ORIENTAL ARCHIVE 80, 2012 • 563

The Man Behind: Luo Qinshun and Korean Confucianism1

Vladimír Glomb

Introduction

The aim of this study is to analyze the reception accorded to Zheng’an Luo Qinshun 整庵2 羅欽順 (1465−1547) and his work in 16th century Korea. Although Zheng’an was (with the exception of Wang Yangming) the greatest figure of Ming Confucianism, there has been relatively little research focused on the reception accorded to his ideas both in China and Korea.3 This reflects the historical development of Confucian discourse during the Ming and Qing periods, when Zheng’an, as an exponent of the traditional branch of daoxue, was overshadowed and later ignored by new trends and schools of Chinese Confucianism and we can find relatively few references to his work and ideas. On the other hand, he played a surprisingly important role in the development of Korean Confucian discourse, which took a rather different direction and adhered more to Zhu Xi’s orthodoxy. Zheng’an remained an important source of inspiration during the whole Chosŏn period for Korea and for a number of Korean thinkers who commented on Zheng’an’s works, including T’oegye Yi Hwang 退溪 李滉 (1501−70), Yulgok Yi I 栗谷 李珥 (1536−84), Udam Chŏng Sihan 愚潭 丁時翰 (1625−1707) and Nongmun Im Sŏngju 鹿門 任聖周 (1711−88), as well as almost every important scholar of the middle and late Chosŏn period.

The nature of this reception was, however, not exclusively positive. In the Korean environment, passionate as it was for disputes on orthodoxy, we may find both admirers of Zheng’an and scholars who considered him a representative of the heretic Ming Confucianism, a typical scholar of the allegedly decadent (and later fallen) dynasty.

These two approaches mirror the possible modes of reception concerning Ming Confucianism by Korean literati and provide an interesting example of an interaction between a Chinese scholar and his Korean readers. The crucial question

1 This research was supported by a grant from the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange, International Sinological Centre at Charles University.

2 Chosŏn scholars often used the variant am 菴.3 Since the ground-breaking studies of Yu Myŏngjong (many of them were later collected in his

T’oegyewa Yulgokŭi ch’ŏrhak), the research dealing with Zheng’an and his work has expanded significantly in many directions. For their methodological overview, see for example Hong Chŏnggŭn, “Han, Chung sasang pigyo yŏngu pangpŏp siron,” 151−88.

ArOr – Issue 80.3 ISSN 0044-8699 © 2012 Oriental Institute (ASCR), Prague

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of Zheng’an’s reception was the definition of the subtle distinction between orthodox and heterodox within the Confucian school: should Korean scholars study the Ming author as a truly orthodox follower of Zhu Xi, someone being worthy of attention, or reject him as a despoiler of the Way, as was the case with his other contemporaries, including Wang Yangming?

Discussions concerning the theories of Luo Qinshun became an important point in the building of the orthodox Korean daoxue tradition and Zheng’an has received from his Korean readers both a positive and a negative reception.

Two or one

Among the most important texts related to Zheng’an are the letters of the famous Four-Seven Debate, the most important philosophical dialogue in the history of Korean thought. The texts of the Debate (i.e. the correspondence between T’oegye Yi Hwang 退溪 李滉 and Kobong Ki Taesŭng 高峰 奇大升 (1527−72) and later between Yulgok Yi I and Ugye Sŏng Hon 牛溪 成渾 (1535−98)) offer us examples of the contemporary reception of Zheng’an within Korean intellectual circles. Although Zheng’an’s name appears in the course of the Debate only a few times, many of the arguments presented by both sides form a direct or indirect dialogue with his teaching. This fact is logical both from historical and philosophical perspectives. Zheng’an was at that time the best known contemporary scholar representing the Chinese daoxue and his theories concerned the same set of questions being discussed in the Debate (most notably the relationship between li and qi).

The first reference to Zheng’an’s theories appears in the first round of the debate between T’oegye and Kobong and T’oegye’s letter serves, in connection with Zheng’an, as a good example of the argumentum ad hominem against Kobong.

Consequently, you consider li and qi as one thing and there is nothing that distinguishes them. Recently, Luo Zheng’an proposed the theory that li and qi are not different things and came to the conclusion that Master Zhu’s explanation was wrong. I search for what is the standard and cannot grasp what his intention was, which is not to say that the meaning of your explanation is also similar.4

Zheng’an’s views on the relationship between li and qi were described among the Chosŏn literati by the general statement that “li and qi are one thing” 理氣爲一物. After reading Zheng’an’s crucial work, Kunzhiji 困知記, we may doubt that this short thesis represents the real stance of this Ming scholar in relation to the most fundamental question of daoxue philosophy but it is the matter of fact that such an image was, in Korea, commonly understood as the essence of his teaching.

4 KBJ 1:5a–6b, 是則遂以理氣爲一物。而無所別矣。近世羅整菴倡爲理氣非異物之說。至以朱子說爲非。

是滉尋常未達其指。不謂來喩之意亦似之也。

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Such an interpretation was based on a rather shallow reading of Zheng’an’s work, where we indeed find some quotations criticizing Zhu Xi’s overly dualistic understanding of the relationship between li and qi, e.g. in statements such as “li and qi are definitely two things” 理與氣决是二物.5 It is quite obvious, however, that Zheng’an at the same time respected Zhu Xi’s basic stance that li and qi are different yet inseparable entities. It would be rather misleading to interpret these two views, i.e. that li and qi are one thing or that they are two things, as an antithesis because their relationship is far more complex than can be defined by just a few characters. In the case of li and qi, it means that the correct interpretation of their relationship is not that they are one thing or two things but that they are “one but two, two but one” 一而二 二而一.6 This famous saying7 is a “mathematical” analogy to another description of their relationship: they are inseparable but are also not mixed 不離不雜. It is important to stress that this feature of the basic paradigm (the relationship between li and qi) also applies to other levels of transformation in relation to these entities and it is merely a question of perspective whether we want to see things and processes in their unity (“one”) or look for differences (“two”). All these aspects are well recorded in the Zheng’an statement:

When we speak about yin and yang, they are in taiji, when we speak about taiji, it is in yin and yang. This is one but two, two but one.8

In this sense, one or two are just parallel aspects of the same fact and do not exclude each another. A common error is to accept only one of them and thus fall into one-sidedness and partiality. Both of these false interpretations are very well described by a thinker who was partly sympathetic to Zheng’an’s approach, Iljae Yi Hang 一齋 李恒 (1499−1576) in his elucidation of the thesis that li and qi are one but two, two but one.

5 Originally Zhuzi yulei 4:13b, quoted in Kunzhiji 1:12.6 The translation of this expression is rather difficult because it plays on the ambiguity

associated with er in the same manner as does the famous thesis wuji er taiji. I am rather reluctant to use the existing Western translations as none of them grasps the problem in a grammatically correct way. For the problem of the translation of er in wuji er taiji we can find a list of translations in Wing-tsit Chan’s Reflections on Thing at Hand, 369−70. An interesting comment concerning this topic is the criticism of Georg von der Gabelentz by Alfred Forke, which offers a wide range of Western translations of er ranging from Jesuit “est” to German “dabei, ist zugleich, und doch” etc. See Georg von der Gabelentz, Thai-kih-thu, des Tscheu-Tsï Tafel des Urprinzipes, 32; and Alfred Forke, Geschichten der neueren chinesischen Philosophie, 49−50.

Irene Bloom translates this crucial phrase (一而二，二而一) in her book as “Unity implies duality and duality implies unity.” Irene Bloom, Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 82.

7 Wing-tsit Chan offers an introduction to the origins and uses of this saying beginning with Song masters, continuing with Luo Qinshun and finally quoting even T’oegye. Wing-tsit Chan, Chu Hsi: new studies, 311−14.

8 Kunzhiji 1:38, 言隂陽則太極在其中矣，言太極則隂陽在其中矣。一而二，二而一者也。

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Although li and qi are two things, their substance is one and it is not correct to divide them in two. Scholars of both ancient and modern times sometimes overly divided them and made them two and sometimes overly united them and made them one. Finally they did not know that they are one but two and two but one.9

Indeed, most of the misunderstandings concerning the Four-Seven Debate and general ideas of xinglixue connected with the relationship between li and qi are caused by the temptation of modern readers to search for antagonism instead of trying to find a common theoretical ground underpinning the opposing concepts. Yi Ŭrho,10 or most recently Ch’oe Yŏngjin,11 show that the difference between T’oegye and Kobong or Yulgok is not based on the fact that one sees things in a holistic and the other in an analytic way or that one advocates li and the other qi, but that they stress different aspects of a common paradigm. Simplified definitions of their ideas are products of a modern desire for a black-and-white categorization. In many cases the criticism of Zheng’an or Yulgok contained in 16th century sources was the result of a degree of hostility on the side of their opponents and as such was logically biased and prejudiced. The most typical accusations were that a certain author considered li and qi as one thing (as in the case of Zheng’an and later Yulgok) or improperly divided them into two (as is the case of T’oegye). One or two, holistic or analytic, adherence to authority or the search for an original point of view are not features which represent the opinion of a thinker but rather are two sides of the philosophical and moral goal of true Confucians, which should be a balanced and unbiased understanding of the Way and of ten thousand things.

The reason why T’oegye and Kobong agreed that Zheng’an’s theory did not belong to the orthodox discourse was that they believed that although li and qi were inseparable, the statement that they are one thing is exaggerated because it does not take into account the second feature of their relationship, i.e. that they are, at the same time, two things. It is possible to emphasize one aspect (sameness or difference, one or two etc.) as do both T’oegye and Kobong in their dialogue, but one has to be aware of the other aspect. The understanding of differences between acceptable and unacceptable interpretations of the common paradigm of different yet inseparable could begin with an analysis of T’oegye’s reprimand of Kobong, which preceded the allegation of similarity with Zheng’an’s theory: “You like sameness and hate difference, you find delight in mixing things together and detest analytical distinctions.”12 The correct approach is, in this case, not the opposite of the wrong approach, i.e. hate differences and find delight in sameness, but a balance between both perspectives.

9 Iljaejip 18a, 理氣雖是二物。而其體則一也。二之則不是。古今學者。理與氣。或太分而爲二。或太合而爲一。殊不知一而二。二而一焉。

10 Yi Ŭrho. “Kobonghak soron,” 9−30.11 Ch’oe Yŏngjin, Chosŏn yuhak sasangŭi yangsang, 11−32.12 KBJ 1:5b, 喜同而惡離。樂渾全而厭剖析。

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Kobong and T’oegye

This balance between “two” and “one” was also respected by Zheng’an but T’oegye was by no means willing to recognize it. Given T’oegye’s notorious aversion towards false learning, which, in his opinion, included the vast majority of Ming scholars,13 it is no surprise that most of his references to Zheng’an are strictly negative. A mere glimpse at the list of his heresiographical works collected in his chapchŏ 雜著 reveals the title of the treatise ”Demonstration that it is not so that li and qi are one thing” (Pi igiilmul pyŏnjŭng 非理氣一物辯證).14 This clearly represents his primary attitude towards Zheng’an’s theory. Although this text is not focused exclusively on Zheng’an, and T’oegye’s criticism is also targeted at Hwadam So Kyŏngdŏk 花潭 徐敬德 (1489−1546), other references to Zheng’an clearly show that in T’oegye’s eyes this scholar was merely a disguised Buddhist despoiling the Way in the same manner as other arch-heretics, most notably Lu Xiangshan15 and Wang Yangming.16

The comparison of Kobong and Zheng’an presented in his letter targeted against Kobong’s theories demonstrates that for T’oegye anything even remotely similar to Zheng’an’s works is completely erroneous. Errors in Kobong’s interpretation were proved not only by T’oegye’s counter-arguments but also by their similarity with Zheng’an’s teaching.

Kobong’s reply thus necessarily responds to both types of accusation, factual (he considers li and qi as one thing) and “heterodoxical” (his theory is similar to Zheng’an’s). With respect to the factual aspect, Kobong repeatedly asserted his acknowledgement of the distinction and separation of li and qi and stressed that “concerning these two, there exists a division,”17 and that “in my boorish explanation, from the beginning I have divided and distinguished li and qi as each having their boundaries and not being mixed together...and did not consider them as one thing.”18 As to the latter aspect of T’oegye’s accusation, Kobong absolutely rejects any inspiration from or similarity with Zheng’an’s theory.

As for the theories of Luo Zheng’an, I have not yet seen them and I do not know what they are but taking into account this one sentence, he is seriously at fault. Concerning myself I certainly do not consider li and qi as one thing, nor do I say that they are not

13 A list of the latest studies related to this topic is presented in my study “Chŏnsŭmnok nonbyŏn – T’oegye Yi Hwang’s Critique of Wang Yangming in 1566,” 131−54.

14 TGCS 41:20a.15 As in the remark, “Kunzhiji is considered to be expressing his opinion of later years and this

is identical to Xiangshan.” TGCS 41–7a, 困知記以爲其晩年所見。乃與象山合。16 See for example TGCS 13:5b, 13:5b−6a, 21:3a−3b.17 KBJ 1:2a, 二者固有分矣。18 KBJ 1:20a−b, 鄙說。當初分別得理氣。各有界限。不相淆雜。...非以理氣爲一物也。

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of different functioning. In my vulgar explanation from the beginning I had neither such intention, nor did I say such words.19

Although the answer is in compliance with the negative attitude towards Zheng’an and rejects his ideas, it creates more questions than answers in terms of the relationship between Zheng’an and Kobong. If we rule out the possibility that T’oegye’s accusation was simply an unfounded personal attack, we have to ask whether the similarity of Kobong’s and Zheng’an’s attitudes was incidental or not. Kobong’s statement that he was unaware of any of Zheng’an’s ideas opens up a broad field of historical research as to whether it was possible for him to be ignorant of the content of Kunzhiji, a frequently discussed text in the literati circles around the time of the T’oegye-Kobong dialogue. An almost detective-like investigation20 of how the newly imported Kunzhiji was spread among Chosŏn literati, based on collecting references and allusions scattered in the works of various authors, provides us with a clear picture that Kunzhiji was the real issue around 1560 (together with Wang Yangming’s Chuanxilu 傳習錄).

Given the consideration that many references to Zheng’an’s work in Korea were written by persons in close contact with Kobong, it would be rather surprising if he had no idea about this controversial topic. Even Kobong admits in a letter to Kim Hoesuk 金晦叔 (Kim Kye 金啓, 1528−74), written in 1566, that he had become acquainted with Kunzhiji “ten years ago,”21 which casts doubt on the above-mentioned claim. Another example can be found in the yŏnbo 年譜 of another influential thinker associated with the origins of the Four-Seven Debate, Hasŏ Kim Inhu 河西 金麟厚 (1510−60). Although the information is not first-hand and was recorded in a later period, it provides interesting facts in relation to Zheng’an’s teaching. Hasŏ biography stated that in the winter 1559 Kobong and Hasŏ discussed Luo Zheng’an’s opinion on the Mind of the Way and the Human mind,22 which clearly preceded his dialogue with T’oegye.

Although the research into the beginnings of Kobong’s contacts with Zheng’an’s “one thing” theory inevitably remains a pure hypothesis due to the lack of documents, we know that even before the Four-Seven Debate Kobong was exposed to ideas similar if not identical to this theory. This is evident in the records of Kobong’s

19 KBJ 1:21a, 羅整庵所論。不曾見得。不知如何。若据此一句。則其悞甚矣。若大升則固非以理氣爲一物。而亦不謂理氣非異爲也。鄙說初無是意。亦無是語。

20 Part of this task relating to the early period of the dissemination of Kunzhiji in Korea was completed by Yu Myŏngjong. However, there is still a lot of bibliographical research to be done. Standard data for Kunzhiji history in Korea use the transmission date 1553 and the first publication date 1560 (for the two quan edition). See Kim Yongjae, “Yangmyŏnghakŭi hyŏngsŏng kwajŏnge kwanhan yŏksa, ch’ŏrhakjŏk koch’al- Myŏnggwa Chosŏnŭi sasangsarŭl chungsimŭro,” 331.

21 KBJ 3:59b−60b, this letter is devoted to the experiences of Kobong and other Korean thinkers with Kunzhiji.

22 Hasŏ sŏnsaengjip purok 3:25b.

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discussion on the relationship of taiji and yin and yang in which Iljae Yi Hang 一齋 李恒 (1499−1576) presented the opinion that taiji and two modes, in other words li and qi, are one thing. But can the existence of these contacts of Kobong and the discussed theory support the claim that he was influenced or inspired by this idea?

Probably not, because, as we have mentioned, the proximity to one or the other side of “two and one” is a very common feature of every daoxue scholar. However, we can be quite sure that even if Kobong had known Kunzhiji, he would never have admitted it. In T’oegye’s well respected opinion, as regards orthodoxy, any consent or similarity with the theory that “li and qi are one thing” inevitably means accepting the criticism of Zhu Xi. At the same time, whoever criticizes Master Zhu should be excluded from the orthodox discourse of Korean scholars. For this very reason we can hardly find any Chosŏn literati23 who would openly agree with Zheng’an’s thesis which challenges the basic paradigm of the orthodox view on li and qi, based on Master Zhu’s authority.

The following T’oegye comment on Zheng’an in his Ŏnhaengnok 言行錄 well illustrates his antipathy and shows that these attitudes were also later shared by his younger colleague. Kobong, under T’oegye’s influence, felt the need to distance himself clearly from Zheng’an’s theories.

The Teacher’s opinion on this teaching was that Zheng’an considered himself as someone rejecting heresies but while he refused them in yang he supported them in yin, he used them on one side and forbade them on the other. In reality, Zheng’an violated the teaching of Masters Cheng and Zhu. (The Teacher) got into an intense argument with Sojae [No Susin] about it but Sojae did not accept it as true till the end. It was only Kobong Ki Taesŭng who shared the Teacher’s opinion and wrote Non Konjigi, the postscript, which refuses this teaching. When the Master read it, he said: These arguments are clear and straightforward. It is not a simple matter; it is not a simple matter.24

The emphatic sigh at the end of the quotation assures us that T’oegye was well aware of the fact that refuting Zheng’an’s teaching was complicated because of its resemblance to orthodox stances. Nevertheless, it may be said that at least in Kobong’s case he found complete understanding, which later (in 1564) led Kobong to compose Non Konjigi 論困知記, a resolute attack against Kunzhiji.25 This treatise

23 Iljae faced strong criticism for his statement on taiji and revised his radical stance. The legendary Sojae No Susin 蘇齋 盧守愼 (1515−90) remained the only real advocate of Zheng’an.

24 TGCS, T’oegye sŏnsaeng ŏnhaengnok 5:13a, 先生以整庵之學。自謂闢異端。陽排陰助。左遮右攔。實程朱之罪人也。與蘇齋力辨之。終不以爲然。獨高峯奇大升。與先生合謂作論困知記跋以斥其學。先生見之曰這議論極明快。甚不易甚不易。

25 Kobong worked with the edition of Kunzhiji, consisting of four quan and a supplement. See KBJ 2:45b.

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may serve as an excellent survey of the neuralgic points of Zheng’an’s teachings, which are summarized in the statement: “This book says that the Mind of the Way is nature and Human mind are feelings, that li and qi are one thing and that liangzhi is not the principle of Heaven etc.”26 It also offers a wide range of personal insults against Zheng’an, accusing him of proximity to Buddhism (“his teaching is derived from Chan’s teaching”其學之出於禪學)27 and we may say that the purpose of the critique was not to dispute but rather to destroy. Such intolerance only highlights the orthodox stance of Korean scholars that the worst enemies of orthodoxy are the authors inside the Confucian school and not outside, such as open enemies represented by Buddhists or shamans, and that the alleged treason of the orthodox Zhu Xi’s canonical theses met with a very sharp reaction in the Korean environment.

We have to stress that although Zheng’an and his Kunzhiji raised criticisms among Chinese scholars from various sides, this never reached the heights of the Korean attacks and Zheng’an was, in China, considered as a distinguished scholar of his time. The unbiased account of Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 (1610−95), Mingru xuean 明儒學案, lists him among the important Ming scholars and awards him significant praise, even stressing his contributions in refuting Buddhism, indeed a very different evaluation from that of his Korean accusers.

Yulgok

The rejection of Zheng’an’s theory by T’oegye set a precedent for later generations of scholars; however, not in the absolute sense. An example of an alternative view on Zheng’an can be found in the work of the second giant of the Four-Seven Debate, Yulgok. Yulgok’s attitude towards unorthodox ideas was relatively tolerant compared to T’oegye’s and Toegye even expressed his concerns about Yulgok’s ideological purity.28 Besides Yulgok’s frequently mentioned youthful experience with Buddhism, his works, for example, include a commentary on Daodejing, something rather unusual for an orthodox Confucian. But although Yulgok showed a more lenient attitude towards “false learning” and claimed that it was better to study unorthodox Lu Xiangshan rather than spend days in laziness and debauchery (like many literati of the Eastern country were prone to do),29 he was always an advocate of correct learning. His interest in Zheng’an’s work was not a matter of pure curiosity for unorthodox learning; it was rather a serious attempt to justly evaluate ideas of the Ming author from the orthodox, i.e. his own perspective.

Most of the studies dealing with the relationship between Zheng’an and Yulgok are introduced by the quotation from Yulgok’s letter to Ugye, which described the author’s relationship with three of the most important thinkers of his time.

26 KBJ 2:45b, 其書所稱道心。性也。人心。情也。及理氣爲一物。及良知非天理云云者。27 KBJ 2:47a, 其學之出於禪學者。益無所遁矣。28 TGCS 14:18a−b. 29 YGCS 13:33a−34b.

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Recently, I looked at the explanations of three masters: Zheng’an, T’oegye and Hwadam. Zheng’an is the best, T’oegye comes after and Hwadam is the last. Among them, Hwadam and Zheng’an feature signs that in many cases they achieved something on their own while T’oegye gives the impression that he largely depended on the model of Zhu Xi, whose explanations he followed. The way Zheng’an understood the complete substance was, in some cases, not absolutely brilliant and he was not able to deeply trust Master Zhu... That is the reason why there were cases when his words cross the boundaries and slide into the error that li and qi are one thing. However, he did not really consider li and qi as one thing.30

This evaluation strikingly differs from the previous evaluations of Zheng’an and the Ming author is suddenly described not as a heretic but as being even superior to T’oegye. The above mentioned quotation shows that in spite of the critical stance of his predecessors Yulgok was independent enough to formulate his own opinions. In order to understand the real meaning of Yulgok’s statement, we have to analyze other references to Zheng’an in the letters of the debate between Yulgok and Ugye and formulate two questions arising from the previous quotation: why did Yulgok value Zheng’an more than T’oegye and why did he state that Zheng’an “did not really consider li and qi as one thing,” contrary to the widely accepted image of the Ming author?

There is a simple answer to the first question: Yulgok admired Zheng’an exactly for the same reasons for which T’oegye despised him. Both Yulgok and Zheng’an participated in the philosophical tradition of xinglixue, which shared certain views on li and qi, deriving authority from a slightly different scholarly tradition and logically came to the same conclusions. Their tradition followed a subtle distinction in the basic framework of daoxue which was already noticeable among the Song masters, Shao Yong and Zhang Zai, in their speculations about qi, on one hand, and in Zhu Xi’s elucidations of li on the other. Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi and the basic differences in their interpretations can be used as good example of this distinction. However, this philosophical current should not be understood as being in opposition to the rest of daoxue (as qi-monism versus li-monism) but rather as one alternative in the spectrum of possible interpretations.

Both Zheng’an and Yulgok belonged to this tradition. They shared an appreciation of the same authors, frequently quoting the same statements such as Mingdao’s “concrete things are the Way and the Way is concrete things”31 and metaphors and

30 YGCS 10:37a−b, 近觀整菴,退溪,花潭三先生之說。整菴最高。退溪次之。花潭又次之。就中整菴花潭。多自得之味。退溪多依樣之味。一從朱子之說整菴則望見全體。而微有未盡瑩者。且不能深信朱子。...故言或有過當者。微涉於理氣一物之病。而實非以理氣爲一物也。

31 See Jinsilu 1:19, 道亦器 器亦道. Although I use Wing-tsit Chan’s translation, Michael Kalton uses a very nice translation for qi 器 “The [concrete] implement is also the Tao; the Tao is also the [concrete] implement.” Qi has many possible meanings, the best of them is, of course, used by Confucius in Lunyu 3:22, 管仲之器小哉。

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exhibiting a slightly critical attitude toward some traditional interpretations of Zhu Xi’s theses.32

In spite of the fact that many of these similarities that are found in Yulgok’s work could be considered as having derived from his reading of Kunzhiji, it is rather problematic and superfluous to search for similarities, because after all, they both share the same theoretical background, or for differences, because each interpretation of this theoretical background differs.

The most important point of disagreement is found in the case of Zheng’an’s “one thing” theory which Yulgok labelled as an obvious mistake, although he added the remark that Zheng’an did not really consider li and qi as one thing. The following two references to Zheng’an in the letters to Ugye explain both the reasons for disagreement, but at the same time indicate why Yulgok considered these theories to be more plausible compared to T’oegye.

Master Cheng said: “Concrete things are the Way and the Way is concrete things.” Here he said that li and qi cannot be separated but those who read it finally understood it that li and qi is one thing … even a man of Luo Zheng’an’s lofty intelligence and sophistication also had a problem regarding li and qi as one thing. And even though nowadays there is no match for the exactness and careful precision of T’oegye, his thesis that “li gives issue and qi follows it” likewise had a slight problem regarding li and qi having priority and posteriority.33

Among the Confucians of recent times, Luo Zheng’an stood out as the most knowledgeable and keen-minded. He knew something of the Great Foundation,34 but in spite of that he doubted whether Master Zhu might have an (excessively) dualistic view. Although he did not understand Master Zhu, he had an understanding of the Great Foundation.

32 The variety of methods dealing with a suitable interpretation of Zhu Xi is very broad, ranging from the search for “the final conclusion” used by Wang Yangming and also by Zheng’an (Kunzhiji 1:11) to the correction of improper exegesis used by later scholars. Compare, for example, Zheng’an’s statement concerning Master Zhu’s thesis that “li and qi are definitely two things” in Kunzhiji 1:12, where he states that “the slight differences in Master Zhu’s view are illustrated in statements like the following: “li and qi are definitely two things” …one does not know which to take as his final conclusion” (trans. I. Bloom) 所謂朱子小有未合者，蓋其言有云：理與氣決是二物。…不知竟以何者爲定論也。Yulgok’s approach to the same quotation is in YGCS 10:8a, “Master Zhu said: “li and qi are definitely two things.” Here he said that li and qi are not mutually mixed, but those who read it understood that li and qi have priority and posteriority.” 朱子曰。理氣決是二物。此言理氣之不相挾雜。而見者遂以理氣爲有先後。

33 YGCS 10:8b, 程子曰。器亦道。道亦器。此言理氣之不能相離。而見者遂以理氣爲一物。…至如羅整菴以高明超卓之見。亦微有理氣一物之病。退溪之精詳謹密。近代所無。而理發氣隨之說。亦微有理氣先後之病。

34 See the first chapter of Zhongyong and the subsequent Zhu Xi’s commentary.

The Man Behind: Luo Qinshun and Korean Confucianism • 573

But when he considered the Human mind and the Mind of the Way as a matter of substance and function he lost what was the meaning of these terms and that is likewise regrettable. Nonetheless, Zheng’an’s mistake is at the level of terminology, while T’oegye’s mistake is at the level of nature and principle. T’oegye’s error is thus relatively more serious.35

Yulgok knew very well that Zheng’an’s statement was merely a rhetorical attack against the false interpretation of Zhu Xi’s definition of li and qi as “two things” and that Zheng’an’s stress on the unity of the two entities was a reaction to the overly dualistic interpretation of the relationship between li and qi. Yulgok’s idea was almost identical. He preferred his own interpretation that focused on the interdependence of li and qi as an antipode to T’oegye’s dualistic theory of “mutual issuance” hobal 互發, which was in his opinion inadequate because it separated li and qi. In this sense, Yulgok’s theoretical perspective was closer to Zheng’an’s than to T’oegye’s and he naturally considered T’oegye’s mistakes as methodologically more serious than Zheng’an’s. Despite the fact that he thought Zheng’an’s point of view was theoretically correct, he considered it unbalanced because it included only one aspect of the basic paradigm “one and two, two and one.” Zheng’an and T’oegye made the same methodological mistake and Yulgok underlined this similarity in the above-mentioned (YCGS 10:8a) parallel criticism; one of them belonged to those persons who “finally understood that li and qi are one thing” and the other to those who “understood that li and qi have priority and posteriority.”

This disarray of evaluations may be summarized in the following order: those who are right are Zhu Xi because he had a balanced understanding of “two and one” and Yulgok himself because he kept the same balance. Both Zheng’an and T’oegye were wrong because their interpretations were one-sided. Zheng’an placed too much stress on unity and T’oegye overemphasized duality. The final verdict, stressing that duality is a more serious mistake than the opposite, was Yulgok’s personal choice, which was closer to his own interpretation.

It is rather surprising that in spite of Yulgok’s theoretical affinity to Zheng’an’s teaching the letters to Ugye quoted above are the only references to Zheng’an in his whole work. Given Yulgok’s surprisingly high evaluation of Zheng’an in his letters to Ugye we would expect more. This omission may be caused by the fact that Kunzhiji was already labelled as unorthodox and it would have probably been futile to defend Zheng’an with the argument that his thesis about “one thing” was only a part of his theory and that he did not mean it in the same sense as the majority of Chosŏn scholars understood it. Yulgok was already preoccupied with a defence of his own in relation to the opinion of many colleagues as to his unorthodox views

35 YGCS 10:13a, 羅整菴識見高明。近代傑然之儒也。有見於大本。而反疑朱子有二岐之見。此則雖不識朱子。而却於大本上有見矣。但以人心道心爲體用。失其名義。亦可惜也。雖然。整菴之失。在於名目上。退溪之失。在於性理上。退溪之失較重矣。

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and he could not afford to defend Zheng’an. It is also true that besides his view on li and qi Zheng’an was the author of many other theories which were clearly beyond the boundaries of Zhu Xi’s orthodox interpretation (for example Zheng’an’s theory of suoyiran 所以然 etc.). However, the strategy of not mentioning Kunzhiji and Zheng’an did not protect Yulgok from attacks targeted at his attention to and sympathy for the Ming scholar. Udam Chŏng Sihan 愚潭 丁時翰 (1625−1707) thus described Zheng’an as the one who “thought that li and qi are one thing and did not differ from the opinion of Xiangshan …and clearly rejected the definitions of Master Zhu”36 and stated with animosity that “Yulgok thus took Zheng’an as his model.”37

Nongmun

The perceptions of Luo Qinshun seem to be so diverse that we are tempted to attribute many features of his critique to personal preferences or biases towards Korean scholars and the heated atmosphere of the Four-Seven Debate times. But these judgments about Zheng’an (both positive and negative) were not the final verdict in relation to the Ming scholar. Yulgok and T’oegye represent only the tip of a considerable body of Korean scholars who continued in the analysis and critique of Kunzhiji and its author. Scholars who devoted specialized treatises to this issue range from Yi Hyŏnik 李玄益 (1678−1717) and his Konjigi pyŏn 困知記辨, to Han Wŏnjin 韓元震 (1682−1715) with his Na Chŏng’am Konjigi pyŏn 羅整菴困知記辨 or Yi Hangno 李恒老 (1791−1868) and his Konjigi nog’ŭi 困知記錄疑. There were also many others who dealt with this issue at considerable length, such as Yun Hyu (1617−80), Kim Ch’anghyŏp 金昌協 (1651−1708) or O Hŭisang 吳熙常 (1763−1833). Although Korean Confucian debates and controversies changed their topics and focus many times, Kunzhiji remained as the central point of disputes concerning problems of liangzhi, the difference between human nature and the nature of animals, or li and its status etc. The reason for this unceasing attention to Kunzhiji and its message was simply the fact that Zheng’an covered almost every aspect of the traditional daoxue paradigm with his alternative interpretations. The discussion about many topics thus inevitably led to at least a mention or a brief discussion about his stance. The mechanism used for this acceptance or refutation of the Ming philosopher shows some common features, which we would like to demonstrate in relation to the case of Nongmun Im Sŏngju.

Nongmun, a distinguished thinker himself, is famous enough to be considered as one of the Korean scholars most supportive of Zheng’an and his theories (and well versed in his work, too). This attitude even accorded him a certain critique-

36 Udamjip 7, 以理氣爲一物者。不外於象山之見。…。顯斥朱子之定論37 Udamjip 7, 栗谷則祖述整庵。38 Nojujip 25:5a, 整庵，鹿門。均是爲理氣一物之論。

The Man Behind: Luo Qinshun and Korean Confucianism • 575

like opinion that “Zheng’an and Nongmun are equally saying that li and qi are one thing”38 or that “Nongmun is a transformed Zheng’an”39 but it also attracted the attention of many modern scholars to his own work.

The proximity or similarity of their philosophical stances is attested not only by their common contempt for people who “only believe in Zhu Xi’s words that li and qi are definitely two things,”40 but also by numerous quotations from Kunzhiji, accompanied by Nongmun’s praise and compliments. On the other hand, we can also find some critical points which we would like to analyze.

Nongmun’s complex philosophical system is an attempt to overcome what he thought to be an improper division of li and qi. In his view, people were not aware of the absolute correspondence between these two terms, which can be summarized in the slogan that “li and qi are real in the same manner” igi tongsil 理氣同實. This means that when li is universal, there also has to be a universal qi, and when there is a particular li, there also has to be a particular qi. Nongmun’s goal was to develop a system which could fulfil this demand for the absolute theoretical consistency of the correspondence between li and qi on every level, i.e. not only in abstract categories but also in the cluster of problems surrounding the theory of human nature.

In this process, among many other sources, he naturally used or disputed Kunzhiji and expressed various opinions about its content and writer. The first point where we can see differences between both authors is in relation to the question of a not yet manifested state of feelings, weifa/mibal 未發. This crucial term of Zhongyong and all Korean debates from the Four-Seven Debate to Horak Controversy is explained by Zheng’an in the following sense:

Not only do all people have equilibrium before feelings have been aroused, but all things have it, too, for equilibrium is the “great foundation of the world” and it cannot be different in human beings and in things.41

The question of the difference between human nature and the nature of animals, the crucial topic of the Horak debate, is also the starting point of Nongmun’s general theory. He argues against Zheng’an’s statement that there exists a universal nature in all creatures in a non-aroused state. Nongmun states that universal nature cannot exist even in a “non-aroused” state because humans and animals (even in a “non-aroused”state) differ in their endowment of qi, which is in the case of man (contrary to animals) a “balanced and correct qi of Heaven and Earth and therefore they have a balanced and correct de.”42

39 Nojujip 32, 是整庵轉爲鹿門。40 Nongmunjip 19:3b,只信朱子决是二物之語。41 Kunzhiji 35, 未發之中，非惟人人有之，乃至物物有之。蓋中爲天下之大本，人與物不容

有二。(trans. Irene Bloom).42 Nongmunjip 19:8a, 天地中正之氣。故有此中正之德。

576 • VLADIMÍR GLOMB

Equilibrium is a quality belonging only to humans and not to other creatures or things.

Concerning things and animals they get partial and one-sided qi and therefore their de is also partial and one-sided. Because of that [the nature] of water is to soak and descend, of fire to blaze and ascend, of wood to be crooked and to be straight, of metal to obey and to change and land’s nature is in sowing and gathering43 and that’s it.. It has never been referred to by the words “appropriateness” or “equilibrium.” If all things really had equilibrium of not aroused they would have one-sided qi and balanced li.44

According to the basic rule of the correspondence between li and qi, a different li requires a different qi and vice versa. The nature of things is thus logically different from that of humans. Zheng’an in this case contradicts his own emphasis on the unity of li and qi. In Nongmun opinion they obviously do not correspond to each other and when they do not correspond it means that they are different. This statement is very close to the theory that li and qi are two and not one. This sudden flash of dualism in Zheng’an’s system attracted attention to yet another case of the “dualistic” approach, such as for example in his analysis of crucial passages from Zhongyong:

Zheng’an said that nature is the same with the Mandate (ming) and that the Way is different from its forms (xing) and he also said “man and things acquire their initial qi at birth and their li is only one and universal. What is conferred by Heaven is nature and when it acquires forms it is divided and different.45 Following nature is called the Way and if it were like this people and things in the state of initial qi would have only nature but not the Way and when they acquire forms they would have only Way and not nature. The Way would be divided and has belonged to Heaven and man, substance and function would be cut off and a difference between the old and the present would be created. If it is like in this argument, it is clearly nonsense.46

Nongmun was deeply disappointed that his favourite Ming scholar fell into the same trap he was criticizing: the dualism between li and qi. Although his mistake was not on a general level, but rather in relation to a subtle interpretation of a basic

43 Shujing, Hongfan 5.44 Nongmunjip 19:8a, 至於物則得氣之偏。故其德亦偏。是以水曰潤下。火曰炎上。木曰曲

直。金曰從革。土爰稼穡。如斯而已。未甞說衷字中字。夫物物果皆有未發之中。則氣偏理中。

45 Kunzhiji 15.46 Nongmunjip 19:20b, 整庵甞云性以命同。道以形異。又云人物之生。受氣之初。其理惟

一。天命之性。成形之後。其分則殊。率性之道。果若是則受氣之初。只有性而無道。成形之後。只有道而無性。性道分屬天人。體用截作古今。似此議論。直是不成說話。

The Man Behind: Luo Qinshun and Korean Confucianism • 577

paradigm, Zheng’an failed to understand the minute nuances of the basic theory. We are witnessing a paradox shift in the evaluation of Zheng’an; the problem is not that he is considering li and qi as one thing, but that he is considering them as two. But does it mean that Nongmun is more unorthodox that Zheng’an?

Certainly not, because Nongmun (like every Korean scholar) was deeply convinced that his theories were in full accord with Zhu Xi and did not hesitate to proclaim his adherence to him (contrary to Zheng’an, who was more reserved). Nongmun also criticized Zheng’an not only for his contradictory statements47 but more specifically for his lack of understanding of the Song masters (which he considered the real cause of this contradiction):

Zheng’an was very good in subtle understanding but he was not very thorough… he was also not able to investigate in broader perspective and work on a hidden meaning of Master Zhu’s theories to fully understand them and comprehend and connect them in harmony…so what he called “not to be sure in consistence”48 was not that Master Zhu was not consistent but in fact it was Zheng’an who was not consistent in his understanding.”49

We are facing here a standard phenomenon in Korean Confucian discourse; although the interpretation can be more or less contradictory to Zhu Xi (or what was commonly understood under this label), it is always important to proclaim adherence to orthodoxy. Nongmun was far more radical in his accent on the unity of li and qi than Zheng’an but due to his stress on argumentum ab auctoritate, i.e. presenting his arguments under the cover of Zhu Xi’s interpretation, he is remaining within the realm of orthodoxy.

Conclusion

If we evaluate Zheng’an’s role in relation to the authors of the Four-Seven Debate and to the later development of Korean Confucianism, we see him as the man in the background, a person whose ideas and work are considered important (both in the positive and negative sense) but who is rarely openly mentioned. The reason for this ostracism was the negative image which certain Korean thinkers developed right from the beginning of the transmission of Zheng’an’s work to Korea. The question of why such a prominent Chinese scholar, a well-known adversary of Wang Yangming and a resolute proponent of traditional daoxue, was labelled as a problematic author in Korea has several possible answers. The explanation that Zheng’an criticized Zhu Xi is valid for many Korean scholars but certainly

47 Nongmunjip 19:9b, 往往有自相矛盾者多。48 Accusation of Zheng’an against Zhu Xi and Cheng Yi, see Kunzhiji 20 and 73.49 Nongmunjip 19:9b, 盖整庵長於妙悟而短於周匝。...其於朱子諸說。亦未能博考潛玩。會

通融貫。...然則其所謂未定于一者。非朱子之未一也。實整庵未能會通爲一也。

578 • VLADIMÍR GLOMB

not objective. Given the complexity of Zhu Xi’s work, every scholar after Zhu Xi contradicted this paragon, at least to a degree. We should not forget that even T’oegye argued in the Four-Seven Debate that his basic thesis in the Debate is correct because of its striking similarity with Zhu Xi’s statement on the Four beginnings and Seven emotions50 but Kobong was able to support his own contrary opinion by quoting the same author, Zhu Xi.51 This, of course, does not mean that Zhu Xi contradicts himself but it simply shows the broad range of possible interpretations concerning his crucial theories. In this sense, we may clearly state that Zheng’an was no less orthodox than the authors of the Debate or other Korean scholars. The true problem was that Zheng’an was, from the beginning, associated with one of the two possible extremes of xinglixue theory-that “li and qi are one thing.” More precisely, in Korea, Zheng’an was selected to be the alleged representative of this theory in order to serve as a negative example and a warning to everybody who chose to be associated with this interpretation of daoxue metaphysics. This goal was partially achieved but it did not prevent some scholars, such as Yulgok, from supporting Zheng’an’s theories (despite the fact that they rhetorically agreed that they were too extreme). The result was that some people used the name of the Ming author as an insult and others stated that he was better than his critics and considered him to be worthy of becoming a respected authority.

Primary sourcesHasŏ sŏnsaengjip 河西先生集 [Collected Works of Master Hasŏ]. Seoul: Minjok munhwa

ch’ujinhoe 民族文化推進會, 2005–2010.Iljaejip 一齋集 [Collected Works of Iljae]. Seoul: Minjok munhwa ch’ujinhoe 民族文化推進會,

2005–2010.Kobongjip 高峰集 [Collected Works of Kobong]. Seoul: Minjok munhwa ch’ujinhoe 民族文化

推進會, 2005–2010.Kunzhiji 困知記. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe 上海古籍出版社, 1987.Kunzhiji 困知記. Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan 臺灣商務印書館, 1985.Nojujip 老洲集 [Collected Works of Noju]. Seoul: Minjok munhwa ch’ujinhoe 民族文化推進

會, 2005–2010.Nongmunjip 鹿門集 [Collected Works of Nongmun]. Seoul: Minjok munhwa ch’ujinhoe 民族

文化推進會, 2005–2010.Udamjip 愚潭集 [Collected Works of Udam]. Seoul: Minjok munhwa ch’ujinhoe 民族文化推

進會, 2005–2010.T’oegye chŏnsŏ 退溪全書 [Complete Works of T’oegye]. Seoul: Sŏnggyungwan taehakkyo

Taedong munhwa yŏnguwŏn 成均館大學校 大東文化研究院, 1971.Yulgok chŏnsŏ 栗谷全書 [Complete Works of Yulgok]. Seoul: Minjok munhwa ch’ujinhoe 民族

文化推進會, 2005–2010.

50 Zhuzi yulei 53:17b.51 A good comparison between Zhu Xi and Kobong from this perspective is provided in Ch’oe

Yŏngch’an, “Chuja ch’ŏrhakesŏ pon sach’illon,” 91−122.

The Man Behind: Luo Qinshun and Korean Confucianism • 579

AbbreviationsKBJ = KobongjipTGCS = T’oegye chŏnsŏYGCS = Yulgok chŏnsŏ

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