bunker stockpiled with food, forming support groups, eliminatingpotentially threatening people, pretending to make friends, earning a lot of money,or living simply to prevent a decline in one’s living standard. One can seek toavoid economic uncertainty, personal uncertainty, social uncertainty, or intellec-tual uncertainty. Postulating avoiding uncertainty as a “core variable” strippedof these daily contexts is uninformative about social life and psychology.

Collectivism-individualism is similarly indefinite and uninformative. Collectivismis defined as people emphasizing the interdependence of every human on somecollective group, and the priority of group goals over individual goals (Triandis,2001, p. 36). Collective interactions can be democratic or autocratic. Collectivismcan characterize completely different social systems such as feudalism and huntinggathering societies. It can be a real bond, a disingenuous behavior, or a detestedobligation that people try to subvert (Fiske, 2002, pp. 82–83). “Collectivism” isuninformed by and uninformative about concrete social life.

Consequently, collectivism explains virtually nothing about peoples’ psychology.For instance, Leung & Stephan (2001, p. 393) tell us that “individualistic andcollectivistic societies have different views of transgressions. In collectivistic cultures,in-group harmony is regarded as an important goal, and socially deviant behaviorsthat jeopardize it are likely to be sanctioned.” This statement merely says thatcollectivists value harmonious group interactions. But that is a tautology; it is thedefinition of collectivism itself. Collectivism is such an impoverished construct

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that it cannot provide specific information about psychology. It can only berephrased in different words, which is a tautology.

Power distance is equally abstract and generates tautologies. It is defined asaccepting power differences among groups of people. One conclusion from re-search is that acceptance of power differences lead individuals to accept injusticeand abuse from superiors (Leung & Stephan, 2001, p. 391). But accepting powerdifferences means that one accepts the rights of powerful people to dominatepowerless people. The research tells us nothing more than what we know fromthe definition of power distance. Nothing more could be learned because theabstract concept of power distance—denuded of specific kinds and amounts ofpower involved and the reasons for accepting power differentials—is empty (cf.Louch, 1966; Smedslund, 1995 for discussion of the tautological nature of manypsychological hypotheses).

Researchers are prone to believing that abstract variables have more explanat-ory power than we have indicated. They claim, for example, that individualismexplains the distribution of rewards/resources according to the principle ofequity—i.e., according to the work that one has contributed (Leung & Stephan,2001, p. 382–383). However, individualism, per se, does not imply this principle.Individualism simply emphasizes personal independence and goals. The equityprinciple can only be explained by concrete social factors which must be addedto individualism. This is revealed in a statement by Leung & Stephan (ibid.,p. 382–383): “individualism is related to the preference for the equity normbecause equity is compatible with the emphasis on productivity, competition,and self-gain in individualist cultures.” Concrete social goals of productivity,competition, and self-gain are necessary to account for equity.

Collectivism also only accrues explanatory power when it is augmented byconcrete social factors. Collectivism is said to promote favoring members ofone’s in-group and disfavoring member’s of one’s out-group (Leung & Stephan,2001). However, this psychological/behavioral effect is not the result of collectiv-ism, per se. Many collective societies are equally generous to in-group and out-group individuals. Hunting and gathering tribes distributed food among all thetribespeople without favoring one’s own family, or clan. The Naxi people ofChina extended sexual favors of wives, daughters, and sisters to male visitorspassing through the village (Hua, 2001, pp. 22–23, 195). It is only when collect-ivism includes particular (as yet to be determined) socio-historical factors that thein-group out-group divide occurs (cf. Ratner, 1991, chap. 3 on distinguishingabstract and concrete factors).

In an important statement which is rarely heeded, Triandis acknowledges thatindividualistic and collectivistic societies are shot through with specific culturalcharacteristics. “Korean collectivism is not the same as the collectivism of theIsraeli kibbutz” (Triandis, 2001, p. 36). Triandis identifies 60 attributes on whichcollectivist cultures may differ. For instance, East Asian collectivist cultures dis-approve of arguing within the in-group, while this is perfectly acceptable to

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Mediterranean collectivist cultures. This means that focusing on individualism-collectivism, per se, ignores at least 60 important cultural issues.

Triandis further emphasizes that no culture is monolithically individualisticor collectivistic; all cultures are mixes of both. “A culture should not becharacterized as individualist or collectivist. That kind of characterization issimplistic . . . Germany is more individualistic than Hong Kong, but even inGermany, people select collectivist cognitions 37% of the time and in HongKong they select individualist cognitions 45% of the time” (Triandis, 2001,p. 40).

Despite their emptiness, abstract constructs are widely employed in cross-cultural and mainstream psychology alike. Moral and cognitive developmentare construed in terms of content-free stages (cf. Ratner, 2002, chap. 6); com-munication is defined as taking turns, offering advice, solving problems, askingquestions, managing conflict and stress—without regard for the content of whatis expressed or the social status or the interlocutors; schizophrenia is definedas flat affect and delusions—without regard for the content of the symptoms orthe specific experiences that provoke them; self esteem is defined as valuingoneself—without reference to what kind of self is involved and the particularways it is valued. Psychologists invoke abstract constructs because they are hop-ing to discover universal, fixed psychological characteristics. Since psychologicalcharacteristics vary on the concrete level, they only exist as universal on theabstract level. However, this level is uninformative about the cultural organiza-tion of psychology.

Particular Cultural Factors are Misconceived. Certain cross-cultural psychologists seekto identify psychological effects of concrete cultural factors rather than abstractvariables. This well-intentioned attempt frequently fails because psychologistsare insufficiently informed about sociology and history. Extensive, sophisticatedknowledge of these areas is necessary if one is to understand a culture and itseffects on psychology. Yet psychologists receive little training in the social sciences,humanities, or philosophy because psychology has been institutionally segreg-ated from them and ideologically oriented toward intra-individual processes.Thus, psychologists’ ignorance is not simply due to the vastness and complexityof cultural information which might escape the most diligent researcher. It is dueto an entrenched blindness to crucial social issues. This leads to misconstruingcultural factors and their psychological effects.

This problem is found in Peng’s cultural analysis of inferential reasoning (Peng& Nisbett, 1999; Peng, Ames, & Knowles, 2001; Ji, Peng, & Nisbett, 2000;Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). The analysis traces psychologicaldifferences in oriental and Western reasoning to historical differences in socialpractices and values of Chinese and Greeks (Nisbett, et al. 2001, pp. 293–295,303). Briefly summarized, Peng and his colleagues argue that in ancient times, inthe orient:

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A Social Structure of: 5 A Cultural Epistemology of: 5 A Psychology of:Many social roles 4 4Large state apparatus 4 4Hierarchical social 4 4

organization 6 Dialectics 6Complex social 4 4

organization 4 4Cooperation 4 4Harmony 7 7

In ancient Greece:

A Social Structure of: 5 A Cultural Epistemology of: 5 A Psychology of:Few social roles 4 4Simple organization 4 4Hunting, fishing, 4 4

herding, trading 6 Formal logic 6Decentralized, 4 4

individualized 4 4organization 4 4

Conflict 7 7

The authors contend that this model persists today: “There is substantialevidence that the social psychological differences characteristic of ancient Chinaand Greece do in fact persist” (ibid., p. 295). Therefore, contemporary Westernfragmented, linear reasoning is rooted in the very birth of Western civilization,extending back to philosophy and social conditions thousands of years ago.Contemporary holistic oriental reasoning is similarly rooted in philosophy andsocial conditions thousands of years old.

This model is erroneous and the cultural analysis of inferential reasoningcollapses. In the first place, modern Western societies have little in common withancient Greece. Modern corporations, factories, consumerism, politics, techno-logy and artifacts, religion, transportation, entertainment, recreation, family struc-ture, and even romantic love between men and women have no parallels inancient Greece. In addition, Western societies are not decentralized and simple,nor do they have small states. Modern Western societies are at least as complexas China, with states that are as large as any in the orient. Ancient social factorscannot account for Western thinking because they no longer exist.

Peng’s account of Western philosophy is also inaccurate and therefore doesnot explain contemporary inferential reasoning. Peng claims that Western phi-losophy since ancient Greece has essentially been atomistic. Even dialecticalthinking that arose in Western Europe in the 19th century was not true dialecticsfor it was dominated by linear, formal logic. In Peng’s words, “Western thought

Holistic,Relational,Contextual,Inferential Reasoning

Analytical,Fragmented,LinearInferential reasoning

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(including Western dialectical thought ) . . . rests in substantial part on Aristotelian logicwhich emphasizes . . . the law of identity, the law of noncontradiction, and thelaw of the excluded middle” (Peng & Nisbett, 1999, p. 744, emphasis added).Western dialectical philosophy and psychology “regard contradiction as a tem-porary state that will be replaced by integrated thoughts—using reasoning that islinear, logical, and moves in one direction—from a contradiction to a synthesis. . . They are still constrained by the laws of formal logic, which do not toler-ate literal contradiction” (ibid., pp. 742–743).

Peng is misinformed about Greek philosophy and modern dialectics. Almostany book on modern dialectics emphasizes its difference from formal logic. ModernWestern dialecticians such as Hegel, Marx, Marcuse regarded stable integrationas a temporary state that is continually undone by conflicting contradictions.Peng, himself, acknowledges this in a statement that unwittingly contradicts hisdescription of Western dialectics: “The dialectics of Marx and Engels can becharacterized as aggressive or assertive in that there is constant negation” (Peng& Nisbett, 1999, p. 742).

Western dialectical thinking drew on Greek philosophy which was organic anddialectical. Plato was a great dialectical thinker. And Aristotle espoused dialecticallogic in addition to formal logic. His understanding of organic unity and inter-relationships is thorough and shows up in his metaphysics, politics, biology, andaesthetics. Although this part of his work has been overlooked in favor of hisformal logic, Marx & Engels acknowledged Aristotle’s dialectics as a precursor totheir own dialectical philosophy. Hegel scholar Findlay similarly says that, “Hegelrecognizes the presence of his Dialectic in the ancient modes of argument thatwent by the same name” (Findlay, 1964, p. 64). A whole literature exists detail-ing Hegel’s debt to Greek dialectical thought and the organic society that spawnedit. Hegel and Greek Thought by Gray (1941) states that “Hegel set his ideal of asocial ethos developed from the Greek polis” (ibid., p. 53); “Impressed as Hegelwas by this Platonic notion of the organic relation of individual and society . . .”(ibid., p. 64). In fact, Gray goes on to say that Hegel criticized Greek thoughtand society as too organic because it excluded individual freedom. Triandis (2001,p. 37) states that Greece was a collectivistic culture well into the 20th century.

It is true that Democritus formulated an atomic philosophy in the fifth centuryB.C. However it was not widely adopted and did not characterize ancient thoughtas a whole. In fact Plato and Aristotle rejected Democritus’ atomic theory as aone-sided account of reality (Van Melsen, 1973, p. 127). Democritus’s doctrine“had only a few adherents between the fifth century B.C. and the seventeenthcentury” (ibid., p. 130).

Peng’s notion that: “Most fundamentally, the Greeks, unlike the Chinese,were inclined to see the world as a collection of discrete objects” (Nisbett, et al.,2001, p. 293) is false. So is his characterization of Western philosophy asthoroughly atomistic and anti-dialectical. Organicism-holism was a strongphilosophical movement from the 18th to the 20th centuries in Germany. One

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manifestation of it was Gestalt psychology (and systems theory, in general) whichemphasized interrelationships of elements and group processes rather than dis-crete individual phenomena.

Peng’s identification of dialectics with oriental philosophy is confused as well. Themistake stems from a fundamental misconception about what dialectics is. Pengconstrues dialectics as a relativistic, pluralistic viewpoint that seeks compromiseamong diverse perspectives. “The dialectical resolution of social contradiction isencouraged by an aspect of Chinese culture, namely the doctrine of the mean, whichemphasizes moderation, sincerity, and most importantly a ‘reasonable’ middle-of-the-road approach” (Peng & Nisbett, 1999, p. 746). Dialectics is “a recognitionof contradiction and of the need for multiple perspectives, and a search for the‘Middle Way’ between opposing propositions” (Nisbett, et al., 2001, p. 293).

Peng’s conception of dialectics as seeking a middle ground between opposingpositions contradicts the established, scholarly meaning of dialectics. Dialecticsdoes not resolve contradictions by accepting contradictory tendencies or com-promising among them. Dialectical thinking understands resolution to be a trans-formation of the elements into a new emergent product. Thus, Marx envisionedthe working class taking power and constructing a novel, classless society. Marxnever envisioned a compromise or middle way between capitalists and the work-ing classes. Hegel employed that same dialectical reasoning to resolve philo-sophical conflicts. In his Phenomenology of Spirit he systematically exposes the errorsof numerous positions, and he proposes an entirely novel metaphysics that incor-porates elements of the other positions in completely new ways.

What Peng calls dialectical thinking is actually an amalgam of traditionalChinese philosophies such as Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism. These rec-ognized a unity of contradictory elements which balance each other. The 29th

motto of Taoism states this:

The universe is sacred. You cannot improve it. If you try to change it, you will ruin it. Sosometimes things are ahead and sometimes they are behind; sometimes breathing is hard,sometimes it comes easily; sometimes one is up and sometimes down.

This motto advocates accepting and balancing diverse aspects of existing factors.Creating novel phenomena is out of the question.

Confucianism was similarly a conservative philosophy which sought to mitigateconflict through compromise that preserved the status quo. It is fundamentallydifferent from dialectics.

In his philosophical essay “On Contradiction,” Mao Tse-tung explained thatmost of Chinese philosophy was “metaphysical,” static, and undialectical: “InChina there was the metaphysical thinking exemplified in the saying ‘Heavenchangeth not, likewise the Tao changeth not,’ and it was supported by thedecadent feudal ruling classes for a long time” (Mao, 1937, p. 313). Dialecticalthinking emphasizes inner contradictions which produce change. It was invented

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by Hegel, Marx, Engels, and Lenin: “Hegel made most important contributionsto dialectics, but his dialectics was idealist. It was not until Marx and Engels, thegreat protagonists of the proletarian movement, had . . . critically absorbed therational elements of Hegelian dialectics and created the great theory of dialect-ical and historical materialism that an unprecedented revolution occurred in thehistory of human knowledge” (ibid., p. 315). Mao’s words show that Peng isconfused in claiming that dialectical thinking was endemic to Chinese philo-sophy and was either foreign to, or deformed in, Western thinking. Mao explainshow systematic dialectical thinking achieved its highest form in Western philo-sophy, motivated by the class struggle of the industrial proletariat against thecapitalist class.

Even if Peng’s terminology is corrected and dialectics is rephrased as tradi-tional Chinese philosophy, it is dubious that the latter is a prevalent culturaloutlook in contemporary China which could foster holistic inferential reasoning.Peng & Nisbett (1999, p. 745) attempted to prove that “dialectical” (i.e., Confu-cian) metaphysics is common in Chinese society and accounts for the orientalstyle of inferential reasoning. Yet when the authors analyzed sourcebooks ofChinese proverbs for “dialectical thinking” (i.e., Confucianism), they found thatonly 12% of Chinese proverbs are “dialectical” while 88% are not. If proverbsinfluence thinking, then Chinese reasoning should be nondialectical more thandialectical! Dialectical Chinese reasoning could not stem from the meager pres-ence of “dialectical” proverbs in the culture.

The assertion that dialectical (i.e., Confucian) thinking is fostered by contem-porary harmonious practices in the orient is similarly dubious. Peng, et al. claimthat “In daily life, East Asians strive to maintain harmony” (Nisbett, et al. 2001,p. 304)—i.e., seek to resolve conflict through compromise—and this fosters“dialectical thinking” that emphasizes a middle ground over extremes. In actual-ity, China has been marred for well over half a century by bitter political andideological struggle and brutal suppression of beliefs that contradict official,hegemonic doctrine. The Cultural Revolution is the most obvious example. Theentire field of psychology was banned throughout China following the 1949revolution because it was deemed bourgeois. Books, news, entertainment, internetsites, religious groups, political parties, and independent trade unions continue tobe banned in China when they deviate from official doctrine. Where is the effortto maintain moderation, harmony, and compromise among differences in thesecases? Contemporary personal and social relationships are also far less harmon-ious and compromising than Peng (Peng & Nisbett, 1999, p. 746) indicates.Jealousy, vindictiveness, competition, arrogance, suspicion, secrecy, duplicity,egoism, back-stabbing, and acrimonious criticism of others are commonplace inChinese personal relations. The public domain is rife with corruption and cheat-ing that are motivated by a desire to enhance personal wealth and power.

The social practices, conditions, or concepts which Peng and his associatesInvoke to explain cross-cultural differences in inferential reasoning are fictitious.

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(We shall see below that Peng’s empirical research claiming national differences inreasoning is invalid as well.) Western civilization is not a continuous pattern ofsocial conditions and ideology which promote analytical, fragmental, linear think-ing. Holistic-organic thinking was characteristic of Ancient Greece and it wascommon throughout the Enlightenment and into the 20th century. Peng’s attemptto deny dialectical thinking in the West is pure sophistry. Equally apocryphal ishis claim that (genuine) dialectical philosophy was popular in China. Confucianismand Taoism were popular however they have nothing in common with dialectics.Moreover, Peng’s own research demonstrates that they are not popular now andare not a source of holistic inferential reasoning. It is equally fanciful to claimthat contemporary Chinese social conditions and practices promote moderate,holistic thinking.

A deeper understanding of history, philosophy, sociology, and politics isnecessary to accurately identify cultural factors that promote particular forms ofinferential reasoning.

METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY

One of the defining features of cross-cultural psychology is its methodology.Cross-cultural psychologists accept positivistic methodology which their main-stream colleagues endorse. (in contrast, cultural psychologists come from a morehumanistic methodological tradition grounded in hermeneutic philosophy out-side mainstream psychology.) This methodology leads to researching cultural-psychological phenomena in ways that are amenable to particular principles ofmeasurement and analysis. Unfortunately, positivistic principles of measurementand analysis often lead to obscuring the cultural origins and characteristics ofpsychological phenomena (Ratner, 1997, chap. 1).

Many Testing Conditions and Instruments are Ecologically Invalid

Many cross-cultural psychologists have recognized that test materials and condi-tions must simulate peoples’ social environments if research conclusions are toaccurately reflect, and generalize to, their real psychology. Despite this caution,researchers often employ artificial, unfamiliar materials. The reason is that thesematerials are readily controlled and calibrated. Positivist principles of measure-ment and analysis demand simple, unambiguous, manipulable, quantifiable stimuliwhich elicit simple, quantitative responses. Artificial testing conditions and in-struments fit these criteria more than natural circumstances do.

An ecologically invalid measure was used by Ji, et al. (2000) in a study onholistic vs. linear perception. They hypothesized that Chinese would be moresensitive to environmental relationships than Americans are. They tested this by

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presenting Chinese and American subjects with schematic items on a computerscreen (e.g., a light bulb and a coin). Objects appeared together in varyingfrequencies. After several trials, subjects were asked to estimate the frequency ofpairings which had occurred. The estimate was the operational definition ofpaying attention to environmental relationships. Mean differences in the estim-ates led Ji to conclude that “East Asians are more attentive to relationships in theenvironment than Americans” (ibid., p. 952).

This conclusion is unwarranted because Ji’s material does not represent sensi-tivity to environmental relationships. Awareness of relationships is awareness ofthe real relationship among significant objects—how they resemble each other,affect each other, depend on each other. Ji et al. did not investigate these issues.They used meaningless, deformed stimuli that appeared momentarily on a com-puter screen. “All the figures were schematic to ensure that there was littlecultural-specific symbolic meaning” (ibid, p. 945). Employing culturally mean-ingless stimuli to draw conclusions about the cultural character of meaningfulpsychological processes would seem to be oxymoronic.

Ji’s artificial conclusions are contradicted by everyday examples. In everydaylife Americans are very aware of contextual relationships. American teenagersare obsessed with manifested or anticipated reactions of their peers. Food, cloth-ing, music, entertainment, sexual behavior, and even friends are selected with aneye to how they will affect social relations with peers. American investors whoare deciding which stock to buy similarly consider contextual factors such asinterest rates, political stability, and unemployment rates. American businessexecutives try to control a broad range of contextual events such as govern-ment policies and candidates for political office. Every American school teacherknows that students’ academic performance is affected by influences outside theclassroom—the home, the media, and the job market. Research on social refer-encing and social comparison proves that American psychological phenomenaare based upon on contextual social cues. Ecologically valid tests and responseswould have indicated such sensitivity.

Everyday life invalidate one of Peng, et al.’s (2001, p. 253) conclusions. Theauthors cite their own unpublished work (!) which supposedly documents thatAmericans value what people say as more important than what they don’t saywhile Chinese show the reverse preference. However, in everyday life Americanshave a deep concern for hidden motives. Freud’s extensive emphasis on uncon-scious processes is a staple of Western thinking. And what American does notwonder whether other peoples’ statements truthfully represent their thinking?

Measures of Cultural Factors Use Incomplete or Ambiguous Scale Items. Ensuing conclu-sions about cultural factors are therefore unwarranted.

This is the case with some of the most widely used cultural constructs such asindividualism-collectivism (IC), power distance (PD), and avoidance of uncer-tainty. It is rarely noted that PD is identified from three questionnaire items,

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avoidance of uncertainty is also identified from three questionnaire items, andIC is identified from six questions! In other words, an entire society is character-ized as (more or less) individualistic on the basis of how individuals respond to afew questions. Other operational measures of IC have been employed, howevermost studies rely on Hofstede’s scales. To demonstrate how impoverished thisbasis is we shall present the questionnaire items which operationally define twoof the factors.

Avoidance of uncertainty (Hofstede, 1980, p. 161):

1) How often do you feel nervous or tense at work? (Always-never on a 5-point Likert scale.)

2) Company rules should not be broken—even when the employee thinks it isin the company’s best interests. (Agreement on a 5-point Likert scale.)

3) How long do you think you will continue working for this company? (2years, 2–5 years, more than 5 years, until I retire.)

Individualism-collectivism (Hofstede, 1980, p. 220–221): how important (veryimportant-not important” on a 5-point Likert scale) is it to you to

1) Have challenging work to do—work from which you can get a personalsense of accomplishment.

2) Have considerable freedom to adopt your own approach to the job.3) Have a job which leaves you sufficient time for your personal or family life.4) Fully use you skills and abilities on the job.5) Have good physical working conditions.6) Have training opportunities to improve your skills or to learn new skills.

(The first three items operationally define individualism, the last three definecollectivism.)

The reader will note that all these questions concern attitudes toward work.Yet Hofstede presumed them to measure general social values. A few questionsconcerning work are clearly insufficient to ascertain whether a country endorsesbroad values, such as avoidance of uncertainty, which encompass many aspectsof life.

Another weakness is that Hofstede’s names for the values (factors) are notwarranted by the questionnaire items and responses. The three items that Hofstedeconstrues as defining avoiding uncertainty have no ostensible relation to thatvalue. One may feel nervous at work for an infinite number of reasons. Thereare no grounds for assuming that an affirmative response indicates an attempt atavoiding uncertainty. Similarly, one may plan to work at a job for a long timefor many reasons (e.g., he likes it), not necessarily to avoid uncertainty. The sameis true for affirming that company rules should not be broken. Labeling re-sponses as “avoiding uncertainty” is entirely arbitrary and subjective.

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The same holds for presuming that the first three items on the IC question-naire measure “actor’s independence from the organization” (ibid., pp. 220–221). Developing a personal sense of accomplishment, adopting your ownapproach to the job, and having time for your personal or family life do notimply that you are individualistic in the sense of being concerned with yourselfindependently of the organization. You might desire a personal sense of accom-plishment by contributing to the company. You may desire to be creative inorder to contribute to the company. And a desire for personal and family timemay complement your positive attitude toward the company. It does not implyany inclination toward self-absorption or rejection of the group. Hofstedeassumes that any reference to self or creativity implies insulation from the group,however the questions do not necessarily imply this and the subjects may nothave meant it.

Hofstede is similarly arbitrary in assuming that the last three IC items “stressthings the organization should do for the individual: provide him or her withtraining, with working conditions, allow him or her to use his or her skills” (ibid.,p. 221). The questions simply ask how important these issues are to the subject;they do not imply that the company should provide them or that the subjectdefines herself as dependent on the group.

Hofstede’s list of social values is thus dubious. The few, fragmentary questionsdo not express broad social values. Nor do they express the names and meaningsthat Hofstede attributes to them. Other operational definitions of IC—there are27 of them—are plagued with the same problems.

Operational Definitions of Cultural and Psychological Phenomena Employ Truncated, Frag-

mentary Responses Which Cannot Represent the Phenomena. Ensuing conclusions aretherefore unwarranted.

The positivistic orientation in cross-cultural research regards psychologicalphenomena to be transparent in simple, overt forms of behavior. Thus, mereagreement with a questionnaire item is deemed to express a definite social value,as we have seen in Hofstede’s work. In other words, the social value “avoidinguncertainty,” or “individualism” is transparent in the behavioral response “stronglyagree.” There is no need to ask subjects what they mean by agreeing with astatement. The social value is assumed to be evident.

Triandis (2001, p. 40) adopted this methodological perspective in researchingIC. He asked subjects to complete the phrase “I am . . .” When the response was“father,” Triandis concluded that this response is a collective form of identitybecause father is a social role/relationship. Conversely, when a subject wrote“kind,” or “play tennis,” this response is an individualistic identity because itdescribes a personal state or quality. Based on this assumption, Triandis (2001,p. 40) concluded that Chinese students have a more collective self (they averagedmore social responses) while University of Illinois American students have amore individualistic self (they averaged more individual responses).

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The assumption that psychological phenomena are transparent in, and reduc-ible to, a singular, overt response is false. Any response can indicate virtually anyphenomenon, and any phenomenon can be expressed in virtually any response.Consequently, a singular, overt response does not convey which psychologicalphenomenon is operative. Ironically, the attempt at enhancing objectivity byrestricting responses leads to its opposite—making arbitrary, subjective interpreta-tions about what the responses mean (cf. Ratner, 1997, chap 1, 2).

In the case of Hofstede’s research we saw that planning to stay on a job canexpress many psychological reasons and the restricted response prevents know-ing which reason, or meaning, the subject has in mind. Similarly, when a mansays that he is a father, he may have any number of values in mind. In order toknow that he sees himself as a social person, we must know what being a fathermeans to the man. Is it a burdensome responsibility which he dreads and avoids,or does he relish the relationship and frequently interacts with his children? Ifthe former, then the man would be deemed to possess an individualistic self-concept, not a social one. Operationalizing a psychological phenomenon as atruncated, overt response with fixed meaning obscures its variable psychologicaland cultural quality and makes any conclusion about this quality arbitrary andspeculative.

This can be seen in Peng & Nisbett’s (1999, pp. 748–750) study #5. Theypresented statements to Chinese and American students and asked them torate the plausibility of each statement on a 7-point scale. Some subjects reada single statement and judged its plausibility alone. Other subjects read thatstatement along with another that contradicted it, and then judged its plausibil-ity. The authors compared the plausibility ratings of each statement alone andin the pair. One statement read, “A social psychologist studied young adultsand asserted that those who feel close to their families have more satisfyingsocial relationships.” The contradictory statement read, “A developmental psy-chologist studied adolescent children and asserted that those children who wereless dependent on their parents and had weaker family ties were generally moremature.”

The authors interpret the results as indicating that when presented with con-tradictory information, Americans construe one as right and the other as wrong.This follows the Western epistemology of non-contradiction, pursuit of a singletruth and consistency. Chinese subjects dialectically believe that both sides of acontradiction might be right and the truth lies in the middle.

However, the restricted response format makes any such interpretation specu-lative. The subjects were only allowed to rate plausibility on a 7-point scale.From this limited information it is impossible to infer anything about their psy-chology. There is absolutely no indication that Americans construed statementsin the pair as right and wrong, or that they pursued a single truth or consistency.There is no indication that Chinese believed that both statements may be trueand that truth lies in the middle. We don’t even know whether the subjects

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regarded the paired statements as contradictory. They may not have regardedthem as contradictory and may not have employed strategies for dealing withcontradictions. Peng may have invented conclusions about psychological processesthat were not even at work.2

Cross-cultural psychologists believe that their proposed meanings and labelsare validated through correlations with other data whose psychological signific-ance is clear. For instance, Hofstede (1980, p. 224) argues that IC has constructvalidity because in countries which score high on individualism subjects tend toendorse more frequently the statement “A larger corporation is generally not amore desirable place to work than a small company.” Hofstede believes thatendorsing this item “confirms the lesser dependency of the individual on thecompany in more individualist countries.” The problem is that the validatingdata are plagued by the same ambivalence as the original data. One couldendorse Hofstede’s statement (about large corporations) for any number of rea-sons which have nothing to do with dependence on the company. Because wedon’t know the meaning of the statement, it cannot be accepted as validating theassumed meaning of an individualism index (cf. Ratner, 1997, pp. 204–205;Ratner, 2002a, pp. 140–144). Whatever the correlation may be between re-sponses to the two instruments, the psychological significance of both sets (thatproduces the correlation) remains a mystery.3

Conclusions Contradict Data

Although cross-cultural psychologists are well-versed in statistical analysis, theirconclusions are sometimes driven by theoretical concerns rather than by thedata themselves.

Earlier we discussed Ji, et al.’s (2000) conclusion that Chinese are more sens-itive to environmental relations than Americans. Yet some of their own datacontradict this. In the study, some objects appeared together randomly (Pearsoncorrelation coefficient of 0). Subjects were asked to estimate the association ofstimuli on a scale from “not at all” (0 association) to “perfect association (100).Americans estimated the association to be 37 and Chinese Ss estimated it to be44. Chinese were far from accurate, and they were less accurate than Americans—they overestimated the association more than Americans did. According to Peng’soperational definition of attentiveness, Chinese were less attentive to relationshipsin the environment than Americans.

Some of Peng & Nisbett’s (1999) data similarly contradict their conclusion thatChinese people prefer, understand, and use dialectical proverbs more than Amer-icans. The experimenters presented both groups with dialectical and nondialecticalproverbs, appropriately translated, from American and Chinese sources. Subjectsrated their preference for all the proverbs from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).The results are reconstructed in table one.

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Table 1. Preference for Dialectical and Non-Dialectical Proverbs

American Proverbs Chinese Proverbs

Non-Dialectical Dialectical Non-Dialectical Dialectical5.2 4.5 American subjects 3.5 3.54.2 4.2 Chinese subjects 4.1 5

The authors claim that the data demonstrate that “Americans greatly preferrednondialectical to dialectical American proverbs, and the Chinese preferred dia-lectical to nondialectical Chinese proverbs.” The finding is contradicted by manydata which the authors ignore:

1) Americans liked American dialectical proverbs just as much as Chineseliked them (4.5 vs. 4.2). If Americans are not dialectical while Chinese are,there should have been substantial differences in the ratings.

2) On Chinese proverbs, Americans liked dialectical ones as much as theyliked nondialectical ones (3.5 & 3.5). If Americans are nondialectical, theyshould have preferred the nondialectical ones more.

3) On American proverbs, Chinese liked nondialectical ones as much asdialectical ones. If Chinese are systematic dialecticians they should havepreferred the dialectical ones from America as well as China.

4) Chinese like nondialectical American proverbs more than Americans likenondialectical Chinese proverbs (4.2 vs. 3.5). If Chinese are dialecticians,they should dislike nondialectical American proverbs.

5) Chinese prefer nondialectical Chinese proverbs more than Americans do(4.1 vs. 3.5). This contradicts the idea that Chinese are more dialecticalthan Americans.

6) Americans prefer dialectical American proverbs to nondialectical Chineseproverbs (4.5 vs. 3.5). If Americans are nondialectical, the ratings shouldbe reversed.

7) On the 7-point scale, Chinese only gave Chinese dialectical proverbs amoderate rating of 5. If they are strongly dialectical why didn’t they givehigher ratings?

8) Chinese gave moderate ratings to American and Chinese nondialecticalproverbs (4.2 and 4.1 out of 7 points). Strongly dialectical thinkers wouldbe expected to give very low ratings to these proverbs.

These eight data all contradict the authors’ contention that Chinese are dia-lecticians while Americans think in fragmented, linear terms.4

Small Quantitative Differences are Exaggerated as Substantive Qualitative Differences. Thisstems from relying upon statistical tests of significance. Statistical tests conclude

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that scores are significantly different even when they are quantitatively quitesimilar. Group scores of 35.2 and 35.4 can be significantly different statistically,despite the minimal quantitative difference between them. It is well known thatstatistical significance only means that the numerical differences could not haveoccurred by chance. It does not mean that the numbers are widely different. Nordoes it mean that the numbers represent significantly different psychologies. Yetpositivistic cross-cultural psychologists routinely ignore this fact and misrepresentstatistical significance as significant psychological differences.

Thus, Peng concludes that cognitive differences between Chinese and Americansare broad, systematic, and qualitative: “The differences we have found, it shouldbe noted, are actual qualitative ones. Chinese participants preferred dialecticalproverbs, whereas American participants preferred nondialectical ones” (Peng &Nisbett, 1999, p. 750). “Chinese appear to share a dialectical epistemology thatstresses the changing nature of reality and the enduring presence of contradic-tion. This stands in contrast to a Western linear epistemology built on notions oftruth, identity, and contradiction. As a result, some scholars argue, Chineseprefer to seek a compromise in the face of contradiction, whereas Americans pursuemore exclusionary forms of truth and resolution” (Peng, et al. 2001, pp. 256–257). However, table 1, above, contains miniscule, contradictory quantitativedifferences in the subjects’ preferences. Peng’s conclusion about qualitativelycontrasting cognitive styles is inflated.

Sweeping statements about the individualism or collectivism of ethnic groupsare similarly out of order. IC is a volatile attribute, easily affected by minorsituational changes. An individual is not always, or generally, individualistic;individualism is elicited by particular situations. People from “individualisticcultures” (relatively more individualistic than collectivist) may manifest individu-alistic cognitions when they are alone, however, when their friends or familiesare under attack they will employ collectivistic cognitions and behaviors. Individualscan alter their individualism and collectivism in a moment’s time: “instructingindividuals to think for 2 minutes about what makes them the same as theirfamily and friends results in responses that are more collectivist; instructing themto think for 2 minutes of what makes them different from their family and friendsresults in responses that are more individualist” (Triandis, 2001, p. 40).

We cannot say that “Collectivists have X psychology.” We can only say that“Collectivists in Q country have X psychology in situation A.” Collectivists incountry Q may have Z psychology in situation B, and W psychology in situationD. Other collectivists in country M may have Y psychology in situation A (ibid.,p. 41). For example, Hong Kong subjects (country Q) distribute resources usingthe principle of equality (psychology X) to in-group members when trying tocare for them (situation A). However, these Ss distribute resources on the basis ofequity (psychology Z) with in-group members when the objective is to maximizeproduction (situation B), rather than caring for the members. And Hong Kongsubjects employ equity (psychology Z) to members of an out-group (situation C).

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The volatility of IC is revealed in the fact that different measures of it, whichcontain different questionnaire items (concerning different situations), generatevery different IC responses (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002, p. 42).Leung & Stephan (2001, p. 384) similarly recognized that “the relationshipbetween culture and reward allocation in collectivistic cultures seems complexand is qualified by many situational variables. The individualism-collectivismframework alone is unable to provide a coherent account of the empiricalevidence.”

As operationally defined and measured by cross-cultural psychologists, indi-vidualism and collectivism are not broad, enduring values with definite proper-ties. Yet these psychologists still insist that variables such as IC do have definitecharacteristics which generate main effects on psychology. Sweeping statementsare made about “the psychology of individualists and collectivists” independentlyof subjects’ circumstances and objectives. Triandis, himself, asserts that individu-alists value pleasure, possess high self-esteem, work better alone, perceive indi-viduals, make internal attributes, and express themselves directly, while collectivistsare conservative, self-effacing, work well with in-group members, perceive groupsand relationships, attribute behavior to external factors, express themselvesindirectly, and use action verbs rather than state verbs (Triandis, 2001, pp. 40–43). Given the qualifications which Triandis introduced earlier, general pro-nouncements about IC must be scrutinized to determine whether they areovergeneralizations from limited situations in which the findings were obtained.

SOLUTIONS

The fact that theoretical and methodological errors are committed by eminentscholars, accepted by scholarly peer reviewers, and are published by editors ofthe most prestigious journals and publishing houses suggests that they stem fromfundamental, widely shared concepts about human psychology, society, andmethods for investigating these (cf. Ratner, 1991, 1997 for a discussion of these).Comprehending the central role that real, concrete culture plays in human psy-chology requires a theoretical and methodological system that fundamentallydeparts from the problematical assumptions of cross-cultural psychology describedin this article. Reforms that are attempted within these assumptions are neversufficient.

For instance, Sulaiman, et al. (2001) diligently attempted to construct a cultur-ally sensitive symptom checklist for depression in Dubai. They painstakinglysolicited 200 community members to produce 400 expressions of emotion. Thislist was then examined by a second indigenous sample of 50, leading to theidentification of a list of “feeling” expressions. This list was then scrutinized toextract 173 words that expressed aspects of clinical depression. A third indig-enous sample of therapists identified 96 expressions that described their patients’

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depression. These 96 were then grouped into 22 categories that comprised mainsymptoms of clinical depression in the native population of Dubai.

This well-motivated, painstaking effort was subverted by requiring subjects torespond with isolated, simple, abstract emotional terms. For instance, guilt emergedas a main symptom and it was associated with the term “it’s painful.” Thislimited response does not enable us to comprehend the cultural psychology ofguilt in Dubai. Sense of failure was another symptom and it was described as“calamitous,” and “I am falling to pieces.” These two phrases leave us unin-formed as to the cultural quality of failure in Dubai. We would need to knowwhether failure is construed as a personal failure, fate, a sign of sin, or due towitchcraft by one’s neighbors. Similarly, self-dislike was one of the 22 symptomsand it was described as “I hate myself.” But the crucial question—what kind ofself is implicated in Dubai depression?—receives no answer from this truncated,abstract phrase. To say that depressed Dubais hate themselves without indicat-ing what kind of self they have and hate reveals little about cultural psychology.Remaining within the confines of a problematical methodology negated theauthors’ efforts at solving the methodological problems.

Van de Vijer & Leung, (1997, pp. 264–269) similarly sought to enhancethe ecological validity of operational definitions objectified in measurement in-struments. The authors offer useful recommendations that Ss be given time tofamiliarize themselves with the test material, that translated instruments be backtranslated to ensure accurate translation, that two researchers administer instru-ments to eliminate the influence of the tester, and that, where necessary, numer-ical points on Likert scales be replaced with verbal designations (e.g., “moderatelylike”) which the researcher can later convert to numbers. However, these helpfulsuggestions are made within the framework of positivistic methods such asoperational definitions, artificial, simple, fragmentary stimuli, and truncated,superficial responses. For instance, the authors state that to ensure good translat-ability of questionnaires one should “use short, simple sentences in order tominimize the cognitive load of the instrument” (ibid., p. 266). Short, simplesentences, possessing minimal significance and requiring minimal cognitive exer-tion to comprehend, cannot represent culturally meaningful stimuli; nor can theyelicit culturally meaningful responses.

New methodological and theoretical principles must be developed to explore thecultural organization of psychological phenomena.5 A theoretical standpoint mustarticulate a coherent theory of culture that identifies major cultural factors whichbear on psychology. These cultural factors must include broad, enduring, structuralelements of society. We want to know how psychology takes form in and takesthe form of macro cultural factors such as social institutions, cultural concepts,and widely used artifacts. We want to understand how the specific features ofthese—the ways they are socially organized—become embodied in psychologicalphenomena. This analysis reveals the heterogeneous characteristics of psychologicalphenomena which are spawned by multiple cultural factors within a society.

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Relating psychological phenomena to concrete macro cultural factors over-comes the errors of cross-cultural psychology such as focusing on abstract cul-tural factors, atheoretically and haphazardly selecting cultural factors, the platformmodel which fails to relate culture to psychology, sweeping generalizations aboutthe psychology of all members of a society, and misrepresenting the nature ofcultural factors which affect psychology.

Relating the characteristics of psychological phenomena to the concrete socialorganization of macro cultural factors is the thrust of activity theory as formulatedby Ratner (1991; 1997; 1999; 2000a, b; 2002a, b). It amalgamates ideas ofVygotsky, Bourdieu, and others. The main emphasis is that psychological phe-nomena are constructed in the process of forming and maintaining macro culturalfactors. Psychological phenomena are therefore part of culture and embody featuresof macro cultural factors. Originating in, embodying, and perpetuating macrocultural factors, psychological phenomena are a cultural factor also. They are aparticular kind of cultural phenomena which can be conceptually distinguishedbut not divorced from the others. Psychological phenomena such as perception,emotions, motivation, memory, personality, intelligence, and mental illness areconceptually distinguishable from other macro factors such as artifacts, culturalactivities, and cultural concepts. However, the form and content of psychologicalphenomena are imbued with those of other macro cultural factors. This is whatgives psychological phenomena a concrete cultural character.

For example, the individualistic self arose as part of the transformation tocapitalist economic activity, and it embodied concrete characteristics of economicrelations and Puritan religion:

The culture of modern individualism emerged most prominently and pervasively in Englandin the century leading to the English Revolution. It began with the rise of a Puritan oppositionin the 1560’s . . . Its constituents were the product of profound changes in the Englisheconomy . . . The increasing role of individual initiative, business acumen, and responsibilityfor success in this new market economy generated a rising group of enterprising rural gentry,yeomen, and artisans . . . The dependence of fortune on an individual’s own actions increasedthe reliance on personal judgment and initiative (Block, 2002, pp. 39–40).

Macpherson (1962) identifies additional concrete features of the individualisticself which derived from emerging capitalist economic and political activities. Theindividualistic self was geared toward competing against others; a hedonisticquest for sensual, material enrichment/pleasure, self-preservation; accepting con-tinual change and uncertainty; alienation and increasing distrust of other peopleand social obligations; utilitarianism; unconcern with issues beyond the indi-vidual’s immediate situation; marketability/commodification of the self; privatelyowning objects and land; and the sense that the individual was the basis ofsociety rather than its product.

These concrete features of the self are only visible by identifying their occur-rence in macro factors where they exist to achieve certain ends in specific ways.

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In contrast, cross-cultural psychologists’ notion of the individualistic self (“em-phasizing personal autonomy and self-fulfillment”) is amorphous because it is notgrounded in real macro factors.

Especially in complex society, individuals are exposed to psychologicalphenomena embedded in multiple cultural activities, artifacts, and concepts.Individuals select and synthesize psychological from this multiplicity. Some busi-nessmen may bring a strong family self into their work and may minimize thepossessive self. Consequently, it is necessary to research individuals to ascertainjust what their cultural psychology is.

Ascertaining the concrete cultural quality of psychology, as it exists for indi-viduals, requires qualitative methods. Qualitative methods elicit extended descrip-tions from subjects and then elucidate the quality of psychological phenomenathrough a contextual, hermeneutical analysis. For instance, the particular qualitiesof romantic love, depression, or problems solving will be elucidated through suchan analysis. Qualitative methodology eschews superficial, artificial, fragmented,simplistic tests and responses. It abandons the fetish of converting psychologicalphenomena to numbers and analyzing these according to mechanical statisticaltests.

Once the quality of psychological phenomena is comprehended, it can becompared with the content of macro cultural factors to determine which aspectsof the latter people have been incorporated into psychology. The qualities ofromantic love, depression, the self, and problem solving can be compared withcharacteristics of social activities (economic activity, religion, family life), artifacts,and cultural concepts. This comparison is one way of indicating the culturalorigins and organization of psychological phenomena.

The cultural origins, characteristics, and functions of psychological phenom-ena can be compared across social systems. The cultural qualities of self and lovein Liberia can be compared with those in Poland. (A qualitative comparison isfar more meaningful than comparing quantitative scores devoid of cultural andpsychological significance.) Moreover, we can compare the macro factors thatgenerate these psychological qualities in various countries. Cross-cultural re-search presupposes in-depth cultural psychology in individual societies. It shouldnot presume and emphasize abstract, transcultural factors devoid of concretecharacter.

Finally, activity theory formulates the relation between biology, culture, andpsychology in a coherent way. It recognizes biology and culture as operating onpsychology in different ways, at different levels of specificity. Vygotsky explainedthat biological mechanisms directly determine elementary functions. These in-clude the behavior of lower animals and infants, and certain adult sensory func-tions such as the just noticeable differences in stimulus properties that we candetect, e.g., between colors, sounds, moving objects, weights. With regard tohigher psychological functions, biology establishes the potential, or capability, tolearn, think, perceive, reason, speak, organize social activities, and produce tools.

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The neocortex is critical for establishing the capacity to develop these, howeverit does not determine that they will develop or what they will be if/when theydo. These capacities are only realized or canalized in specific forms and charac-teristics through cultural processes.

Specific psychological forms and contents are not apportioned into biologicalparts and cultural parts operating according to completely different principles—e.g., the form/structure of language is biologically determined while the contentis culturally constructed. Rather, the form and content of psychology are bothorganized by cultural factors and processes (cf. Tomasello, 1995. 1999; Ratner,1989, 1991, 1998a, b, 2000b, 2003a, b for such a formulation).

A coherent theory of biology, culture, and psychology is more informative thanincoherent, schematic notions about this crucial relationship. It also avoids theconundra of conceptual problems that plague formulations such as Matsumoto’s.Finally, activity theory avoids subordinating culture to biology as many cross-cultural psychologists do.

In summary, the theoretical and methodological approach of activity theorypresents the real, concrete cultural life of people as central to their psychology.

Carl Ratner Lumei Hui

Institute for Cultural Research & Education Dept of Psychology

P.O. Box 1294 Humboldt State University

Trinidad, CA 95570 Arcata, CA 95521

USA USA

http://www.humboldt1.com/~cr2

NOTES

1 In this schema there would be little significance to the universal biological programbecause people mostly express emotions in social situations, and the expression of emo-tions is most important in social situations—where cultural display rules should overridebiological programs. Moreover, if cultural display (and interpretation) rules are dominantin social situations, then the claim (by Ekman, for example) for universal recognition ofexpressions is inexplicable or invalid because it was conducted in social situations wherean experimenter interacted with a subject. Subjects who posed and judged emotionsshould have been affected by cultural rules which should have generated dramatic differ-ences in the research findings. In fact, this is exactly what did happen. Reports of univer-sal similarities in emotional displays, feelings, and recognition are overstated (Ratner,1989, 2000b).

2 There is good reason to suspect that subjects may not have regarded the statementsas contradictory. In the example above, the paired statements can both be true. The firstone implies that weak family ties lead to unsatisfying social relationships. The second oneasserts that weak family ties leads to maturity. There is no contradiction between stating thatweak family ties can have two psychological outcomes. When thinking about these state-ments, the subjects may not have been concerned with handling contradictions because

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they may not have perceived any. With no information about what psychological func-tion is occurring, Peng has no warrant for drawing psychological conclusions from thisdata.

3 Even if the psychological significance of one measure were known, its correlationwith the other would not illuminate the significance of the latter. The two might correlatefor any number of reasons and would not indicate that they had similar meanings.

4 Michell (1999) contends that psychological phenomena are not amenable to quanti-fication and measurement at all. This would call into question all conclusions aboutculture and psychology that were based on psychological measurement.

5 Van de Vijer & Leung’s methodological assumptions never allow new principles tobe considered. They never once mention the existence of alternative methodologicalprinciples such as qualitative methodology. Their chapter exclusively concerns positivisticmethods and refinements thereof. Yet the authors claim that the major goal of theirchapter is to provide a comprehensive overview of methodological issues encountered incross-cultural research (Van de Vijer & Leung, 1997, p. 259). Since qualitative methodsdo not appear in the “comprehensive overview” they must, by implication, not exist, ornot be worth considering. This is a case of defending the status quo through excludingalternatives from consideration rather than through reason.

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Theoretical and Methodological Problems in Cross-Cultural Psychology

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