The conditions which surround us best justify our cooperation. We meet in the midst of a

nation brought to the verge of moral, political, and material ruin.

Declaration of Union and Industrial

Independence, 1892

(Quoted in Katz 1995; p. 28)

Introduction

If we can judge from the above quote, Americans like to portray

themselves as living in the worst of times. That statement could have

just as easily been made yesterday, as at least some Americans

currently see the United States on the verge of moral, economic, and

political disaster. To be sure, each generation of Americans, not to

mention citizens of other nations, has been beset with new problems,

many of them the result of rapidly developing technologies. In the

1890s it was industrialization; during the 20th Century revolutions in

transportation and communication created profound economic, social,

and political changes. In the 21st Century further changes in

technology continue to keep people unbalanced, all the while seeking

to find or create some stability in their lives.

1 | P a g e

Southerners (and Midwesterners), coming from more agricultural

regions of the nation, are often more conservative and status-quo

oriented than citizens of other regions. In the 1890s the Populist

Movement, which had its strongest support in the Midwest and South,

attempted to wrestle with industrialism and banking to protect farmers

and workers. They met with limited success, though some of their

reform ideas have become policy in the interim. Similar movements and

counter-movements were sprinkled throughout the 20th Century

(Progressivism, unionism, socialism, the anti-war and civil rights

movements, for example) some of which saw the Federal Government as

the enemy while others viewed it as a potential savior.

The current edited volume seeks to evaluate the South’s

relationship with the Federal Government. It is the purpose of this

essay to examine the South within the context of a recent popular,

political movement, the Tea Party. Cultural Theory (Thompson, Ellis, and

Wildavsky 1990) will be invoked to provide a cultural framework with

which to analyze the movement in the South using survey data collected

by the Associated Press and the Washington Post in April of 2010, at

the height of the Tea Party influence. Additionally, using a less

intrusive method, Tea Party websites in four states will be examined

for motivational and cultural themes. The first section provides a

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brief overview of American political movements followed by an

introduction to cultural theory hypothesis development. The next

section will examine the organizational structure of the party, before

turning to the analysis of the poll data and the discussion and

conclusion.

American Political Movements: A Brief Overview

V. O. Key, in his classic work on political parties (1964),

recalls the words of Walter Dean Burnham who noted that “the

Democratic Party ‘swallowed the Populist party almost entirely (or

vice versa!)’” (p.258). The Populist Party of the late 1800s was a

coalition of farmers and workers who distrusted banks, railroads, and

industry, as well as government. Populists favored a version of “fiat

money,” a graduated income tax, and public ownership of the railroads

among other things (p. 257). The party also represented a social

movement with clear egalitarian principles (Thompson, Ellis, and

Wildavsky 1991) as well as egalitarian organizational structure and

practices (Malecha).

It is Key’s assessment of the Populist party that it promoted a

clarification of the policy structures of the two major parties by

pushing the Democratic Party towards “opposition to the ‘interests,’”

especially banking and corporate interests. Key concludes that the

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division between the two parties created by the Populist movement

continue to define the parties up until the time that he published his

work on parties in 1964 (p. 257), nearly three-quarters of a century.

Rhetorically, if not in practice, the division between the parties

remains in force into the 21st century.

Populists were the radicals of their era and illustrate the

American penchant for radicalism. In the lead-up to the Civil War the

abolitionist movement infiltrated the Whig and later the Republican

parties driving them towards a stronger anti-slavery stance than they

might have otherwise adopted. As a result, when Republican Abraham

Lincoln was elected in 1860 the southern states were so worried about

Lincoln’s, and his party’s, views on slavery they seceded from the

nation almost immediately. The American “Know-Nothing” Party in 1854

was similarly radical in some of its views about immigration, views

that resulted in election day deaths in Baltimore, St. Louis, and

Louisville (Murrin 201; p. 386).

An additional theme that is regular element in populist

movements, whether from the left or right, is the "us vs. them"

mentality. The "us" part of the formula has, in the past, referred to

producers (workers), have-nots, anti-communists, wage earners,

citizens, and religious adherents among others (The “Occupy Movement”

4 | P a g e

in 2011 talks about the “99%”). The "them" has alternately referenced

elites, the “haves,” bankers, corporate leaders, government officials,

as well as liberals and communists. In order to enforce the sense of

“us vs. them,” some of the early populist groups practiced restrictive

membership (Kazan 1995).

In the post-Civil War South, Populism was forced to address the

role of freedmen and women within the framework of the movement.

Sentiment in the Jim Crow South was antagonistic to people of color,

but it was just such people who occupied a central position in the

agricultural economy of that region. Though blacks were not uniformly

welcomed into the Southern wing of the movement it happened often

enough to be remarked upon by historians. Goodwyn (1976) provides a

systematic state by state assessment of the role black farmers played

in the Populist movement and in the process gives a more sympathetic

overview of the effort to attract black farmers even though it cost

the Populists some support elsewhere. Thus, while Populism was a

“bounded” movement it made some effort to include the typically

excluded of the post-Civil War South.

Populism had at its core the notion that "political problems" be

resolved "by appealing to the 'will of the people'" (Scruton 1996; p.

362), a somewhat muddled democratic principle; how many of the

5 | P a g e

"people?" which of the people? It is implicit in the formulation that

it is "most of the people" but it is not clear how the will of the

people should be determined; by ballot, by force of arms, by

consensus, by discussion? For Kazan, populism is defined by a

language that separates average citizens from "'bureaucrats', 'fat

cats' and 'Big Men.' It is defined by a "language whose speakers

conceive of ordinary people as a noble assemblage not bounded narrowly

by class, who view their elite opponents as self-serving and

undemocratic, and who seek to mobilize the former against the latter"

(1995; p. 1). Both the contemporary Tea Party movement and the

“Occupy” movement call upon “the people” in their appeals.

While the notion of the "people" seems self-evident in practice

it has not always proven to be so. In the past, all American states

have restricted the franchise in one form or another, beginning with

the original franchise limitation to white male property owners;

further slaves were not even considered whole human beings in the eyes

of the constitution. Even James Madison expressed reservations about

the quality of the common "man," reserving the right to rule to those

"whose wisdom may discern the true interest of their country, and

whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice

to temporary or partial considerations" (#10). (He makes these

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comments only shortly after noting that all men have opinions and

"passions" that will have "reciprocal influences on each other" and

thus make them no more fit for rule than any other.) Thus the notion

of “the people” has undoubtedly changed and expanded over the past 220

year or so. The Knights of Labor, for example, excluded from their

membership bankers, land speculators, lawyers, liquor dealers, and

gamblers (Kazan 1195; p. 35) The Farmer's Alliance, which was active

throughout the Mid-west and South and was a central element of the

Populist movement in the late 19th Century, deemed the following to be

ineligible for membership: "merchants, merchants clerks, bankers,

lawyers, speculators, as well as editors who were unaffiliated with

reform presses or Alliances newspapers" (Malecha 1988; p. 24).

According to Kazan, Americanism is also a common theme found in

populist movements, though he adds that it is not simple jingoism, but

an idealistic attachment to either a "liberal" or a "republican"

tradition. By the former Kazan meant individualist attachments to

civil liberties, especially free speech; the latter has at its core a

"public spirited, moral commonwealth" (p.12). In the early years of

the republic, public speakers would appeal to both sentiments. In

contemporary times, a result of an historical irony, the Republican

party is more likely to use the rhetoric of freedom while the

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Democratic Party relies upon the language of equality (though most

often the equality of opportunity) and community. The distinction is

even more starkly drawn between the Tea Party (the party of freedom)

and the “Occupy Movement” (the movement for the 99%).

Separating the people from the elite in the United States is no

easy matter, compared to nations which have clearly defined

aristocracies/hierarchies. The president, members of congress, and

the federal courts are candidates for membership in the elite but so

also are bankers, corporate owners, leaders of top law firms and

universities, top military officials and financiers. In contemporary

terms those with large incomes and wealth (income greater than

$250,000 and/or wealth in the neighborhood of $3,000,000) have been

suggested as part of an American oligarchy; a group that represents

10% (3,000,000) of the U.S. population (Winters and Page 2009; pp735-

736). Not only does this group have resources far above the remaining

90% of the population but the corporate sector’s status has been

enhanced as a result of what might be called the “inadvertent ruling”

(see Hartmann 2010 for a fuller discussion of this case) in Santa

Clara County v. S.P.R.R (1886) that established corporations as legal

persons and the recent, ironically named, “Citizen's Limited” which

8 | P a g e

empowered corporations with unlimited campaign spending (in other

words “limiting citizens”).

The Populist Party raised issues that probably appeal to the

political left than the political right, as have some other popular

movements. Beginning with the Dixiecrats in 1948 that pattern was

interrupted, as the Dixiecrats, a splinter faction of the Democratic

Party, were opposed to offering political support to expand the

political and social rights to African-Americans and were committed to

the rights of the states to regulate race relations without

interference from Washington, issues that resonated with the right.

Following in the wake of the Dixiecrats, other popular movements in

the United States have been notable for their support of conservative

causes: to segregation may be added anti-communism (the first Red

scare actually took place in the 1920s) and the anti-abortion

movement. The left has not been silent for its part, during the last

half of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century,

including the popularly supported civil rights movement, anti-war

movement of the 1960s, the environmental movement, feminism and the

current (2011) Occupy Wall Street movement.

A contemporary movement, The Tea Party, has re-invigorated the

political right. The modern Tea Party draws upon a populist tradition

9 | P a g e

that can be traced to Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln, as well as the

populist and progressive movements of the 19th and 20th centuries

(Kazan 1995). As observed in the foregoing in most of its early

incarnations populism drew upon politics that are mostly left-leaning;

by the middle of the 20th century conservatives, such as Strom

Thurmond, George Wallace, and Richard Nixon, had learned to devise

campaigns and strategies that pitted "average Americans" against

"liberal elites." The earliest populists combined "moral revivalism"

with the spirited defense of the producing class, i.e. those who

worked the field and toiled as wage earners. (Kazan 1997; p. 3). It

is perhaps not a coincidence that Nixon called upon the “moral

majority” and that Wallace appealed to the average (Southern) working

man as they successfully attempted to forge a new voting coalition.

Cultural Theory (and hypotheses)

Exceptionalism is a term used to describe the United States in

comparison to other nations, particularly in reference to its lack of

a landed aristocracy, a fact which has been thought to contribute to

the weakness of the socialist movement in this country.

Exceptionalism is a qualifier that could also be used to describe the

American South in relation to the rest of the nation. The exceptional

character of the South is certainly related to its “peculiar

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institution” (slavery) and the Civil War that many believe was caused

by the South’s dogged attachment to slavery. Slavery also contributed

to the “traditionalistic” character of Southern culture (Elazar ;

Black and Black1987) or what has been called its hierarchic cultural

bias (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1991).

Traditionalistic cultures, one of three cultural types used by

Elazar to create a cultural topography of the United States, in his

model exist primarily in the South with the following characteristics:

a well-defined political and cultural hierarchy; a view of the

marketplace as a mixed blessing; a limited role for government; a

conservative approach to change tempered by tradition and the

expectation that any change should benefit the elite ( ). Another

cultural model, developed by Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, uses a

four part typology, that includes a category they call “hierarchy,”

that resmebles Elazar’s traditionalism. In their model hierarchies

have the following characteristics: extensive rules about who may

interact with whom and the manner of the interactions; strong

boundaries that limit entrance and exit from the culture and also

restrict movement between classes; hierarchists incline toward the

view that human nature is flawed, requiring substantial external

controls; resistance to unmanaged risks; and wealth creation that

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benefits the elite, but also the community, among other things (1991,

see the Introduction and Chapter 3, “Preferences”).

Though Elazar mapped the South as largely

traditionalistic/hierarchic, a perceptive observer may also detect

prominent elements of individualism in the region, largely as a result

of the religious preferences of many of its inhabitants. Thompson,

Ellis, and Wildavsky report that August Comte argues that “religion

functions to fulfill the ‘two great ends of human existence,’ i.e.,

‘to regulate and combine’ members of a social unit….establish(ing) the

requisite conditions for social order” (1991 p. 115). The Southern

Baptist religion, among Christian religions, places great emphasis

upon the role of the individual and the congregation in their

relations with God and heaven and, more importantly here, concerning

the issue of control. According to the precepts of the Southern

Baptist Church, the Bible is interpretable by the individual and

church members are empowered with direct communication with God,

without direct intercession on the part of the church clergy, leading

to greater independence for the individual church member. It would be

foolish to ignore Southern hierarchic/traditionalistic

characteristics, but that does not preclude the coexistence of these

two cultures in the same region. In fact, in a

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hierarchic/traditionalistic culture, such as Elazar reported for the

American South, it is to the advantage of the elite to allow the

controlled development of disciplined individualism (for example, in

the form of classical liberalism or Baptism) among its lower echelon

members to create wealth (and independence) and to insure that the

lower classes learn to restrain themselves. Of course, the danger is

that they will become so independent and so focused on wealth creation

that they will seek to usurp the elite (a problem not just for the

South).

For Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky cultural purity is a recipe

for disaster. The most stable societies are those in which permanent

or temporary alliances exist between the adherents of several of the

cultures. For example, egalitarianism would have trouble existing in

a system that neither created nor supported inequalities against which

to define itself and to oppose. Similarly, individualists in

contemporary America need established authority in the form of

government to protect the rights of property, while individualists and

egalitarians will combine in opposition to a government that desires

to intrude into their private affairs. In the United States evidence

of all four cultures can be found, but, according to the authors, the

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low grid cultures (individualism and egalitarianism) have bonded to

weaken hierarchy (1991; p. 4).

The four cultures are inductively created from a two-by-two

matrix derived from two variables – group and grid. The original

group/grid theorist, British anthropologist Mary Douglas, defines

group “as the experience of a bounded social unit (Thompson, Ellis,

and Wildavsky 1990; p. 11). Boundaries may be physical (walls,

fences, etc.) or they may be psychological/legal or a combination.

Boundaries/borders tend to be more rigid in high group cultures

(hierarchy and egalitarianism) and more permeable in low group

cultures (individualism and fatalism). Grid refers to the nature and

type of prescriptions that determine the sorts of relationships that

members of a culture may have with each other. In low grid cultures

(individualism and egalitarianism) individuals are freer to negotiate

their own relationships than they are in high cultures (hierarchy and

fatalism).

Cultural types are distinguishable partially by what may be

called “cultural indicators.” For example, equality is an example of

a cultural indicator; egalitarians are dedicated to as much equality

of outcome as possible, while individualists are willing to concede

only “equality of opportunity.” Hierarchists entertain support for a

14 | P a g e

more limited “equality before law” and fatalists accept whatever level

of equality drops into their collective laps. Attitudes towards

authority and the manner in which authority is conferred also provide

clues about the way of life: hierarchists support authority and

imagine that it may be conferred according to lineage, race, or

gender, or some other ascriptive characteristic; individualists are

ambivalent about authority (“what have you done for me lately?”) but

willingly follow those who are competent and achievement oriented;

egalitarians are distrustful of authority because it generates

inequality, but may be convinced to adopt a leader who has a vision of

a new tomorrow with greater equality for all. Fatalists are the least

well-defined of the four cultures, but probably would be obsequious

towards authority with the slim hope that something good might result.

Expectations regarding organizational structure and policy

preferences lead to specific cultural hypotheses for the Tea Party.

Organizationally, because hierarchy has high boundaries and high

prescriptions, if the Tea Party is hierarchic the following should

ensue: difficulty in joining, with a well defined leadership

structure, a culture of deference, and with limited devotion to

democratic decision-making. Further, because hierarchs are rule

oriented and distrustful of markets they might support regulation of

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the economy; they are willing to impose a moral structure on members

(anti-abortion and anti-gay rights for example) who are unable to

control their baser urges; and they shed blame or blame

dissidents/outsiders for mis-performance of the economy. Generally

they prefer closed borders because immigrants do not have a well-

defined status either legally or socially. Politically, in the United

States, they adhere to democratic principles, though they might

distinguish between the “masses and the classes” believing that the

former need to be regulated and controlled. Their preferred form of

representation would be trustee.

If the Tea Party is largely individualistic it will have the

following characteristics: membership in the Tea Party should be

voluntary with an ad hoc structure; member attitudes towards leaders

and leadership are probably ambivalent (approving, if the leader

achieves what the membership desires, distrustful otherwise);

decision-making is also probably based upon majority rule but leaders

may function authoritatively, adopting the trustee model. American

Individualists favor the free market model with minimal regulation

(just enough to provide equality of opportunity); they oppose any

moral code imposed from above; they argue that the recent economic

failure was caused by individuals and that individuals should have to

16 | P a g e

bear the responsibility for that failure (including homeowners and

stockholders); if immigration is the issue, then individualists in the

United States favor a more open immigration policy to provide the

market access to workers, while providing workers opportunities to

improve their economic standing. Politically individualists are

majoritiarian democrats who probably adhere to the politico ideal of

representation.

Egalitarian style organizations are driven by the issue of

equality. They: favor a more closed organizational structure, with

membership determined by the level of individual support for greater

equality; oppose leadership in general because leaders are by their

nature not equal to other members; evidence strong support for

democratic values, including support for the delegate model of

representation (wherein representatives closely follow the desires of

their constituents), and perhaps consensual decision-making. In terms

of policy preferences egalitarians; distrust the market because it

tends to create great inequalities and prefer economic regulation to

level the playing field and to assure greater equality; they oppose

the imposition of moral codes, because any imposed rules imply

inequality; they blame the system for economic failure and favor

widespread systemic change; finally, they might be conflicted about

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American borders, favoring national borders that insured greater

equality while opposing those that created greater economic and

political oppression.

Tea Party Organization (in the South and elsewhere)

The structure of the "Party" reinforces the importance of

individual action. American political parties are famously weak,

lacking disciplinary tools common in parliamentary systems (restricted

access to the party label for election purposes, for example).

Nonetheless American parties, at the national level, have a loosely

defined structure and rules for primaries and nominations, with fund-

raising facilities that provide some level of continuity. The Tea

Party lacks even these fundamentals, with numerous web pages

proclaiming themselves (or at least so-identified by Google) as

official websites.

Courser (2010) makes several observations about the movement:

lack of coordination among its constituent parts; no control over

membership, or over the use of the movements name; 42% of the Tea

Party groups reported being unaffiliated (Courser 2010; p. 9); a local

resistance to organization; an unwillingness to campaign for

candidates; Courser reports the results of a CBS news/New York Times

poll from April 5-12, 2010 that found only 7% of Tea Party voters

18 | P a g e

supported electing their own candidates (2010; p. 11); and its

leaderless and spontaneous nature; Courser says that Freedom works and

the Tea Party Express, two umbrella national Tea Party organizations

have actively encouraged "the disorganized nature of the movement

(2010; p. 7). (One is tempted to conclude that the lack of

organization makes the movement more subject to impermanence and to

manipulation.)

Because the Tea Party movement formed at the local grassroots

level it is difficult to find an official spokesperson or even

website. Potential spokespersons include Ron and Rand Paul, Sarah

Palin (who spoke at the national Tea Party convention), Michelle

Bachman, and conservative media opinion leader and comedian Glenn

Beck. Additionally, a search for an "official" website turns up

several candidates: "Re Tea Party" (reteaparty.com), the "Tea Party

Platform" (teaparty-platform.com), Tea Party Patriots

(teapartypatriots.bing.com), TeaParty.org, Patriot Action Network

(Patriotstoactionnetwork.com), Tea Party Express

(teapartyexpress.org), and The Tea Party (theteaparty.net). No

apparent linkage exists between these sites, except for the common

name.

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Many, if not all, of these sites, feature opportunities for

viewers/readers to comment on posts and blogs. Topics range from gun

rights to tax reform. For the sake of clarity and ease of access the

tea party-platform.com site lays out 10 core beliefs of the modern

movement: eliminate excessive taxes (individualism); eliminate the

national debt (debt elimination, because it would help reduce the size

of government, would be evidence of individualism); eliminate deficit

spending (individualism); protect free markets (individualism); abide

by the constitution of the United States (could be both hierarchy and

individualism as the constitution supports the system but is also a

low grid framework for government); promote civic responsibility

(hierarchy); reduce the overall size of the government

(individualism); believe in the people (individualism); avoid the

pitfalls of politics; and maintain local independence (low grid,

probably individualism).

The "Contract from America," though not a document created by any

elements of the Tea Party, has been endorsed by a number of the Tea

Party locals, and has the following similar elements to the Tea Party

platform: its three general principals are individual liberty,

economic freedom, and limited government; the remaining ten items

include "protect the constitution, reject “cap and trade,” demand a

20 | P a g e

balanced budget, enact fundamental tax reform (presumably to reduce

taxes; probably an individualistic demand), restore fiscal

responsibility and constitutionally limited government in Washington,

end runaway government spending, repeal and replace government-run

health care (individualism by returning health care fully to the

market), pass an “all-of-the-above” energy policy (individualism; i.e.

let the market figure it out), stop pork barrel spending, and stop the

tax hikes (thecontract.org/the-contract-from-america; accessed August

16, 2011).

Both of these websites call for eliminating the national debt and

deficit spending, call for tax reform, and support for a literal

translation of the constitution. And in one way or another both favor

reducing government either by ending "pork," by eliminating the 2010

health care bill, or reducing the overall size of government. The Tea

Party platform specifically calls for redefining the influence of "big

money" and special interests while the Contract singles out "cap and

trade"(and the 2010 health care plan) for elimination. A general

reading of these two sets of proposals leads to the conclusion that

they seek to empower the individual and the states.

The Tea Party is not organized nationally; instead, it is a

decentralized coalition of local groups united by the internet. As

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such the movement has no well-defined, or even poorly defined,

leadership. Leaderless organizations are most often associated with

low grid cultures (individualism and egalitarianism) and have included

19th Century Populist movement (Malecha), the Student Non-violent

Coordinating Committee (SNCC) (Ftn), and early women’s self-help

groups from the 1960s and 1970s.

The confederal style of the Tea Party is consistent with the low

grid way of life, which seeks to empower the individual. For the Tea

Party, which has adopted a strict constructionist approach to the U.S.

Constitution, power is best situated at the state and local level and

in the market, ignoring the constitutional mandate for the national

government to “provide for the…general welfare” (U.S. Constitution,

Article I, Section 8). As historians and political scientists

recognize, the current American constitution was created as a result

of two historical forces. The first was the “tyranny” of the British

monarchy which led to the Declaration of Independence and the Articles

of Confederation. The Articles was ultimately rejected because in the

minds of some it led to an excess of democracy and to an intolerably

weak central government that was wholly dependent upon the states for

its existence. The Constitution of 1789 increased the power of the

central government at the expense of the state government.

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Tea Party Issues: South vs. non-South

For the Tea Party the Declaration of Independence is the more

salient founding document as it maintains that citizens have

“unalienable rights” to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”

When government imposes taxes, regulations, and laws it is impeding

that free pursuit. Markets are responsive to the impersonal forces of

supply and demand and are, according to classical economics, not

subject to the abuses associated with governments (why state

governments are thought to be more trustworthy remains to be

satisfactorily explained). Social Darwinism is the guiding principal

of the market as benefits and risks are equally shared by market

participants, and presumably the most fit get more of the former.

This, of course, is the ideal; in practice, in the current 2011

economy, for those at the top of the market the risks have been

effectively reduced and even eliminated, while the benefits have

become even more substantial than has historically been true. Critics

of the market argue that the cost of reducing risk in the market is

that of paying taxes. However, market supporters, including members

of the Tea Party, are unwilling to pay that cost or to accept some

regulation to eliminate externalities, trusts, and monopolies. We can

see evidence of that from public opinion polls. One of the few

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scholarly investigations of the Tea Party (Williamson, Skocpol, and

Loggin 2011) reports that party supporters are concerned about

undeserved government handouts, regulatory and tax policies, and

deficits and the size of government (echoing the foregoing).

Williamson, Skocpol, and Coggin argue that contemporary Tea Party

activists are not totally opposed to government programs; according to

the authors’ accounting, many Tea Party members are beneficiaries of

government programs such as social security and medicare. The concern

of the movement is that some people are getting a share of the

national pie without contributing to the system. Three things are of

interest in the Williamson et al report: first, the criticism of non-

contributors who are living off of the system resonates with echoes of

the 1968 GeorgeWallace presidential campaign, described as a campaign

that “recognized that many voters were beginning to lose faith in

welfare-state programs and to see themselves as victims of an aloof,

tax-and-spend bureaucracy” (Murrin et al 2001; p. 801). Second,

Williamson and her coauthors note, there is a disconnect between the

avowed leadership of the Tea Party and the membership:

For example, FreedomWorks (a major funder of Tea Party Patriots)

was active in President Bush’s campaign to privatize Social

24 | P a g e

Security, and FreedomWorks Chairman Dick Army has referred to

Social Security as “generational theft.” (p. 33)

Third, government programs that are “deserved” (that is paid for by

the recipient) are consistent with an individualistic cultural bias

(i.e. they have been earned). Williamson, Skocpol, and Coggin,

however, based upon their interviews with Boston area Tea Partiers and

a survey conducted by the New York Times and CBS news, conclude that

most rank-and-file members were not motivated to join the Tea Party by

social issues, but rather by the economic issues outlined in the

following.

The following section explores the attitudes of Southerners and

non-Southerners as well as Tea Party adherents in both regions on a

variety of issues. The data were collected on Behalf of the

Associated Press and the Washington Post ,between April 22 and April

25, 2010 from a national sample of the adult population via telephone

(land lines and cell phones). The total number of respondents is

1001; however, because they used split half approach for some items

the number of respondents varies considerably.

Economic Issues

25 | P a g e

The first series of items in the AP/Post poll queried respondents

about Obama’s overall performance as well as his performance in

economic terms. Approval levels for Obama’s performance in April,

2010 were mixed; hehad majority approval in three of four Census

Bureau regions (Northeast, Midwest, and West) and nearly majority

support in the fourth (South). More specifically the ABC/Washington

Post poll also queried respondents about Obama’s performance regarding

the economy, the budget deficit, health care, and regulation of the

financial industry. Additionally, respondents were to assess Obama

compared to Congressional Republicans in dealing with the same four

issues.

Generally, respondents were divided relatively evenly between

those who approved and disapproved of the president’s performance in

these issue areas. However, across all four regions and across the

four issues “strong disapprovers” were more common than “strong

approvers.” In other words, approvers were relatively evenly divided

between those who approved strongly and those who approved “somewhat.”

Among disapprovers, strong disapproval was more common. In a few

instances the “strong disapprovers” were more than twice as common, in

terms of percentages. His disapproval ratings, that being said, were

slightly elevated in the South, but the regional differences while

26 | P a g e

consistent were not strong (Cramer’s V for all of these associations

never exceeded .12). For example, 40.23% of Southerners (n=353)

reported strong disapproval of Obama’s overall handling of his job,

while only 35.93% of non-Southerners gave similar responses (n=615).1

Southerners were more critical and disapproving of Obama across

the board, registering strong disapproval between 42% and 52%,

depending on the issue. Non-Southerners strong disapproval levels

ranged between 35% and 45%. The highest level of criticism was in

response to Obama’s handling of the Federal budget deficit for both

regions. Among non-Southerners he received nearly 50% approval for

his handling of the economy, health care, and financial industry

regulation. Southerners were also most likely to approve those

issues, though at a lower level.

When respondents were asked who they trusted more to handle the

economy, etc., Obama or Congressional Republicans, the president fared

somewhat better, suggesting that the Southern bias may be against the

government. For this series of items respondents were given two

response categories (“trust Obama”; “trust Congressional

Republicans”); a significant number also volunteered “trust neither”

and “trust both.” Comparisons are made on the same four issues (the

1 N-sizes vary significantly for some of the data reported here since the survey used a split-half approach to some questionnaire items.

27 | P a g e

economy, regulation of the financial industry, health care, and the

budget deficit), again according to whether respondents were

Southerners or non-Southerners. The average percentage of non-

Southerners who reported trust for Obama was 50.46% (range=47.6-

52.56%). Non-Southerners trusted him least to handle the budget

deficit. Southerners reported trusting Obama on average about 44% of

the time, still a higher percentage than those reported that trusting

Congressional Republicans (43.3%). On three of the four issues (the

economy, financial regulation, and health care) Southerners were more

trusting of Obama than they were of Republicans. Respondents who

answered that they trusted neither or trusted both were also recorded;

the percentages who trusted neither ranged between 10.5% and 14.38%

for non-Southerners and between 10.8% and 12.18% for Southerners. No

more than 2% of respondents indicated that they trusted both,

regardless of region.

Respondents were also asked whether they felt that President

Obama or President Bush was more responsible for the current economic

crisis and for the record budget deficits. Bush received blame most

often from both sectors of the country, though again Southerners were

slightly more likely to blame Obama. Virtually 60% of non-Southerners

blamed Bush for the current state of the economy while 58% blamed him

28 | P a g e

for the budget deficit. Fifty-two percent of Southerners blamed Bush

for the economy and 58% blamed him for the deficit.

Finally, regarding the role of regulation of the economy,

respondents were asked whether they favored or opposed stricter

regulation of the financial industry, whether they thought it

appropriate to regulate derivatives, whether they supported a new

banking insurance fund underwritten by the industry to finance failed

banks, and, lastly, whether they would support increased regulation of

consumer lending.

As observed above, the South generally takes a more

“conservative” view of the economic situation: Southern respondents

were more likely to oppose stricter banking regulations, regulation of

derivatives, the banking insurance idea, and regulation of consumer

lending, though in every instance except one (regulation of

derivatives) a majority were in favor of greater regulation. For non-

Southerners between 54% and 73% supported greater regulation of the

economy (mean=62%) with the strongest support for regulating banks and

weakest support for the regulation of derivatives. Fifty percent to

68% of Southern respondents supported more financial regulations

(mean=57%) with the strongest support coming for bank regulation. In

both regions respondents seemed to be less sure about the regulation

29 | P a g e

of derivatives, both in terms of supporting further regulations, but

also in terms of non-responses. Seventeen percent of respondents did

not respond to that item compared to 3-5% for the other three items,

indicating probably less familiarity with the derivative issue.

The four items just reported speak more directly to the notion of

the political culture issue since they are presented as “preferences”

or value statements about most desirable nature of the relationship

between the public and private sectors. It is apparent that generally

Americans, on average, favored some more extensive regulation and

backstop programs to protect the economy, though a solid minority

opposes many of the ideas. Generally, those who opposed one type of

regulation tended to oppose others (as a rough indicator, the r2s

between these items ranged between .l7 and .32).

Though Southerners in the aggregate were consistently more likely

to oppose regulation and to give Obama lower ratings than non-

Southerners, the differences are small across the board. Cramer’s V,

a measure of association for data at the nominal level of measurement,

for these associations never exceeded .09, indicating little to no

association.

Culturally, the willingness of the respondents, regardless of

region, to support greater regulation suggests that Americans are

30 | P a g e

leaning toward a more restricted market (less likely to favor

unfettered individualism). Whether that makes them egalitarians or

hierarchists is unclear (fatalists would probably reckon that

regulation would have little positive personal effect). Tea Party

enthusiasts, on the other hand, were clearly opposed to both Obama and

regulation of the economy. The former is noteworthy since many on the

American political left have concluded that Obama has been willing to

allow the financial sector far more freedom than is justifiable given

the widespread perception that it was the lack of regulation that led

to current economic downturn. Such a criticism suggests a concern for

inequity (egalitarianism) or instability (hierarchy). So the Tea

Party has elements of individualism (deregulation) coupled with

dislike for Obama (is it his race or his rhetoric?).

Given the presumption that the South is more likely to oppose big

government and therefore to support the Tea Party, it is appropriate

to, first, examine the level of support for the Tea Party regionally,

and, second, to evaluate the impact of regional effects on Obama’s

performance and general support for economic regulation, while

controlling for Tea Party support. Such an analysis will provide

evidence of the effects of region on Obama’s approval and support for

regulation independent of the effects of Tea Party support.

31 | P a g e

Southerners in the AP/Post were slightly more likely to support

the Tea Party than non-Southerners, 33% to 30% respectively, though

the differences were not statistically significant (chi-square=1.5, df

[2], p=.473, n=956). The size of the regional differences in Tea

Party support are reflected in the respondents’ evaluations of Obama

and the economy, as well, as will be observed in the ensuing. On the

other hand, the differences between Tea Party supporters and opponents

are strong and as might be predicted (Tea party supporters in 2010

were markedly anti-Obama and anti-regulation). For example, when Tea

Party supporters were asked to evaluate Obama’s overall performance,

as well as his handling of the economy, health care, the budget

deficit, and regulation of the economy, only about one in ten of Tea

Party supporters approved of his performance. Though non-Southerners

were consistently more likely to approve, the regional differences

were uniformly small (average difference on the five measures was only

2.5%).

When queried about whether they trusted Obama or Congressional

Republicans to better handle economic and budget issues the results

were nearly the same; about one in ten Tea Party supporters trusted

Obama more regardless of region. Similarly, slightly more than half

of Tea Party supporters (range 51-57%) blamed Obama for the state of

32 | P a g e

the economy (Spring 2010), in both the South and non-South. For the

purposes of comparison, 85-89% of Tea Party opponents blamed George W.

Bush for the state of the economy). The average percentage regional

blame difference among Tea Party supporters was 4.95%.

The worm turns a bit when Obama’s name is removed from the

questions. When supporters of the Tea Party were asked their views

about reining in the financial and banking sectors support levels

increased, ranging from 27% to 50%. The South is truer to its

populist roots when the picture is not clouded by race.

Non-Economic Issues

Comparisons of Southerners with non-Southerners can also be

fruitfully conducted on a few additional, non-economic issues raised

in the 2010 AP poll, which included measures of attachment to the Tea

Party, attitudes towards Roe v. Wade, and the advisability of having a

large engaged government. If the Tea Party is the party of

individualism, as its platform statements suggest it is, then we would

expect lower levels of support for the movement among Southerners if

Elazar is correct about the South as a largely traditionalistic

(hierarchic) region; alternatively, based upon what we saw in the

preceding section, we might expect higher levels of support in the

South for the Tea Party. If Elazar is correct, we should also find

33 | P a g e

greater opposition to Roe v. Wade; if individualism is strong in the

South then opposition to Roe may be in line with the rest of the

nation. Finally, given the evidence of individualism that we have

already presented, we might expect to find opposition to big

government, though perhaps no stronger in the South than elsewhere.

If Elazar is correct then opposition to big government should be

weaker than elsewhere. The evidence follows.

The differences between respondents in the South and non-South on

the issues outlined above are small with one exception. Regarding Tea

Party support, 33.33% (n=336) of Southern respondents say they support

the movement compared to 29.52% (n=620) of non-Southerners. The Tea

Party movement platforms which were reported on above are heavily

weighted with anti-big government rhetoric, which is consistent with

the findings present so far, and are of essentially the same level of

magnitude. Similarly, 64% of non-Southerners (n=607) and 62% of

Southerners (n=342) report that they support upholding the Roe v. Wade

decision, a finding that is virtually identical between regions.

Sixty percent of Tea Party supporters in both regions indicate that

their preference is overturn Roe, while 85% to 88% of Tea Party

opponents (South and non-South) indicate support for Roe. For

34 | P a g e

comparative purposes, among Democrats, 75% of respondents regardless

of region report support for Roe while only 45% of Republicans do so.

We would expect individualists and egalitarians, both low grid

ways of life in the “cultural theory” scheme, to oppose undue

restrictions upon their personal conduct. Hierarchists, on the other

hand, would be comfortable with government action to enforce

“necessary” rules on the lower classes (i.e. those who are not

“capable” of restraining themselves. (For an interesting discussion

of an American hierarchic style political party, see Daniel Walker

Howe’s The Political Culture of the American Whigs.)

Southern and non-Southern respondents were equally likely to

prefer “smaller government with fewer services”; about 63% of

respondents agreed with this ideal. Though this survey does not delve

into which services should be targeted for saving and which are best

jettisoned, Americans have expressed a variety of view points on this

topic. A small number of Americans take the extreme position that any

government above the county sheriff position is superfluous, while

others implicitly or explicitly apply the “deservingness” criteria and

others still are willing to use government to achieve social and

economic goals.

35 | P a g e

Southern Tea Party Views

Given the presumption that the South is more likely to oppose big

government and, therefore, to support the Tea Party, it is appropriate

to, first, examine, the level of support for the Tea Party regionally

(reported in the preceding), and second, to evaluate the impact of

regional effects on Obama’s performance and economic regulation, while

controlling for Tea Party support. Such an analysis will provide

evidence of the effects of region independent of Tea Party support.

As was noted above, Southern respondents in the AP/Post poll were

slightly more likely to support the Tea Party than non-Southerners

(33% to 30% respectively). As we will observe, Tea Party supporters

in the both the South and non-South are very similar; Tea Party

supporters and opponents have striking differences (Tea Party

supporters in 2010 were decidedly anti-Obama and anti-regulation).

For example, when Tea Party supporters were asked to evaluate Obama’s

performance, as well as his handling of the economy, healthy care, the

budget deficit, and regulation of the economy, only about one in ten

supporters approved his performance, though Southerners were slightly

more disposed to consistently disapprove.

When queried about whether they trusted Obama or Congressional

Republicans to better handle economic and budget issues, the results

36 | P a g e

were nearly the same; about one in ten Tea Party supporters trusted

Obama more regardless of region. More than half of Tea Party

supporters in the South and non-South (52% and 57% respectively)

blamed Obama for the economy and budget deficit, though among Tea

Party opponents 84.62 % and 89.13% (South and non-South) blamed Bush.

Finally, two non-economic issues reported earlier; support levels

for a smaller government with fewer services and Roe v. Wade.

Slightly over 88% of Tea Party supporters (South and non-South) opted

for smaller government with a regional difference of only .99%.

Additionally, fully 40% of Tea Party supporters favored retaining Roe

with virtually no regional differences. Though some have argued that

the Tea Party is just warmed-over moral-majority, among Tea Party

supporters, support for Roe is substantial. (Surprisingly among born

again Southern respondents to the AP/Post poll, 47% favor upholding

Roe, compared to only 40% of non-Southern AP/Post respondents.)

Discussion

The American South and its inhabitants have been thought to be

distinctive components of the United States since the Revolutionary

War era, as indicated by no less a personage than Thomas Jefferson who

enumerated the differences between Southerners and Northerners. The

devotion that vocal Southerners exhibited to slavery exacerbated those

37 | P a g e

sorts of thoughts on the part of both Southerners and non-Southerners,

while the loss of the Civil War and the resulting Reconstruction era

solidified the feelings.

It is the intention of the current work to explore the evidence

in support of the distinctiveness thesis, especially as it related to

the South’s relationship with the national government. In this essay

tow types of arguments have been made; first, it has been hypothesized

that political culture might provide some clues as to the nature of

the regional differences. Two cultural models, with overlapping

categories, were presented: the first, developed by Daniel Elazar,

presented the South as a largely traditionalistic region, with a well-

developed elite that protected its own status. Using the second,

informed by the model of culture elaborated by Thompson, Ellis, and

Wildavsky, we hypothesized that the South, a region in which many, if

not most, residents are low-grid Southern Baptists, is likely a

combination of individualism and hierarchy/traditionalism. Second,

the Tea Party, as a recent manifestation of conservative populism, was

offered as an examplar Southern style anti-government movement.

Using a data set collected in April of 2010 the following results

were reported: Southerners were more critical of President Obama

across the board, though the differences between the residents of the

38 | P a g e

South and non-South were not large (on the order of 2-7%); though

Southerners were less likely to trust Obama than non-Southerners, they

generally trusted him more than they Congressional Republicans across

four policy issues; both Southern and non-Southern respondents were

substantially more likely to blame George W. Bush than the president

for the economic downturn and the large budget deficit – again

Southerners were slightly more likely to blame Obama; on the final set

of economic items, respondents across all regions indicated a

preference for a more heavily regulated market, especially the banking

sector. The differences between South and non-South were generally

weak to non-existent (Cramer’s V ranged between .04 and .11).

Finally, evidence was presented on two additional issues:

support for Roe v. Wade and for a small vs. a large government. In

both instances, the regional differences were small. A significant

majority of Southerners (62%) favored upholding Roe (compared to 64%

of non-Southerners). Sixty-three percent in both regions favored a

small government.

Culturally, the South’s differences from the non-South are a

matter of degree. A majority of Southerners and non-Southerners

reject an unfettered economy, preferring to err on the side of the

consumer. Support for regulation would come from hierarchists, who

39 | P a g e

display little affection for an uncontrolled market, or from

egalitarians, who prefer to control the market in order to reduce

inequalities. The data from the AP/Post poll provides no evidence to

test for that distinction. If the South has a tradition of hierarchy

as suggested by Elazar and the history of the plantation economy, the

support for regulation probably results from that source, rather than

egalitarianism, though one might suspect that Southern African-

Americans might favor egalitarian solutions.

The level of support for Roe, regardless of region, suggests a

low grid cultural bias, reinforced by the strong support seen in the

poll for small government. The conflicting evidence reported herein

(support for regulation and opposition to large government coupled

with support for Roe) is consistent with the “requisite variety

condition” of cultural theory which stipulates that the most stable

cultures are those that blend cultural values.

Turning to the role of the Tea Party; Southerners are only

marginally more likely to be supportive than non-Southerners. Tea

Party supporters and opponents take decidedly different positions on

most issues discussed in the foregoing, from opposition to Obama and

regulation of the economy to support for Roe.

40 | P a g e

Does the South retain its distinctive character? In some ways,

yes – Southerners are more likely to be poor than their non-Southern

counterparts and register lower levels of educational attainment.

Regarding the Federal government, however, the differences seem to be

evaporating. Changes in Southern demographics suggest that the South

is becoming more like the non-South, but also that the non-South is

becoming more Southern (see Black and Black The Americanization of the South;

The Southernization of America). The growth of the Southern Baptist

denomination outside of the South has contributed to former as has the

growth in popularity of country and western music. Migration into and

out of the South has taken place over the past century also creating

pressure towards homogenization (Louisiana and Mississippi remain as

the most “home-grown” states as more residents of those two states

report that they were born there than any other American states). The

widespread availability of television programming as a medium of mass

communication may have contributed to the process as well.

Conclusion

The Democratic Party in the South has been the party of Jim Crow,

segregation, racial inequality, and hierarchy (the planter elite). It

has also been the party that has opposed big government (except in the

41 | P a g e

defense field), has been anti-welfare, and pro-law and order (Alabama

has recently enacted a restrictive immigration law that is being

challenged by the Federal government, a legislative act which in

cultural theory terms is resplendent with boundary implications). The

Baptist Party is an active force in the region as well, injecting an

element of individualism into the culture mix (what Thompson, Ellis,

and Wildavsky refer to as the “request variety condition” (1990 p.4).

From individualism comes the anti-welfare attitude that is prominent

in the South, coupled with a fierce self-dependence on the part of

many Southerners. On the other hand, the South remains the home of

many African-Americans as well as the Civil Rights movement, which

sought legal rights for blacks, a form of equality (before the law)

that even hierarchy can eventually come around to supporting (Schwarz

and Thompson 1990; p.66-67).

The distrust of the Federal Government that is ascribed to the

South has a lot to do with the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act

and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Lyndon Johnson is reputed to have

said when he signed the 1965 act, that he just signed the South over

to the Republican Party. Voting, especially in presidential

elections, has essentially proven him correct.

42 | P a g e

How the elite was defined (aside from name calling directed its

way) varied according to the historical era. But, the tensions

existing between the elite and the "people," if the historical record

43 | P a g e

is any guide, have been periodically re-addressed by expressive (and

symbolic) popular movements. We are in the midst of such a movement

(the Tea Party) currently, led by an elite (Ron Paul, Glenn Beck, Sara

Palin, and Michelle Bachman), that share characteristics with

preceding populist movements. It is first and foremost a movement

with a spontaneous origin linked most often to Rick Santelli, but more

originally, according to bloggers at the Beaufort Observers website,

to Ron Paul in 2007. Its growth has been aided by the internet and

Fox News with between 28 and 40% of Americans in sympathy with their

views.

The bank bailout was the prime mover, along with taxes, for much

of the early Tea Party-like rhetoric. When CNBC reporter Rick

Santelli made his much reported comments at the Chicago Mercantile

Exchange in 2007, his reference point was saving the homes of those

who couldn’t afford to pay their mortgage ("Do we really want to

subsidize the losers' mortgages?....How many of you people want to pay

for your neighbors mortgage that has an extra bathroom…?"

(www.infoplease.com/us/government/tea-party-history.html; accessed

August 15, 2011)). The cudgel was taken up and within weeks public

protests were held around the nation.

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Similarly the populists were extremely autonomous rejecting all

notions of leaders and hierarchy. Their rejection of authority "was

translated into an animus for institutions…..which were fallible and

constrictive social forces" (Malecha 1988; p. 27) Goodwyn (1976)

emphasizes the pragmatic and programmatic aspects of the Alliance in

Texas, as well as Kansas. Members benefitted from greater solidarity

but they also made the market work for them, providing them with

better profits. This contrasts with the Tea Party which proposes only

vague anti-government slogans, without clearly articulated policies or

programs. American party platforms are typically short on detail and

long on slogans, but the lack of concrete proposals suggests the Tea

Party movement has, as yet, not agreed upon an action agenda. The

Farmers’ Alliance, however, at the end of the 19th Century, knew what

they wanted to accomplish and set about doing so, at least at the

local level. They were less successful with their national program.

Goodwyn describes them as both cooperative and competitive, "not

capitalist reformers…(nor) socialists" (p. XIII). "Populist sought

what they called a 'cooperative commonwealth' in order that individual

human striving might be finally respected" (p. XV).

“Us vs. Them”

45 | P a g e

Tea Party Issues

Tea Party Organization

The Populist or People's Party and its affiliate, the Farmer's

Alliance, provides a useful contrast to the Tea Party organization.

Restrictions in membership were mentioned in the foregoing, only those

who were harvest producers, those who tilled the soil, were thought

fit to be members (Malecha 1988, p. 4). Members who were later

determined to be unfit (those who worked against the organizations

goals) were to be purged and shunned (p. 25).

Further the Alliance "emerged as the center of social life for

many rural members" (p. 25) with the goal of creating organizational

solidarity. In order to create a collective environment the Alliance

in Kansas also supported cooperatives to "buy and market (members’)

agricultural products" (p. 26). Each of these arrangements helps

establish well-defined boundaries around the group, protecting members

from contamination by the evil forces associated with market.

Kazan (?)suggests that most of the preceding research on Populism

focuses on its "liberal 'edges, those who were not fully engaged and

46 | P a g e

might even have been "progressives" (supporter of the developing

corporate state); men such as William Jennings Bryan.

Why populism failed-not because it was ideologically pure alone,

it went against the grain of American culture which was

individualistic and hierarchic. Tea Party will probably also fail

because it is ideologically pure and fighting the corporate and

government forces of hierarchy. Also, however, because it is

structurally unconnected except rhetorically, but also because they

demand a return to first principles.

Campbell and Putnam (2011) in a New York Times Op-ed piece offer

an alternative, but well-founded view of Tea Party provenance. Using

a panel study of data collected first in 2006 and again in 2011, they

report that, contrary to other reports, Tea Party supporters in 2011

reported themselves as strong Republican partisans in 2006; and

second, that "Americans who have suffered 'as a result of the economic

turndown are no likelier to support the Tea Party than those who have

not suffered." They report two standard characteristics of Tea Party

members: they are white and tended to have low evaluations of

immigrants and blacks prior to joining the Tea Party; second, they

were more likely to be social conservatives in 2006. In the words of

47 | P a g e

Campbell and Putnam "The Tea Party's generals may say their overriding

concern is a smaller government, but not their rank and file, who are

more concerned about putting God in government." Regardless of the

region of the country Tea Party supporters are more likely to be “born

again Christians” than are non-supporters, according to a poll

conducted by ABC and the Washington Post in April, 2010, a finding

which, though it does not directly confirm the preferences of

supporters, suggests that they are more likely to have expressed a

concern for issues that have been at the forefront of the religious

right in the past, issues such as abortion and gay rights.

Additionally, a poll commissioned by CBS News and the New York

Times in the aftermath of the debt limit crisis in August 2011

indirectly supports the Campbell and Putnam argument. According to

that poll (www.cbsnews.com/ntdocs/pdf?Aug11a-all.pdf; accessed August

26, 2011) a significant majority of Americans responded that

Republicans in Congress had compromised too little in the debt ceiling

debate; thus indicating less concern with smaller government and a

greater willingness to tolerate more government spending. Equally

telling, 62% of respondents felt the focus of government should be on

creating jobs, while just 29% felt that excessive government spending

should have the higher priority (85% of respondents favor compromise

48 | P a g e

in Congress including 79% of Republicans). In this survey only 18% of

all respondents indicate that they were Tea Party supporters.

Another poll conducted in April 2010, however, by ABC and the

Washington Post poll reports that nearly 70% of Tea Party supporters

(n=251) were opposed to federal action to regulate the derivatives

market, compared to only slightly over 23% of Tea Party opponents (n=

231). A similar percentage (67% of Tea Party supporters, n=285)

opposed the establishment of a bank funded insurance plan to protect

the industry from collapse (27% of opponents expressed a similar

belief, n=249). Additionally, 62% of movement supporters (n=289) were

opposed to additional federal regulation of the consumer loan market,

compared to 19% of movement opponents (n=257). Finally, 51% of Tea

Party supporters (n=270) opposed stricter regulation of

banks/financial institutions, and Wall Street, while only12% of Tea

Party opponents (n=262) were opposed. This poll included no questions

about social issues, however.

An ABC/Washington Post telephone survey, conducted in April, 2010,

found that 30.86% of respondents offered an opinion that supported the

Tea Party at some level, with 20.20% stating strong support. By

August 2011 support the movement had dwindled to only 25%

49 | P a g e

(www.gallup.com; accessed 9/16/2011). The 30% figure from 2010 is

consistent with surveys conducted by Gallup, which charted Tea Party

support at 28% in April, 2010 (www.gallup.com; access 9/16/2011).

Reportedly the Tea Party played a pivotal role in the 2010

midterm election which found Republicans regaining formal control of

the House of Representatives and clear veto control of the Senate.

Though the Tea Party may have played in a role in the Republican

success, history records that the party out of power often gains seats

in off-year elections.

The ABC/Post addresses the issue both obliquely and directly. Under

the latter category is a questionnaire item that queries respondents

on the extent to which they believe that race remains a problem today:

among the strongest movement supporters 53.6% label race as either a

“big” or “somewhat” of a problem. By comparison among the strongest

opponents 89.31% view it the same way, a difference of 35.7%. The

question wording probably leads to the surprising outcome. For

respondents what constitutes a “problem?” Is it true that Tea Party

supporters are providing what they believe to be the “socially

50 | P a g e

desirable” response? If so, why, then, does a majority still view

race as at least “something” of a problem? Are movement opponents

more candid in identifying race as a continuing problem? Does the

race of the respondent contribute to the skewed findings? Does the

region from which respondents come, also influence their response to

this item? The contribution of both of these potentially confounding

variables (race and region) can be tested in the ABC/Post poll.

For example, among Southern Tea Party strong supporters 50.69%

(n=73) report race as either a “big” or “somewhat” of a problem (13.7%

see it as a big problem). Among Southern Tea Party opponents (n=54)

nearly 89% make similar reports, with 54% seeing as a “big” problem.

Southerners seem no more or less likely to see race as a problem, than

the rest of the nation.

Another item measures whether respondents believe that Obama is

spending the right amount representing the interests of African-

Americans. Response categories were “too much, a big concern;” “too

much, not a big concern;” “too little, not a big concern;” “ too

little, a big concern;” “about the right amount.” Among Tea Party

supporters 26% responded “too much” (14.6% - “big concern;” 10.4% -

“not a big concern”). Forty-eight percent of that group thought that

he was representing the interests of African-American interests at

51 | P a g e

about the right level. By comparison, among the strongest opponents

to the Tea Party, only 3% thought he was devoting too much to the

African-American community, while 87% thought the spending was about

right.

When region is controlled Southerners are at the national

average; 26% of strong Southern Tea Party supporters responded that

Obama was over-representing the interests of African-Americans and 48%

thought he was devoting about the right amount of concern to the

issues. Similarly 0% thought he was spending too much and 92% thought

he was spending about the correct amount.

As a region of the country that has often rejected Federal

government intrusion, Southerners might be expected to oppose economic

regulation, budget growth (as evidenced by growth in budget deficits),

and health care, especially among those who are Tea Party supporters.

Since the South is also the poorest region in the nation, however,

with a high proportion of African-Americans, support for health care

might be mixed.

Health Care

One of the issues which has stimulated Tea Party supporters to

action was what has come to be known as the Patient Protection and

52 | P a g e

Affordable Care Act, passed in 2010. Stark differences on this issue

separate Tea Party supporters from opponents, as 59.09% (n=132) of Tea

Party opponents strongly approved of the plan while 82.35% (n=136) of

Tea Party supporters strongly opposed it. The taub for that first-

order relationship is -.52 Even though only about 60% of movement

opponents approved of the new health care plan, they were considerably

more likely to express trust for Obama over Congressional Republicans

when it came to health care policy; responses to a second survey item

finds that 90.53% (n=264) of all respondents trusted Obama’s handling

of health care reform, while only 6.06% trusted the Republicans in

Congress to reform health care. Among Tea Party supporters (n=292)

75.34% trusted Congressional Republicans and 9.59% of opponents

trusted Obama on the health issue. Additionally, nearly 15% of Tea

Party supporters said they would trust neither Obama nor the

Republicans (taub=-.51).

Regionally, on the first issue (support for Obama’s handling of

health care), Southern Tea Party supporters disapproved at a rate of

82.46%, while 75.47% of Tea Party opponents approved (n=165;

taub=-.51). Southern Tea Party supporters are not so different from

non-Southerners. Tea Party opponents lag slightly behind opponents in

other regions. Tea Party supporters from the South report Trusting

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Congressional Republicans at a rate of 78.38% while opponents register

support for Obama at 84.27% (n=331; tabb=-.43). Again, Southern

opponents lag somewhat behind in their trust of Obama, perhaps a

reflection of a generic Southern anti-federalism.

Thus, on the issue of health care Southern Tea Party supporters

are not much different than non-Southerners. The association between

region and support for health care, as framed in the preceding and

measured by Cramer’s V, registered an anemic .10 (support for Obama’s

health care plans) and .067 (trust for Obama or the Republicans).

Budget Deficits

Government budget deficits have skyrocketed since 2007 as it

became clear that the economy was preparting to go into freefall.

Both Republicans and Democrats put together economic stimulus

proposals and the Federal Reserve lowered interest rates nearly into

the negative territory. Virtually all government officials argued

that if steps were not taken to protect the banking and financial

industries, we would assuredly fall into a depression on a scale of

that of the 1930s. The dollar amounts are daunting in current dollar

values, though since the economy is so much larger today than it was

in the 1940s, the debt as a percentage of the GDP is not as large as

it was in 1949. Coupled with the health care plan passed in 2010 and

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the current high unemployment rate, the deficit and debt seem

insurmountable and add fuel to Tea Party supporters.

The situation is compounded by the balanced budget amendments or

statutory requirements that have been passed in every state except

Vermont. The Tea Party Contract From America

(www.thecontract.org/the-contract-from-america, downloaded 8/16/2011)

lists as their number three concern “Demand a Balanced Budget.” Many

supporters (and some non-supporters), no doubt, are convinced that the

Patient Health Care plan will contribute to the budget deficit,

providing health care support for the “undeserving,” even though

support for the “undeserving” has been provided at higher cost through

delayed emergency room visits for several decades.

Three measures of the budget and budget deficit can be found in

the ABC/Post poll: the first measures the level of

approval/disapproval of Obama’s handling of the budget (referred to

hereafter as “approval”); the second is a measure of respondents’

trust in Obama or Congressional Republicans to handle the deficit

(“trust”); and the final item measures the level of responsibility

doled out to Obama and George W. Bush for the current budget deficit

(“responsibility”). On only one of these three measures are

differences between the south and other regions notable and

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statistically significant. The South and the Midwest approve Obama’s

handling of the budget at a rate around 35%, while in the Northeast

the approval level is 42% and in the West it is 52% (Cramer’s V=.10;

chi square=14.87, p=.095, n=485). On the other two survey items,

regional differences are small: on the trust issue, the percentages

supporting Obama vary between 85.95 and 87.91 (Cramer’s V=.06; chi

square=10.66, p=.30; n=976); for the responsibility measure Bush is

blamed by between 61% and 53% (South comes in at 58%) (Cramer’s V=.04;

chi square=2.33, p=.985; n=489).

On the other hand, true to the findings on health care reported

in the preceding, Tea Party supporters and opponents have very

different assessments of the budget and budget deficits. Ninety-two

percent of Tea Party supporters disapprove of Obama’s handling of the

budget; 78% trust Congressional Republicans to handle the deficit; and

54% blame Obama for the deficit. By comparison, 84% of Party

opponents approve of Obama’s handling of the budget; 85% say Obama is

more trustworthy than Republicans; and 87% blame Bush over Obama for

causing the soaring budget deficit.

Tea Party support does not vary appreciably between regions as

well. Table 1 A-C reports taub for the relationships between the three

budget variables and support for the Tea Party, controlled for region.

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From Tables 1A and 1B it can be seen that the movement support results

in a proportionate reduction in error of between .41 and .60; the

relationships were all negative (i.e. Tea Party supporters were more

likely to disapprove of Obama’s budgets and to trust Republicans over

the president, regardless of region). Table 1c reports taub for the

relationship between budget problem blame and level of Tea Party

support. The relationships here were weaker, though chi square was

universally significant, as supporters were more likely to blame

Obama, though significant numbers of movement supporters blamed both

or neither. Opponents reported higher levels of blame for Bush (85%

to 100% blamed Bush, while only 50% to 60% of supporters blamed

Obama). Very few opponents blamed both or neither.

Regulatory Policy

For many Tea Party supporters, government intrusion into the

market is anathema. This is illustrated by the prelude to the

Contract from America which remarks upon two fundamental principles:

limited government and economic freedom. Under economic freedom the

Contract says: “The most powerful, proven instrument of material and

social progress is the free market….Any other economic system,

regardless of its intended pragmatic benefits, undermines our

fundamental rights as a free people.” In other words, intrusions into

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the market, regardless of their intent, are bound to have detrimental

effects on productivity and freedom. In the United States two types

of federal regulatory agencies have had oversight responsibility for

sectors of the economy. The first was responsible for insuring that

some sectors of the economy were protected from destructive

competition and these were created as independent agencies; examples

include the Federal Reserve System, Federal Communication Commission,

the Interstate Commerce Commission, and Civil Aeronautics Board (the

latter two have since been phased out). The second type protected

workers and citizens from some sorts of economic and work related

threats and abuses; examples include the Occupational Safety and

Health Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Food

and Drug Administration; and the newly created Consumer Protection

Agency, none of which were created as independent agencies.

Deregulation of the economy, which resulted in the elimination of

the ICC and CAB, began in the late 1970s and included the savings and

loan industry, which collapsed in the late 1980s, and the banking

industry, which many have credited with the current economic collapse.

Table ? presents the association coefficients between levels of Tea

Party support and levels of support for various regulatory proposals

in the aftermath of the decline of the credit markets in the U.S. The

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regulatory items include: approval rates for Obama’s handling of the

regulation of the financial industry (Obama); support for stricter

government regulation of banks (regulation); support for regulation of

derivatives (derivatives); and support for oversight of consumer loans

and credit cards (oversight).

A quick perusal of the taub values presented in that table

confirms the consistency of the relationship between Tea Party support

and support for regulation, in particular of the banking industry.

That association is negative in every region of the country, which

means that Tea Party supporters are more likely to say that they

oppose regulation. The association is strongest for the one measure

that also mentions Obama by name in relation to regulation (-.47 to

-.54 in range), suggesting further that Obama is a Tea Party

lightening rod. For the other regulatory proposals that association

between these two variables, though statistically significant, is more

modest (-.27 to -.45).

Though the South registers the highest association between Tea

Party support and opposition to Obama’s regulatory policy (though not

by much), the South is once again not particularly distinctive. In

fact, the level of Tea Party support as a predictor is weaker than we

might expect, based upon the supposition that the South is or has been

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a “state’s right” region since the Civil War and the fact that each of

the reported items calls for greater federal action.

Auxiliary Alliance Information

The Farmer's Alliance and Industrial Union (the Alliance, the

organizational precursor of the People’s Party) was multi faceted

network of organizations from Texas to the Northeast, from the Dakota

territory to Florida; at its height it featured an extensive speakers

bureau, supportive newspapers and editors, cooperatives that provided

buying, selling, and marketing services to members, and crop

insurance. The issues that were of the greatest importance to the

Alliances included money, lending, greenbacks, and a proposal to

create a sub-treasury which was tied to the preceding three issues.

The impetus for the Alliance was farm debt and "sound money" (money

with "intrinsic value," i.e. gold and to a letter extent, silver).

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Banks insisted upon specie (coin) as a medium for exchange, though

during the Civil War the government had issued "greenbacks" to help

pay for the war; by the time the war ended the value of the greenbacks

had been reduced to only 50 cents, thus inflating their value but also

making money more widely available. When the War ended the government

stopped expanding the fiat money supply (greenbacks) and allowed the

population and economy to catch up "thus forcing general price levels

down to a point where it was no longer profitable to redeem paper

dollars in gold to finance imports" (Goodwyn 1997; p.13)

In the interim the banks/lenders were able to redeem their 50

cent treasury notes for the full face value of $1.00, reaping

significant financial reward. Bankers and lenders generally preferred

a stable monetary system because it meant that they were repaid in the

same units they loaned in. Borrowers preferred a more upwardly fluid

monetary unit that made repayment easier.

The Alliance advocated a return to a more fluid (fiat) monetary

system comparable to what we use today that would have eased the

plight of the farming community. A perhaps unintended consequence of

a hard money policy in the late 1800's was that the economic pressure

placed on farmers forced many of them to abandon their farms and seek

employment in the rising industrial centers of the northeast. Goodwyn

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argues that the "corporate state" that exists in the U.S. today has

its roots firmly planted in the legal, financial, and technological

context of the post-Civil War United States.

The South was transformed in 20th century (Black and Black 1987),

reducing the authority of the planter elite and with it hierarchic

control. Several factors contributed to the transformation, according

to Black and Black: internal migration from and to the non-South (pp.

16-17); the influence of the individualistic Populist movement, with a

devotion to the creed of the marketplace, that spread through the

South in the late 1800s; the authors also note that an industrial

class began to develop that sought economic development that

challenged the prevailing economic and political elite (pp. 27-28); to

this may be added the effects of mass media, especially television

which has had a broadening effect on the South, as well as the non-

South.

In the antebellum South, plantations created a culture of well-

defined hierarchies with the planter’s family at the top, ranging down

through the “agent” (who took the place of the planter when he or she

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was absent, oftentimes of the planting class as well), the overseer,

the field boss, and the slaves (Scarborough). Even within the slave

community, a social structure similar to hierarchy existed as house

slaves and slave artisans were more valuable and had an easier life in

many respects compared to field hands. This is the South that many

Americans assume to be the “real” South, as characterized in movies

such as Gone with the Wind.

But plantation culture existed alongside a more democratic,

though less prosperous, culture. The Southern frontier was a rough

and tumble existence, making a living out of an environment that was

in some places barren and in others formidable. For those who settled

there, many of whom had come to this country as indentured servants,

survival was the first order of business, to be accomplished by the

sweat of their own brow. For many this meant developing a sense of

self-reliance and independence was the first order of business.

Independence may not have been sought, but it came with the territory,

and was reinforced by the Protestant religious tradition. Southern

Protestant churches, especially the Baptist religion, rejected the

hierarchical structure of the Roman Catholic church, replacing it with

a clergy that was untrained and self-selected, an empowered

congregation, and individual members who “chose” salvation, who had a

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direct connection to heaven, and who could interpret the Bible

independently (Billington 1971; Chapter XIV). Furthermore, in the

antebellum era individual Southerners were responsible for whatever

level of education they were able to achieve, without assistance from

the county, state or national government (Billington 1971; Chapter

XIII).

After the Civil War the Southern farmer (non-planter) was ill-

placed for success. White and black farmers toiled on the least

productive land, probably owned by someone else, to whom the farmer

was heavily indebted for his (her) very existence. Their status and

existence during Reconstruction were tenuous and they were ripe for

any steps that might lead to improved living conditions. Despite

their historic self-reliance and independence, according to

Billington, these farmers were unlikely to blame themselves for their

failure, finding plenty of villains among bankers, politicians,

railroads, and the trusts to hold to account (p. 216). While the

farmer “continued to express his belief in individualism, the farmer

in the South became aware of his social and physical isolation….The

paucity of social diversions irritated the farmer as he (sic) brooded

upon his low economic status” (p. 216). The National Grange of the

Patrons of Husbandry and later the Farmer’s Alliance and Populists

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provided relief from the isolation while reinforcing the message that

the farmer was caught in a web of forces that were beyond direct

control (pp. 216-217).

The Grange and the Populist movement found that the system was to

blame for the plight of Southern (and non-Southern) farmers, and

sought to fix it, while creating an organization that farmers could

relate to and control. System blame is characteristic of egalitarian

cultures, but replacing the system with something more egalitarian

would be the solution most preferred by that eponymous culture.

Fixes, patches, and regulations are solutions for hierarchists who

think the market needs control to insure that the status quo is not

disturbed, or by individualists who believe that opportunities

sometimes need protecting.

Rae (2011) likens the Tea Party movement to a “starfish” which

may survive the loss of its head by growing a replacement. In fact,

in some 1960s leaderless organizations spokespersons were the order of

the day and were ad hoc and designed to be replaceable. In the

thinking of Rae this makes the leaderless organization more difficult

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to eliminate. By implication, well structured organizations with

established leaders, are prone to failure when the leader dies. On

the contrary, it is the structured organization that is more likely to

survive by providing a mechanism for smooth leadership transitions.

It is more likely that as a spontaneous popular uprising, that the Tea

Party is emblematic of American political protest and that it will not

survive as a significant force for more than one or two election

cycles. If the Tea Party is individualistic, as seems probable,

without a leader behind which members can combine, its prospect

horizon is short. Egalitarian cultures are also inclined toward short

shelf life, but because of their commitment to equality, which becomes

in effect a boundary that holds the membership together, they may a

better chance at longer survival.

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