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Religious Divisions and the Perils of Patronage: the inhibitive potential of unmanaged confessional cleavages for deeper ASEAN integration.

Kenneth Houston Webster University Thailand

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Contents

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... 3

Introduction: .................................................................................................................................... 4

Understanding the Topography of the Religion-Politics Nexus ..................................................... 4

The ‘Freedom as Non Domination’ benchmark.............................................................................. 6

ASEAN’s Play on the Affective Dimension..................................................................................... 9

The Governance Question............................................................................................................ 10

Mapping overt fractures in ASEAN ............................................................................................... 13

ASEAN Member States and the Patronage Issue ....................................................................... 15

Rectifying Structural Fractures: Member States and Religious Patronage ................................. 17

References .................................................................................................................................... 21

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Abstract

When Europe wrestled with the God question in the run up to the finalization of its Draft Constitution in 2003/4 the salience of religion in politics seemed to take the majority of the EU’s political class by surprise. ASEAN has so far spared itself from dealing with the issue of religion’s public role relative to the affective dimension of regional integration in Southeast Asia. The question posed in this paper is whether this benign neglect is ultimately sustainable. The regulation of religion remains firmly the competence of national politics. However, the inevitably pluralist religious makeup of both the region and ASEAN’s member states, the increasing and inevitable mobility of ASEAN’s population, the transfer of people, goods, capital and information within the impending AEC, and wider economic cooperation will – through the process of ‘spillover’ – draw out political issues including the affective dimension of regional integration and the solidarity of peoples. ASEAN’s policy makers will at some point need to move beyond the platitudes of ‘one vision, one identity, one community’ to confront the question of managing the region’s very diverse and differing confessional makeup. The confessional tensions within the bloc – some of which have already manifest themselves as open violent conflicts – will be thrown into sharper relief as a result and such fracture points are not insignificant. They are already obvious. The ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights (2012), specifically Article seven, attempted to mediate the issue by relativizing the bloc’s commitment to international normative standards, and affirmed the hegemony of national and ‘cultural’ particularism. However, this effectively evaded the key function of the Declaration through its effective deference to national particularities. This paper maps and examines the patterns of national constitutional patronage relative to ethno-religious tension within ASEAN and among member states along several indicators. Through the deployment of selected tools within the broader conflict analytical approach to social conflict we analyze the risks in retaining confessional patronage as overtly as is the case in many ASEAN member states. The failure to formally secularize politics in order to provide for ‘freedom as non-domination’ at the national level is in line with the Asian way and the non-interference principle. However, this reluctance on the part of ASEAN as an institution to offer clearer normative regional standards, such as those of human rights, along with the retention of de facto and de jure confessional privilege in most constitutions, will store up problems for closer integration in a political and economic region much more diverse than the EU.

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We see vibrant and open ASEAN societies consistent with their respective national identities, where all people enjoy equitable access to opportunities for total human development regardless of gender, race, religion, language, or social and cultural background.

ASEAN 2020

Introduction: How might ASEAN successfully manage the diverse ethno-religious makeup of the region and avoid the potential for ASEAN’s religious differences to be an inhibitive force in regional integration? The question takes as its basic premise two entirely reasonable assumption that, a) unless the culture of any world region is infused with a single religio-cultural framework, then the potential for religion to be a unifying factor among multiple states is non-existent, and b) that the policy to date of embodying benign neglect is not sustainable in the longer term. Religion and issues that imply religious ideology require some regulation. The inability of religion to provide a unifying factor, therefore, means that its potential for religion to prove itself a problematic variable politically politics is ever present. This is not to posit determinist logic; potentiality does not mean inevitability. There are, in fact, no world regions without at least some measure of internal religious, ethno-religious or sectarian/confessional diversity. ASEAN’s member states cannot mobilize around a single religious narrative, not least because there is too much religious diversity between and within its states. Like Europe, ASEAN has played it safe – so far – in ensuring that the unifying narratives for its regional population are concerned with mutual economic and security interests. The appendage of the culture pillar to ASEAN’s remit has largely ignored the religion question and concentrated on manifestations of culture other than the confessional sphere. This prudence, however, only delays the inevitable intrusion of the politics-religion nexus into public policies. Sooner or later, the role of religion in public policy will emerge as a contested issue, placing unexpected demands – and strains – upon ASEAN’s brittle collective consensus (Dinham, Furbey & Lowndes 2009).

Understanding the Topography of the Religion-Politics Nexus Scholarly examinations of the subject of religion in Southeast Asian regional politics tend to fall into five key thematic strains: religious influence on state and national identity formation, security and terrorism, religious freedom, minority issues and inter-religious dialogue, universal versus particular values and the question of public policy and political reform. These conceptual strands are reflective of related and wider study of the subject of religion and politics that in turn implies further research areas such as the sociology of religion and political theory. Without doubt the role of religion in state formation and its role in the reproduction of hegemonic national identity narratives is a highly salient one (Anh 2002; Chong 2010; Gungwu et al 2005; Hirschl 2008; Tarling 2004). Most of the regional actors were former colonies of western powers, and the emergence of anti-colonial movements were often a result of an amalgamation of various normatively infused worldviews orientated around an imperative towards ‘self-determination’ in the face of a colonial ‘Other’. Sometimes the capitalist domination of many states and certainly their exploitation by imperial powers entrenched strains of Marxist-Leninism in the ideological framework of anti-colonial movements. Others looked to essentialized and primordial ties within state jurisdictions that had, for the most part problematically, drawn on

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specific ethno-nationalist or ethno-religious identity claims. Usually, it was a combination of both. The suffusion of religion and national identity was ultimately achieved through the imposition of a hierarchy of acceptable or valid beliefs and – often – the marginalization or outright repression of other religious and social categories within these states. The role and impact of religion and religious differences remains subsumed beneath other high politics issues at present, notwithstanding the imperatives of security policy around radicalization (Ramakrishna 2005). The security and radicalism dimension to the religion politics nexus is naturally well trodden territory (Nathan & Kamali 2005). It can sometimes be difficult to draw with clarity the distinction between fundamentalism on the one hand and extremism on the other (Mutalib 2006). The Fundamentalism Project has, over a prolonged research period, charted the emergence of a particular strain of religious belief, which represents a challenge to the concept of an equitable society (Almond, Appleby & Sivan 2003). Radicalization and fundamentalist belief and ancillary objectives expressed through violence are a distinct – if related – analytical concern (Mansurnoor 2008). While inter-confessional conflict has not been limited in brutality, within the ASEAN context this dimension has been somewhat limited in geographical scope: the Philippines (Mindanao), Indonesia (Aceh, Poso), Myanmar, and southern Thailand. Now that ASEAN has made a formal declaration of human rights it is obliged to demonstrate greater cognizance of the socio-cultural question, including religion as well as many others. This will be demanding for a region where the implementation of civil freedoms and human rights standards are decidedly patchy. The caveat inserted into Article seven of the 2012 Declaration will not prevent the increasing number of demotic claims based upon international human rights norms by ASEAN’s citizens against state intrusions into the private sphere, which can sometimes emanate from specific religiously derived ethics. Questions of dress, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, matters of education and religious symbolism will continue to increase in importance. Regardless of the pretext cultural relativism provides, in other words, the human rights gateway has been opened. We are, if we pay attention, reminded daily of the potential for the ASEAN region’s religious-cultural fractures to become dangerous cleavages. There are two ways of looking at the intersection of the spheres of religion and politics. The first, perhaps traditional, method is to consider the overt fracture points that have embodied violent – sometimes intractable – conflict and all its associated problems. The second is the question of religion’s role in policy formulation through the normal (if often highly charged) business of politics and the formulation, implementation and arbitration of public policy through judicial processes, which is in turn often played out in public media. Not to be dismissed because it has not, on the whole, resulted in bloodstained media coverage, this latter dimension and approach has acquired increasing visibility in both developed and developing economies for the last two decades at least. This vexed question of ‘public’ religion, or the intersection of religion and public policy and legislation, has animated strident debates among academics and public commentators at least since the start of the 21st century, particularly in the West (Dinham, Furbey & Lowndes 2009). The roots of these debates follow on from the communitarian critique of the latest communiqué from the Enlightenment articulated by John Rawls in his A Theory of Justice (Rawls 1971). Following on from that was the incorporation and appropriation of communitarian thinking into political theory and praxis, which underpinned a revival of cultural primordialism and particularism – including the concept of ‘identity politics’. A further variable was the concurrent questioning of the secularization paradigm in advanced democracies from the late 1990s within the sociology of religion on the one hand (on this see Bruce 2012; Norris & Inglehart 2004; XXXX) and the concomitant (and arguably related) critique and erosion of the universal basis of

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fundamental rights through postmodernist scholarship on the other (for discussion of this in the European context see Houston 2011). The issue of culture – and specifically, religion – is not a new consideration in the calculus of efforts towards realizing political stability in any polity, whether national or proto-supranational. However, ever since John Rawls went on the defensive in the face of the communitarian onslaught, a critical element in the arsenal of normative politics is regrettably less explicitly defended in modern political discourse. Surprisingly, the idea of civic, secular, liberal and universal principles as a basis for political organization has run up against the rocks of particularism, primordialism, relativism and the claims of identity politics. Kaldor has put forward an alternative but intriguing definition of ‘identity politics’. She describes it as: ‘movements which mobilize around ethnic, radical or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power ’ (Kaldor, 2012, p. 79). The connection she makes between identity and power is a useful one. ASEAN’s concession to the trend towards identity politics in its recent Declaration on Human Rights in ASEAN, specifically within Article seven, is both recognition of the fundamental incompatibilities that exist between states and the collective abrogation of ASEAN’s collective commitment to fundamental rights. Cumulatively, we now stand at a point in political thought and social analysis where previously axiomatic components of modernity – inevitable secularization, universal human rights and civic political organization – no longer hold the weight they once did (on debates around the secularization thesis see Bruce 2012; Norris & Inglehart 2004; see also Cliteur 2010). There are many practical consequences of this: the pursuit of flawed ‘multicultural’ policies in advanced democracies, the relativisation and reticence of moral outrage for particular cultural practices, not only in their manifestation in their places of origin, but also when they appear among migrant communities in western states. Within ASEAN, we find the symptoms of these intellectual trends visible in the lines of the 2012 ASEAN declaration. As Article seven reads:

7. All human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. All human rights and fundamental freedoms in this Declaration must be treated in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing and with the same emphasis. At the same time, the realization of human rights must be considered in the regional and national context bearing in mind different political, economic, legal, social, cultural, historical and religious backgrounds (ASEAN 2012, Emphasis added).

This concession to primordialism and ethical relativism in the document is indicative of a prevailing false dichotomy between universal human rights and cultural particularism. Liberalism never really denied the reality or importance of culture. It certainly never intended to eliminate culture in favour of hyper individualism. In fact, liberal philosophy was indifferent to culture. What liberalism did concern itself with was the mal-distribution of power on the basis of cultural or religious differences. It is this aspect of liberal thought that brings us to the question of how ASEAN, like other regional organizations, has constructed a framework that effectively neutralizes its normative power with respect to religious privilege in national contexts.

The ‘Freedom as Non Domination’ benchmark In what follows, the analysis offers a theoretical basis for its critique of ASEAN’s benign neglect of the relationship between religion and rights. This framework is Philip Pettit’s concept of republican freedom as ‘non-domination’ (Pettit 1997, 2009; see also Marti & Pettit 2010). Pettit

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sought to distinguish republican and liberal concepts of freedom from one another by showing that, within liberalism, the emphasis on non-interference (whether conceived as either negative liberty or positive liberty) did not go far enough in ensuring the protection of individuals from arbitrary power, specifically that of the state. ‘Non-domination’ demanded more comprehensive checks against power by ensuring that power could never be potentially – still less actually – exercised against the interests of citizens. In short, the organization of the state should be around the principle that no one should fear the possibility of interference, still less actual interference. We include not only the organs and components of the state who might be in a position of domination over individual citizens, but also the non-state actors such as civil society institutions and corporate interests and actors who could conceivably undermine individual freedom. For our purposes, we include corporate and professionalized forms of religion in this category of private interests. As an advisor to the former Prime Minister of Spain remarked of Pettit’s conceptualization and theoretical development of civic republicanism:

Philip Pettit provided us with the appropriate grammar to furnish our political intuitions, to express the kind of proposals and dreams we had in mind for Spain. Pettit's republicanism has been our north star (Marti and Pettit 2010, p. 1)

The dimensions of this principle emanate from a distinction within normative political theory between freedom as ‘non-interference’ and freedom as ‘non-domination’. The former lies at the heart of liberal theory, and arguably has provided the basis for the conceptualization of human rights. The distinction, as Pettit outlines, rests on the idea that ‘non-domination’ is a much more demanding principle. The liberal conception of freedom as non-interference only demands that those in a position of domination over others refrain from actually interfering in citizen choices. Their dominant position remains intact. Whereas, the principle of non-domination attempts to eradicate the potential for interference tout court. As Marti and Pettit write:

[Citizens] may not actually suffer interference at the hands of those who dominate them. What ensures that they are dominated is the fact that those others have the power of interfering with them in an arbitrary way—that is, in a way that they themselves do not control (Marti and Pettit, 2010, p. 33) […] They economize on interference, resorting to it only on a need-for-action basis (Marti and Pettit 2010, p. 36).

Because of its sweeping normative concern with domination (as distinct from interference), it includes two key sources of potential domination: domination by private power (dominium), that is, the power one citizen has over another, and domination by the state or public power (imperium) (Marti and Pettit 2010, p48). Grant McConnell, writing in the 1960s, would identify precisely this potential for domination in levels of organization below that of the state (McConnell 1966). His concern was primarily with corporate power, but the principle might also – very easily – be applied to ‘corporate’ or organized forms of religion.

Therefore, Pettit points out that there are two guiding principles at the heart of the republican tradition and freedom defined as non-domination. The first is the constitutional-democratic principle, wherein the state is organized and configured in such a way as to limit the domination of the state itself over the individual citizen. The second is the establishment of a social-democratic counterpart in order to ensure that the citizen is protected from private forms of power (Marti and Pettit 2010, p. 52). Pettit then outlines four key initiatives that are required in

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order to provide a sufficiently robust framework for the realization of this more demanding form of freedom:

Firming up the infrastructure of non-domination (through the bolstering of rule of law, etc) Empowerment of the vulnerable (identification and resourcing of the disadvantaged)

Protection for citizens against those who would do harm (both internal and external enemies)

Regulation of powerful agencies (that have some form of authority over citizens) (from Marti and Pettit 2010, p. 54-55).

This is a fruitful diagnostic approach as it is not burdened by utopian visions of equality and freedom but rather a pragmatic framework that can assist in identifying instances of localized domination in particular contexts. In our study, the concept of non-domination can permit us to measure the extent to which the patronage of religion among ASEAN member states violates the non-domination principle and thereby exposes latent potential for interference among other categories of citizens. It might well be asked, and undoubtedly will be asked by defenders of religious patronage, why this theoretical principle should be applied. There are valid reasons to ask this, and there are invalid reasons. A valid reason to ask this question is to demand theoretical justification in terms of matching the normative indicators of non-domination with those of human rights. The study argues that these principles are not only compatible, but in fact intrinsic to human rights discourse. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the example of how the discourse of human rights has expanded in recent years to include the protection of categories that were not necessarily considered at the genesis of the human rights tradition at the end of World War Two: such as, women, children, the disabled, homosexuals, minority religions, New Religious Movements and non-believers. Through the claim of their universality was laid the foundation for continual and ongoing iterations of human rights to include categories of humanity that did not exist as normative targets until their oppression became recognizable. This is particularly true in the last two decades. An invalid reason is the assumption that, as this draws on the liberal and republican philosophical tradition that happened to emerge in modern Europe, these principles are problematic in a non-Western or non-European context. There is also the correlating accusation that it is ‘euro-centric’ to attempt to apply them in a region like Southeast Asia. The argument from the point of view of ‘Asian values’ has its problems (for an excellent collection of analyses on this see Bruum & Jacobsen 2000). It is a concept and idea that flirts closely with the notion of an essentialized ASEAN culture. The fact that ASEAN attempted to formulate a human rights declaration, however flawed, indicates that its leaders at least recognize the universality of the discourse, if not the implications of its principles. In some senses, the inclusion of the problematic caveat in Article seven of the 2012 Declaration indicates that the pressure to produce a declaration was keenly felt. Had it not been one must wonder what the imperatives of the declaration were. The question might legitimately be asked whether this normative framework is demanding too much from any state, let alone states in ASEAN, or indeed from ASEAN itself. The application of this framework is defended on the basis that it is a diagnostic tool and not a utopian ideal to which ASEAN (or any state) might strive. As Pettit himself acknowledges, there is no discernible end point for the achievement of a republic. A republic that embodies the principle of non-domination is one that is engaged in a twofold task simultaneously: state vigilance against the

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potential for domination by its own institution and those social entities in the private sphere; and the constant refinement of its political system in light of newly emerging claims for civil liberties. To invoke Foucault, there can never be a complete escape from power (Foucault 1979). The potential for domination and oppression is ever present while there is any form of socio-political organization. In what follows, the study outlines the problematic around the idea of an ASEAN affective dimension and thereafter outlines the difficulties manifest along the confessional dimesion in the region. The paper then concludes with pertinent observations, revisiting once more the non-domination principle.

ASEAN’s Play on the Affective Dimension

As ASEAN prepares for the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015 (or more likely later, towards 2020) there is no doubt that it has adopted a particular approach to its public relations task of persuading it collective populations of the benefits of closer integration. Perhaps inadvertently, the official discourse of ASEAN assumes (or tries to construct) the identity of the collective as a reality. A cursory look at the semiotic representations of ASEAN and its regional integration process through its various public relations campaigns demonstrates that, unlike the more recent reticence of EU efforts, ASEAN trades very explicitly on the idea of ‘one vision, one identity, one community’. With identity and community in the singular there is an obvious disconnect with the reality of a profoundly diverse regional collective, with member states mobilized not least around potent ethno-religious narratives on the one hand, and the ideal of a singular community of nations and peoples on the other. The following is a narrative segment from one ASEAN public relations video aimed at juveniles:

The ASEAN Community is a place where all the ten countries come together to build a better future for everyone. Together as ten we are stronger, and can do more than one country alone.1

The journey to ASEAN in the video is semiotically displayed as three ‘doorways’ towards ASEAN: Peace, Prosperity and People. This example of engaging a diverse citizen body of multiple member states through social media and conveying a message of commonality of purpose evinces the not untypical strategy of playing down the differences and appealing to people’s mutual material interests: their need for security and prosperity. The viability of such a singular community, while retaining the primacy of national identity frames, is not necessarily unrealistic, as long as the concept of community is confined to limited inter-state cooperation, usually conceived of in terms of macro level political concerns such as economic development and security. There might well also be room for tokenistic references to ‘one community’ of nations. The reality, however, is that regional integration processes can imply a certain level of ‘spillover’ (Haas 1968), and the AEC is an example of a path that the EU has already trodden. The Single European Act of 1986 paved the way not only for the intended outcomes of accelerated economic development through the establishment of a single market but also for the largely unintended consequences of closer political cooperation and deeper mutual interdependence in order to sustain and regulate that market. Increasingly dense interstate cooperation in one area, such as the economic and security spheres invariably make unexpected and unintentional demands for cooperation in other areas. Cooperation in the

1 The video clip can be viewed here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aiQhqN-NdQc

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economic, security and the cultural spheres are explicit the official public discourse of ASEAN’s institutional utterances. The idea is also prevalent that ASEAN will benefit all peoples in the region at multiple levels, including the cultural level. However, the region, and the bloc itself, confronts a considerable uphill struggle in actualizing the concept of the ASEAN citizen, not least when there is already considerable socio-economic disparity between states as well as within them. Without a mutually agreed framework of normative principles to regulate state and neocorporate conduct over the citizen, the possibility of a constructed regional identity will remain remote. In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of the mid to late 1990s the distribution of urban and rural poor among ASEAN’s member states was stark (Rigg 2002, p93). Added to that is the question of ASEAN’s highly diverse national political systems, ranging from democracies to constitutional monarchies, socialist/communist regimes and several states that are still emerging from autocratic systems. One key issue that will eventually confront ASEAN and and national policy makers is the imperative of protecting the rights of member state citizens when they migrate to work in other member states. This will inevitably imply the question of religious freedom and other associated or implied freedoms such as gender and sexual equality. It is possible that policy makers, blinkered by the economic dimension, have forgotten that people are the basis of economies. If religious, sexuality and gender freedoms are inhibited through the hegemony of ethno-religious centrism at the national level, then one of the core gates – People – will be closed.

The Governance Question The key framework for addressing the question of confessional tension centers on the issue of whether the governance structures in the member states concerned have the institutional capacity to channel public social conflict over contested issues and the distribution of social goods. Do ASEAN states have political frameworks of sufficient robustness to manage social conflict over matters of religion? Are these systems, in an obvious sense, sufficiently distinct from confessional narratives and normative frameworks to arbitrate effectively between competing claims? It is clear that the advancement of civil liberties in the ASEAN region lags behind those of other world regions (though it is ahead of other neighbouring contexts). Several indicators point to difficulties within ASEAN in realizing sound democratic governance. There are, according to the NGO reports aggregated below, no ‘free’ and ‘full democracies’ going by the indices presented.

ASEAN

Member State

Freedom in the

World

Press Freedom

Index

Democracy

Index

Brunei Not free Difficult situation Authoritarian regime

Cambodia Not free Difficult situation Hybrid regime

Indonesia Partly free Difficult situation Flawed democracy

Laos Not free Very serious situation Authoritarian regime

Malaysia Partly free Difficult situation Flawed democracy

Myanmar (Burma)

Not free Difficult situation Authoritarian regime

Philippines Partly free Difficult situation Flawed democracy

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Singapore Partly free Difficult situation Hybrid regime

Thailand Not free Difficult situation Flawed democracy

Vietnam Not free Very serious situation Authoritarian regime

Totals Indicator (Mbr States)

Not free (6) Partly free (4)

Difficult situation (8) Very serious situation (2)

Authoritarian Reg (4) Hybrid Reg (2) Flawed Democracy

(4)

Sources: Compiled from (respectively) Freedom House (2014), Reporters without Borders (2014), Economist Intelligence Unit (2013) Similarly, the World Bank’s Governance Indicators (below) point to a world region that cumulatively does not measure favourably with respect to three key indicators. In the absence of these basic components, the structural domination of national identity narratives, which incorporate majority religious norms and narratives within them, strains at the affective and identitarian integrity of national self-understanding. The cumulative result is the structural basis of societal tension along a confessional axis. In addition there is an increasing likelihood that tension will also emerge relative to issues that religiously derived ethical principles might conceivably pronounce on, such as family law, gender and sexuality issues, children’s rights, education and public symbolism.

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Worldwide Governance Indicators (2012)

Source: World Bank WGI:

In the absence of resilient public institutions and established shared principles the stage is arguably set for protracted social conflict, not merely – or primarily of a security nature – but also in the form of public controversy. New social movements in Europe and North America have been colliding with conservative and traditional forces since the latter part of the twentieth century. These ‘culture wars’ are ongoing.

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Mapping overt fractures in ASEAN The study considers this question in light of how states distribute practical and symbolic ‘societal goods’. The more acute issue, of course, is the question of religious minorities in majority religious states. Within ASEAN all states have a majority and several minorities. The Minorities at Risk dataset gives us a useful starting point in summarizing the key ethno-religious divisions within ASEAN’s member states. There are other divisions, of course, socio-economic, ethno-nationalist and ethno-linguistic, but our concern here is with those divisions along a confessional-religious axis.

‘At Risk’ Minorities along the Religious-Confessional Axis

ASEAN Member State Minority ‘at risk’

Brunei None

Cambodia None

Indonesia Aceh (Orthodox Islam)

Laos Hmong (Animist/Christian)

Malaysia East Indians (Hindu), Kadazans

(Catholic/Animist)

Myanmar Kachins (mainly Christian), Rhohingya (Muslim), Shan (Buddhist with differentiated customs), Chin (Christian/Animist)

Philippines Moros (Muslim)

Singapore Malays (Muslim)

Thailand Malay (Muslim), Northern Hill

Tribes (Animist/Christian)

Vietnam Montagnards (Animist/Protestant)

Source: Minorities at Risk Dataset, University of Maryland (2014)

We must be mindful that such conflicts are not necessarily about religion itself or competing doctrines or belief systems. As in the case with Northern Ireland during the ‘Troubles’ period, Catholics and Protestants were not in conflict about theological and dogmatic differences. Nevertheless, the cleavage was explicitly along sectarian lines, a legacy Europe’s older conflict of religion rooted in the sixteenth century. The danger lies not so much in competing beliefs but in the communitarian logic of ‘us and them’. In-group and out-group tribalism was a residual effect of religious differences. Notwithstanding the latent nature of many of the ‘at risk’ categories in each state, the high profile conflicts dogging the region are the subject of some academic commentary, not to say considerable political energy in seeking resolution or at least some form of finality (Jory 2013; McAmis 2002; Ramakrishna 2005; Searle 2002; Snitwongse & Thompson 2005). This ‘traditional’ consideration of the religion-politics nexus provides a useful entry point into the subject.

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There are certainly some very overt religiously framed conflicts, albeit with additional components such as socio-economic disadvantage, relative disenfranchisement, discrimination on the basis of language differences and wider cultural divisions. These conflicts are not merely reducible to ‘religion’. Rohingya Muslims are persecuted in Buddhist majority Myanmar. Buddhists have been attacked in Malaysia and Indonesia, possibly in direct reprisal. The conflict between the majority Catholic Philippine state and Moro Muslims in Mindanao has perhaps lurched into an uneasy peace – for now. Not least, there is a nasty insurgency in the southern tip of Buddhist majority Thailand with ethnic Malay Muslims. Pew Research highlighted more recent deteriorations in inter-confessional relations and measured an increase in hostility between religious groups. As of 2012 (Pew 2014, Appendix 3), of the ten member states of ASEAN exactly half (five) had either ‘high’ (2) or ‘very high’ (3) levels of social hostility involving religion.

Social Hostilities

Score

Very High Social

Hostilities

High Social

Hostilities

Moderate Social

Hostilities

Low Social

Hostilities

ASEAN Member States

Indonesia Myanmar Thailand

Malaysia Vietnam

Brunei Laos Philippines

Cambodia Singapore

Number of Member States

3 2 3 2

FIVE Member States in a ‘risk’ category

Source: Pew Report ‘Religious hostilities reach six year high’ (January 2014)

In attempting to consolidate state integrity while also addressing the basis of both latent and overt conflict with minorities there is a tendency to place limited or special arrangements of devolution on the table for consideration. Even this is sometimes a stretch too far for some states to contemplate, and it emerges as a possible option only after a protracted period of conflict. This is particularly true when very divergent cultural tropes are at odds, including those of ethno-religious affiliation. It is not merely the presence of ethno-religious division; it is also the presence of political dysfunction manifest through imbalances in the distribution of social goods. The experience of mistreatment by one group at the hands of another, or at the hands of a state that is partisan in favour of another group, discredits the political apparatus that is either unable to prevent this treatment or is even complicit in it. The demand from the oppressed minority group, understandably, is the establishment of some form of political distance from the dominant regime, either as autonomy, devolution or outright secession or independence. The normative literature sometimes assumes – wrongly – that the problem of discrimination or oppression is more likely to be resolved when the oppressed group gains self-rule in some form. Quite apart from the failure of such ‘solutions’ to address the real causes of fractious inter-confessional relations, there is also the not insignificant problem of creating newer ‘minorities’ within new subnational arrangements. These proposed arrangements are symptoms of a failure on the part of state actors to embody a fuller normative dimension of state function. In essence, these arrangements effectively absolve the state of its responsibility to ensure that the constitutional, legal and political arrangements are capable of guaranteeing – both in word and praxis – that all citizens will have an equal share in government, representation and the distribution of social and economic goods. At the cost of retaining (re-) constructed national

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narratives of putatively primordial origin, such as national ‘blood’, ‘belief’ or ‘kinship’, states have effectively created the structural exclusion of portions of their own populations: the Malay Muslims in southern Thailand, the Moros Muslims of the Philippines, the Rohingyas of Myanmar. Such divisions clearly blight ASEAN’s cooperative ambitions and may prove to be the foundations for a diffuse and sporadic inter-confessional conflict that would pull at the fabric of several member states. Yet even this high profile manifestation of religious differences might prove less of a problem than the emergent pressures brought on by rapid social change, social and population mobility combined with the potent discourse of human rights. As the AEC approaches the full implications of its premises will become increasingly evident. The combination of population mobility and salient identity markers, including those beyond ethno-religious divides, will likely provide the seedbed for significant public tension.

ASEAN Member States and the Patronage Issue

One significant consideration is the patronage issue. This issue throws Pettit’s fourth point: the regulation of powerful agencies that have control or authority over citizens. We might add to this an emphasis upon both state and non-state agencies. Although instances of overt inter-confessional tension (and violence) are important the structural fractures that characterize many states when it comes to confessionalization, national narratives and identity are just as salient, perhaps more so. The structural instances of distinction and asymmetry evinced through symbolic and practical patronage establish the conditions of possibility for the more overt forms of political tension and conflict. Among ASEAN member states there are overt privileges for majority religious traditions. This is to be entirely expected and is certainly not unique to ASEAN states. The contentious element to this is that it is precisely these identities and narratives, underpinned by overt state practice and behavior, which represent both the inhibitive potential for the integration process being pursued by ASEAN and its concomitant articulation and realization of human rights principles. Is the state complicit in instances of domination of citizens? The Pew data highlights the practical dimensions of this privileging, which includes: deference in state law and organization to the principles of specific religious texts; funding to one or more religious organization; the mainstreaming of religious indoctrination into the education system; and privileges in terms of government access that are not available to other groups.

GRI Q 20: Do some religious groups receive government support or favors, such as

funding, official recognition or special access?

Yes, the national government defers in some w ay to religious authorities, texts or

doctrines on legal issues (see GRI.Q.20.5)

Yes, the government provides funds or other resources to one or more religious groups

(see GRI.Q.20.3)

Yes, religious education is required in public schools by local governments or

the national government (see GRI.Q.20.4)

Yes, one or more religious groups have privileges or government

access unavailable to other religious groups (see GRI.Q.20.2)

Yes, the country's constitution or basic law

recognizes a favored religion or religions (see

GRI.Q.20.1)

Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Philippines Vietnam

Malaysia Laos Myanmar Singapore

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Thailand

Source: Pew Report ‘Religious hostilities reach six year high’, Appendix 6 (January 2014)

Pew research shows that member states have For example, in the Pew data seven out of ten member states could be classed as giving de jure privileged place within their basic or constitutional law

Does the country’s constitution or basic law

recognize a favored religion

or religions?

Yes

Brunei

Cambodia

Indonesia

Malaysia

Myanmar

Singapore

Thailand

Source: Pew Report ‘Religious hostilities reach six year high’ (January 2014) Pew’s research further demonstrates that at a practical level, and quite apart from de jure manifestations of overt privilege for particular religious institutions there are extensive, practical accommodations that exhibit preference to (usually) majority traditions. The question of religious freedom is the most overt concern: the ability of mobile citizens to freely practice and embody their religion or belief in a context other than their national origin. Within the confines of ASEAN and the AEC we can identify some potential problem areas. Bouma, Ling and Pratt (2010) have outlined the problem of religious freedom in the southeast Asian region. Their data is based on the US State Department reports on religious freedom. The Pew data augments these findings. Already in some states overt religious adherence and certain manifestations of belief are not permitted or are restricted. A total of seven member states of ASEAN exhibit high (2) or very high (5) restrictions on religious adherence. These findings echo the analysis evident in the US Dept of State reports on religious freedom, where most of these states restrict religions other than the dominant one (see USDS 2013).

Very High

Govt Restrictions

High

Govt Restrictions

Moderate

Govt Restrictions

Low

Govt Restrictions

Brunei Indonesia Malaysia Myanmar

Vietnam

Laos Singapore

Cambodia Thailand

Philippines

FIVE MEMBER STATES

TWO MEMBER STATES

TWO MEMBER STATES

ONE MEMBER STATE

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Source: Pew Report ‘Religious hostilities reach six year high’ (January 2014)

Rectifying Structural Fractures: Member States and Religious Patronage Why, therefore, would the patronage of religion and the privileging of religious doctrines, religious professionals and institutions in particular nation states be problematic for regional integration in ASEAN? To answer this we need to consider how the patronage of religion potentially obstructs the objectives of regional economic and political interdependence and human rights promotion. The AEC is committed to the free movement of goods and capital, which is primarily an economic concern. But economies are based upon peoples. The AEC is committed to making ASEAN a region of free movement, primarily of workers, something that is already evident in the visa waivers for ASEAN citizens. Nevertheless, to see the free movement of peoples purely in economic terms is to marginalize the multifaceted dimension of the future ASEAN citizen. When beliefs or what Rawls called ‘comprehensive doctrines’ are treated differently within different states the result is a hierarchical structure that ranges vertically from the privileged to the marginalized. In states where the core principles of democracy, freedom and good governance are absent or weak, the vertical range can extend towards oppression. When this happens tension and conflict are an inevitable potentiality. Camilleri and Schottmann ask at the end of their volume on the region’s intercommunal tensions:

[W]hat are the forces that have brought about what appears to be this continual ‘turns for the worse’ in the region’s intercommunal relations? Why are the religious and cultural groups asserting their respective traditions, languages, ethnicities and inventing myths of shared heritage and descent in ways that serve to exclude or subsume others they view as threatening their rights to freedom and property (Camilleri & Schottmann 2012, p. 180)?

The questions posed by these scholars, while pertinent, tend to assume that identity formation and the nexus of religious and political identity should be a largely positive matter, and that negative outcomes are an aberration. Identity formation is invariably about exclusion. Through explicit and practical patronage of religious tradition, and mainstream religious institutions, states symbolically reproduce the ethno-religious basis of their identity. While not necessarily illegitimate in itself – after all, the birth of the concept of nationhood is rooted in the Westphalian compromise of confessionally divided Europe – the twin processes of globalization and regional integration render it an anachronistic luxury. Disparities in rights and the specter of intolerance will invariably be thrown into relief once the mobility of populations begins to increase. This is likely even if the AEC does not materialize before 2020. Nations are not mono-religious or mono-cultural, despite self-constructed narratives to the contrary. However, the legacy of state formation among ASEAN nations, rooted in post-colonial imperatives and the bipolar standoff mean that member states have – through primordially based narratives and communitarian invocations of ‘Asian values’ – constricted their capacity to deal effectively with internal and wider regional diversity. At a practical level, states have realized this and there are limited practical concessions to this reality in the form of recognition of religious diversity. However, the conflation of religious freedom with corporate religious privilege within states undermines the de jure recognition of member states of ASEAN’s diverse religious makeup. The

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recent regression of Brunei’s political system into an even stronger affinity with Islam, including some very problematic proposed reforms to the penal code, are a salutary reminder of the potential for state domination of citizens. The difficulty is that, in order to embed human rights more comprehensively in the region, and indeed to smooth the path towards closer integration (assuming this continues to be pursued politically), the structural domination by confessional majorities evident in each of the member states must be confronted. This is not the only form of domination, of course, but it is one of them. Presently, categories other than ethno-religious minorities, such as women, homosexuals and alternative religious and non religious ‘comprehensive doctrines’, remain vulnerable to either the dominium of non-state actors such as institutionalized and ‘corporate’ faith organizations or the imperium of states organized around explicit adherence to religious tenets. Pettit’s freedom as ‘non-domination’ is a pertinent diagnostic tool that allows observers to identify the gaps between de jure and de facto equality and human rights compliance. Primordial and ideological bases for state organization ultimately and inevitably restrict citizen freedoms. A better approach is to structure the political apparatus of states around an idea of clearly articulated equal membership of society on the basis of individual rights and civic communalism, something that more closely approximates the embodiment of non-domination and human rights. Civic republicanism offers a viable template to progress in this direction. And if undertaken through coordinated regional efforts will provide a much more promising basis for both regional integration and the promotion of human rights. This is why the recent 2012 Declaration was a lost opportunity for ASEAN. The caveat included in Article seven provides the basis for member state opt outs of advances in citizen empowerment that originate from regional organs. Through the invocation of ‘cultural’ particularities, inherited from the 1993 declaration on Asian values, states will cite the provision of Article seven as justification for the relativization of rights. The question raised here centers on whether state citizenship and public policy should continue to be mediated through ‘group’ membership. The defensive concession embodied in the latter part of article seven represents the pre-eminence of non-interference. Some citizens should not be privileged above others on the basis of group categorization, specifically membership of majority religions. Calls for regional autonomy, secession or irredentism reflect the presence of failure, not historically-based aspirations. Differences of religion or ethnicity should not be misguidedly ‘promoted’ through special arrangements - they should be structurally and deliberately ignored through the express promotion of civic citizenship. The citizen should be shielded from the arbitrary power of not just the state, but also corporate religious, economic and neo-corporate interests. The net result of national religious patronage, de jure or de facto, has been to entrench domination over a variety of categories within each ASEAN member state. National political systems that are too explicitly associated with a particular worldview – and particular ethno-religious worldviews – invariably alienate some part of their population. There will always be a minority (usually several minorities) within the bounds of any state. Cultural purity is a myth and cultural hegemony realized through the state’s political apparatus is a source of injustice, inequality and conflict. ‘Primordial’ identities are not illegitimate, but they are constructs that are inevitably sustained through the production and reproduction of exclusion. If the reproduction of these identity frames is sustained through deliberate and longitudinal state support there is a risk that the emergence of collective consciousness within ASEAN will be undermined through manifest asymmetries in citizen protection. Danger presents itself when that exclusionary process is fostered through the framework of the nation state. The identitarian framework of any state should strive to be a system of civic patriotism that is inclusive, without being chauvinistic,

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still less triumphalist. The tried and tested path to greater civic peace within diverse or even divided societies can conceivably be reached through elaborate forms of political compromise such as devolved government or power sharing. There are numerous examples of this such as Northern Ireland and Lebanon. However, in such contexts ‘peace’ is a special status which is usually fragile, sometimes superficial and invariably underpinned by special arrangements such as power-sharing and heightened securitization. These might end overt violence, but they are not examples of real peace. Such societies remain deeply divided and such arrangements are the result of a failure to realise a fully articulated liberal democratic political culture. The simple truth of the matter is that nations which entrenched a robust civic-based public value system and a strong separation of religion and politics fare better in dealing with what is often termed ‘cultural diversity’. Regrettably, this is not the norm within the ASEAN region. Also regrettably, it is becoming something of a minority position among scholars in the field of political and social thought. We have the deeply flawed caveat – clearly a product of the non-interference principle – in the recent Declaration of Human Rights in ASEAN to prove it. The mantra that ‘diversity’ is a desirable end in itself should be jettisoned in favour of a realistic recognition that ‘diversity’ is actually difference and latent ‘division’. Differences harbour the risk of being bloody affairs at worst, or deeply contested social conflicts acrimoniously played out in courtrooms and in the media at best, and they need to be managed and negotiated through established and widely legitimized institutional mechanisms underpinned by an agreed public value framework. ASEAN’s religious diversity precludes religion being a linchpin for common values. Examples abound, both within ASEAN and beyond, where ‘agreed’ public values among different ethno-religious persuasions are unilaterally imposed by state power which becomes the instrument of a partisan majority. In ASEAN, Brunei is arguably the latest and most high profile example. The recent invocation of Islamic Sharia by the head of state, and the impending formalization of laws that are patently regressive and antithetical to human rights principles. It is an indictment of ASEAN’s pretensions to regional interdependence, security and prosperity. The prospects for human rights in this context are bleak. Other examples could be invoked, although less extreme than the Brunei example. There are over one hundred and thirty ‘ethnic identities’ in Myanmar alone. What should the basis of citizen loyalty be in such a state? Attempts in the 1960s to establish a ‘Buddhist’ state backfired and in part provoked the political instability that wracked the country in the decades since. Buddhist ‘nationalism’ (surely an oxymoron) evinced the residual influence of this strain of ethno-religious chauvinism. How should Myanmar structure its affective dimension now? Should it continue to impose unitary state control despite the partisan culture of national identity, the hegemonic appropriation of state power and the mal-distribution of social goods? Or should they grant autonomy to subnational ‘regions’ on the basis of majority make up? This latter solution might appear to be more reasonable but it is in reality a blueprint for national fragmentation. It is what might be colloquially referred to as a ‘cop out’. It’s a solution that avoids dealing with the problem, with the central constitutional question of the relationship between state, citizen and national identity. It exchanges the urgent questions about the relationship between the citizen and the state for a spurious emphasis on the relationship between ‘groups’ and the state. The individual is relegated to instrumentation for group interests. Where the principles of civic, secular and liberal democratic governance are flouted or ignored, domination becomes a reality and oppression is not far behind. Questions of which religion, ethnic group, state or sub-state actor perpetrates the most egregious violations of the non-domination principle are – ultimately – irrelevant. The problem, in large part, emanates from the lingering presence of cultural-religious chauvinism at the expense of a genuine commitment to human rights and civil liberties embodied within the state apparatus. This should be the target of

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collective reform within ASEAN, something precluded at the outset by the principal of non-interference and the ASEAN way. Civic, secular and liberal democratic government does not reflect the reality among most of the ASEAN states. The overt violent conflicts scattered across the region, along with the latently ‘at risk’ populations of various states, exemplify the failure to properly institutionalize a sufficiently robust separation between the state apparatus and institutionalized corporate religion. If conflict between sectarian or confessional divisions among and within ASEAN’s community of nations is to be avoided in the future such principles are a necessary precondition. Similarly, as globalization and increasingly expansive definitions of human rights gain the status of international norm, further violations of human rights, further instances of domination by state and non state actors of individual liberties, will continue to come to the fore. The enduring connections between national identities and specific religious affiliations are hampering greater inclusiveness within more diverse regional demos. The failure to formally secularize politics in order to provide for ‘freedom as non-domination’ at the national level, along with the retention of de facto and de jure confessional privilege in most member states of ASEAN, will store up problems for the promotion of human rights and closer integration in a political and economic region much more diverse than the EU.

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