Louise Fawcett

Revisiting the Iranian Crisis of 1946: How Much More Do We

Know?

Abstract

The Iranian crisis of 1946 has come to occupy a significant

place in the early history of the Cold War. While this fact

has been increasingly acknowledged by scholars there are still

aspects of the crisis, in particular the motivations of the

major actors involved, that further exploration. This article

aims to reconsider the roles of early Cold War actors

including, Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union

and Iran in the Azerbaijan crisis and offer a synthesis and

reconsideration of different views and perspectives. It

revisits the crisis and some of the early literature and

combine this with the more recent archival findings. Above

all it aim to combine contributions from international

history, Cold War and Iranian perspectives on the crisis

revisiting its different dimensions into an integrated

narrative.

1

Iran had an extraordinary Cold War. The country’s strategic

and resource importance meant that it was of intense and

continuing interest to both superpowers. Its domestic

upheavals and regional conflicts were rarely free from

external influences and pressures. While some of Iran’s Cold

War story has been told, through case studies, biographies,

memoirs and wider accounts of Cold War history, much still

remains to be done in piecing together the different elements

of this story into a more comprehensive and integrated

account. It is an account that must perforce include a

discussion of the rise and fall, but also the full reign of

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, which occupied nearly four Cold War

decades, but also the establishment of the Islamic Republic

which took place when the Cold War had another ten years or so

to run. Neither the shah’s reign, nor the establishment and

consolidation of the Islamic Republic can be fully understood

without reference to the Cold War, which closely conditioned

Iran’s domestic and international politics. However, scholars

continue to debate the impact of the Cold War on Iran and the

extent to which Iran, as popular folklore has it, was a mere

pawn of the great powers, at least until the outbreak of the

2

Revolution. This article seeks to contribute to this debate

by further exploring the conditions that gave rise to the

Iranian, or Azerbaijan crisis of 1946 which is widely

acknowledged as being one of the first Cold War crises. 1 It

is deservedly described as such because it led to a US

challenge to Soviet pretensions for a sphere of influence in

northern Iran. In the words of one Cold War scholar: “[i]t

was the first time the new tougher American attitude took

force as policy”.2 Importantly, it also involved an Iranian

appeal against Soviet interference and non-conformity with

international treaty obligations to the newly established

Security Council of the United Nations. Thus exposed to both

US pressure and world opinion, the USSR backed down. There

was no direct conflict between the superpowers, but this

represented an early Cold War flexing of muscles outside the

European theatre, resulting in what is portrayed as an early

US victory in a globalizing Cold War.

1Louise Fawcett is Wilfrid Knapp Fellow and University Lecturer in Politicsat St Catherine’s College, University of Oxford

Caroline Kennedy Pipe, Origins of the Cold War, (New York, 2007), 138.2 Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (London, 1977), 179.

3

Drawing on more recent and older archival materials and a

variety of secondary sources this article offers a

reconsideration of Iran’s early Cold War. It is an account in

which the role of external powers remains central, but in

which the agency of Iranians themselves is also highlighted.

The search for local agency has been an important part of

post-revisionist Cold War studies: a move away from the

obsessive focus on the great powers as the only or most

important agents of change.3 Iran is an example of a

developing country where, rather than being passive recipients

of Cold War directives, local actors challenged, debated and

negotiated virtually every aspect of allied Cold War policies,

whether in relation to the terms of the allied occupation, the

possibility of foreign companies obtaining oil and other

economic concessions in Iran, or the conditions of troop

withdrawals. In all these three crucial areas Iranians showed

themselves, albeit not always consistently, to be resistant to

external pressures that compromised their freedom of action

and persistent in their pursuit of independence and

territorial integrity.

3 See for example Fred Halliday, “The Middle East, the Great Powers and theCold War”, in Avi Shlaim and Yezid Sayigh eds., The Cold War and the Middle East (Oxford, 1997), 11.

4

Until the ending of the Cold War scholars of early Cold

War history in Iran and elsewhere had to content themselves

with a limited archival range with “meager” access to non-

Western sources.4 This did not prevent some very sound

scholarship and excellent accounts that have survived the test

of time.5 Yet all acknowledged that there was more to know and

that fuller accounts must await the opening of former Soviet

(and East European) archives. This was particularly true

where the absence of Soviet archives was matched by a relative

dearth of local materials in societies where such information

was withheld or absent or where oral cultures predominated.

Iran is such a case where both the absence of Soviet material,

beyond bland official versions, and the limited availability

of Iranian sources led to a dependence on British and US

documents. Even those with access to Iranian materials were

necessarily forced to rely on Western archives.

In telling the story of the Cold War therefore, scholars

drew heavily on US sources, including the published Foreign

Relations of the United States (FRUS) series as well as unpublished

materials available in National Archives in Washington and 4 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (Cambridge, 2007), 7.5 Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece (Princeton, 1980).

5

various presidential libraries. On the British side this

meant dependence on Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO) and

national archives, available in the Public Records Office,

subject to the statutory thirty-year rule. These archives

were supplemented by Iranian newspapers and parliamentary

proceedings, a number of which were also available outside

Iran in the US Library of Congress, as well as numerous

biographies and secondary accounts. Given the intense

interest and involvement of the British and increasingly also

the United States in Iranian affairs, these materials, in

themselves, constituted an impressive treasure trove, an

important point to note given the recent fascination with

Soviet-driven accounts. Further, since British and US

accounts did not always converge, there was the possibility of

crafting a story by reading between the lines and balancing

these disparate interpretations. Indeed some advanced the

argument that not only did Britain and the US diverge, but

also that Britain had a far more important role in early Cold

War developments than traditional US-based accounts allowed.6

It emerges clearly from new documents, for example, that

Stalin himself was principally concerned, not about US 6 For example Anne Deighton, Britain and the First Cold War, (London, 1990).

6

influence, but about balancing British influence or what he

called “Anglophile” circles in Iran.7 Others demonstrated how

the US was slow to involve itself in Iran’s affairs, and have

suggested that the British even “invited” the United States,

by design or default, into the Cold War in certain settings.8

While not displacing earlier accounts, Soviet materials

have added considerable clarity and nuance, allowing more

definite answers to certain questions that remained puzzling.

Following the lead set by the Cold War International History

Project (CWIHP) at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC

and other research initiatives we now have a much fuller

record. This is the result of the selective opening of former

Soviet archives, the translation and publication of core

documents, and the gradual emergence of other documentation

and accounts. In respect of Iran this has meant above all the

possibility of verifying and amending existing narratives. As

one of the new generation of post-Cold War scholars writes:

7 Joseph V. Stalin to Ja’afar Pishevari, Leader of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, 8 May 1946, in Natalia Yegorova, “The Iran Crisis 1945-6: A view from the Russian Archives’” CWIHP Working Paper 15, Washington (May 1996) Appendix.8 J.F. Goode, The United States and Iran 1946-1951: the Diplomacy of Neglect (London, 1989), 12; Geir Lundestad, “Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe 1945-1952”, Journal of Peace Research 23/3 (September 1986), 263-277; Louise Fawcett, “Invitations to Cold War: British Policy in Iran, 1941-1947”, in Deighton, Britain and the First Cold War, 184-200.

7

“The new archival materials allow us, on the one hand, to

confirm a number of the assumptions and conclusions of

foreign historians, and, on the other, to introduce some

corrections to the general view of Soviet-Iranian and

Soviet American relations during the first post-war

years”.9

Further, the mere passage of time has also meant that there

are simply more accounts of the period by different observers

and scholars. All in all, a new set of sources and positions

to explore.

While not rehearsing fully all the details of the

Azerbaijan crisis and its roles in the early unfolding of the

Cold War,10 this article revisits some of the assumptions of

the earlier literature and supplements these, where possible,

with some of the later offerings. It demonstrates that focus

on newer materials has led to a tendency to downplay evidence

from the old, so a particular purpose is to integrate

different sources. Following a recapitulation of the key 9 Natalia Yegorova, “The Iran Crisis 1945-6: A view from the Russian Archives”, CWIHP Working Paper 15, Washington (May 1996) 2.10 For more detailed accounts see Louise Fawcett, Iran and the Cold War. The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946. Paperback ed, (Cambridge, 2009); Jamil Hasanli, At the Dawn of the Cold War: the Soviet-American Crisis over Iranian Azerbaijan, 1941-1946 (New York, 2006); Touraj Atabaki, Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and Autonomy in Twentieth-Century Iran, (London, 1993).

8

events surrounding the crisis with selective references to the

core literature, this article turns to consider some areas

that have been further elucidated by more recent research.

Three areas in particular are given attention: First, the part

played by the USSR in the initiation and unfolding of the

crisis as revealed by new Soviet documents; second and related

to this, the part played by the pro-Soviet Tudeh (masses) Party

of Iran and its related yet distinctive offshoot, the

Azerbaijan Democratic Party (ADP), which became the short term

vehicle for Soviet ambitions in Azerbaijan; third, the roles

played by certain Iranian individuals in the crisis. Key

players were the shah’s different prime ministers, in

particular Ahmad Qavam who became the chief negotiator with

the USSR in this period, and his ambassadors in London and at

the United Nations, Hassan Taqizadeh and Hussein Ala, both of

whom were responsible for bringing Iran’s case to the newly

formed Security Council. Mohammed Mosaddeq and Mozaffar

Firouz also had important roles, the first in introducing a

bill that forbade the negotiation of oil concessions without

the consent of the Majlis, the second as confidante of Qavam

and to some extent also mediator between Moscow and Tehran.

9

While the contribution of these individuals has been the

subject of lively discussions in the existing literature, new

materials and evidence have given cause for further

reflection, inviting a rethinking of their roles, actions and

motivations.11

Finally, in the light of the above considerations, a

concluding section asks whether further amendments need to be

made to existing accounts. What do the newer archival

findings on the actions and motivations of the USSR in Iran

add to existing knowledge about the two other major players,

the US and Great Britain? Following the assertions of the

eminent Cold War historian, John Lewis Gaddis, it asks how

much more do “we now know” about this particular crisis and

its local and international ramifications?12

The Azerbaijan Crisis Revisited

This section offers a brief expose of the crisis, viewed from

a post-Cold War perspective. Though certain aspects require a

11 Two recent biographies of the shah offering insights into the role of different individuals are Abbas Milani, The Shah (New York, 2011), 111-140, and Gholam Reza Afkhami, The Life and Times of the Shah, (Berkeley, 2008) 86-109.12 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know. Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, 1997)

10

longer-term historical analysis of Iranian Azerbaijan, the

Iranian Left, and the actions and ambitions of foreign powers,

all of which created important path dependencies in respect of

later events and policies adopted, the short-term origins of

the crisis evidently lay in the Anglo-Soviet occupation of

Iran during World War II, an occupation which contributed

directly to the volatile political situation inside Iran and

provided a unique opportunity for external powers, notably the

USSR and Britain, to exploit the local situation to their

advantage. [reference?]

Iran’s political situation was particularly volatile

because of the forced abdication of Reza Shah, who was accused

of pro-German sympathies and seen as obstructive to the

occupation and his replacement by his son, Mohammed Reza, a

young and inexperienced monarch who was yet to consolidate his

position and authority. The conditions of the allied

occupation and the former shah’s removal meant that Iran was

in a state of political ferment with multiple competing

political groups and factions. Despite the foreign

interference, there was considerable freedom of speech and

expression as reflected in the flourishing of newspapers of

11

all political persuasions.13 There were opportunities for

Iranian politics to take a more liberal turn, to revive its

earlier constitutional settlement, but equally there were real

dangers of fragmentation or a return to authoritarian rule.14

The Azerbaijan crisis built upon the prevailing political

instability, but was also the direct result of the USSR’s

desire to establish some permanent foothold or position of

influence in Iran. Such a foothold, reflected the USSR’s

longer term strategic and economic interests, but became

particularly important to balance western interests,

especially those of Britain which were prevalent in southern

Iran, but also in the capital Tehran. Indeed it emerges from

Soviet archives that balancing British interests in Iran, or

achieving a modus vivendi based on “mutually demarcated

spheres of influence”, was a particular concern of Soviet

leaders.15 Interest in oil exploitation, which was fully

consistent with the aspirations of other powers, both Britain,

which already had a substantial and longstanding concession in

13 L.P Elwell Sutton, “The Iranian Press, 1941-1947”, Iran 6 (1968), 65-66.14 See further F. Azimi, The Quest for Democracy in Iran. A Century of Struggle against Authoritarian Rule (Harvard, 2008), 134-139.15 Vladimir O. Pechatnov, “The Soviet Union and the World”, 1944-1953, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol 1, (Cambridge 2010) 93; John Dunbabin, The Cold War, (London, 2008), 44.

12

southern Iran, and the US which now aspired to one, was the

initial vehicle through which this foothold was pursued. Here

we see how Stalin’s diplomacy often mimicked that of his

Western allies and rivals, even if their styles differed.

Having failed to achieve an oil concession through diplomatic

negotiations conducted with the Iranian government in 1944,

the USSR determined to employ new tactics using its position

as occupier of northern Iran as part of an effort to insist on

further concessions. Drawing also on its influence with the

Tudeh Party and with Azerbaijanis (and Kurds) desirous of

obtaining autonomy from Tehran, the USSR directly facilitated

the creation of an Azerbaijani (and Kurdish) Democrat Party in

the Soviet occupying zone with the purpose of obtaining a more

favorable relationship with the government in Tehran. These

new parties, with close Soviet guidance and support, went on

to form “autonomous” regional governments with a significant

degree of independence from Tehran. [note on Kurds –

republic of M]

When the war drew to an end, the USSR failed to commence

troop withdrawals as agreed under the terms of the 1942

Tripartite Treaty and subsequent Allied Declaration on Iran.

13

Rather it sought to use its influence to renegotiate a deal

with the government regarding an oil concession and now also

the future status of Azerbaijan. In early 1946, the Iranian

government sought actively to resist such pressures seeking

the support of Britain and the United States while appealing

to the newly created UN Security Council. This prompted the

USSR, in turn, to speed up its negotiations with the Iranian

government now led by the seasoned, and from the Soviet

viewpoint, friendlier politician, Ahmad Qavam. Together,

under the watchful if inexperienced eye of the UN Security

Council, they reached an agreement regarding the future status

of the northern provinces and the establishment of a joint

Irano-Soviet company subject to ratification by the next

Majlis. With this agreement in hand, the USSR duly commenced

troop withdrawals demonstrating little concern for the future

of the Democratic governments that they had recently been so

keen to promote. Once Soviet troops left Azerbaijan, the

position of the ADP was weakened as was Qavam’s government

itself. Despite his evident negotiating skills and efforts to

promote an alternative political force, Qavam came under

increasing pressure, particularly given what some perceived as

14

his continuing appeasement of the left and the USSR. The shah

and his allies, playing on fears of Qavam’s intentions and

increasingly confident of US support, were able to consolidate

their position, undermining Qavam’s strategy and rallying

anti-Soviet forces in the capital and elsewhere. The

restoration of government control and the toppling of the

Democratic regimes in the northern provinces soon followed

with minimal Soviet protest, perhaps because Stalin had given

up Iran, or perhaps because he still believed that the joint

oil company proposal negotiated with Qavam would be ratified.

When the new Majlis reconvened, however, the balance of forces

inside and outside Iran had shifted and the oil deal was

soundly rejected with an overwhelming majority in October

1947. With other pressures mounting in Europe, the USSR was

in no mood to further resist Iranian actions and limited its

response to verbal and written protests about Iran’s

unfriendly behavior. The crisis ended with a Soviet rebuff

and the consolidation of pro-Western forces in Iran.

This short summary, some points of which will be

elaborated on further below, tells of an early Cold War crisis

in which the Soviet Union sought opportunistically to increase

15

its influence in Iran by means of an economic concession and

the fostering of separatist sentiment. This was not an

isolated strategy, but part of a wider series of Soviet

initiatives to selectively increase influence in Asia. The

aim of the USSR was to establish some kind of permanent

foothold in Iran and thereby balance the predominance of

British interests. This aim, however, was ultimately resisted

through a variety of pressures including the US and UK, the UN

Security Council and the government in Tehran and its

representatives overseas. Newer Soviet accounts, while

revealing fresh evidence, corroborate this interpretation of

Soviet intentions and policies in Iran. Even if the Iranian

situation provided an opportunity and external powers provided

some provocation, the USSR must take primary responsibility

for the immediate origins and escalation of the crisis.

However, as discussed below, Soviet aims were both flexible

and ultimately limited: this was certainly a bid for influence

but not necessarily territorial expansion.

In respect of the resolution of the crisis in

Azerbaijan, traditional, or so-called “orthodox” Cold War

accounts have emphasized the agency of the United States,

16

seeing this as an early US victory in a globalizing Cold War.16

Some early post-revisionists have focused on Britain’s

distinctive role in the crisis, both in inviting Soviet-US

competition in Iran, but also in trying, through spheres of

influence tactics, to contain any undue extension of Soviet

influence, which would ultimately damage Britain’s position.17

Others have sought to shift the focus onto the Iranians

themselves, part of a wider body of Cold War history that has

relocated attention from the core actors to the periphery.18

Hence Iran, in this early Cold War episode, showed “firm

resolve” in its handling its relations with the USSR.19 In

such accounts the shah and his ministers are accorded

independent agency: for example in bringing Iran’s grievances

against the USSR to the UN Security Council, in adopting a

firm negotiating stance with the USSR, in reoccupying the

rebellious northern provinces and in overturning the oil

agreement. Amid all these divergent versions, one thing

remains clear. The Iranian crisis was a crucially important

16 On the historiography of the Cold War see John Lewis Gaddis, “The emerging post-revisionist synthesis on the origins of the Cold War”, Diplomatic History, 7/3 (1983)17 Fawcett, “Invitations to Cold War”. 18Tony Smith, “New Bottles for New Wine, A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War”, Diplomatic History 24/4 (2000) 568. 19 Pechatnov, “Soviet Union and the World”, 100-101.

17

event in the origins of the Cold War and in the political

history of Iran. One scholar’s claim, perhaps exaggerated, was

that the Cold War “started” in Iranian Azerbaijan.20 It was

important because of its timing: the spring of 1946 was a

critical juncture in the development of the Cold War as

revealed in the shift in Stalin’s policies in Eastern Europe

and reflected in Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech

delivered in March 1946;21 its location, because it revealed

the global reach of the Cold War by extending it outside

Europe to a country of geo-political importance to the

emerging superpowers. It was important for Iran’s political

history because it contributed to arresting the revival of

parliamentary politics and facilitated the early

consolidation, with US backing, of the shah’s regime.22

This significance of the Iranian crisis is reflected in

the expanded space it has been accorded in recent Cold War

accounts, particularly those that adopt a more international

or global perspective. 23 This stands in contrast to the

20 Hasanli, Dawn of the Cold War, 225-25, 386.21 Pechatnov, “Soviet Union and the World”, 10022 Azimi, Quest for Democracy, 138-13923 Mervyn P. Leffler, David and David S. Painter, The Origins of the Cold War. An International History, 2nd ed (2005); Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War, (Cambridge 2005).

18

rather slim space that the crisis occupied in most early

accounts of the Cold War’s origins. The crisis was not

ignored, but usually relegated to just a few paragraphs or

pages in larger Cold War histories. 24 Indeed even Gaddis’

post-Cold War work, We Now Know, which inspired the title of

this article, says very little on Iran beyond showing how

Soviet policies helped to ease the way for the expansion of

British and US interests.25 Let us now reconsider some of the

different aspects of the crisis in the light of more recent

accounts.

The USSR and the Iranian Crisis

It is hardly surprising that with access to former Soviet

archives we have learnt considerably more about Soviet foreign

policy and its pursuit of an interests based policy in Iran.

The importance of Soviet policy in the Azerbaijan crisis has

never been in doubt. Consider the following statement

contained in a report by the British Embassy in Tehran in

early 1946:

24 One exception is Kuniholm, Origins of the Cold War.25 John L. Gaddis, We Now Know. Rethinking Cold War History, (Oxford, 1997), 164.

19

“It seems reasonable to conclude from the actions of the

Russians in Persia since 1941, and from what we have seen

of their policy elsewhere, that they intended from the

beginning to utilise presence of their troops to establish

their influence in North Persia for good”.26

Orthodox accounts of the Cold War insisted on Soviet

culpability based on its expansionist designs in Iran and

elsewhere, a claim that official Soviet accounts naturally

denied. Revisionists suggested rather that aggressive and

exclusive Western policies drew the USSR into Cold War in

Europe and the periphery, where economic and political

ambitions were no less prevalent, while post-revisionists have

sought balance between such views and explored the agency of

actors like Britain and Iran. But amid all this discussion,

there remained speculation as to the extent and motivation of

Soviet involvement. It is clear that Soviet archives have

provided some more answers. Two accounts that have proved

particularly helpful in revealing Soviet policy intentions are

those of Fernande Scheid Raine and Natalia Yegorova both of

whom have drawn extensively on newly available Soviet

26 Foreign Office, Class FO371/52667, “Russia and North Persia”, Tehran, 3 March 1946.

20

materials. While the former’s account has been influenced by

access to local party archives in Baku, providing valuable

insights into the origins of the crisis from an Azerbaijani

perspective, the latter’s is focused on documents from the

Russian Federation’s Archive of Foreign Policy. Drawing also

on materials from the Baku archives, Jamal Hasanli, an

Azerbaijani historian and former member of the Parliament of

Azerbaijan, has helped to reconstruct in considerable detail

the story from the perspective of what was then Soviet

Azerbaijan. Indeed his volume is dedicated to “the unfading

memory of those who dedicated their life to the freedom and

independence of Azerbaijan”.27 Despite differences in emphasis

and approach, all reveal the extent of Soviet involvement and

the controlling hand of Stalin.

Yegorova’s claim is modest. Reflecting that historians

still only have access to certain archival sources she writes:

“It would be naïve to expect that the still very limited

amount of declassified documents from the Russian archives,

would allow us to offer exhaustive answers to all the unclear

questions connected with events in Iran and the policy of the

27 Hasanli, Dawn of the Cold War, v.

21

great powers”.28 It is hard to disagree with Scheid Raine’s

conclusion, however, that the events surrounding “the creation

of the Azeri Democratic Party in 1945 provides a unique

illustration of the interior workings of Stalin’s foreign

policy in the aftermath of the Second World War”.29

Both Scheid Raine and Yegorova find that interests rather

than ideology principally motivated Soviet-Iran relations.30

Clearly the USSR had a close interest in the Tudeh Party which

had been founded in 1941, [ref] and the ADP whose very

creation in 1945 was inspired and assisted by Soviet leaders

under the influence of Mir Bagirov, head of the Communist

Party in Soviet Azerbaijan.31 However in both cases, these

parties and their accompanying ideologies were seen, by Moscow

at least, as vehicles for the pursuit of wider Soviet

interests rather than revolutionary or indeed Azeri

nationalist policies. This point is important in untangling

the motivations of Soviet foreign policy, which did not

conform to a rigid plan. It explains Moscow’s preference for

28 Yegorova, “Iran Crisis”, 2.29 Fernande Scheid Raine, “Stalin and the Creation of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party in Iran, 1945” Cold War History 2/1 (2001) 1-38, (abridged andreprinted in Leffler and Painter, Origins of the Cold War, 93-111) 30.30 Yegorova, ‘The Iran Crisis’, 2, 31 Bagirov’s roles are discussed in detail by Hasanli, Dawn of the Cold War.

22

promoting the ADP as the most effective vehicle for promoting

Soviet interests.32 Even in Scheid Raine’s account, which

gives more agency to the joint nationalist aspirations of

Soviet and Iranian Azerbaijanis, the final conclusion remains

unchanged: the goals and interests of the Tudeh Party and

Azerbaijanis were always secondary to Soviet interests and

prestige. This was made clear in the negotiations over oil

concessions, over the decision to form the ADP and other

separatist movements, without effectively consulting the

Tudeh, and later to sacrifice it, as revealed in a message

sent by Stalin to the leader of the Azerbaijan Democrats,

Ja’far Pishevari.33 Rather than ideology, economic and

strategic interests were uppermost in Soviet minds. This was

entirely consistent with a spheres of influence policy of the

sort that both Britain and the USSR were seeking to pursue in

Iran and elsewhere. In this sense, though Stalin has been

labeled as opportunistic, inconsistent and even “bumbling”,

there was also continuity in Soviet policy in respect of its

32 Sergey Radchenko, “Joseph Stalin”, in Steven Casey and Jonathan Wright (eds), Mental Maps in the Early Cold War Era, 1945-1968 (London, 2011), 22.33 Stalin to Pishevari, in Yegorova, “Iran Crisis”, Appendix.

23

wider ambitions even if the means to achieve those ambitions

differed.34

First, and in respect of oil, we now have more

information about the initial Soviet bid in 1944, and the

evolution of Soviet policy following its failure.35 Following

up an initiative first broached at the start of the occupation

to revive an older agreement regarding Soviet exploitation

rights in the Semnan region, Vice Commissar Sergei Kavtaradze

arrived in Tehran to start negotiations with the shah and

prime minister, Mohammed Sa’ed, to agree to a Soviet

concession. These followed earlier precedents set by both the

United States and Great Britain, and could not therefore be

interpreted as an aggressive or unexpected move. The result

of these protracted negotiations, however, was not only a

Soviet rebuff, but also a Majlis moratorium on all concession

until the war was over and troops were withdrawn.36 We know

that the Soviet publicity campaign in Iran intensified after

this disappointment, moving from what the British consul in

Tabriz had called “passive obstructionism” at the start of the

occupation to a far more activist policy in which the Soviet 34 Scheid Raine, “Stalin and the ADP”, 31.35 Yegorova, “Iran Crisis”; Haslam, Russia’s Cold War (New Haven, 2011)36 Hasanli, Dawn of the Cold War, 48-51.

24

demand for a concession was now explicitly linked to a demand

for provincial autonomy.37 This link is clearly revealed in

newly published documents. Three translated documents

reproduced in the 2001 Cold War International History Project Bulletin are

particularly revealing. In the first, dated June 1945, the

Azerbaijan Oil Association of the Narkomneft, Azneft, was

tasked with prospecting for oil in northern Iran. 38 In the

second, dated 6 July, a decree from the Politburo is sent to

Bagirov laying out instructions regarding the organization of

a separatist movement in “Southern Azerbaijan and Other

Provinces in Northern Iran”.39 These detailed “preparatory

work to form a national autonomous Azerbaijan district [oblast]

with broad powers within the Iranian state”. Such work

included, inter alia, the establishment of a “democratic party

in Southern Azerbaijan under the name ‘Azerbaijan Democratic

Party’”; the organization of a “Society for Cultural

Relations between Iran and the Azerbaijan SSR to strengthen

37 FO371/27154, Tabriz, 7 September 1941; FO371/40718, Tabriz, Diaries, October-November 1944.38 Decree of the USSR State Defense Committee No 9168 SS Regarding Geological Prospecting Work for Oil in Northern Iran, June 21 1945. CWIHP Bulletin, 12/13 (Fall/Winter 2001) 310-311.39 Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to Mir Bagirov, CC Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan on “Measures to Organize a Separatist Movement in Southern Azerbaijan and Other Provinces of Northern Iran,” 6 July 1945, CWIHP Bulletin, 12/13, 311-12.

25

cultural and propaganda work in Southern Azerbaijan”; and, in

addition, the creation, in Tabriz, of a “Society of Friends

of Soviet Azerbaijan” with branches throughout Southern

Azerbaijan. The ADP program was to endorse redistribution of

land, full employment, improvements in health and the

establishment of equal rights for minorities and tribes. The

stated aim, to achieve a “radical improvement in Soviet-

Iranian relations”, would be achieved by “ensuring the

election of deputies who are supporters of the separatist

movement” at upcoming Majlis elections.40 In the third

document, dated 14 July 1945, there are further instructions

regarding measures to “carry out special assignments

throughout Southern Azerbaijan and the northern provinces of

Iran”, including the creation of organizing committees to

select candidates from “authoritative democratic elements”

with a view to creating the ADP.41

While the evidence from these high-level documents is in

itself compelling, it also complements accounts that show how

the USSR had been actively preparing for possible future

40 Ibid.41 “Secret Soviet instructions on measures to carry out special assignments throughout Southern Azerbaijan and the Northern Provinces of Iran”, CWIHP Bulletin 12/13, 312-314.

26

involvement. Scheid Raine notes how Bagirov had been made

responsible for enacting Soviet policy in Iran since the

occupation started and had already spent four years trying to

promote Soviet influence.42 [ref to Hasanli] This fact was also

known to the Soviet Union’s wartime allies: US sources in

Tabriz reported how the USSR was exerting pressure locally

through “liberal” agitators, recently arrived from Baku.43

Remarkable in their clarity, perhaps more remarkable was

how the instructions contained in these documents were

faithfully carried out. The ADP held its first congress in

September 1945 to select candidates for elections for the

Azerbaijan National Parliament which convened in December.

Only the Soviet consul general in Tabriz responded to the

invitation to all foreign representatives to attend the

opening ceremony, which duly approved Ja’far Pishevari as

prime minister.44 [previous note on Pishevari?] Under the

circumstances, the whole operation proceeded rather smoothly,

a point not lost on Bagirov.45 Indeed while the Soviet

occupation lasted, and even beyond, a functioning “autonomous”

42 Scheid Raine, “Stalin and the ADP”, 3-4.43 US Department of State, Record Group 59, SD891.00, Tabriz, 24 July 1943.44 FO371/52663, “Report on Conditions in Azerbaijan, August-December 1945”.45 Scheid Raine, “Stalin and the ADP”, 15, 103.

27

government appeared to exist in Azerbaijan. The USSR provided

logistical support and aid to the Democratic regime while

arming local partisans or fada’i-yan to maintain order and

prevent the entry of Iranian troops to the region. However,

when negotiations started in earnest for the withdrawal of

Soviet troops and award of an oil concession, the fragility of

the autonomous government and its dependence on Moscow was

quickly revealed.

One possible implication of the above documents and of

the much reported upon activities of the USSR in Azerbaijan

and other regions, was that Soviet leaders seriously

contemplated the option of the separation of Iranian

Azerbaijan or the possible union of the two Azerbaijans. This

was a view expressed on different occasions by both Britain

and the United States.46 Scheid Raine claims that in giving his

support to the creation of the ADP Stalin had two options in

mind: “either the movement would be so successful that Iranian

Azerbaijan would separate from Iran and solve both his

security dilemma and his desire for oil; or it would scare

Teheran enough to obtain the concession he really wanted from

46 Gavin R Hambly, “The Pahlavi Autocracy: Muhammad Riza Shah 1941-1979”, Cambridge History of Modern Iran, Vol 7, 248.

28

the present Iranian government.”47 Though Stalin, the

opportunist, may have briefly entertained the first option,

the second was more compelling to Stalin the realist. Early

support for the ADP and the fostering of nationalist sentiment

were designed to obtain a favorable negotiating position for

Moscow rather than to create a viable separatist movement in

northern Iran. As Yegorova claims, “[a]lthough the creation

of the ADP and its activity had an undeniably separatist

character, it is hardly probable that the Soviet leadership

short-sightedly planned to divide Iran.”48 She cites a

statement by Kavtaradze warning Molotov against the “renaming

of Iranian Azerbaijan into Southern Azerbaijan” a move that

“would be inexpedient and fraught with the risk of unwanted

consequences”.49 Despite flirting with the nationality issue

in Iran and elsewhere, it was self-evident that any sustained

support of Azerbaijani nationalism would have represented a

huge problem for the USSR.

This view is supported by Stalin’s later rebuke of

Pishevari following the decision to withdraw Soviet troops,

which were necessary, Stalin claimed, to render more efficient47 Scheid Raine, “Stalin and the ADP”, 32.48 Yegorova, “Iran Crisis”, 12.49 Ibid,

29

“liberationist policy” elsewhere. Pishevari, in his words,

had “misjudged” the situation in Iran. There was “no profound

revolutionary crisis”. Rather there was a conflict between

Qavam and “Anglophile circles”. In such conditions, Stalin

explained, appropriate Soviet tactics should be to “wrench

concessions from Qavam, to give him support, to isolate the

Anglophiles, thus, and to create some basis for the further

democratization of Iran.”50

Based on the above, the interests-based account surely

wins. Azerbaijani nationalism was temporarily harnessed to

serve wider Soviet interests. Once Stalin believed he had

secured an oil concession and a future entrée into Iran, he

lost all interest in the Azerbaijan Democrats - indeed their

concerns, whether about supplies of school text books or light

arms, become something of an embarrassment. After the demise

of the Democrat regime and his escape across the border into

Soviet Azerbaijan, Pishevari’s evident nuisance value

continued. The former Democrat leader, openly critical of

Soviet policy, was conveniently disposed of in a car crash in

1947. This represented, in Hasanli’s words, one of “a great

50 Stalin to Pishevari, CWIHP 15, Appendix, 24.

30

many cases in the post-war history of the USSR when well know

figures and statesmen lost their lives in accidents.”51

The Tudeh and the Azerbaijan Democratic Party

What light do the above findings regarding Soviet intentions

and policies in northern Iran throw on related questions about

the relationship between the Tudeh Party and the ADP and the

level of local support that the ADP enjoyed? Answers to

these questions are important because they offer clues about

the evolving nature of Iranian politics. In respect of the

relationship between the Tudeh and the ADP, many Western

scholars and observers have been content to accept that both

responded to the controlling hand of Moscow and were

therefore, to all extents and purposes, similar. 52 Iranian

scholars, particularly those who have studied the history and

development of the Tudeh party, have pointed to significant

differences in origins, memberships and ideologies of the two

parties.53 For example, Ervand Abrahamian has demonstrated

51 Hasanli, Dawn of the Cold War, 388.52 George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran 1918-1948, (New York, 1949) 286-287; Richard Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, (Pittsburg, 1964), 125-6.53 Zabih, Communist Movement in Iran, 97-107.

31

conclusively how they were not “two sides of the same coin”.54

The new Tudeh was formed from a Persianised intelligentsia;

the ADP from old Communist Party members from the provinces,

where many had played a role in earlier regional uprisings.

Corroborating this evidence, the ADP leader, Pishevari, had

briefly joined the Tudeh after its foundation, but found it

not to his liking. The important link between the two was the

acceptance of Soviet direction.55 The Tudeh, like the ADP, was

seen as a means to satisfy the “imperial” rather than the

“ideological” interests of the USSR.56

Recent archival evidence has clarified this relationship

further: even if the Tudeh diverged from the ADP program on a

variety of issues, particularly the nationality question,

areas of common ground and loyalty to the USSR meant keeping a

united front. Tudeh members had been schooled in the

Comintern tradition, meaning that their activity was

“corrected” according to instructions from Moscow.57 Hence

Tudeh demonstrations in Tehran and elsewhere were orchestrated

to coincide with the USSR’s efforts to pressure the Iranian

54 Ervand Abrahamian “Communism and Communalism in Iran. The Tudah and Firqah-i Dimukrat”, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 1/4 (1970) 315.55 Fawcett, Iran and the Cold War, Chapter 2, 37-51.56 Yegorova, “Iran Crisis”, p. 457 Scheid Raine, p. 5.

32

government into making concessions. Even when Tudeh members

felt uncomfortable with such directives, as was evidently the

case with support for the Soviet oil concession, they

complied. The creation of the ADP and its amalgamation of the

local Tudeh branch in Azerbaijan provide another example.58

The Politburo decree cited above instructed that the formation

of the ADP was “to be done by a corresponding reorganization

of the Azerbaijan branch of the People’s Party of Iran and

drawing into it supporters of the separatist movement from all

strata of the population.”59 While discussions had clearly

taken place at the local level to facilitate this move we know

that the Tudeh Party was not forewarned about the absorption

of their regional branch into the ADP and was deeply unhappy

at this course of events. In this regard, a letter sent by the

Tudeh Party to the All-Union Communist Party (or CPSU) is

revealing: “If the enemies of the USSR had created a plan

against it, they could not possibly invent anything better

than what is taking place at the present time”.60 This was

strong evidence indeed that the Tudeh Party did not initially

support the ADP but that solidarity with the USSR required

58 Yegorova, “Iran Crisis”.59 “Decree of the Politburo”, CWIHP 12/13, 311.60 Yegorova, “Iran Crisis”, 10-11.

33

them to do so. This decision and its implications for future

policy was the subject of much later soul searching in the

party.61 Loyalty to the USSR not only obliged the Tudeh Party

to contain its sentiments on issues such as the nationality

question but to offer support to Soviet activities in the

northern provinces and to promote its cause in Tehran, for

example in accepting an invitation to join Qavam’s government

in 1946. All of these actions were part of a Soviet strategy

to utilize the Tudeh to increase pressure on the government in

Tehran to ensure a favorable outcome to the proposed joint oil

agreement and to promote Soviet interests in Iran.

If the above facts are revealing in describing the extent

to which Moscow directed both Tudeh and ADP activities, they

do not provide definitive answers to the second question posed

regarding the level of popular support for developments in

Azerbaijan. For if the ADP, as some have suggested, was

created on the back of a genuine popular movement for

autonomy, and drawing on historical antecedents, this would

have obvious implications for the nature and extent of Soviet

involvement.

61 Maziar Behrooz, Rebels with a cause. The Failure of the Left in Iran (London, 2000) 26-28.

34

Two scholars of the Azerbaijan region, Touraj Atabaki and

Jamil Hasanli, though from different perspectives argue the

case for Azeri nationalism as being a decisive factor in the

Azerbaijan crisis. Hasanli, while not denying the importance

of Soviet influence, focuses on the aspirations of

Azerbaijanis on both sides of the border. He argues that the

ADP drew upon genuine cross-border sentiment; that Soviet

Azerbaijan acted as a “magnetic force for the residents of

Iranian Azerbaijan”; and that Bagirov had worked tirelessly to

achieve unity, but was ultimately manipulated and frustrated

by the USSR.62 This point is corroborated by British sources

which reported how Bagirov had promoted the notion that the

frontier between Persian and Soviet Azerbaijan no longer

existed, except in a “cultural or psychological sense”, and

the day would come when the whole of Azerbaijan would be

one.’63 Scheid Raine concurs that Bagirov was tireless in his

support of Azerbaijani unity, as evidenced by his policies

from the start of the occupation, but also that he restrained

his ambitions, partly for reasons of self-survival and partly

because of his over-riding sense of loyalty to Stalin.64 His

62 Hasanli, Dawn of the Cold War, 386.63 Fawcett, Iran and the Cold War, 97.64 Scheid Raine, “Stalin and the ADP” 31.

35

commitment to a union of the two Azerbaijans, however, was not

one that resonated with Iranian Azeris, including Pishevari

himself.

Writing from an Iranian perspective, Touraj Atabaki also

makes the claim that the ADP reflected a long history of

nationalist struggle by the Azerbaijanis and that the

autonomous government represented the “first practical attempt

at regional autonomy by an ethnic group in Iran”.65 In his

account he elaborates on the evolution of the crisis focusing

on the history and development of ethnic identity in Iranian

Azerbaijan and how “this sense of ethnic identity was

transformed into direct political action which led to the

establishment of the autonomous government of Azerbaijan”.66

There is little doubt that grievances had long existed between

different provinces and the center; there was a prior history

of Azerbaijani activism and subsequent repression at the hand

of the central government.67 But Azerbaijan was not unique in

this regard and things had changed considerably since the

early twentieth century. By the 1940s, if some Azerbaijanis

had suffered from the effects of the centralizing policies of

65 Atabaki, Azerbaijan, 566 Ibid.67 Fawcett, Iran and the Cold War, 8-17.

36

Reza Shah, most appeared disinterested in the question of

autonomy and suspicious of the Soviet link to separatism.

Members of the provincial elite had reportedly left Azerbaijan

for the capital at the time of the Soviet occupation and

though there were a few representatives from the middle and

upper classes in the Azerbaijan Majlis, the majority were

against greater provincial autonomy. Referring to the ADP, one

Majlis deputy claimed that “no patriotic Azerbaijani had a

share in its formation”68 Foreign observers before the uprising

agreed that Azerbaijan was not ripe for rebellion.69 The US

consul in Tabriz found that Azerbaijan was politically

“immature” and there was “absolutely nothing of a nationalist

nature which can be considered unredeemed in this province”.70

The initial success of the ADP and the relative ease with

which it was able to form a provincial government, without

significant local resistance, might have owed more to apathy

than local sympathy and support. Furthermore, Tabriz was

well connected by road and rail links to Soviet Azerbaijan, a

68 Speech by Panahi, quoted in SD891.00, Tehran, 24 September 1945.69 FO371/20830, “The economic and financial situation of Azerbaijan”, Tabriz, 31 December 1936;70 SD891.00, “Memorandum on the social and political economy of Azerbaijan”,Tabriz 2 October 1943.

37

factor that facilitated familiarity while the propaganda

activities of Bagirov actively promoted nationalist sentiment.

Despite evidence from the accounts of Hasanli and

Atabaki that contradicts the dominance of Soviet agency and

suggests that indigenous forces were at work on both sides of

the border, a review of existing accounts and recent evidence

makes it hard to refute the notion that the USSR was indeed

the most significant player in the formation of the ADP and

that it lacked any widespread and sustained local support.

Scheid Reine puts this bluntly: “The whole party from its

inception to its demise, was created and controlled by the

cabal running Soviet policy towards Iran in Moscow and Baku.”71

Though there were undoubtedly members of the ADP, like

Pishevari himself, who were committed to the autonomy project

they did not have significant popular backing. If the ADP

takeover was largely unopposed, it was hardly celebrated and

its demise was not mourned. Indeed the entry of central

government troops was the cause of some rejoicing: “[p]eople

everywhere looked relieved” according to the admittedly

partial US consul, F. Lester Sutton.72 The ADP, as Soviet 71 Scheid Raine, “Stalin and the ADP”, 10.72 SD891.00, “Report on the end of Democratic Party control in Azerbaijan”, Tabriz, 30 December 1946.

38

documents now attest, was designed as a lever of pressure and

bargaining chip for Moscow. Faced with growing external

pressures and with a bargain apparently struck with Tehran,

the Soviet leadership quickly lost interest in the Azerbaijani

project, even distancing itself in order to facilitate the

smooth passage of the oil agreement. When this, in turn,

failed, the Soviet juggernaut simply moved on. Perhaps, as

some have suggested, the Iranian opportunity was passed over

simply because more compelling issues rose to the fore.

Stalin tried his hand in Iran, as he did in China for example,

by backing the Uighurs and Kazakhs in their bid for autonomy,

but was ready to do reverse course when other pressures

intervened.73 In any event, without Soviet support, Pishevari

and his party could not survive and there was demonstrable

Soviet irritation at the ADP’s overzealous pursuit of its

autonomous goals. The next section consider some further

factors contributing to the collapse of the Azerbaijan

government, exploring in particular the often-neglected agency

of Iranians themselves.

Who Won? Iran’s Agency Reconsidered

73 Radchenko, “Stalin”, 22.

39

If the origins of the Iranian crisis have been widely and

properly attributed to the USSR and the facilitating

conditions brought about by the Second World War, the

conclusion of this early Cold War round in Iran has been

widely attributed to the US, as Yergin’s quote at the start of

this article makes clear. When US President Harry S. Truman

famously declared that he was “tired of babying the Soviets”,

Iran was uppermost in his mind.74 The American victory

argument, as noted, not only gives credence to the predominant

role of the United States, but also reinforces the popular

impression of Iran as a mere pawn of the Great Powers, one

that Iranians themselves as well as other contemporary

observers helped to perpetuate. Such impressions are not

without some truth. After all, Britain had been at least

partly responsible for the rise and fall of Reza Shah, as well

as the succession of his son. The new shah was initially

weak and dependent on outside powers and his position grew

stronger with American assurances, even if American friendship

ultimately came late and at a very high cost for both Iran and

74 Harry Truman, Memoirs: Year of Decisions, (New York, 1955), 550-52.

40

the United States.75 But the claim by the US ambassador in

Tehran, George Allen, that Iranians were “so accustomed to

outside interference” that they “resembled a man who has been

in prison for a long time and is afraid to go out in the

sunlight”,76 missed an important part of the story. External

influence mattered, but Iranians themselves also had an

important part to play in their Cold War history. In this

regard post-Cold War scholarship has been helpful in re-

evaluating the roles played by actors in the so-called

peripheral states. Such accounts have multiplied as the

agency of the Third World has been increasingly acknowledged.77

However there are a number of interpretations here: some

advocate a “pericentric” or “peripheral” theory whereby

countries like Iran acted to expand or intensify the Cold War,

by drawing in powers like the United States.78 This may be

true: Iran sought to preserve its independence, not

necessarily by expanding the Cold War as such, but by securing

alliances with friendly powers that would pursue that aim.

Such approaches are useful therefore in challenging the 75 Goode, United States and Iran, 105. 76 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), VII (1946), 495.77 Robert McMahon, The Cold War in the Third World, (Oxford, 2013).78 Smith, “New Bottles for New Wine”, p. 568; Stephen L. McFarland, “A Peripheral View of the Origins of the Cold War: The Crises in Iran 1941-1947”. Diplomatic History 4/4 (1980) 333.

41

traditionally minor roles accorded to small states, but they

still leave out details about individual agency that remain

hidden in Cold War history narratives.

Trying to uncover the roles played by prominent Iranians

in this period is complicated not only by the absence of

Iranian sources, but by a diplomatic language that was often

dismissive and derogatory. [Check!!] This was particularly

true of Britain, which according to one recent account

demonstrated a “profound contempt for Persia and its people”,79

but also to a lesser extent of the United States, which also

had a tendency to “look down” on Iran.80 While the USSR

preferred to define foreign leaders in terms of their

“friendliness” to the USSR, Western diplomats were often

dismissive of Iranians and their political acumen. The

British ambassador in Tehran, Reader Bullard, was one

notorious example. He thought little of Iran’s leaders and of

the population at large. Comparing the Iran of 1945 to

Britain in 1800, he wrote that the Iranian electorate would

“use power wildly” if they got it; Iran’s “only hope” lay with

79 Christopher de Bellaigue, Patriot of Persia, (New York, 2012)80 James Bill, The Eagle and the Lion. The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven, 1998), 15-16

42

the United States.81 Words like “wily” and “crafty” were used

to describe politicians like Qavam who proved adept at

bargaining, but his behavior was rarely described as

statesmanlike. Rather, adjectives suggesting weakness and

vacillation were popular, with “giggly” used in reference to

Qavam and “weepy” to describe Mosaddeq on numerous occasions.

The Majlis, in turn, was ridiculed as “absurd”, and likened to

a “monkey-house”.82 The use and repetition of this kind of

language has contributed to a story in which, in Iran and

elsewhere, the roles of politicians are dismissed or ignored.

Statesmanship is reserved for Great Powers and the great men

who lead them. We should be grateful to an emerging

scholarship which attempts to rescue some Third World voices.

In this section I further explore a few episodes of the

Azerbaijan crisis which defy such stereotypes and reveal the

agency of Iranians in a way that does not suggest inadequacy

or indecision. These include the circumstances surrounding

the occupation itself, the oil concession issue and the final

dénouement of the Azerbaijan crisis including Iran’s appeal to

the United Nations. In these episodes there is evidence of

81 FO371/45434, Message from Tehran to the Foreign Office, 21 August 1945.82 FO317/52667, “Russia and north Persia”, 15 March 1946.

43

attempts at consistency and firmness in Iranian foreign

policy. Despite enormous internal and external pressures,

which made Iranian politicians particularly vulnerable to the

exhortations of Britain and the USSR, there is a discernible

common line in respect of defending Iran’s territorial

integrity and independence.

This line is clearly present from very early on in the

occupation when the new shah and his foreign minister, Ali

Soheili were anxiously seeking American support in pressing

for the Tripartite Treaty to regulate the occupation (which

the United States did not sign) and the subsequent Declaration

on Iran (which it did) as guarantees of future independence.

This followed similar representations by Reza Shah and his

envoy in Washington, Mohammed Shayesteh.83 This motif, a

constant of the period, would become particularly significant

in the presentation of Iran’s case against Soviet interference

and abrogation of wartime treaties at the United Nations at

the start of 1946 as discussed below.

The wartime negotiations over oil concessions to foreign

powers during the war, especially the USSR, suggest

considerable consistency of purpose. The discussions with 83 Afkhami, The Shah, 86-87

44

Soviet representatives in 1944 were conducted by the shah

himself and Prime Minister Mohammed Sa’ed. The shah had come

under considerable pressure, having been told by the Soviet

envoy, Kavtaradze, that the USSR was dissatisfied with the

current state of bilateral relations.84 Yet, despite the

considerable difficulties, Sa’ed’s government held firm and

the Soviet proposal was turned down on the grounds that all

such negotiations should be postponed until the end of the

war. This was undoubtedly a popular move and consistent with

the conditions of the Tripartite Treaty, but one that caused

Soviet recriminations and Tudeh activism sufficient to force

Sa’ed’s resignation.85 But the story did not end there:

Kavtaradze’s angry departure was followed by the introduction

of a new law proposed by Majlis Deputy Mohammed Mosaddeq,

designed to prevent any negotiations of foreign oil

concessions without prior Majlis approval. Despite its own

interest in an Iranian concession, which had triggered the

Soviet visit, the United States supported the Iranian

cabinet’s decision. There is no doubt that Iran had come to

view the United States as an attractive third power to balance

84 FO371/52667, “Tehran to the Foreign Office”, 3 March 1944.85 Afkhami, The Shah, 89.

45

Anglo-Soviet influence, just as it had so viewed Germany

before the war. Nevertheless, independent of American

influence, these were important developments with significance

for future events since the new legislation provided Iran’s

leaders with some tools to resist future Soviet bullying; they

do not suggest an incapacitated Majlis, rather the

possibilities of an activist, nationalist one.

Let us now briefly examine the different responses of

Iran’s politicians to the Azerbaijan crisis itself. As might

be expected these covered a very wide range, from pro-British

politicians on the Right to pro-Soviet politicians on the

Left, but again there are some elements of consistency in the

behavior of the shah and his ministers and these converged on

the insistence of independence and territorial integrity, if

the means to achieve this differed. When Qavam, the “bourgeois

nationalist”86 and the USSR’s preferred negotiator, agreed to a

retrospective oil concession and an interim agreement with the

Azerbaijan Democrats it was far from clear that he had simply

bowed to Soviet pressures, as some claimed. Given Qavam’s

political background, his anti-shah reputation, and his

position as a northern landowner there is considerable 86 Westad, Global Cold War, 62.

46

evidence to support the case that he, like others, was

pursuing a pragmatic policy aimed at balancing different

foreign interests in Iran while maintaining its independence.

He insisted, for example, following the precedent set in 1944,

that no oil deal could be ratified while foreign troops were

present in Iran and this proved to be an important trump card

which ultimately lost the USSR its desired concession. Using

sympathetic negotiators like Mozaffar Firouz - whose own

account of these events is revealing87 - and inviting the

Tudeh into his government, could be interpreted as part of a

negotiating strategy to ally Soviet suspicions. He did not

approve of, nor fully cede on the question of Azerbaijan’s

autonomy and presided over the reoccupation of the northern

provinces amid Tudeh protests and Soviet warnings about the

possible repercussions. He utilized, albeit somewhat

erratically, the UN forum to pursue the case for Soviet troops

withdrawals. Debates about Qavam’s agency and intentions will

doubtless continue. The British mistrusted his tactics and

saw him as the man who would have “sold the pass if left to

87 Interview with Mozaffar Firouz, Iranian Oral History Project, (Harvard University, 1981)

47

his own devices”.88 The Americans increasingly concurred with

this view, regarding his relationship with the “pro-Soviet”

Firouz with much suspicion89. The Shah, for his part, emerged

strengthened from the Azerbaijan affair, claiming victory for

himself and succeeding at the same time in dispensing with the

once indispensable Qavam.90

In any discussion of Iranian agency, the UN dimension of

the Iranian crisis merits separate attention.91 It is

interesting both from an Iranian but also a wider United

Nations perspective as this was the first question addressed

by the Security Council under its responsibility for

international peace and security. Iran presented two separate

appeals to the UN Security Council; the first was considered

in January and the second from March to April 1946. These

appeals and their significance have been understudied but

provide a fascinating vignette of early UN debates as well as

insights into Iran’s policy-making at that time. The Iranian

appeals, presented by Ambassadors Seyed Hassan Taqizadeh in

London (where the Security Council held its first session) and

88 FO371/75458, “General review of events in Persia, 1947-1948” 17 January 1949.89 Milani, The Shah, 125.90 Ibid, 127.91 See Kuniholm, Origins of the Cold War, 305-342.

48

Hussein Ala in New York (where it then took up permanent

residence) respectively, provide further evidence of the

consistency of Iranian purpose already noted above. Amid the

enormous challenges the crisis presented for Iran, the UN

forum offered an opportunity for a more proactive Iranian

policy which proved helpful to achieving a favorable outcome.

The first appeal drew the attention of the Security Council to

the interference of Soviet troops in northern Azerbaijan, in

particular the issue of denial of entry to central government

troops.92 The second appeal related to the non-withdrawal of

Soviet troops in abrogation of the Tripartite Treaty.93

These appeals, alongside questions relating to Spain and

Greece, were the earliest cases to be addressed by the new

Security Council and occupied a considerable amount of time in

the early months. Indeed, reports of the Council’s

proceedings on Iran cover nearly 500 pages in what was the

first Journal of the UN Security Council, published in 1946.94 As

impressive as the novelty and detail of these reports, however

is the manner in which the Iranian delegates pursued their

92 Journal of the United Nations Security Council, First Year: January to July 1946. No,293 Ibid, No. 1794 Security Council Resolutions for 1946 are also available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/1946.shtml

49

cases with eloquence, persistence and clarity despite the

considerable pressure they came under from the Soviet

delegates, Andrei Vyshinsky and Andrei Gromyko to secure their

removal or postponement.

Time magazine recorded the moment when, “In the spring of

1946, a little man named Hussein Ala, envoy from Iran, stood

before the UN Security Council and unflinchingly insisted that

the Red Army get out of his country”.95 Ala clearly impressed

the chamber, his dignified behavior, which is recorded on film

was persuasive and convincing and helped to contribute to a

majority vote in favor of retention of the Iran case on the

Security Council’s agenda, while Qavam’s negotiations with

Soviet representatives continued. Further, in a manner that

may have contradicted Qavam’s intentions, though this was

never explicitly revealed, Ala continued to insist on the

retention of the case, even when the Soviet delegate claimed

that troop withdrawals had already commenced and an agreement

between Qavam and the Soviet ambassador Sadchikov had been

reached.96 Whatever the facts relating to the communication

between Qavam in Tehran and Ala in New York, the determination

95 Time, 5 Feb. 195196 Journal of the United Nations, (1946), No. 26.

50

of the Iranian ambassador was an important feature of the

negotiations, helping to strengthen Iran’s case. This meant

that the USSR, under the watchful eye of the Security Council,

was obliged to speed up and ratify what otherwise might have

been a more protracted and inconclusive agreement regarding

troop withdrawals and the status of Azerbaijan. It would take

a further eight months before Tehran regained full control of

the northern provinces.

Final Considerations

Reviewing these different aspects of the Iranian crisis in the

light of new materials and fresh perspectives has permitted a

rethinking of a number of questions about the agency of the

Great Powers and Iranians themselves. Despite the

authoritative evidence from former Soviet archives, there is

still room for speculation on questions regarding the policy

intentions of the “Big Three” and their impact on the nature

of Iranian politics and society. We now know much more, but

there is still more to learn. It has been argued that there

was competition, not only between the United States and the

51

Soviet Union but also between the two Western allies, whether

over oil or the appropriate handling of the situation in

Azerbaijan, in respect of which Britain was willing to

entertain a spheres of influence approach, permitting Soviet

influence in the north in order to preserve her southern

interests intact. This was an idea that the Secretary of State

for India, Leo Amery clearly favored, asking Halifax in 1940

“whether we should not deliberately do a deal with Russia over

Iran as Grey did in 1907 (or Ribbentrop over Poland in 1939)

encouraging her to do what she likes in the north, so long as

she recognizes our interests in the south.”97 Ambassador John

Le Rougetel later spoke of the need to establish “a definite

frontier between the USSR and Iran”.98 This was a point also

insisted on by Mozaffar Firouz.99 It was not a policy that the

US would endorse, and ultimately, in a changing post-war

climate and facing uncertainties over the nature and extent of

Soviet expansion, the interests and policies of the West

converged in Iran.

97 FO371/27233, India Office to War Office, 29 Aug 1941. See further Fawcett, Iran and the Cold War, Chapter 6, p. 143.98 SD891.00, Tehran, 28 July 1946.99 Interview with Firouz.

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The United States portrayed itself as victorious, so did

the shah, but victory (and defeat) is many sided. On the

American side, despite initial hesitation, evidence points to

a growing degree of support for Iran, exposing a cumulative

vision of the desirability of extending assistance to

countries threatened by communism as reflected more widely in

the Truman Doctrine. There was no “Truman ultimatum” to

Stalin over Iran, as recent research has conclusively

demonstrated.100 However, this was regarded as one of his

great successes. Furthermore, as one biographer notes, the

USSR did not get Iranian oil and American companies did!101

Independent of the United States, it has been argued here that

the USSR, Britain and the Iranians themselves all played their

parts in the unfolding of the events; so did the United

Nations, and the Iranian crisis and all its varied dimensions

provided an early example of how the Cold War could enter and

absorb the attention of the Security Council.

100 K.J. Shannon, “Truman and the Middle East”, in Daniel S Margolies (ed), A Companion to Harry Truman, Blackwell: Oxford (2012), 370-71.101 Harold F Goswell, Truman’s Crises. A Political Biography of Harry S Truman, (Westport 1980), 303.

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