The shifting contours of international state-building practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The shifting contours ofinternational state-building

practices in Bosnia andHerzegovina

Mateja Peter

State-building – creation of new governance inStitutionS and/or the strengthening of existing ones with an aim to provide citizens with physical and economic security – has been recognized by both practitioners and scholars as one of the main concerns faced by the international community today.1 Third-party (exogenous) state-building, as opposed to indigenous (endogenous) state-building, is a relatively recent practice in international relations, but has been on the rise since the end of the cold war.2 a decade and a half of international community’s involvement in post-conflict politics of bosnia and Herzegovina (biH) shows a varied and complex picture of state-building policies as envisaged by the outsiders for this country. This contribution outlines the broad strokes of this process. while the rest of the book concerns itself mainly with domestic conceptions of state and nation, this piece shifts the attention

1 cf. chandler, david, Empire in denial: the politics of state-building (london: Pluto, 2006); fukuyama, francis, “The imperative of state-building,” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 2 (2004); Paris, roland and timothy d. Sisk, The dilemmas of statebuilding: Confronting the contradictions of post-war peace operations (new York: routledge, 2009).2 for a good overview of third-party state-building see for instance caplan, richard d., International governance of war-torn territories: rule and reconstruction (oxford: oxford university Press, 2005); wilde, ralph, The Administration of Territory by International Organizations (oxford: oxford university Press, 2005).

21

DavorMarko KNJIGA 2010.indd 1 8.11.2010 11:23:31

to international ones. This kind of focus is crucial for properly comprehending biH politics, considering the large role the international community occupies in it. local understandings of what a state and what its role is are formed in a co-constitutive process with international ones. for proper insight into developments in post-dayton3 bosnia and Herzegovina it is therefore imperative to study both sides of the coin.

This contribution examines what role the international community has envisaged for itself in bosnia and Herzegovina. i attempt to answer to what extent internationals saw state-building as an exogenous and to what extent as an endogenous process and what were the policy areas that internationals thought had to be addressed/resolved by them before leaving the country in the hands of its people. The argument this contribution advances is that the international community came in with a poorly planned strategy. The policy objective was ‘peace’ or ‘ending a war’, but as goodhand succinctly points out, this kind of a broad objective is not enough for a sustainable state as it does not involve the transformation of the institutions, networks and incentive systems – regionally, nationally and locally – which caused and perpetuate the conflict system.4 This was the reality that the internationals were faced with quite quickly. The state-building policy in bosnia and Herzegovina therefore developed on the ground as a response to local emergencies, without clear advance planning and without comprehensively addressing the complexities of the situation. Poor planning and increasingly complex situation resulted in the international community gradually expanding its own policy priorities. This mission creep, as it is often referred to in the literature, tends to be portrayed as something that developed at an intergovernmental level, among countries involved in the state-building process. what i argue in this contribution is that the inflation of goals in bosnia and Herzegovina occurred both at an intergovernmental level and as a result of successive High representatives having new approaches to state-building.

This contribution therefore analyses the international conceptions of state-building with a focus on individual High representatives and their understanding of the priorities of the international community. turning a light to a different level of analysis provides us new perspective on the developments in international politics and helps us answer a new set of questions.5 The focus of analysis in this contribution is therefore on successive High representatives (Hirep), the highest civilian authority in the country, and their relationship with institution’s advisory body – the Peace implementation council (Pic). This analysis of their state-building views is organised chronologically, so that trends can be discerned.

3 The general framework agreement for Peace in bosnia and Herzegovina, initialled in dayton, ohio on 21 november 1995, signed in Paris on 14 december 1995 (dayton Peace agreement, dayton accords).4 goodhand, Jonathan, “aiding violence or building peace? The role of international aid in afghanistan,” Third World Quarterly 23, no. 5 (2002): 839.5 cf. rosenau, James n., The scientific study of foreign policy (london: Pinter, 1980), ch. 6; russell, bruce, Harvey Starr, and david Kinsella, World Politics: The Menu for Choice, 9th ed. (belmont, california: wadsworth Publishing, 2009), 15.

Dayton anD the international state-builDingThroughout the period leading up to the dayton proximity talks as well as during

the negotiations themselves the post-war state-building efforts received only cursory attention. The military ceasefire and territorial settlement were at the forefront of all discussions and civilian implementation was sidelined. russia and local actors were more concerned with military aspects of the settlement and stayed away from the discussion over the international civilian administration and its authority and role in post-dayton state-building.6 disagreements over the level of involvement in state-building efforts were mainly between european union (eu) representatives and the united States (uS).

There were three main contentions between trans-atlantic partners over the future state-building effort in bosnia and Herzegovina. firstly, regarding the powers of the highest civilian implementer. Secondly, over the relation of the biH mission with the un and thirdly, over the relationship between the military and the civilian part of the implementation effort.

The question of what the powers of the highest civilian implementer of the dayton Peace agreement would be proved one of the most contentious in planning the international involvement in post-war bosnia and Herzegovina. given that european countries were to finance the bulk of the reconstruction efforts, the eu negotiators got a clear instruction from the eu council of Ministers that carl bildt, a Swedish diplomat that served as a co-chairman of the dayton Peace conference, should be appointed as the High representative.7 once the chief uS negotiator richard Holbrooke acquiesced to a european taking the post, the uS insisted on granting as little authority to this institution as possible.8

another disagreement was over the role the united nations (un) would play in the post-conflict reconstruction. even at early stages of planning the uS insisted that the un could not hold a leading role in either the civilian or military part of the op-eration.9 while the european partners wanted a stronger role for the un Security council, neither side insisted on a central role of the un Secretariat.

a major point of contention was the relationship between the military and the civilian parts of the implementation efforts. The uS position was that the military

6 goodby, James e., Europe undivided: The new logic of peace in US-Russian relations (washington: united States institute of Peace Press, 1999), 126-8; bildt, carl, Peace journey: The struggle for peace in Bosnia (london: weidenfeld and nicolson, 1999), 108-9.7 neville-Jones, Pauline, “dayton, ifor and alliance relations in bosnia,” Survival 38, no. 4 (1996): 50, 53.8 Holbrooke, richard, To end a war: Sarajevo to Dayton: An inside story (new York: random House, 1999), 209; daalder, ivo H., Getting to Dayton: the making of America’s Bosnia policy (washington: brookings institute Press, 2000), 157.9 daalder, Getting to Dayton: the making of America’s Bosnia policy, 153-4; neville-Jones, “dayton, ifor and alliance relations in bosnia,” 51.

22

state or natio0nal Building in Bosnia and HerzegovinaMateja Peter

tHe sHifting contours of international state-Building practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina


to international ones. This kind of focus is crucial for properly comprehending biH politics, considering the large role the international community occupies in it. local understandings of what a state and what its role is are formed in a co-constitutive process with international ones. for proper insight into developments in post-dayton3 bosnia and Herzegovina it is therefore imperative to study both sides of the coin.

This contribution examines what role the international community has envisaged for itself in bosnia and Herzegovina. i attempt to answer to what extent internationals saw state-building as an exogenous and to what extent as an endogenous process and what were the policy areas that internationals thought had to be addressed/resolved by them before leaving the country in the hands of its people. The argument this contribution advances is that the international community came in with a poorly planned strategy. The policy objective was ‘peace’ or ‘ending a war’, but as goodhand succinctly points out, this kind of a broad objective is not enough for a sustainable state as it does not involve the transformation of the institutions, networks and incentive systems – regionally, nationally and locally – which caused and perpetuate the conflict system.4 This was the reality that the internationals were faced with quite quickly. The state-building policy in bosnia and Herzegovina therefore developed on the ground as a response to local emergencies, without clear advance planning and without comprehensively addressing the complexities of the situation. Poor planning and increasingly complex situation resulted in the international community gradually expanding its own policy priorities. This mission creep, as it is often referred to in the literature, tends to be portrayed as something that developed at an intergovernmental level, among countries involved in the state-building process. what i argue in this contribution is that the inflation of goals in bosnia and Herzegovina occurred both at an intergovernmental level and as a result of successive High representatives having new approaches to state-building.

This contribution therefore analyses the international conceptions of state-building with a focus on individual High representatives and their understanding of the priorities of the international community. turning a light to a different level of analysis provides us new perspective on the developments in international politics and helps us answer a new set of questions.5 The focus of analysis in this contribution is therefore on successive High representatives (Hirep), the highest civilian authority in the country, and their relationship with institution’s advisory body – the Peace implementation council (Pic). This analysis of their state-building views is organised chronologically, so that trends can be discerned.

3 The general framework agreement for Peace in bosnia and Herzegovina, initialled in dayton, ohio on 21 november 1995, signed in Paris on 14 december 1995 (dayton Peace agreement, dayton accords).4 goodhand, Jonathan, “aiding violence or building peace? The role of international aid in afghanistan,” Third World Quarterly 23, no. 5 (2002): 839.5 cf. rosenau, James n., The scientific study of foreign policy (london: Pinter, 1980), ch. 6; russell, bruce, Harvey Starr, and david Kinsella, World Politics: The Menu for Choice, 9th ed. (belmont, california: wadsworth Publishing, 2009), 15.

Dayton anD the international state-builDingThroughout the period leading up to the dayton proximity talks as well as during

the negotiations themselves the post-war state-building efforts received only cursory attention. The military ceasefire and territorial settlement were at the forefront of all discussions and civilian implementation was sidelined. russia and local actors were more concerned with military aspects of the settlement and stayed away from the discussion over the international civilian administration and its authority and role in post-dayton state-building.6 disagreements over the level of involvement in state-building efforts were mainly between european union (eu) representatives and the united States (uS).

There were three main contentions between trans-atlantic partners over the future state-building effort in bosnia and Herzegovina. firstly, regarding the powers of the highest civilian implementer. Secondly, over the relation of the biH mission with the un and thirdly, over the relationship between the military and the civilian part of the implementation effort.

The question of what the powers of the highest civilian implementer of the dayton Peace agreement would be proved one of the most contentious in planning the international involvement in post-war bosnia and Herzegovina. given that european countries were to finance the bulk of the reconstruction efforts, the eu negotiators got a clear instruction from the eu council of Ministers that carl bildt, a Swedish diplomat that served as a co-chairman of the dayton Peace conference, should be appointed as the High representative.7 once the chief uS negotiator richard Holbrooke acquiesced to a european taking the post, the uS insisted on granting as little authority to this institution as possible.8

another disagreement was over the role the united nations (un) would play in the post-conflict reconstruction. even at early stages of planning the uS insisted that the un could not hold a leading role in either the civilian or military part of the op-eration.9 while the european partners wanted a stronger role for the un Security council, neither side insisted on a central role of the un Secretariat.

a major point of contention was the relationship between the military and the civilian parts of the implementation efforts. The uS position was that the military

6 goodby, James e., Europe undivided: The new logic of peace in US-Russian relations (washington: united States institute of Peace Press, 1999), 126-8; bildt, carl, Peace journey: The struggle for peace in Bosnia (london: weidenfeld and nicolson, 1999), 108-9.7 neville-Jones, Pauline, “dayton, ifor and alliance relations in bosnia,” Survival 38, no. 4 (1996): 50, 53.8 Holbrooke, richard, To end a war: Sarajevo to Dayton: An inside story (new York: random House, 1999), 209; daalder, ivo H., Getting to Dayton: the making of America’s Bosnia policy (washington: brookings institute Press, 2000), 157.9 daalder, Getting to Dayton: the making of America’s Bosnia policy, 153-4; neville-Jones, “dayton, ifor and alliance relations in bosnia,” 51.

23




part of the operation was to be under sole command of the north atlantic treaty organization (nato), entirely separate, and certainly not subordinate to, the civil-ian administration. Suggestions for some kind of a political control over the military operation were emanating most strongly from france, but were thwarted at dayton.10

at this early stage we can already see two diverging views of international state-building in bosnia and Herzegovina. while the uS wanted a quick military stabilisa-tion mission with minimum civilian, i.e. state-building effort, the europeans wanted to strengthen the political-civilian component. Several of my interviewees contended that this position merely reflected the strengths each side perceived it had.11 The final agreement was aligned more closely to the uS wish to assign the central political fig-ure, the Hirep, a coordinating, not a directing role. Military and civilian component were separated and the un gained a relatively peripheral role. The agreement never-theless allowed some room for european wider endeavours.

despite not being the main issue of the discussions for a long time, the civilian an-nexes ended up comprising five-sixths of the dayton agreement. They included pro-visions for a wide range of activities in which a considerable number of international organizations and agencies were called upon to assist. at the centre of international efforts was the institution of the High representative, who was to “facilitate the Par-ties’ own efforts and to mobilize and, as appropriate, coordinate the activities of the organizations and agencies involved in the civilian aspects of the peace settlement”.12 The dayton Peace agreement also made the Hirep “the final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of this [dayton] agreement on the civilian implementation of the peace settlement”13. This, in essence, gave the Hirep the ability to interpret its own powers. british negotiator at dayton Pauline neville-Jones later described this provision as a key victory, because it would allow europeans to allocate the institution more power if needed.14

The dayton Peace agreement also did not resolve the issue of whom the High rep-resentative would be accountable to. There is only a brief mention that the appoint-ment was to be consistent with relevant un Security council resolutions.15 because the uS was opposed to a greater un involvement, the london Peace implementation conference, organised a week before the signing of the dayton accords, provided for

10 Holbrooke, To end a war: Sarajevo to Dayton: An inside story, 276; daalder, Getting to Dayton: the making of America’s Bosnia policy, 154; bildt, Peace journey: The struggle for peace in Bosnia, 131.11 The context of this contribution is informed by personal interviews conducted in bosnia and Herzegovina and countries involved in international administration. due to the sensitivity of the topic, most of the interviews were conducted in confidentiality. 12 The general framework agreement for Peace in bosnia and Herzegovina, annex 10, art. i. 2.13 ibid., annex 10, art. v.14 neville-Jones, Pauline, “rethinking the dissolution of Yugoslavia, keynote conference speech, Senate House, centre for South-east european Studies, School of Slavonic and east european Studies/university college london, 18 June,” (2004).15 The general framework agreement for Peace in bosnia and Herzegovina, annex 10, art. i. 2.

alternative structures. The international community agreed to set up the Peace im-plementation council (Pic), that was to “review progress in peace implementation” and the Pic Steering board composed of the key donors (canada, france, germany, italy, Japan, russia, united Kingdom, united States, the Presidency of the eu, the eu-ropean commission and turkey). The Steering board was to have a greater role and provide “political guidance on peace implantation” to the Hirep on a regular basis.16

Dayton in practice The immediate period after the signing of the dayton agreement was marked

with attempts to normalize the situation in the country by ensuring compliance with military provisions, releasing prisoners of war and ensuring that refugees and displaced persons have a right to return so that reconstruction could take place. The initial priority for the civilian part of the agreement was to hold free and fair elections that would allow biH to transition from an internationally supervised territory to a self-governing democracy. The expectation was that the country would then be able to assume responsibility for its future, that the office of the High representative (oHr) would be dismantled and that state-building would be externally supported but endogenously driven.

The dayton agreement entrusted the task of preparing the elections to the organization for Security and co-operation in europe (oSce).17 it specified a very clear schedule for elections and assigned the oSce to coordinate the elections closely with the Hirep. all reports of the High representative to the relevant bodies in a period leading up to the elections stressed the holding of democratic elections as a central element of the Peace agreement.18 in the conclusions of the Pic meeting in florence June 1996, the council noted that in “the coming period, civilian implementation will involve a wide range of tasks in which the High representative will be called upon to play a central role.”19 Yet, t he expectation was that after the elections bosnian officials would take the lead in the state-building efforts and the Hirep would only assist them. The internationally supervised transition was planned to end with the elections to state and entity bodies in September 1996. However, in the run-up to the elections, as it became clearer that the three main nationalistic parties would secure a clear electoral victory, the international community started downplaying the importance of the elections.20 although the elections were internationally supervised and ratified,

16 conclusions of the Peace implementation conference held at lancaster House, london, 8 december 1995, art. 21. 17 The general framework agreement for Peace in bosnia and Herzegovina, annex 3.18 E.g,. bildt, carl, “first report of the High representative to the united nations Secretary general, 14 March,” (1996); “report to the Secretary-general of the united nations on compliance with the Peace agreement, 23 March,” (1996). 19 Pic Main Meeting, “florence: chairman’s conclusions, 13 June,” (1996).20 chandler, david, “State-building in bosnia: The limits of informal trusteeship,” International Journal of Peace Studies 11, no. 1 (2006).

24






part of the operation was to be under sole command of the north atlantic treaty organization (nato), entirely separate, and certainly not subordinate to, the civil-ian administration. Suggestions for some kind of a political control over the military operation were emanating most strongly from france, but were thwarted at dayton.10

at this early stage we can already see two diverging views of international state-building in bosnia and Herzegovina. while the uS wanted a quick military stabilisa-tion mission with minimum civilian, i.e. state-building effort, the europeans wanted to strengthen the political-civilian component. Several of my interviewees contended that this position merely reflected the strengths each side perceived it had.11 The final agreement was aligned more closely to the uS wish to assign the central political fig-ure, the Hirep, a coordinating, not a directing role. Military and civilian component were separated and the un gained a relatively peripheral role. The agreement never-theless allowed some room for european wider endeavours.

despite not being the main issue of the discussions for a long time, the civilian an-nexes ended up comprising five-sixths of the dayton agreement. They included pro-visions for a wide range of activities in which a considerable number of international organizations and agencies were called upon to assist. at the centre of international efforts was the institution of the High representative, who was to “facilitate the Par-ties’ own efforts and to mobilize and, as appropriate, coordinate the activities of the organizations and agencies involved in the civilian aspects of the peace settlement”.12 The dayton Peace agreement also made the Hirep “the final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of this [dayton] agreement on the civilian implementation of the peace settlement”13. This, in essence, gave the Hirep the ability to interpret its own powers. british negotiator at dayton Pauline neville-Jones later described this provision as a key victory, because it would allow europeans to allocate the institution more power if needed.14

The dayton Peace agreement also did not resolve the issue of whom the High rep-resentative would be accountable to. There is only a brief mention that the appoint-ment was to be consistent with relevant un Security council resolutions.15 because the uS was opposed to a greater un involvement, the london Peace implementation conference, organised a week before the signing of the dayton accords, provided for

10 Holbrooke, To end a war: Sarajevo to Dayton: An inside story, 276; daalder, Getting to Dayton: the making of America’s Bosnia policy, 154; bildt, Peace journey: The struggle for peace in Bosnia, 131.11 The context of this contribution is informed by personal interviews conducted in bosnia and Herzegovina and countries involved in international administration. due to the sensitivity of the topic, most of the interviews were conducted in confidentiality. 12 The general framework agreement for Peace in bosnia and Herzegovina, annex 10, art. i. 2.13 ibid., annex 10, art. v.14 neville-Jones, Pauline, “rethinking the dissolution of Yugoslavia, keynote conference speech, Senate House, centre for South-east european Studies, School of Slavonic and east european Studies/university college london, 18 June,” (2004).15 The general framework agreement for Peace in bosnia and Herzegovina, annex 10, art. i. 2.

alternative structures. The international community agreed to set up the Peace im-plementation council (Pic), that was to “review progress in peace implementation” and the Pic Steering board composed of the key donors (canada, france, germany, italy, Japan, russia, united Kingdom, united States, the Presidency of the eu, the eu-ropean commission and turkey). The Steering board was to have a greater role and provide “political guidance on peace implantation” to the Hirep on a regular basis.16

Dayton in practice The immediate period after the signing of the dayton agreement was marked

with attempts to normalize the situation in the country by ensuring compliance with military provisions, releasing prisoners of war and ensuring that refugees and displaced persons have a right to return so that reconstruction could take place. The initial priority for the civilian part of the agreement was to hold free and fair elections that would allow biH to transition from an internationally supervised territory to a self-governing democracy. The expectation was that the country would then be able to assume responsibility for its future, that the office of the High representative (oHr) would be dismantled and that state-building would be externally supported but endogenously driven.

The dayton agreement entrusted the task of preparing the elections to the organization for Security and co-operation in europe (oSce).17 it specified a very clear schedule for elections and assigned the oSce to coordinate the elections closely with the Hirep. all reports of the High representative to the relevant bodies in a period leading up to the elections stressed the holding of democratic elections as a central element of the Peace agreement.18 in the conclusions of the Pic meeting in florence June 1996, the council noted that in “the coming period, civilian implementation will involve a wide range of tasks in which the High representative will be called upon to play a central role.”19 Yet, t he expectation was that after the elections bosnian officials would take the lead in the state-building efforts and the Hirep would only assist them. The internationally supervised transition was planned to end with the elections to state and entity bodies in September 1996. However, in the run-up to the elections, as it became clearer that the three main nationalistic parties would secure a clear electoral victory, the international community started downplaying the importance of the elections.20 although the elections were internationally supervised and ratified,

16 conclusions of the Peace implementation conference held at lancaster House, london, 8 december 1995, art. 21. 17 The general framework agreement for Peace in bosnia and Herzegovina, annex 3.18 E.g,. bildt, carl, “first report of the High representative to the united nations Secretary general, 14 March,” (1996); “report to the Secretary-general of the united nations on compliance with the Peace agreement, 23 March,” (1996). 19 Pic Main Meeting, “florence: chairman’s conclusions, 13 June,” (1996).20 chandler, david, “State-building in bosnia: The limits of informal trusteeship,” International Journal of Peace Studies 11, no. 1 (2006).

25






the transitional international administration was prolonged for a further two year ‘consolidation period’.21 while an extended engagement in the country had not been the plan of the drafters of the dayton agreement, the document itself did not specify any time frames for international community’s exit from bosnia and Herzegovina and so the extension of the mandate was interpreted as falling within the scope of the agreement.

after substantial delays in setting up the common institutions of bosnia and Herzegovina, especially the council of Ministers, the first Hirep, carl bildt, convinced the international community that there was a need to become more proactive in their state-building efforts. while triggered by local implementation failures, this change could only occur in the light of a new thinking in washington. This created a possibility of an enhanced and longer civilian engagement which the europeans were advocating at dayton.

The Paris Ministerial Meeting of the Pic Steering board in november 1996 already indicated an international intention to reinforce the position of the Hirep vis-à-vis domestic institutions.22 The final policy change was confirmed at the Pic conference in london in december 1996. The decision-making powers slowly started shifting from the domestic institutions to international actors. london conclusions approved the Hirep’s action Plan for the coming year. The plan mapped out a wider range of efforts that focused on institution building and future elections, instead of an endorsement of the elections that just took place. The Pic also confirmed the continuation of the Hirep mandate, with “reinforced co-ordination structures, including in the field of reconstruction”.23

by the beginning of 1997 bildt had decided he would step down as the Hirep by the following summer. This decision was not surprising considering that most other comparable positions in biH had seen two or three people holding them in the same period. His final discussions with the Pic Steering board were based around the question of how ambitious the international community in bosnia and Herzegovina should be. The main dilemma was how to balance between tendencies to set up a semi-protectorate and acceptance of local deals, which might not always be to the liking of internationals.24 at his last meeting as the Hirep, he presented a draft of proposals for the extension of powers to the position of the Hirep as well as a limited set of concrete demands on the biH authorities, coupled with sanctions if these were not met. This text was then adopted at a Pic Steering board meeting in Sintra in May 1997. a year and a half after the signature of the dayton accords, all key international actors were in concord regarding the need for a broader engagement in bosnia and

21 Pic Steering board Ministerial Meeting, “Paris: conclusions, guiding Principles of the civilian consolidation Plan, 14 november,” (1996). 22 ibid., art. 6. 23 Pic Main Meeting, “london: bosnia and Herzegovina 1997, Making Peace work, 5 december,” (1996), art. 8.24 bildt, Peace journey: The struggle for peace in Bosnia, 343.

Herzegovina and a strengthened civilian administration able to enforce a wider set of state-building goals.

at a meeting in Sintra in May 1997, the Pic Steering board nominated a Spanish diplomat, carlos westendorp, to serve as the new Hirep.25 at the same meeting, the Steering board countries announced a new set of provisions that allowed the Hirep to ensure better co-operation of local parties. The Hirep was charged with pursuing deadlines adopted by the Steering board and take measures in cases of non-compliance, i.e. introduce visa restrictions for travel abroad for obstructive politicians,26 suggest the denial of economic assistance to those municipalities which continued to tolerate indicted persons in public offices27 and suspend media networks whose output contravened the spirit or letter of the dayton Peace agreement.28

not only on paper, but also in practice, the Hirep and the Pic were gaining more power vis-à-vis local parties. The lengthy discussions in bosnian state institutions were seen as an unnecessary delay in policy implementation and the institutions were judged by the Hirep as being “painfully cumbersome and ineffective.”29 at a meeting in november 1997 the Pic Steering board concluded that those in the common institutions who constantly block progress should be replaced,30 but no mechanism for this was provided at that point.

in december 1997 the Pic held a conference in bonn at which it granted itself and the Hirep an indefinite mandate, a move that was not only legally dubious but also a little surprising given that the ‘consolidation period’ for which the international administration had the mandate was only half way through. The Pic also substantially increased the powers of the Hirep despite previous suggestions that the international community would gradually give greater responsibility for state-building to the authorities in biH. The bonn conclusions enabled the Hirep to pass binding interim legislation, which would remain in force until bosnian institutions reached an agreement on it.31 The so-called bonn powers also gave the Hirep a power to dismiss public officials who were obstructing the peace process.32 This decision lay at the complete discretion of the Hirep and no appeal process was established. while these extensions generated a lot of controversy, the Pic and its Steering board interpreted

25 Pic Steering board Ministerial Meeting, “Sintra: Political declaration, communiqué, 30 May,” (1997), art. 90.26 ibid., art. 35.27 ibid., art. 36.28 ibid., art. 70.29 oHr, “office of the High representative bulletin, no. 62, 11 october,” (1997).30 Pic Steering board and Presidency and the coM chairs, “Sarajevo: Joint Statement, 6 november,” (1997), art. 3.31 Pic Main Meeting, “bonn: bosnia and Herzegovina 1998: Self-sustaining Structures, 10 december,” (1997), Part Xi. High representative, art. 2. b.32 ibid., art. 2. c.

26




the transitional international administration was prolonged for a further two year ‘consolidation period’.21 while an extended engagement in the country had not been the plan of the drafters of the dayton agreement, the document itself did not specify any time frames for international community’s exit from bosnia and Herzegovina and so the extension of the mandate was interpreted as falling within the scope of the agreement.

after substantial delays in setting up the common institutions of bosnia and Herzegovina, especially the council of Ministers, the first Hirep, carl bildt, convinced the international community that there was a need to become more proactive in their state-building efforts. while triggered by local implementation failures, this change could only occur in the light of a new thinking in washington. This created a possibility of an enhanced and longer civilian engagement which the europeans were advocating at dayton.

The Paris Ministerial Meeting of the Pic Steering board in november 1996 already indicated an international intention to reinforce the position of the Hirep vis-à-vis domestic institutions.22 The final policy change was confirmed at the Pic conference in london in december 1996. The decision-making powers slowly started shifting from the domestic institutions to international actors. london conclusions approved the Hirep’s action Plan for the coming year. The plan mapped out a wider range of efforts that focused on institution building and future elections, instead of an endorsement of the elections that just took place. The Pic also confirmed the continuation of the Hirep mandate, with “reinforced co-ordination structures, including in the field of reconstruction”.23

by the beginning of 1997 bildt had decided he would step down as the Hirep by the following summer. This decision was not surprising considering that most other comparable positions in biH had seen two or three people holding them in the same period. His final discussions with the Pic Steering board were based around the question of how ambitious the international community in bosnia and Herzegovina should be. The main dilemma was how to balance between tendencies to set up a semi-protectorate and acceptance of local deals, which might not always be to the liking of internationals.24 at his last meeting as the Hirep, he presented a draft of proposals for the extension of powers to the position of the Hirep as well as a limited set of concrete demands on the biH authorities, coupled with sanctions if these were not met. This text was then adopted at a Pic Steering board meeting in Sintra in May 1997. a year and a half after the signature of the dayton accords, all key international actors were in concord regarding the need for a broader engagement in bosnia and

21 Pic Steering board Ministerial Meeting, “Paris: conclusions, guiding Principles of the civilian consolidation Plan, 14 november,” (1996). 22 ibid., art. 6. 23 Pic Main Meeting, “london: bosnia and Herzegovina 1997, Making Peace work, 5 december,” (1996), art. 8.24 bildt, Peace journey: The struggle for peace in Bosnia, 343.

Herzegovina and a strengthened civilian administration able to enforce a wider set of state-building goals.

at a meeting in Sintra in May 1997, the Pic Steering board nominated a Spanish diplomat, carlos westendorp, to serve as the new Hirep.25 at the same meeting, the Steering board countries announced a new set of provisions that allowed the Hirep to ensure better co-operation of local parties. The Hirep was charged with pursuing deadlines adopted by the Steering board and take measures in cases of non-compliance, i.e. introduce visa restrictions for travel abroad for obstructive politicians,26 suggest the denial of economic assistance to those municipalities which continued to tolerate indicted persons in public offices27 and suspend media networks whose output contravened the spirit or letter of the dayton Peace agreement.28

not only on paper, but also in practice, the Hirep and the Pic were gaining more power vis-à-vis local parties. The lengthy discussions in bosnian state institutions were seen as an unnecessary delay in policy implementation and the institutions were judged by the Hirep as being “painfully cumbersome and ineffective.”29 at a meeting in november 1997 the Pic Steering board concluded that those in the common institutions who constantly block progress should be replaced,30 but no mechanism for this was provided at that point.

in december 1997 the Pic held a conference in bonn at which it granted itself and the Hirep an indefinite mandate, a move that was not only legally dubious but also a little surprising given that the ‘consolidation period’ for which the international administration had the mandate was only half way through. The Pic also substantially increased the powers of the Hirep despite previous suggestions that the international community would gradually give greater responsibility for state-building to the authorities in biH. The bonn conclusions enabled the Hirep to pass binding interim legislation, which would remain in force until bosnian institutions reached an agreement on it.31 The so-called bonn powers also gave the Hirep a power to dismiss public officials who were obstructing the peace process.32 This decision lay at the complete discretion of the Hirep and no appeal process was established. while these extensions generated a lot of controversy, the Pic and its Steering board interpreted

25 Pic Steering board Ministerial Meeting, “Sintra: Political declaration, communiqué, 30 May,” (1997), art. 90.26 ibid., art. 35.27 ibid., art. 36.28 ibid., art. 70.29 oHr, “office of the High representative bulletin, no. 62, 11 october,” (1997).30 Pic Steering board and Presidency and the coM chairs, “Sarajevo: Joint Statement, 6 november,” (1997), art. 3.31 Pic Main Meeting, “bonn: bosnia and Herzegovina 1998: Self-sustaining Structures, 10 december,” (1997), Part Xi. High representative, art. 2. b.32 ibid., art. 2. c.

27




them as being granted in the dayton accords.

less than a week after the bonn Pic meeting Hirep westendorp passed his first binding decision imposing the law on citizenship of biH33 and continued by passing 23 other interim legislations and enforcing six dismissals from public office in 1998. The bulk of difficult and controversial legislative work was slowly shifting away from the elected bosnian politicians to international administration. in contrast to the elections in 1996, the international community exhibited less hope and more caution for the general elections in September 1998.34 caplan even argues that international community’s backing of reformist candidates in 1998 seems to have contributed to their defeat as voters resented the interventionist politics.35 after the elections, the international community stressed the importance of the electoral process but saw it only as an exercise in democracy and strongly reaffirmed its support for the Hirep’s bonn powers.36

in this early period the international community realized that its initial plan of a quick stabilisation and exit was not working; the country was still extremely fragile. Quite early on the scholarly community came to agree with practitioners on the ground that elections were organised prematurely and that the focus of international state-building efforts should have been institution strengthening.37 as the state, entity and cantonal institutions were now occupied with nationalist politicians unwilling to cooperate with each other and often at odds with the international community, the Hirep’s attempts to negotiate and look for consensus were failing. instead of institutional strengthening, we therefore experience substantial institutional replacement. The High representative took upon himself to provide the citizens of bosnia and Herzegovina with the basic contours of a functioning state. among others, the 1998 interim laws imposed the flag of biH, the design of bank notes and the coat of arms and uniform licence plate system.38 all these decisions were to strengthen and

33 westendorp, carlos, “decision imposing the law on citizenship of biH, 16 december,” (1997).34 cf. international crisis group, “doing democracy a disservice: 1998 elections in bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Europe Report No. 42 (1998). 35 caplan, richard d., “international authority and state building: The case of bosnia and Herzegovina,” Global Governance 10, no. 1 (2004): 39.36 Pic Steering board Political directors, “Sarajevo: Meeting, 6 october,” (1998). 37 McMahon, Patrice c., “rebuilding bosnia: a Model to emulate or to avoid?,” Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 4 (2004): 580; Krasner, Stephen d., “Sharing sovereignty: new institutions for collapsed and failing states,” International Security 29, no. 2 (2004); chesterman, Simon, You, the people: the United Nations, transitional administration, and state-building (oxford: oxford university Press, 2005); fearon, James d. and david d. laitin, “neotrusteeship and the problem of weak states,” International Security 28, no. 4 (2004); Sharp, Jane M. o., “dayton report card,” International Security 22, no. 3 (1997): 114; cousens, elizabeth M., “from Missed opportunities to overcompensation: implementing the dayton agreement on bosnia,” in Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements. , ed. Stephen John Stedman, donald rothchild, and elizabeth M. cousens (boulder, colorado: lynne rienner, 2002); Paris, roland, At war’s end: Building peace after civil conflict (cambridge: cambridge university Press, 2004). 38 Kaldor, Mary, “Security Structures in bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Governing insecurity:

confirm international community’s commitment to keeping bosnia and Herzegovina as a unified state.

expanDing international prioritiesat the end of July 1999 wolfgang Petritsch replaced westendorp as the new High

representative. Petritsch argued for a thorough overhaul of international community’s engagement in biH (Solioz and Petritsch 2003:358). His plan was to minimise the use of bonn powers to critical matters. for this purpose he presented the concept of ownership as his guiding principle. The concept meant that the people of bosnia and Herzegovina were becoming the owners of their progress in implementation of the dayton accords and the eventual entry of biH in the european institutions.39 This policy shifted the responsibility for progress, and the eventual blame for the lack thereof, to the local population and politicians. The High representative and the international community were to remain as the guarantors of the dayton Peace agreement but state-building would have to be driven from within. in practice a little changed; if anything, the interventions by the Hirep intensified and diversified. Petritsch later on justified acting as the most interventionist Hirep to date by explaining that he needed to lay solid foundations to create the conditions for ownership to take root.40

by the end of 1999 the new Hirep removed from their positions 23 public officials, almost twice as many as westendorp in a year and a half since the Hirep gained enhanced powers in bonn. Moreover, Petritsch also began removing officials that were delaying economic reintegration and refugee return. unlike in previous cases, where decisions were targeted mainly against obstructing Serbian and to lesser extent croatian politicians, this time bosniak officials found themselves under pressure as well.

economic reforms, with a special emphasis on fighting corruption and privatization efforts, were one of the main strategic aims of the office of the High representative under Petritsch. The Pic Main Meeting in brussels in May 2000 confirmed this direction. bonn conclusions from 1997 granted the Hirep powers to pass interim legislation in matters relating to the civilian implementation of the dayton accords as well as to dismiss officials that were obstructing its implementation and the work of common institutions. declaration from brussels went a step further and the Pic explicitly urged the Hirep to use his authority for “removing obstacles that stand in the way of economic reform” as well as stated that a “/d/irect intervention by the High representative may be necessary in strategic industries and in cases where the

Democratic control of military and security establishments in transitional democracies, ed. gavin cawthra and robin luckham (london: Zed books, 2003), 209.39 Petritsch, wolfgang, Bosnien und Herzegowina: Fuenf Jahre nach Dayton: Hat der Frieden eine Chance? (Klagenfurt: wieser verlag, 2001), 212-3.40 Solioz, christophe and wolfgang Petritsch, “The fate of bosnia and Herzegovina: an exclusive interview of christophe Solioz with wolfgang Petritsch,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 5, no. 3 (2003): 361.

28




them as being granted in the dayton accords.

less than a week after the bonn Pic meeting Hirep westendorp passed his first binding decision imposing the law on citizenship of biH33 and continued by passing 23 other interim legislations and enforcing six dismissals from public office in 1998. The bulk of difficult and controversial legislative work was slowly shifting away from the elected bosnian politicians to international administration. in contrast to the elections in 1996, the international community exhibited less hope and more caution for the general elections in September 1998.34 caplan even argues that international community’s backing of reformist candidates in 1998 seems to have contributed to their defeat as voters resented the interventionist politics.35 after the elections, the international community stressed the importance of the electoral process but saw it only as an exercise in democracy and strongly reaffirmed its support for the Hirep’s bonn powers.36

in this early period the international community realized that its initial plan of a quick stabilisation and exit was not working; the country was still extremely fragile. Quite early on the scholarly community came to agree with practitioners on the ground that elections were organised prematurely and that the focus of international state-building efforts should have been institution strengthening.37 as the state, entity and cantonal institutions were now occupied with nationalist politicians unwilling to cooperate with each other and often at odds with the international community, the Hirep’s attempts to negotiate and look for consensus were failing. instead of institutional strengthening, we therefore experience substantial institutional replacement. The High representative took upon himself to provide the citizens of bosnia and Herzegovina with the basic contours of a functioning state. among others, the 1998 interim laws imposed the flag of biH, the design of bank notes and the coat of arms and uniform licence plate system.38 all these decisions were to strengthen and

33 westendorp, carlos, “decision imposing the law on citizenship of biH, 16 december,” (1997).34 cf. international crisis group, “doing democracy a disservice: 1998 elections in bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Europe Report No. 42 (1998). 35 caplan, richard d., “international authority and state building: The case of bosnia and Herzegovina,” Global Governance 10, no. 1 (2004): 39.36 Pic Steering board Political directors, “Sarajevo: Meeting, 6 october,” (1998). 37 McMahon, Patrice c., “rebuilding bosnia: a Model to emulate or to avoid?,” Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 4 (2004): 580; Krasner, Stephen d., “Sharing sovereignty: new institutions for collapsed and failing states,” International Security 29, no. 2 (2004); chesterman, Simon, You, the people: the United Nations, transitional administration, and state-building (oxford: oxford university Press, 2005); fearon, James d. and david d. laitin, “neotrusteeship and the problem of weak states,” International Security 28, no. 4 (2004); Sharp, Jane M. o., “dayton report card,” International Security 22, no. 3 (1997): 114; cousens, elizabeth M., “from Missed opportunities to overcompensation: implementing the dayton agreement on bosnia,” in Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements. , ed. Stephen John Stedman, donald rothchild, and elizabeth M. cousens (boulder, colorado: lynne rienner, 2002); Paris, roland, At war’s end: Building peace after civil conflict (cambridge: cambridge university Press, 2004). 38 Kaldor, Mary, “Security Structures in bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Governing insecurity:

confirm international community’s commitment to keeping bosnia and Herzegovina as a unified state.

expanDing international prioritiesat the end of July 1999 wolfgang Petritsch replaced westendorp as the new High

representative. Petritsch argued for a thorough overhaul of international community’s engagement in biH (Solioz and Petritsch 2003:358). His plan was to minimise the use of bonn powers to critical matters. for this purpose he presented the concept of ownership as his guiding principle. The concept meant that the people of bosnia and Herzegovina were becoming the owners of their progress in implementation of the dayton accords and the eventual entry of biH in the european institutions.39 This policy shifted the responsibility for progress, and the eventual blame for the lack thereof, to the local population and politicians. The High representative and the international community were to remain as the guarantors of the dayton Peace agreement but state-building would have to be driven from within. in practice a little changed; if anything, the interventions by the Hirep intensified and diversified. Petritsch later on justified acting as the most interventionist Hirep to date by explaining that he needed to lay solid foundations to create the conditions for ownership to take root.40

by the end of 1999 the new Hirep removed from their positions 23 public officials, almost twice as many as westendorp in a year and a half since the Hirep gained enhanced powers in bonn. Moreover, Petritsch also began removing officials that were delaying economic reintegration and refugee return. unlike in previous cases, where decisions were targeted mainly against obstructing Serbian and to lesser extent croatian politicians, this time bosniak officials found themselves under pressure as well.

economic reforms, with a special emphasis on fighting corruption and privatization efforts, were one of the main strategic aims of the office of the High representative under Petritsch. The Pic Main Meeting in brussels in May 2000 confirmed this direction. bonn conclusions from 1997 granted the Hirep powers to pass interim legislation in matters relating to the civilian implementation of the dayton accords as well as to dismiss officials that were obstructing its implementation and the work of common institutions. declaration from brussels went a step further and the Pic explicitly urged the Hirep to use his authority for “removing obstacles that stand in the way of economic reform” as well as stated that a “/d/irect intervention by the High representative may be necessary in strategic industries and in cases where the

Democratic control of military and security establishments in transitional democracies, ed. gavin cawthra and robin luckham (london: Zed books, 2003), 209.39 Petritsch, wolfgang, Bosnien und Herzegowina: Fuenf Jahre nach Dayton: Hat der Frieden eine Chance? (Klagenfurt: wieser verlag, 2001), 212-3.40 Solioz, christophe and wolfgang Petritsch, “The fate of bosnia and Herzegovina: an exclusive interview of christophe Solioz with wolfgang Petritsch,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 5, no. 3 (2003): 361.

29




privatisation process [was] suspect.”41 The decision to do so lay solely in the hands of the Hirep and the Pic Steering board and no appeal mechanism was provided. The international community was now also explicitly promoting a liberal state in bosnia and Herzegovina.

another interesting shift occurred at the brussels Pic Main Meeting. The declaration from brussels witnesses a europeanization of the political discourse.42 in the annex to the declaration, the Pic explicitly referred to the eu road Map that was agreed upon in March 200043 and specified 18 conditions that bosnia had to fulfil in order to prepare a feasibility Study that would then form the basis of negotiations for a Stabilisation and association agreement (Saa). chandler (2006b) argues that since the brussels Pic meeting, “the framework used by the Pic and the oHr has increasingly been shaped by the eu road Map and subsequent eu strategies of engagement rather than by dayton itself”.44 This finding was confirmed by several of my interviewees at the oHr, although some have argued that the oHr was shaping the eu agenda and not the other way around.

after the general elections in november 2000, when “for the first time since the war those parties committed to biH european orientation received the majority”,45 the Pic Steering board had expectations that local authorities would ensure “proper prioritisation of work”46 and that the state-building efforts would be endogenously driven. This change was part of a wider positive trend in the region – most notably the defeat of Slobodan Milosevic in the presidential elections in Serbia and the nationalist party croatian democratic union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, HdZ) in the parliamentary elections in croatia. The Steering board nevertheless remained cautious and urged the Hirep to use his powers to the full extent in the event of undue delays and obstructionism “aiming to block biH’s path to europe”.47 This seemingly also gave the High representative powers to push for the acceptance of criteria set out by the eu in its road Map. These ‘membership’ criteria covered a wider range of tasks that were set out at dayton.

given the fundamentally diverging opinions of local elites on what the biH state should look like and what its powers should be, the positive climate did not last long.

41 Pic Main Meeting, “brussels: declaration, 24 May,” (2000).42 for an excellent analysis of this process see Majstrović, danijela, “construction of europeanization in the High representative’s discourse in bosnia and Herzegovina,” Discourse & Society 18, no. 5 (2007). notice also that europe in this entire discourse is equated with the european union, which in itself is problematic. 43 Pic Main Meeting, “brussels: declaration, 24 May,” annex.44 chandler, “State-building in bosnia: The limits of informal trusteeship.” See also Solioz and Petritsch, “The fate of bosnia and Herzegovina: an exclusive interview of christophe Solioz with wolfgang Petritsch.”45 Pic Steering board Political directors, “brussels: communiqué, 7 december,” (2000).46 ibid.47 ibid.

The expectation of the international community that pro-european forces would take over was proved wrong by spring 2001, when nationalistic violence broke out in both republika Srpska and Herzegovina.

at the end of february 2002 when Petritsch announced that he would stand down as the High representative by the end of May 2002, the Pic Steering board designated lord Paddy ashdown as his successor. at the same meeting, the Steering board also took note of the eu’s intention to appoint the next Hirep as the european union Special representative (euSr) in bosnia. This ‘double-hatting’ was to take place with the understanding that the role of the euSr would in no way prejudge the mandate of the Hirep.48 nevertheless this move indicates that the oHr’s priorities for bosnia and Herzegovina were becoming identical to the eu ones. as ashdown himself noted, although the two jobs doubled his reporting lines, they were in fact rolled into one.49

intensive state-builDing unDer ashDowndespite having inherited the problems from previous High representatives,

ashdown wanted to outline his own priorities that clearly distinguished his mandate from his predecessors’. western diplomats and analysts concur that he was the best-prepared Hirep when he assumed the office. during the preparations for his job, ashdown worked on the assumption that peace and stability were not going to be a problem and that he would rather focus on state-building itself.50

ashdown’s speeches and policy proposals at the beginning of his term implicitly criticised the direction that the international community had been pursuing in biH in the seven years before he assumed the office. This implicit criticism is then openly conveyed in the book he wrote after leaving his position as the Hirep:

because the international community had thought that elections were more important than the rule of law, those who had prosecuted the war and profited from it were now elected as the politicians who ran the country.51

The establishment of the rule of law should have been our first priority after the war ended. it hadn’t been, primarily because the international community didn’t think it would stay there that long. So it would have to become my priority now [i.e., when he assumed the office].52

48 Pic Steering board Political directors, “brussels: communiqué, 28 february,” (2002).49 ashdown, Paddy, Swords and Ploughshares: Bringing peace to the 21st century (london: weidenfeld and nicolson, 2007), 217.50 ibid., 216-31.51 interestingly enough his predecessor Petritsch was happy with the results of the elections in 2000. for comparison see Solioz and Petritsch, “The fate of bosnia and Herzegovina: an exclusive interview of christophe Solioz with wolfgang Petritsch,” 364.52 ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares: Bringing peace to the 21st century, 222-3.

30




privatisation process [was] suspect.”41 The decision to do so lay solely in the hands of the Hirep and the Pic Steering board and no appeal mechanism was provided. The international community was now also explicitly promoting a liberal state in bosnia and Herzegovina.

another interesting shift occurred at the brussels Pic Main Meeting. The declaration from brussels witnesses a europeanization of the political discourse.42 in the annex to the declaration, the Pic explicitly referred to the eu road Map that was agreed upon in March 200043 and specified 18 conditions that bosnia had to fulfil in order to prepare a feasibility Study that would then form the basis of negotiations for a Stabilisation and association agreement (Saa). chandler (2006b) argues that since the brussels Pic meeting, “the framework used by the Pic and the oHr has increasingly been shaped by the eu road Map and subsequent eu strategies of engagement rather than by dayton itself”.44 This finding was confirmed by several of my interviewees at the oHr, although some have argued that the oHr was shaping the eu agenda and not the other way around.

after the general elections in november 2000, when “for the first time since the war those parties committed to biH european orientation received the majority”,45 the Pic Steering board had expectations that local authorities would ensure “proper prioritisation of work”46 and that the state-building efforts would be endogenously driven. This change was part of a wider positive trend in the region – most notably the defeat of Slobodan Milosevic in the presidential elections in Serbia and the nationalist party croatian democratic union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, HdZ) in the parliamentary elections in croatia. The Steering board nevertheless remained cautious and urged the Hirep to use his powers to the full extent in the event of undue delays and obstructionism “aiming to block biH’s path to europe”.47 This seemingly also gave the High representative powers to push for the acceptance of criteria set out by the eu in its road Map. These ‘membership’ criteria covered a wider range of tasks that were set out at dayton.

given the fundamentally diverging opinions of local elites on what the biH state should look like and what its powers should be, the positive climate did not last long.

41 Pic Main Meeting, “brussels: declaration, 24 May,” (2000).42 for an excellent analysis of this process see Majstrović, danijela, “construction of europeanization in the High representative’s discourse in bosnia and Herzegovina,” Discourse & Society 18, no. 5 (2007). notice also that europe in this entire discourse is equated with the european union, which in itself is problematic. 43 Pic Main Meeting, “brussels: declaration, 24 May,” annex.44 chandler, “State-building in bosnia: The limits of informal trusteeship.” See also Solioz and Petritsch, “The fate of bosnia and Herzegovina: an exclusive interview of christophe Solioz with wolfgang Petritsch.”45 Pic Steering board Political directors, “brussels: communiqué, 7 december,” (2000).46 ibid.47 ibid.

The expectation of the international community that pro-european forces would take over was proved wrong by spring 2001, when nationalistic violence broke out in both republika Srpska and Herzegovina.

at the end of february 2002 when Petritsch announced that he would stand down as the High representative by the end of May 2002, the Pic Steering board designated lord Paddy ashdown as his successor. at the same meeting, the Steering board also took note of the eu’s intention to appoint the next Hirep as the european union Special representative (euSr) in bosnia. This ‘double-hatting’ was to take place with the understanding that the role of the euSr would in no way prejudge the mandate of the Hirep.48 nevertheless this move indicates that the oHr’s priorities for bosnia and Herzegovina were becoming identical to the eu ones. as ashdown himself noted, although the two jobs doubled his reporting lines, they were in fact rolled into one.49

intensive state-builDing unDer ashDowndespite having inherited the problems from previous High representatives,

ashdown wanted to outline his own priorities that clearly distinguished his mandate from his predecessors’. western diplomats and analysts concur that he was the best-prepared Hirep when he assumed the office. during the preparations for his job, ashdown worked on the assumption that peace and stability were not going to be a problem and that he would rather focus on state-building itself.50

ashdown’s speeches and policy proposals at the beginning of his term implicitly criticised the direction that the international community had been pursuing in biH in the seven years before he assumed the office. This implicit criticism is then openly conveyed in the book he wrote after leaving his position as the Hirep:

because the international community had thought that elections were more important than the rule of law, those who had prosecuted the war and profited from it were now elected as the politicians who ran the country.51

The establishment of the rule of law should have been our first priority after the war ended. it hadn’t been, primarily because the international community didn’t think it would stay there that long. So it would have to become my priority now [i.e., when he assumed the office].52

48 Pic Steering board Political directors, “brussels: communiqué, 28 february,” (2002).49 ashdown, Paddy, Swords and Ploughshares: Bringing peace to the 21st century (london: weidenfeld and nicolson, 2007), 217.50 ibid., 216-31.51 interestingly enough his predecessor Petritsch was happy with the results of the elections in 2000. for comparison see Solioz and Petritsch, “The fate of bosnia and Herzegovina: an exclusive interview of christophe Solioz with wolfgang Petritsch,” 364.52 ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares: Bringing peace to the 21st century, 222-3.

31




Moreover he also thought that economic reform had been sacrificed for political issues:

like the rule of law, economic reform should have been one of the international community’s first priorities in bosnia. /…/ but since this hadn’t been a priority at the start, liberalising and reforming the economy had to be one of mine now [i.e., when he assumed the office].53

in his inaugural speech in front of the biH State Parliament he outlined his three priorities: “first Justice. Then Jobs. Through reform”.54

while justice/rule of law had been on the agenda of all previous High representatives,55 ashdown put it at the centre of his plans. in the inaugural address and during his first meeting with the Pic Steering board56 he highlighted several areas in need of reform and put special emphasis on fighting corruption in the public sector. economic reform was to remain high on the state-building agenda, but ashdown repeatedly emphasised that the oHr would act as a facilitator rather than a mediator in the economic reform process. with that, he endorsed the concept of ownership that Petritsch had developed.

His third priority, besides justice and economy, was the reform of institutions created by the dayton agreement. while both the rule of law and economic reforms could theoretically be imposed by the exercise of the bonn powers and their subsequent clarifications, the institutional reform was radically different. The role of the Hirep was to uphold the dayton accords and so his legal powers stopped at the limits of dayton; as the constitution of bosnia and Herzegovina forms an integral part of the dayton accords,57 any modifications to it would have to be adopted in the Parliamentary assembly of bosnia and Herzegovina and not by the Hirep. agreement on any fundamental changes to the concept of state would therefore have to come from within.

The planning team put together a Mission implementation Plan (MiP) for the oHr, which identified the key tasks that each of the oHr’s departments had to complete before it could be closed down. This was to prevent mission creep, allowed a focus on what ashdown thought the priorities for biH should be and prevented duplication of work of other international actors. The adoption of a comprehensive MiP to guide international state-building efforts only in 2002, almost seven years after the war had ended, was at minimal problematic and substantially too late. The

53 ibid., 224.54 ashdown, Paddy, “inaugural Speech, biH State Parliament, Sarajevo, 27 May, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=8417,” (2002).55 rule of law featured prominently as a goal during the second half of bildt’s mandate (after the September 1996 elections did not yield satisfactory results) as well as during westendorp’s mandate. Petritsch’s focus were more economic issues but rule of law never slipped entirely off the agenda. 56 Pic Steering board Political directors, “Sarajevo: communiqué, 31 July,” (2002).57 The general framework agreement for Peace in bosnia and Herzegovina, annex 4.

mission’s agenda had by then expanded to include almost every aspect of politics in bosnia and Herzegovina, yet even it were desirable for international community to mediate among diverging opinions, the High representative had no authority to resolve the fundamental dissensus among local elites over the nature of the state.

in the first six months of ashdown’s mandate, justice and economy took the centre of the oHr agenda. in July 2002 the Pic agreed with the biH authorities on the targets and necessary steps for economic reform. in September a similar set of targets was adopted to assist local authorities in strengthening the rule of law so that criminality and corruption could be rooted out.58 before october 2002 elections, the first elections that were held in biH since dayton under the exclusive control of the domestic authorities, the Pic and the oHr were urging the newly elected authorities to abide by these agreements. in a speech to the biH House of representatives in december 2002, the Hirep emphasised the urgency of reform once again: “/…/ the choice is not whether to reform. but how fast, how soon and, above all, who will drive the process of reform – you or me?”59

by the beginning of 2003, it became clear that the oHr had taken two different strategies to pass reforms in the realm of justice and ones in the realm of economy. ideally, local authorities would compromise and pass the reforms; as that had not been the case, the Hirep had the option of carrying out the threat he had issued in his december speech and adopt them himself.

ashdown proceeded to use the ‘stick’ in the area of justice and many rule of law targets agreed upon in September 2002 were met only because of the imposition by the Hirep.60 Some of these decisions proved controversial and drew substantial criticism from both domestic and international actors, e.g., demonstrations in february and March 2003 against the High Judicial and Prosecutorial councils, criticism by the council of europe of vetting and reappointment of all judges and prosecutors.61 in the summer of 2003, a research institute european Stability initiative heavily attacked this approach and their report on how ashdown was turning bosnia into a ‘european raj’ was widely reproduced in the international media.62

58 Pic Steering board Political directors Meeting, Sarajevo: declaration, 24 September 2002. 59 ashdown, Paddy, “Speech, biH State Parliament, Sarajevo, 17 december, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=28736,” (2002).60 Pic Steering board Political directors, “brussels: communiqué, 28 March,” (2003). 61 council of europe, “comments on the ‘discussion paper on the Selection Process for the interim High Judicial council’, March, http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_europeanraj_judicialreform_id_3.pdf “ (2003).62 full-length report was later reprinted in Knaus, gerald and felix Martin, “travails of the european raj,” Journal of Democracy 14, no. 3 (2003).. The first international media outlet that picked up the report was The guardian (traynor, ian “ashdown running bosnia like a raj,” The Guardian, 5 July, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/jul/05/politics.foreignpolicy 2003.), followed by bbc (bbc, “Karadzic family assets frozen, 7 July, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/europe/3051754.stm,” 2003.) and transitions online (Perry, valery, “bosnia, an intellectual raj,” Transitions Online, 24 July, http://www.tol.org/client/article/10208-bosnia-an-intellectual-raj.html 2003.) among others.

32




Moreover he also thought that economic reform had been sacrificed for political issues:

like the rule of law, economic reform should have been one of the international community’s first priorities in bosnia. /…/ but since this hadn’t been a priority at the start, liberalising and reforming the economy had to be one of mine now [i.e., when he assumed the office].53

in his inaugural speech in front of the biH State Parliament he outlined his three priorities: “first Justice. Then Jobs. Through reform”.54

while justice/rule of law had been on the agenda of all previous High representatives,55 ashdown put it at the centre of his plans. in the inaugural address and during his first meeting with the Pic Steering board56 he highlighted several areas in need of reform and put special emphasis on fighting corruption in the public sector. economic reform was to remain high on the state-building agenda, but ashdown repeatedly emphasised that the oHr would act as a facilitator rather than a mediator in the economic reform process. with that, he endorsed the concept of ownership that Petritsch had developed.

His third priority, besides justice and economy, was the reform of institutions created by the dayton agreement. while both the rule of law and economic reforms could theoretically be imposed by the exercise of the bonn powers and their subsequent clarifications, the institutional reform was radically different. The role of the Hirep was to uphold the dayton accords and so his legal powers stopped at the limits of dayton; as the constitution of bosnia and Herzegovina forms an integral part of the dayton accords,57 any modifications to it would have to be adopted in the Parliamentary assembly of bosnia and Herzegovina and not by the Hirep. agreement on any fundamental changes to the concept of state would therefore have to come from within.

The planning team put together a Mission implementation Plan (MiP) for the oHr, which identified the key tasks that each of the oHr’s departments had to complete before it could be closed down. This was to prevent mission creep, allowed a focus on what ashdown thought the priorities for biH should be and prevented duplication of work of other international actors. The adoption of a comprehensive MiP to guide international state-building efforts only in 2002, almost seven years after the war had ended, was at minimal problematic and substantially too late. The

53 ibid., 224.54 ashdown, Paddy, “inaugural Speech, biH State Parliament, Sarajevo, 27 May, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=8417,” (2002).55 rule of law featured prominently as a goal during the second half of bildt’s mandate (after the September 1996 elections did not yield satisfactory results) as well as during westendorp’s mandate. Petritsch’s focus were more economic issues but rule of law never slipped entirely off the agenda. 56 Pic Steering board Political directors, “Sarajevo: communiqué, 31 July,” (2002).57 The general framework agreement for Peace in bosnia and Herzegovina, annex 4.

mission’s agenda had by then expanded to include almost every aspect of politics in bosnia and Herzegovina, yet even it were desirable for international community to mediate among diverging opinions, the High representative had no authority to resolve the fundamental dissensus among local elites over the nature of the state.

in the first six months of ashdown’s mandate, justice and economy took the centre of the oHr agenda. in July 2002 the Pic agreed with the biH authorities on the targets and necessary steps for economic reform. in September a similar set of targets was adopted to assist local authorities in strengthening the rule of law so that criminality and corruption could be rooted out.58 before october 2002 elections, the first elections that were held in biH since dayton under the exclusive control of the domestic authorities, the Pic and the oHr were urging the newly elected authorities to abide by these agreements. in a speech to the biH House of representatives in december 2002, the Hirep emphasised the urgency of reform once again: “/…/ the choice is not whether to reform. but how fast, how soon and, above all, who will drive the process of reform – you or me?”59

by the beginning of 2003, it became clear that the oHr had taken two different strategies to pass reforms in the realm of justice and ones in the realm of economy. ideally, local authorities would compromise and pass the reforms; as that had not been the case, the Hirep had the option of carrying out the threat he had issued in his december speech and adopt them himself.

ashdown proceeded to use the ‘stick’ in the area of justice and many rule of law targets agreed upon in September 2002 were met only because of the imposition by the Hirep.60 Some of these decisions proved controversial and drew substantial criticism from both domestic and international actors, e.g., demonstrations in february and March 2003 against the High Judicial and Prosecutorial councils, criticism by the council of europe of vetting and reappointment of all judges and prosecutors.61 in the summer of 2003, a research institute european Stability initiative heavily attacked this approach and their report on how ashdown was turning bosnia into a ‘european raj’ was widely reproduced in the international media.62

58 Pic Steering board Political directors Meeting, Sarajevo: declaration, 24 September 2002. 59 ashdown, Paddy, “Speech, biH State Parliament, Sarajevo, 17 december, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=28736,” (2002).60 Pic Steering board Political directors, “brussels: communiqué, 28 March,” (2003). 61 council of europe, “comments on the ‘discussion paper on the Selection Process for the interim High Judicial council’, March, http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_europeanraj_judicialreform_id_3.pdf “ (2003).62 full-length report was later reprinted in Knaus, gerald and felix Martin, “travails of the european raj,” Journal of Democracy 14, no. 3 (2003).. The first international media outlet that picked up the report was The guardian (traynor, ian “ashdown running bosnia like a raj,” The Guardian, 5 July, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/jul/05/politics.foreignpolicy 2003.), followed by bbc (bbc, “Karadzic family assets frozen, 7 July, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/europe/3051754.stm,” 2003.) and transitions online (Perry, valery, “bosnia, an intellectual raj,” Transitions Online, 24 July, http://www.tol.org/client/article/10208-bosnia-an-intellectual-raj.html 2003.) among others.

33




economic reforms were a different story and the Hirep acted as a facilitator of the reform only, consistent with his statements at the time he assumed the office. as the opening of the negotiations on the Saa with the eu was contingent on passing these reforms, the Pic and the Hirep stepped back to encourage bosnian authorities to pass these reforms themselves if they wanted to eventually join the eu. The idea was to promote state-building with a carrot rather than a stick.

Justice and economy remained high on the agenda throughout ashdown’s mandate but it soon became clear that there was another controversial issue that the Hirep wanted to tackle which was not elaborated in his tagline Posao i Pravda (Jobs and Justice) – namely, prosecution of war criminals.

at the end of 2002, seven years after the end of the war in bosnia and the signing of the dayton Peace agreement, in which parties promised to bring to justice those that had committed the most heinous crimes, several individuals indicted for war crimes were still at large. These included radovan Karadzic, the first president of republika Srpska, and ratko Mladic, the chief of Staff of the army of the republika Srpska during the war. The oHr and the Pic had previously been urging local parties to cooperate fully with the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ictY) but neither westendorp nor Petritsch had used their bonn powers to pass any decisions relating to individuals indicted for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia.

The first campaign launched to undermine the support network allowing Karadzic to evade arrest took place on 7 March 2003. The Hirep designated two individuals and two companies as being obstructionist.63 in another campaign on 7 July 2003, ashdown ordered the freezing of bank accounts of fourteen more people, including Karadzic’s immediate family, and removed two of them from their official positions in state and local bodies.64 on 10 february 2004 he continued his sweep by freezing bank accounts of ten individuals and dismissing from public office four of them, but the biggest campaign took place in the space of two days over summer 2004. on 30 June and 1 July ashdown removed, and conditionally removed, 59 individuals,65 blocked bank accounts of Serbian democratic Party (Srpska Demokratska Stranka, SdS) and required the SdS to establish a single account in order to increase transparency.66 The targets of these campaigns were bosnian Serbs, who were also the most dissatisfied with the international engagement in bosnia.

63 oHr, “Press release: High representative acts to undermine Karadzic Support network, 7 March 2003, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=2 9389 “ (2003).64 oHr, “Press release: High representative announces further action in The fight against crime, 7 July 2003, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id =30230,” (2003).65 oHr, “Press release: list of removed and conditionally removed officials by the High representative, 30 June 2004, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content _id =32748,” (2004).66 ashdown, Paddy, “decision blocking all bank accounts Held by and/or in the name of the SdS and requiring the SdS to establish one bank account, 30 June, http://www.ohr.int/decisions/war-crimes-decs/default.asp?content_id=32752 “ (2004).

This sweeping move to bring war criminals to justice coincided with a wider international campaign; both the eu and the uS had, around that time, also been issuing blacklists of individuals from bosnia for whom travel to their respective countries was banned.67 in statements issued by the Pic Steering board, failure to cooperate with the ictY and the slow progress of defence reform were described as the main obstacles for bosnian alignment with nato’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme.68 Police reform (together with economic reforms and strengthening of the rule of law) was deemed to be the main test for the signing of the Saa with the eu.69

in 2005, for the first time, the Pic Steering board clearly expressed its intention to close down the oHr and issued a recommendation that the position of the High representative be replaced by an eu Special representative. This step would have to be endorsed by the un Security council. at this time the euSr would take over the work of the Hirep but would not have the powers the Hirep holds. Therefore, the Steering board wanted to ensure that transition would not happen before biH was capable of driving its own state-building policy. according to their own statements, one clear indicator of this would be the point at which bosnia and Herzegovina would qualify for negotiations on the Saa with the eu.70 as bosnia started negotiations on 25 november 2005, it was expected that ashdown’s successor, dr christian Schwarz-Schilling, would be the last person to be double-hatted as the Hirep and the euSr.

state-builDing without Directioneven before Schwarz-Shilling was appointed, it was clear that he would take the

oHr in a new direction. in an interview with radio free europe/ radio liberty he was remarkably open about the difference between him and ashdown:

RFE/RL: what will be your style?

Schwarz-Schilling: well, i will listen to the people, i will listen to the bosnian politicians. Then i will try to convince them to come to a decision by themselves and then everybody has to follow up that.71

Schwarz-Schilling also underlined that he wished the oHr to be reduced step by

67 alic, anes, “washington blacklists bosnian nationalists. transitions online, 6 September, http://www.ceeol.com,” 2003. 68 for instance: Pic Steering board Political directors, “Sarajevo: declaration, 12 June,” (2003). “brussels: communiqué, 11 december,” (2003). “Sarajevo: communiqué, 1 april,” (2004). “Sarajevo: communiqué, 24 June,” (2005).69 for instance: Pic Steering board Political directors, “brussels: communiqué, 3 february,” (2005); “Sarajevo: communiqué, 24 June.” (2005)70 Pic Steering board Political directors, “Sarajevo: communiqué, 24 June.” (2005).71 agović, Mehmed, “bosnia-Herzegovina: High commissioner candidate interview,” RFE/RL, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 18 November, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1063074.html 2005.

34




economic reforms were a different story and the Hirep acted as a facilitator of the reform only, consistent with his statements at the time he assumed the office. as the opening of the negotiations on the Saa with the eu was contingent on passing these reforms, the Pic and the Hirep stepped back to encourage bosnian authorities to pass these reforms themselves if they wanted to eventually join the eu. The idea was to promote state-building with a carrot rather than a stick.

Justice and economy remained high on the agenda throughout ashdown’s mandate but it soon became clear that there was another controversial issue that the Hirep wanted to tackle which was not elaborated in his tagline Posao i Pravda (Jobs and Justice) – namely, prosecution of war criminals.

at the end of 2002, seven years after the end of the war in bosnia and the signing of the dayton Peace agreement, in which parties promised to bring to justice those that had committed the most heinous crimes, several individuals indicted for war crimes were still at large. These included radovan Karadzic, the first president of republika Srpska, and ratko Mladic, the chief of Staff of the army of the republika Srpska during the war. The oHr and the Pic had previously been urging local parties to cooperate fully with the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ictY) but neither westendorp nor Petritsch had used their bonn powers to pass any decisions relating to individuals indicted for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia.

The first campaign launched to undermine the support network allowing Karadzic to evade arrest took place on 7 March 2003. The Hirep designated two individuals and two companies as being obstructionist.63 in another campaign on 7 July 2003, ashdown ordered the freezing of bank accounts of fourteen more people, including Karadzic’s immediate family, and removed two of them from their official positions in state and local bodies.64 on 10 february 2004 he continued his sweep by freezing bank accounts of ten individuals and dismissing from public office four of them, but the biggest campaign took place in the space of two days over summer 2004. on 30 June and 1 July ashdown removed, and conditionally removed, 59 individuals,65 blocked bank accounts of Serbian democratic Party (Srpska Demokratska Stranka, SdS) and required the SdS to establish a single account in order to increase transparency.66 The targets of these campaigns were bosnian Serbs, who were also the most dissatisfied with the international engagement in bosnia.

63 oHr, “Press release: High representative acts to undermine Karadzic Support network, 7 March 2003, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=2 9389 “ (2003).64 oHr, “Press release: High representative announces further action in The fight against crime, 7 July 2003, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id =30230,” (2003).65 oHr, “Press release: list of removed and conditionally removed officials by the High representative, 30 June 2004, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content _id =32748,” (2004).66 ashdown, Paddy, “decision blocking all bank accounts Held by and/or in the name of the SdS and requiring the SdS to establish one bank account, 30 June, http://www.ohr.int/decisions/war-crimes-decs/default.asp?content_id=32752 “ (2004).

This sweeping move to bring war criminals to justice coincided with a wider international campaign; both the eu and the uS had, around that time, also been issuing blacklists of individuals from bosnia for whom travel to their respective countries was banned.67 in statements issued by the Pic Steering board, failure to cooperate with the ictY and the slow progress of defence reform were described as the main obstacles for bosnian alignment with nato’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme.68 Police reform (together with economic reforms and strengthening of the rule of law) was deemed to be the main test for the signing of the Saa with the eu.69

in 2005, for the first time, the Pic Steering board clearly expressed its intention to close down the oHr and issued a recommendation that the position of the High representative be replaced by an eu Special representative. This step would have to be endorsed by the un Security council. at this time the euSr would take over the work of the Hirep but would not have the powers the Hirep holds. Therefore, the Steering board wanted to ensure that transition would not happen before biH was capable of driving its own state-building policy. according to their own statements, one clear indicator of this would be the point at which bosnia and Herzegovina would qualify for negotiations on the Saa with the eu.70 as bosnia started negotiations on 25 november 2005, it was expected that ashdown’s successor, dr christian Schwarz-Schilling, would be the last person to be double-hatted as the Hirep and the euSr.

state-builDing without Directioneven before Schwarz-Shilling was appointed, it was clear that he would take the

oHr in a new direction. in an interview with radio free europe/ radio liberty he was remarkably open about the difference between him and ashdown:

RFE/RL: what will be your style?

Schwarz-Schilling: well, i will listen to the people, i will listen to the bosnian politicians. Then i will try to convince them to come to a decision by themselves and then everybody has to follow up that.71

Schwarz-Schilling also underlined that he wished the oHr to be reduced step by

67 alic, anes, “washington blacklists bosnian nationalists. transitions online, 6 September, http://www.ceeol.com,” 2003. 68 for instance: Pic Steering board Political directors, “Sarajevo: declaration, 12 June,” (2003). “brussels: communiqué, 11 december,” (2003). “Sarajevo: communiqué, 1 april,” (2004). “Sarajevo: communiqué, 24 June,” (2005).69 for instance: Pic Steering board Political directors, “brussels: communiqué, 3 february,” (2005); “Sarajevo: communiqué, 24 June.” (2005)70 Pic Steering board Political directors, “Sarajevo: communiqué, 24 June.” (2005).71 agović, Mehmed, “bosnia-Herzegovina: High commissioner candidate interview,” RFE/RL, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 18 November, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1063074.html 2005.

35




step and expressed his hope that it would be completely dissolved by 2007.72 during the meetings with international officials and in public statements Schwarz-Schilling emphasized that supporting bosnia and Herzegovina’s progress towards the eu and nato would be a key priority during his mandate. However, in order for bosnia to achieve that, he as the Hirep must take a step back and stop intervening.73

at a meeting with the Pic Steering board in March 2006, Schwarz-Schilling em-phasized that the oHr would no longer take on new commitments and would focus instead on meeting existing tasks.74 at the same meeting the Hirep also set out his plans for new measures to address the status of officials removed from their positions. on his last day in office ashdown lifted the ban to hold office for seven individuals. Schwarz-Schilling’s plan was much more expansive. besides passing 13 more deci-sions explicitly allowing individuals to hold public offices and positions within par-ties by the end of 2006, he also issued two more general decisions limiting the scope of the ban.75 both of these decisions allowed individuals that had previously been barred from running for positions to return again to political life under specific pro-visions. neither of the decisions applied to individuals that were banned from office for reasons related to non-compliance with the ictY, but these pardoned politicians in some way or another contravened international state-building project at the time when they were removed.

This limited amnesty indicated Schwarz-Schilling’s conviction that biH citizens themselves would and must make responsible choices about who they would elect to public offices and who they wanted to be in the driving seat of the state-building project. on 24 May 2006, the Hirep identified a set of laws that biH parliamentarians should had enacted in the hundred days before the october 2006 general elections in order to demonstrate that they were serious about improving the lives of citizens and that would take bosnia and Herzegovina further along the path of euro-atlantic inte-gration.76 while the Pic Steering board welcomed the conduct of the elections it also noted that not one law of the reform agenda was passed in the intervening period. by contrast, several bills that undermined the fiscal stability of the country were either passed or in the process of being adopted.77 Schwarz-Schilling’s plan to give bosnian politicians a chance to take ownership of their country’s future was failing.

72 ibid.73 Schwarz-Schilling, christian “High representative’s tv address to citizens of biH, Sarajevo, 31 January, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=36501 “ (2006).74 Pic Steering board Political directors, “vienna: communiqué, 15 March,” (2006).75 Schwarz-Schilling, christian, “decision further limiting the scope of the ban from public office in the removal decisions issued by the High representative, 4 april, http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?content_id=36919 “ (2006); “decision lifting the ban from office within political parties in the removal decisions issued by the High representative, 7 July, http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?content_id=37615,” (2006).76 oHr, “Press release: 100 days to Make History, 24 May, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=37226,” (2006).77 Pic Steering board Political directors, “Sarajevo: communiqué, 20 october,” (2006).

by the end of 2006 a lot of needed reforms were still unfinished but biH had man-aged to secure an invitation to join nato’s PfP programme.78 Preparations for the oHr closure were continuing, in line with the Pic Steering board decision of June 2006 to close the office at the end of June 2007.79 but disagreements among key states over the closure started showing. by the end of January 2007 it was already clear that Schwarz-Schilling would be vacating his position come June 2007. in an interview he gave to der Spiegel around the time he announced his resignation the High repre-sentative said he was quitting because of disagreements with the Pic members over the level of intervention needed from the Hirep.80 in a personal interview in august 2009 he acknowledged that this decision was not entirely voluntary and that the uS and the uK had made it clear that his mandate would not be renewed if he continued refusing to use bonn powers.81 He mentioned in both interviews that the uS was the main actor that demanded tougher action. The Hirep also explained that the uS had originally wanted to enable reforms by the end of June 2007, through a policy of stronger intervention, which would have made it possible for the oHr to finish its mission and close down its activities.

according to Schwarz-Schilling by January 2007, the bush administration, largely under pressure from the new democratic congress, had come around to agree to ex-tend the mission and preserve international special powers for one more year.82 Some of my interviewees argued that Schwarz-Schilling’s analysis of uS domestic politics, might have not been the most accurate one, but they concurred that the High repre-sentative was at odds with the uS and the uK throughout most of his mandate. at a meeting in february 2007 the Pic Steering board officially decided to push back the closure of the oHr to 30 June 2008, but did not renew Schwarz-Schilling’s mandate. russia did not join the consensus and has, ever since, publically expressed the opinion that the oHr should be closed down immediately.

during Schwarz-Shilling’s mandate it became obvious that the consensus within the international community regarding how the state-building in bosnia and Herze-govina should take place broke down. The uS and turkey were pushing for outside intervention and the use of bonn powers when it came to the key reforms. russia thought it was time to leave the process to local politicians. eu members were scat-tered somewhere in between both sides, counting on the conditionality of the eu accession process to advance the transition of the country.

at the last Pic Steering board meeting before Schwarz-Schilling left his office, the

78 nato, “Signatures of Partnership for Peace framework document,” http://www.nato.int/pfp/sig-cntr.htm.79 Pic Steering board Political directors, “Sarajevo: communiqué, 23 June,” (2006); “brussels: communiqué, 7 december,” (2006).80 der Spiegel, “Zunehmend ungeduldig,” Der Spiegel, 29 January 2007. 81 “telephone interview with dr christian Schwarz-Schilling, 18 august, cambridge and büdingen.,” (2009).82 ibid.

36




step and expressed his hope that it would be completely dissolved by 2007.72 during the meetings with international officials and in public statements Schwarz-Schilling emphasized that supporting bosnia and Herzegovina’s progress towards the eu and nato would be a key priority during his mandate. However, in order for bosnia to achieve that, he as the Hirep must take a step back and stop intervening.73

at a meeting with the Pic Steering board in March 2006, Schwarz-Schilling em-phasized that the oHr would no longer take on new commitments and would focus instead on meeting existing tasks.74 at the same meeting the Hirep also set out his plans for new measures to address the status of officials removed from their positions. on his last day in office ashdown lifted the ban to hold office for seven individuals. Schwarz-Schilling’s plan was much more expansive. besides passing 13 more deci-sions explicitly allowing individuals to hold public offices and positions within par-ties by the end of 2006, he also issued two more general decisions limiting the scope of the ban.75 both of these decisions allowed individuals that had previously been barred from running for positions to return again to political life under specific pro-visions. neither of the decisions applied to individuals that were banned from office for reasons related to non-compliance with the ictY, but these pardoned politicians in some way or another contravened international state-building project at the time when they were removed.

This limited amnesty indicated Schwarz-Schilling’s conviction that biH citizens themselves would and must make responsible choices about who they would elect to public offices and who they wanted to be in the driving seat of the state-building project. on 24 May 2006, the Hirep identified a set of laws that biH parliamentarians should had enacted in the hundred days before the october 2006 general elections in order to demonstrate that they were serious about improving the lives of citizens and that would take bosnia and Herzegovina further along the path of euro-atlantic inte-gration.76 while the Pic Steering board welcomed the conduct of the elections it also noted that not one law of the reform agenda was passed in the intervening period. by contrast, several bills that undermined the fiscal stability of the country were either passed or in the process of being adopted.77 Schwarz-Schilling’s plan to give bosnian politicians a chance to take ownership of their country’s future was failing.

72 ibid.73 Schwarz-Schilling, christian “High representative’s tv address to citizens of biH, Sarajevo, 31 January, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=36501 “ (2006).74 Pic Steering board Political directors, “vienna: communiqué, 15 March,” (2006).75 Schwarz-Schilling, christian, “decision further limiting the scope of the ban from public office in the removal decisions issued by the High representative, 4 april, http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?content_id=36919 “ (2006); “decision lifting the ban from office within political parties in the removal decisions issued by the High representative, 7 July, http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?content_id=37615,” (2006).76 oHr, “Press release: 100 days to Make History, 24 May, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=37226,” (2006).77 Pic Steering board Political directors, “Sarajevo: communiqué, 20 october,” (2006).

by the end of 2006 a lot of needed reforms were still unfinished but biH had man-aged to secure an invitation to join nato’s PfP programme.78 Preparations for the oHr closure were continuing, in line with the Pic Steering board decision of June 2006 to close the office at the end of June 2007.79 but disagreements among key states over the closure started showing. by the end of January 2007 it was already clear that Schwarz-Schilling would be vacating his position come June 2007. in an interview he gave to der Spiegel around the time he announced his resignation the High repre-sentative said he was quitting because of disagreements with the Pic members over the level of intervention needed from the Hirep.80 in a personal interview in august 2009 he acknowledged that this decision was not entirely voluntary and that the uS and the uK had made it clear that his mandate would not be renewed if he continued refusing to use bonn powers.81 He mentioned in both interviews that the uS was the main actor that demanded tougher action. The Hirep also explained that the uS had originally wanted to enable reforms by the end of June 2007, through a policy of stronger intervention, which would have made it possible for the oHr to finish its mission and close down its activities.

according to Schwarz-Schilling by January 2007, the bush administration, largely under pressure from the new democratic congress, had come around to agree to ex-tend the mission and preserve international special powers for one more year.82 Some of my interviewees argued that Schwarz-Schilling’s analysis of uS domestic politics, might have not been the most accurate one, but they concurred that the High repre-sentative was at odds with the uS and the uK throughout most of his mandate. at a meeting in february 2007 the Pic Steering board officially decided to push back the closure of the oHr to 30 June 2008, but did not renew Schwarz-Schilling’s mandate. russia did not join the consensus and has, ever since, publically expressed the opinion that the oHr should be closed down immediately.

during Schwarz-Shilling’s mandate it became obvious that the consensus within the international community regarding how the state-building in bosnia and Herze-govina should take place broke down. The uS and turkey were pushing for outside intervention and the use of bonn powers when it came to the key reforms. russia thought it was time to leave the process to local politicians. eu members were scat-tered somewhere in between both sides, counting on the conditionality of the eu accession process to advance the transition of the country.

at the last Pic Steering board meeting before Schwarz-Schilling left his office, the

78 nato, “Signatures of Partnership for Peace framework document,” http://www.nato.int/pfp/sig-cntr.htm.79 Pic Steering board Political directors, “Sarajevo: communiqué, 23 June,” (2006); “brussels: communiqué, 7 december,” (2006).80 der Spiegel, “Zunehmend ungeduldig,” Der Spiegel, 29 January 2007. 81 “telephone interview with dr christian Schwarz-Schilling, 18 august, cambridge and büdingen.,” (2009).82 ibid.

37




Steering board noted that since april 2006 there had been a near total deadlock in the peace implementation and the delivery of reforms required for the Saa with the eu.83

when Slovak Miroslav lajčák succeeded Schwarz-Schilling it was unclear from his public positions whether he was going to bring any radical policy change to the oHr. unlike previous Hireps who had been quite clear in identifying their objectives in their first public appearances, lajčák was more cautious. The sole indication of a possible change was his affirmation that should it be necessary to use bonn powers in the interest of moving biH forward, he would not hesitate to do so.84 The new Hirep held a number of meetings with political leaders over the summer and by September 2007 he was prepared to outline his assessment of the situation and priorities. He specifically mentioned police reform as his first priority for bosnia, followed by constitutional reform, justice and war crimes and the list of 27 other requirements bosnia and Herzegovina had been given before it could sign the Saa with the eu.85 all the priorities were clearly couched in the eu rhetoric. after biH parties adopted principles guiding the police reform (Mostar declaration on Police reform), the eu on 4 december 2007 initialled the Saa with the country.

in february 2008 the Pic Steering board reiterated that both the transition from the oHr to the euSr and local ownership remained the goals.86 in order for this transition to happen, it agreed that the biH authorities must deliver on the most critical issues contained in the oHr work Plan. for this purpose, the Pic Steering board formulated five objectives and two conditions that would need to be fulfilled prior to the transition. The five objectives were: apportionment of property between state and other levels of government, resolution of defence property, brčko final award, fiscal sustainability and entrenchment of the rule of law. The two conditions were the signing of the Saa and a positive assessment of the situation in biH by the Pic Steering board--based on full compliance with the dayton Peace agreement. while all the objectives had clearly defined benchmarks and the signing of the Saa could be ascertained, the assessment of compliance or non-compliance with the dayton accords remained based on the Steering board’s perception of the existence of rhetoric or action that would threaten or violate the agreement. in contrast to the communiqué from february 2007, which specified the Pic Steering board’s plan to close down the oHr end of June 2008, the february 2008 declaration did not contain a clear timeline for the oHr’s closure and extended its mandate until the Pic Steering board was satisfied that the five objectives and the two conditions were met.

83 Pic Steering board Political directors, “Sarajevo: declaration, 19 June,” (2007).84 lajčák, Miroslav, “tv address to citizens of biH, Sarajevo, 2 July, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=40108 “ (2007).85 lajčák, Miroslav, “Speech to the Parliamentary assembly of bosnia and Herzegovina in Joint Session, 6 September, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=40431,” (2007).86 Pic Steering board Political directors, “Sarajevo: declaration, 27 february,” (2008).

The Saa with the eu was signed on 16 June 200887 and a number of other progresses were made, but several areas remained of concern for the Pic Steering board and the Hirep. by the time lajčák left for a new post as the foreign Minister of republic of Slovakia, beginning of 2009, authorities in republika Srpska were still calling for a secession, trying to unilaterally withdraw from previously agreed reforms and had repeatedly failed to reply to instructions and requests by the Hirep to secure access to needed documents. The federation authorities had disregarded the relevant responsibilities of the state level High Judicial and Prosecutorial council and a number of reforms had come to a complete halt.88 Therefore, in March 2009, amid loud complaints -- coming especially from bosnian Serb politicians -- the Pic Steering board appointed austrian ambassador valentin inzko as the new Hirep.89

state-builDing from Dayton to saa anD beyonD

The role the international community played in state-building in bosnia and Herzegovina is unprecedented in the post-Second world war world. This contribution shows that although at dayton there was no consensus among key international players on what the scope of external state-building for the country should be, the mission gradually expanded to include virtually all facets of political and economic life in bosnia and Herzegovina. Priorities and visions of the international community therefore greatly circumscribed the opportunities for the local subjects to translate their visions of state and nation into practice. Moreover, the lack of initial consensus on the role of external powers meant that the mission and its own priorities to a large extent developed ad hoc and on the ground.

The role of locally based international implementers was of crucial importance for the development of international priorities and state-building strategies. appoint-ment of a new High representative presented a rupture in external state-building, as individuals brought along new state-building approaches and a new set of priorities. The expansion of the state-building vision was especially evident during the man-dates of wolfgang Petritsch and Paddy ashdown, the two High representatives that enjoyed the most support from the international community at large. The honey-moon period for the Hirep and the Pic reached its peak during ashdown’s time and the office of the High representative had an opportunity to develop a coherent and more aggressive state-building strategy, something that previous High representa-tives would have problems achieving. Subsequent High representatives enjoyed less trust from the countries of the Peace implementation council, making it difficult for them to coordinate and manage such an expansive mission, deliver to their interna-tional underwriters and at the same time attempt to transfer the primary respon-

87 council of the european union, “council regulation (ec) no 594/2008, 16 June, official Journal of the european union l 169/1, 30 June,” (2008).88 Pic Steering board Political directors, Pic Steering board Political directors, “Sarajevo: communiqué, 26 March,” (2009). 89 Pic Steering board ambassadors, “Sarajevo: Statement, 13 March,” (2009).

38




Steering board noted that since april 2006 there had been a near total deadlock in the peace implementation and the delivery of reforms required for the Saa with the eu.83

when Slovak Miroslav lajčák succeeded Schwarz-Schilling it was unclear from his public positions whether he was going to bring any radical policy change to the oHr. unlike previous Hireps who had been quite clear in identifying their objectives in their first public appearances, lajčák was more cautious. The sole indication of a possible change was his affirmation that should it be necessary to use bonn powers in the interest of moving biH forward, he would not hesitate to do so.84 The new Hirep held a number of meetings with political leaders over the summer and by September 2007 he was prepared to outline his assessment of the situation and priorities. He specifically mentioned police reform as his first priority for bosnia, followed by constitutional reform, justice and war crimes and the list of 27 other requirements bosnia and Herzegovina had been given before it could sign the Saa with the eu.85 all the priorities were clearly couched in the eu rhetoric. after biH parties adopted principles guiding the police reform (Mostar declaration on Police reform), the eu on 4 december 2007 initialled the Saa with the country.

in february 2008 the Pic Steering board reiterated that both the transition from the oHr to the euSr and local ownership remained the goals.86 in order for this transition to happen, it agreed that the biH authorities must deliver on the most critical issues contained in the oHr work Plan. for this purpose, the Pic Steering board formulated five objectives and two conditions that would need to be fulfilled prior to the transition. The five objectives were: apportionment of property between state and other levels of government, resolution of defence property, brčko final award, fiscal sustainability and entrenchment of the rule of law. The two conditions were the signing of the Saa and a positive assessment of the situation in biH by the Pic Steering board--based on full compliance with the dayton Peace agreement. while all the objectives had clearly defined benchmarks and the signing of the Saa could be ascertained, the assessment of compliance or non-compliance with the dayton accords remained based on the Steering board’s perception of the existence of rhetoric or action that would threaten or violate the agreement. in contrast to the communiqué from february 2007, which specified the Pic Steering board’s plan to close down the oHr end of June 2008, the february 2008 declaration did not contain a clear timeline for the oHr’s closure and extended its mandate until the Pic Steering board was satisfied that the five objectives and the two conditions were met.

83 Pic Steering board Political directors, “Sarajevo: declaration, 19 June,” (2007).84 lajčák, Miroslav, “tv address to citizens of biH, Sarajevo, 2 July, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=40108 “ (2007).85 lajčák, Miroslav, “Speech to the Parliamentary assembly of bosnia and Herzegovina in Joint Session, 6 September, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=40431,” (2007).86 Pic Steering board Political directors, “Sarajevo: declaration, 27 february,” (2008).

The Saa with the eu was signed on 16 June 200887 and a number of other progresses were made, but several areas remained of concern for the Pic Steering board and the Hirep. by the time lajčák left for a new post as the foreign Minister of republic of Slovakia, beginning of 2009, authorities in republika Srpska were still calling for a secession, trying to unilaterally withdraw from previously agreed reforms and had repeatedly failed to reply to instructions and requests by the Hirep to secure access to needed documents. The federation authorities had disregarded the relevant responsibilities of the state level High Judicial and Prosecutorial council and a number of reforms had come to a complete halt.88 Therefore, in March 2009, amid loud complaints -- coming especially from bosnian Serb politicians -- the Pic Steering board appointed austrian ambassador valentin inzko as the new Hirep.89

state-builDing from Dayton to saa anD beyonD

The role the international community played in state-building in bosnia and Herzegovina is unprecedented in the post-Second world war world. This contribution shows that although at dayton there was no consensus among key international players on what the scope of external state-building for the country should be, the mission gradually expanded to include virtually all facets of political and economic life in bosnia and Herzegovina. Priorities and visions of the international community therefore greatly circumscribed the opportunities for the local subjects to translate their visions of state and nation into practice. Moreover, the lack of initial consensus on the role of external powers meant that the mission and its own priorities to a large extent developed ad hoc and on the ground.

The role of locally based international implementers was of crucial importance for the development of international priorities and state-building strategies. appoint-ment of a new High representative presented a rupture in external state-building, as individuals brought along new state-building approaches and a new set of priorities. The expansion of the state-building vision was especially evident during the man-dates of wolfgang Petritsch and Paddy ashdown, the two High representatives that enjoyed the most support from the international community at large. The honey-moon period for the Hirep and the Pic reached its peak during ashdown’s time and the office of the High representative had an opportunity to develop a coherent and more aggressive state-building strategy, something that previous High representa-tives would have problems achieving. Subsequent High representatives enjoyed less trust from the countries of the Peace implementation council, making it difficult for them to coordinate and manage such an expansive mission, deliver to their interna-tional underwriters and at the same time attempt to transfer the primary respon-

87 council of the european union, “council regulation (ec) no 594/2008, 16 June, official Journal of the european union l 169/1, 30 June,” (2008).88 Pic Steering board Political directors, Pic Steering board Political directors, “Sarajevo: communiqué, 26 March,” (2009). 89 Pic Steering board ambassadors, “Sarajevo: Statement, 13 March,” (2009).

39




sibility for state-building to local institutions. Since Schwarz-Schilling the external state-building has been confronted with obstacles and as one of my interviewees at the oHr has put it: “during ashdown’s time the oHr was above local politics, now we have become a part of it,” implying that the oHr has lost its power. while external state-building certainly is not the same as it was during ashdown’s time, it continues to limit the choices of local actors on what kind of state people of bosnia and Herze-govina could live in. not even the signing of the Stabilisation and association agree-ment changed that.

BiBliography

Agović, Mehmed. “Bosnia-Herzegovina: High Commissioner Candidate interview.” RFE/RL, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 18 November, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1063074.html 2005.

Alic, Anes. “Washington Blacklists Bosnian Nationalists. Transitions Online, 6 September, http://www.ceeol.com.” 2003.

Ashdown, Paddy. “Inaugural Speech, BiH State Parliament, Sarajevo, 27 May, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=8417.” 2002.

—. “Speech, BIH State Parliament, Sarajevo, 17 December, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=28736.” 2002.

—. “Decision Blocking All Bank Accounts Held by and/or in the Name of the SDS and Requiring the SDS to Establish one Bank Account, 30 June, http://www.ohr.int/decisions/war-crimes-decs/default.asp?content_id=32752 “, 2004.

—. Swords and Ploughshares: Bringing peace to the 21st century. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2007.

BBC. “Karadzic Family Assets Frozen, 7 July, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/europe/3051754.stm.” 2003.

Bildt, Carl. “First Report of the High Representative to the United Nations Secretary General, 14 March.” 1996.

—. “Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations On Compliance with the Peace Agreement, 23 March.” 1996.

—. Peace journey: The struggle for peace in Bosnia. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1999.

Caplan, Richard D. “International authority and state building: The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Global Governance 10, no. 1 (2004): 53-65.

—. International governance of war-torn territories: rule and reconstruction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Chandler, David. Empire in denial: the politics of state-building. London: Pluto, 2006.

—. “State-building in Bosnia: The Limits of Informal Trusteeship.” International Journal of Peace Studies 11, no. 1 (2006): 17-38.

Chesterman, Simon. You, the people: the United Nations, transitional administration, and state-building. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference held at Lancaster House, London, 8 December 1995.

Council of Europe. “Comments on the ‘Discussion paper on the Selection Process for the Interim High Judicial Council’, March, http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_europeanraj_judicialreform_id_3.pdf “, 2003.

Council of the European Union. “Council Regulation (EC) No 594/2008, 16 June, Official Journal of the European Union L 169/1, 30 June.” 2008.

Cousens, Elizabeth M. “From Missed Opportunities to Overcompensation: Implementing the Dayton Agreement on Bosnia.” In Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements. , edited by Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens, 531-66. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2002.

Daalder, Ivo H. Getting to Dayton: the making of America’s Bosnia policy. Washington: Brookings Institute Press, 2000.

Der Spiegel. “Zunehmend ungeduldig.” Der Spiegel, 29 January 2007, 93.

Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. “Neotrusteeship and the problem of weak states.” International Security 28, no. 4 (2004): 5-43.

Fukuyama, Francis. “The imperative of state-building.” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 2 (2004): 17-31.

Goodby, James E. Europe undivided: The new logic of peace in US-Russian relations. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999.

40




sibility for state-building to local institutions. Since Schwarz-Schilling the external state-building has been confronted with obstacles and as one of my interviewees at the oHr has put it: “during ashdown’s time the oHr was above local politics, now we have become a part of it,” implying that the oHr has lost its power. while external state-building certainly is not the same as it was during ashdown’s time, it continues to limit the choices of local actors on what kind of state people of bosnia and Herze-govina could live in. not even the signing of the Stabilisation and association agree-ment changed that.

BiBliography

Agović, Mehmed. “Bosnia-Herzegovina: High Commissioner Candidate interview.” RFE/RL, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 18 November, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1063074.html 2005.

Alic, Anes. “Washington Blacklists Bosnian Nationalists. Transitions Online, 6 September, http://www.ceeol.com.” 2003.

Ashdown, Paddy. “Inaugural Speech, BiH State Parliament, Sarajevo, 27 May, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=8417.” 2002.

—. “Speech, BIH State Parliament, Sarajevo, 17 December, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=28736.” 2002.

—. “Decision Blocking All Bank Accounts Held by and/or in the Name of the SDS and Requiring the SDS to Establish one Bank Account, 30 June, http://www.ohr.int/decisions/war-crimes-decs/default.asp?content_id=32752 “, 2004.

—. Swords and Ploughshares: Bringing peace to the 21st century. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2007.

BBC. “Karadzic Family Assets Frozen, 7 July, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/europe/3051754.stm.” 2003.

Bildt, Carl. “First Report of the High Representative to the United Nations Secretary General, 14 March.” 1996.

—. “Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations On Compliance with the Peace Agreement, 23 March.” 1996.

—. Peace journey: The struggle for peace in Bosnia. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1999.

Caplan, Richard D. “International authority and state building: The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Global Governance 10, no. 1 (2004): 53-65.

—. International governance of war-torn territories: rule and reconstruction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Chandler, David. Empire in denial: the politics of state-building. London: Pluto, 2006.

—. “State-building in Bosnia: The Limits of Informal Trusteeship.” International Journal of Peace Studies 11, no. 1 (2006): 17-38.

Chesterman, Simon. You, the people: the United Nations, transitional administration, and state-building. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference held at Lancaster House, London, 8 December 1995.

Council of Europe. “Comments on the ‘Discussion paper on the Selection Process for the Interim High Judicial Council’, March, http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_europeanraj_judicialreform_id_3.pdf “, 2003.

Council of the European Union. “Council Regulation (EC) No 594/2008, 16 June, Official Journal of the European Union L 169/1, 30 June.” 2008.

Cousens, Elizabeth M. “From Missed Opportunities to Overcompensation: Implementing the Dayton Agreement on Bosnia.” In Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements. , edited by Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens, 531-66. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2002.

Daalder, Ivo H. Getting to Dayton: the making of America’s Bosnia policy. Washington: Brookings Institute Press, 2000.

Der Spiegel. “Zunehmend ungeduldig.” Der Spiegel, 29 January 2007, 93.

Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. “Neotrusteeship and the problem of weak states.” International Security 28, no. 4 (2004): 5-43.

Fukuyama, Francis. “The imperative of state-building.” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 2 (2004): 17-31.

Goodby, James E. Europe undivided: The new logic of peace in US-Russian relations. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999.

41




Goodhand, Jonathan. “Aiding violence or building peace? The role of international aid in Afghanistan.” Third World Quarterly 23, no. 5 (2002): 837-59.

Holbrooke, Richard. To end a war: Sarajevo to Dayton: An inside story: New York: Random House, 1999.

International Crisis Group. “Doing Democracy a Disservice: 1998 Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” In Europe Report No. 42, 1998.

Kaldor, Mary. “Security Structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” In Governing insecurity: Democratic control of military and security establishments in transitional democracies, edited by Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham, 205-31. London: Zed Books, 2003.

Knaus, Gerald, and Felix Martin. “Travails of the European Raj.” Journal of Democracy 14, no. 3 (2003): 60-74.

Krasner, Stephen D. “Sharing sovereignty: New institutions for collapsed and failing states.” International Security 29, no. 2 (2004): 85-120.

Lajčák, Miroslav. “Speech to the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Joint Session, 6 September, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=40431.” 2007.

—. “TV Address to Citizens of BiH, Sarajevo, 2 July, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=40108 “, 2007.

Majstrović, Danijela. “Construction of Europeanization in the High Representative’s discourse in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Discourse & Society 18, no. 5 (2007): 627-51.

McMahon, Patrice C. “Rebuilding Bosnia: A Model to Emulate or to Avoid?” Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 4 (2004): 569-93.

NATO. “Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document.” http://www.nato.int/pfp/sig-cntr.htm.

Neville-Jones, Pauline. “Dayton, IFOR and alliance relations in Bosnia.” Survival 38, no. 4 (1996): 45-65.

—. “Rethinking the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, keynote conference speech, Senate House, Centre for South-East European Studies, School of Slavonic and East European Studies/University College London, 18 June.” 2004.

OHR. “Office of the High Representative Bulletin, No. 62, 11 October.” 1997.

—. “Press Release: High Representative Acts to Undermine Karadzic Support Network, 7 March 2003, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=2 9389 “, 2003.

—. “Press Release: High Representative Announces Further Action In The Fight Against Crime, 7 July 2003, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id =30230.” 2003.

—. “Press Release: List of removed and conditionally removed officials by the High Representative, 30 June 2004, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content _id =32748.” 2004.

—. “Press Release: 100 Days to Make History, 24 May, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=37226.” 2006.

Paris, Roland. At war’s end: Building peace after civil conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Paris, Roland, and Timothy D. Sisk. The dilemmas of statebuilding: Confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations. New York: Routledge, 2009.

Perry, Valery. “Bosnia, an Intellectual Raj.” Transitions Online, 24 July, http://www.tol.org/client/article/10208-bosnia-an-intellectual-raj.html, 2003.

Petritsch, Wolfgang. Bosnien und Herzegowina: Fuenf Jahre nach Dayton: Hat der Frieden eine Chance? Klagenfurt: Wieser Verlag, 2001.

PIC Main Meeting. “Florence: Chairman’s Conclusions, 13 June.” 1996.

—. “London: Bosnia and Herzegovina 1997, Making Peace Work, 5 December.” 1996.

—. “Bonn: Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998: Self-sustaining Structures, 10 December.” 1997.

—. “Brussels: Declaration, 24 May.” 2000.

PIC Steering Board Ambassadors. “Sarajevo: Statement, 13 March.” 2009.

PIC Steering Board and Presidency and the COM Chairs. “Sarajevo: Joint Statement, 6 November.” 1997.

PIC Steering Board Ministerial Meeting. “Paris: Conclusions, Guiding Principles of the Civilian Consolidation Plan, 14 November.” 1996.

—. “Sintra: Political Declaration, Communiqué, 30 May.” 1997.

PIC Steering Board Political Directors. “Sarajevo: Meeting, 6 October.” 1998.

—. “Brussels: Communiqué, 7 December.” 2000.

—. “Brussels: Communiqué, 28 February.” 2002.

—. “Sarajevo: Communiqué, 31 July.” 2002.


—. “Brussels: Communiqué, 28 March.” 2003.

—. “Sarajevo: Declaration, 12 June.” 2003.

—. “Sarajevo: Communiqué, 1 April.” 2004.


—. “Sarajevo: Communiqué, 24 June.” 2005.


—. “Sarajevo: Communiqué, 20 October.” 2006.


—. “Vienna: Communiqué, 15 March.” 2006.


—. “Sarajevo: Declaration, 27 February.” 2008.

—. “Sarajevo: Communiqué, 26 March.” 2009.

Rosenau, James N. The scientific study of foreign policy. London: Pinter, 1980.

Russell, Bruce, Harvey Starr, and David Kinsella.World Politics: The Menu for Choice. 9th ed: Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing, 2009. 9th.

Schwarz-Schilling, Christian. “Decision further limiting the scope of the ban from public office in the removal decisions issued by the High Representative, 4 April, http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?content_id=36919 “, 2006.

—. “Decision lifting the ban from office within political parties in the removal decisions issued by the High Representative, 7 July, http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?content_id=37615.” 2006.

Schwarz-Schilling, Christian “High Representative’s TV Address to Citizens of BiH, Sarajevo, 31 January, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=36501 “ (2006).

Sharp, Jane M. O. “Dayton report card.” International Security 22, no. 3 (1997): 101-37.

Solioz, Christophe, and Wolfgang Petritsch. “The fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina: an exclusive interview of Christophe Solioz with Wolfgang Petritsch.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 5, no. 3 (2003): 355-73.

“Telephone interview with Dr Christian Schwarz-Schilling, 18 August, Cambridge and Büdingen.”. 2009.

The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, initialled in Dayton, Ohio on 21 November 1995, signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 (Dayton Peace Agreement, Dayton Accords).

Traynor, Ian “Ashdown Running Bosnia like a Raj.” The Guardian, 5 July, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/jul/05/politics.foreignpolicy, 2003.

Westendorp, Carlos. “Decision Imposing the Law on Citizenship of BiH, 16 December.” 1997.

Wilde, Ralph. The Administration of Territory by International Organizations: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

42




Goodhand, Jonathan. “Aiding violence or building peace? The role of international aid in Afghanistan.” Third World Quarterly 23, no. 5 (2002): 837-59.

Holbrooke, Richard. To end a war: Sarajevo to Dayton: An inside story: New York: Random House, 1999.

International Crisis Group. “Doing Democracy a Disservice: 1998 Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” In Europe Report No. 42, 1998.

Kaldor, Mary. “Security Structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” In Governing insecurity: Democratic control of military and security establishments in transitional democracies, edited by Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham, 205-31. London: Zed Books, 2003.

Knaus, Gerald, and Felix Martin. “Travails of the European Raj.” Journal of Democracy 14, no. 3 (2003): 60-74.

Krasner, Stephen D. “Sharing sovereignty: New institutions for collapsed and failing states.” International Security 29, no. 2 (2004): 85-120.

Lajčák, Miroslav. “Speech to the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Joint Session, 6 September, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=40431.” 2007.

—. “TV Address to Citizens of BiH, Sarajevo, 2 July, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=40108 “, 2007.

Majstrović, Danijela. “Construction of Europeanization in the High Representative’s discourse in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Discourse & Society 18, no. 5 (2007): 627-51.

McMahon, Patrice C. “Rebuilding Bosnia: A Model to Emulate or to Avoid?” Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 4 (2004): 569-93.

NATO. “Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document.” http://www.nato.int/pfp/sig-cntr.htm.

Neville-Jones, Pauline. “Dayton, IFOR and alliance relations in Bosnia.” Survival 38, no. 4 (1996): 45-65.

—. “Rethinking the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, keynote conference speech, Senate House, Centre for South-East European Studies, School of Slavonic and East European Studies/University College London, 18 June.” 2004.

OHR. “Office of the High Representative Bulletin, No. 62, 11 October.” 1997.

—. “Press Release: High Representative Acts to Undermine Karadzic Support Network, 7 March 2003, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=2 9389 “, 2003.

—. “Press Release: High Representative Announces Further Action In The Fight Against Crime, 7 July 2003, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id =30230.” 2003.

—. “Press Release: List of removed and conditionally removed officials by the High Representative, 30 June 2004, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content _id =32748.” 2004.

—. “Press Release: 100 Days to Make History, 24 May, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=37226.” 2006.

Paris, Roland. At war’s end: Building peace after civil conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Paris, Roland, and Timothy D. Sisk. The dilemmas of statebuilding: Confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations. New York: Routledge, 2009.

Perry, Valery. “Bosnia, an Intellectual Raj.” Transitions Online, 24 July, http://www.tol.org/client/article/10208-bosnia-an-intellectual-raj.html, 2003.

Petritsch, Wolfgang. Bosnien und Herzegowina: Fuenf Jahre nach Dayton: Hat der Frieden eine Chance? Klagenfurt: Wieser Verlag, 2001.

PIC Main Meeting. “Florence: Chairman’s Conclusions, 13 June.” 1996.

—. “London: Bosnia and Herzegovina 1997, Making Peace Work, 5 December.” 1996.

—. “Bonn: Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998: Self-sustaining Structures, 10 December.” 1997.

—. “Brussels: Declaration, 24 May.” 2000.

PIC Steering Board Ambassadors. “Sarajevo: Statement, 13 March.” 2009.

PIC Steering Board and Presidency and the COM Chairs. “Sarajevo: Joint Statement, 6 November.” 1997.

PIC Steering Board Ministerial Meeting. “Paris: Conclusions, Guiding Principles of the Civilian Consolidation Plan, 14 November.” 1996.

—. “Sintra: Political Declaration, Communiqué, 30 May.” 1997.

PIC Steering Board Political Directors. “Sarajevo: Meeting, 6 October.” 1998.



—. “Sarajevo: Communiqué, 31 July.” 2002.


—. “Brussels: Communiqué, 28 March.” 2003.


—. “Sarajevo: Communiqué, 1 April.” 2004.




—. “Sarajevo: Communiqué, 20 October.” 2006.


—. “Vienna: Communiqué, 15 March.” 2006.


—. “Sarajevo: Declaration, 27 February.” 2008.

—. “Sarajevo: Communiqué, 26 March.” 2009.

Rosenau, James N. The scientific study of foreign policy. London: Pinter, 1980.

Russell, Bruce, Harvey Starr, and David Kinsella.World Politics: The Menu for Choice. 9th ed: Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing, 2009. 9th.

Schwarz-Schilling, Christian. “Decision further limiting the scope of the ban from public office in the removal decisions issued by the High Representative, 4 April, http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?content_id=36919 “, 2006.

—. “Decision lifting the ban from office within political parties in the removal decisions issued by the High Representative, 7 July, http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?content_id=37615.” 2006.

Schwarz-Schilling, Christian “High Representative’s TV Address to Citizens of BiH, Sarajevo, 31 January, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=36501 “ (2006).

Sharp, Jane M. O. “Dayton report card.” International Security 22, no. 3 (1997): 101-37.

Solioz, Christophe, and Wolfgang Petritsch. “The fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina: an exclusive interview of Christophe Solioz with Wolfgang Petritsch.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 5, no. 3 (2003): 355-73.

“Telephone interview with Dr Christian Schwarz-Schilling, 18 August, Cambridge and Büdingen.”. 2009.

The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, initialled in Dayton, Ohio on 21 November 1995, signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 (Dayton Peace Agreement, Dayton Accords).

Traynor, Ian “Ashdown Running Bosnia like a Raj.” The Guardian, 5 July, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/jul/05/politics.foreignpolicy, 2003.

Westendorp, Carlos. “Decision Imposing the Law on Citizenship of BiH, 16 December.” 1997.

Wilde, Ralph. The Administration of Territory by International Organizations: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

43




The shifting contours of international state-building practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Documents

Transcript of The shifting contours of international state-building practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina