The unintended consequences of kingpin strategies:kidnap rates and the Arellano-Félix Organization

Nathan Jones

# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Abstract Kingpin strategies— the targeting of the top-levels of terrorist or drugtrafficking organization hierarchies— has become a centerpiece of US and Mexicanefforts to combat drug trafficking. This study addresses the unintended consequen-ces of these strategies by assessing the impact of the arrest or deaths of ArellanoFelix Organization leaders on kidnap and homicide levels from the late 1990’s to2011. Based on the study, the arrest of important AFO “lieutenants” increasedkidnap rates. Arrests or the deaths of organization “kingpins” did not result inincreased homicides or kidnappings, if respected successors were ready to fillleadership vacuums. When leadership succession was in question, the arrest of“kingpins” did result in internecine conflict and thus increased homicide andkidnapping rates. Following internecine conflict, kidnap and homicide ratesdropped, but not to pre-conflict levels. This is likely attributable to the use ofkidnapping and homicide as a dispute resolution mechanism in the growing Tijuanaconsumer drug market.

Keywords AFO . Arellano Felix Organization . Counternarcotics . Decapitationstrikes . High value targets . Kidnapping . Kingpin . Mexican drug traffickingorganizations . Second order effects . Tijuana Cartel

Introduction

“Decapitation” or “kingpin strategies” play an important role in counter-narcotic andcounter-terror policy in both the United States and Mexico (Dudley 2011).

Trends Organ CrimDOI 10.1007/s12117-012-9185-x

N. Jones (*)Alfred C. Glassell III Postdoctoral Fellow in Drug Policy, Rice University’s James A. Baker IIIInstitute for Public Policy, 6100 Main Street, Rice University, Baker Hall, Suite 120, Houston,TX 77005, USAe-mail: npj2@rice.edu

Decapitation strikes involve targeting for arrest the highest levels or core leadershipof terror or criminal networks. While kingpin strategies can be highly effective indisrupting both terror and drug trafficking organizations (DTO’s), they can also haveunintended consequences (Johnson 2010). In the course of in-depth archival andinterview-based research on the history of the Arellano Felix Organization (TijuanaCartel), these consequences, including increased homicide and kidnap rates, becameapparent (Jones and Cooper 2011).1

This is not a polemic against the use of kingpin strategies, but rather an attempt tounderstand the “negative externalities” associated with them. Kingpin strategies inthe fight against the Arellano Felix Organization in the early 2000’s resulted ininternecine conflict that caused homicide and kidnap rates to surge by 2008 (Jones2011b). With the destruction of one faction, which emphasized kidnapping in itsbusiness model, kidnap rates have since declined, but remain higher than their pre-2008 levels (Jones 2011a, b).

Kingpin strategies

A kingpin strategy is the term US law enforcement uses to refer to the targeting forarrest of the leadership of drug trafficking organizations (DTO’s). The strategy canalso be applied to counterterrorism; referring to the strategy of targeting terroristleaders in an attempt to disrupt illicit networks (Dudley 2011; Pachico 2011). Thesestrategies are embodied by the “Consolidated Priority Organization Target” (CPOT)programs of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), which identifies important DTO’sand their leadership (DEA 2006a, b; DEA OCDETF 2010). While these strategiesdisrupt network operations, they can also disrupt them to the point of creatinginternecine conflict, resulting in spikes in homicides as various factions and lieuten-ants vie for control of illicit networks. This has become commonplace in Mexicoamong the various “cartels” as violence surges following the arrest of importantleaders (Guerrero Gutierrez 2010; Jones 2011a, c). The Mexican government arguesthat violence in areas where the military is present is the result of preexistingconditions (Escalante Gonzalbo 2011; Rios 2011). Mexican scholars have counteredthat following the removal of major DTO leaders like Arturo Beltran-Leyva, homi-cides have surged only to return to lower levels; but not as low as the periods beforetheir removal (Guerrero Gutierrez 2010). For supporters of these strategies, the logicis “cut off the head of the beast and the body ceases to function”:

In March 2002, the Office of the Attorney General announced a comprehensivesix-part drug enforcement strategy designed to identify and target the world’smost significant drug supply organizations and their related components. Thecentral element of the strategy was the development of the CPOT List, a rogue’sgallery of international kingpins who were responsible for the “command and

1 The author would like to thank the Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation, which funded 9 monthsof fieldwork in Mexico; the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine, and theCenter for Global Peace and Conflict Studies, which funded preliminary research trips; and the James A.Baker III Institute for Public Policy, where much of the editing of this project was completed.

Trends Organ Crim

control” of the most sophisticated and far reaching drug trafficking and moneylaundering organizations (DEA 2006a, b; DEA 2010).

The above exert from the US attorney general illustrates the emphasis and dom-inance of “kingpin strategies” in counternarcotics and counter-terror operations. Butwhat are the unintended consequences that policy-makers and public officials mustbe aware of when utilizing these strategies? Before we can answer that question, wemust understand the existing literature on the structures of illicit networks, examinethe history and sociology of kidnapping in Tijuana, and analyze the kidnap rates inrelation to important “decapitations.”

Flat versus hierarchical networks

There have been extensive debates about the value of flat versus hierarchical illicitnetworks in the post 9/11 discussions of terrorism and drug trafficking. Kenney hasargued that flatter networks, with fewer layers of management, are more “nimble”and “adaptive” than their “hierarchical” “bureaucratic” state counterparts (Arquillaand Ronfeldt 2001; Kenney 2007a, b). Others like, Privette, have pointed to theadvantages hierarchy provided the Cosa Nostra in surviving the arrest or killing ofkey leadership figures (Privette 2006). But in reality, all illicit networks have varyingdegrees of hierarchy and centralization as they, like governments, face the challengesof managing the free flow of information and the security compartmentalizationprovides (Kenney 2007a). This study provides detail to this debate by specifyingwhen a semi-hierarchical illicit network suffered following decapitation strikes.Increased homicide and kidnap rates are signs of internal network weakness becausethey are signs of profit-starvation and internecine conflict. Thus, this study provides“lessons learned” on how decapitation strikes weaken illicit networks and when illicitnetworks prove themselves resilient to these strategies.

Kidnapping in the context of Mexican drug trafficking

Kidnapping has been an intrinsic part of Mexican drug trafficking since at least the1980’s. Traffickers held members of other organizations to collateralize delivery orpayment of cocaine. Kidnapping has many variants and has taken on a more nefarioustone in drug trafficking in Mexico since 2005. According to the former head of Anti-Organized Crime Unit of the Mexican Federal Attorney General’s Office (SIEDO),the Arellano Felix Organization was the first major Mexican drug trafficking organi-zation to significantly increase its kidnapping prior to President Calderon’s offensiveagainst the cartels beginning December 2006 (Blancas 2008).

Kidnapping can serve numerous functions in drug trafficking. Kidnapping is ameans by which to (1) enforce the payment of drug transactions in the illicitunderworld, (2) enforce the payment of protection services or extortion in the illicitworld, (3) enforce extortion payments in the licit business world and, finally, (4) as aprofit-seeking enterprise in and of itself. Recently, Mexican DTO’s have adopted atactic of kidnapping journalists for the purpose of having their videos broadcast on

Trends Organ Crim

air. This would suggest that kidnapping can also be used for political purposes; apossible fifth function of kidnapping. This is however a new and untested phenomenaand how widespread it is remains to be seen (Malkin 2010). According to lawenforcement sources that specialize in the AFO, kidnapping may be as profitable asdrug trafficking and is motivated by the need of the network to pay the large“overhead” they have due to the number of enforcers they employ (Duncan 2009).

Kidnapping is notoriously difficult to study systematically due to a lack of accuratedata. Most kidnapping data comes from the state, but it is also estimated that 90 % ofkidnappings go unreported because Mexico’s public does not trust law enforcementinstitutions (Thompson 2004). One telling statistic is that it is estimated that Mexicanpolice do not solve 98.5 % of crimes (Shirk 1999, 2006; Shirk and Donnelly 2009).Thus, inference becomes important in attaining a picture of kidnapping in Mexico inspecific geographic locations. What are typical stories of kidnappings? What patternsemerge among these stories from primary sources? And what will this tell us aboutthe structure of the organization and its business model?

Tijuana kidnapping in the 1990’s

In Mexico, kidnapping has long been famous as a means by which to enforce thepayment of drug transaction debts; particularly in the state of Sinaloa. This couldinvolve the kidnapping of the individual who owes money to a drug traffickingorganization or the capture of his family members or business partners. Sometimesvalued cartel members were held as collateral to enforcement the payment of debtsbetween Mexican and Colombian trafficking groups. Kidnapping expanded into ameans by which to enforce protection/extortion payments in the illicit world. How-ever in the Tijuana area, controlled by the Arellano-Felix Organization, the practice ofkidnapping expanded into the extortion of licit businesses and as a business in and ofitself in the years preceding 2008. Most of these kidnappings were attributed to the“El Teo” faction of the organization, led by Eduardo Teodoro Garcia Simental (ElTeo). Before we can discuss this spike in kidnappings, a history of the illicit net-work’s use of kidnapping must be elucidated for context (Duncan 2009).

The AFO was profit-starved in the immediate aftermath of the killing of CardinalArch-Bishop Posadas Ocampo in 1993. AFO gunmen attempting to kill ChapoGuzman of the rival Sinaloa Cartel had mistakenly killed the Cardinal at the Guada-lajara airport in his white Grand Marquis (Caldwell 2007a, b). From 1993 to the late1990’s, all top-level AFO leadership were “laying low,” some in the United States,some engaging in legitimate occupations in rural Mexico. In this period, they madecalculated top-down decisions to engage in kidnapping, typically “as needed” and forhigh-profile targets. Prior to 1993, the AFO rarely engaged in kidnapping, derivingnearly all profits from drug trafficking (Duncan 2009).

These high-profile kidnappings required intelligence on the target’s habits, sur-veillance of the target, safe-houses and the capability to hold the victim for longperiods of time. Typically, the AFO had “inside-information” about the target and acorrupted official within the Mexican anti-kidnap unit. Usually, someone on thetarget’s security detail would make a commission from the ransom for providinginformation. Thus, the intelligence often came to the AFO based upon their

Trends Organ Crim

“reputation for violence” and their reputation for paying commissions to those whoprovided intelligence (Duncan 2009).

The AFO had “offices” where enforcers were expected to be ready to work eachmorning. No advance warning would be given to those participating in a kidnapping.A lieutenant of the organization would arrive at the “office” on the morning of akidnap operation and give minimal instructions to enforcers participating in thekidnapping. Generally, these were instructions on what to wear, what arms to carry,and what type of vehicle to drive. This is an example of information compartmen-talization through procedures within the organization. It is also an example of theneed for security coming into conflict with the need for information flows within anillicit network. The AFO failed in some of their attempts to kidnap high profile targetsduring this period, likely due to the compartmentalization of information. It alsolikely survived this period intact without large numbers of major arrests because of itscompartmentalization (Duncan 2009).

The new kidnap wave (mid-2000’s)

The early 2000’s was a period in which the AFO was considered one of the mostprofitable DTO’s in Mexico. It was at this time that it suffered major arrests and theevents of September 11th resulted in increased US border enforcement. This madedrugs more difficult to traffic across the border and forced some elements of theorganization to diversify their activities into retail drug sales and kidnappings. In theearly to mid-2000’s, an AFO lieutenant, El Cris, began kidnapping more individualsfor smaller and smaller ransoms. In 2004, he was arrested but his brother El Teocontinued the practice with his enforcer cells. This would lead to one of the mostimportant splits within the AFO (Marosi 2008a, c; Ojeda 2008; Reza Gonzalez 2011;Zeta 2010a, 2007).

Eduardo Teodoro Garcia Simental (El Teo) relied heavily on kidnapping as arevenue source. It should be noted that it is universally recognized that El Teoengaged in a much larger use of kidnapping than other factions as per media sources,and interviews with journalists, local citizens, and law enforcement in Mexico and theUnited States (Marosi 2008a).

The kidnapping operations were not sophisticated, though they did include a largenumber of people, cell phones, and safe-houses. Most of the people operating thesekidnap cells were mugrosos young teenagers doing the dirty work of the “cartel.”There was very little previously collected intelligence on the targets and they weretypically not held for very long period; usually 4 to 5 days. The victims were oftenkilled. The advantage to the strategy of using mugrosos is that an illicit networkrelying on them is highly resilient because they can be constantly recruited andreplaced, due to a large number of highly impoverished young people in Mexico(Anonymous Tijuana business leader 2011).

Holding the victims for short periods allowed an increase in the number ofkidnappings that could be undertaken. Once the “El Teo” faction began kidnappingprofessionals and petit bourgeoisie, e.g. taco stand owners, doctors, and engineers,they were kidnapping for much smaller amounts, usually $5,000–10,000 US dollars.This dramatically increased the number of people who could be kidnapped and the

Trends Organ Crim

number of people in Tijuana who had been touched by the phenomena. The psycho-logical impact upon the victims was devastating. Female victims were raped repeat-edly and “would never be the same.” The sense of security of all of the victims wasshattered (Anonymous Tijuana resident 2009; Duncan 2009; Ramos 2011).

Determining the patterns of kidnappings in Tijuana in the 2000’s was very difficult.Initially, it seemed likely that extortion moving from the illicit to the licit worlds targetedcertain industries where the line between the licit and illicit blurred, e.g. an auto-shopcan also be used as a “chop-shop” by breaking down stolen cars and selling their parts.Anecdotally, there did appear to be a pattern to the businesses which were targeted,which included many auto-shops. However, based on interviews of Tijuana residentsand business-owners, the apparent patterns came about very differently.

According to multiple Tijuana citizens and confirmed by anonymous governmentofficials, kidnap victims, usually business-owners, would be abducted and held forransom. They often negotiated their own ransom and were asked for exorbitantamounts. The victim would offer a lower amount which they could produce. Thekidnapping cell would accept the lower amount on the provision that the victimprovide ten names of people who could pay the same amount. In this fashion, thekidnappings occurred along the lines of social networks, e.g. an auto-mechanicknows other auto-mechanics and those of similar socio-economic status. Eventually,kidnappings entered the professionally educated class including doctors, engineers,and lawyers and triggered a societal backlash (Anonymous Tijuana resident 2010;Anonymous Tijuana business leader 2011).

To avoid being kidnapped, an illicit or licit business owner was usually given anopportunity to pay cuota (tax) regularly (the tax is also sometimes referred to as pisoor plaza). Again, anecdotally, the pattern appeared to be that the business-owner had a“protector” whom he could contact to arrange payments. Sometimes payments wouldbecome dramatically larger when for example “the boss has a birthday coming”(Anonymous Tijuana businessman 2011). If a business-owner wanted to shut downhis business, he had to arrange a final payment; usually larger than his regularpayments. This was not uncommon in the period in which the Fernando SanchezArellano “El Ingeniero” faction and the “El Teo” faction of the AFO were ininternecine conflict from 2008 to 2010. One business owner lamented being toldby police that it was “not a good time to be in business,” fatalistically acknowledgingthat they could not keep the business safe (Anonymous Tijuana business leader2011). Business people paying cuota, or extortion tax, were also given an opportunityto provide ten names of people that would not be kidnapped based on this arrange-ment. This usually included immediate family and employees. There were alsoanecdotal accounts of kidnap victims being asked for lists of names of other potentialkidnap victims (Anonymous Tijuana business leader 2011).

After the experience of narco-juniors in the 1990’s, Tijuana society wanted aseparation between “polite society” and the criminal under-world; although therewere some who may have blurred the line. The Rhon family and other Tijuana elitesare reported to have functioned as the money-laundering side of the illicit criminalworld in Tijuana, though this has never been proven (Bergman 2000). The criminalworld was allowed to function and was largely ignored provided that “polite society,”the elites of the licit world, went unmolested (Anonymous Tijuana business leader2011; Anonymous Tijuana resident 2010).

Trends Organ Crim

Kidnappings of those who were uninvolved in illegitimate activities and owners ofmiddle-class businesses, were shocking to Tijuana society. Doctors installed panic-rooms in their offices and threatened to refuse to treat police officers and the public,until the kidnappings of doctors ended (Anonymous family member of Tijuana doctor2009; Marosi 2008b). The abduction of Dr. Guzman “the general surgeon of a leadingTijuana hospital,” was a turning point:

Guzman’s abduction came amid a plague of crime targeting the city’s medicalcommunity. About 20 doctors have been kidnapped and dozens have receivedcalls demanding as much as $50,000, according to the city’s medical associa-tions (Marosi 2008b).

In response to the kidnappings, civil society groups representing doctors mobilizedand threatened a strike. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Guzman was released (Marosi 2008b).

Kidnapping was at the center of the split between the “El Teo” and the FernandoSanchez Arellano “El Ingeniero” factions in April of 2008. The “El Ingeniero”faction believed the Teo cells were “calentando la plaza,” that is “heating up theturf,” with too many kidnappings and drawing negative attention which could hurt thedrug trafficking business. El Teo believed El Ingeniero was a weak leader who hadinherited leadership from his uncles; a spoiled child not from the Tijuana streets andunworthy of leadership in the organization. He also needed the profits kidnappingbrought his faction, while El Ingeniero needed a calm plaza to traffic drugs andoperate money laundering front-businesses. Neither El Teo nor El Ingeniero waspresent for the violent April 2008 gun-battle on the streets of Tijuana that markedtheir split (Fox News 2009; Marosi 2008c).

Most Tijuana citizens attributed kidnappings to the “El Teo” faction of theArellano Felix Organization. This is consistent with media reports which suggestedthat El Teo had a network of kidnapping houses and kidnap cells throughout Tijuana(Anonymous Tijuana businessman 2011; Anonymous Tijuana resident 2009; Marosi2008a). He also had a higher propensity for violence and the public use ofviolence. He employed “El Pozolero” who used acid to dissolve the bodies of cartelvictims. El Teo is rumored to have had a drug-use problem though this is uncon-firmed (cristal or methamphetamine). This, in addition to his youthful and inexperi-enced leadership, could have contributed to higher levels of violence (Marosi 2008a).

El Teo had many advantages in the internecine conflict with El Ingeniero. First, heand his brothers were Tijuana natives. They had grown up within the city and hadoperated as enforcers there for most of their lives. It is reported that El Teo and hisbrother began their illicit careers in human-smuggling, guiding undocumented aliensacross the border on foot. Second, El Teo was able to establish a 6-month alliancewith the Sinaloa cartel led by Chapo Guzman and Mayo Zambada. Widely consid-ered the most powerful cartel in Mexico, this alliance provided El Teo with the drugconnections he lacked. The Sinaloa cartel had already taken control of Mexicali by2004, facilitating this alliance. Third, El Teo had extensive contacts within the localpolice force (Anonymous Tijuana resident 2009). Fourth, El Teo’s use of publicviolence was very high (Carroll 2010; Ellingwood 2009; Jones 2011a; Marosi2008c). He was known for leaving the decapitated heads of victims on top of vatsof acid where their bodies were dissolved. This, in effect, defeated the purpose of

Trends Organ Crim

having a Pozolero to hide the carnage, but had a strong psychological impact uponrival cartels and the local population (de Mauleon 2009; Dudley 2010; Marosi2008a). He was known for having many local police on his payroll but also forkilling police that did not cooperate with him.2 Such violence was a “double-edgedsword” for this faction. It terrorized and cowed the population into submission, butalso led to a societal backlash (Kenney 2007a) Fig. 1.

Figure 2 shows average registered monthly kidnappings in Tijuana for the yearsfrom January 2006 to September 2011 and makes the relationship between interne-cine illicit network conflict and kidnapping clear (SSP 2012). Before 2008, theaverage number of monthly kidnappings was 2.5 and 1.17 in 2006 and 2007,repectively. It spiked dramatically in 2008 to 7.67 and 2009 to 7.92, coinciding withthe AFO’s internecine conflict. The average number of monthly kidnappings in 2010was 5.67, lower than the internecine conflict period, but still higher than previousyears. By 2011, average monthly kidnapping were down to 4.33 (data throughSeptember 2011) (SSP 2012). There are multiple explanations for this new higherrate of kidnapping following the AFO’s internecine conflict (Jones 2011c).

The first has to do with the data. Following the Calderon administration’s “war” onorganized crime, local governments received federal money if their area was identi-fied as prone to organized crime violence. Thus, the issue may be that local and state

2 Before El Teo’s arrest in January 2010, I visited Tijuana in 2009 and noticed that municipal police alwaystravelled in groups of two trucks, with at least two men each sitting in the truck bed with automaticweapons. Motorcycle police, that typically enforce traffic violations individually, rode in groups of three.Seven months after Teo’s January 2010 arrest, Police appeared calmer and rode in their trucks with onepartner in the cab with them and no one in the truck bed. This is evidence of the impact that Teo’s arrest hadon the Tijuana psyche. It has calmed municipal police by reducing the daily threat of police assassination(Anonymous Tijuana resident 2009).

Fig. 1 Kidnappings in Tijuana as reported by the SSP (2012) Baja California

Trends Organ Crim

governments have been incentivized to keep better or inflate counts of violent crimes(Ilescas 2011).

A second explanation has to do with the remnants of the “El Teo” faction. Notevery member of the illicit network has been arrested or killed following this period.Some were annexed by the Sinaloa Cartel in a highly compartmentalized fashion(Borderland Beat 2010; Zeta 2011). Others were killed or rejoined the Cartel ArellanoFelix. Still others likely continue to free-lance as kidnap cells without paying taxes ortribute to a larger trafficking network. Finally, the environment of legal impunity createdlikely encouraged newcomers and amateur cells (Jones 2011b; Zeta 2010a, b, c, 2011).

AFO spin-off kidnap cells—Los Palillos

Kidnapping can also serve to assist in the cannibalization process of the illicitnetwork. The case of Los Palillos or the “toothpicks” is illustrative. The kidnap cellleadership had a personal conflict with AFO leadership. They relocated their oper-ations to the United States to kidnap wealthy members of the AFO residing in theUnited States. They utilized their knowledge of those involved in the network to“spin-off” into their own group, which could profit from the exploitation of theirknowledge. They were eventually captured by authorities that were notified by thewife of a victim in the United States. Los Palillos could be considered an example of“spillover” violence from Mexico into the United States. It should be noted that thisspillover violence is typically directed toward members of the illicit network

Fig. 2 Average monthly kidnappings Tijuana as reported by SSP (2012)

Trends Organ Crim

themselves. The Los Palillos story is also an example of self-cannibalization ofcompartmentalized illicit networks. In the words of one cross-border taskforcemember, “these guys make their own enemies (Duncan 2009).” The “need forsecurity,” results in a compartmentalization of an illicit network into cells, whichare loyal to each other, but not necessarily to the larger network (Kenney 2007a).

Kidnapping in Tijuana post AFO conflict

Following the AFO internecine conflict, kidnapping in Tijuana also appearslinked to narcomenudeo or retail drug trafficking. Kidnapping is used toenforce payment on drug trafficking debts among those involved in sellingdrugs locally in Tijuana. A recent case is illustrative. A mother and son werekidnapped in an urban area in Tijuana. According to a Baja California statekidnap unit representative, they were both involved in local drug trafficking anddistribution (Jones 2011b). Drug consumption has been on the rise in Mexicodue to a number of factors including the emergence of methamphetamine as aninexpensive synthetically produced drug, the hardening of the US border, and adeliberate strategy by MDTO’s to diversify their consumer markets beyond theUS consumer (Jones 2011b).

The relationship between “decapitation strikes” and the kidnap rate in BajaCalifornia

I attempt here to establish a relationship between the removal by arrest or killing ofkey AFO leaders and the kidnapping rate in Baja California by analyzing the ICESIkidnap data for Baja California and SSP state and local data, in the context ofdisruptive events within the AFO and based upon what position within the hierarchythey occupy. The general argument is that when the AFO is profit-starved,“enforcers” raise funds by engaging in more kidnapping. This argument was identi-fied in interviews of law enforcement officers who had, in turn, learned about thephenomenon from interrogations of Arellano Felix Organization members and duringwiretapped conversations (Duncan 2009).

The removal of high-ranking AFO leaders with critical business ties can increasethe network’s propensity for kidnapping. In addition to demonstrating the importanceof those with business connections in the organization to the kidnap rate and totalkidnappings, the analysis revealed that charismatic enforcement-oriented leadersprovided control over enforcer cells and their removal also accelerated kidnappings.Using the logic of John Stuart Mill for establishing causation, proper time-order,correlation, and a causal mechanism are needed to demonstrate a link betweeninternal AFO events and changes in the number of kidnappings in Baja California(Mill 2009).

Figure 3 shows the number of kidnappings in Baja California from 1997 to 2009as reported by Instituto Ciudano de Estudios Sobre la Inseguridad (ICESI) withimportant AFO “decapitations” marked. Baja California data provides a better basisof analysis over a longer time-span than solely Tijuana kidnap data for numerous

Trends Organ Crim

reasons. First, it includes Tijuana. Second, the AFO plaza or territory at differentpoints in this epoch included Rosarito, Ensenada, and, at different points, Tecate andMexicali—all of which are included in Baja California. Third, ICESI aggregate datais more accessible (ICESI 2010).

All of these statistics should be considered suspect due to underreporting, probablyby a factor of 10. Historically, in Mexico there has been a lack of trust in local andstate police many of which are feared to be involved in kidnapping. Also, threats tovictims and their families may result in underreporting by victims.3 Nonetheless, thisgraph demonstrates data and trends that fit with the qualitative history of the AFO, theaccounts of local citizens, and the relationship of profit-starvation to increasedkidnappings.

The arrest in 1997 of “Kitty” Páez, a key AFO lieutenant and leader of a narco-junior cell in Tijuana, had a detrimental effect on the AFO. It led directly to JesusBlancornelas, editor of Zeta Magazine, publishing stories on the AFO which DavidBarron Corona, an important enforcer lieutenant and connection to the Logan Streetgang and La Eme prison gang, decided to kill him for. In the attempt, Corona waskilled by ricochet fire and died. The loss of these two important figures could explainthe spike in kidnappings in the area in the following year. Kitty Páez had married animportant Tijuana businessman’s daughter. He had important business connectionsand profitable narco-juniors working for him (Caldwell 2007a, b).

David Barron Corona was an important enforcer lieutenant commanding loyaltywithin the AFO and likely control over many other “soldiers” recruited from his

3 Voluntary and anonymous surveys conducted regularly throughout Mexico might help to provide a moreaccurate picture of the kidnapping problem than reports based on statistics provided by law enforcementinstitutions that lack the faith of the populace. Indeed, websites like www.notecalles.org.mx appear toattempt to address this issue in this fashion by allowing Mexican citizens to self-report crime anonymously(No Te Calles - No+Inseguridad 2010).

Fig. 3 Kidnappings and kidnap rates per 100,000 Baja California (ICESI 2012)

Trends Organ Crim

Logan Street Gang and La Eme prison gang. The loss of these two figures representedthe loss of profits and control over enforcers within the organization. According tolaw enforcement interviews, with lower profits and the same number of enforcers tobe paid, the organization found alternative sources of profit. Kidnapping for ransomwas one of those alternatives according to California Department of Justice Investi-gator Steve Duncan, a member of the AFO taskforce (Duncan 2009).

Without Corona, there may not have been sufficient control over low-level soldiersto prevent the rise in kidnappings in 1998. The year 1999, however, sees a drop inkidnappings, which suggests that the AFO may have reasserted control over theorganization to minimize kidnappings, which draw negative attention to the drugtrafficking business.

The arrest of Jesus “Chuy” Labra Aviles, chief financial adviser to the organizationand Ismael Higuera Guerrero, formerly the operational head of the organization forTijuana while Benjamin and Ramon were “laying low” in the 1990’s, saw a slightincrease in the number of kidnappings in Tijuana in 2000 (Duncan 2009).

The most interesting finding of the analysis is the most counterintuitive. The lossof the most important figures in the organization saw no increase in the number ofkidnappings, but rather a slight decrease. Benjamin Arellano Felix was the strategichead of the organization and his brother Ramon was the chief enforcer. They werearrested and killed, respectively, in short order in March 2002. This lack of a surge inkidnappings following their removal can be attributed to the control maintained bytheir brother El Tigrillo who was very experienced by 2002 and was able to maintainfirm control over the organization. This suggests Privette’s view that hierarchyprovides advantages in terms of clear lines of succession that allow criminal organ-izations to continue to function efficiently is accurate (Privette 2006).

Another possible factor may have been the funneling of profits upward. If Ramonand Benjamin, at the top of the AFO, were owed a great deal of payments from belowas a form of internal taxation, the removal of these figures and replacement with ElTigrillo may have reduced the payments owed to the peak of the AFO by consoli-dating two payments into one. It should be noted that these are plausible butspeculative explanations.

The greatest spike in kidnappings is attributable to a split in the organization, adirect result of the removal of El Tigrillo and later El Doctor from leadershippositions in the AFO. This allowed El Teo to fragment the organization into interne-cine conflict and focus his business model on kidnapping, in part, because he hadlittle access to drug profits. The drop in kidnappings in 2009, though they remained ata higher level than previous years, could be attributed to the truce established betweenthe two factions as they reinforced their organizations after high levels of violence in2009. Part of that truce may have included the reduction of kidnappings to reducesocietal backlash. This interpretation is consistent with media and law enforcementreports at the time (Zeta 2011; Marosi 2008a, c, 2009). See the Fig. 4, below, for anillustration of monthly kidnap, homicide, and extortion cases with the arrest andkilling of key AFO figures noted. The data was entered by hand into a spreadsheetfrom PDF files from the Baja California Secretary of Security Website (SSP 2012).

Once kidnapping is widespread, as it became in 2008 (as depicted in Fig. 4), it islikely to remain high. There are, and will continue to be, many kidnap cells operatingwithout access to drug trafficking profits in Tijuana. They will continue until they are

Trends Organ Crim

arrested or killed. This is likely to occur even if kidnap cells do not have permissionfrom cartel leaders that have been weakened by internecine conflict. Many kidnap-ping cells may be operating as free-lance cells, with no permission to kidnap fromlarger trafficking networks and no affiliation with them. This may explain manyrecent arrests of kidnapping cells. Larger trafficking organizations with superiorintelligence may provide this intelligence to police to remove these cells and garnersupport from the population, as insurgencies do (Brands 2009).4

The relationship between the removal of cartel figures and the number of kidnap-pings appears to be caused by a combination of (1) the importance of figure beingremoved, (2) his ability to produce profits, and (3) his ability to exert control overenforcers for the organization. Interestingly, it is not the removal of top figures thatincreases the number of kidnappings (if successors are in place) nor is it the countlessnumber of low-level enforcers who are arrested daily. Rather, it is the removal of mid-level lieutenants that appeared to most increase kidnappings. This finding is logicalgiven the important operational role these lieutenants play in compartmentalized drugtrafficking organizations (Kenney 2007a).

Thus, the relationship between the cartel figure removed through arrest or deathand kidnapping is parabollically related to his importance in the organization; “themore in the middle” a figure is, the more his arrest will increase kidnappings. Theexception to this rule is when a top level leader is removed and his successors lack

4 This argument posits that certain factions of the organization became profit-starved while others may havecontinued to thrive. The profit-starved factions began to focus on the taxation of territory and the expansioninto “high impact” crime like kidnapping and extortion. This was especially true in the internecine conflictperiod where the enforcers of the Teo faction attempted to take control of the territory and network. Thus,the argument is not dependent upon a commensurate reduction in drug trafficking, which might bemeasured or correlated with a reduction in confiscated drugs at the border. Rather drug confiscations atthe border would represent an irrelevant variable because another portion of the illicit network continued totraffic.

Fig. 4 Homicides, kidnappings and extortion cases in Tijuana (SSP 2012)

Trends Organ Crim

sufficient legitimacy within the organization to prevent internal conflict from profit-starved lieutenants in need of new revenue streams. Also, the presence of kidnap cellswith no access to drug trafficking profits will keep kidnapping at a higher level untilthey are removed from the system, which may be a long and daunting process(Duncan 2009).

It is important to rule out the possibility that these surges in kidnappings are notattributable to other causes. One alternative hypothesis is that the surges in kidnap-ping in Tijuana were not attributable to what was happening inside the AFO, butresulted from broader economic trends. The Mexican peso collapse of 1994 was asevere economic dislocation that might have had a delayed impact upon kidnap ratesin Mexico; potentially explaining increases in petty crime and kidnappings for profitin 1998. However, as Fig. 5 illustrates, Tijuana’s kidnap rate surges cannot beexplained by national kidnap rates; thus ruling out the economic dislocation alterna-tive hypothesis.

During the internecine conflict between El Teo and El Ingeniero, the Sinaloa Cartelestablished a presence and cells inside Tijuana. Some suggest that the arrest of El Teowas arranged by the Sinaloa cartel (his one time ally) to reduce violence in theTijuana corridor, though this is not verifiable. Remembering its violent split with theBeltran-Leyva Organization, the Sinaloa Cartel kept its Tijuana affiliates operatingautonomously and in competition with each other (Zeta 2011). Based upon reducedviolence levels, arrests, statements from the arrested and interviews of Tijuanabusinessmen, the Sinaloa Cartel appears to have achieved some sort of arrangementwith the remaining elements of the AFO to minimize violence; despite their longhistory of animosity (Jones 2011d).

Notably absent from this discussion is the role of the state security institutionsincluding the military and municipal police in the reduction of kidnapping. These

Fig. 5 National and Baja California kidnap rates (ICESI 2011)

Trends Organ Crim

institutions played a role in reducing kidanapping, but did so in the context ofassisting in the elimination of the El Teo faction. In this sense, the successes of thestate had less to do with an improved capacity to address kidnapping and more to dowith swaying the results of the internecine conflict in favor of groups that did notengage in the activity (Jones 2012b). Thus, even though the state security apparatusplayed a role in reducing kidnappings, it was in the context of illicit networkinternecine conflict dynamics, the level of analysis used here.

Through early 2012 the AFO and the Sinaloa cartel maintain a presence in Tijuana.Despite the presence of two large illicit networks, Tijuana has lower levels ofviolence than the internecine conflict era. This suggests that the two illicit networksare not in open conflict with each other and have achieved some sort of truce. TheNovember 2011 arrest of Juan Francisco Sillas Rocha a key enforcer lieutenant for ElIngeniero and his statements to police appear to confirm the truce assessment and alsosuggest that the AFO is stronger than many believe (Jones 2011d). The extemely lowlevels of kidnappings in early 2012 further suggest that kidnapping is a crime illicitnetworks in Tijuana strongly discourage (Jones 2011d, 2012a).

Conclusions

Kingpin strategies can effectively disrupt and fragment an illicit network, whether it beinsurgent or profit-seeking. However, the consequences of that disruption can be dire forthe society in which these illicit networks are embedded. Consequences may includeincreased kidnap, extortion, and homicide rates. Homicide rates increase as members ofthe network struggle to fill the leadership vacuums left by the removal of leadershipfigures.When there are clear successors, this does not occur until a network is decapitatedto the point that it has no clear succession. Hierarchy thus can have advantages for illicitnetworks in addition to increasing their vulnerabilities (Kenney 2007a; Privette 2006).

An identifiable hierarchy becomes more susceptible to decapitation strike, but canprevent internal succession struggles when the network loses leadership figures.Kidnap rates generally change when cells within a network are profit-starved.Sometimes this is the result of a lack of trafficking connections— be they source ordistribution connections—which would allow them to become highly profitable drugtraffickers (Duncan 2009; Kenney 2007a).

Decapitation or kingpin strategies may be most disruptive to kidnap rates when keylieutenants who provide control over low level enforcers, or lieutenants who generateprofits for the network, are removed. For example, the arrest of Kitty Páez and the deathof David Barron Corona appear to have resulted in the increase in kidnapping the nextyear according 1998 ICESI data which shows a significant spike in kidnappings. Thus,the removal of lieutenants who serve as key managers and control the periphery of thenetwork for the core may be more important for understanding kidnap spikes than theremoval of strategic leadership (Kenney 2007a) (see Appendix).

The removal of the strategic leadership appears to be most important when there isa lack of legitimate succession depth as the analysis of SSP data demonstrated.Eventually, if sufficient state or rival network pressure is applied, the line of succes-sion is exhausted and internal struggles raise violence in terms of homicide andkidnap rates, as the need to establish new revenue streams arises for enforcer-heavy

Trends Organ Crim

networks (Duncan 2009; Privette 2006). A similar pattern is apparent in the splitbetween the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas. The split was structurally preconditioned onthe arrest and later extradition of leader Gulf Cartel leader Osiel Cardenas Guillen in2007. While actual fighting between the two did not occur until 2010, the conflictwould not have been possible had Cardenas not been extradited from his Mexicanprison cell, resulting in the Zetas declaring independence in 2007 (Insight Crime2010). The Los Zetas’ business model emphasizes kidnapping and extortion morethan that of the long-time traffickers of the Gulf Cartel. Just as decapitations of theAFO resulted in more kidnapping by one faction of the AFO, a Gulf Cartel decap-itation led to an increase in kidnappings by Los Zetas. Thus, this analysis appears tohave broader applicability; especially in the Mexican context.

This analysis has provided important insights into the unintended consequences ofkingpin strategies that law enforcement and counter-terror agencies should considerwhen arresting or killing leadership figures of various levels and social networkpositions. It adds specificity to debates about the advantages of “flat” versus hierarchicalnetwork resilience (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001). More studies of a wider variety andnumber of illicit networks could help to glean further lessons from the relationshipbetween decapitation strikes and increased kidnap and homicide rates in the regionswherein illicit networks function. Studies of this kind could help to increase understand-ing of the unintended consequences of kingpin strategies and how to prepare for them.

Acknowledgments I would like to take this opportunity to thank my dissertation committee membersProfessors Caesar Sereseres, Etel Solingen, Kamal Sadiq and Louis Desipio. I would also like to thankSteve Duncan of the California Department of Justice for opening important doors for me in the course ofmy research on the AFO. Finally, I would like to thank the Institute Global Conflict and Cooperation(IGCC), the UC Irvine Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies (CGPACS) and the UC IrvineDepartment of Political Science for funding various phases of research on which this analysis is based.

Appendix

Data

ICESI annual kidnap data

1997 28 1

1998 72 3

1999 23 1

2000 47 2

2001 25 1

2002 22 1

2003 20 1

2004 9 0

2005 9 0

2006 38 1

2007 20 1

Trends Organ Crim

2008 115 4

2009 103 3

2010 79 2

2011 64

ICESI Baja/National Kidnap Rates

Year Kidnap Rate Baja California Kidnap Rate National

1997 1 1

1998 3 1

1999 1 1

2000 2 1

2001 1 1

2002 1 0

2003 1 0

2004 0 0

2005 0 0

2006 1 1

2007 1 0

2008 4 1

2009 3 1.1

2010 2 1.1

Secretaria de Seguridad Publica (SSP) data on homicides, kidnappings and extortioncases in Tijuana.

Homicides - Tijuana Kidnappings Tijuana Extortions in Tijuana

2006-1-January 25 3 10

2006-2 -February 27 3 5

2006-3-march 20 1 4

2006-4-april 26 3 5

2006-5-may 27 4 10

2006-6-june 28 1 23

2006-7-july 25 5 17

2006-8-august 29 3 21

2006-9-September 32 0 23

2006-10-october 26 3 20

2006-11-november 23 1 7

2006-12-December 26 3 19

2007-1-January 22 0 13

2007-2 -February 27 0 19

2007-3-march 24 2 12

2007-4-april 25 2 5

Trends Organ Crim

2007-5-may 22 1 7

2007-6-june 32 0 7

2007-7-july 22 4 7

2007-8-august 27 1 7

2007-9-September 24 0 11

2007-10-october 23 1 6

2007-11-november 38 2 8

2007-12-December 24 1 6

2008-1-January 30 11 5

2008-2 -February 33 11 7

2008-3-march 48 10 11

2008-4-april 42 10 10

2008-5-may 21 5 17

2008-6-june 33 3 29

2008-7-july 28 5 14

2008-8-august 29 5 4

2008-9-September 32 7 11

2008-10-october 87 7 23

2008-11-november 123 16 19

2008-12-December 71 2 17

2009-1-January 56 7 14

2009-2 -February 36 9 14

2009-3-march 47 12 21

2009-4-april 38 7 9

2009-5-may 43 15 9

2009-6-june 31 3 9

2009-7-july 41 3 9

2009-8-august 51 5 18

2009-9-September 45 5 26

2009-10-october 32 5 17

2009-11-november 38 12 22

2009-12-December 98 12 18

2010-1-January 99 9 19

2010-2 -February 51 3 19

2010-3-march 57 4 23

2010-4-april 54 5 25

2010-5-may 50 6 25

2010-6-june 44 6 22

2010-7-july 52 6 20

2010-8-august 45 9 16

2010-9-September 58 5 21

2010-10-october 50 3 14

2010-11-november 69 7 13

2010-12-December 59 5 15

Trends Organ Crim

2011-1-January 51 4 18

2011-2-February 27 11 13

2011-3-March 45 4 9

2011-4-April 28 4 16

2011-5-May 42 4 6

2011-6-June 41 5 8

2011-7-July 35 1 14

2011-8-August 38 0 11

2011-9-September 33 6 14

Oct-11 28 4 12

Nov-11 24 1 11

Dec-11 26 1 19

Jan-12 39 1 19

Feb-12 22 0 26

Mar-12 24 1 16

Apr-12 26 0 12

May-12 27 1 14

References

Anonymous interview of family member of Tijuana doctor (2009)Anonymous interview with Tijuana business leader (2011). 15 FebAnonymous interview with Tijuana businessman (2011). JulAnonymous interview with Tijuana resident (2009)Anonymous interview with Tijuana resident (2010). JulArquilla J, Ronfeldt D (eds) (2001) Networks and netwars: the future of terror, crime, and militancy.

National Defense Research Institute (RAND), United States Department of Defense, Office of theSecretary of Defense, Santa Monica, http://ed.informata.com/liburl.asp?productid=0833032356&customerid=002217 http://www.rand.org/PUBS/index.html

Bergman L (2000) Frontline: murder money & Mexico: family tree: the Hanks. Documentary. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/mexico/family/bergman.html

Blancas J (2008) El cártel de Tijuana, número uno en secuestros. El Mexicano, http://www.el-mexicano.com.mx/informacion/noticias/1/3/estatal/2008/05/31/272020/el-cartel-de-tijuana-numero-uno-en-secuestros.aspx. 31 May

Borderland Beat (2010) El Tomate reveals the Sinaloa cartel’s methods of operation. http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2011/01/el-tomate-reveals-sinaloa-cartels.html. 12 Jan

Brands H (2009) Mexico’s narco-insurgency and U.S. counterdrug policy. Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub918.pdf

Caldwell R (2007a) Cartel secrets. San Diego Union Tribune, http://ww.uniontrib.com/uniontrib/20070701/news_lz1e1cartel.html

Caldwell R (2007b) Cold-blooded killers. The San Diego Union Tribune, http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20070701/news_lz1e1killers.html. 1 Jul

Carroll R (2010) US has lost faith in Mexico’s ability to win drugs war, WikiLeaks cables show. TheGuardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/02/us-mexico-drugs-war-wikileaks. 2 Dec

de Mauleon H (2009) Tijuana. En la colina de El Pozolero. Nexos, http://www.nexos.com.mx/?P=leerarticulov2print&Article=729. 8 Jan

Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) (2006a) Three Islands, $70 Million in assets seized in DEA drug bust:“Operation Twin Oceans” nets most-wanted kingpin and 52 tons of cocaine Brazil, Colombia, Panama& U.S. involved in arrests, http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr051706.html

Trends Organ Crim

Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) (2006b) DEA Dismantles International Black Tar Heroin TraffickingGroup: Nationwide Coalition of Agencies Target Drug Organization with U.S.-Mexico Ties. NewsRelease, http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/states/newsrel/atlanta081606.html. 16 Aug

Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). Programs, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF)(2010) http://www.justice.gov/dea/programs/ocdetf.htm

Dudley S (2010) Tijuana cartel. Insightcrime.org. Retrieved from http://www.insightcrime.org/criminal-groups/mexico/tijuana-cartel/item/193-tijuana-cartel-profile?tmpl=component&type=raw

Dudley S (2011) Bin Laden, the drug war and the kingpin strategy. Insight Crime, http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/847-insight-bin-laden-the-drug-war-and-the-kingpin-strategy. 2 May

Duncan S (2009) Interview with US law enforcement investigator focused on Arellano Felix Organization(California Department of Justice). (N. Jones, ed.).

Ellingwood K (2009) Actually violence is down— so say the numbers. Los Angeles Times, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-mexico-murder22-2009aug22,0,3018278.story

Escalante Gonzalbo F (2011) Homicidios 2008–2009 Lamuerte tiene permiso. Nexos, http://www.nexos.com.mx/?P=leerarticulo&Article=1943189. 1 Mar

Fox News (2009) Massive gunbattles break out in Tijuana; 13 dead, 9 wounded. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,352739,00.html. 29 Dec

Guerrero Gutierrez E (2010) Cómo reducir la violencia en México. Nexos, http://www.nexos.com.mx/?P=leerarticulo&Article=1197808. 3 Nov

ICESI (2010) Eventos realizados sobre inseguridad. http://www.icesi.org.mx/estadisticas/estadisticas_oficiales.asp. Accessed 1 Dec 2011

ICESI (2011) Eventos realizados sobre inseguridad. http://www.icesi.org.mx/estadisticas/estadisticas_oficiales.asp

ICESI (2012) Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios Sobre la Inseguridad, A.C. http://alec.com.mx/uploads/links/96/U7._249_ICESI_-_Instituto_Ciudadano_de_Estudios_Sobre_la_Inseguridad,_A.C._(2012-04-06_20-00-37).htm. Accessed 12 Dec 2012

Ilescas (2011) Interview with author on violence in Northern Mexico. (N. Jones, ed.). MarInsight Crime (2010) WikiLeaks: a gulf cartel attack; a Zetas’ retreat, http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-

news/item/383-wikileaks-a-zetas-retreat-to-monterrey. 27 DecJohnson T (2010) Mexico finds killing drug kingpins can add to mayhem. MiamiHerald.com, http://

www.miamiherald.com/2010/11/11/1920346/mexico-finds-killing-drug-kingpins.html. 12 NovJones N (2011a) Report tracks how intra-cartel wars exploded inMexico. Insight Crime, http://insightcrime.org/

insight-latest-news/item/548-insight-report-tracks-how-intra-cartel-wars-exploded-in-mexico. 9 FebJones N (2011b) Kidnapping in Tijuana: the new normal. Insight Crime, http://insightcrime.org/insight-

latest-news/item/1002-kidnapping-in-tijuana-the-new-normal. 31 MayJones N (2011c) Cartel lieutenant’s capture could bring Tijuana a step closer to war. Insight Crime,

http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/1248-cartel-lieutenant%E2%80%99s-capture-could-bring-tijuana-a-step-closer-to-war. 18 Jul

Jones N (2011d) The state reaction: a theory of illicit network resilience (Dissertation). University ofCalifornia, Irvine, Irvine. 30 Nov

Jones N (2012a) Tijuana cartel survives, despite decade-long onslaught. http://www.insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/2790-tijuana-cartel-survives-despite-decade-long-onslaught. 20 Jun

Jones N (2012b) “Tijuana’s New Calm Shows Benefits of Local Policing in Mexico”, http://www.insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/2672-tijuanas-new-calm-shows-benefits-of-local-policing-in-mexico. 24 May

Jones N, Cooper S (2011) Tijuana’s uneasy peace may endure, despite arrests. http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/1854-tijuanas-uneasy-peace-may-endure-despite-arrests. 16 Nov

Kenney M (2007a) From Pablo to Osama: trafficking and terrorist networks, government bureaucracies,and competitive adaptation. Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip075/2006037198.html

Kenney M (2007b) The architecture of drug trafficking: network forms of organisation in the Colombiancocaine trade. Global Crime 8:233–259

Malkin E (2010) Mexican journalists’ captors demand broadcast of videos. New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/29/world/americas/29mexico.html?scp=5&sq=kidnapping%20in%20mexico&st=cse. 29 Jul

Marosi R (2008a) Mystery man blamed for gruesome Tijuana deaths. LA Times, http://www.latimes.com/la-fg-tijuanadruglord18-2008dec18,0,5864824.story

Marosi R (2008b) Diagnosis: irony. Los Angeles Times, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/may/03/local/me-tijuana3. 3 May

Trends Organ Crim

Marosi R (2008c) ATijuana blood bath. Los Angeles Times, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/06/world/fg-arellano6

Marosi R (2009) Tijuana’s security chief needs all of it he can get: Julian Leyzaola lives with threats andworse, plus the accusations. LA Times, http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-fg-tijuana-police20-2009dec20,0,1484440.story

Mill J (2009) System of logic ratiocinative and inductive. Cosimo Classics. News from DEA, NewsReleases, 16 Aug 2006. Drug Enforcement Administration, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr081606.html

No Te Calles - No+Inseguridad (2010) http://www.notecalles.org.mx/ [An electronic forum established byInstituto Ciudano de Estudios Sobre la Inseguridad (ICESI) to allow individuals to anonymously andconfidentially report crimes in Mexico. http://www.notecalles.org.mx/nosotros.php]

Ojeda N (2008) Ruffo y Franco Ríos protegían a los Arellano Félix: “El Chapo.”El Mexicano, http://www.el-mexicano.com.mx/informacion/noticias/1/1/internacional/2002/07/08/1878/ruffo-y-franco-rios-protegian-a-los-arellano-felix-el-chapo.aspx

Pachico E (2011) Mexico defense of kingpin strategy falls short. Insight Crime, http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/1092-mexico-defense-of-kingpin-strategy-falls-short. 16 Jun

Privette W (2006) Organized crime in the United States: organizational analogies for counterinsurgencystrategy. http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2006/Dec/06Dec_Privette.pdf

Ramos J (2011) Interview with Professor Jose Maria Ramos of the Colegio de La Frontera Norte deTijuana. (N. Jones, ed.). Mar

Reza Gonzalez Y (2011) “Cae” narco miembros del CAF. El Mexicano, http://www.el-mexicano.com.mx/informacion/noticias/1/22/policiaca/2011/02/07/453559/cae-narco-miembros-del-caf.aspx. 7 Feb

Rios V (2011) Violencia mediática. Nexos, http://www.nexos.com.mx/?P=leerarticulo&Article=1943190.3 Jan

Secretaría de Seguridad Pública (SSP) (2012) http://www.bajacalifornia.gob.mx/portal/gobierno/gabinete/sria_seguridad.jsp

Shirk D (1999) New federalism in Mexico: implications for Baja California and the cross-border region.University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, http://www.sddialogue.org/pubs/page.html

Shirk D (2006) Law enforcement challenges and “smart borders.”. In: Forest J (ed) Homeland securitysecurity: protecting America’s targets. Praeger, Westport

Shirk D, Donnelly R (eds) (2009) Police and public security in Mexico. Trans-Border Institute, Univesity ofSan Diego, San Diego

Thompson B (2004) Kidnappings are out of control in Mexico. Mexidata, http://mexidata.info/id217.html.14 Jun

Zeta (2007) Imparables comandos de “El Teo”. Edicion 1748 (28 Sep–4 Oct 2007), http://www.zetatijuana.com/html/EdcionesAnteriores/Edicion1748/Principal.html

Zeta (2010a) 246 ejecuciones en el año… la guerra sigue: Los muertos de “El Ingeniero”. Edicion 1878(26–30 Mar 2010), http://www.zetatijuana.com/html/Edicion1878/Principal.html

Zeta (2010b) Quiere “Chapo” células del CAF. Edicion 1901 (3–9 Sep 2010), http://www.zetatijuana.com/html/Edicion1901/Principal.html

Zeta (2010c) “Los Teos” rentan sicarios. Edicion 1904 (24–30 Sep 2010), http://www.zetatijuana.com/html/Edicion1904/Reportajez_Los_Teos_rentan_sicarios.html

Zeta (2011) “El Chapo” y “El Mayo” reclutan jefes de célula para traficar droga en Tijuana. Delataestructura de Sinaloa: Por lo menos diez delincuentes. Edicion 1919 (6–13 Jan 2011), http://www.zetatijuana.com/html/Edicion1919/Principal.html

Trends Organ Crim