The Islamic Religion and Cultural Diversity in Contemporary Russia : Case Study of North Caucasus...

OMNES : The Journal of Multicultural Society｜2014. Vol.5 No.1, pp. 22-47.

❙Special Issue❙

The Islamic Religion and Cultural Diversity in Contemporary Russia :

Case Study of North Caucasus Region, Dagestan*1)

Marya S. Rozanova & Akhmet A. Yarlykapov

Abstract

The article largely based on field research presents an analysis of the branches of Islam in contemporary Russia (North Caucasus region) and its influ-ence on ethnically diverse society (on the example of Republic of Dagestan). In this context authors examine complexity of ethnic composition and the role of ethnicity, focusing in particular on identity changes in the Republic of Dagestan. Authors describe general global trends as well as regional features (“local forms of Islam”) of the Islamic religion, which partly confirm and partly refute the perception that the “Islamic factor” plays a role in the development of culturally diverse society. Particular attention is paid to radical forms of Islam.

❚Key words：Islam, Islamic globalization, ethnicity, diversity, North Caucasus,

Dagestan.

Introduction

The Muslim world contains many different and distinctive regions

and peoples. By the sixteenth century, the Muslim community was no

longer exclusively Middle Eastern as Islam became a multi-civilizational

entity of both urban-based and nomadic societies. This Islamic entity

boasted extensive diversity within a broad network of peoples and groups,

yet had enough commonalities to claim its place in the «Islamic world»

* Authors would like to acknowledge the help of Anna I. Klyukanova for her translation and valuable research assistance.

OMNES : The Journal of Multicultural Society｜2014. Vol.5 No.1 23

(Voll, 2010, pp. 6-7).

In the modern culturally diverse society of Russia, the Islamic reli-

gion is affected by trends that act on global Ummah, or Muslim

community. As a result of the introduction of modern forms of communi-

cation and the subsequent accelerated dissemination of ideas, modern

Islam is experiencing a transitional period characterized by a growth of

fundamentalism, radicalism, processes of ‘Islamic globalization’ and in-

creased patchiness of Islam in the world.

Russia is composed of four Islamic cultural subregions. In addition

to the traditional North Caucasus and Volga regions with compact settling

of muslim population, there are also “hybrid” subregions created as a

result of active internal and external migration processes: Central Russia

and the oil-producing North.

The need to focus on one region – the North Caucasus, and partic-

ularly on Dagestan – is determined by its regionally traditional ethnic

diversity, the exclusive role of Islam in the cultural identity of the ma-

jority of the population and the preservation of principles of poly-ethnicity

and diversity in the region for a long period of time.

Figure 1

The map of the North Caucasus region (Russian Federation)

24 OMNES : The Journal of Multicultural Society｜2014. Vol.5 No.1

Islam has a long history in the North Caucasus, where the vast ma-

jority of Muslims are Sunni, which shows a very high adaptive potential

of this world religion. The Islamic religion has managed to “digest” the

local customs and traditions because first of all, Islam permits the ex-

istence of local traditions and customary law if they do not explicitly

contradict Islamic customs and Islamic law (Sharia). Secondly, Sufism,

which is widely spread in Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia, has re-

tained many local cults, including the uncharacteristic for Islam cult of

saints and cult of holy places, subjecting them to superficial Islamization

but not depriving them of the old, pre-Islamic meanings (Bulatov, 2003,

pp. 103-116). Thus, Islam played a major role in preserving the diverse

appearance of this region (Isaev, 2001). Penetrating the culture of in-

digenous peoples, Islam shaped local forms of the Islamic religion

(Leontovich, 2002), characterized by the combination of inter-Islamic cul-

tural codes and the local culture, largerly based on traditional law (adat1)).

An important influence was Sufism, which entered the territory of

Dagestan early on and helped to preserve the local cults under the guise

of worshipping holy places and the graves of saints associated with the

activities of the Sufi Sheikhs (Aliyev et al., 2007, pp. 119-124). All of

this contributed to the conservation of the mosaic of Dagestani cultures

under the Islamic umbrella.

Moreover, in the previous times, Islam’s tolerance of the Abrahamic

religions (Christianity and Judaism) allowed regional Muslims to peace-

fully coexist with followers of these religions and be incorporated into

the non-Muslim state, which has always been the Russian Empire/USSR/

modern Russia. In the region, Islam has always presented itself as a

unique mosaic of different forms and movements, which essentially sup-

ported the basic principles of heterogeneous poly-ethnic society.

Since the late 1980s, the North Caucasus has undergone major

changes that radically changed the religious landscape in the region.

During all these years, the role of Islam has been growing rapidly, ac-

tively infiltrating into different spheres of life for the Caucasian people.

The modern map depicting the spread of Islam in the Caucasus has


changed dramatically. Traditionally, the region had the following areas

of distribution of various currents of Islam:

1. Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia – the Sunni region dominated sha-

fiizm; the strong influence of Sufism;

2. The Central and North-Western Caucasus – Sunni Hanafi.

First of all, the previously nonexistent contact between followers

of the two Sunni factions – Hanafi and Shafi’i – is growing. This process

is appearing against the background of a rising number of those who

advocate for the abolition of boundaries between the various sects of

Islam. (This conclusion is also based on extended field research done

with Salafi Jamaat in Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and

Dagestan. During interviews conducted by one of the authors, A.

Yarlykapov, the question regarding taqlid following madhhabs was al-

ways raised. The opinion of Salafis of the North Caucasus is that the

boundaries between mazhabs should be eliminated and the foundation

of Islamic practice should become the criterion of the validity of the

Islamic tradition set by hadith).

Today, Muslims all over the world are gradually entering into an

era of “Islamic globalization” that seeks to erase ethnic and national boun-

daries between them (Roy, 2004). “Islamic globalization”, which is pre-

dominantly based on the Middle Eastern cultural norms, tends to penetrate

the Salafist groups that focus on preachers from the Middle East.

Among the common features of the “Islamic globalization” are the

following:

1. The desire to go beyond the division of Islam into factions and

sects. The idea of a single Islamic “nation” is becoming increasingly

popular and ethnic identity is becoming secondary to that of the

religious one.2) People with such views say: “First and foremost,

we are Muslims, and only after that we are Arabs, Persians,


Chechens, and so on.” This way, such identities as civic and politi-

cal are not even the second place. As the highest good of their

motherland for these people they proclaim a complete subordination

of all life in a country with Islamic values. This search for a univer-

sal, “ideal” Islam that would unite the whole Muslim Ummah ig-

nores the diversity and patchiness of ‘real’ Islam. This process in-

evitably implies fundamentalization. According to ideologists of

Islamic globalism, a universal Islam exists, but it should be sepa-

rated from the later accretions (Graf et al., 2009). Their version

of Islam is rather simple: it is based on the Quran and the Sunnah,

while the achievements of Islamic thought accumulated over 14

centuries are being ignored. Even if the heritage is recognized – itself an admission that there is no need to exert much effort in

receiving a thorough education and comprehending the intricacies

of interpreting sacred texts when a minimum knowledge is sufficient

– this is a very serious step towards youth radicalism.

2. The transition of modern Islam to a network form of organization

and activism. Network activism3) helps to quickly distribute ideas

and penetrate many different (often initially adverse) communities,

such as the cases of Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia in the

mid-2000s (Kurbanov, 2010, p. 156). This kind of Islamic activism

offered by youth leaders was completely alien to local Sufi

communities. However, attempts to counteract it with the punitive

power of the state did not succeed: youth network structures have

become an integral part of the Muslim landscape of these three

republics. The widespread use of modern technology – mobile and

satellite communications, the Internet, etc. – helps the development

of network forms of organization and activity (Bunt, 2009). Today,

the Muslim youth community becomes extraterritorial. In the past,

if members of the Muslim community visited the same mosque on

Fridays, lived in the same neighborhood and knew each other in

person, now, the criteria has changed. Like-minded individuals can

create real social networking through virtual technologies.4)


All these forms of Islamic globalization are informal, coming from

the ground up, which is undoubtedly their strength. This version of Islam,

which spread among Russian Muslim youth, received the name of “new”

Islam. There is already some opposition in the title itself, which harbors

a serious danger (it can be considered as a danger since there is a “new”

Islam, that means that there is an “old” Islam, which is perceived as

a “fake” version of Islam (Yarlykapov, 2010, pp. 110-111)). Nevertheless,

we cannot close our eyes to this trend and pretend that there is only

a small group of young extremists who do not have much influence

among Muslims in the North Caucasus region.

It is important to note that ‘Islamic globalization’ bears the imprint

of global trends in the sphere of information wars between ‘Eastern and

Western civilizations’, in the terminology of S. Huntington. Distrust and

a false sense of vilification was created among Muslims through the por-

trayal of Islam as a threat to modern Western civilization (Ousman, 2004,

p. 67). According to the widespread opinion in the West, Islam is in

direct opposition to the spirit of multiculturalism that has been cultivating

in Western societies (Kumar & Sharma, 2010, p. 64). This confrontation

affects intercultural relations in most regions of the planet, including

Russia.

New Islamic Movements and Challenges for Culturally Diverse Societies : Case Study of Dagestan

This article is based on field research that has been conducted an-

nually in the North Caucasus since 1995, either with the personal par-

ticipation or under the direction of one of the authors, Akhmet

Yarlykapov. Through continuous observations, it was possible to track

the dynamics of the processes of the Islamic revival, or re-Islamization,

in this complex region of the Russian Federation. The Dagestani case

was thoroughly investigated in the autumn of 2011 when five focus

groups were held in the Republic of Dagestan with representatives of


different social groups: students, social workers, teachers, farmers and

representatives of nonprofit organizations. As part of the research, inter-

views were conducted with representatives of Dagestani academia, reli-

gious leaders, journalists, and government officials supervising reli-

gious-state relations and religious education. A special place in the

study was given to interviewing representatives of various groups of the

Islamic community of Dagestan: Sufis, Salafis, and followers of other

Islamic movements and groups.

Ethnic Composition and Identity Changes in the Republic of Dagestan

The Republic of Dagestan is the most multiethnic region of Russia

(Ibragimov, 2002, p. 36) with 14 “titular” nationalities with state-sup-

ported languages: Avars –29.2% of the population of Dagestan, Aguls

–0.9%, Azeris –4.5%, Dargins –16.9%, Kumyks –14.8%, Laks –5.5%,

Lezghins –13.2%, Tats –0.004%, Tabasarans –4.0%, Nogais –1.4%,

Rutuls –1%, Russians –3.6%, Tsakhurs –0.3%, Chechens –3.2%, etc. The

total number of indigenous peoples of Dagestan is much more than 30.

Nowadays the number of population exceeds 3 million.

Ethnicity has and always will be a key factor of crucial importance

for Dagestan because of its variety of nationalities. In the legacy of the

Soviet era, Dagestanis received a high ranking in ethnic self-identity,

with peoples of the republic having a high degree of ethnic consolidation.

The ethnic identity in Dagestan is one of its main mobilizing factors.

The republic leads in the number of inter-ethnic conflicts, both overt

and latent. However, according to most experts, none of these conflicts

are based on purely ethnic hatred: “Any inter-ethnic conflict is some

way or another tied either to a land issue, or an issue of redistribution

of power and resources”.5) Nevertheless, because ethnic identity has a

limited life, it cannot be the common unifying factor in Dagestan. Ethnic

diversity in the absence of a dominant ethnic group creates a situation

where ethnic elites are forced to negotiate with each other, while the


relative minority unites against the relative majority to avoid anyone’s

dominance. At the same time, a representative of the ethnic group who

moved to the most powerful position has to consider the interests of

other ethnic groups while maintaining the system of ethnic quotas in

government.

An effective system of ethnic quotas in Dagestan was implemented

during the Soviet years. It is from the Soviet era that Dagestanis grew

accustomed to keenly monitoring the proportions in various fields, al-

though the most important resource was, of course, power.

Nowadays, there is a process gradually uniting common Dagestani

identities that is based on the experience of living together under one

administrative unit that represents different ethnic groups, the presence

of interethnic communication – a combination of Caucasian and in-

ter-Russian cultural traits that create a unique Dagestani cultural-historical

community. Even in the Soviet era, the interethnic dialogue of Dagestanis

developed a special version of the Russian language which is charac-

terized by an extensive use of common Dagestani colloquialisms and

widely understood Arab-Persian words. Nevertheless, a common

Dagestani identity is still in flux and in the process of formation. It is

actualized by Dagestanis who are outside of the republic who make up

a fairly significant group (about 700,000 live outside of the republic)

and are widely known as “dags”.

Modern Dagestani society is very patchy. On the one hand, cul-

tural Dagestanis stand out with more and more features that make

Dagestan similar to Middle Eastern countries (this refers to the norms

of behavior, clothing, and the widespread distribution of Arabic lan-

guage and music. From Middle Eastern countries, the most similar to

Dagestan are Egypt and Syria (where, as in Dagestan, the Shafi’i

school of Sunni Islam is widespread)). However, this does not imply

a preservation of traditions. Traditions are largely preserved in the

countryside, yet there are less young people involved in the structure

of traditional relationships, the mechanism of which was disturbed. The

previous layout of traditions falling within the framework of Jamaat


while combining rural communities is broken. A sharp limitation of the

scope of traditions within the family and clan is occurring. Beyond

these limits, young people feel absolutely free. This is happening with

some of the Dagestani youth when they leave the perimeters of their

Jamaat. Restrictions are removed and their sometimes deviant behavior

can often cause conflicts with others, especially in the context of inter-

cultural interaction outside Dagestan.

First and foremost, the youth are experiencing a crisis of identity.

Dagestani sociologist Zaid Abdulagatov speaks of the paradoxical duality

in the consciousness of the youth: drawing from interviews, more than

half of young Dagestanis claim affiliation to the Middle Estern cultures,

which are based on Islam.6)

Crisis of identity has led to the weakening of traditional interethnic

tolerance and increased xenophobia, often in the form of “Russophobia”,

as well as the emergence of ethnoreligious extremism and terrorism. The

strong alarming sings were victims of ethnically motivated attacks against

Slavs, mainly Russians (Korovin, 2011; Torgovtzev, 2010) who presented

in Dagestan not merely different ethnic and religious group, but also

another cultural tradition, closely related to the ‘Western civilization’.

As a result, massive outflow of the ethnic Russian population from

Dagestan upset the established ethnopolitical and ethnocultural balance

and principles of miltucultural society (see Table 1). This even led to

the creation of a special “Coordinating Council of the Northern Region

of the Republic of Dagestan” and the Commission on the Russian-speak-

ing population, which are attempting to prevent the outflow of the Russian

population from Dagestan through the establishment of the system of

preferentials and incentives.


Table 1

Population Dynamics in Dagestan (1970-2010) (in thousands)

Based on Population Census in 1970, 1979, 1989, 2002, 2010

1970Census

1979Census

1989Census

2002Census

2010Census

Number % Number % Number % Number % Number %

Dagestan 1,429 100 1,628 100 1,802 100 2,576 100 2,910 100

Titular Population 1,061 74 1,267 78 1,444 80 2,229 86 2,601 89

Russians7) 210 15 190 12 166 9 121 5 104 4

Other Nationalities 158 11 171 10 192 11 226 9 205 7

Source: Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation (Dzadziev, 2008).

Since 2010, this migration outflow has not been stopped, so nowa-

days the new figures might be higher. Of course, there are other crucial

causes of the outflow of non-titular population, as well as ethnic Russians

from Dagestan. Among them- the process of institualization of the politi-

cal ethnocracy that has been taking place since the beginning of 90s

(it went along with massive propaganda of ideas of ethnic exclusiveness

and ethnocentrism in the regional media in the 90s), where the interests

of non-titular population in the regional political arena are under-

represented, often non-titular population do not participate in the regional

governance, and the principle of proportional representation of all the

major ethnic groups in the government structures is not observed; high

level of unemployment and the lack of security in the region (the perma-

nent threat of terroristic attacks, etc.), especially for non-titular residents;

the rise of the significance of adat and sharia laws in everyday practice.

Seeing as that to create a culturally diverse society, «is not enough

to allocate a space for the ‘other’, but also to accept the transformations

that the cultural contacts and cultural interchanges with the ‘other’ may

cause» (Nye, 2001), the current situation in the field of intercultural rela-

tions does not leave much hope for strengthening the principles of cultural

diversity in Dagestan. It will most likely get worse in the coming years:


in accordance with ‘contact hypothesis’, the objective fact is that the

more homogeneous a society, the higher the level of xenophobia.

Conversely, in a diverse society, social interaction between members of

different cultures raises the level of tolerance (Escandell & Ceobanu,

2009; Pettigrew, 1998). These changes in the ethnic composition in

Dagestan will lead young people to further have intolerance towards

‘others’. This, in return, will emerge Caucaso-phobia outside Dagestan

(Rozanova, 2012), that will be pushing youth of the republic to find them-

selves on the other side of the all-Russian community, exacerbating an

already serious identity crisis.

The role of ethnicity in distribution of the resources

Dagestan is a predominantly rural area with strong influence of tradi-

tional culture. Land in Dagestan has always been scarce and a basic value.

During the Soviet years, flat territories of the former Terek region were

added to Dagestan, which spurred an organized resettlement of the high-

landers to the plains in the 1960s (Adiev, 2011). When this planned reset-

tlement stopped around the 1980s, this process became uncontrollable.

Today, Dagestan is suffering the consequences of migration and various

related violations. The main issue and catalyst of the conflict becomes

the land and seeing as how migrants are of different ethnicity, conflicts

become interethnic.8)

It must be noted that the spread of opinions concerning the land

can be some of the widest and most prolific. Aboriginal residents of

the plains often appeal to the notion that land was taken away from

them and they demand justice. However nowadays, few people are talking

about expelling those who migrated during Soviet times: there are no

complaints about them and they’ve developed relations of neighborliness.

With the older population, there are complaints against those who have

occupied the lands above the quota, and are trying to settle on the plains

while bypassing legal procedures. Basically, they are accusing the new-

comers of using the legally unregulated status of their lands as pastures


for cattle grazing. These settlements are illegal, yet attempts to legitimize

them are eliciting protests.

As a result of the policies implemented in the second half of the

20th century, former residents of the plains feel persecuted. The amount

of land accrued by residents of the mountain regions, who received plots

of land from the territory of the plains, was significantly higher than

that of the previous residents. For example, the amount of land of the

inhabitants of the Gunib district was ten times higher than that of the

Dagestani inhabitants of the plains.

As such, it’s not a question of ethnic differences and an impossibility

of the coexistence of different nationalities which are behind all the con-

flicts associated with land but the acquisition of an ethno-political

character. The authorities of various levels who do not want to solve

the chronic problems associated with land use in the country are largely

to blame. This actualizes the ethnic aspect and leads to an increasing

binding of “land and blood.”

The Revival of Islam9)

The spread of Islam in Dagestan had been uneven and a cen-

turies-long process. The communion of different ethnic groups to Islam

that started in the VII century and lasted for almost 900 years was essen-

tially completed by the end of the XVI century. In the following XVII

to XIX centuries the religious, legal and cultural ideas and traditions

of Islam finally consolidated its positions and influence in all spheres

of everyday life of the Dagestani society.

Russia’s influence in Dagestan has been growing since the 17th cen-

tury, when feudal formations in its territory were accepted as citizens.

However, the actual submission of Dagestan has been delayed since the

feudal rulers faced very serious opposition from the Islamic elite.

Dagestani theologians developed a special interpretation of the concept

of Islamic Caliphate, which allowed for the election of a local imam,

despite the fact that the Sunni caliph Ottoman Sultan was recognized


as the ruler in Istanbul (Shterin & Yarlykapov, 2013, p. 250).

In XIX century Imams of Dagestan led the popular resistance against

the Russian Empire. It unfolded under Islamic slogans. Shamil, the third

Imam of Dagestan and Chechnya, succeeded in creating a theocratic state

– Imamate – in which he managed to skillfully use the features of the

organization of the hierarchical Sufi community, which are based on the

uncomplaining submission of student-Murids to teachers-Murshids.

The defeat and capture of Shamil in 1859 largely decided the out-

come of the bloodstained Caucasian War. However, the war itself and

the ensuing bloody uprisings (especially the uprising of 1877 in Dagestan)

forced the Russian tsarist authorities to conduct a highly flexible religious

policy. Thereby, the Sufi order Naqshbandiya maintained its influence;

worshipping was permitted; mosques, mektebs and madrassahs were wi-

dly built. In Dagestan, a developed system of Islamic education allowed

for a high level of literacy among the population (Yarlykapov, 2002,

pp. 66-67).

Thus, the transition of Dagestan under the power of Imperial Russia

did not change the status of Islam, as well as did not lead towards

Russification because the local system of Islamic education was success-

fully competing with the Russian system. A serious modernizing break-

through, brought by Soviet power, could not completely eliminate the

influence of religion – Dagestan preserved its Islamic education system

and traditions that became the basis for the subsequent Islamic revival

after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Yarlykapov, 2003. pp. 18-19).

Nowadays Dagestan is the most Islamized region of Russia, which

is what determines the value of the religious factor for the republic

(according to the Ombudsman for the Hajj for the commission on reli-

gious associations Minister Ilyas Umakhanov of all pilgrims to Mecca

from Russia, 65-70% are from Dagestan (Magomedova, 2013), although

Dagestani Muslims make up only about 15% of the total number of

Muslims in Russia (3 out of 20 million people). In Dagestan, there active

from 1600 to 2300 mosques, 600 maqtabs and 25 madrasas (Yarlykapov,

2002, p. 68), 13 Islamic universities. Around 95% of the population are


religious – Muslims (Sunni majority, up to 4% are Shiites), with about

4% Christians (mostly Orthodox, but there are Protestants, Baptists,

Pentecostals and Jehovah’s Witnesses), and less than 1% being Jewish.

For the vast majority of the population Islam is one of the founda-

tions of the new forming Dagestani identity. At the same time, Islamic

factor plays an important role in instability and conflicts escalation in

this region alongside ethnicity. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the

religious development of Dagestan was far from peaceful. The Islamic

revival began with the violent separation from the Spiritual

Administration of Muslims of the North Caucasus and continued with

further fragmentation along ethnic lines. The time of ethnic Mufti had

passed, but now a single Spiritual Administration of Muslims of

Dagestan is not recognized as legitimate by at least half of the Muslim

communities of the republic. The key complaint was the narrow specif-

icity of the Sufi Republican Muftiat, represented by Murids of one

sheikh – Said-Afandi Chirkawi (now deceased), and the clan – the key

positions were controlled not just by the Avars, but by representatives

of just one clan.

The Islamic field of Dagestan is not limited to the presence of two

branches of Sunni Islam – Shafi’i and Hanafi, Shi’ism and Sufism. It

is much patchier, with various radical groups of the Salafi faction (the

so-called “Wahhabis”, “Ahlu Sunna”), various schools and traditions of

Sufism, as well as fairly marginal and weak groups supporting Hizb

ut-Tahrir, Gulen and a very peculiar sect of “krachkovtsevs”. This entire

field is active and directly affects the state of affairs in the republic.

In a situation that lacks unity, Islam cannot play a stabilizing role, sig-

nificantly easing tensions and resolving social issues. Moreover, religion

often becomes a mouthpiece of dissent, a destabilizing factor.

A simplistic notion formed that in Dagestan, the Islamic protest

groups were represented only by Salafis, “Wahhabis” and “radical fight-

ers”. However, even among the “traditional” and supposedly loyal Sufis

there were those who expressed sentiments of protest. In particular, there

is opposition from the most influential group of Sufi figures, followers


of Sheikh Said-Afandi, who limit contacts with the government and cur-

rent regime. These include Khasavyrut Avars, the followers of Sheikh

Tajuddin, and also Akusha and Levashi scholars. They justify their posi-

tion with the notion that power is in the hands of the infidels. Because

they cannot change the current situation; they forbade their followers

to go against the government with weapons, but recommended that they

minimize contact with it.10)

Therefore, Salafists are not the only ones who represent protest in

Islam. They actually want to establish their own political system.

However, the Salafis have undergone major changes: in the past 20 years,

they have lost their intellectuals who had a political platform and knew

what they wanted and how to achieve it. However, ideology is not de-

feated, leading to haphazard growth of violence from their side through

terror against security forces and government officials. Another un-

pleasant fact that the authorities of the republic had to face is that there

is almost no one left on the Salafi side with whom one can talk and

negotiate seriously.

This became apparent in 2010-2011 due to the reversal of the

then-authorities of the republic to attempts of developing inter-Islamic

dialogue in the republic. The then-President of Dagestan, Magomedsalam

Magomedov, initiated discussions between different Islamic groups in

the republic, during which a fair portion of Salafis (Association of Islamic

Scholars “Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a”) formed a semblance of political

force, representing the interests of the Muslim opposition. An order was

given to stop the use of force against peaceful Salafis, which resulted

in Salafi mosques being openly used by Salafi groups in Makhachkala.

The new Head of Dagestan, Ramazan Abdulatipov, essentially stopped

the initiatives of his predecessors, but the implemented processes of dia-

logue are already happening without participation and against the will

of the authorities.

The high degree of religiosity in Dagestanis is reflected in the so-

cio-political life of the republic. Religious leaders, feeling the support

of the conservative-religious part of society, actively involve themselves


in debates with secular leaders, trying to interfere in areas distant from

religion, particularly in scientific discussions, while attempting to monitor

the literature and influence of the readings of Dagestanis through the

prohibition of certain books. Following the initiative of the Russian

Orthodox Church, Muslim leaders of Dagestan actively raise the question

of the necessity of introducing Islam lessons into schools.

Increasingly, questions are raised concerning the permissibility of

Islamic dress in public schools, the co-education of boys and girls and

so on. The supporters of secularism become victims of the intensity of

emotions, like the director of the school in the village of Shamkhal,

Patimat Magomedov, who was killed in September 2010, ostensibly due

to her intransigent position on the hijab in school and physical education

for girls.

However, experts say that in some cases, not everything is so

straightforward.11) In particular, the question of Islamic education is often

raised, which is supposedly trying to replace secular education. In reality,

communities that favor a system of Islamic education in Dagestan are

vanishing. The prestige of a secular education is not questioned by

anybody. Moreover, according to experts and even government officials,

actively criticized Islamic universities in Dagestan play a very important

social role with those who have not found the funds to enroll in a secular

university. These young people are given shelter, food, and are brought

up with the Islamic morals of the Sufi directions, which prohibits armed

fighting and extremism.

The problem of generational differences in Dagestan is escalated

to its limit. Traditional society, regulated by intergenerational communi-

cation and the transfer of knowledge, skills, talents and practices are

increasingly being eroded under the influence of the globalization taking

place in the world as a whole, as well as a kind of “globalized Islam”,

where the idea of a universal Islam which must be free of differences

in direction, faction and flow is spreading widely amongst Muslims. The

Muslim youth around the world, and more recently in Dagestan, is becom-

ing more involved in the creation of extraterritorial communities, where


it is not necessary for one to belong to a community of those who attend

the same mosque. The internet provides access to an impressive collection

of fatwas of so-called “electronic Muftis”, which are the new heroes of

the Islamic youth. These fatwas are not taking into account the context

and local features, and attract young people for its versatility. In their

eyes, the official religious leaders, clinging to the old traditions, are in-

creasingly losing credibility. Contrary to traditional conservative Islam,

Muslim youth adhere to the Western idea of individualism by claiming

that as a true believer, one is freed from the norms and cultural rules

of the society, with personal values and beliefs being of the utmost

importance. Paradoxically, by emphasizing the divide between culture

and religion, Muslim youth aid in secularizing the societies that succeed

in bridging this divide (Roy, 2004).12)

Corruption and a lack of opportunities for self-development lead to

growth of dissent among the youth. Even amongst the educated youth,

there is a spreading idea that the introduction of Sharia is the only way

to solve the problems of the Dagestani society (a total change of the

system from above, Moscow, is also proposed as a solution). As a result,

a small but active part of the youth ends up among militant groups. The

majority of the youth prefers labor migration, not only because there

is high unemployment in Dagestan, which is not a big problem in the

agrarian society, but primarily because the wages are too low.

Sharia is playing more and more important role in everyday life

in Dagestan. There are Sharia courts, known in Arabic as Mahkama

Shar’iya, in many Dagestani Jamaat mosques (Juma) and prayer houses.

As a rule, the Imam usually performs Qadi duties (sharia judge) on

Fridays. Usually, these informal judicial bodies are limited to the analysis

of minor criminal cases, drawing up marriage contracts (nikah) and di-

vorce according to Sharia, and notarizing religious testaments (vasiyat).

In some Dagestani villages, mosques established Sharia Guard units

made up of youth 20-30 years of age, replacing the late Soviet vigilantes.

Their functions include maintaining public order on the streets and enforc-

ing the sentences for the chairman of the Sharia court. Russian folk and


public courts of arbitration work alongside with Sharia tribunals of the

North Caucasus Muslims. Chairmen of the Sharia courts often represent

the rural and district administrations. The most authoritative of them are

involved in the analysis by adat or Sharia agrarian litigation between

the villages, which are very frequent nowadays.

The nature of the reconstituted de facto Muslim communities in

Sharia courts and its chairmen-Qadi largely determine the degradation

of legal knowledge in the field of Fiqh for Muslims of Russia in the

20th century, the loss of Sharia as the regulator in society and the narrow-

ing of the scope of Islamic law on religious worship, household customs

and rules of etiquette. According to the accepted classification of norms

of Muslim law, these are the actions that fall into the scope of rules

of ritual worship and religious precepts of Islam that define the relation-

ship of believers with God.

Despite the fact that the proponents of Sharia justice in the region,

consisting of young people and representatives of the Muslim spiritual

elite, have a desire to limit the effect of the Russian and adat, believers

do not have a clear idea about the boundaries and differences between

Adat and Sharia. In practice, just as in the 1990s and the 2000s, the

Sharia courts under the leadership of rural Cadi are often guided in their

activities not only by the norms of Islamic law, but also the local norms

of customary legal tradition. The form of the proceedings carries a sim-

plistic character. Sharia court rulings are recorded in free-form in Russian

and one of the Dagestani languages, and also in literary Arabic with

added prayer formulas, which, in the eyes of the trial participants, imparts

legal strength to the document, which it is actually deprived of, in accord-

ance with current Russian law.

Sharia law is relatively successfully competing with secular law,

largely due to the increasing withdrawal of the government from all walks

of Dagestani society. In particular, the biggest challenge is marked by

continued uncertainty of the legal status of the land (pastures and arable

plots), seized in bypass of Russian legislation for construction and

housing. Because of the growing migration from the mountains to the


plains and the increasing value of recreational areas in Dagestan, there

are a growing number of land disputes, the decision of which is increas-

ingly being based on Sharia and traditional Islamic mediation due to

the absence of clear laws regulating land relations. In Dagestan, there

is a growing number of cases where land conflicts between the indigenous

people and the plain settlers are decided on the basis of consensual agree-

ments of Jamaat of these two groups and are concluded in a mosque

with the secured contract being drawn up in Arabic. Such agreements

have been concluded with the active participation of Jamaat Imams, even

if they are not achieved on the basis of Sharia but by traditional mediation.

The appeal of Sharia and adat impart systemic problems that cannot be

solved by the official government in the region: total corruption of the

judicial system, the reduction in quality of public services, the ineffective-

ness of the law-making activity of the government (in particular, the pro-

traction of the problem of land status), the lack of clear national and

religious policies.

Thus, the situation in the Republic of Dagestan is characterized by

a high degree of dynamics. The ethno-cultural mosaic over the past two

decades became supplemented by the Islamic mosaic, which resulted in

the fact that this global religion is the conduit of two mutually exclusive

trends: globalization and localization.

Conclusion

Although Islam as a world religion aims towards cultural unification,

using the example of the North Caucasus, it can be traced how «traditional

Islam» is easily woven into the local culture and adat while developing

the local forms of Islam, thus only intensifying the ethnic and religious

mosaic of the region, consolidating the principles of ethnic and cultural

diversity and creating conditions for the development of multiculturalism.

New trends associated with the displacement of traditional Islam

and the spread of «globalized Islam» among young people pose new


challenges for the culturally diverse societies. “Islamic globalization” is

largely formed under the pressure of globalization and the often ag-

gressive expansion of Western values (Moghaddam, 2006), the negative

manifestations of information warfare in many Western countries aimed

at demonizing the whole Muslim world, and the emergence of persis-

tent stereotypes of Islamophobia. As a result, radical Islamic move-

ments can easily find fertile ground for the further spread of extremist

ideas aimed as though against infidels, and against the very idea of

«diversity in unity».

In today’s Russia, at the example of Dagestan, we see serious ten-

sions within the Muslims communities themselves, mainly escalated by

the search of the “true” Islam, as well as unsolved problems in distribution

of the resources and political power and ethnic conflicts, on the one hand,

and a clear alienation of this youth Muslims from the mainstream of

all-Russia culturally diverse multi-confessional society and complicates

the task of their adaptation and integration in larger modern diverse soci-

ety, - on the other.

1) Adat is the system of traditional law for the people of the North Caucasus. A large part of adat comes from customs as forms for diffusing social norms from one generation to another. Substantially, adat includes “a set of rules of conduct, regulations, and social imperatives. In adat, there are principles of conformal behavior and forms of behavior that it does not tolerate.” (Misrokov, 2002, p. 21)

2) Here we are speaking only of the idea of a united Islamic nation, which has captivated the North Caucasus Muslims, especially the youth.

3) Network activism (or active network building) helps to spread extremist movements fairly quickly and to move into widely varying, initially adverse communities, such as how it happened, for example, in Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia in the mid-2000s. For highly traditional Sufi communities of these republics, the new kind of Islamic acti-vism offered to youth leaders was completely alien. However, the state’s attempts to resist using its punitive power did not reach their goals: youth network structures have become an integral part of the Muslim landscape of these three republics.The widespread use of modern technology – mobile and satellite communications, the Internet, etc. – helps the development of network forms of organization and activity. Today, the Muslim youth community becomes extraterritorial: it’s not at all necessary


for them to attend the same mosque on Fridays or live in the same neighborhood and know each other in person. Like-minded individuals can create real social networking through virtual technologies. After the failed attempt of creating a strong, legal youth community in Nalchik, the young Jamaats in Russia are actively going down this path. This form of activism contributes to the further involvement of youth Jamaat in the sphere of “Islamic globalization”. Fatwas and opinions of “electronic” muftis put on the global network are spreading among youth Muslims who can specifically work with an audience that has access to the Internet. These sermons and fatwas often include an English translation or are even written in English originally, which, at the current stage of development of the Internet (and different translation services, in particular, Google translator) are not an obstacle for Russian-speaking Muslims.It is interesting that in the ethnically diverse territory of the Caucasus, the main language of communication is not Arabic (Turkish, Persian, etc.), but specifically Russian, which was the former language of sermons in such strong Jamaats as Kabardino-Balkaria. This certainly does not mean that these languages are not used at the local level. Undoubtedly, the imam in the Balkar village would preach in Balkar, but at the federal level, the national language of the sermon was Russian.

4) This form of activism contributes to the further inclusion of youth Jamaat in the sphere of “Islamic globalization”. Fatwas and opinions of “electronic” muftis put on the global network are spreading among youth Muslims who can specifically work with an audience that has access to the Internet. These sermons and fatwas often include an English trans-lation or are even originally written in English, which, at the current stage of development of the Internet (and different translation services, in particular, Google translator) are easily accessible for Russian-speaking Muslims.

5) Interview with S. Shikhaliyev, Head of the Department of Eastern Manuscripts of the Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Daghestan Science Center, September 14, 2011.

6) Interview with Zaid Magomedovich Abdulagatov; Head of the Department of Sociology at the Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Dagestan Science Center, September 14, 2011

7) Although in official documents Russians are accounted as one of 16 titular ethnic groups of Dagestan, in reality this statement is very contentious.

8) It is meant that the participants of the conflict are beginning to perceive it as interethnic, for example, if the indigenous population is that of Kumyks, and settlers are that of the Avars, then the conflict begins to be perceived as a conflict between Kumyks and Avars.

9) This part of the article is emphasized not on Islam “as religion”, but on various inter-pretations of Islam, including its radical forms (especially in the terms of modern inter-pretations that are used by ideologists refer to Salafi tradition, but often having little to do with the Salafi tradition of Islam itself; these interpretations are used as the ideology for mobilizing protest groups).


10) Shamil Shikhaliev, Head of the Department for oriental manuscripts, in Daghestan Center of Science at the Russian Academy of Sciences. His interview was conducted September 14, 2011.

11) One of these experts, for example, is Murtazali Yakubov, chief specialist in the Department of the Interaction with Religious Education Institutions and Humanitarian Cooperation of the Office of Church-State Relations of the Ministry for National Policy, Religious Affairs and External Relations of the Republic of Dagestan. His interview was conducted on September 23, 2011

12) Despite Roy’s concept of “globalized Islam” is not entirely a key factor in religious life of Dagestan, nevertheless, field research among the Muslims of the North Caucasus testifies, that young Muslims in the region increasingly feel as though they are part of the worldwide, global Islamic community. We do not claim that all of Dagestan is swept up in these developments, but at the same time, we cannot ignore these essential trends.


References

Adiev, A. Z. (2011). Zemel'nyy Vopros i Etnopoliticheskie Konflikty v Dagestane [The land issue and ethnopolitical conflicts in Dagestan]. Rostov-na-Donu: Izd-vo SKNTs VSh YuFU.

Aliyev, A. K., Arukhov, Z. S., & Khanbabaev K. M. (2007). Religiozno- Politicheskii Ekstremizm i etnokonfessional'naya tolerantnost' na Severnom Kavkaze [Religious and political extremism and eth-no-confessional tolerance in the North Caucasus]. Moscow: Nauka.

Bunt, G. R. (2009). iMuslims: Rewiring the house of Islam. London: Hurst & Company.

Bulatov, O. A. (2003). Relikti shamanstva v kulte svyatih i svyatih mest u narodov Dagestana [Relics of shamanism in the cult of saints and holy places of the peoples of Dagestan]. In S.N. Abashin & V.O. Bobrovnikov (Eds.), Podvizhiniki islama: Kult svyatih i sufizm v Srednei Azii i na Kavkaze (pp. 103-116) [Devotees of Islam: Cult of saints and sufism in Central Asia and the Caucasus]. Moscow: Eastern Literature.

Dzadziev, A. B. (2008). Russkoe naselenie respublik Severnogo Kavkaza: Sovremennye migratsionnye ustanovki [The Russian population of the North Caucasus: Current migration policies]. In V. A.Tishkov (Ed.), Severnyi Kavkaz v natsional’noi strategii Rossii (pp. 129-146) [Northern Caucasus in the Russian national strategy]. Moscow: FGNU “Rosinformagroteh”.

Escandell, X., & Ceobanu, A. (2009). When contact with immigrants matters: Threat, interethnic attitudes and foreigner exclusionism in Spain’s Comunidades Autonomas. Ethnic & Racial Studies, 32, 44-69.

Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation. Retrived from http://www.gks.ru.

Graf, B., & Skovgaard-Petersen, J. (Eds.) (2009). Global Mufti. The phenom-enon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi. New York: Columbia University Press.

Isaev, A. A. (2001) Duhovnaya literatura na yazikah narodov Dagestana [Spiritual literature in the languages of the peoples of Dagestan]. In A.A. Isaev (Ed.), Islam i islamskaya kul’tura v Dagestane (pp.


171-187) [Islam and the Islamic culture in Dagestan]. Moscow: Vostochnaya Literatura, RAN.

Ibragimov, M.-R. A. (2002). Naselenie (etnodemograficheskii obzor) [Population (ethnodemographic review)]. In S. A. Arutyunov, A. Osmanov, & G. A. Sergeeva (Eds.), Narodi Dagestana (pp. 36-50) [Peoples of Dagestan]. Moscow: Nauka.

Korovin, V. (2011). Migratzia russkih: prichini ottoka s Severnogo Kavkaza (1989-2011) [Migration of the Russians: Causes of the outflow from the North Caucasus (1989-2011)]. Moscow: Sociological faculty of Moscow State University.

Kumar, S., & Sharma, P. (2010). Capitalism, multiculturalism and the global identity of Islam. European Journal of Economic and Political Studies, 3, 61-81.

Kurbanov, R. (2010). The Information Jihad of “Shariat” Jamaat: Objectives, methods and achievements. In R. Dannreuther & L. March (Eds.), Russia and Islam: State, society and radicalism (pp. 155-174). Abingdon: Routledge.

Leontovich, F. I. (2010). Kavkaz: Adati Gorskih Narodov [Caucausus: Adat of the Caucasian highlanders]. Nalchik: Izdatel'stvo M. i V. Kotlyarovih.

Magomedova, A. (2013, May 03). Pochti polovina rossiskoi kvoti na hagj v 2013 godu pridetsya na urozjentzev Dagestana [In 2013 Almost half of the Russian quota for Hajj consists of people from Dagestan].

Retrieved from http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/223693

Misrokov, Z. H. (2002). Adat i Shariat v Rossiiskoi Pravovoi Sisteme: Istorichskie sud'bi Uridicheskogo pluralisma na Severnom Kavkaze [Adat and sharia in the Russian sharia legal system: The history destiny of legal pluralism in the North Caucasus]. Moscow: Moscow State University Press.

Moghaddam, F. M. (2006). From the terrorists' point of view: What they experience and why they come to destroy. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International.

Nye, M. (2001). Multiculturalism and minority religions in Britain. London: Routledge.


Ousman, A. (2004). The potential of Islamist terrorism in Sub-Saharan

Africa. International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, 18, 65-105.

Pettigrew, T. F. (1998). Intergroup contact theory. Annual Review of Psychology, 49, 65-85.

Roy, O. (2004). Globalized Islam: The search for a new Ummah. New York: Columbia University Press.

Rozanova, M. S. (2012). Migration processes in contemporary Russia: St. Petersburg case Study. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Shterin, M., & Yarlykapov, A. (2013). Caliphate in the minds and practices of young Muslims in the Northern Caucasus. In M. Al-Rasheed, C. Kersten & M. Shterin (Eds.), Demystifying the Caliphate. Historical memory and contemporary context (pp. 247-272). London: Hurst & Company.

Torgovtzev, E. (2010, August 08). Pervii russkii miting v Dagestane [The first Russian rally in Dagestan] Retrieved from www.genocid.net/news_content.php?id=270

Voll, J. O. (2010). Islam as a community of discourse and a world-system. In A. S. Ahmed & I. Sonn (Eds.), The sage handbook of Islamic studies (pp. 3-16). London: SAGE Publications.

Yarlykapov, A. A. (2002). Religioznie verovaniya [Religious beliefs]. In S.A. Arutyunov, A. Osmanov & G. A. Sergeeva. (Eds.), Narodi Dagestana (pp. 66-77) [Peoples of Dagestan]. Moscow: Nauka.

Yarlykapov, A. A. (2003). [Islamic Education in the North Caucasus in Past and Present]. In Vestnik Evrazii. Nezavisimii Nauchnii Jurnal [Bulletin of Eurasia. Independent Scientific Journal], 2, 5-31.

Yarlykapov, A. A. (2010). “Folk Islam” and Muslim youth of the Central and Northwest Caucasus. In M. M. Balzer (Ed.), Religion and poli-tics in Russia: A reader (pp. 109-126). Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.


Biographical NoteDr. Marya S. Rozanova is a Director of Migration Policy Program at the Institute of Applied Research (St. Petersburg, Russia), Doctoral candidate at St. Petersburg State University (Faculty of Political Science, the Department of International Political Processes). She specializes on migration policy and integration of migrants. Her last book, Migration Processes and Challenges in Contemporary Russia (St. Petersburg Case Study). (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2012), was devoted to the migration processes in contemporary Russia and St. Petersburg, migration policy, and migrant’s integration.E‐mail: [email protected]

Dr. Akhmet A. Yarlykapov is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences. His main scientific interests are contemporary Islamic movements, ethno-political and ethno-confessional conflicts in the North Caucasus. He is author of the book Islam Among Steppe Nogais in XIX Century. Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences, 2008 (in Russian).E‐mail: [email protected]

Date of the submission of the article: June 5, 2014Date of the peer-review: July 10, 2014Date of the confirmation of the publication: July 10, 2014

The Islamic Religion and Cultural Diversity in Contemporary Russia : Case Study of North Caucasus...

Documents

Transcript of The Islamic Religion and Cultural Diversity in Contemporary Russia : Case Study of North Caucasus...