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Dissertation Title:

The Syrian Refugee Crisis:

A Reification of State Sovereignty in Lebanon?

By Jessie Nassar

SOAS candidate number: 577098

MSc Middle East Politics

‘This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree

of MSc Middle East Politics of the School of Oriental and African Studies (University

of London)

Date of submission: September 15, 2014

Word count: 9,960

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Declaration:

I have read and understood regulation 17.9 of the Regulations for students of the

School of Oriental and African Studies concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all

material presented for examination is my own work and has not been written for me,

in whole or in part by any other person. I also undertake that any quotation or

paraphrase from the published or unpublished work of another person has been duly

acknowledged in the work which I present for examination. I give permission for a

copy of my dissertation to be held for reference, at the School’s discretion.

Signature: Date: 15/09/2014

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Table of Contents

Table of contents ………………………………………………………

Abstract ……………………………………………………….

Acknowledgments ……………………………………………………….

Chapter 1: Introduction ………………………………………………………. 1.1 Motivations: the everyday experience of refugees ...…………………………... 1.2 Defining the research problem …………………….………………………….... 1.3 Performing sovereignty through exclusion: the case of refugees ……………… 1.4 Thesis scope, aim and objectives ………………….…………………………… 1.5 Research methods and methodology …………………………………………...

Chapter 2: Conventional and alternative understandings of state sovereignty: an examination in the Lebanese context ………………………………………… 2.1 Conventional definitions of state sovereignty ………………………………….. 2.2 Problems of conventional definitions of state sovereignty …………………….. 2.3 Performing sovereignty through exclusion: the case of refugees ……………… Chapter 3: Examining Lebanese state sovereignty through the Syrian refugee crisis ………………………………………………………………………………... 3.1 The ‘no-policy policy’: a general overview ……………………………………. 3.2 Understanding factors influencing the ‘no-policy policy’ and their effects …... 3.3 The refugee as a “site of modern statecraft” ……………………………………

3.3.1 The ambiguities of the ‘no-refugee’ status ………………………… 3.3.2 The effects of illegal sovereign practices on the everyday life of refugees ……………………………………………………………………..

3.4 Analysing discursive practices and their effects ……………………………….. Chapter 4: Assessing the refugee crisis at the local level: impact and practices 4.1 The case of Bar Elias …………………………………………………………... 4.2 The case of Burj Hammoud …………………………………………………….

Chapter 5: Reconstructing or ‘re-deconstructing’ sovereignty? ……………….

5.1 Revisiting the ‘no-policy policy’ ………………………………………………. 5.2 Considering conflicting sovereignties …………..……………………………… 5.3 Revisiting the effects of sovereignty ……………………………………………

Page 2-3

4 5

7-14

7 8 9 10-11 11-14

15-20

15-17 17-19 19-20

21-28

21-23 23-25 25-28 25-26 26-28

28-30

31-34

31-32 32-34 35-39 35-36 37-38 38-39

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Chapter 6: Rethinking sovereignty and refugees: a more constructive approach …………………………………………………………………………... 6.1 Conclusions and limitations of the research …………………………………… 6.2 Rethinking the refugee: rethinking sovereignty ……………………………….. Bibliography ……………………………………………………………………….

Appendix A1: List of the interviews conducted …………………………………

Appendix A2: Vulnerability Assessment map …………………………………..

40-44 40-42 42-44 45-50

51 52

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Abstract

This contribution aims to deconstruct state sovereignty in Lebanon through the

Syrian refugee crisis. While mainstream approaches view sovereignty in Lebanon as

weak and contextually limited, I argue that the Syrian refugee was resourceful for the

reproduction of statist images through everyday practices of exclusionary and

arbitrary power. I reveal how the ambiguities of the state’s strategies succeed in

shifting attention on pre-existing gaps, towards the refugee. I also evaluate the

implications of the ‘no-policy policy’ at both central and local levels. The gaps caused

by the central authorities’ passive actions gave municipalities an increasing role in the

management of the crisis. To show this, I take Burj Hammoud and Bar Elias

municipalities as case study examples. I evaluate the extent to which sovereign

images were successfully reiterated at the local level, through coercive and illegal

practices among others. The analysis of the challenges on the ground, which are

exacerbated by the state’s official ‘no-policy’, unveils, however, the unsustainability

of the current management. I conclude that the need to adopt a more constructive

approach to the refugee problem would also allow for a renegotiation of relations

within the state, and hence, the reification of a more inclusive yet ‘de-centralised

sovereignty’.

 

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Acknowledgments This work would not have seen the light without the positive impulse and encouragements of my Professor and supervisor Salwa Ismail. Her input was definitely what inspired a big part of this work. I owe my gratitude to my interviewees, including those I haven’t cited in the thesis, and without whom I would have not been able to give it a meaning. Thank you for your big insight, time, and most of all, for making me want to search for more. My gratitude is also to Joanna, my sister, without whom I would not have reached most of these people. I also thank all my friends who were caring, understanding and patient enough. I especially include those who gave me the time to think out loud, and fed me with resourceful ideas. A special thought to the two ones who constantly fuel me with “power” and “energy”… Finally, thank you to my father, mother and sisters, who inspire me everyday. And to my baby nephew, who accompanied me and calmed me during my field research, through his warmth and love…

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Strangely, the foreigner lives within us: he is the hidden face of our identity,

the space that wrecks our abode, the time in which understanding and affinity

founder. By recognizing him within ourselves, we are spared detesting him in

himself. A symptom that precisely turns “we” into a problem (…). (Kristeva,

1991, p.1)

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Motivations: the everyday experience of refugees

The seeds of this work were planted in the Lebanese Beqaa valley. During my ten-

month work experience with the Norwegian Refugee Council, the Syrian refugee

crisis became part of my everyday life. Going back to Beirut on the weekends, where

people enjoyed nightlife away from the hidden misery, I felt a sense of schizophrenia.

While I was witnessing how the thousands of refugees who daily crossed Lebanon’s

uncontrolled borders had become the local authorities and communities’ main

concern, Beirut was silent. It is from that time on that the humanitarian catastrophe

shifted my interest towards the state1. Having had the opportunity to work in the area

most affected by the refugee influx, which also happens to be a historically neglected

area by the state, pushed me to further question its seemingly absence. As I became

familiar with the situation on ground, I felt the growing gap between reality and any

applicable policy. In this contribution, the choice to focus on the state rather than the

‘refugee’ therefore serves, first and foremost, as a personal quest to understanding

what I had missed back on field.

                                                                                                               1  My usage of the term ‘state’ refers to the ensemble of power structures linked directly or indirectly to the Lebanese central authorities, and generating forms of power performing on the refugee. I recognise the work of various scholars, like Salame (1994), Picard (1996; 2000), Makdissi (2000), Owen (2004), among others who analysed the nature of the Lebanese state, its ‘weaknesses’ and complexities. However, I use my own definition because my work questions the practices of existing state authorities in dealing with the refugee crisis, rather than the structure of state institutions.  

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1.2 Defining the research problem

In a situation of refugee influx:

“The host government is faced with a threefold choice in its response to each

event: it can do nothing, it can respond negatively towards the refugees, or it

can respond positively. When the government does nothing, this suggests

that it either lacks the capacity for action, is unwilling to act, or does not

consider the appearance of refugees as a significant matter for its agenda

(Gordenker, 1987). The government will probably react if the number of

refugees threatens to overwhelm local capacities, or if refugees threaten

security by encouraging local conflict or incurring the military interest of

sending countries”. (Jacobsen, 1996, p.658)

The Lebanese government’s response to the Syrian refugee influx appears to be easily

classifiable along Jacobsen’s categorisation. From 2011 till this day, one could say

that it did not take any official action. Its ‘no-policy policy’2 exasperated by its

position of political neutrality towards the Syrian conflict, commonly known as the

“dissociation” policy, have not changed. However, what Jacobsen’s argument fails to

portray, is that although the number of refugees has already overwhelmed local

capacities and threatened security, the government remains passive.

Whilst the exponential number of refugees was manageable at first, today,

Lebanon shelters more than half of the total number of Syrian refugees in the region

(UNHCR, 2014). In that respect, it is only fair to question the role of the state, and try

to understand its response, or rather, its no-response. With the absence of policy,

attention should turn towards what lies in its shadows, in other words, the daily

                                                                                                               2 I use this term to describe the state’s lack of both the will and the capacities to adopt policies and a strategic plan to deal with the crisis. It has indeed become of common usage and is differently formulated by analysts; for instance, some like Malaeb (Interview, 2014) call it the “decision of no-decision”, while others like Boustani or Mufti (2014) label it “the policy of no-policy”.

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dealing and interaction with refugees. It is from this premise that I consider the

principle of sovereignty to be important in a situation of crisis, a moment used to

define the foreigner as a national ‘threat’ to unity, security, and sovereignty.

1.3 Theoretical framework

Little attention has been accorded to sovereignty and displacement in the non-

Western world, while those drawing the link between sovereignty and humanitarian

interventions are state-centred (See for example, Weber and Bierstecker, 1996;

Krasner, 1999 or Haddad, 2008). As Soguk argues, this undermines the importance of

sovereignty on the one hand, and fails to admit that the state is neither “permanent”

nor “ephemeral” (Soguk, 2005, p.187). I believe, however, that Soguk’s approach

would be much more insightful if read in parallel with Jacobsen’s study. As she

argues, studies on refugee movements in the less developed countries actually put

very little focus on the effects they have “on host countries and communities [and]

relatively few focus specifically on host government responses” (1996, p.656).

As such, starting from Soguk’s consideration that the state’s boundaries are

not fixed (a view inspired by scholars like Foucault, 1988 and Mitchell, 1991), and

that sovereignty, hence, follows the same path; my aim is to evaluate the extent to

which the Lebanese state’s response to the Syrian refugee crisis contributes to the

reproduction of statist images. My analysis will draw on two main theoretical

arguments. The first explores that the “weakness of everyday stateness” in Lebanon is

countered by measures inflicted on the refugee to make “power highly visible”

(Hansen and Stepputat, in Hoffman 2011, p.25). The second is a reinterpretation of

Soguk’s reading in the European context, where he argues that state responses to

refugee problems do not necessarily produce a statist image more than they contribute

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to shaping and reshaping relations and institutions (2005, p.233). By that, he

highlights that the presence of refugees has ambivalent effects: on the one hand it is

“disruptive (problematic); and on the other hand it is recuperative (resourceful) of

sovereignty practices” (Soguk, 1999, p.15). My attempt is to evaluate these accounts

in the Lebanon context.

1.4 Thesis scope, aim and objectives

In the absence of studies on Lebanese state sovereignty in light of the Syrian

refugee crisis, this contribution could serve as a starting point to further investment on

the topic. It will provide a new perspective to understanding practices of sovereignty

by shedding light on the importance of the changes caused by the Syrian refugee

crisis. This would not only be an attempt to go beyond conventional understandings

of sovereignty, but also an effort to perceive refugees differently in a country where

tension and conflict are an everyday affair. Although the role of international actors is

fundamental to the definition and understanding of practices of sovereignty, they

remain outside the purview of this study (See for instance: Eggli, 2002; Nathwani,

2003 and Haddad, 2008). The research focuses on practices committed by national

actors representing the state directly or indirectly.

The work will also constantly underline how the refugee helps statesmen to

cover-up existing gaps. Although I do not rule out the reality of the challenges and

problems caused by the crisis, I expose how Lebanese authorities 3 constantly

manipulate the refugee problem while adopting arbitrary measures that enforce their                                                                                                                3 The major role political parties like Hezbollah play in affecting state sovereignty generally, and in the context of the refugee crisis particularly (For example: see Charara, 1996 and Naufal, 2012) hence falls outside the scope of my argument.  

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power. Also, since the ‘no-policy policy’ and political deadlock describing at best the

political reality in Lebanon shifted the burden to local authorities, my analysis would

be incomplete if I do not assess the response of the latter. The crisis, in fact, enforced

the role of municipalities. Due to the immobilisation at the national level, they

became the “most active public institutions”, and an irreplaceable focal point to local

and international organisations (Boutani, 2014). Accordingly, to what extent has the

Syrian refugee crisis reified and reproduced statist images in Lebanon? And how does

this translate at the local level?

To answer my questions, I first revisit conventional definitions of sovereignty

in order to introduce the refugee as a new lens to reconsider the concept, and frame it

in the Lebanese context (Chapter 2). This will then allow me to examine the state’s

policies and everyday practices on the refugee, which I support by interviews I

conducted with reliable sources (Chapter 3). Later, I make a concise overview of the

effects of these policies, their translation, and reproduction at the local level, by

taking three municipalities as case studies (chapter 4). Chapter 5 provides a more

elaborate and critical reading of the two previous chapters. It assesses the extent to

which the reiteration of sovereign images is successful in the refugee context. It

reconsiders the long-term implications of the ‘no-policy policy’, and identifies

conflicting actors, who are competing to gain power through the refugee crisis.

The concluding chapter sets both the limitations and prospects of the research, and

answers the main research question. It aims at drawing lessons from the problems

highlighted in the thesis and forges a ground for a reconsideration of relations and

roles within the state.

1.5 Research methods and methodology

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In my research, I rely on drawing a link between general literature on state

sovereignty, and a number of journal articles recently published on the Syrian crisis,

which I support, when needed, with newspaper articles. I also focus on the more

recent literature tackling main issues in Lebanese politics, including sovereignty and

power relations. My main source of inspiration, nonetheless, comes from the work of

Nevzat Soguk (2005), and Hansen and Stepputat’s edited contribution (2005). I draw

on their unconventional understanding of state sovereignty and refugees to apply it

within the Lebanese context by also referring to other insightful sources as a support.

Another enlightening contribution is the PhD thesis of Sophia Hoffman (SOAS,

2011), who deconstructs Syrian state sovereignty in the context of the Iraqi refugee

crisis. Hoffman’s work is, in fact, the only study I found applying those two concepts

in a country with big similarities to Lebanon, and takes a very recent humanitarian

crisis as a case study.

To strengthen the link I draw between theory and case study, and investigate the

aim of this dissertation, I use a qualitative research method based on semi-structured

interviews, which I present in a table (See Appendix 1). This method helped me

overcome the difficulty to assess and confirm the informal yet ‘formalised’ everyday

practices, which are fundamental for the understanding of the refugee crisis, but also

the Lebanese system. The method also allowed to provide more solid support to

recently published articles on the refugee crisis, which, if considered alone, could not

be as informing given the ongoing development of the conflict.

The selection of municipalities:

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My three areas of focus are Bar Elias (BE), Burj Hammoud (BH), and Jdeideh4.

The criteria of selection are partly based on the latest vulnerability assessment map

made in collaboration with the MoSA and UNHCR (See Appendix 2), which

identifies the 242 most vulnerable areas, taking into account both refugee and host

communities. As the map shows, Bar Elias and Burj Hammoud are of the “most

vulnerable localities”. Jdeideh’s classification as the “3rd most vulnerable” is not

surprising as it hosts a smaller number of refugees, while it is the most at ease both

financially and administratively – this could be noticeable by merely consulting the

municipality’s up-to-date official website (both Arabic and English versions). Being

the capital of the Matn Qada’ (district), and “one of the main arteries of the region”

(English version of the website, 2014) surrounding the Greater Beirut, Jdeideh

comprises the security, judicial and administrative centres of the state, and is actively

engaged in community life. As confirmed during the interview I conducted with Jean

Bakhos, an active member of the municipal council, Jdeideh is handling the refugee

crisis quite well when compared to other municipalities (especially the security

aspect), despite its large population density (about 150 000 inhabitants), and growing

constraints (Municipality website, 2014). The interview was therefore more

informative of the general status of Jdeideh than the crisis per se. As the gaps in my

findings were completely filled with the enriching interviews conducted in BH and

BE, I decided, thereafter, to consider Jdeideh as my ‘in-between’ case-study-support

to balance my approach. In fact, although Jdeideh and BH are adjacent to each other

and carry many similarities5, the differences are also visible. While BH is part of the

Greater Beirut and therefore hosts urban refugees, BE is a large rural town located at

                                                                                                               4 Also known as "Jdeidet, Al Bouchrieh, Al Sed", which are the names of the three areas managed by the municipality. 5 Urban density, socio-economic background, for instance.  

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the ‘margins’ of the central state. More details about these two areas are provided in

Chapter 4.

To explain my referencing method, it is worth mentioning that most of my

interviewees preferred to use both Arabic and English. While some citations are

originally and directly quoted in English, the ones translated from Arabic are either

paraphrased or translated between brackets. I make this distinction because the

statements I choose to quote directly have a revealing meaning in the original way in

which they were expressed by the interviewee, which actually serves the analysis of

my findings.

As shown in Table 1, only one of my interviewees wished to remain anonymous.

This research was conducted in accordance with SOAS research ethics. I have been

committed to maintaining the highest ethical standards of integrity, honesty and

openness.

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Chapter 2: Conventional and alternative understandings of state sovereignty: an

examination in the Lebanese context

This chapter sets the theoretical ground upholding this thesis. It aims at

explaining the logics behind the conception of Lebanese state sovereignty through

refugees. I first draw on mainstream definitions of sovereignty. Then, I highlight the

problems these approaches unveil by relying on both the unconventional literature

supporting my work, and key features of the Lebanese system. This finally allows me

to fill the gap of mainstream conceptions, by introducing the refugee as an actor

informing practices of sovereignty. This hence leads the way to my case study

analysis.

2.1 Conventional definitions of state sovereignty

Generally, it is agreed that sovereignty consists of three main features:

“territory, population, and authority - in addition to recognition”; and two

components: domestic and international (Weber and Bierstecker, 1996, p.3). While

internal sovereignty is built through “context dependent state-government-population

relations that create distinct forms of governance on the territory of different states”;

its outside facet is “constructed through much for standardized ritualized interactions

based on the sovereign ideal and its underlying myths of popular self-determination

and the equality of all states” (Hoffman, 2011, p.9).

It is through these lenses that scholars view sovereignty in Lebanon, and

therefore, contest its strength. For example, drawing upon Krasner’s three forms of

internal sovereignty, Kaufman argues that they combine to create a weak state

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structure in Lebanon, where society was born “divided according to political and

cultural orientation into various groups, none of which has been able to impose its

will on the rest of the society” (Kaufman, 2014, p.181). This categorisation deserves

some elaboration because it resumes well the main issues tackled in conventional

approaches to Lebanese sovereignty.

The first is “Wesphalian sovereignty”, which is violated when external actors

impact on domestic authority structures (Kaufman, 2014, p.179). Many scholars like

Salame (1994), Picard (1996; in Heydemann, 2000), Owen (2000) and Bahout (in

Picard and Ramsbotham, 2012) reveal how the blurred boundaries between domestic

and foreign agendas actually complicate the study of Lebanese sovereignty. They

explain how the French mandate created a system of dependence from foreign actors

and the Lebanese ruling elite, and ensured the formation and consolidation of a weak

and dependent military institution.

This undeniably undermines the second form, which is “domestic

sovereignty”. Kaufman defines it as the ability of public authorities to have effective

control over their borders (2014, p.179). Israel’s invasion of the South until 2000, and

the occupation of Lebanon by Syrian troops from 1976 till 2005 are two among many

other examples revealing the limits of this ability (Najem, 2012). Many like Najem

(2012) and Abdel-Kader (in Picard and Ramsbotham, 2012) argue that it is the Syrian

occupation which more specifically paralysed the restoration of sovereignty,

especially that neither Syria nor Lebanese leaders made serious efforts to demarcate

Lebanon’s boundaries.

Finally, the third form Kaufman analyses is “interdependent sovereignty”,

consisting of the capacity of authorities to regulate “the flow of information, ideas,

goods, people”, among other things (2014, p.179). As the contributions of Picard (in

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Heydemann, 2000), Charara (1996) or Harik (2004) among others show, the Lebanese

war allowed for militias, but also other actors like Hezbollah, to exercise full or

partial control over the territories and communities they represent. Even after the

signature of the Taif Peace Accord in 1990, political parties, including former militias

maintained a territorial control strategy, creating what Hansen and Stepputat call

“zones of unsettled sovereignties and loyalties” (2005, p.27). As such, Kaufman

concludes that the Lebanese state was not “seriously concerned about enforcing

control over its territory, about excluding external actors, or about controlling the

flow across its borders” (2014, p.180).

2.2 Problems of conventional definitions of state sovereignty

Although these accounts highlight convincingly the limits of state sovereignty

through the three angles presented, they do not consider the incompleteness of the

concept, as underlined in Chapter 1. Along Hansen and Stepputat’s view, they do not

consider that the nature of sovereignty in the postcolonial world is “provisional”,

“partial”, and devoid of monopoly of violence (2005, p.27). Indeed, Cammett notes

well the commonality of this phenomenon in pluralist societies like Rwanda, India,

Iraq or Lebanon, where “communal groups are associated to different geographical

units” (2014, p.88). This approach entails the necessity to comprehend internal

dynamics of power.

Taking advantage of a paralysed institutional mechanism as a consequence of

the war, political leaders (including previous militiamen) infiltrated state institutions

by occupying the seats of Parliament and Government, to engage in an “unruly

struggle for power” (Ayubi, 1995, p.184; Karam, in Picard and Ramsbotham, 2012,

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p.37). Instead of creating an inclusive participatory system based on checks and

balances, they appropriated public institutions as “private communitarian preserves

(chasse gardée)”, where decision-making depends on compromise, and where short-

lived crisis management superseded reform (Karam, in Picard and Ramsbotham,

2012, p.38). Hence, this allowed political parties but also other actors to gain a

‘degree of sovereignty’ and protect their own communities through provision of

welfare services. As Cammett demonstrates in her book (2014), this is typical in many

– especially post-war – developing countries, where governments do not have the

capacity to provide services to their citizens, for various reasons like lack of

resources, administrative deficiencies, or corruption (2014, p.219).

Although my focus is centred on the authorities’ practices and their official

policies, mentioning the role political parties play, is essential. Their activities from

both within official institutions, and through their welfare organisations do not only

prove the problems of reducing sovereignty to the three forms described earlier. More

importantly, their practices are sometimes revealing for the understanding of the

central authorities’ practices towards the refugee crisis, which is the aim of this study.

Besides, insofar as political party leaders and representatives play the role of state

officials, they contribute to the reproduction of statist images and discourses. Keeping

these issues in mind serves the rational of the following chapters.

Henceforward, the Lebanese state can be conceived as a “multiple and mobile

field of force relations” (Foucault, in Gratton, 2004, p.448). Understanding

sovereignty as the “effect” of the state’s actions (Hansen and Stepputat, 2005, p.7)

appears, as such, more promising. By de-centralising power and sovereignty, this

approach most importantly saves us from disregarding the state, which is, after all, “a

creation of our still-existing knowledge of law and sovereignty, and institutions

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that are known as state apparatus [and] are involved in relations of power”

(Foucault, in Constable, 1991, pp.274-275). It would also prove the simplistic nature

of the mainstream arguments reducing understandings of Lebanese sovereignty to the

state’s dependence from regional and foreign actors. Hereafter, the continuous

performance and reiteration of sovereignty on a daily basis would be revealed as “the

basic referent of the state” (Hansen and Stepputat, 2005, p.7). My emphasis is on how

this reiteration is practiced on the foreign ‘other’.

2.3 Performing sovereignty through exclusion: the case of refugees

One of the main prerogatives of sovereign practices – undermined by the

general trend among anthropologists and sociologists – is the categorisation and

distinction of individuals (Fassin, 2011, p.222). In fact, Agamben considers the

process of inclusion and exclusion, what he called “bare life”, as the “very effect of

the sovereign decision” (Gratton, 2006, p.446). “Sovereignty includes those that it

has to reject for the purpose of excluding them”, he explains (Agamben, in

Hoffman, 2011, p.29). This infers that the state “needs bodies and “bare life”, an

imagined or real “other”, to continuously manifest itself (Hansen and Stepputat, 2005,

p.31).

“Bare life is produced in and through the fundamental act of sovereignty –

deciding upon who is and who is not granted status in the state – and thus is

politicized by the sovereign’s act of exclusion”. (Gratton, 2006, p.454)

Taking Agamben’s argument even further, Hoffman argues that the state’s inclusion

of exclusion serves the purpose of power holders because it emphasises the

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“superiority of those allowed to participate” (Hoffman, 2011, p.29). As such,

refugees become the manifestation of its power to exclude.

Their presence, nonetheless, has paradoxical implications on sovereign

practices. On the one hand, it is disruptive because:

“Migration weakens a number of powerful assumptions and imaginations on

which the ideal of sovereignty rests, and undermines control over borders,

territory and population, which present the most fundamental attributes of

sovereignty (Hoffman, 2011, p.11).

On the other hand, it is resourceful because it allows the manipulation, or even, the

legitimation of exclusionary practices (Soguk, 2005, Chapter 5). It is that angle which

conventional approaches miss out, and thereby, fail to recognise “sovereignty’s

evolution as an organizing principle of power” (Hoffman, 2011, p.23). Accordingly, it

is that gap which I aim to cover, by analysing how the refugee crisis allows for the

reproduction of sovereignty through everyday practices of power. This reproduction

can originate from different entities dealing with refugees, whether embodying the

central state (for example: officials, ministries, security forces and army), or local

authorities (like municipalities).

Chapter 3: Examining Lebanese state sovereignty through the Syrian refugee crisis

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Following the literature regarding conventional and alternative understandings

of state sovereignty examined in Chapter 2, a deconstruction of statecraft practices

towards Syrian refugees is addressed in this chapter. I first provide an overview of the

state’s stance towards the crisis. Secondly, I elaborate on key factors influencing its

response, and the implications they have on sovereignty. Thirdly, I closely examine

how the refugee becomes an everyday instrument for the construction of a

sovereign image, which is crafted through and despite legal ambiguities. Finally, I

show how the discursive tool used by officials and supported by the media veils both

legal and illegal inconsistencies, but shapes anyhow the sovereign image. As

mentioned earlier, details on the interviews I use to support my findings are included

in Table 1.

3.1 The ‘no-policy policy’: a general overview

“As the war in Syria continues and the number of refugees is likely to keep on

increasing, the passive approach of Lebanese decision makers remains the

rule, instead of using the policy tools at hand” (Mufti, 2014).

Conversely, in the early stages of the crisis, the Lebanese government revealed a

relative degree of engagement. For instance, thanks to UNHCR’s efforts, it started

issuing registration certificates to refugees (Naufal, 2012, p.8). It also prepared a

response plan draft dividing responsibilities between the Ministry of Social Affairs

(MoSA), the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education and the High Relief

Council. Nonetheless, the plan was never adopted because of Prime Minister Mikati’s

resignation, which resulted in long delays to form a new government (Boustani,

2014). Since October 2013, the MoSA reengaged in the Syrian file through schemes

including a project aiming at coordinating aid efforts to refugees, developing action

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plans, and more importantly, assisting poor host communities neglected by NGOs.

(Malaeb, Interview, 2014). But as the Program Manager of this project, Makram

Malaeb, confirms, the “caretaker government” did not endorse the strategic action

plan his team developed, namely because of the “decision of no decision” (Malaeb,

Interview, 2014).

Nowadays, the lack of consensus among leaders is best portrayed by the

presidential vaccum, which dates back from last May (Now, 2014). Commenting on

the situation, Mikdachi (2014b) says:

“The amazing thing about the present situation is that despite the absence of a

legitimate government, the state and its institutions continue to function.

This is different than saying that politics continues to function, which also

does”.

Her statement can indeed reflect on some issues elaborated in chapter 2, where I

mention how decision-making depends on state leaders’ political calculations and

motivations rather than on a clear-set system. Although Lebanon’s host capacities are

oversaturated, which therefore impacts the government’s response, it is more the

absence of will than power which led to the aggravation of the refugee crisis. Whilst

the system “continues to function” as Mikdachi says, the heavy price of the

“disastrous policy of no-policy” (Boustani, 2014) is to be paid by both refugee and

local communities.

While coordination responsibilities lie in the hands of the UNHCR and other

UN agencies; practically, municipalities “were left to deal with the fate of the Syrian

refugees in their localities, taking responsibility for hosting and extending basic urban

services” (Boustani, 2014). Although a decree-law (no.118 of 1977) allows them to

accomplish a variety of tasks, and provides them with administrative and financial

  23  

autonomy, they are faced with major difficulties (Boustani, 2014), which I highlight

in the following chapters.

3.2 Understanding factors influencing the ‘no-policy policy’ and their effects

Commonly, many factors influence the policy responses of host refugee states to

refugee influxes. As presented by Jacobsen, these factors include relations between

the host and hosting country, the local community’s absorption capacity, calculations

about accepting international assistance, and national security concerns. Furthermore,

“host governments also struggle with bureaucratic politics, the position of refugees in

domestic politics, power struggles between government ministries and among

decisionmakers, paucity of information, bureaucratic inertia” (1996, p.655).

“After thirty years of Syrian hegemony, [Lebanon] remains profoundly divided

between adversaries and partisans of the Syrian regime” (Naufal, 2012, p.11). The

presence of refugees from Syria further increases existing sensitivities, as the regular

clashes in Tripoli reveal (Zahar and Yousuf, 2012; Naufal, 2012, p.18;

Christophersen, Thorleifsson and Tiltness, 2013, p.56). The ongoing battle between

ISIS fighters and the Lebanese army in the bordering town of Arsal – sheltering

alleged fighters among its refugee community – is perhaps even more telling6 (LBCI,

2014).

From that perspective, the “spillover effect” of the Syrian conflict is convincing

enough to frame the refugee crisis in security terms (Christophersen, Thorleifsson,

                                                                                                               6  I happened to meet with a well-positioned state official (Anonymous, Interview, 2014), who was on a meeting with the Mayor of Hemlaya (a small village in Matn), right after the clashes erupted. This allowed me to notice the remarkable extent to which such security threats are being linked to refugees (Interview, 2014). This highlights the general confusion regarding the categorisation of vulnerable refugees who are being confused with extremist fighters (See Naufal, 2012).  

  24  

and Tiltness, 2013; Lebanon24, 2014). Even more, it contributes to reinforce a

sovereign image, and ‘statising’ the humanitarian crisis by considering it a “specific

problem of the sovereign state” (Soguk, 1999, p.189)7. Nonetheless, this highlights

the confusion made between the humanitarian and political aspects of the crisis. On

the one hand, the government appropriates and identifies with the refugee problem;

while on the other hand, it justifies its unofficial yet formalised “no-policy policy” by

the principle of “dissociation” or political neutrality – which is anyhow questioned by

Hezbollah’s involvement in the conflict (Christophersen, Thorleifsson and Tiltness,

2013, p.51).

Another important factor influencing the Lebanese government’s response is the

political and security concerns behind camp establishment (Christophersen,

Thorleifsson, and Tiltness, 2013, pp.9-58). Without going into details, it is important

to mention that this position is animated by fears of ‘another Palestinian scenario’

(Naufal, 2014, p.7), which unveils ambiguities behind the recognition of refugee

status (see section 3.2.1). The transformation of Palestinian camps into ‘illegal spaces

of sovereignty’, which comprise “a complex tapestry of multiple and partial

sovereignties”, is indeed a major threat to the state (Hanafi, in Picard and

Ramsbotham, 2012, p.69).

The main issue, however, is that the government’s “no-camp policy” decision

of 2013 did not matter anymore; coming after about three years of silence,

“’unofficial’ camps were [already] flourishing in a disorganized manner in the North

and the Bekaa”, putting forward the “de facto rule” to enforce itself over the “no-

camp policy” (Mufti, 2014). As Vilet and Hourani further elucidate, “this makes it

very difficult for humanitarian agencies, government planners, and researchers alike

                                                                                                               7  The examples I give in section 3.2.2 also prove how security is an efficient tool to practice exclusion (Also see Foucault, in Gratton, 2006, p.449 and Latham, 2010, p.186).  

  25  

to have a full understanding of their numbers and needs” (2014, p.4). As such, the

“laxist” behaviour of the state – as the Advisor of the Minister of Interior, Khalil

Gebara, describes it – created new problems intensifying its loss of control: “82% of

refugees live in sub-standard shelter conditions [be it] on an agricultural land,

underground, in garages, and so on” (Informal interview, 2014). Moreover, the

absence of registration severely adds to these problems while, as Malaeb observes,

“registration is a sovereign decision; it is not only about knowing who needs what,

it is also about the right to know who is where” (Interview, 2014).

3.3 The refugee as a “site of modern statecraft”8

3.3.1 The ambiguities of the ‘no-refugee’ status

“The Lebanese authorities do not recognise the legal status of refugees, as it

has neither signed nor ratified the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention” (Naufal, 2012,

p.12). It however abided by the non-refoulement principle, and pledged to adopt an

“open-border policy” (Naufal, 2012, p.12). The legal ambiguity appears when the

state considers the refugee to be a “displaced person”, while this category is not

recognised by Lebanese law (Naufal, 2012, p.12) 9. This only demonstrates that the

refugee problem is, above all, “one of categorization, of making distinctions”

(Haddad, 2008, p.23). It also confirms the statement of the Lebanese Centre for

Human Rights (CLDH) Director, who said that statesmen are using a different

labelling to designate refugees, “but it is a way to deviate the problems” (Asmar,

Interview, 2014).

An example revealingly displaying the legal ambiguities of categorisation is

                                                                                                               8  Soguk, 1999, p.20.  9  Only the category of “asylum seekers” is recognised.  

  26  

the decree the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MoIM) issued on the 22nd of

May. The decree proclaims to ‘de-register’ any ‘refugee’ who goes back to Syria and

enters back Lebanese territory. The decision is based on the assumption that this

person is not under threat to be considered a ‘refugee’ (MoIM, 2014). But as the

Director of Human Rights Watch, Nadim Houri, puts its well: “the state does not even

register. How can it ‘de-register’ people who are not even refugees?” (Interview,

2014). Given the debates caused following this decree (namely with the UNHCR),

Gebara confirmed that it will be reviewed (Interview, 2014).

3.3.2 The effects of illegal sovereign practices on the everyday life of

refugees

In an insightful article, Latham shows how the refugees’ lives are completely

dependent on the state “for being in limbo for refugee status”, or, like in Lebanon

where that status is ‘illegal’, for “seeking to change [it] from temporary or ‘illegal’ to

‘legal’ and permanent” (Latham, 2010, p.187). By intentionally creating restrictive

provisional status, state officials ensure that refugees are not incorporated, which

increases their insecurity (Latham, 2010, p.192). This undeniably generates legal

infringements, which are, according to Kristeva, the result of material constraints

(Kristeva, 1991, p.103) but also, I would argue, the consequence of the legal vacuum

in Lebanon. In fact, while security forces have the ‘right’ to close down businesses

that Syrian refugees are illegally opening (Van Vilet and Hourani, 2014, p.12), no

decree to prevent or control such infringements was issued in the first place (Asmar,

Interview, 2014).

Additionally, “the freedom allowed for the administration to take steps”

permits an “instrumentalization of the law”, which leads to the administration of the

  27  

refugee by the “least dignified forms of regulation” (Kristeva, 1999, p.102). The

words of Gebara and Houri could not be more revealing to validate these accounts:

“One of the strategies, which is maybe a bit racist, [and which is expressed]

in open debates but in a closed circle (already opened with the Palestinians) is

to make refugees feel that they are not living a good life. The more they

are living in a deprived way, the faster they will be forced to leave.”

(Gebara, Interview, 2014)

“Sometimes it might be on purpose: uncertainty creates fear.

When [the General Security] know they cannot deport, if they make their life

uncomfortable they will voluntarily leave”. (Houri, Interview, 2014)

Even more telling is when Naufal interviewed the mufti of the Republic about

deportation, the latter said: “when superiors are interrogated on this subject, one of

them responds saying that only people moving by car are admitted [to Lebanon], the

others are too “poor”” (2012, p.13).

While the government’s decision to stop deportation was respected for some time,

precisely after increasing pressure by watch groups like ICRC and HRW (AFP, 2012;

Whitson, 2012), Houri confirms that it was implicitly reversed (Interview, 2014; also

see Naharnet, 2013). Today, some refugees are still arbitrarily denied entry to

Lebanon; “it depends on the mood of the guy at the checkpoint”, Houri adds

(Interview, 2014). Illegal detention of refugees also continues in the General Security

underground cell (which is actually a parking lot), where punishment would oblige

some “to accept their deportation to their country of origin” (Rights Observer, 2014).

3.4 Analysing discursive practices and their effects In her thesis, Hoffman shows how the Syrian state’s reproduction of

sovereignty at the national level using a liberal discourse played in favour of the

  28  

reification of the sovereign ideal, and the strengthening of international sovereignty

by state officials (2011, p.79). Syria appeared as a generous unified nation whose

population warmheartedly welcomed refugees (Hoffman, 2011, p.97). Similarly,

Lebanese media and state discourses depicted Lebanon as exceedingly generous,

urging the international community to share Lebanon’s burden and increase aid

provision (Mikati, 2014; PressTV, 2014).

The fact that political parties and statesmen own most TV stations is quite

revealing (Mufti, 2013). As Asmar notes, this causes a big challenge to human rights

organisations; whether they are opponents or supporters of the Assad regime, “there is

a general trend [among citizens and officials] that refugees have become unbearable”

(Interview, 2014). For instance, Mufti (2013) provides evidence in his article of how

officials are behind accusation discourses blaming refugees for economic collapse and

increasing unemployment. This is unavoidably contributing to heating up already-

existing tensions, and setting a “spectral tone in public” (Soguk, 1999, p.223).

Regular incidents occur between Lebanese and Syrians, coupled with regular

testimonies of racist statements in encounters with locals (Christophersen,

Thorleifsson and Tiltness, 2013, p.43; Carpi, 2014 – See chapter 4).

As Mufti expresses, neither statesmen nor the media make serious efforts to

control “xenophobic” discourses expressing “racist sentiments” against Syrians

(Mufti, 2013). “According to some Lebanese political leaders, this “worsened the

security situation,” without actually specifying how and why” (Carpi, 2014).

Accusations that refugees are behind incidents of crime and theft have become very

common (Mikdachi, 2014a); “although Syrians are arrested on suspicion of criminal

activity, national statistics show that it is not disproportionate to the increased number

of Syrians in Lebanon” (Zakaret, in Christophersen, Thorleifsson, and Tiltness, 2013,

  29  

p.44). Asmar also confirmed that the numbers given by officials are over-exaggerated,

erroneous, and do not rely on any evidence (Interview, 2014).

The accusations which were also reinforced by the state’ usage of the security

argument were successfully translated through “the daily politics of individuals and

groups” (Chit and Nayel, 2013). Basing their findings on a countrywide opinion poll,

Christophersen, Thorleifsson and Tiltness’s study reveals well the wider majority’s

feelings of insecurity and instability linked to the refugees’ presence (2013, p.49).

Besides, Lebanese employers ceased the opportunity created by the increasing

number of Syrians in dire of work, to lower the wages of the national workforce

(Carpi, 2014). Hence, it is only predictable that resource scarcities and the general

strain on Lebanese society would further exacerbate “a class division of ‘we’ who

belong and ‘the others’ who do not belong in ‘our’ community”10 (Christophersen,

Thorleifsson and Tiltness, 2013, p.37).

Interestingly, this unveils the state’s contradictory stance towards refugees, as

I mention in Chapter 2. On one hand, refugees are sympathetically perceived and

welcomed. On the other hand, they become economic burdens who ‘steal jobs’ and

cause a threat to the entire nation, in addition to emitting “bad odours” and

“unpleasant noise” (Soguk, 1999, p.236). “The Syrian’s breath is not like ours”, said

Hemlaya’s Mayor during our informal chat (Translated from Arabic, Interview,

2014).

Hence, as Soguk notes, refugee images, “represented in an through the

vocabularies of “invasion”, “flood” and “plague” serve as fertile grounds of

reference” for the empowerment of states, specifically through “symbolic,

metaphorical, formal, and institutional resources (along racial, social cultural, and

                                                                                                               10  Also witnessed with Palestinians (see Peteet: Knudsen and Knudsen, 1995, pp.168-185).  

  30  

economic lines)” (1999, p.16). If he asserts, however, that the formation of discursive

images is based, first and foremost, on assumptions that the state is abandoning

citizens by spending part of the national budget on refugees (1999, p.223), the

problem is that the state’s “culture of diversion” – as Chit (2013) labels it – seems to

have won the game. Once more, “the ills of Lebanon” are relegated to a “stranger”

(Chit, 2013), which is leading citizens to shift their blame and anger towards the

refugees rather than the entities responsible of managing the both of them.

  31  

Chapter 4: Assessing the refugee crisis at the local level: impact and practices

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the refugee crisis led to an upsurge of municipalities’

engagement and action, which highly increases the challenges they face:

“70% of the 1,100 municipalities in Lebanon are small and with limited

capacities for service provision, in addition to being highly dependent on the

irregular payments of the Independent Municipal Fund”. (Boustani, 2014, n.p)

This concise chapter aims at assessing the ways in which the local authorities are

dealing with refugees. Since the analysis is dedicated to Chapter 5, I only gather main

information provided during the interviews. As I previously explained, the description

only touches upon Burj Hammoud and Bar Elias.

4.1 The case of Bar Elias

BE is part of the Beqaa governorate, which hosts the largest number of

refugees (UNCHR, 2014). During my interview with Malaeb, he randomly mentioned

BE and his statement is worth repeating: “some municipalities like BE are investing

all their resources and efforts on refugees” (Translated from Arabic, Interview, 2014).

In fact, while BE’s estimated population is about 50,000; the number of refugees has

reached about 70,000 (Al-Arab, Interview, 2014). Today, BE has about 12 informal

tented settlements 11 , which host a massive number of refugees. While the

municipality is reportedly cooperating well with local and international organisations,

its relations with local communities have unsurprisingly deteriorated. Having to cut

                                                                                                               11  For more, see Save the Children, 2013.  

  32  

down its budget to meet the demands created by the influx, it is increasingly accused

of neglecting its own people. Furthermore, locals and refugees alike are using

informal means such as rashwa (bribery) and wasta (informal connections) to outdo

formal procedures of service provision, or ease registration. As the Municipality

Support Assistant – employed by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) – confirmed,

while local actors are already facing difficulties to enhance cooperation, new donors –

namely Qataris and Kuwaitis – form another obstacle (Interview, 2014). They make

distributions randomly – or rather ‘selectively’– and often use mosques and religious

organisations to get beneficiary lists. As Maita notes, this breaches the coordination-

triangle comprising local authorities, UNHCR, and partner NGOs (Interview, 2014).

4.2 The case of Burj Hammoud

BH is a densely populated area with about 150 000 inhabitants (Abi Saad,

2013). It hosts a large number of migrant workers and is considered the urban hub of

Armenians, who constitute 70% of its total population (Abi Saad, 2013). Since 2011,

BH attracts increasing numbers of urban Syrian refugees hunting for jobs. As the Vice

President of the municipality, George Krikorian commented, BH is paying a heavier

price because the Syrians it shelters have mixed backgrounds (Interview, 2014).

While NGOs are not very active there, political parties that are providing assistance

prefer homogenous areas having similar political and sectarian affiliations. Therefore,

parties limit aid provision to a selected number of families, whom they are able to

reach through lists they receive from unclear sources. Besides, the fact that parties

have conflicting agendas makes things harder for the municipality, since they are

represented in the municipal council. Also, like many other areas, tension is on the

  33  

rise due to increasing socio-economic constraints. This sometimes results in violent

clashes, such as the recent incident between some Syrian Kurds and members of the

local community. Consequently, the municipality imposed a curfew of circulation on

refugees and migrant communities, which caused strong reactions (Watch coverage of

LBCI, Future, and Al-Arabiya News, Youtube, 2014). When I asked him about that

decision, Krikorian said:

“Legally, we have no right to impose curfews and we are the 108th

municipality to do so. It was not an order as much as a “wish” [said in

English] to prevent clashes between communities and, first and foremost, to

protect refugees. This is why we later gave exceptional circulation permits for

people who are obliged to be out after 8pm, under the condition we put their

documents on hold”. (Translated from Arabic, Interview, 2014)

Even more, the clash lead the Armenian Tashnag party to order Syrian Kurds who are

opposed to the Assad regime to immediately evacuate their houses and leave BH in

May (Future News, 2014). This order, however, was neither issued in cooperation

with nor upon the consent of the municipality.

Overall, problems of coordination between different actors deteriorated as the

influx snowballed. Nowadays, Act 376 issued in May 2013 (MoIM, 2013)12 is neither

being followed, nor its application is monitored by the state. Furthermore, while

curfews are illegal and banned in a decree issued by the previous Minister of Interior,

many municipalities are still publically announcing it through leaflets (Houri; Gebara,

Interview, 2014). As Krikorian states, the situation of “laissez-faire laissez-passer”

drives the local authorities to “improvise” (Interview, 2014).

                                                                                                               12 It calls upon municipalities to conduct full surveys including accurate counts of refugees and information about their location.

  34  

In summary, the burden caused by the refugee crisis is increasing the problems of

municipalities. This is particularly because of the state’s ‘no-policy policy’ and lack

of assistance to its local entities. As in the case of BH, these gaps have to be covered

by “improvisation” measures. This revealingly proves Hoffman’s observation: state

sovereignty is “constructed on the spot, by human behaviour” (2011, p.96).

  35  

Chapter 5: Reconstructing or ‘re-deconstructing’ sovereignty?

In this chapter, I critically assess my empirical findings in light of the previous

chapters. The analysis also revisits some main issues elaborated in Chapter 3. The re-

assessment of the ‘no-policy policy’ at the municipal level better informs the

implications on the central sphere (section 5.1). The combination of these effects thus

demonstrates the widespread character of sovereignty and its practitioners (section

5.2). Finally, section 5.3 consists of a reconsideration of the real implications of

sovereign practices, which, by initially operating on the refugee, end up affecting

sovereign actors and threatening their power.

5.1 Revisiting the ‘no-policy policy’

The overview of the effects of the refugee crisis in the three areas presented in

chapter 4 highlights noticeable similarities, which could allow me to draw more

general conclusions. The Syrian crisis not only proved pre-existing challenges faced

by municipalities (Boustani 2014), it also gave rise to new ones. Often, municipalities

are driven to take measures going beyond their capabilities, while they face increasing

infrastructural and socio-economic problems, and lack both financial and human

resources13 required to deal with the situation. Nonetheless, “the lack of trust on the

level of the central government” makes them a reliable focal point (Boustani, 2014).

As in BH, this enforces the local communities’ impression that municipalities give

some legitimacy to a government “perceived as totally absent” (Abi Saad, 2013).

                                                                                                               13 The fact that the ‘representative of the municipality’ I was referred to when I scheduled an interview appointment in BE is a DRC rather than a municipality employee is a revealing hint to administrative shortages.

  36  

With regards to the state, the ‘no-policy policy’ aggravated the lack of

coordination and loss of control witnessed at the local level. Gebara’s statement

speaks for itself:

“As a person who works in the Ministry of Interior, I do not have a list

about which donors doing which project. I do not know. I have to look for

them”. (Interview, 2014)

Indeed, it is widely approved that the lack of control from the central level created a

duplicate system in almost each sector, and even reached an attempt to make a

“duplicate government”, Malaeb adds mockingly (Interview, 2014). The fact that

some of the suggestions made by the MoSA to improve crisis management are still

not taken into consideration is revealing enough (Malaeb, Interview, 2014). Besides,

it should be reminded that central-level duplication comes on top of the pre-existing

multiple welfare regimes created by political parties and religious institutions

(mentioned in Chapter 2).

Although it is undeniable that NGOs and other non-state actors are more

equipped than the state to deal with the crisis:

“What we have witnessed is the complete collapse of the state in terms of

response”. (…) [But] while the physical institutions are collapsing, the

political institutions seem to be safe”. (Malaeb, Interview, 2014)

As most of my interviewees agree, coordination is not solely related to the state’s

capacities, but more importantly, to political will. This reflects on the factors

influencing the government’s response, which I presented in Chapter 3; and, even

more, mirrors the nature of power relations in Lebanon – elaborated in Chapter 2.

  37  

5.2 Considering conflicting sovereignties

The example of the Tashnag Party’s order, or the unmonitored collaboration

between new donors and religious institutions in BE – among others – provide an

insightful lens to expand Cammett’s analysis in the refugee context. As she argues,

“most [parties] will not release even aggregate data on beneficiary characteristics”

(2014, p.86). As such, while they contribute to Lebanese state sovereignty insofar as

they operate from within the formal system and speak in its name, their informal

welfare and humanitarian operations follow an “extra-state” strategy14 rather a “state-

centric political strategy” (Cammett, 2014, p.3). By so doing, they created

“fragmented welfare regimes”, which hinder potentials to build national ones, and

cause duplication, social tension, and conflict between providers having conflicting

agendas (Cammett, 2014, pp.219-234). Even more, by filling a gap created by fragile

state institutions, leaders make the Lebanese state “less accountable to its citizens”

(Yousuf and Zahar, 2012). Krikorian confirms this by saying that “there is an attempt

to weaken central authorities” (Translated from Arabic, Interview, 2014). He adds:

The political side [of the state] intervened in the administrative side to the

extent that it paralysed it. When there is political deadlock, the

administration is also affected, from border control to electricity, water etc. If

the administration was strong, it would not have been affected by political

fragmentation” (Interview, 2014)

As seen in Chapter 2, political parties’ activities had contributed to a “low

trust in government” even before the crisis (Cammett, 2014, p.219). Even more, non-

state providers often take “full credit for services supplied with government                                                                                                                14 By this, Cammett particularly refers to the arbitrary yet calculated logics behind the parties’ provision of welfare services.

  38  

financing” (Camett, 2014, p.219), a problem voiced by Malaeb in the refugee context

(Interview, 2014). Besides, as the case study examples also reveal, the selection of

beneficiaries is less based on clear and fair standards (like degree of poverty) than a

“discretionary basis with over or covert exclusionary criteria” (Cammett, 2014,

p.234). Mufti’s analysis of the GCC countries’ humanitarian intervention is similar

(2014). As revealed in BE, they not only undermined the municipality’s control

capacity but also the international regime’s sovereignty.

All these facts point out to a more important issue, which Hoffman notes in

the context of the Iraqi refugee crisis in Syria, but is equally relevant to my study. As

she reveals, everyday practices of sovereignty create transforming and overlapping

power relations through which agents do not only govern “Iraqi [Syrian] lives, but

also each other” (2011, p.79). Many examples could in fact demonstrate the ways in

which conflicting sovereignties within different state institutions govern each other.

For instance, Malaeb mentions that the government still neglects some suggestions

made by the MoSA to deal with the crisis (Interview, 2014). Another example

mentioned by Houri is the arbitrary practices of the General Security, which

“implements rather than sets policies” (Interview, 2014). Clearly, these practices

enforce the confusion and loss of control caused by the ‘no-policy policy’.

5.3 Revisiting the effects of sovereignty

Reacting on the situation of deadlock, Krikorian said: “when there is a will,

there is a way” (Interview, 2014). His statement highlights two important issues.

Municipalities can either choose to include or exclude refugees. Either way, this

implies, in most cases, the usage of informal means and/or breaching laws, which are

  39  

anyhow ‘outdated’; as Bakhos attests, “if we stick to municipal laws, we won’t do

anything” (Interview, 2014). When law enforcement on banning torture, illegal

detention, discrimination, racism and curfews is nonetheless beneficial for refugees

and Lebanese alike – the chosen option was a “laissez-faire laissez-passer” strategy,

as Krikorian describes it (Interview, 2014). By allowing this, the state’s coercive

image reiterated at the local level, and contributed to reshaping the municipalities’

image. The local reproduction of a sovereign image through the use of illegal power

is for instance well demonstrated through the example of curfews, which was justified

by the same statist security argument. Besides, the fact that security forces are

informed about such illegal practices – and collaborative in that regards15 – is even

more intriguing.

Once more, I am driven back to Hansen and Stepputat’s argument: the

“weakness of everyday stateness” [is] often countered by attempts to make state

power highly visible” (in Hoffman, 2011, p.25). The restrictions imposed upon

‘others’, I argue, demonstrate the state’s partiality and “show its inconsistencies or

ambiguities”, which appear in the force of a mix between harsh policing and neglect

of illegal practices (Fassin, 2011, p.218). While ambiguities could feed the

construction of a sovereign image, and fortify it through local practices, the confusion

and loss of control they lead to consequently undermine practices of sovereignty.

                                                                                                               15 Confirmed by all my interviewees.

  40  

Chapter 6: Rethinking sovereignty and refugees: a more constructive approach

6.1 Conclusions and limitations of the research

When I first started my empirical research in Lebanon, I underestimated the

difficulties I was going to face. Even though I knew that a full and easy access to

policies and practices related to the refugee crisis, which are mostly informal, would

be hard if sometimes not impossible in a short period of time, I was somehow still

convinced that there were clear-cut ‘answers’. The more I searched, the more I

became frustrated, even imprisoned by the ‘confusion’ and ‘chaos’ not merely

amplified by the state’s ‘no-response’, but also felt by ‘those who are supposed to

know’ what is happening. It even made me doubt whether I was looking for the ‘right

sources’, whether I was doing enough, feeling constantly insecure about the

informality and spontaneity of my field research. I had almost forgotten what it is like

to ‘live in Lebanon’, to ‘be Lebanese’. It was not until the very last interview I

conducted with Houri (Interview, 2014), that I accepted the reality of the response to

the crisis, as it is: chaotic, confusing, and ambiguous. I was even relieved when he

confirmed that “the ambiguity and confusion are a challenge for research”, which

might be masochist for someone who was seeking answers. But this is when I realised

that there are neither clear-cut answers nor ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ sources. This is when I

also knew that my research had not come to a closure; it has just started.

This research verified Hansen and Stepputat’s conclusion that the “weakness

of everyday stateness” is countered by measures to make “power highly visible” (in

Hoffman, 2011, p.25). The literature on conventional approaches to state sovereignty,

  41  

which reveal the weakness of stateness in Lebanon, was investigated in Chapter 2.

The evaluation of sovereignty through the three forms elaborated by Kaufman (2014)

confirmed the limits of the state’s capacity to control its border, population and

territory, among other things. By not taking into account contextual factors affecting

the evolution of sovereignty, however, these accounts neglect the importance of statist

attempts to make power visible (Hansen and Stepputat, 2005; Soguk; 2005; Hoffman,

2011). By introducing the refugee as a new lens to study sovereignty in the Lebanese

context, I tried to prove that sovereignty should be de-centralised (Foucault, in

Constable, 1991). In fact, the performance of various exclusionary and arbitrary

practices on the Syrian refugee, reified coercive statist images. In a sense the Syrian

refugee became an ‘easy way-out’ for officials to cover-up or silence pre-existing yet

increasing gaps, namely by shifting blames and concerns.

Evaluating the consequences of these measures at both central and local

levels, the long-term efficiency of the informal ‘no-policy policy’ and everyday statist

practices is nonetheless questionable. This allowed me to support the second objective

of this research, which is to reveal the ambivalent effects of refugees on sovereignty

practices (Soguk, 1991). The Syrian crisis highlighted administrative and financial

deficiencies at the local level. Still, it revealed the importance of municipalities and

their potential to “address semi-urban and urban issues and plan for the future, despite

the lack of a national policy” (Boustani, 2014). The problem is that this potential

cannot be developed without the active engagement of central authorities.

“Unclear policies give sometimes the space for those who do not fall in the

trap. But clearly, that model is unsustainable. What we need is a policy

which we can scale up. With the absence of this, the Lebanese state is

hampering the creation of a proper refugee policy. From a security

perspective, it is very naïve and stupid. We are pushing an entire refugee

  42  

population underground, creating areas where different rules apply although

not written”. (Houri, Interview, 2014)

The crisis has indeed proven that all actors involved, including international NGOs,

are unable to meet the demands alone without a solid and sustainable strategy that

should be set by the Lebanese authorities – especially when shortages and demands

are exponentially increasing. As such, I believe that the suggestion made by many to

decentralise decision-making16 cannot be a ‘solution’ to the problem, when the

essence of the problem is the absence of decision-making. Only through a cooperation

mechanism aiming to a whole-scale approach, a systematisation of intervention

through the creation of pathways and the strengthening of already-existing state

institutions rather than enhancing duplications, can the obstacles enforced by

confusion and chaos be overcome, and local potentials be empowered. Only when

these measures are implemented can the state’s sovereign will be restored.

6.2 Rethinking the refugee: rethinking sovereignty

Syrians refugees are more than the burden state officials wish them to be.

They are a chance to rethink relations within the state, and amongst Lebanese citizens.

I highly agree with Soguk who sees responses to refugee problems as measures that

continuously “shape and reshape” institutions and relations (2005, p.233). Ongoing

debates on the future role and empowerment of municipalities cannot be more

revealing. Going back to Kristeva’s account cited in the very beginning of my work,

the Syrian refugee is indeed a “symptom” helping us to identify ourselves as a

problem, in other words, a medicine to our illness. If Iraqi or Palestinian refugees

                                                                                                               16 This topic also deserves further research.

  43  

were not enough of a lesson, one could for the least hope that Syrians play the role of

awakening agents, forging “new possibilities for living in the routines of everyday

affairs” (Soguk, 2005, p.224). What Hanafi suggested in the Palestinian refugees’

context could be equally valid in today’s setting: “a more constructive approach to

governance and rights [for Syrians] – inside and outside [informal] camps – would

help to clarify Lebanese sovereignty and bolster security’ (in Picard and

Ramsbotham, 2012, p.69). The latest announcement by the MoSA of a pilot project to

create pre-fabricated and removable houses for refugees between the Syrian and

Lebanese checkpoints in the bordering village of Masnaa, and another in Al-

Abuddiyeh in Northern Lebanon raises many debates and security concerns (LBCI

live broadcast, 2014; Boulos, 2014). The proposal could however mean that the time

of silence and passivity is over.

Going beyond that, a more constructive approach would allow the Lebanese to

renegotiate their presence, through questioning exclusion. As Foucault (1988) reveals

through his work, exclusion does not necessarily operate on the ‘foreign-other’ divide,

which perfectly makes sense in Lebanon where a centralised welfare-system

providing services to citizens is nearly inexistent. From here, more similarities can be

drawn between host communities – being of the poorest in the country – and refugees,

than between these two and Syrian and Lebanese elite.

My conclusion is that Syrian refugees demonstrated the need to reify the

search for a sovereign ideal, one that is more inclusive and consistent. I consider this

work to be more than a step towards examining how statist images are reified in the

everyday life, and playfully exercised on the refugee. I believe it recommends a close

examination of the ways in which different entities exercise sovereignty and often

overlap each other’s power – be it the General Security, the army, municipalities,

  44  

political parties or Islamic organisations. Considering their activities as part of

practices of sovereignty is another way to conceive or de-centralise the concept. This

would hence allow us to understand rather than be enmeshed in the ambiguities of

conflicting sovereignties. If this is a challenge for research, this means these areas

deserve further research.

  45  

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Appendix 1: Table of interviews conducted

Interviewee Institution/

Organisation Position Place and Date of

Interview Khalil Gebara Ministry of Interior and

Municipalities (MoIM) Advisor of the Minister

MoIM 18/07/2014

Makram Malaeb

Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA)/UNHCR

Program Manager MoSA 21/07/2014

Wadih Asmar CLDH (LCHR- Lebanese Center for Human Rights)

Secretary General Urbanista 23/07/2014

Lama Maita Danish Refugee Council (DRC) / Bar Elias Municipality

Municipal Support Assistant at Bar Elias Municipality

Bar Elias Municipality 31/07/2014

Bassima Al-Arab

Bar Elias Municipality Mayor Secretary Bar Elias Municipality 31/07/2014

Jean Bakhos Jdeideh- Sad Municipality (serving Zaatriye and Roueisat)

Municipality Council member

Jdeideh Municipality 1/08/2014

Anonymous Anonymous Anonymous 4/08/2014 Chahid Assaf Hemlaya Municipality Mayor of Hemlaya Metn

Qaemaqamiya 4/08/2014

George Krikorian

Burj Hammoud Municipality

Vice President of Burj Hammoud Municipality

Burj Hammoud Municipality 6/08/2014

Nadim Houri MENA, at Human Rights Watch

Deputy Director HRW 13/08/2014

Adib Neimeh ESCWA, MoSA ESCWA, MoSA consultant, and writer

Café Place de l’etoile 21/07/2014

Hayat Fakhreddine

-- CSO activist and focal point informant

Nabaa neighborhood- 1/08/2014

Ana Pollard UNHCR Associate Statelessness Officer

UNHCR 4/08/2014

The interviewees highlighted in bold are used in the text. The rest of the interviewees are not cited.            

  52  

Appendix 2: Vulnerability Assessment Map