The Worst Military Disasters - India Post Independence

By

Col Dr Narendar Singh

The best military decisions rightly go down in history as great

events and the people who made them are immortalised for all of

time.

But what about the worst decisions? They also changed the course

of history, but not for the right reasons.

India has fought many conventional wars since independence; it

has also been involved in fighting insurgency and proxy wars

during this period. Many heroes that these wars produced have

become household names. However, these wars also produced heroes

who remain unsung; whose stories of bravery and gallantry are not

so well known.

Fall of Gilgit and Sakrdu 1947

Gilgit Baltistan, a region is legally part of former Princely

State of Jammu and Kashmir. Britain had leased Gilgit, which was

strategic, as also the corridor to Muzaffarabad.from the Maharaja

in 1935 in a lease agreement effective for 60 years and

integrated Gilgit Agency with the North West Frontier Province.

When Gilgit was returned in August 1947, Brigadier Ghansara

Singh, General Staff Officer of J&K State Forces, was appointed

Governor New Delhi ignore a direct warning by Major Onkar Singh

Kalkat about the impending attack planned by General Frank

Messervy, British chief of the Pakistan Army, within days of the

creation of Pakistan? Kalkat had accidentally stumbled on the

conspiracy and was placed under house arrest, but made a daring

escape and reached Delhi on 18 October 1947. Pakistan had already

imposed an economic blockade on J&K.

Governor, Ghansara Singh realised the gravity of the situation on

Gilgit given the attitude of the Scouts, 6th Kashmir Infantry,

civilian local employees, and the local notables. Shockingly

however, he never got a response to any of his appeals from

either Ram Chandra Kak, his successor General Janak Singh, and RL

Batra, the then Deputy Prime Minister, a grave dereliction of

duty on the part of each gentleman.

Yet, instead of rushing arms in anticipation of trouble, Nehru

and the geo-strategically savvy Mountbatten sat unmoved even

after Kalkat’s warning, and enforced further delay by insisting

that Hari Singh first sign the Instrument of Accession before

sending the Army. This led to an erratic Indian position, in 3

communiqués, one omits any reference to Gilgit; this lease also

proves the strategic importance of this land to the West, as

subsequent history has proven. India's only fault: not taking a

firm position on the Gilgit lease, and that erratic wavering

communiqués, which did nothing to ease the problem?

India Not whole of Kashmir of Pakistani Invaders in

1947By the late 1930s, British India consisted of ten provinces

administered in large part by Indian politicians, elected on a

small percentage of the adult franchise, and working under a

British constituted centre. Princely India consisted of over 600

states of varying sizes, making up almost two-fifths of the

Empire. The Princely States were the remains of the various

regional kingdoms conquered by the British in the expansive

phases of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Essentially feudal, these states were associated directly with

the Crown through the principle of `paramountcy', a vague concept

under which the British granted the princes considerable autonomy

of action in exchange for their political loyalty and the

surrendering of foreign policy and defence to the supremacy of

British imperial interests.

Constitutionally, British and Princely India did not co-exist

well with each other. The conflict between representative

government (however limited) and monarchy was fudged during the

long period of constitutional reform that set in at the turn of

the century. From the 1890s until the adoption of the 1935

Government of India Act, the doctrine of Paramountcy shielded the

princes from the need to reform their governments along

representative lines, although some chose to do so through

expedience. By the late 1930s, Jammu and Kashmir had an

indirectly elected assembly (the Praja Sabha) and an embryonic

party-based system made up of the National Conference and the

Muslim Conference. In this regard, the Dogra Kingdom was an

exception, but even so, the Maharaja appointed his Wazir (or

Prime Minister) without regard to party representation within the

assembly, or to wider popular sentiment.

As the British moved towards the inevitability of Indian

independence they attempted to persuade the princes to federate

with a new independent Indian republic, and then, after

Mountbatten's declaration on June 3rd, 1947, to decide between

joining either Pakistan or India.

the Dogra kingdom of Kashmir was one of the few large Princely

States that, due to its geographical location, could join either

India or Pakistan. Moreover, as the British were increasingly

aware throughout the summer of 1947, the Maharaja Hari Singh was

thinking of joining neither state, but of becoming an independent

country in his own right. Jammu and Kashmir had signed stand-

still agreements with India and with Pakistan, but had delayed on

signing the Instrument of Accession. Hari Singh was to hold out

for an independent state until October 1947, when tribal

incursions coming from the vicinity of Poonch, a district close

to the new Pakistani border, forced him to join India in exchange

for Indian military help. In his letter to the Governor-General

of India (Mountbatten) of October 26th the Maharaja blamed

Pakistan for the invasion, alleging that it had failed to honour

the stand-still agreement as part of a concerted effort to coerce

Hari Singh into joining Pakistan. The Maharaja also wrote that he

intended to appoint Sheikh Abdullah, leader of the National

Conference and a man closely associated with Nehru, to the post

of prime minister in a new interim government.

From the perspective of the Indian government, several key events

established the legitimacy of Indian sovereignty over Jammu and

Kashmir. Foremost is the actual signing of the Instrument of

Accession by Maharaja Hari Singh, on or about October 26th, 1947.

This, along with the stand-still agreement, fulfilled the

established procedures whereby Princely India opted to join

either India or Pakistan. In a formal sense, the legality of the

document is not in serious doubt, although some have suggested

that either the signature has been forged, the date changed, or

the whole document fabricated.

Signing of the Instrument of Accession by Maharaja Hari Singh in

October 1947 legitimises India's `occupation' of the area. Now it

was for Indian Government to establish control over the

territories, But Nehru failed to do so and went to United

Nations.

The failure of Indian Government in 1948 led to loss of territory

and a permanent impasse, Iy led to a permanent loss of parts of

Kashmir.

India’s Withdrawal from TibetTibet is bordered by Chinese Turkestan and Mongolia in the north;

by China in the east; by Burma, India, Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal

in the South; and by India (Punjab and Kashmir) in the west.

Bhutan and Sikkim were formerly part of Tibet but are now

separate states under Indian suzerainty. Both Tibet and Nepal

were under Chinese suzerainty, but whereas the Nepalese threw off

Chinese domination, Tibetan efforts to terminate dependence were

never completely successful. However, the term Chinese domination

calls for explanation. Chinese suzerainty meant at first the

overlord-ship of the Manchu Emperors. With their downfall,

Chinese Republican influence in Tibet decreased rapidly and

Chinese Communist influence was considered a menace in Lhasa long

before the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek.

When British rule established itself in India in the nineteenth

century, a number of treaties ensured the settlement of all

controversial relations on the northeastern frontier. In a treaty

between Great Britain and China, concluded in 1890, the former

secured recognition of her protectorate over Sikkim. In 1904,

Great Britain concluded a treaty with Tibet securing an open

trade route frome Kalimpong in India, to Lhasa. Though direct

relations were established between the two countries, Great

Britain recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet in 1906. In 1910

a British Protectorate over Bhutan was established. Thus India,

under British rule, had produced a system of security by which

her northeastern frontier could be considered more or less immune

against the turmoil of Chinese politics. As shown above, the main

elements of this security system were British India's suzerainty

over Bhutan and Sikkim, the free trade route between Kalimpong

and Lhasa opened after Colonel Francis Younghusband's expedition

to Lhasa in 1904, and friendly relations with Nepal which ceased

to be a vassal state in relation to China.

In view of the constant Chinese infiltration into Tibet, British

India had to consider how to maintain a balance of power there.

The Shimla Conference in 1914

1. Tibet was to be divided into two parts: Outer Tibet, adjoining

India and including Lhasa, Shigatse and Chamdo; and Inner Tibet,

including the provinces near China and part of Eastern Tibet.

2. The principle of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was recognized,

but China was to observe strictly her limited position as a

suzerain. Suzerainty implies that internal sovereignty is vested

in the vassal state; in other words China could not, according to

the Convention, infringe upon the internal jurisdiction of the

Dalai Lama's Government.

3. The division of Tibet into Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet implied

the predominant interest of British India in the former and of

China in the latter.

4. Finally, the Chinese were to maintain a representative, called

Amban, in Lhasa. The Amban was later matched by the presence of

the British Indian Mission to the Dalai Lama.

Tibet was obviously to serve as a buffer state without giving up

its autonomy in its own internal affairs. It was also obvious

that British India's action was dictated not only by British

Commonwealth interests but by the natural requirements of any

future Indian policy.

Sir Charles Bell, one of the greatest experts on Tibet, made

clear in his work, "Tibet, Past and Present,"[ii] that if the

Chinese should disturb the Tibetan balance of power as laid down

in the Simla Convention, both Nepal and India would be threatened

Indo-China War 1962 Ill Prepared War and Non Use of Air Force

A disputed Himalayan border was the main pretext for war, but

other issues played a role. There had been a series of violent

border incidents after the 1959 Tibetan Uprising, when India had

granted asylum to the Dalai Lama. India initiated a Forward

Policy in which it placed outposts along the border, including

several north of the MacMohan Line, the eastern portion of a Line

of Actual Control proclaimed by Chinese Premier Zhou En Lai in

1959.

As far as the McMahon Line was concerned India inherited the

dispute with China, which the British had created in the mid-

1930s by seizing the Tibetan territory they re-named NEFA

(Present day Arunachal Pradesh). The PRC government was prepared

to accept that border alignment but insisted that it be re-

negotiated, that it be put through the usual diplomatic process,

to wipe out its imperialist origins. Nehru refused, using

London's claim that the Simla Conference had already legitimised

the McMahon Line.

To back up that refusal — that was his Himalayan blunder. Then in

1954 he compounded that mistake by laying cartographic claim to a

swathe of territory in the north-west, the Aksai Chin, a claim

which was beyond anything the British had ever claimed and on an

area which Chinese governments had treated as their own for at

least a hundred years. To make matters worse, he ruled that there

should be no negotiation over that claim either! So Indian policy

had created a border dispute and also ruled out the only way it

could peacefully be settled, through diplomatic negotiation.

By September 1962 the Indian "forward policy" of trying to force

the Chinese out of territory India claimed had built up great

tension in the Western (Ladakh) sector of the border, with the

Chinese army just blocking it. Then the Nehru government applied

the forward policy to the McMahon Line eastern sector and when

the Chinese blocked that too India in effect declared war with

Nehru's announcement on October 11 that the Army had been ordered

to "free our territory", which meant to attack the Chinese and

drive them back. As General Niranjan Prasad, commander of 4

Infantry Division, wrote later: "We at the front knew that since

Nehru had said he was going to attack, the Chinese were certainly

not going to wait to be attacked" — and of course they didn't.

That's how the war began. The Chinese attack was both reactive,

in that General Kaul had begun the Indian assault on October 10,

and pre-emptive because after that failure the Indian drive had

been suspended to build up strength for a resumed attack.

The Chinese launched simultaneous offensives in Ladakh and across

the McMahon Line on 20 October 1962. Chinese troops advanced over

Indian forces in both theatres, capturing Rezang la in Chushul in

the Western Theatre (Ladakh), as well as Tawang in the Eastern

Theatre (Arunachal Prdesh). The war ended when the Chinese

declared a ceasefire on 20 November 1962, and simultaneously

announced its withdrawal from the disputed area.

The Sino-Indian War is notable for the harsh mountain

conditions under which much of the fighting took place, entailing

large-scale combat at altitudes of over 4,000 metres (14,000

feet). The Sino-Indian War was also noted for the non-deployment

of the navy or air force by either the Chinese or Indian side.

Indo Pak War 1965 Vacating Haji Pir

Following the cease-fire after the Indo-Pak War of 1965, a

Russian sponsored agreement was signed between India and Pakistan

in Tashkent on 10 January 1966. Under the agreement, India agreed

to return the strategic Haji Pir pass to Pakistan which it had

captured in August 1965 against heavy odds and at a huge human

cost. The pass connects Poonch and Uri sectors in Jammu and

Kashmir and reduces the distance between the two sectors to 15 km

whereas the alternate route entails a travel of over 200 km.

India got nothing in return except an undertaking by Pakistan to

abjure war, an undertaking which meant little as Pakistan never

had any intention of honouring it.

Return of the vital Haji Pir pass was a mistake of monumental

proportions for which India is suffering to date. In addition to

denying a direct link between Poonch and Uri sectors, the pass is

being effectively used by Pakistan to sponsor infiltration of

terrorists into India. Inability to resist Russian pressure was a

manifestation of the boneless Indian foreign policy and

shortsighted leadership.

Return of Prisoners to Pakistan without any Resolution

of Kashmir Issue at Shimla

Pakistani Prime Minister Zulifiqar Ali Bhutto and Indian Prime

Minister Indira Gandhi sign an agreement in the Indian town of

Simla, in which both countries agree to "put an end to the

conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their

relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious

relationship and the establishment of a durable peace in the

subcontinent". Both sides agree to settle any disputes "by

peaceful means".

The Simla Agreement designates the ceasefire line of December 17,

1971, as being the new "Line-of-Control (LoC)" between the two

countries, which neither side is to seek to alter unilaterally,

nor which "shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to

the recognised position of either side".

It is this that has given legitimacy to Pakistan.

Entry in to Sri Lanka

From a military perspective also the IPKF operation were a

failure because it failed to separate the LTTE from the Sinhala

forces, much less disarm them. In fact, the IPKF’s efforts to

establish Tamil governments in northern (Jaffna) and eastern

(Trincomalee) Sri Lanka failed spectacularly—they fell within a

few days of the IPKF’s withdrawal in early 1990. Besides, the

IPKF suffered major confusions in discerning its role in Sri

Lanka, with that role changing radically from peace-keeping to

peace-enforcing. Thereafter, an armed force designed to maintain

the peace and disarm the LTTE was called upon to maintain law and

order, suppress the LTTE, and collaborate with the Sinhala forces

against the Tamils. 

The implications of this radical change in the IPKF’s basic

charter  can well be imagine with peace-keepers  turning into an

expeditionary force. Little wonder the IPKF got no cooperation

from the local population; in fact, they turned hostile and

became the eyes and ears of the LTTE. Compounding its constraints

was the fact that the IPKF forces were not equipped or trained

for a counter-militancy operation in another country. They lacked

the arms, training, orientation, even maps  or knowledge of the

local language, customs and cultural norms. No wonder again that

the IPKF took heavy casualties in the initial few weeks of their

transformed role (August-October 1987) before the situation

crystallized.