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between “loss of control of borders or restrictive policies toward immigrants in general” <p. 390). Brimelow, Lind, and the multicultural&s they combat might relish that choice. But Sowell would undoubtedly argue that it is no choice at all.

Eurasia after the Third Empire

by Jed C. Snyder

;rhe Intmtioml Politics of Eurasia, 10 ~01s. Edited Bruce Parrot. (Armor&, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1994-97.)

by Karen Dawisha and

In December 1991, imperial Russian control collapsed for the third time in four hundred years. The fmt collapse occurred with the death of Ivan the Terrible in 1584 and the end of the Muscovite principality at the close of the sixteenth century. The accession of the Romanovs in 1613 and the subsequent reign of Peter the Great during the early eighteenth century greatly expanded the old Muscovite domain into a true Russian empire. In 1917, the Russian Revolution precipitated the collapse of Tsar Nicholas II’s rule and the bii of yet another Russian empire under the banner of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Seven decades later, state socialism under Soviet rule ended with the general secretaryship of Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1990, whom a frightened Politburo had co mmanded to salvage Soviet power and prestige. Perestroika and glasnost brought down Gorbachev and his system in a revolution that neither he nor most of his colleagues fully understood. As with the previous collapses of Russian power, reform from the top created uncontrollable move- ments for radical change among a populace whose impulse was to topple an elite and distant ruling hierarchy. Soviet rule ended in December 1991 when Gorbachev transferred power to a protege, Boris Yeltsin, a former party apparatchik from Sverdlovsk, who as the first elected president of Russia had helped salvage his patron’s weak and ragged rule after an abortive coup four months earlier. Prior to his assuming power as Gorbachev’s successor in Russia, Yeltsin cobbled together the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a confederation designed to maintain a semblance of union among eleven of the fifteen former Soviet republics (excluding Georgia and the three Baltic states).

As events of the last five years have confirmed, the end of the Soviet state was so abrupt and so unexpected that the legacy of Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev,

Jed C. Snyder is a supervisor research professor and team leader at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, U.S. Department of Defense. He oversees programs on the Middle East, South Asia, and the former Soviet south, and he is the editor of A&r En?pire: 7be Emerging Geopolitics

of Cent& Asia (NDU Press, lB5). The views expressed here are the author’s and should not be regarded as necessarily reflecting the views of the Department of Defense, the National Defense University, or any other agency of the U.S. government.

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and Brezhnev still endures in much of post-Soviet Eurasia. The survival of many Soviet institutional structures, much of the political culture, and (in some of the newly independent states) a surprising portion of the administrative hierarchy has retarded fundamental transformation of the system and fueled the reemer- gence of long-dormant “national” identities. Indeed, to many scholars and observers, the most amazing characteristic of post-Soviet Eurasia is its continuity. While the old Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) structure has generally been erased, many successor regimes are notable for their reliance upon the Soviet-engineered structures that sustained Moscow’s tight control. The prevalence of conservative forces over those that could be labeled as reformist or radical is also noteworthy.

For those who envisioned a rapid transformation from a closed, state- controlled, politically repressive system to an open, pluralistic one, much of post-Soviet Eurasia seems stalled. Those anxious to see the resurrection of long-smothered ancient cultural traditions and identities are frustrated by the surviving detritus of “the Soviet man.” In some regions, the absence of perestroika and glasnost is frustrating and the glacial pace of change disheartening. Con- servative political and religious groups, who seek their own forms of legitimacy, have combined with extremist elements preaching the restoration of empire and autocracy to blunt radical systemic reform. The power of the nomenklatura, while severely reduced, is still sufficient to support governing structures in many regions. Also, though privatization has begun to move more quickly in many regions (particularly in agriculture), state enterprises in the industrial sector remain powerful obstacles to free enterprise. To some extent, reluctance by officials and entrepreneurs to pursue radical market-oriented reforms outside of Russia has been reinforced by the inability of the Russian prophets of reform to implement these measures successfully. Indeed, under the leadership of reformist leaders like Yegor Gaydar, industrial decline characterized Russia’s frst period of experimentation with market economics. Further, industrial managers trained under the Soviet system were often able to exploit the uncertain business environment in Russia and elsewhere to siphon off scarce profits and establish a class of rz0uz.eau.x riches. Without a growing middle class to build and sustain economic growth, the public in the former Soviet Union has become cynical about the prospects of genuine economic reform. This cynicism has been strengthened by the fear that post-Soviet society is rapidly becoming corrupt and criminalized, owing to the sudden opportunities for quick wealth for a very few.

Political leadership and governance in many of the new nations are static and decaying. In Central Asia, for example, four of the five current presidents leading these new nations were frst secretaries of the CPSU in their respective republics, guardians of Soviet orthodoxy. These tendencies have delayed the movement toward genuine statehood for many of the new post-Soviet nations. Moreover, the successor states of the Soviet Union are not moving toward liberal democracy at a uniform pace, owing to a number of factors: historical circumstances, demographic patterns, ethnic rivalries, economic con- ditions, the absence (or prevalence) of competing forms of legitimacy, irredentist

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claims leading to border disputes among neighboring states, and the absence of managerial and administrative talent.

Such are the subjects of the multivolume The h%wzutionuZ Politics of Eur&, a mammoth undertaking by any measure. The series is a product of the Russian Littoral Project, sponsored jointly by the University of Maryland at College Park (where series editor Karen Dawisha is on the faculty) and the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins (where co-editor Bruce Parrot is on the faculty). Both editors are respected analysts of Soviet politics.

The first seven volumes (all that were available at the time of review) contain more than ninety essays, many of which are written by distinguished scholars. Three additional volumes are scheduled for publication in late 1996 and 1997. The essays were originally commissioned for a series of three workshops held in the United States, Europe, and the former Soviet Union between 1993 and 1995, and focusing on, respectively, Russia, the new states of the Slavic heartland plus the Baltic and western regions, and the emergent nations of the southern periphery-the Caucasus and Central Asian states.

As the editors note in the preface to volume 1, the series is intended to provide a “comprehensive scholarly study” of the USSR’s transformation from an imperial entity to a grouping of independent states. The methodological focus for this project is the “interaction between the internal affairs and foreign policies of the new states” (p. xii). With this approach, the volumes examine the issues of historical legacy, ethnicity and national identity, religion, political culture and society, economics, foreign affairs, decision making, military and defense issues, and nuclear weapons.

Since the series is incomplete, this review should be regarded as preliminary, particularly because the remaining three volumes will cover issues that are critical to understanding Eurasia’s evolution in the post-Soviet era- economic issues; a comparative analysis of imperial collapse under tsar@ Ottoman, British, and other variants; and the implications of the Soviet collapse for the West.

The Presence of the Past

Volume 1 of the series, i%e Leg&y of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, is a generally disappointing beginning.’ The best chapter in many ways (but unfortunately the shortest) is the introductory essay by the volume’s editor, S. Frederick Starr. A noted scholar, Starr provides a sweeping synthesis, previewing the volume and assessing the power of historical forces that have shaped the Russian and Soviet state. He correctly concludes that

1 S. Frederick Starr, ed., 7he Legacy of H&toy in Russia and the Nau States of Eurasia, vol. 1 of She ~ntemutional Politics ofEtwasiu, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot (Amonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1994. 313 pp. $66.95; $25.95, paper).

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history has been a most critical determinant of contemporary behavior and policy in the Baltic states-Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Along with Russia, they stand out among the former Soviet republics for their success in developing institutions that permit a semblance of independent political expression. Some will quibble with Starr’s conclusion that “the history that counts is that of the Soviet era rather than the more antique past” (p. 11). Obviously, those who see tsarist roots in Soviet and Russian practice will contest his interpretation, but Russia’s tsarist traditions are often discounted as determinants of contemporary Russian imperial behavior. The challenge of this volume (and of the series more broadly) is to weave together an interpretive tapestry from disparate and uneven threads. In the final analysis, Starr comes closer than most of the other volume editors to achieving this objective, but the reader may regret that the editor did not contribute a more lengthy piece to the collection.

In chapter 2, “On Certain Mythical Beliefs and Russian Behaviors,” Edward Keenan seeks to explain the ideological roots of Russian history, tracing the development of official Russian ideology by examining (“revising,” to use his term) seven “national myths” and concluding that “none of these axioms can withstand modern analytical scrutiny and confrontation with the sources” <p* 21).

The myths examin ed here are: the origins of the Muscovite state; the Kievan inheritance; the struggle to oppose Tatar overlordship and this struggle’s relation to the subsequent Russian leadership role played by the Moscow princes; the political dividends obtained from collaboration of the Muscovy princes with the Orthodox Church; the role of the church in advancing the “Third Rome” theory, which held that Moscow inherited the mantle of Christian imperial responsibility; the influence of the anti-Tatar crusade on the Muscovite conquests of non-Russian lands; and lastly the importance of Kievan unity and religious concerns for Orthodox populations upon the imperial incorporation of Belarus and Ukraine.

Yet, in constructing this argument, Keenan acknowledges that he has done “scant justice” to “the relevant scholarly literature” (p. 21), a judgment that is affirmed by even a cursory examination of the footnotes. It is more than strange that in seeking to debunk conventional wisdom and to discredit “mythic lore” in Russian historiography, the author refrains from assessing the relevant literature. Keenan does reach some interesting hypotheses regarding the strategic rationale for Muscovite imperial expansion and identifies three conditions for its success, in the absence of which expansion slowed or stopped entirely: the demographic dynamism of Muscovite ethnicity, an administratively and politically efficient Muscovite court, and the internal withering of competing political-military organizations.

Keenan concludes that subsequent Russian (and presumably Soviet) leaders were motivated, not by a belief that expansion was the only (or preferred) course of action, but by a benign and pragmatic opportunism that merely responded to “favoring circumstances.” His bottom line-that Russian political culture is “not at base expansionist” (p. 37)--is curious. It is also generally uncontested by other authors in the series, raising questions about how balanced

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this project was from the beginning and how seriously the series editors searched for scholarly diversity. Regardless, Keenan’s thesis, while intellectually stimulating, will (or should) be greeted by calls for more evidence, reassuring those skeptical of revisionist history that such skepticism is generally well placed.

Clearly, covering such a vast amount of historical and geographic territory required the editors to make certain choices regarding what to include and what to leave on the cutting-room floor. Nevertheless, some will be disappointed by their choices. The first volume, for example, does not include an essay on Georgia, whose historical experience is unique among the former Soviet states. Neither does it include treatment of Kazakstan, whose demographic and ethnic relationship with Russia warrants historical analysis. That said, the two chapters that address Central Asia broadly and Uzbekistan more specifically are superior contributions.

Peoples and Places

Volume 2, National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States ofEurasia, is a rich collection of well-written and intellectually rigorous pieces2 It is also one of the best-organized volumes. Among the most interesting issues from a policy standpoint is how the Russian Federation has been transformed by the end of empire. Much attention has been paid to center-periphery relations between Russia and the other former Soviet republics, but relatively little to the issue within Russia. Elizabeth Teague repairs that omission in her chapter, “Center-Periphery Relations in the Russian Federation.” Teague focuses on the devolution of Moscow’s political authority and economic leverage over the rest of the federation. She asserts that the prospect of a truly democratic system is quixotic without a more “federal” federation. No doubt, greater political expres- sion and a trend toward pluralism have begun in the Russian Federation, but it is unclear whether some of the impulses that fuel a more federal model of governance in Russia facilitate democratic governance, as Western observers understand it. Initiatives toward greater federalization could create such chaotic inter-regional relations that greater (i.e., more centralized) political authority for the mandarins in Moscow would appear attractive to many Russians. As Teague notes, Moscow was soon haunted by its promises for greater autonomy in the regions (oblasts), districts (okrugs), and territories (krais), because many regional leaders insisted on genuine autonomy rather than cosmetic concessions. Probably, Gorbachev and Yeltsin underestimated the seriousness with which regional authorities would pursue autonomy and counted too heavily on Russia’s relative ethnic homogeneity. (More than 80 percent of the federation’s population is ethnic Russian.) This reliance proved to be a mistake, as the nearly thirty million

2 Roman Szporiuk, ed., National Zakntity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, vol. 2 of 7be Zntemuti~ Politics of Eurasiu, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot (At-monk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 194. 328 pp. $66.95; $25.95, paper).

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ethnic non-Russians living in the federation (nearly 20 percent of the populace) were significantly more vocal, and in some cases volatile, than anticipated. Furthermore, the artificiality of the federation was more transparent to a larger segment of the population than the Moscow leadership understood. Employed essentially as a tool of legitimation by the Bolsheviks to assert political control and legitimize the imperial system, the federation has changed radically since the fall of Soviet authority.

Teague disagrees with many other scholars concerning the crisis of legitimation in Russia. She discounts the relative weight of the CPSU’s dissolution and gives greater attention to the absence within Russia’s constitution of a true separation of powers or a system of checks and balances. Unfortunately, some of the discussion in this chapter (and others) is dated. Since the chapter was written, a broader debate on these issues has occurred, forcing through the Russian parliament some measures that have given increased authority to the nonexecutive branches of the government. In any event, Teague’s focus on constitutional and jurisdictional issues may miss the larger problem for most Russians-the absence of a source of legitimacy and control, which the CPSU provided, at least for the party faithful. As Paul Goble has noted, following the dissolution of the CPSU, “So far, there is no obvious candidate for such legitimation and control.“3

Several other chapters in this volume are noteworthy. The essay on ethnicity and foreign policy in Ukraine by Ilya Prizel, the contribution by Walter Clemens Jr. on Baltic identities, and the piece by Martha Brill Olcott on the role of Central Asian ethnicity and nation building in foreign policy are all superb. Olcott, who has established herself as the preeminent U.S. scholar on Central Asia, exposes a number of misconceptions regarding the region’s evolution, including the conventional (and ridiculous) assumption that there is little diversity among the Central Asian nations. Central Asia presents a particularly interesting case of postcolonial evolution. Five nations, wrapped in economic misery and political obscurity for seven decades, are in the midst of a slow and excruciating process of self-identification. This process is held hostage by the Soviet legacy in ways that are likely to delay progress on nation building for decades. That is particularly true in the economic sphere, where, as Shireen Hunter has observed, Soviet imperial control was absolute. “In an economic sense, the Soviet Union was organized as a single state.“4

The chapter by Gueorgui Otyrba on ‘War in Abkhazia” also merits close attention. It contains a wealth of detail on the origins of that conflict, which, along with the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute between Armenia and Azer- baijan, is likely to be regarded as a watershed event in post-cold war history. In Abkhazia, Russia was ambivalent about which side to support and for a time

3 Paul Goble, “Regions, Republics, andRussian Reform: Center-Periphery Relations in the Russian Federation,” in i%e Swctssor States to the USS& ed. John W. Blaney @%.shington, DC.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 19951, p. 162.

4 Shireen T. Hunter, GzntraI Asia Since I t7dqm&ze, ‘Ihe Washington Papers (Washington, D.C.: Praeger Publishers for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 19961, p. 66.

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assisted both the Georgian nationalists and the insurgency of the Abkhazian rebels. However, the peculiar aspects of Georgian history, the brand of nation- alism that thrives in Tbilisi, and the effect on the policies of many of the other “near abroad’ nations toward Moscow warrant greater attention than this volume confers. 5

Ideologues, Faiths, and Fighting Creeds

The issue of religion is addressed in volume 3, ne Politics of Religion in Russia and the Neul States ofEurasia. There are few issues of greater sensitivity in Russia than the role of religion and the church in political and state affairs. Among the most negative and enduring legacies of the Soviet imperium has been the utter crushing of religion as a force in the lives of the population. The desecration of churches, religious defilement and persecution, and the official policy of de-legitimating religion in general still sting for most Russians. Soviet authorities clearly recognized the potential of religion to serve as a force competing with the communist ideology and as a powerful source of dissonance. Lenin’s campaign to close and defile churches was continued by Stalin, although the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church was generally spared persecution during World War II because the Kremlin regarded Orthodox clergy as a useful ally in combatting Nazi Germany. Beginning in 1959, and until his fall in 1964, Nikita Khrushchev orchestrated a concerted and aggressive campaign against religion, ordering thousands of houses of worship razed. He was reportedly outraged to learn that many Siberian churches had somehow escaped the attention of the official defilers.

Religious persecution was not limited to the Slavic and Baltic Christians, but extended to Judaism and Islam as well. The Soviet state was militantly atheistic and did not discrimin ate among the believers when it came to persecution-Roman Catholics, Pentecostals, Muslims, Jews, and even members of the Russian Orthodox Church were all subject to it.

While suppressing overt religious practice at home, Soviet leaders did not hesitate to employ international religious organizations in order to pursue foreign policy objectives or to manipulate public opinion abroad. A number of organizations, including the World Council of Churches, were used as propaganda instruments in pursuit of “peace campaigns” during periods of East-West tension. That occurred with great effect during the early 198Os, when Europe’s NATO members debated the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons to answer Soviet stationing of longer-range, nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles in

5 For an analysis of Georgia’s post-Soviet struggle for independence, see Jonathan Aves, “Independent

Georgia,” in Chalkwges for the Former Soviet South, ed. Roy Allison Whington, DC.: The Brookings

Institution for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1%6), pp. 167-85. 6 Michael Bourdeaux, ed., 7he Politics of Religion in Russia and the Nkw States of Eurasiq vol. 3 of irhe

IntmnationalPoliticsofEtmzsia, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot &monk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995. 321 pp. $68.95; $26.95, paper).

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several of the Warsaw Pact nations. The Kremlin also occasionally exploited well-known evangelists visiting the USSR, most notably in 1982 when the Reverend Billy Graham was invited to Moscow.

The targeting of ethnic groups, most viciously illustrated in the anti-Semitic persecution of Russian Jews and the forced resettlement of Muslim Crimean Tatars, also served as religious persecution. Both groups experienced discrimi- nation in employment and were often denied entry into the best universities. Ultimately, Soviet authorities allowed some groups, particularly the Jews, to emigrate, albeit in small numbers and only when the cause of East-West detente was well served as a result. There was a double benefit to ideological allegiance in allowing Soviet Jews to leave the USSR. The majority of them were members of, and in many cases leaders of, the more vocal democratic and human-rights movements, whose publications encouraged freedom of political and religious expression, challenging Soviet orthodoxy. Thus, emigration served to weaken the dissident movements. Other discontented groups, including Volga Germans and Armenians, were also allowed to emigrate.

Common to many of the persecuted groups was an allegiance to non-Russian nationalisms. More than a decade before the fall of the Soviet Union, Seweryn Bialer concluded that the issue of ethnic nationalism “is potentially the most devastating for the state in its possible long-range conse- quences and presents the deepest challenge to the legitimacy of the regime.” He argued that the growing gap between the ethnic Russians and the other nationalities could generate the most volatile tensions and create the most serious pressures for change.’ Somewhat similarly, the emergence of Islam as a political force in parts of the former Soviet Union, including regions bordering Russia, now constitutes one of the greater threats to stability in several of the former republics and remains among Moscow’s worst nightmares.

The best contributions in this volume are the chapter by John Dunlop, “The Russian Orthodox Church as an ‘Empire Saving’ Institution,” and the essay by Muriel Atkin on “Islam as Faith, Politics, and Bogeyman in Tajikistan.” The Dunlop piece analyzes the resurrected &nigre ideology of “Eurasianism,” one of several schools of thought among “empire savers” designed to create the new glue of confederation. Some Eurasian&s view the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church as respected agents of this newly created “great state.” Among other interesting revelations, Dunlop exposes the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church as advocating a reconstituted, post-Soviet union. Among the church’s co-conspirators are a collection of unsavory rightists determined to save the unity of the Soviet state. They include Ruslan Khasbulatov, the former chairman of the Supreme Soviet. Khasbulatov (an ethnic Chechen) used the considerable power of his office to halt a parliamentary committee’s inquiry into the role of the KGB in the failed 1991 coup against Mikhail Gorbachev and was among those who instigated the October 1993 revolt against Yeltsin,

7 Seweryn Bialer, Stalin’s Sucmon: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union (New York: Cambridge University Press, 19&I), p. 207.

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Dunlop’s story is an interesting one and probably not widely known by Russian specialists.

The chapter on Islam in Tajikistan is an important contribution to the literature on the origins of the Islamic resurgence in Central Asia. Atkin notes quite correctly that such a resurgence in the former Soviet Union predates the

Emigration

from the USSR

served to

weaken

dissident

fall of the Soviet empire by at least two decades. She also illuminates the distinctions between “official Islam,” that which was sanctioned by the state, and “parallel Islam,” which was practiced outside of Soviet constraints. _

The functioning of “parallel Islam” in Tajikistan is in- structive to those who regard the continuing civil war there as a harbinger of the region’s fate. The president of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, has led the crusade against this movement, insisting on the need for his fellow Central Asian leaders in Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan to unite with him to

movements.

oppose it. When civil war broke out in the Tajik capital of Dushanbe, Karimov closed the Uzbek-Tajik border, fearing a spillover. More than anyone else, he was responsible for the deployment of a CIS “peacekeeping” force in Tajikistan, a force that included units from Uzbekistan and two other Central Asian states (grudgingly in the latter cases). He has also used his self-appointed role as protector of the status quo to send Uzbek military units into Osh, the portion of the Fergana Valley controlled by Kyrgyzstan, where Islamic radical elements are concentrated. In 1993, a senior Kyrgyz official told this author that Karimov sent those units without the permission of the Kyrgyz leadership.’

Overall, Karirnov has done his best to demonize the Islamists in Tajikistan as threatening instability and determined to overturn the system of governance throughout the former Soviet south. Uzbek offtcials were quite passionate about the need for the Russian 201st division (reinforced to about twice its normal strength) to remain in Dushanbe in support of the communist, Moscow-backed regime.” These officials and many respected Uzbek scholars are confirmed believers in the domino theory as applied to Central Asia. They warn of a “funda.rnentalist” contagion spreading throughout the region if it is not halted now, and they see the Russian military as the only force capable of opposing it. Adherents of this view will not be heartened by the recent victory of the Taliban, the Islamic-trained student movement from Pakistan that, as of this writing (October 1996), has captured two-thirds of Afghanistan, including the capital, Kabul. The Taliban victory is likely to create greater support for the indefinite deployment of Russian troops in neighboring Tajikistan. More and more, the Russian military presence is seen by the majority of Central Asian leaders as stabilizing, in stark contrast to the view of leaders in the Caucasus, who have seen Russian political pressure and military involvement topple leaders in Georgia and Azerbaijan.

8 Author’s interview with a senior Kyrgyz defense official, Bishkek, July 1993. 9 Author’s conversations with Uzbek officials, Tashkent, Aug. 1996.

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The Near and Far Abroad

Volume 4, edited by Adeed and Karen Dawisha, focuses on ?%e Making ofForeign Policy in Russia and theNew States ~fEwz.sia.~~ “Fluidity,” “uncertainty,” and “instability” are the terms that come to mind when considering the foreign policy of the post-Soviet states. In none of the successor states is there any semblance of a consensus on the core questions that normally concern statesmen and bureaucrats: What are the national interests? How are these interests threatened or best protected? Who are our allies and adversaries? The context for the development and implementation of foreign and security policies for all of the newly independent countries is so dramatically altered that, with the notable exception of Russia, virtually none of the earlier assumptions regarding identification and protection of national interests remains valid. Indeed, the very notion of a “national interest” was foreign to the non-Russian nations and remains a mystery to most of the smaller successor states, For seven decades, the international politics of empire governed interstate relations for these republics. Until 1991, the notion that Turkmenistan or Ukraine could pursue a foreign and security policy independent of Russia was unimaginable. Certainly, it was unimaginable to many Russians who defined Soviet and Russian interests as one and the same.

Russia was the ultimate status quo hegemonic power, seeking to preserve an involuntary internal union-the USSR-and insisting on the perpetuation of an external alliance-the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet legacy remains the most important source of continuity in policy for most of the newly independent nations of the former Soviet Union. Russia has formally acknowledged, through a series of treaties and agreements signed over the last five years, the sovereign status of all of the successor states, Yet, it has done so in the context of pursuing its supreme national interest of stewardship over the former republics. Thus, Russia’s attitude toward the successor states remains among the most important variables in the formulation of foreign and security policies for each of them, albeit to varying degrees. In most cases, the room for maneuver in the internal arena for these newly independent nations is a function of the bilateral relationships each has forged with Russia. In that sense, Moscow’s interactions with the new states are typical of those seen in other postcolonial or postimperial relationships. The key difference in this postimperial situation is the continuing effort by the former hegemon to reestablish some semblance of control, despite its own weakened economic and geopolitical state. The Russian characterization of the former republics as constituting the “near abroad’ illustrates this tendency to discount the independent status of these new nations.

The absence of consensus among Russia’s foreign and defense policy elite regarding Russia’s postimperial relationships with its former vassals continues

10 Adeed Dawisha. and Karen Dawisha, eds., The Making of Fompz Policy in Rusia and the New States of Etmsiq vol. 4 of i%e Itimtional Politics of Eurasia, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot (Am~onk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995. 360 pp. $65.95; $25.95, paper).

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to hobble Moscow’s strategic approach on virtually every policy issue. There remains a struggle between the “Atlanticists,” who favor a continued close relationship with the West, and the “Eurasian&s,” who defme Russia’s future strategic interests in the context of its roots in Eurasia. While the two approaches are not mutually exclusive, they do reflect different strategic orientations with profound implications for all of the former republics.” The principal architect of the Atlantic& approach was former foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev, a protege of the last Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze. With Kozyrev’s departure and the appointment of Yevgeny Primakov in his stead, it appears that the Atlanticists are no longer in the ascendancy, and Washington can expect less Western-oriented foreign and security policies, with greater emphasis on courting the Asian powers and increased attention to Russia’s interests in the south, that is, in Central Asia and the Caucasus. It may also signal a more assertive policy toward the “near abroad’ generally, including those whose security interests are more likely to conflict with Russia’s Thus, Ukraine and Georgia are probable targets for a less-benign Russian security approach.

As the editors of volume 4 note in their introduction, this collection of essays addresses “selected’ states of the former Soviet Union, Some will quibble with the selection. For example, there is no analysis of Georgia’s foreign policy approach. That is particularly regrettable considering Moscow’s more assertive stance there (including agreements with Shevardnadze, now the Georgian leader, to allow the stationing of Russian forces on several new bases) may signal Russia’s intention to remilitarize the Caucasus in light of its bitter experience in Chechnya. Georgia is treated in volume 5 of the series but together with discussions of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and little attention is paid to Georgia’s relationships with other former Soviet states, including Russia. The most inter- esting contribution to volume 4 is by Andrew Bouchkin, whose essay includes a very illuminating (though too brief) analysis of Russia’s emerging palicy toward China and Japan. In addition, four chapters are devoted to Central Asia, which seems excessive, especially in light of the scant treatment of the three Baltic nations-only one chapter is devoted to that key region, and that too is regrettable considering the important role played by Latvians, Estonians, and Lithuanians in igniting many of the forces that ultimately brought down the USSR.

The absence of a chapter on the issue of NATO expansion is the most glaring omission and cannot be excused by the volume’s publication date of 1995. The debate over this issue began in earnest in early 1992 and has become one of the most important security policy issues for Russia and the United States. It certainly warrants a separate chapter. There is little mention of this issue anywhere in the seven volumes published to date, although volume 5 does address some of the NATO-related questions. One hopes to find a more detailed analysis in one of the three volumes yet to appear.

11 For a discussion of the transformation of Russian foreign and security policy, see Eugene Rurner, Russiun National Security and Foe@ Policy in Transition (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1995).

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Politics and Power

Volume 5, among the best in the series, is edited by Bruce Parrot and addresses State Building and Military Power in Russia and the Neu! States of Eurmia.12 As Parrot correctly notes, the absence of either consensus on national security or a structure to implement policy creates a very difficult environment for the practitioner striving to pursue strategic interests, as well as for the analyst trying to assess trends and implications. Like Starr’s introduction to volume 1, however, Parrot’s discussion here is all too brief, although he does extend his analysis in the concluding chapter and provides a skillful synthesis of issues covered by other contributors to the volume.

Among the most useful essays in this volume is one by Raymond Garthoff (a long-time student of Soviet doctrine and arms control behavior), which traces the development of Russian doctrine and military deployments. As with a number of pieces in this series, however, it suffers from the long gestation period between the drafting of the chapters and the final publication. Garthoff’s analysis ends in 194, so that the crisis in Chechnya is not addressed. Russian deployments in the North Caucasus (some in direct response to the Chechnya rebellion) have revealed interesting trends in Russian deployment patterns and exposed some serious weaknesses in logistical support and combat readiness within the Russian force structure. Tatiana Shaldeina’s chapter on “Russian Policy Toward Military Conkts in the Former Soviet Union” is also commendable and includes a rich discussion of contending approaches to great-power status.

The sixth volume is the most narrowly focused and will interest students of nuclear weapons policy and proliferation.‘3 The authors make clear that, despite the program of denuclearization in the three post-Soviet states that had Soviet weapons deployed there, serious concerns remain. While these weapons have been removed from Kazakstan and Ukraine, Belarus has reportedly delayed fulfilling its promise to the Clinton administration to remove by the end of ~86 eighteen SS-25 missiles deployed on its territory. These weapons, among the most advanced in the Russian strategic missile inventory, are caught in the politics of post-Soviet relations. Reminiscent of earlier efforts by Ukraine, Belarus is stalling on the question of nuclear disarmam ent in the belief that its SS-25 missiles are an effective card to hold. In the case of Ukraine, nuclear weapons were used by the Kiev leadership to seal a deal with Russia on the status of the Black Sea Fleet and to protect Kiev’s independence from Moscow. By contrast, in the case of Belarus, these weapons could be used as a chip in persuading the Russian leadership to support confederation. The Belarusian

l2 Bruce Parrot, ed., State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New St&es of Eurasia, vol. 5 of The InternukmzlPo1itic.s ofEumsiu, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot (Arn~onk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995.

319 pp. $65.95; $25.95, paper). 13 George Quester, ed., The Nuclear chalhge in Rusiu and the New States of Eumsb, vol. 6 of l%e

IntanarionalPolitics ofEurasiu, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot (Am~onk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharp-e, 1995. 274

pp. $65.95; $25.95, paper).

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Review Essays

president, Alexander Lukashenko, had sought the support of retired Russian general Alexander Lebed in his bid for reunion. Lebed’s dismissal as national security advisor by Yeltsin in October 1996, however, removed a key Lukashenko ally in the effort to cement a closer tie with Russia.

Russian custody of nuclear weapons, the problems of ‘loose nukes,” and the diffusion of nuclear-related technology and expertise from the non- Russian republics to other regions all present potential security hazards that are addressed in some detail, Edited by the noted nuclear theoretician George Quester, this collection contains several excellent essays. Most notable are the pieces by Bruce Blair, who chronicles in great detail the problems of Russian nuclear command and control, and the one by John Lepingwell, who analyzes Russian policy toward the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. While the Lepingwell chapter is somewhat dated (the discussion focuses on 1993 and 19941, the analysis is sound and illuminating. Sherman Garnett, who served in the Pentagon during the Bush administration’s handling of the negotiations with Ukraine over nuclear weapons, presents a superb analysis of the factors influencing Ukraine’s nuclear anxieties toward Russia, placing them in the context of Kiev’s larger security concerns.

Society and Stability

The seventh volume in this series is, from an intellectual standpoint, the most engaging. I4 Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the Nm States of Eurasia, edited by Vladimir Tismaneanu, assesses the conceptual evolution of civil society in the post-Soviet era and the prospects for a liberal society’s emerging from the failed Soviet experiment. In his introduction, Tismaneanu concludes quite rightly that the most remarkable aspect of this transformation is its relatively non-violent character. He notes that the volume’s objectives are to avoid either prolonging a “Russocentric line” or engaging in “tedious particularisms” (p. 9). The authors have succeeded in meeting both objectives. The contribution by Roger Kangas on “State Building and Civil Society in Central Asia” and the one by Henry Huttenbach on “Post-Soviet Crisis and Disorder in Transcaucasia” are among the most intriguing in the volume. Kangas concludes that the priority for all of Central Asia’s leaders has been to secure short-term stability, often at the expense of building state and political structures. The result is an indefinite stall in pursuing reform, including greater democra- tization. There is the added problem, acute in countries like Kazakstan, of a cult of personality that has developed around key leaders, complicating the search for ethnic and cultural identity.15

l4 Vladimir Tiimaneanu, ed., Politicd Cdture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia

vol. 7 of Ihe Internationul Politics of Eurasiu, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot (Anuonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 195. 384 pp. $65.95; $25.95, paper).

l5 For a discussion of Kazakstan’s president, see Martha BriU Olcott, “Nursuhn Nazerbaev and the Balancing Act of State Building in Kazakhstan,” in Patterns in Po.st&viet Leaded@, ed. Timothy J. Colton and Robert C. Tucker (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1951, pp. 169+%.

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Review Essays

The Huttenbach essay on Transcaucasia identifies the historic forces of volatility and tum-roil that have resulted in social disequilibria and political fragmentation. There, as in other regions (most notably Central Asia), the shock of sudden independence prevented a more tranquil end to imperial subjugation. The explosion of nationalism in this region (where there are more than fifty distinct ethnic groups and nationalities) has fueled continued fighting in places like Abkhazia, Ossetia, NagomoKarabakh, Chechnya, and Ingushetia. The wealth of energy sources in the Caucasus, particularly the Caspian Sea basin, could yet transform these societies in positive ways, but for political and economic reasons, the extraction of oil and gas will be problematic at best.

In sum, this series is an important contribution to the literature on post-Soviet Eurasia. While it suffers from some of the usual maladies of edited collections (uneven contributions, dated material), on balance the essa an illuminating picture of an extraordinarily complex phenomenon- the transformation of an imperial system into independent, sovereign entities.

Winter 1997 I 161