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TO APPEAR IN BEING AMORAL: PSYCHOPATHY AND MORAL INCAPACITY EDITED BY THOMAS SCHRAMME, MIT PRESS

The Significance of Psychopathic Wrongdoing1

Matthew Talbert

12.1 Introduction

I argue below that psychopaths are sometimes open to moral blame on account of their

wrongdoing. Thus, on my view, psychopaths are sometimes appropriate targets for

negative reactive attitudes like resentment that characterize moral blame.

On the approach to moral responsibility that I pursue, blame is fundamentally a

response to a certain characteristic significance that other agents’ actions can have for us.

The argument of this chapter depends, therefore, on the claim that despite their

impairments, psychopaths possess rational and agential capacities that endow their

behavior with a significance that makes blaming responses appropriate. As a kind of

shorthand, I will often simply say that psychopaths are capable of acting in ways that

express disregard, contempt, or ill will of a sort that reasonably grounds emotional

responses like resentment.2 1  I  am  grateful  to  Thomas  Schramme,  Zac  Cogley,  David  Shoemaker,  Gary  Watson,  and  Kyle  Adams  for  their   thoughtful   comments   on   drafts   of   this   chapter.   A   West   Virginia   University   Faculty   Senate  Research  Grant  made  part  of  this  research  possible.  2  My  view   is,  of   course,   indebted   to  P.  F.   Strawson’s   “Freedom  and  Resentment,”   reprinted   in  Gary  Watson  (ed.),  Free  Will,  2nd  edition  (New  York:  Oxford  University  Press,  2003),  72–93.  For  Strawson,  to  regard  individuals  as  morally  responsible  is  to  see  them  as  open  to  positive  and  negative  reactive  attitudes.   I   find   Strawson’s   approach   instructive,   particularly   his   account   of   blaming   attitudes   like  resentment  as  “essentially  reactions  to  the  quality  of  others’  wills  towards  us,  as  manifested  in  their  behaviour:   to   their   good   or   ill   will   or   indifference   or   lack   of   concern”   (83).   However,   in   the   next  

   

 

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My defense of this proposal begins with a brief account of the approach to moral

responsibility that I favor and a discussion of how psychopaths, with their various

capacities and incapacities, fit into this approach. Next, I consider recent arguments by

Neil Levy and David Shoemaker that psychopaths’ incapacities entail that their actions

cannot convey the type of malicious ill will to which blame responds. Finally, I consider

Gary Watson’s recent discussion of psychopathy. Watson grants that psychopaths express

morally significant malice through their behavior, but he argues that their moral

impairments still render them unfit for an important range of reactions involved in

holding agents morally accountable for their behavior.

12.2 Attributionism and Psychopathy

The approach to moral responsibility that I favor is sometimes called “attributionism,”

though critics of the view most often use this term. The following account of

attributionism from Neil Levy, who is one such critic, brings out some important features

of the view:

On attributionist accounts, an agent is responsible for an action just in

case that action is appropriately reflective of who she most deeply is. If it

is appropriately reflective of who she is, it is attributable to her, and that is

section,   instead   of   characterizing   moral   responsibility   simply   in   terms   of   openness   to   reactive  attitudes,  I  characterize  it   in  terms  of  attributability.  I  claim  that  agents  are  morally  responsible  for  behavior  that  is  attributable  to  them  (in  the  right  way),  and  that  agents  are  blameworthy  for  morally  objectionable   behavior   that   is   attributable   to   them   (in   the   right   way).   At   this   point,   I   return   to  Strawson   insofar   as   the   objectionable   behavior   that   I   attribute   to   psychopaths   is   behavior   that  expresses   ill  will  and  thus  grounds  resentment.   I  should  note  that  Strawson  himself  apparently  did  not  view  agents   like  psychopaths  as  open   to   resentment;   I  will   say  something  about   the   “objective  attitude”  that  Strawson  encouraged  toward  the  “morally  undeveloped”  in  my  conclusion  (79).  

   

 

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sufficient for us to hold her responsible.… It simply does not matter, on

this account, whether the agent knows that her action is wrong. All that

matters is that the action expresses the agent’s attitudes toward others.

The agent who intentionally harms another thereby expresses her

contempt of that person, whether or not she is capable of appreciating the

moral reasons that condemn such actions.3

David Shoemaker, another critic of attributionism, offers a related assessment of

T. M. Scanlon’s and Angela Smith’s accounts of moral responsibility.4 According to

Shoemaker, “[b]oth Smith and Scanlon believe responsibility is fundamentally about

attributability, that is, about actions or attitudes being properly attributable to—reflective

of—the agent’s self.”5 Thus, “[w]hat it means for A to be morally responsible for Φ is

just that Φ is properly attributable to A in a way that renders A open to moral appraisal

for Φ,” and “[w]hat it means for A to be blameworthy for Φ is just that (1) A is morally

responsible for Φ and (2) A has violated some normative standard(s) via Φ.”6 And when

is Φ attributable to an agent in such a way that it is relevant to our moral appraisal of the

3  Neil  Levy,  “The  Responsibility  of  the  Psychopath  Revisited,”  Philosophy,  Psychiatry,  and  Psychology  14   (2007):   129–138,   132   (the   third   italics   is   mine).   In   his   recent   book,   Hard   Luck:   How   Luck  Undermines   Free   Will   and   Moral   Responsibility   (New   York:   Oxford   University   Press,   2011),   Levy  substitutes   the   label   “quality   of   will   theories”   for   “attributionism”   (158,   note   2).   Angela   Smith  discusses   problems   with   the   label   “attributionism”   in   “The   Myth   of   Attributionism”   (unpublished  manuscript);  I  retain  the  usage  here  because  it  appears  in  work  to  which  I  refer.  4  See  T.  M.  Scanlon,  What  We  Owe  to  Each  Other   (Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard  University  Press,  1998),  chapter  6,  and  Moral  Dimensions:  Permissibility,  Meaning,  Blame  (Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard  University  Press,   2008),   chapter   4.;   and   Angela   Smith,   “Responsibility   for   Attitudes:   Activity   and   Passivity   in  Mental   Life,”   Ethics   115   (2005):   236–271,   and   “Control,   Responsibility,   and   Moral   Assessment,”  Philosophical  Studies  138  (2008):  367–392.  I  defend  a  perspective  related  to  Scanlon’s  and  Smith’s  in  “Blame  and  Responsiveness  to  Moral  Reasons:  Are  Psychopaths  Blameworthy?,”  Pacific  Philosophical  Quarterly  89  (2008):  516–535,  and  in  “Moral  Competence,  Moral  Blame,  and  Protest,”  The  Journal  of  Ethics  16  (2012):  89–109.  5   David   Shoemaker,   “Attributability,   Answerability,   and  Accountability:   Toward   a  Wider   Theory   of  Moral  Responsibility,”  Ethics  121  (2011):  602–632,  604.  6  Ibid.  

   

 

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agent? As Shoemaker notes, what is required on the views in question is that “Φ must

bear a rational connection to the agent’s evaluative judgments.”7

Shoemaker’s mention of evaluative judgments relates to Levy’s point about the

importance (for the views under discussion) of the way wrongdoers’ behavior can express

objectionable, blame-grounding attitudes toward the people they wrong. Whether

wrongdoers’ behavior expresses such attitudes depends on whether they guide their

behavior by judgments about reasons. For example, if I know that my action will injure

you and I still judge that I have reason to perform the action in order to achieve some

trivial aim, then my action plausibly reflects a judgment that is contemptuous of your

welfare: The judgment that your welfare is less important than whether I achieve my

trivial aim. This offensive judgment is a reason to regard my action as wrong and

unjustifiable, rather than merely injurious, and it makes it natural (though not obligatory)

for you to target me with blaming attitudes like resentment.

As the quotation from Levy also suggests, a signal feature of attributionist

accounts of moral responsibility is that wrongdoers’ blameworthiness, and their openness

to negative reactive attitudes, does not depend on whether they are able to recognize and

respond to moral considerations. This is because even wrongdoers who lack this ability—

who lack, as I will say, moral competence—may still guide their behavior by judgments

that manifest contempt or ill will for those they mistreat, at least if they possess general

powers of rationality and self-government. As Scanlon notes, a generally

7  Ibid.,  605.  

   

 

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rational creature who fails to see the force of moral reasons—who fails,

for example, to see any reason for being concerned with moral

requirements at all … can nonetheless understand that a given action will

injure others and can judge that this constitutes no reason against so

acting.8

The point here is that—just as with a morally competent wrongdoer—a morally

blind (but otherwise rational) agent may willingly and (by our lights) unjustifiably do

something that he or she knows will injure you. Like a morally competent agent, such an

individual thereby expresses the offensive judgment that your welfare matters little in

comparison with whether his or her ends are achieved. This account of an agent’s

behavior will make sense if the agent is aware of the consequences of his or her behavior

and if the agent has the ability to judge (by his or her own lights) whether these

consequences count in favor of acting or refraining from action.9 Insensitivity to

specifically moral reasons is compatible with fulfillment of these conditions.

This discussion of moral blindness brings us to psychopathy. Psychopaths are

persistent wrongdoers who have a variety of negative personality characteristics such as

egocentricity, aggression, callousness, lack of empathy or remorse, and impulsivity. From

8  Scanlon,  What  We  Owe  to  Each  Other,  288.  Scanlon  speaks  of  a  mere  failure  to  see  the  force  of  moral  considerations,  but  it  is  clear  from  the  context  that  he  has  in  mind  an  agent  who  cannot  see  the  force  of  these  considerations.  It  is  important  to  note  that  Scanlon  is  thinking  here  of  an  agent  who  judges  that   there   is  no   reason   to   refrain   from  action   rather   than  an  agent  who  makes  no   judgment  about  reasons.  Thanks  to  Thomas  Schramme  for  encouraging  greater  clarity  here.  9   In   “Expressing   Who   We   Are:   Moral   Responsibility   and   Awareness   of   Our   Reasons   for   Action,”  Analytic   Philosophy   52   (2011):   243–261,   Levy   argues   that   the   conditions   under   which   actions  express  attitudes  is  more  demanding  than  many  suspect.  I  agree  with  parts  of  Levy’s  argument  even  though  his  conclusion  would  restrict  moral  responsibility  on  an  account  like  mine.  This  concession  is  compatible  with   the   claim   that  moral   blindness   is   not   a   bar   to  moral   responsibility   and   that   some  actions  of  morally  blind  agents  express  blame-­‐grounding  attitudes.  

   

 

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the standpoint of assessing moral responsibility, the interesting thing about psychopaths

is that their persistent wrongdoing appears to stem from a deeply rooted difficulty

apprehending and responding to moral considerations. The etiology of this difficulty is

not entirely clear, but James Blair, Derek Mitchell, and Karina Blair have recently

advanced a compelling “neurocognitive” account of psychopathy and its development.

According to this account, partial dysfunction of the amygdala is at the heart of the

disorder. The amygdala dysfunction itself likely results from genetic anomalies and gives

rise, in turn,

to impairments in aversive conditioning, instrumental learning, and the

processing of fearful and sad experiences. These impairments interfere

with socialization such that the individual does not learn to avoid actions

that cause harm to other individuals. If such an individual has a reason to

offend, because their other opportunities for financial resources or respect

are limited, they will be more likely to offend than healthy developing

individuals.10

While the psychopath’s moral impairments are profound, they should not be

overstated. As Walter Glannon notes, psychopaths appear to have “at least a shallow

understanding of right and wrong” since they correctly answer questions about whether

proposed actions are conventionally regarded as “right” or “wrong.”11 On Glannon’s

view, this is sufficient for attributing a limited form of moral responsibility to

10  James  Blair  et  al.,  The  Psychopath:  Emotion  and  the  Brain  (Malden,  MA:  Blackwell  Publishing,  2005),  139.  11  Walter  Glannon,  “Psychopathy  and  Responsibility,”   Journal  of  Applied  Ethics  14  (1997):  263–275,  268.  

   

 

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psychopaths. However, many theorists are unimpressed by the psychopath’s ability to, as

R. Jay Wallace puts it, “parrot moral discourse” since this is compatible with the absence

of a “participant understanding” of that discourse.12 Evidence that psychopaths lack a

participant understanding of moral discourse is found, among other places, in their

limited ability (as compared to nonpsychopaths) to distinguish authority-dependent

conventional norms and non-authority-dependent moral norms.13

What is important for my purposes is that, despite their moral impairments and as

the quotation from Blair and his coauthors suggests, psychopaths are capable of

evaluating reasons and guiding their behavior on this basis. Psychopaths often do wrong

because they judge something to count in favor of acting that way: Their use of violence,

for example, is often instrumental rather than merely reactive.14 According to the account

I pursue here, psychopaths may thus be open to moral blame because it is possible for

their wrongdoing to reflect the judgment that the consequences of their behavior do not

give them reason to refrain from that behavior. Indeed, as Gary Watson notes,

psychopaths are capable of seeing the prospect of another’s harm and suffering as a

12   R.   Jay   Wallace,   Responsibility   and   the   Moral   Sentiments   (Cambridge,   Mass.:   Harvard   University  Press,  1996),  178.  13  For  philosophical  discussions  of  some  of  the  relevant  evidence  here,  see  Levy,  “The  Responsibility  of   the   Psychopath   Revisited,”   and   Cordelia   Fine   and   Jeanette   Kennett,   “Mental   Impairment,   Moral  Understanding   and   Criminal   Responsibility:   Psychopathy   and   the   Purposes   of   Punishment,”  International   Journal   of   Law   and   Psychiatry   27   (2004):   425–443.   Recently,   David   Shoemaker   has  questioned   the   use   to   which   the   conventional/moral   distinction   has   been   put   in   philosophical  discussions  of  psychopathy,   “Psychopathy,  Responsibility,  and  the  Moral/Conventional  Distinction,”  The  Southern  Journal  of  Philosophy  49,  Spindel  Supplement  (2011):  99–124.  14  Blair  et  al.,  The  Psychopath,  12–13  and  17.  

   

 

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reason to act: “They frequently enjoy forcing others into painful submission”; “they often

intentionally or willingly oppose what matters most to us.”15

However, there is evidence that the psychopath’s rational impairments extend

beyond their impaired moral understanding. This raises the possibility that psychopaths

are too rationally impaired for the attributionist approach to moral responsibility to be

applied to them. For one thing, psychopaths have deficits in fear and empathy. Not only

do they not have the same fear responses as nonpsychopaths, they are also deficient with

respect to recognizing fear or sadness in others.16 Cordelia Fine and Jeanette Kennett

appeal to this feature of psychopathy to argue that psychopaths lack deep moral

understanding; it may also mean that psychopaths are sometimes nonculpably unaware of

the consequences of their behavior.17 As Paul Litton points out, “If psychopaths’

experience of fear is limited compared to ours, then we can reasonably conclude that they

do not fully comprehend the unpleasant nature of our experience with fear.”18 This

suggests that it may not be plausible to attribute to psychopaths the judgment that others’

fear or sadness is not a reason to refrain from a certain bit of behavior.

Furthermore, psychopaths are famously imprudent. Their response to threatening

stimuli is reduced as compared to nonpsychopathic individuals, and they have difficulty

changing behavior that has proven contrary to their interests.19 We might think, then, that

15  Watson,   “The  Trouble  with  Psychopaths,”   in  R.   Jay  Wallace  et  al.   (eds.),  Reasons  and  Recognition:  Essays  on  the  Philosophy  of  T.  M.  Scanlon  (New  York:  Oxford  University  Press,  2011),  307–331,  316,  317.  16  Blair  et  al.,  54–56  and  126.  17  Fine  and  Kennett,   “Mental   Impairment,  Moral  Understanding,  and  Criminal  Responsibility,”  428–429.  18  Paul  Litton,  “Psychopathy  and  Responsibility  Theory,”  Philosophy  Compass  5  (2010):  676–688,  686  note  17.  19  Blair  et  al.,  The  Psychopath,  48–53  and  68–69.  

   

 

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psychopaths are impaired not just for moral reasoning, but for practical reasoning more

generally.20

On the other hand, there may be psychopaths who are not so seriously impaired

for keeping track of their own interests. Perhaps so-called successful psychopaths are like

this. A recent study defines members of this group as “individuals who fit the criteria of a

psychopath, having certain fundamental traits (e.g., callousness), but [who] largely

succeed in their exploitation.”21 The authors of this study found that “successful

psychopaths were rated high in assertiveness, excitement-seeking, and activity, and

especially low in agreeableness traits like straightforwardness, altruism, compliance, and

modesty.”22 Additionally, the “successful psychopaths were high in competence, order,

achievement-striving, and self-discipline” and thus were better able to act in their own

interests than unsuccessful psychopaths.23 In a related study, Babiak, Neumann, and Hare

administered Hare’s Revised Psychopathy Checklist (PCL–R) to 203 managers from

seven U.S. and international companies.24 Nine of the participants scored above 25 on the

PCL–R and eight had a score above 30, which is “the common research threshold for

psychopathy.”25 (Of the nine, seven held management positions, two were vice-

20  See  the  following  for  helpful  discussion  of  the  psychopath’s  general  rational  deficiencies:  Jeanette  Kennett,  “Do  Psychopaths  Threaten  Moral  Rationalism,”  Philosophical  Explorations  9  (2006):  69–82;  Heidi  Maibom,  “The  Mad,  the  Bad,  and  the  Psychopath,”  Neuroethics  1  (2008):  167–184.  21  Stephanie  N.  Mullins-­‐Sweatt  et  al.,  “The  Search  for  the  Successful  Psychopath,”  Journal  of  Research  in   Personality   44   (2010):   554–558,   554.   For   related   conclusions   based   on   reviews   of   a   number   of  studies,  see  Yu  Gao  and  Adrian  Raine,  “Successful  and  Unsuccessful  Psychopaths:  A  Neurobiological  Model,”  Behavioral  Sciences  and  the  Law  28  (2010):  194–210.  22  Sweatt  et  al.,  “The  Search  for  the  Successful  Psychopath,”  556.  23  Ibid.  24  Paul  Babiak  et  al.,  “Corporate  Psychopathy:  Talking  the  Walk,”  Behavioral  Sciences  and  the  Law  28  (2010):  174–193.  25  Ibid.,  183.  

   

 

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presidents, and two were directors.26) These results not only “provide evidence that a

high level of psychopathic traits does not necessarily impede progress and advancement

in corporate organizations,”27 they also suggest that at least some psychopaths are not

grossly impaired for prudential reasoning.

However, despite the example of successful psychopaths, I admit that there is

reason to worry that psychopaths do not possess the general rational capacities that are

important for attributionist approaches to moral responsibility.28 However, I set this

concern aside below and assume that psychopaths possess sufficient general powers of

rational agency that it makes sense to describe them as conducting themselves on the

basis of judgments about the weight of reasons. This is a licit assumption because the

critics I engage below are largely willing to allow it—they are mainly concerned with

psychopaths’ specifically moral impairments, with their inability to see moral norms as

anything more than external conventions with no independent, overriding normative

authority. Gary Watson nicely sums up the deficiencies these critics take to undermine

the psychopath’s blameworthiness:

Psychopaths appear to know what morality “requires” of them in the same

way that they know that one must pay income taxes and that smoking in

commercial airplanes is against the rules. What they cannot understand is

that those requirements have any kind of nonstrategic normative force for

26  Ibid.,  185.  27  Ibid.,  192.  28   Paul   Litton   suggests   a   related   problem   for   the   account   I   gave   in   “Blame   and  Responsiveness   to  Moral  Reasons.”  Perhaps  psychopaths,  “or  an  extreme  subset  of  psychopaths,”  are  “wantons”  (agents  who  are  unconcerned  with  which  of  their  competing  desires  will  ultimately  move  them  in  action),  in  which   case   “their   antisocial   conduct   does   not   reflect   normative   commitments,”   “Psychopathy   and  Responsibility  Theory,”  681.  

   

 

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anyone; that is, they cannot regard moral demands as anything more than

coercive pressures. They can know that what they aim to do might hurt

someone, but not that there is any sort of (noninstrumental) reason against

doing or having done it.29

I assume below that psychopaths are impaired in the way Watson describes.

12.3 Are Psychopaths Capable of Contempt?

In “The Responsibility of the Psychopath Revisited,” Neil Levy takes on the attributionist

perspective directly and offers several considerations in favor of the claim that

psychopaths are not open to moral blame for their bad behavior. Levy’s approach to

moral responsibility emphasizes agents’ histories, particularly the factors that explain

how they came to be the way they are. For example, Levy believes that “[a]gents are

morally responsible for an action if (roughly) they are capable of appreciating and

responding to moral reasons,” and when they lack these capacities, “their responsibility

hinges on whether they are responsible for this fact.”30 Since “psychopathy is a

developmental disorder, for which there is no known cure, psychopaths lacks [sic] control

over their coming to be bad.”31 “Hence,” concludes Levy, “they ought to be excused from

moral responsibility.”32 This means that we should refrain from blaming psychopaths,

exempting them both from reactive attitudes like resentment and from “those aspects of

the criminal justice system which are expressive of blame.”33 29  Watson,  “The  Trouble  with  Psychopaths,”  309.  30  Levy,  “The  Responsibility  of  the  Psychopath  Revisited,”  134–135.  31  Ibid.,  135.  32  Ibid.  33  Ibid.,  136.  

   

 

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However, for the attributionist, whether psychopaths are morally responsible and

blameworthy is not settled by noting that they cannot respond to moral considerations or

that they are not responsible for this fact about themselves. This is because these

considerations don’t necessarily bear on whether psychopaths are capable of contempt

and ill will.

Levy addresses this rejoinder by arguing that psychopaths’ moral impairments do,

in fact, mean that they cannot express contempt or ill will through their behavior.

According to Levy,

it is simply false that expressing contempt, ill-will, or moral indifference is

independent of moral knowledge. For an action to express contempt for

others or for morality, the agent must be capable of appreciating moral

facts. Contempt is a thoroughly moralized attitude; only a moral agent is

capable of it.34

I agree with Levy that contempt is a moralized attitude, but we disagree about

what this point comes to. I take Levy’s view to be that contempt is a moralized attitude in

the sense that only moral agents—those who can make use of moral concepts—can

express contempt through their actions. But why should we believe this? One 34  Ibid.,  135.  Note  that  Levy  says,  “…express  contempt  for  others  or  for  morality.”  In  this  section,  I  am  concerned   with   whether   psychopaths   can   express   contempt   for   others.   Expressing   contempt   for  morality   is,   I   think,   something  very  different;   I  discuss   it  briefly  at   the  end  of  section  12.5.   In  Hard  Luck,  Levy  raises  the  objection  considered  here  against  my  argument  in  “Blame  and  Responsiveness  to  Moral  Reasons.”  He  says  there  that  contempt  is  an  “expression  of  the  perceived  worthlessness  of  another  where   the  worth   is  measured   against   some   evaluative   standard.…   The   psychopath  might  judge  himself  superior  to  others,  but  does  not  have  the  evaluative  resources  for  contempt”  (208  note  18).  I  take  this  to  mean  that  for  an  agent’s  behavior  to  express  contempt,  the  agent  must  be  able  to  assign   less   moral   value   to   one   person   than   another.   As   I   explain   in   the   text,   I   think   that   if   a  psychopath  takes  pleasure  in  injuring  someone,  and  counts  the  injury  in  favor  of  acting  a  certain  way,  then  he  or  she  takes  a  morally  significant,  contemptuous  stance  toward  the  other  even   if  he  or  she  can’t  use  a  concept  like  moral  value.  

   

 

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possibility—which would explain why psychopaths are not capable of contempt—is that

expressing contempt requires an agent to make judgments with explicit moral content. If

psychopaths cannot deploy moral concepts in the way required for their judgments to

have explicit moral content, then, according to this view, their actions cannot express

moralized attitudes like contempt.

I propose, however, that in order for an agent’s actions to express contempt or ill

will, the agent does not need to be able to form judgments with moral content. Contempt

is certainly a moralized attitude, but this just means that contempt is an attitude with a

certain sort of moral significance—something in which we take a certain sort of moral

interest. When we speak of “contempt,” then, we are squarely within the moral domain,

but, as I shall argue, this need not entail that for an agent to be capable of contempt he or

she must be able to use moral concepts.

Suppose, for example, that psychopaths cannot deploy concepts like “moral

standing” (at least not in the way that nonpsychopaths do), and that their behavior is

therefore not informed by judgments like, “You don’t have moral standing, so I can

disregard your objections to my treatment of you.” What is important for my account is

that this is still compatible with psychopaths guiding their behavior by judgments like,

“The fact that this action will injure you is no reason to refrain from it.” I suggested in the

last section that insofar as psychopaths have the ability to make, and to guide their actions

by, judgments about reasons, it will sometimes be reasonable to attribute this sort of

judgment to psychopaths.

   

 

14

A judgment like “The fact that this action of mine will injure you is no reason to

refrain from it” can reasonably have moral significance for us even though it does not

have explicit moral content. For one thing, this judgment is in stark contrast with the

judgment by which a good-willed agent would be moved. The judgment in question also

conflicts with the injured party’s view about the importance of his or her welfare; it is,

therefore, a judgment to which the injured party has reason to object. This judgment has

moral significance for the injured party, then, not because it involves moral concepts, but

because it involves denying the significance of factors that are morally salient for the

injured party.35 Thus, psychopaths may be capable of behavior that has moral

significance (for us) despite their impaired ability to recognize and find motivation in

moral considerations.

In a way, of course, it is beside the point whether psychopathic behavior is

properly described as expressing “contempt” or “ill will.” What really matters is whether

the expressive content of a psychopath’s action is such that it is appropriate to respond to

his or her behavior with characteristic blaming attitudes like resentment. Even if

psychopaths are not capable of contempt because, as a matter of terminology, contempt

involves an ability to use moral concepts, I would argue that blaming attitudes are still an

appropriate response to psychopaths because of the type of disregard for others’ interests

of which they are capable. Suppose that a psychopath judges that my welfare doesn’t

have any significance as a reason to refrain from an action. Such a psychopath dismisses

35  By  contrast,  when  a  wild  animal  injures  us,  this  is  not  morally  significant  in  the  same  way  because  it   is  much   less   plausible   to   interpret   the   animal   as   guiding   its   behavior   by   the   judgment   that   our  injuries  don’t  count  as  reasons.  

   

 

15

a consideration that by my lights ought not to be dismissed by someone who is—unlike a

machine or a nonhuman animal—in the business of guiding his or her behavior by

judgments about reasons. From my point of view, the psychopath’s judgment involves a

serious error about my standing, and this error is a proper basis for resentment regardless

of whether the psychopath’s attitude toward me is properly described as contempt.

12.4 Psychopaths as Unwitting Wrongdoers

To conclude his discussion of contempt, Levy introduces an example that is supposed to

help us see that psychopaths’ moral incapacity means that they do not express blame-

grounding attitudes and qualities of will through their behavior. Levy asks us to imagine

that

there is a kind of harm that is objectively morally relevant, but of which

we are ignorant. Suppose, for instance, that plants can be harmed, and that

this harm is a moral reason against killing or treading on them. In that

case, many of us are (causally) responsible for a great many moral harms.

But it is false that we express contempt, ill-will, or even moral

indifference to these plants. Nor do we flout their standing as objects to

whom moral consideration is owed. These attitudes all require a

background of normative beliefs for their expression, in the relevant sense.

Absence of moral regard does not entail, indeed it is incompatible with,

presence of moral disregard. But just as we fail to express any moral

   

 

16

attitudes toward plants, so psychopaths fail to express the relevant

attitudes toward their victims.36

David Shoemaker offers a similar example to make the same point. “Suppose,”

says Shoemaker, that

a race of alien beings comes to live amongst us, and while in general they

share our moral sensibilities, they find additional sources of moral reasons

around them. In particular, they think it immoral to walk on the grass,

precisely because of what it does to the grass: it bends and breaks it. It is

intrinsically bad, they claim, for this sort of organism to be bent or broken,

and they purport to ground this claim on their understanding of what it is

like to be a blade of broken or bent grass. When it is pointed out to them

that blades of grass do not feel or have consciousness, that there is nothing

it is like to be a blade of grass, they reply that understanding what it is like

to be something need not have anything to do with consciousness;

sometimes, it can simply consist in projectively entering into the entity’s

being-space. Indeed, claim the aliens, they have the special capacity for

doing just that, and they have come to recognize the grass’s moral status

thereby. We, of course, simply do not get what they are talking about.37

Now what should we say if a human fails to respect the moral status of grass?

Suppose, for instance, that as I am walking through the park, I see an

interesting rock formation I would like to see up close but to do so

involves tramping on some grass. I cannot “empathize” with the grass, and

36  Levy,  “The  Responsibility  of  the  Psychopath  Revisited,”  135.  37  Shoemaker,  “Attributability,  Answerability,  and  Accountability,”  625.  

   

 

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what the aliens deem immoral about grass-tramping I merely see as stupid:

I am just incapable of viewing the grass’s bending and breaking as giving

me reasons of any kind. So as I chortle about the aliens’ ridiculous moral

beliefs, I tramp across the grass. I am spotted by an alien, however, who

rails at me with indignation, hell-bent on publicly shaming me. Is this an

appropriate reaction?38

Shoemaker says that these blaming responses would not be appropriate because when he

walks on grass, he is not disrespecting the grass in a way that justifies moral indignation.

As Shoemaker sees it, “while it is true that I fail to express respect for the grass, I am

incapable of disrespecting it.”39 This inability to disrespect grass is supposed to stem

from an inability to see any reason in favor of refraining from walking on grass: Such “an

incapacity undermines the possibility of my expressing ill will in the sense warranting

accountability-blame, namely, active disregard.”40

I agree that the people in the above examples are not blameworthy for walking on

plants because they do not express blame-grounding disrespect for plants. However,

neither Shoemaker’s nor Levy’s example supports the conclusion that psychopaths are

not fit targets for negative reactive attitudes. This is because psychopaths are importantly

different from the people who harm plants in their examples.

The reason the people in these examples do not express disrespect is that they are

unaware of the consequences of their actions. In Shoemaker’s example, the humans know

that walking on grass causes it to bend and break, and they know that the aliens say that

38  Ibid.,  626.  39  Ibid.  40  Ibid.,  627.  

   

 

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this has a morally significant effect on grass’s “being-space.” However, in the context of

the example, the aliens’ claims are supposed to be bizarre; they are claims that it would

be reasonable for the humans to reject.41 Since the humans reasonably do not believe that

there is any sense to talk of grass’s being-space, they reasonably fail to be aware that

walking on grass harms it. Similarly, in Levy’s example, people may know that uprooting

a plant harms it insofar as this disrupts its normal plant-like functioning, but they

reasonably do not know that plants can be harmed in a way that turns out to be morally

relevant—for example, that uprooting a plant causes it pain.

If the humans in these examples are wrongdoers, then they are unwitting

wrongdoers, and they are unwitting in a way that is often not compatible with blame:

Through no fault of their own, they don’t know that their actions have certain

consequences.42 The psychopath, on the other hand, is an unwitting wrongdoer in a way

that is compatible with blame: Psychopaths may not know that they do something wrong

when they harm you, but they may well know that an action of theirs harms you. This is

compatible with blame because someone who does not believe that it is wrong to harm

you (but who knows that he or she harms you) treats you with contempt. As I have

argued, the judgment that the possibility of harming you doesn’t matter, or that your

objections to being harmed can be overlooked, is a contemptuous judgment.

Levy’s and Shoemaker’s examples can be altered so that they have a better

chance of supporting their claims about psychopaths. What is required is for the 41  I  assume  that  Shoemaker  would  agree:  If  we  thought  it  was  unreasonable  for  the  humans  to  reject  the  aliens’  claims,  then  it  would  be  more  difficult  to  accept  Shoemaker’s  conclusion  that  they  are  not  blameworthy.  42   Paul   Litton   suggests   a   similar   response   to   Levy’s   example,   “Psychopathy   and   Responsibility  Theory,”  681.  

   

 

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wrongdoing in the examples to more closely resemble psychopathic wrongdoing. We

could imagine, for instance, that plants are caused great pain by being walked on and that

humans know this, but that some humans are incapable of caring about this fact. If we

think that these impaired humans do not express contempt for plants when they

knowingly harm them, then we would have an example that supports Levy’s and

Shoemaker’s conclusion. However, I would say that if an impaired human knows that

walking on a plant seriously harms it, then walking on the plant expresses the

contemptuous judgment that the harm doesn’t matter. This would, I suggest, be a suitable

basis for blame on the part of someone who takes the welfare of plants seriously.43

12.5 Can the Mere Possibility of Moral Understanding

Contribute to Ill Will?

Another way to approach the issue of the psychopath’s capacity for ill will is to ask

whether, when we stipulate that a normal (i.e., nonpsychopathic) wrongdoer is capable of

appreciating moral facts, we have added anything to the account of his or her wrongdoing

that is necessary for the expression of ill will. What, in other words, do we learn about an

instance of wrongdoing when we learn that the wrongdoer is morally competent? One

thing we learn is that it was possible (at least at a suitably general level of psychological

description) for the wrongdoer to have responded appropriately to moral considerations

to which the wrongdoer in fact did not respond appropriately. But what does the presence

43   I   give   a   more   detailed   response   to   Shoemaker’s   example   in   “Aliens,   Accountability,   and  Psychopaths:  A  Reply  to  Shoemaker,”  Ethics,  122  (2012):  562–574.  

   

 

20

of this unexercised ability have to do with whether the wrongdoer’s behavior expresses ill

will?

Consider a recent example of hypothetical psychopathic wrongdoing from David

Shoemaker. Shoemaker argues that psychopaths are not open to blame in a way that

licenses attitudes like resentment—they are not, in his words, “accountability-

responsible.”44 However, psychopaths can be morally responsible for their behavior in

more limited ways. For example, psychopaths can be “answerability-responsible”

because it makes sense to ask them what considerations motivated their behavior. As

Shoemaker suggests, we can reasonably ask a psychopath, “‘Why did you cheat that old

lady out of her life savings?,’” and the psychopath may truthfully “cite various judgments

of worth: ‘It’s funny to see the look of panic on an old lady’s face,’ or ‘Old people don’t

deserve to have any money.’”45

According to Shoemaker’s and Levy’s positions, a psychopath is not an apt target

for resentment even if he or she acts on the judgments just mentioned, and this is because

of the psychopath’s inability to form appropriate moral judgments. However, suppose

that we have two wrongdoers (A and B) who both cheat an old woman out of money and

who both truthfully report that they did so because they wanted to see “the look of panic

on an old lady’s face.” Next, suppose we find out that wrongdoer A, but not B, could have

formed a morally preferable judgment about the normative status of the consequences of

her action. A could have judged—though she did not—that the prospect of the old lady’s

suffering was a sufficient reason to not cheat her. While both wrongdoers failed to

44  Shoemaker,  “Attributability,  Answerability,  and  Accountability,”  623.  45  Ibid.,  628.  Emphasis  added.  

   

 

21

respond appropriately to moral considerations, the general facts about A’s psychology,

but not B’s, were such that A could have responded appropriately to the moral

considerations relevant to the situation. But as things actually transpired, neither A nor B

responded appropriately to moral considerations. They both intentionally cheated the old

lady for the reason mentioned above, so why should we think that only wrongdoer A

expresses a quality of will that makes negative reactive attitudes appropriate? How does

the fact that A had psychological access to a morally preferable, but entirely

counterfactual, instance of moral awareness make the quality of her action, or the quality

of her will, more malicious, or more morally significant than B’s?46 Why, to put it

differently, shouldn’t we focus on the actual features of A’s and B’s behavior—which

happen to be quite similar—when we come to assess their blameworthiness?

There may well be satisfactory answers to these questions, and if there are, then

perhaps psychopaths are not open to blame.47 My point is that before we accept the

conclusion that the actions of psychopaths do not express attitudes to which blame

properly responds, we need an account of how a normal wrongdoer’s possession of the

capacities that the psychopath lacks makes him or her capable of such attitudes. Without

46  One  might  say  that  A’s  capacity   for  morally  preferable   judgments  doesn’t  make  her  action  worse  than   B’s,   but   it   does   make   her   a   more   appropriate   target   for   blame   because   it   is   fair   to   blame  wrongdoers  only  if  they  could  have  avoided  wrongdoing.  R.  Jay  Wallace  develops  this  sort  of  point  in  Responsibility  and  the  Moral  Sentiments  (196–207),  and  I  respond  to  it  in  “Moral  Competence,  Moral  Blame,  and  Protest”;  my  response  draws  on  Pamela  Hieronymi,  “The  Force  and  Fairness  of  Blame,”  Philosophical   Perspectives   18,   (2004):   115–148.  Here,   I  will   just   point   out   that   concerns   about   the  avoidability  of  blame  are  most  intuitive  in  cases  like  that  of  a  compulsive  wrongdoer  who  cannot  do  otherwise  and   whose   behavior   is   independent   of   his   or   her   judgments   about   how   to   behave.   The  behavior   of   the   psychopath,   however,   is   often   dependent   on   his   or   her   judgments   about   how   to  behave.   This   means   that   psychopaths   can   avoid   committing   particular   wrong   acts   if   they   judge  themselves  to  have  reason  to  do  so  (though  they  can’t  avoid  these  acts  for  moral  reasons).  47   As   we   have   seen,   Levy   has   one   proposal   about   why   moral   competence   matters   for  blameworthiness,  which  I  have  rejected.  In  the  next  two  sections,  I’ll  consider  Gary  Watson’s  recent  answer  to  these  questions.  

   

 

22

such an account, I suggest that if a psychopath unjustifiably, intentionally, and knowingly

injures someone, then (prima facie and other things being equal) the psychopath’s action

expresses an attitude toward the injured party that makes the psychopath an apt target for

the attitudes that characterize moral blame.

I don’t mean to claim that there can never be a difference in the moral quality of a

wrong committed by a psychopath and one committed by a nonpsychopathic wrongdoer.

Morally competent wrongdoers can have a moral participant’s understanding of the fact

that they do wrong. Indeed, they can take a general stand against morality. Like Milton’s

Satan, the morally competent wrongdoer can say, “Evil, be thou my good.” This is

something the psychopath cannot do (at least not in the way a nonpsychopath can). There

are, then, certain forms of moral badness of which the psychopath is not capable.

However, this does not mean that the forms of badness of which the psychopath is

capable are not sufficient for blameworthiness.

We might think that only knowing wrongdoing of the sort mentioned above can

express blame-grounding ill will because only this sort of wrongdoing involves an

explicit choice against some moral value. However, we should keep in mind that many

normal wrongdoers are not knowing wrongdoers in this sense. Many people motivated by

bias against a race, gender, or sexual orientation know that others regard their behavior as

wrong, but they do not see their behavior as conflicting with values that they themselves

take to be morally decisive. If we think that these bad actors are open to blame even

though their actions don’t involve a knowing choice against morality, then the fact that

   

 

23

psychopaths are not capable of this sort of wrongdoing does not mean that they are not

open to blame.

12.6 Gary Watson’s View

In “The Trouble with Psychopaths,” Gary Watson takes an approach to assessing the

moral responsibility of psychopaths that is importantly different from Levy’s and

Shoemaker’s. For one thing, Watson allows the plausibility of attributing morally

significant, malicious behavior and ill will to psychopaths.48 Psychopaths pass what

Watson calls the malice test: They “are often not just dangerous but cruel. They

frequently enjoy forcing others into painful submission.… That psychopaths are in this

way ‘into’ or ‘behind’ the mischief and pain is what constitutes their malice.”49 This

interpretation of psychopathic behavior is plausible because psychopaths possess the

rational capacities I discussed in section 12.2. In virtue of these capacities, Watson says,

“[p]sychopaths are capable of a complex mode of reflective agency that is ethically

significant in ways that the activities of less complex creatures cannot be.”50

The “trouble” with psychopaths is that while they pass the malice test, they do not

meet the moral competence requirement.51 On the one hand (and insofar as they pass the

malice test), Watson says that we “rightly predicate viciousness of the attitudes and

conduct of psychopaths” and that these attributions constitute a form of moral

responsibility.52 However, since psychopaths lack moral competence, they are not 48  Watson,  “The  Trouble  with  Psychopaths,”  308.  49  Ibid.,  316.  50  Ibid.  51  Ibid.,  308.  52  Ibid.  

   

 

24

morally responsible in the crucial sense of being morally accountable for their

behavior.53 Because of their inability to recognize the normative significance of others’

interests, Watson says, psychopaths “lack the capacity for moral reciprocity or mutual

recognition that is necessary for intelligibly holding someone accountable to basic moral

demands and expectations.”54

For Watson, what makes it inappropriate to impose the moral demands and

expectations associated with accountability on psychopaths is that they cannot enter into

the context of mutual recognition in which these demands are at home. Thus, there is an

important sense in which psychopaths’ disorder “disqualifies them as members of the

moral community.”55 We are, and must be, morally alienated from the psychopath

because “[m]oral objections and other forms of moral address [e.g., our demands for

moral recognition] presume or appeal to an authority that psychopaths cannot

recognize.”56

Unsurprisingly, Watson is critical of approaches that deny that moral competence

is a requirement for moral responsibility. For example, Watson objects to T. M.

Scanlon’s claim that even in the absence of moral understanding, a generally rational

wrongdoer is open to moral criticism that “‘supports demands for acknowledgment’” of

wrongdoing, as well as demands “‘for apology, or for justification or explanation.’”57

These demands for acknowledgment and apology look, says Watson, “like instances of

53   Watson   is   building   here   on   his   well-­‐known   distinction   between   the   attributability   and  accountability   “faces”  of   responsibility,   “Two  Faces  of  Responsibility,”   reprinted   in  Watson,  Agency  and  Answerability:  Selected  Essays  (New  York:  Oxford  University  Press,  2004),  260–288.  54  Watson,  “The  Trouble  with  Psychopaths,”  308.  55  Ibid.,  309.  56  Ibid.  57  Ibid.,  313.  Watson  is  quoting  Scanlon,  What  We  Owe  to  Each  Other,  272;  the  italics  is  Watson’s.  

   

 

25

holding accountable, like calls for avowal of responsibility.”58 However, this is “plainly

not warranted by [Scanlon’s] general rational competence view” because general (but

nonmoral) rational competence is not sufficient for an agent to stand with us in a moral

relationship characterized by reciprocity.59 For Watson, because psychopaths are

“incapable of the reciprocity that demanding and owing justification presumes, moral

criticism [of the sort conveyed by the demands Scanlon mentions] is not only futile but

senseless,” for “[n]othing they could do could be intelligibly construed as an apology or

acknowledgment.”60

As the preceding hopefully makes clear, Watson’s central reservation about the

moral responsibility of psychopaths has to do with “the conceptual aptness of making a

‘demand’ of a creature that is incapable of recognizing one’s standing to make

demands.”61 Now it is certainly plausible to say with Watson that a condition on

reasonably imposing a demand for apology or moral recognition on another agent is that

the agent can recognize the legitimacy of the demand and the authority of the one who

issues it. I admit, then, that Watson identifies an important sense in which psychopaths

are not morally responsible for their behavior. Psychopaths are not morally responsible in

the sense of being members of our moral community with whom we can engage in

genuine moral dialogue or from whom we can reasonably demand an apology in the hope

of restoring (or creating) a moral relationship.

58  Ibid.  59  Ibid.  60  Ibid.,  314.  61  Ibid.  

   

 

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It’s important to note, however, that the sort of moral responsibility just identified

is largely prospective. In his conclusion, Watson says,

Holding one another morally accountable honors the value of mutual

recognition and expresses a basic form of respect. The telos of this

practice is the prospect of codeliberation and reconciliation. In the case of

psychopathy, I have argued, this hope is forlorn. Psychopaths are, in this

sense, irredeemably alien.62

If holding another accountable involves the prospect of reconciliation, then psychopaths

are not properly held accountable for their behavior. But holding accountable, so

understood, is a relatively narrow slice of what is involved in judgments of moral

responsibility and in holding others responsible for their behavior. Even if psychopaths

are not reasonably open to demands for sincere apology or for moral reform, perhaps they

are open to the emotional responses that are plausibly at the center of our blaming

practices: the negative reactive attitudes.

However, Watson, like Shoemaker and Levy, does not mean to leave this option

open. While there is little explicit discussion of the negative reactive attitudes in “The

Trouble with Psychopaths,” it is clear both that Watson means to include them in the

range of responses that are involved in holding accountable and that he views these

responses as inappropriate if a wrongdoer does not meet the moral competence

requirement.63 While Watson believes that psychopaths are “capable of acting in morally 62  Ibid.,  322.  In  a  note  attached  to  this  passage,  Watson  adds  that  “[t]he  rationale  of  moral  and  legal  accountability  is  therefore  prospective,  without  being  consequentialist”  (331,  note  71).  63   This   aspect   of   Watson’s   view   comes   out   more   clearly   in   “Two   Faces   of   Responsibility”   and  “Responsibility  and   the  Limits  of  Evil:  Variations  on  a  Strawsonian  Theme,”   in  Watson,  Agency  and  Answerability,  219–259.  

   

 

27

horrible ways, of exhibiting a kind of evil to which we respond accordingly,” and that

“[t]heir conduct is morally significant in this way,” he does not see this as justifying our

resentment:

what is a proper object of moral horror and hard feelings does not

necessarily warrant resentment and indignation proper. These latter

responses must fall short of their erstwhile targets [in the case of

psychopaths]. Some agents of evil, therefore, are beyond moral

accountability.64

In another brief reflection on the reactive attitudes, Watson clarifies his claim in

earlier work that these “attitudes are ‘incipiently forms of communication.’”65 He says

now that resentment is “‘incipiently communicative’ in that it involves a commitment,

not to the communication of moral demands, but to the appropriateness of an inherently

communicative stance.”66 And, of course, one must have some capacity for genuine

moral conversation before it is appropriate to take up this communicative stance.

I take Watson’s view to be, then, that psychopaths are not appropriate targets for

resentment because it is part of the logic of resentment that it is apt only in the case of

wrongdoers who possess moral competence. This is because resentment presumes that its

target is, at least in a general way, a candidate for moral dialogue—one to whom we can

reasonably express a demand for apology or a wish for moral reconciliation, and these

demands and wishes are reasonable only in the case of morally competent,

64  Watson,  “The  Trouble  with  Psychopaths,”  317.  65   Ibid.,   328,   note   35.   The   earlier   characterization   of   resentment   occurs   in   “Responsibility   and   the  Limits  of  Evil,”  230.  66  Ibid.  

   

 

28

nonpsychopathic agents. To my mind, however, characterizing resentment in this largely

prospective way obscures an important aspect of resentment: namely, the way in which it

is a manifestation of moral offense at past acts, and the way it marks certain actions as

offensive because of their moral character and the quality of will that informs them.

Consider, as an alternative, Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson’s account of

resentment. D’Arms and Jacobson propose that certain emotions are “cognitive

sharpenings” of more basic “natural emotion kinds.”67 Cognitive sharpenings are

“constructed by specifying a subclass of instances of an emotion, or other affective state,

in terms of some thought that they happen to share.”68 For example, we “could take all

the episodes of anger-that-one-was-denied-tenure together and treat them as a type of

anger.”69 This “tenure rage” would be a cognitive sharpening of anger insofar as it is a

form of anger that involves the belief that one was denied tenure. Similarly, resentment is

a sort of moralized anger, a cognitive sharpening of a more basic natural emotion kind,

the “constitutive thought” of which “is that one has not merely been slighted but

wronged.”70 Thus, as D’Arms and Jacobson have it, if “you believe that because you

deserve tenure, you were wronged by not getting it,” then “[i]t is resentment, not merely

anger, you feel.”71 On the other hand, if you come to think that you in fact did not

67   Justin   D’Arms   and   Daniel   Jacobson,   “The   Significance   of   Recalcitrant   Emotion   (or,   Anti-­‐quasijudgmentalism),”   in  A.  Hatzimoysis  (ed.),  Philosophy  and  the  Emotions   (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2003),  127–145.  68  Ibid.,  137.  69  Ibid.  70  Ibid.,  143.  This  sentence  should  not  be  read  as  implying  that  the  natural  emotion  kind  of  anger  has  a  constitutive  thought  along  the  lines  of  “I  was  slighted.”  For  D’Arms  and  Jacobson,  natural  emotion  kinds  have  no  constitutive  thoughts.  Thanks  to  Zac  Cogley  for  encouraging  me  to  clarify  this.  It’s  also  worth   noting   D’Arms   and   Jacobson’s   acknowledgment   that   “resentment”   can   refer   to   a   sort   of  moralized  envy,  in  which  case  it  would  not  be  associated  with  the  constitutive  thought  mentioned  in  the  text.  71  Ibid.  

   

 

29

deserve tenure, then while “[y]ou may still be disposed to anger,” it would not be

appropriate to describe this as resentment: “the more you judge that you have not been

wronged, the more difficult it will be to understand yourself as resenting those who made

the decision.”72

Presumably, Watson regards resentment as having to do with more than just the

belief that one was wronged. If we were to put his view in D’Arms and Jacobson’s terms,

perhaps we would say that resentment is a cognitive sharpening of anger characterized by

the thought that another wronged me and that other is a potential moral interlocutor.

Alternatively, or in addition, the constitutive thought might be that the person who

wronged me could have responded appropriately to moral considerations and refrained

from wronging me on that basis. Characterized in either way, resentment would be off

target if it were aimed at a psychopath—or at least the emotional responses we might feel

toward psychopaths would not be resentment, properly so called.

However, I don’t think we have much reason to regard resentment as

quintessentially involving the thoughts just mentioned. Certainly, it often does occur to us

either that the one who wronged us could have been appropriately responsive to our

moral standing, or that he or she might be inspired by our moral criticism to offer an

apology. But it is also possible for emotional responses to wrongdoing to involve just the

thought that others have treated us in a way that we did not deserve to be treated, that

they did so on purpose and for reasons of their own that we do not view as justifying their

behavior. A psychopath is capable of committing actions that have all these properties, so

72  Ibid.  

   

 

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if judging that an action has these properties is the “constitutive thought” involved in

resentment, then psychopaths are open to resentment, so defined.

As D’Arms and Jacobson suggest, emotions can be “sharpened out” in different

ways by different constitutive thoughts. The point of the last paragraph is that there are at

least two different, but related, ways of sharpening the emotion of anger that might

plausibly be called “resentment” (or perhaps one of these forms of resentment is primary,

and the other is a further refinement, or sharpening, of this primary sort). If this is so,

then there may be a kind of resentment that is not appropriate in the case of the

psychopath: the sort of resentment that involves the thought that the one who wronged us

is a potential moral interlocutor. However, there will also be another sort of resentment,

which is plausibly the more basic form, that involves a thought that can reasonably be

had of a psychopath: the thought that, for no good reason, another has knowingly and

intentionally treated us in a way that, by your lights, we did not deserve to be treated.

Therefore, even if Watson is right about the importance of moral competence for (one

kind of) resentment, psychopaths may still be open to a form of blame that involves

negative reactive attitudes and that goes beyond the relatively shallow sort of blame that

Watson (and Shoemaker) are willing to allow in the psychopath’s case.

I grant the following to Watson (and Shoemaker). Psychopaths are not morally

responsible for their behavior in the sense of being properly subject to certain demands,

such as the demand for apology, or to the form of resentment that involves the thought

that the one who is resented could have responded appropriately to moral reasons. I am

comfortable with this concession because it leaves it open that psychopathic wrongdoing

   

 

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is expressive of ill will and that psychopaths can be morally responsible for their

wrongdoing in the sense of being properly targeted with a form of resentment that

involves the thought that one has been wronged rather than merely harmed.

As Watson shows, psychopaths are not members of our moral community in the

sense of being moral interlocutors. Since moral accountability (in Watson’s sense)

involves demands that are reasonably imposed only on moral interlocutors, it addresses

agents insofar as they are members of our moral community in this sense. However,

psychopaths are members of our moral community in the sense of being capable of

wronging us (rather than merely injuring us) and of treating us with contempt and

disregard. An important role that (one form of) resentment plays is to respond to agents

insofar as they are members of our moral community in this limited sense.

12.7 Psychopaths and Other Incorrigibles

Several points from the preceding sections can be brought into sharper focus by

considering Watson’s response to an earlier discussion of mine about the relation

between psychopaths and other wrongdoers. Watson believes that the sort of view

defended here is too inclusive because “[i]t accepts too many into the circle of moral

accountability,” but he notes that his own view faces the converse objection that it

shrinks the circle of moral accountability too much because it can provide “no principled

way to distinguish the psychopath’s unreachability from that of the incorrigibly hardened

and vicious nonpsychopathic criminal.”73

73  Watson,  “The  Trouble  with  Psychopaths,”  317.  

   

 

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In an earlier paper, I expressed something like this worry in the following way, as

Watson quotes it,

Imagine the way prisoners in a Nazi concentration camp surely blamed

and condemned their murderers.… I do not think that these demands and

claims lost their point when they failed to move hardened concentration

camp executioners. Of course, it may be true that the executioners in

question could have been brought to recognize their crimes for what they

are, but it is strange to suppose that it is only the psychologically

improbable possibility of radical conversion at the last moment that makes

blame appropriate here.74

In response, Watson distinguishes between the incorrigibility of psychopaths and

the incorrigibility of nonpsychopathic wrongdoers who are committed to their

wrongdoing but for whom responsiveness to moral considerations remains at least a dim

possibility. For example, as Watson notes, “[o]ccasionally a Nazi or a Mafioso or white

supremacist makes a genuine return to the moral point of view.”75 Watson says “return”

because moral recognition depends here “upon suppressed or partial or partitioned moral

sensibilities that are somehow reengaged or extended.”76 For the psychopath, there is no

similar possibility of a return to morality; this means “not just that there is no chance that

74   Ibid.   Watson   is   quoting   my   “Blame   and   Responsiveness   to   Moral   Reasons,”   532;   the   ellipsis   is  Watson’s.  75  Watson,  “The  Trouble  with  Psychopaths,”  318.  76  Ibid.  

   

 

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[psychopaths] will change but (again) that it makes no sense to address moral demands to

them as though these could be intelligible to them.”77

All this seems right, but Watson’s observation is somewhat orthogonal to the

point I was trying to make by invoking concentration camp guards. My point was not that

we can’t differentiate between hardened Nazis and psychopaths, but rather that the

admitted differences between these two groups does not give us reason to think that only

members of the former group are open to moral blame. For one thing—along the lines I

sketched in section 12.5—even if the capacity for responding to moral reasons is not

entirely extinguished in hardened Nazis, it is not clear that this is what makes their

actions expressive of ill will toward their victims.

Now if the entire point of blaming attitudes like resentment were to provoke a

return to morality on the part of a wrongdoer, then we would have reason to think that

resentment is not appropriate in the case of psychopaths. However, the concentration

camp example gives us reason to think that this is not so. I take it that many people find it

reasonable—as opposed to being merely understandable—for concentration camp victims

to resent even the most thoroughly hardened and unrepentant Nazis. If we assume that,

though it remains a possibility, hardened Nazis are not going to reform themselves on the

basis of being targeted by their victim’s resentment, this suggests that we take resentment

to be doing work besides aiming at eliciting apologies and moral reform. Thus,

77  Ibid.  It  may  be  possible  to  provide  a  psychopath  with  incentives  to  refrain  from  some  of  his  or  her  wrongdoing,   but  Watson  means   that   a  psychopath   can’t   be   changed   into   a  person  who   see  others’  interests  as  noninstrumental  reasons.  

   

 

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resentment seems apt even in cases where moral reform is so unlikely that any

expectation of it would be unreasonable.78

Another thing I had in mind in the passage Watson quotes is that prisoners in a

concentration camp, facing an evil that they cannot reasonably hope to reform or

dissuade, might issue “demands and claims” (as I put it) without necessarily attempting to

engage their captors in moral dialogue.79 Rather, I imagine the demands and claims as

ways the prisoners have of expressing their resentment by insisting on their own moral

standing. One can reasonably insist on such a thing even in the face of implacable evil

because the point of this insistence need not be to convince the wrongdoer of his or her

error. The point may be, rather, to defiantly express moral values as one sees them, to

stand up for oneself, and to commit oneself to the claim that one has standing to object to

the treatment in question, even if one cannot convince others of this fact.80 These are

expressions of one’s moral commitments, but these expressions do not depend for their

sense on the possibility that they will be affirmed by a wrongdoer.

As I noted in the last section, Watson views resentment as in some way tied to

demands that make sense only when they are posed to morally competent wrongdoers.

Watson adds that “[i]n some elusive sense, resentment is ‘meant to be expressed.’”81

Presumably, Watson believes that resentment is meant to be expressed in such a way that

78  Similarly,   if  ordinary  conversation  is  a  guide,  many  people  make  sense  of  the  notion  of  resenting  the   dead   and   others  who  will   never   be   in   a   position   to   know   about   our   resentment   or   to   reform  themselves  because  of  it.  79  I  should  have  avoided  the  use  of  the  word  “demands”  since  I  think  Watson  is  right  that  demands  are  felicitous  only  when  directed  at  those  who  can  obey  them.  80   I  develop  the  claim  that  blame  can  sometimes  be  construed  as  a   form  of  moral  protest   in  “Moral  Competence,  Moral  Blame,  and  Protest.”  81  Watson,  “The  Trouble  with  Psychopaths,”  328,  note  35.  

   

 

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its expression would be infelicitous if it were directed at someone who could not respond

appropriately. I agree that resentment is meant to be expressed: It seeks an outlet. Part of

what it is to feel resentment is to have an urge to express it. However, as the last

paragraph indicates, I don’t believe that expressions of resentment must aim at eliciting a

certain response from a wrongdoer.

12.8 Conclusion

We hold wrongdoers morally responsible because of the significance of their actions for

us, and the negative attitudes that characterize blame are responses to this significance.

Therefore, one argument against blaming psychopaths is that it is inappropriate to find

the sort of meaning in their actions that is involved in judging that someone is

blameworthy. Perhaps psychopathic behavior lacks the relevant sort of significance. In

this case, we might be obliged to view psychopaths with what P. F. Strawson called an

“objective attitude” and to see them merely as things “to be managed or handled or cured

or trained” and not as candidates for interpersonally engaged attitudes like resentment.82

There certainly are engaged responses that are out of place in the case of

psychopaths. It does not make sense to expect moral acknowledgment or sincere apology

from them, and if there is a form of resentment that essentially involves an attempt to

elicit these responses, then it is not reasonably directed at psychopaths. There might also

be a kind of moral sadness or disappointment that is not a reasonable response to

psychopaths and their bad behavior. We can reasonably be disappointed that we have

82  Strawson,  “Freedom  and  Resentment,”  79.  

   

 

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crossed paths with a psychopath, but it makes little sense to be disappointed in the

psychopath for disregarding our moral standing instead of respecting it.83

The fact that the responses just mentioned are out of place gives us reason to view

psychopaths as outside the bounds of the moral community. But there is at least one way

in which psychopaths are part of the moral community: They can wrong us. Psychopaths

can wrong us rather than merely injure us, and they can wrong us in ways that are

deliberately contrary to our interests and that express commitments to which we are

opposed and to which we have reason to object. This, I have argued, makes psychopathic

wrongdoing significant for us in a way that makes it reasonable to respond to

psychopaths with moral blame.

83  George  Sher  argues  that  a  component  of  blame  is  the  desire  that  a  wrongdoer  “not  have  performed  his   past   bad   act   or   not   have   his   current   bad   character,”   In   Praise   of   Blame   (New   York:   Oxford  University  Press,  2006),  112.  If  this  desire  entails  the  wish  that  the  wrongdoer  had  refrained  from  his  bad   act   for   the   right   (moral)   reason,   then   psychopaths   would   not   be   open   to   blame   on   this  interpretation.