The Human Security Implications of Oil Spillage in Niger Delta, Nigeria

Assessing the Human Security Implications of Oil

Spillage in Niger Delta, Nigeria

By

{Andrew Ovienloba}∗

{04/27/2009}

Abstract: It is not unusual to read nerve-charging researches from various

scholars and local people of the Niger Delta indicating that life in the Niger Delta could

have been better off without crude oil exploration in that part of Nigeria. The argument

for this assumption have often times been linked to the negative effects of oil spillage that

have adversely change the social and economic life of the people between 1958 and

2009. Oil spillage is the release of a liquid petroleum hydrocarbon into the environment

due to human activities that in turn constitutes significant level of pollution endangering

human life through environmental degradation occasioned by unclean environment of oil

spillage. For this school of thought, oil spillage risks the human security of the population

in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Human security refers to the protection of

communities and individuals from those preventable environmental conditions that

endangers and compromises their fundamental human dignity. These conditions includes

the loss of economic wellbeing of the people exacerbated by reactionary activities of ∗ John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University.

Oil Spillage and Human Security in Niger Delta, Nigeria

Ovienloba, A 2

militant groups voicing their protect about their illegitimate negligence by both the

federal government of Nigeria and oil multinationals operating in the region. But to the

question attended to by this research is to what extent is oil spillage associated with the

level of human insecurity in the Niger Delta? My tested statistical research discovered

that the human security condition in the Niger Delta is occasioned by interrelated

variables. These variables are 39% garbage dump, 14% militant activities, 16% oil

spillage, 31% of an untested combination of gas flaring, and oil bunkering in the region

working in harmony to exacerbate human security risk in Niger Delta.

Key Words: Nigeria, Niger Delta, oil spillage, human security, oil multinational and

environmental degradation}


Ovienloba, A i

Table of Contents

1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 2 2 Issue/Literature Survey of Oil Spillage and Security in Niger Delta, Nigeria ...... 5 3 Research Claim/Testable Hypotheses ..................................................................... 13 4 Analysis and Findings on the nexus between oil spillage and Human Security in Niger Delta ....................................................................................................................... 17

4.1 Analysis/Model: ................................................................................................... 30 4.2 Findings: Oil Spillage and Environmental impact analysis ................................. 33

5. Policy Implications ....................................................................................................... 52 6.Concluding Comments ................................................................................................ 62 ...............................................................................................................................................


Ovienloba, A 2

{Assessing the Human Security Implication of Oil Spillage in the Niger Delta}

1 Introduction

NIGERIA is a country of an estimated population of about 150 million people

(Ovienloba 2007 p.21). She is often described as the giant of Africa and endowed with

abundant natural resources. The discovery of crude oil in Nigeria in 1956 and exploration

in 1958 created the arena of influence with leadership opportunity for her both in the

Sub-Saharan region of Africa and the continent as whole. However, since the mornings

of independent Nigerian nation in 1960, Nigeria has faced multiple crises in the guise of

ethnic, political and religious conflicts. The cause of these conflicts could be traceable to

the problem of over centralization of control over power and revenue; politicization of

ethnicity; poor state security management and increasing proliferation of non-state armed

groups, especially in the oil rich Niger Delta region and the hegemonic pursuit of a few

elitist groups in the country. (www.crisiswatchgroup.org)

Between 1966 and 1970, Nigeria was engrossed in a civil war that claimed the life

of over two million people in the Eastern region (Biafra), which attempted secession from

the country as a result of orchestrated marginalization and inadequate security

management. Between 1999 and 2007, over 14, 000 lives were lost to both religious and

ethnic conflicts. About 60% of these lost lives were in the Niger Delta precisely in the

core Niger Delta region of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States predominantly inhabited by

the Ijaws, the Itsekiris, Ogonis, Urhobos and the Isokos. Between December 2005 and

August 2006, the militant activities in the Niger Delta led to the shutdown of up to 800,

000 barrels per day not negotiating the spade of security risk of kidnappings of oil


Ovienloba, A 3

workers, piracy and increasing bunkering activities in the region (Africa Report N.118,

September, 2006). Nigeria’s sad history since independence demonstrates a case of

“politicization of ethnicity and religion and factional mobilization along these lines as a

direct by-product of monopolization of power and assets by ruling elites [both military

and civilian] that continually frustrates open and fair competition.”

(www.crisiswatchgroup.org) These unattended political and economic misnomers have

engineered frustrations and mistrust of government ability to respond purposively to the

needs and aspirations of the people thereby resulting in the freelance militant group

formations especially in the Niger Delta oil rich regions of the nation. The activities of

the militant groups have often been blamed on the frequent occurrence of oil spillage that

remain unattended to and thus risking the health and economic opportunities in the

region. In the evidence of this the militant groups take to arms as way to express their

dissatisfaction with the political system in Nigeria.

It could be argued that the same commodity that had poised the Nigerian state for

African leadership, international influence, and economic opportunities for a fast pace

development has increasingly become the pillar of conflicts and identity definition from

the years of her independence in 1960 to the present date. Reporting on the Nigerian

economic dilemma in 1996, the World Bank “described Nigeria as a paradox: the country

is rich but the people are poor…. Nigeria is rich in land, people, oil and natural gas

resources. If more wealth had been channeled to the development of its people…. Nigeria

could have been poised for a promise.” (Awe, December, 1999, p.3)

As the wealth of the Nigerian oil industry grows with a lot of economic euphoria, so has

its attendant conflicts multiply in the Niger Delta part of the country where zero-sum


Ovienloba, A 4

thinking has continually led to group formation and identity definitions. Whereas the

Northern part of the country could be termed as relatively developed by the provisions of

roads and other socio-economic activities, the cores states of Niger Delta especially

Bayelsa lack linking road networks, pipe-borne water, hospitals or schools save roads

linking oil wells. Niger Delta is the major source of oil revenue generation in Nigeria

accounting for about 96% of state foreign earnings and about 85% of [internal revenue],

yet the poorest region in Nigerian (Ikelegbe, 2001, p. 437; Shaw, 1984, p.394). Niger

Delta (ND) is made up of nine regional states of the South, South and South Eastern part

of Nigeria these states are: Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Beyelsa, Delta, Edo, Imo, and Ondo,

Rivers, and Cross Rivers state. These states representing a good percentage of the ethnic

minorities in Nigeria (predominantly the Edos, Ijaws, Urhobos, Itsekiris, Isokos, Ogonis,

Ibibios, Aguleris and Umuneris) created at different historical time interval in Nigeria,

were originally meant to respond to the agitations of the Niger Delta indigenes for a

manifest federal presence in their region as a corresponding development efforts

commensurate to the unquantifiable resources being generated from the region. Even

though oil exploration gained influence in the region beginning from 1958, the advent of

conflict between the local communities of this region and the federal government of

Nigeria and the multinationals came to lime light especially in the 1990s. The crux of the

matter lies in the power of control over the largess that comes from the natural resources

and the environmental effects of crude oil extractions. These effects include especially

oil spillage. “Oil spill is the release of a liquid petroleum hydrocarbon into the

environment due to human activity, and is a form of pollution. ...”

(www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_spillage)


Ovienloba, A 5

The States of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers, (mainly the Ijaws, Itsekiris, Urhobos,

Edos, Isokos and Ogonis) are the very prominent part of the Niger Delta hardest hit by

the imbroglio resulting from environmental degradation from excessive oil exploration,

spillage, and inadequate socio-economic infrastructures to improve the life of the people.

Conflict in the Niger Delta therefore could be perceived as a palpable response from the

civil society and community based organizations to the perceived visible negligence of

the federal government of Nigeria and the multinationals (Shell, Exxon, Texaco,

Chevron, and Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation) that have decimated their lives.

The purpose of this research is to give significant statistical consideration to the

contention that human security risk in the Niger Delta is created by the years of intensive

oil spillage (1958 and 2009). It has been argued by various scholars that the slow

destruction of the Niger Deltan’s livelihood by the ecological carelessness of Exxon

Mobil, Shell, Agip, Chevron, Texaco and other multinationals extracting crude oil in the

region have incrementally impacted the overall wellbeing of the residents of Niger Delta

region of Nigeria. My objective is to tap from the resources of the different field

researches that have been carried out on the subject and establish a statistical conclusion

on the truth content of these previous findings.

2 Issue/Literature Survey of Oil Spillage and Security in Niger Delta, Nigeria

Crude oil exploration has remained a very contentious issue in the Niger Delta for as

long as the history of natural gas industry has lasted for almost fifty-four years. The


Ovienloba, A 6

pervading arguments on the subject are quite complex and emotionally charged with both

ethnic identity survival and oil and gas resource control.

Identity politics in the delta has become more pronounced, violent and

widespread, even to the extent of threatening the Nigerian nation- state as

presently constituted. The volatile nature of politics in the Niger delta, especially

since the mid-1980s, is traceable to several factors: the emergence of petroleum as

the fiscal basis of the Nigerian state, the status of petroleum as a critical element

in the reproduction of the ruling class and the ultimate prize of political power.

(Obi, 2001, p. 5)

The context of identity politics as it relates to the oil industry could be better understood

when we contextualize it within the framework of the management and control of the

economic resources of the oil largess. Just as the discovery of crude oil in the wet

mangrove region of the Niger Delta part of Nigeria in 1956 brought a lot of economic

opportunity with leadership opportunity both in Africa and across the world so has such

euphoria attended to the specific needs of the residents in the region as a defining

moments in their sociological and anthropological developments. In other words, the

basis of agitation lies on negotiating the impact of the oil industry on the livelihood of the

people. For instance, whereas the federal government of Nigeria derives the bulk of its

economic resources from the region and the oil multinationals functioning in that part of

the world accrue significant amount of their profit from oil extraction from the region the

economic development cum environmental negligence of the region leaves little or

nothing to be desired. For example, whereas Shell Petroleum Development Company

(SPDC) derives 14% of its global net profit from its oil investments from the Niger Delta


Ovienloba, A 7

part of Nigeria, its attendance to the economic and environmental needs of the population

is not at any rate commensurate to its disclosed investment profits. In the face of this

telling reality individual communities whose life pattern have been significantly

decimated negatively by activities of the extractive industries communities resolve to

militant activities as way to protect their economic and social survival claims. The

argument for this course of action is hinged on the claim that oil spillage from oil

industries not only pollutes and degrades the environment, it equally takes away from

maintaining their quality of life and economic activities like farming and fishing activities

that is the people’s source or earning a living. For example, “Available records for the

period of 1976 to 1996 indicate that approximately 6%, 25%, and 69% respectively, of

total oil spilled in the Niger Delta area, were in land, swamp and offshore environments.

Also, between 1997 and 2001, Nigeria recorded a total number of 2,097 oil spill

incidents.” (Nwilo and Badejo, 2005, p.5)

The fact of the matter lie not so much on the spillage but on the application of the

various policies guiding the regulation of oil spillage in Nigeria. The gap effects of this

abnormally have not only created a zero-sum thinking among the population, it equally

has multiple security implications. These include possible health epidemics like increased

skin cancer and other complicated diseases resulting from drinking of oil-contaminated

water from oil pollution, and ethnic conflicts in militant protest from such negligence.

These evident issues risk the survival of a democratic peace process in Nigeria and the

significant health of the population cum the economic stability of Nigeria because of the

ethnic militant activities as already evident in the region. For example the Ijaw and the

Ogoni ethnic groups in the region have long taken to arms to pursue their course by


Ovienloba, A 8

taking oil workers hostage and vandalization of oil pipelines in the region.

While a lot has been written about the Ogoni (Loolo, 1981; Ngemutu- Roberts,

1994; Welch, 1995; Osaghae, 1995b; Boele, 1995; Crow, 1995; Naanen, 1995;

Birnbaum, 1995; Cessou and Fatunde, 1995; Kretzman, 1995; Olukoshi, 1995;

Cayford, 1996; CLO, 1996; Rowell, 1996; Saro-Wiwa, 1992, 1993, 1995;

Robinson, 1997; Skogley, 1997; Ibeanu, 1997, 1999; Na’ Allah, 1998; Obi,

1997a, 1998a, 1998b, 1999), the more recent travails of the Ijaw, the largest oil

minority ethnic group are yet to be broadly captured. Yet, both exemplify the pat-

tern of demands for restitution being ignored by the state and its “partners” the oil

multinationals. Ultimatums for redress given by aggrieved oil minorities popular

movements have been met by state repression, violence and extraction, thus

feeding into a cycle of increasingly popular protests and resistance by these social

movements which themselves express pent up rage and frustrations arising from

the contradictions spawned in the local context by national and global forces (Obi,

1998a; Ihonvbere and Shaw, 1998: 224–225). (Obi, 2001, p. 7)

Some authors that attempt to link environmental degradation resulting from oil

spillage that compromises human security are Ezzati and Kammen (2002), Fentiman,

(1996), Hellermann (2007), Livesey (2001), and Williams, 1996 among others. For

Ezzati and Kammen (2002), the exposure of population to biomass could greatly impact

the health condition of the population over a period of time. Even though the authors did

not provide any significant scientific evidence from the Niger Delta region to justify the

claim, the contention only speaks to the heart of scientific negligence of the region by

policy makers both from the side of the Nigerian government and oil multinational that


Ovienloba, A 9

benefits directly from the oil largess. It is this laxity that threatens the life security of the

population of the Niger Deltas. “For security, the genealogist would insist, is not a fact of

nature but a fact of civilization. It is not a noun that names something; it is a principle of

formation that does things. It is neither an ontological predicate of being, nor an objective

need, but the progenitor instead of a proliferating array of discourses of danger within

whose brutal and brutalizing networks of power- knowledge modern human being is

increasingly ensnared and, ironically, radically endangered.” (Dalby, 2002, p. xix) If no

effort is being made in the long and short run to measure the comprehensive impact of

gas flaring and environmental pollution on the residents of the Niger Delta, then it could

be legitimately assumed that the Niger Deltas are living on a game of chance in the

twenty first century where unpredictable epidemic could be reversed with notable

intelligence. The consequence could be grave and calamitous. Aside from the human

impact of oil pollution, the ecosystem and biodiversity that connects with the human

species are spared from the consequences of oil spillage. Fentiman argues that in spite of

the fact that research data on the consequences of oil spillage in the Niger Delta region is

scarce to come by, current field researches shows how oil spillage impacts the ecosystem

negatively with evident cases of sterility, skin diseases and lung cancer that have been

identified among the population. Williams corroborated these prevailing arguments when

he opined that: “it is time for change. The rethinking of the post-Cold War security

agenda to embrace environmental concerns, epitomized by the title of Gwyn Prins' book,

Threats Without Enemies (1993), increasingly presents environmental victimization as a

matter of human security - at the personal, national, and global levels.” (Williams, 1996)


Ovienloba, A 10

Another aspect to the untended oil spillage in the Niger Delta is the International

Law implications of the environmental degradation. Oil spillage does not only

compromise the security level of the residents of Niger Delta, it equally contravenes

various international protocols and Conventions on sustainable environment to which

Nigeria is signatory. For example, Rio Declaration (1992) and the Brundtland Report

(UN WCED, Our Common Future,1987) recommended a balance of national economic

development with the environment especially when the Brundtland report facilitated the

concept of sustainable development. Sustainable development refers as used by the

Brundtland Report is the “development that seeks to meet the needs and aspiration of the

present without compromising the ability to meet those of the future.” (WCED 1987

article 49,) Livesey critique the Brundtland report as vague and lacking adequate analysis

of what the term sustainable development comprised. (Livesey, 2001 pp. 9-12) However,

he did not in any case provide concrete policy recommendations that would supply for

such inadequacies inherent in the Brundtland report. Vieira (1985) argues in favor of the

skeptic’s ideology that within either a socialist ideal or capitalist ideology, attaining a

consensus is impossible because of a comparative advantage of the rich over the poor in

government policy making process. Quoting Stetton, Vieira argues that “most

governmental actions, both in safeguarding natural resources and in cleaning the polluted

environment, are detrimental to the lower class because of the associated cost increases

and scarcities of some natural commodities. He then suggests that the conservationist

movement is right-wing and basically benefits the upper class….” (Vieira, 1985, p.9) If

we are to go by Livesey and Vieira’s contention then, the Niger Delta is caught in a

network of evil axis where whereas the present generation is deprived of safe life and


Ovienloba, A 11

environment, the future generation of Niger Delta’s is blinked and destroyed even before

they were born. Within this caveat environmental degradation could go on unchecked

with all its attendant consequences because the Nigerian and Multinational hegemony

under a capitalist agenda could achieve their economic interest at the expense of the

misery cum endangerment of the Niger Delta lower class.

Perhaps the security index of the region could further be appreciated when we

compare the poverty level of the Niger Deltas to other oil producing communities and the

rest of Nigeria.

The region’s human development index is 0.564 and while this is slightly higher

than the Nigerian HDI of 0.448, the area rates far below regions or countries with

similar gas or oil reserves (Venezuela is 0.772 and Indonesia is 0.697) (UNDP,

2006: 15). As well, when further disaggregated to the local government level, the

Niger Delta Human Development Report shows that state and regional HDI

scores mask inequalities in human development among oil producing

communities. Significantly, local government areas without oil facilities appear to

have fewer poor people than those with oil facilities (UNDP, 2006: 15). (World

Bank Report 2009, Nigeria, Niger Delta)

The antecedents to this scenario are not farfetched. World Bank Report of May 1995 had

indicated that “Declining agricultural productivity; land degradation; disease; erosion;

fisheries depletion; illegal logging; deforestation; proliferation of exotic species; toxic

and hazardous substance pollution; vehicular emissions; sewage; resource ownership;

population; municipal wastes; oil pollution; institutional collapse and corruption”

(Harmon, www.waado.org/Environment/OilCompanies/WorldBank_BigOil.html) are


Ovienloba, A 12

evident factors that could risk the life of the inhabitants of Niger Delta below poverty

level while compromising the health of the population at the same token. In a “research

done for Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) in its areas of operation in the

Niger Delta reports that 84 percent of the people believed that the oil companies

(including Chevron) had adversely affected the economies of the host communities, and

69 percent felt that there was a high level of deprivation and neglect.14” (Bustany &

Wysham, 2000) in response to the environmental needs of Niger Delta, the federal

government of Nigeria came up with the following legal provisions: the Federal

Environmental Protection Agency Act of 1988 (FEPAAct) with concomitant regulation

to regulate effluent limitation, pollution abatement in industries and facilities generating

wastes, and management in hazardous wastes.

Additionally there was another incremental provision titled Environmental Impact

Assessment Act of 1992 (EIA Act), with a corresponding criminalization of harmful

wastes from the Harmful Wastes Act of 1988 and other special agencies to address the

socio-economic needs of the region. But the level of unattended oil spillage degenerating

social provisions in the region is indicative of the ineffectiveness in the implementation

of these policies. In a research conducted by Oyefusi (2007) from a sample of about

1,337 individuals drawn from 18 communities in the Niger Delta to estimate the

propensity to armed struggle in population, it was observed that about 36% of the

sampled population revealed a willingness to take up arms, which translates into a

potential rebel army size of about 24% of the male population in the states covered by the

research. (The World Bank Group, http://vlex.com/vid/propensity-armed-struggle-niger-

delta-468488) The question then is what precisely is wrong with the Niger Delta?


Ovienloba, A 13

3 Research Claim/Testable Hypotheses

Does oil spillage constitute a human security risk for the populations of the Niger

Delta? This research is designed with the focus of providing a testable response to the

research question of dependable relationship between oil spillage in the Niger Delta part

of Nigeria and human security risk. My contention therefore is that Excessive oil spillage

in the Niger Delta part of Nigeria poses a significant threat to the comprehensive security

risk of the about 27 million human population of the aforementioned region. Some of the

facilitated issues raised in connection with the environmental risk factor of oil spillage

are health, poverty and conflicts. The contentions of the research remain that whenever

there was oil spillage the risk of having cancer and respiratory problems within the

sampled population become rife. Secondly that oil spillage is directly linked to the

poverty level of the population that invariably leads to ethnic conflict. This thesis could

be justified from the research conducted by Paul Collier (2007); poverty was identified as

one of the strong triggers of civil war. Collier noted that “young men, who are the recruits

for rebel armies, come pretty cheap in an environment of hopeless poverty. Life itself is

cheap, and joining a rebel movement gives these young men a small chance for riches.)

Collier 2007, p.20) The evidence for these possibilities is quite obvious in the Niger Delta

population where militancy has already become a way of life.

The weak political system in Nigeria governance structure creates a situation where

enforcement of strict environmental laws is compromised through the networks of

corruption and structural inefficiency. This means whenever there was an oil spillage the

multinational could get away with not keeping to the rule because they could bribe


Ovienloba, A 14

corrupt government officials out of cleaning the spilled oil for over a very long period of

time that enable a massive degradation of the environment. Once the soil is devastated

farmers are unable to cultivate their crops, money meant for compensation is diverted

illegally and the people remain poor and disgruntled. Dissatisfaction resulting from

unmerited poverty and its attendant effects of malnutrition and economic powerlessness

gives vent to rebellious acts that further truncate the economic development of the region.

Empirical studies have established a causal link between natural resource abundance

and civil conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (1998), for example, show that natural

resource availability/ abundance considerably increases the chances of civil conflict

in a country. A country that has no natural resources faces a probability of civil

conflict of 0.5 percent, whereas a country with a natural resources-to-GDP share of

26 percent faces a probability of 23 percent. De Soysa (2000) observed a similar

correlation between resource wealth and civil conflict; while Addison and others

(2003) note that in Africa as well as other developing regions countries with point

resources such as minerals have a high propensity for conflict ranging from high

levels of political violence to outright wars. Ross (2004b) provides similar evidence

linking mineral resources in general to civil conflict. Fearon and Laitin (2003) and

Fearon (2005) however argue that the risk of civil war is limited to oil. (Oyefusi,

2007)

This paper attempts to argue that conflict associated with oil and mineral resources in the

Niger Delta could be reversed if spilled oil is effectively cleaned on a timely basis with

adequate compensation for victims. This arrangement could reverse the sense of

insecurity felt by the sampled population that often leads to arm struggle between the


Ovienloba, A 15

population and the government security agents versus oil multinationals versus restive

unemployed youths. If we consider the fact that “the local people generally bore the

greater part of the cost of the extraction process in terms of land appropriation,

environmental damage and the immigration of labor from other parts of the country, to

the exclusion of the local population then a keen consideration of conflict drivers such as

absence of social infrastructures and a decimation of the traditional means of employment

such as fishing and farming in the Niger Delta becomes even more relevant. I will like to

argue that “recent conflicts in Colombia, Sudan and Indonesia (Aceh) that reflect these

dynamics” (Oyefusi, 2007) are lessons in the same direction.

Another note of interest to this research linking oil spillage to human security is

the health implications of oil spillage on the sampled population. Whereas World Bank

Report (1995) observed that

"particulates, including sulfur, contribute to chronic and potentially debilitating

respiratory illnesses, while lead can cause mental dysfunction and potentially,

death... and NO2 may lead to increased susceptibility to respiratory pathogens." But

these are the deadly benefits of an unregulated and opportunistic automobile

industry, where gas lead content is the highest in the world. Curiously, the

epidemiological effects of poisons spilled by the waste streams of pipelines, flow-

stations and gas-flares are dismissed without mention. Unlike other problems where

data or research is lacking, here there is "little evidence" of disease, though

"speculations are widespread," the "toxicity is likely to be very low," the

pathological impact on human health "extremely unlikely. (Oyefusi, 2007)


Ovienloba, A 16

the tenacity of this report is highly debatable given the fact that people living in a region

of this sort with absence of portable drinking water would necessarily drink from the oil

contaminated water and perform other domestic chores with such unhealthy water.

Besides Seafood like crab, fish and other edible resources that have been greatly infected

by this oil pollution are going to be consumed by the population as secondary consumers

of such products. The long-term benefit effects could be scientifically established as

detrimental to the epidemiological wellbeing of both the primary and secondary

consumers of the pollution. For instance local people interviewed reported skin rash and

other undiagnosed illness after the use of polluted water for bath and contact with

residues from oil pollution.

Based on these findings the research established the link between oil spillage and

human security risk in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

Independent variable: Oil Spillage

Dependent Variables: Human Security

= Oil Spillage = {Human Security} =poverty, health, conflict

Niger Delta here represents the entire population sample of 27 million that could

possibly be affected by oil spillage. Oil spillage refers to the release of a liquid petroleum

hydrocarbon into the environment with the possibilities of impacting soil fertility,

environmental pollution or a significant change to the ecosystem due to human activity

either from crude oil exploration or vandalization of oil pipelines.

Human security in this research refers to “… 'People-centered security' or

'security with a human face,' focuses on freedom from fear and want of human beings

rather than states." (2) Whereas "human security emphasizes the complex relationships


Ovienloba, A 17

and often-ignored linkages among disarmament, human rights and development," it is

suggested here that human security also takes center stage in the way the world

appreciates and deals with the impact of large-scale disasters on populations” (3) (Burkle,

2006). Disaster in this research refers to all those variables from oil spillage that

endangers the socio-economic, psychological healthcare of the sampled population.

4 Analysis and Findings on the nexus between oil spillage and Human Security in

Niger Delta

Crude oil was discovered in Nigeria in 1908 and effectively commenced

exploration in 1958. At the initial stage of the exploration, the oil industry was solely

managed by the joint ownership of the royal Dutch-Shell Group and British Petroleum

Company of Nigeria. As the number of oil extraction industries multiplied so was there

increase in the discoveries of the oil basins in Nigeria with its consequent increase in

production. For example, from a mere 17 million tons in 1958, it rose to 4,800 million

tons by 1974. By the end of 1974 a huge reserve of 45,000 billion cubic feet of natural

gas of associated and none associated crude oil was discovered. Moreover, a good

proportion of the Nigerian surface area of about 375,000 square miles were calculated to

be covered by sedimentary basins where oil-bearing rock are most likely to be found”

Interestingly, these discovered basins were in the Niger Delta part of Nigeria. During the

same period, “the British Government, the International Management and Engineering

Group (IMEG) commented that offshore Niger Delta is regarded as one of the most

prolific oil-producing prospects in the world, and excellent quality of its crude and


Ovienloba, A 18

Nigeria’s relative proximity to markets in Western Europe, North and South America,

should ensure that it will continue to be a major area of offshore interest and activity.”

(Madujibeya, 1976, p.284)

The infancy state of the independent Nigerian nation coupled with the relative

developmental stage of the Nigerian oil industry made her bargaining power rather low at

the initial stage of oil exploration adventure. Thus as such the income generating capacity

of the oil industry was still at it miniature stage between 1958 and 1969. In any case, the

presence of this fortune, factored greatly into the incidence of the Nigerian civil war

between 1967 and 1970 as an economic power derivation element of interest for regional

and national political influence. However, with the growth of the oil industry market, the

Nigeria bargaining power equally gained momentum. Thus the initially bargained royalty

with the Shell-BP Petroleum Company of Nigeria of a 12.5% royalty paid based on

realized prices and large capital allowances (Madujubeya, 1976), were revised to reflect

the current situation. In 1966, the federal government decreed a “Tax (Amendment)

policy, which reduced capital allowances in the previous arrangement. In January 1967,

another policy was issued: Petroleum Profit Tax (Amendment) Decree which provided

for the establishment of posted prices, the payment of royalties on the basis of posted

prices and the expensing of royalties. Another royalty policy was enacted by 1969 which

provided that for compulsory 51% state participation in all new concession granted under

the decree.” (Madujbeya, 1976, pp.287-288) By 1971 when Nigeria joined OPEC, the

Nigerian economy has doubled 95% dependent on oil revenue generation while the

drilling of crude oil increased by a reasonable percentage.


Ovienloba, A 19

The Niger Delta region being the heart of the oil wells and extraction activities in

Nigeria is trailed with a history of insurgence and inter/intra ethnic conflict of survival

and agitation for local resource control in the midst of gross environmental degradation

resulting from excessive oil spillage. As a policy response to the agitation of the

indigenous people of the Niger Delta, the federal government created more states for the

region: Akwa-Ibom, Delta, and Bayelsa States carved out from the Old

Midwestern/Bendel and Rivers States in 1987, 1991 and 1996 respectively (Osaghae

1998b, Omotola 2006). This was intended to increase financial allocation to the region in

addition to the establishment of development agencies like the Niger Delta Development

Board in 1961, the Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC)

in 1992, the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) in 1996, and the Niger Delta Development Fund

(NDDC) in 2000 respectively (Omotola 2006). Additionally, these agencies were meant

to compensate for the economic deprivation of the population created by the

environmental degradation of the region as a result of oil spillage. Unfortunately, the evil

of lack of accountability and corruption that has been the hallmark of the Nigerian

government at creation affected the effective delivery of the interventionist boards and

commissions created. Besides, the creation of state was a far cry from the needs of the

people for a safe and habitable environmental that had existed prior to the era of oil

extractive industries.

On the part of the multinationals, particularly Shell which has about 30% holdings

in the Nigeria petroleum industry next to the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation

(55%) ELF (10%) and Agip (5%) (Ite 2007), they responded by creating community

development funds. These activities were carried out by way of donation of books to


Ovienloba, A 20

schools in Warri in Delta State among other infantile public amenities. But the limitations

of the Shell’s industrial effort reside in its inability to create an inclusive environment of

program development and implementation. Even though the company shifted its policy

paradigm in community development intervention, its initiatives were more of an “ad hoc

development projects rather than coordinated plans. It focused on what shell felt the

communities lacked, or Shell’s perception of poverty within communities” as against

what the communities actually feel they needed (Ite 2007; Zalik 2004). For instance

Shell’s policy adjustment had a strong oversight of the incremental needs of

these indigenous peoples who live traditionally by fishing and farming suffered

severe ecological and health impacts from oil. According to Oil Spill Intelligence

Report, for instance, between 1982 and 1992, 40% of Shell's total spills

worldwide had been in Nigeria (cited in Rowell, 1994, fn. 88). Further, in Nigeria

in 1995, 75% of gas by-products from oil drilling were flared--burned off in the

open air-as compared to a world average of less than 5%, and less than 1% in the

United States (see Lawrence, 1999a, section 8a). Flaring in Nigeria not only

caused some of the worst local environmental pollution but also contributed

adversely to global warming as a result of the greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide

and methane) released through combustion (see Essential Action (Livesey, 2001,

p. 58).

Even though the reports from the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World

Bank contest the link between oil spillage or pollution to health risk, the argument is

porous for the fact that “the effects [of crude oil] on fishes and wildlife suggest that the

region's toxic brew of pollutants may pose a threat to the human population that uses the


Ovienloba, A 21

water and eats the region's fish, game, livestock, and dairy products. (Ehrlich & Ehrlich,

1991, p. 141)

The benefits of the paradigmatic shift in policy within the Shell oil company

equally goes to both the number of Nigerian hired in obedience to the Nigerian

government policy of indigenization of employment of 60% of their staff as Nigerians

(Petroleum Act 1990). Shell employs about 10,000 staff 95% of which are Nigerians (Ite

2007) but the percentage of Niger Delta indigenes in that employment profile is another

bone of contention. World Bank Report (2009) noted that unemployment level in the

region is higher than the rest of the country while the poverty level is equally at a steep

end. (refer to appendix 1 for statistical report). In the quest for more creation of

infrastructures in the area, it is claimed that in the last forty years Nigerian government

has received a substantial amount of oil rent to the tune of about $230 billion generated

by Shell Petroleum Development Corporation and other multinationals operating in the

Niger Delta. Whereas in 2003 shell alone paid $1.2 billion to the federal government in

Petroleum Tax, by 2004 there was a substantial increase of 83% amounting to $2.2

billion paid to the coffers of the federal government. These enormous financial benefits

accruing from the oil industries have further led Nigerian development policy experts to

lay more emphasis on production over environmental impact/risk analysis. The dire

consequence of this policy negligence remains a solid case for scientific debate for

example,

…Apart from air pollution from... emissions and flares day and night, producing

poisonous gases that are silently and systematically wiping out vulnerable

airborne biota and otherwise endangering the life of plants, game and man


Ovienloba, A 22

himself, we have widespread water pollution and soil/land pollution... [Which]

result in the death of most aquatic eggs and juvenile stages of life of fm-fish and

shell-fish ... whilst ... agricultural lands contaminated with oil spills become

dangerous for farming, even where they continue to produce any significant

yields.... (Dappa-Biriye, et al., 1992, pp. 59-60, quoted in Rowell, 1994, Section

3, [paragraph] 20 (Livesey, 2001, p. 58)

The security risk implication of this sustainable neglect is a consequence that Nigeria and

the world at large have yet to significantly attend to in a very decisive way.

Nigeria government operates a Unitary, federal system of governance, which

comprise of the federal, state and local government levels of governance. The irony of the

system is such that incremental and gaming policies over the years favors the overriding

influence of the federal government which leaves the state government as a mere trustees

rather being owners of government properties. In order words the land where

multinational operates belong solely to the federal government whereas the local states

has the rights of guidance thereby rendering the sole right to rents from Petroleum Tax

and royalties to the federal government because she owns the onshore and offshore

within the Nigerian waters. Nigeria currently under the Niger Delta Development Act

(2000) repatriates 13% derivation of oil revenues to oil producing states. Whereas the

State government lays claim to the resource, the Local government contest the

constitutional right of the state to the use of the fund. One school of thought holds that

the oil revenue should go to the Local government from source with 20% allocated to the

federal government, while another school of thought predominantly held by the Militant

groups hold that the community should claim the rent and royalties for self determination


Ovienloba, A 23

and community based development. This dichotomy is anchored on the thesis that since

the federal government had failed in its primary responsibility to honor the challenges of

the people; the community has therefore decided to own their fate by challenging the

status quo. This mentality is demonstrated by the statement ascribed to a local chief from

Korokoro village in Niger Delta when he challenge Western expert thus:

When crude oil touches the leaf of a yam or cassava, or whatever economic trees

we have, it dries immediately, it's so dangerous and somebody who was coming

from, say, Shell was arguing with me so I told him that you're an engineer ... I did

not go to the university, but I know that what you have been saying in the

university sleeps with me here so you cannot be more qualified in crude oil than

myself who sleeps with crude oil. (Chief GNK Gininwa, quoted in Essential

Action, 2000, [paragraph] 7 (Livesey, 2001, p. 58)

Confronted by the poor logic of its policy deliberations and implementations the federal

government of Nigeria resorted to a face saving mechanism. Folger, et al., (2005) defined

face saving “as an attempt to protect or repair relational images in response to threat, real

or imagined, potential or actual.” (p.148) The criticisms that have often been levied

against oil and gas policies in Nigeria are that such policies were elitist, segregational,

incremental and so represents only the selected few and the interests of military generals

and northern hegemony. The Niger Delta Development commission (Establishment etc)

Act 2000 Act No. 6 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria was enacted as

an Act to provide for the repeal of the Oil, Mineral Producing Areas commission

Decree 1998 and among others things, establish a new Commission with a re-

organized management and administrative structure for more effectiveness; and


Ovienloba, A 24

for the use of the sums received from the allocation of the federation account for

tackling ecological problems which arises from the exploration of oil mineral in

the Niger-Delta area and fro connected”

The effectiveness of this face saving act is a strong bone of contention today in Nigeria.

At the developmental stage of the policy, series of protest were held and offered by the

Movement for the emancipation of Niger Delta on the need to consult and involve the

beneficiaries of the policy. This was not done making the policy more of an elitist policy

and so distanced from the actual and the needs of the Niger Delta suburbs. (Omotola

2006, p.80)

As a demonstration for the inadequacies of the NDDC policy arrangement, the

Niger Delta region has become even more militant than it was before the policy creation.

The militants’ ammunition and strategic design equals that of the national armed forces.

The activities of abduction for ransom have grown in leap and bound to include the

abduction of even local citizens and children. About 400,000-900,000 barrels per day

equaling about 20-25% of Nigeria’s total oil production have been affected by the

activities of militant ethnic groups. Oil spillages has depleted aquatic lives and rendered

the Delta region fishermen jobless. Environmental degradation activities by the

multinationals are on the increase. “Gas flaring, a process whereby crude oil is burnt off

pollutes the Delta’s rivers and streams and emits some 35 million tons of carbon dioxide

and 12 million tons of methane a year, making it the world’s largest single contributor to

global warming. Service road construction and canals had lead to deforestation, flooding

and stagnant ponds. Pollution in the Delta region is reported to be on a yearly rise by

2.3billion cubic meters of oil, making fishing activities, which is the economic main stay


Ovienloba, A 25

of the people impossible. SPDC reported that 50,200 and 123,777barerels of oil were

spilled in 1998 and 1999 (Wamala 2002). “According to the Department of Petroleum

Resources (DPR), between 1976 and 1996 a total of 4647 incidents resulted in the spill of

approximately 2,369,470 barrels of oil into the environment. Of this quantity, an

estimated 1,820,410.5 barrels (77%) were lost to the environment. A total of 549,060

barrels of oil representing 23.17% of the total oil spilt into the environment was

recovered. The heaviest recorded spill so far occurred in 1979 and 1980 with a net

volume of 694,117.13 barrels and 600,511.02 barrels respectively.” (Nwilo and Badejo,

2005, p.5)

Between June and July 2000, the Shell Petroleum Development Corporation again

reported to have lost over one million barrels of crude in vandalized pipe lines and flow

stations, the equivalent of a two days output from its wells in the /country.” In that same

year, over one hundred pipelines maintainer worker were lost to the kidnapping activities

of ethnic militant groups (Ifeka 2001). In 2002, thousands of lives were either deformed

or lost to the Jesse oil pipeline bust leading to fire outbreak in Delta State. Since 2006,

the Movement for the emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has continued to wage

militant war against oil companies, pipelines and Nigerian security agents. In May 2008,

about 175,000 barrels per day of oil production were shut in by militant activities whose

responsibilities were claimed by MEND. The conflict drivers for these endless wars are

the lack of good governance both at the local, state and federal level to provide for the

effective administration of the resources. The vacuum created by these administrative

flaws led to the demand for a sovereign National Conference to renegotiate the basis of

(Unitary) constitution with the hope that the power of control over petroleum resources


Ovienloba, A 26

will be transferred from the Federal Government to the State Government. A situation

that was highly contested by Northern hegemony for fear of its consequence of stripping

the North of Economic equality with the South should the States has control over their

generated resources (Ifeka, 2001). Secondly, the absence of visible presence of

government development projects in the Niger Delta region is a case for concern. For

example, Bayelsa is estimated to have been the producer of about 40% of Nigeria’s crude

but essentially lack hospitals, pipe borne waters, functional schools, connection

electricity; boast only one motor able road (Port Harcourt to Yenagoa) as a company

service linking access.

While the government of Umaru Yar’Adua made deep commitment and even in

his choice of his Vice President Joshua Goodluck a former governor of Bayelsa State and

an Ijaw by birth coupled with the recent appoint of minister for the Niger Delta, his slow

paced response to the needs and agitations of the Niger Deltas has seemingly eroded

confidence in his ability to make good his electoral promises for resolution. In his

inaugural address, President Yar’Adua made ND one of the cardinal points of his

administration “On July 2, 2007, the federal government inaugurated a peace and conflict

resolution committee for the Niger Delta chaired by Senator David Brigidi, a highly

respected Ijaw from Bayelsa State.” Even though the committee was constituted under

the aegis of fair representation from all stakeholders, the vintage position of the

committee was minimized by various reasons not excluding growing mistrust of the

federal government by the militant groups and the fact that some of the members of the

committee were identified by groups like the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) as the agents

responsible for nefarious activities in the region (Africa Report No. 135, December 2007,


Ovienloba, A 27

p.4). Additionally, the Appointment of Professor Ibrahim Gambari, the United Nations

Under Secretary General as the chairman for the Niger Delta summit has been highly

criticized as a purposeful political undermining of the ND peoples for the fact that the

Professor Gambari is a Northerner who lack firsthand experience in the affairs of the

region. While the condition of life and security remain pathetic, with about 70% of rural

dwellers living on less than $2 per day, what is needed therefore is a political process that

includes all stakeholders (government, respected and trusted community representatives,

reliable militant groups and multinationals) and a trusted intermediary not excluding

international communities. There is the need for a deliberate and increased government

involvement with a process that goes beyond cosmetic window dressing of the way

forward. Finally the Niger Delta needs improved security presence to checkmate the

heinous activities of politically motivated militant activities in the region. But the security

risk could not be effectively checkmated unless the negative consequences of oil spillage

in the region are constructively addressed. According to one respondent to an interview

on the local people’s perception of the oil industrial activities in comparison to life before

the advent of the oil industries in the Niger Delta, the respondent noted as follows:

Before, there was a beautiful sandy beach; but look, it no longer exists. In the

back of my house there was a big playground called ogbo-ngelege, but that land

has eroded, and now our houses are eroding. Our traditional livelihood is fishing,

but there are no more fish. We now buy tinned fish or stockfish. The chemicals

from oil spillage have mined the fish as well as the esem (periwinkles) and mgbe

(mangrove oysters). We receive nothing from Shell. For example, no electricity,

no piped waters, no health facilities, anything to make us happy. They were


Ovienloba, A 28

supposed to build a fishpond, but look around you, there is nothing. They

destroyed our land and dredged our creek. (Fentiman, 1996)

This observation speaks directly to the heart of the problem that currently exists in the

Niger Delta. The question is would the local people’s life have been better without the

presence of oil industries? If the oil industry existed and played by the rule of

maintaining a sustainable environment where oil spillage are cleaned up within

specifications, while compensations are equitably paid will the security risk be different

for the population? From the above attendant analysis it could be noted at this point by

popular opinion that if oil spillage had been attended to chances is high that the

traditional employment opportunities of fishing and farming would have been preserving

and therefore competition for meager resources would have doused the conflict.

Therefore there is a relationship between oil spillage and conflict leading to security

compromise in the region.

Figure I: Statistical Test Results of Association between Dependent and Independent variables

Group Statistics

Impact of oil spillage N Mean Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

Estimated quantity of pollutants

Female 5 100.00 .000 .000

Male 18 77.33 18.182 4.286


Ovienloba, A 29

Independent Samples Test Estimated quantity of

pollutants Equal

variances assumed

Equal variances not

assumed

Levene's Test for Equality of Variances

F 12.205

Sig. .002

t-test for Equality of Means

t 2.741 5.289

df 21 17.000

Sig. (2-tailed) .012 .000

Mean Difference 22.667 22.667

Std. Error Difference 8.270 4.286

95% Confidence Interval of the Difference

Lower 5.468 13.625

Upper 39.865 31.708

The first bloc output above shows the descriptive statistical result. There were five

numbers of cases where the female variable sample surfaced in the test while male scored

18. The female sample was impacted by oil pollutant by 100.00 frequency level with a

standard deviation of .000. The male sample was impacted on a frequency level of oil

pollutants by 77.33 with a standard deviation of 18.182. This SPSS statistical test for

Windows indicates the value of obtained t score (2.741), with a degree of freedom (df =

21 i.e. alpha level or a “p” level) and the significance level of association {Sig. (2-tail)}

(.012). this significance value is less than .05. Given the fact that the value of significance

of association is less than .05, the statistical indicator of significance, we can therefore

conclude from above statistics that there is a significant level of association between the

impact of oil pollution in the Niger Delta and human security risk in the region.


Ovienloba, A 30

Now the question is what is the strength of the established association between oil

spillage and human security risk? If the strength of association is possible, what is the

validity level or could there be a third variable influencing the association? In order to

substantiate this thesis, an analysis progression was designed.

4.1 Research Design of Analysis/Model:

The Sample population of analysis for this research is the Niger Delta population in

Nigeria with a sample population size of approximately 27 million. The region is made

up of nine political demographic states, (Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta,

Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers.) six out of these nine states constitute the South, South geo-

political region of Nigeria. But the core states of emphasis are Edo, Delta, Bayelsa, Ondo

and Rivers State. The reason for this choice is based on available statistical data that

delineates these states as those areas with a high concentration of oil spillage. The model

that I am using for this test is the multiple regression Pearson r’ for interval ratio level of

analysis. The objective is to measure the strength cum validity of association between my

independent variable (Oil Spillage) and my dependent variable (Human Security). Oil

spillage here refers to the release of a liquid petroleum hydrocarbon into the environment

with the possibilities of impacting soil fertility, environmental pollution or a significant

change to the ecosystem due to human activity either from crude oil exploration or

vandalization of oil pipelines.

Human security on the other hand represents those causal effects of oil spillage that

may affect the overall wellbeing of the sample population in the Niger Delta region. This


Ovienloba, A 31

includes the impact of oil spillage on the economic wellbeing, healthcare, and security of

life and property in the region. This will be measured through the impact of oil on the

environment, number of lost of life, income lost by the labor force in the population and

the consequent ill health, lose of life and properties that the population may face as a

result of persistent exposure to polluted environment from oil spillage. My basic

assumption is that there is an association between oil spillage and the evidence of

insecurity of life in the Niger Delta. By extension, insecurity in the Niger Delta has the

potentials of replicating itself into a wider force of danger for Nigerian economic and

political order. The multiplier effect of this threat is its consequent influence for the

global safe environment regime and Nigeria’s ability to maintain a sustainable

development; just it may affect Nigeria’s ability to contribute to the African cum United

Nations’ Peacekeeping force because of instability at the domestic front. Hence the

research finds it necessary to statistically establish the level of domestic insecurity threat

that may have a long-term effect on the international order.

Working on the null hypothesis of no association between the variables, the

Pearson’s r test to test for the significance of association between the variables was

adopted. In order to prove the validity level of the null hypothesis, I constructed a

scattergraams to test for the strength of association that measures the index of strength of

association between the interval variables (oil spillage and human security), that ranges

from 0 (no association) to +1(perfect positive relationship) or -1.00 (perfect negative

relationship). Therefore we have: Ho: p = 0, Ha: p = 0. The test that is conducted using

an interval ratio random sampling assumed a linear relationship between variables,

(homoscedasticity). That is the error variance is assumed to be the same at any point


Ovienloba, A 32

along the linear relationship. I am using sampling distribution, normal distribution-

bivariate normal distribution while using the t (distribution) to test the level of association

between the associations.

To find the critical value of association here, I used Alpha + 0.5 t (critical) and the

degree of freedom is taken as =N-2. Furthermore in order to ascertain if there are other

possible variables that could create human security risk in the Niger Delta, I used the

statistical test for a third and controlled variable. In conducting this test I measured for a

possible causal relationship that could have been affecting the security level of the region

other than oil spillage. For example, I tested and controlled for other variable provided by

the World Bank data as the risk factor in the region (inefficient garbage disposal and

activities of militant groups). For the sake of organizational clarity, the analysis is

subdivided into three models to significantly establish the association between the

variables. In Model I, the research constructed a statistical analysis to test for the strength

of association between oil spillage and human security in the Niger Delta. In Model II,

the validity level of association was established to justify claim of the null hypothesis of

no association between the variables. In Model III, A test for controlled variable that

could have been influencing the correlation between the dependent and independent

variable. That is, a variable could have work in consonance with the dependent and

independent variable to create human insecurity in the region. In this case garbage dump

and activities of militant activities were tested with established results.


Ovienloba, A 33

4.2 Findings: Measuring the Dependent and Independent Association Strength,

Validity and association influence

Niger Delta is the oil bed of Nigeria with the production rate of about 1.584 -2.29

million barrels per day (Oil and Gas News, Jan, 5, 2009) there are well over 500 crude oil

drilling sites in the Niger Delta landscape. Closely linked to the oil drilling activities is

the oil spillage and pollution problem. The pollution could come from oil blowouts or oil

pipeline leakages. For example we have the blowout and leakages from Shell-British

Petroleum (Shell-BP).

Bomu II blowout of 1970, the Safram (now Elf) ‘Obagi 21 blowout of 1972, the

Texaco blowout of 1980, and the Agip Oyakama pipeline leakage of 1980, have all

resulted in disastrous effects on land, freshwater swamps and the marine

environment. Moffat and Linden (2) cited reports by Ibiebele (4) and Resigner (5)

on dissolved petroleum hydrocarbons in wastewater. Ibiebele (4) found a

concentration of up to 53.9 mg L−1 while Resigner observed an average

concentration of 62.7 mg L−1 in Oloma Creek, near Bonny oil terminal. Based on

these findings, they concluded that the concentrations were high and indicated poor

or no treatment of effluents. Kontagora (6) noted that between 1976 and 1990, oil

companies in Nigeria reported a total of 2796 oil spill incidents. An estimated total

quantity of 2 105 393 barrels of oil was spilled on land, coastal, and offshore

marine environments. (Daniel-Kalio, L.A. and Braide, S.A., 2002, p. 441)

Various researches have demonstrated that over 6 million barrels of oil have been

spilled in the Niger Delta since the commencement of oil exploration in the region for

over fifty years. The chart below shows the econometrics of spillage across the


Ovienloba, A 34

population landscape of the Niger Delta area. Oil spillage spirals into the very fabric of

the ecosystem such that when it is not clean after an unspecified number of years it

destabilizes the ecosystem. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) Report

describes an ecosystem as “a dynamic complex of plant, animal, and micro-organism

communities and the nonliving environment interacting as a functional unit. Humans are

an integral part of ecosystems.” By framing human health and wellbeing in the context of

an ecosystems approach, it is recognized that healthy people and healthy environments

are inextricably linked—the MA report describes ecosystems as “the life support system

of planet earth.” (World Health Organization, 2005)

Figure II: A descriptive representation of Oil effects on the Ecosystem

oil spillage effects

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25


Ovienloba, A 35

The diagram indicates the complex dynamic of oil spillage effect on the

environment and how this exchange interface with the various bio-lives not particularly

specified in this research because of the limitation focus of the research design. However,

being the case that the emphasis of this test was on the human life, number 16 on the

chart represents the human community as the biggest recipient of the effects of oil on the

environment. These effects resonate in the multiple securities problematic of such effects.

These include: food chain shortage, human health problem and limited access to fertile

environment for agricultural and economic purposes.

For example, a report by the Essential Action and Global Exchange (2000)

document cases of environmental pollution arising from gas flaring, acid rain and

oil/gas pipeline leaks. Depending on the location, oil spills can poison water,

destroy vegetation and kill living organisms (van Dessel, 1995; Amajor 1985).

The situation is made worse in the Niger Delta where as a result of floods; waters

carry the oils to villages and onto farmlands (Moffat and Linden 1995:527). This

also renders the cleaning of oil spills all the more difficult. According to a Report

prepared by the Center for Social and Corporate Responsibility, Port Harcourt,

Nigeria, (Emmanuel, 2004), less than 50 percent of oil spills in the Niger Delta

are cleaned up. A 2001 Report by the Minister of State for Environment also

shows that about 68 percent of the associated gas production in the Niger Delta is

flared (The Guardian, Lagos, 1 October 2001) (Oyefusi, A. 2007, CSAE

WPS/2007-09)

Data on the long-term human security impact of unclean oil spillage are not readily

available but there is ample evidence that demonstrates the negative effects of destroyed


Ovienloba, A 36

ecosystem as it may be arguable for the Niger Delta region. This claim could be seen

from the SPSS statistical test ran on a data pulled from different sources on the quantity

of oil on the Niger Delta soil for well over fifty years of crude oil extraction.

Model I: Testing for Strength and Validity of Association between Oil Spillage and

Human Security.

There are significant data on the quantity of oil spilled on the Niger Delta

environment between 1958 when Nigeria effectively began crude oil drilling and 2009.

There are equally multiple claims from scholars and environmentalist on the

consequences of oil spillage on the environment. The present day scholarship coupled

with various international regimes on climate change and reduction of greenhouse gas

emission (C02) amplifies the level of what is known and yet to be understood about the

strength of association between oil spillage and the long and short term effects of oil

spillage on the human life. In the Niger Delta part of Nigeria, the endemic incidence of

oil spillage has been on the increase with a limited level of assessment on how this

significant quantity of oil spilled on the environment factor into the unpredictable crisis

in the region. For instance,

Oil spill incidents have occurred in various parts and at different times along our

coast. Some major spills in the coastal zone are the GOCON’s Escravos spill in

1978 of about 300,000 barrels, SPDC’s Forcados Terminal tank failure in 1978 of

about 580,000 barrels and Texaco Funiwa-5 blow out in 1980 of about 400,000

barrels. Other oil spill incidents are those of the Abudu pipeline in 1982 of about

18,818 barrels, The Jesse Fire Incident which claimed about a thousand lives and


Ovienloba, A 37

the Idoho Oil Spill of January 1998, of about 40,000 barrels. The most publicized

of all oil spills in Nigeria occurred on January 17 1980 when a total of 37.0

million litres of crude oil got spilled into the environment. This spill occurred as a

result of a blow out at Funiwa 5 offshore station. Nigeria's largest spill was an

offshore well-blow out in January 1980 when an estimated 200,000 barrels of oil

(8.4million US gallons) spilled into the Atlantic Ocean from an oil industry

facility and that damaged 340 hectares of mangrove (Nwilo and Badejo, 2005).

Oil spillage does not only degrade the environment because of the excessive chemical

mix with the limited capacity of the environment, it equally results in multiple human

security risk input. Whereas, the federal government of Nigeria and the various

multinationals (Texaco, Exxon Mobil, Chelvron, Shell Petroleum Development

Corporation, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, and Agip) and a host of other

national and International groups have argued that there is no defendable association

between oil spillage and the restiveness in the Niger Delta. whereas their argument

remains statistically untested these assumptions have greatly influenced various policy

generations and implementations in the Niger Delta. For example World bank (2009)

Report in analyzing the principal causes of insecurity in the Niger Delta identified

environmental degradation as one of those factors leading to the deplorable situation in

the Niger Delta when it analyzed that “

Oil exploration and production gas led to environmental damage on many levels:

land, water and air pollution, depleted fishing grounds and the disappearance of

wetlands (World Bank, 2007b).These environmental changes have had significant

implications for local livelihoods, and the alienation of people from their


Ovienloba, A 38

resources and land has led to the inefficient use of resources that remain and poor

or inequitable land use practices (UNDP, 2006: 17). Measures to counterbalance

environmental damage are inadequate and this is a major focus of community

discontent (World Bank, 2007b).

What appears absent or inadequately identified in the World Bank 2009 report is inability

to link the core and fundamental causes of the restiveness in the region to oil spillage as a

primary cause of the security risk in the region. Moreover, whereas the body significantly

analyzed factors such as: economic exclusion leading to a lack of capital resources or

skill among the population (UNDP, 2006: 17), judicial ambiguity over land rights, social

and political exclusion leading to youth militancy to challenge the government and

extortion of oil from oil companies (world Bank 2007b), poor infrastructure and public

service delivery, poor governance marred in institutional corrupt practices and

geographic challenges making it difficult for development, coupled with a vicious circle

of violence fuelled by the illegal bunkering of oil fuels, (World Bank, 2007b), the report

lacked the fundamental understanding of the what genesis of the problem. It diagnosed

and treats the symptoms rather the disease itself. No doubt, poor human capital

development hinders the Niger Delta communities from being able to derive benefits

from economic activities in the form of employments as the report indicated (World

Bank, 2009).

I have reasons to doubt that a combination of these multiple factors in isolation is

significantly fuelling the community’s feeling of marginalization especially among those

hardest hit by the factors of oil production in the Niger Delta, and consequently fuelling

endemic conflicts and violence (World Bank, 2009). My contention is anchored on the


Ovienloba, A 39

fact that the logic of this argument cannot be substantiated given the statistical correlation

between endemic histories of oil spillage in the region without adequate compensation. It

will be an oxymoron to analyze and judge a community’s reaction to deprivation of their

means of socio-economic survival and self actualization on the negative when the

fundamental cause associations have been given an oversight. The paucity of the World

Bank’s argument is further established when we consider the result of statistical analysis

that significantly prove otherwise.

Figure III: Histographical description of strength of association of variables.


Ovienloba, A 40

Figure IV: Regression Line of association of Variables

Figure V. Scatter plot indicating positively strong association of variables


Ovienloba, A 41

Figures III-V demonstrates strong association between the dependent and independent

variable. That is whenever there is oil spillage the level of insecurity increases to some

measurable extent. Judging from the curve and the regression line in figures III and IV

we can predict a positive strong association that whenever there is oil spillage its impact

will be highly consequential on the security risk factors in the Niger Delta. The security

risk include possible loses of income activities because of farm erosion and soil

degradation and the restive activities of militant groups seeking exorbitant compensation

from oil multinationals and the federal government of Nigeria. The table below gives

further information about this strength of this prediction.

Figure VI: Correlation table of association between variables

Correlations

Insecurity in the

Niger Delta

Frequency of oil

spillage

Estimated

quantity of

pollutants

Insecurity in the Niger Delta Pearson Correlation 1.000 .114 .006

Sig. (2-tailed) .412 .968

N 55 54 55

Frequency of oil spillage Pearson Correlation .114 1.000 -.178

Sig. (2-tailed) .412 .197

N 54 54 54

Descriptive Statistics

Mean Std. Deviation N

Insecurity in the Niger Delta 3.05 2.642 55

Frequency of oil spillage 171704.94 824096.920 54

Estimated quantity of

pollutants 80.02 16.287 55


Ovienloba, A 42

Estimated quantity of

pollutants

Pearson Correlation .006 -.178 1.000

Sig. (2-tailed) .968 .197

N 55 54 55

ANOVA

Sum of

Squares df Mean Square F Sig.

Insecurity in the Niger

Delta

Between Groups 121.975 16 7.623 1.124 .370

Within Groups 251.007 37 6.784

Total 372.981 53

Impact of oil spillage Between Groups 22.709 16 1.419 1.978 .043

Within Groups 26.550 37 .718

Total 49.259 53

Our focus with the correlation table above is to look at the correlation between oil

spillage (frequency of oil spillage) and insecurity on the one hand, and insecurity and the

impact of oil spillage (quantity of pollutants) on the other hand. As already explained

above our Standard of assessment will be from Pearson’s r, variance (0.00 to ± 1.00) with

0.00 indicating no association and +1 and -1 indicating perfect positive and perfect

negative relationships respectively (Healey 2009, pp. 370 -371). The test indicates a

weak to moderately strong positive linear relationship between oil spillage and insecurity

in the Niger Delta (.114) and a weak to moderately strong negative relationship between

insecurity and the impact of oil spillage in the region (-.178). The weakness in the

association does not necessarily state weakness in their causative relationships but that

there could be other variables interfering in the association between these variables.

Within the limit of error, we could statistically predict that about 12% of insecurity in the


Ovienloba, A 43

Niger Delta is associated with oil spillage in the region. Additionally we could predict

that ±18% of the human insecurity in Niger Delta is associated with the direct impact of

oil spillage.

The ANOVA test for significance of association was conducted to further

measure the level of significance of this report and the following report as displayed in

the ANOVA table above indicates reasonable level of significance for the relationship

between oil spillage and insecurity (Sig. (.379) and (.043) for the impact of oil spillage.

Therefore we can conclude that there is some level of statistical relationship between oil

spillage and human security risk in the Niger Delta.

Model II: Proving the Research null hypothesis and Level of Association between

Variables

Some of the arguments proffered to explain the level of violence in the Niger

Delta by the World Bank was poor democratic dividend delivery from the federal

government of Nigeria to the Niger Delta population, and the incredulity of the Niger

Delta residents on the other hand in their quest to take undue advantage of the oil

multinationals in the region under the guise of unfounded claim of environmental

degradation from oil spillage. For example in the 2009 report, the World Bank analyzed

that

the democratization of the means of violence has emerged, as the state has lost

monopoly power over the use of force. This violence has emerged in many forms,

and exists between communities over host community status, resource and land

claims and surveillance contracts; within communities over compensation


Ovienloba, A 44

distribution; between communities and oil companies; and between communities

and security forces. The fault lines of these conflicts often coincide with, or are

justified in terms of, ethnic differences (World Bank, 2007b). Persistent conflict,

while in part a response to the region’s poor human development, also serves to

entrench it as it is a constant drag on the region’s economic performance and

opportunities for advancement (UNDP, 2006: 16), World bank, 2009).

What is lacking in the analytical resume of the World Bank is the absence of a link

between oil spillage and the risk apparent in the region. The organization’s analysis

appeared to be built on a presumptive logic that the restiveness in the Niger Delta is

cultural and endemically entrenched in the undue vested interest in the oil and gas

industry in Nigeria. Therefore, the multiple risk factors in the region could be arrested

through direct investment in the region by aggressive industrialization and the

establishment of skill acquisition centers. On the part of the Federal government of

Nigeria, a policy of demilitarization of the region has been pursued through the direct

multiplication of military personnel present in the region as way to stop the insecurity

trend or growing pace of kidnapping of international and domestic experts for financial

gains. Within this caveat, the null hypothesis of no association between insecurity of life

and property with oil spillage is pursued with great intensity. Furthermore, youth militant

activities in the region have been facilitated as the main cause of insecurity of life and

property in the region. But to what extent is this argument tenable? In order to proof this

null hypothesis of no association between oil spillage and human security, I conducted a

statistical test with the result displayed in figure VI below.

Assumptions: There is a relationship between oil spillage and human security risk in the


Ovienloba, A 45

Niger Delta.

Null hypothesis: Ho: p = 0

Hi: p ≠ 0

That is: there is no relationship between oil spillage and human security risk in Niger

Delta.

Figure VII: Testing for the Null Hypothesis of no association

Model Summaryb

Model R R Square

Adjusted R

Square

Std. Error of the

Estimate

1 .081a .007 -.012 .970

a. Predictors: (Constant), Frequency of oil spillage

b. Dependent Variable: Impact of oil spillage

ANOVAb

Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.

1 Regression .327 1 .327 .347 .558a

Residual 48.932 52 .941

Total 49.259 53

a. Predictors: (Constant), Frequency of oil spillage

b. Dependent Variable: Impact of oil spillage

Coefficientsa

Model

Unstandardized

Coefficients

Standardiz

ed

Coefficient

s

t Sig.

95% Confidence

Interval for B

B Std. Error Beta

Lower

Bound

Upper

Bound


Ovienloba, A 46

1 (Constant) 2.720 .135

20.164 .000 2.449 2.991

Frequency of oil

spillage -9.528E-8 .000 -.081 -.589 .558 .000 .000

a. Dependent Variable: Impact of oil spillage

Residuals Statisticsa

Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N

Predicted Value 2.19 2.72 2.70 .079 54

Residual -1.720 2.280 .000 .961 54

Std. Predicted Value -6.587 .208 .000 1.000 54

Std. Residual -1.773 2.350 .000 .991 54

a. Dependent Variable: Impact of oil spillage

The level of measurement for this test was interval-ratio, sampling distribution (t distribution), Alpha = 0.05, degrees of freedom taken as N – 2 = 10 and t (critical) = -2.28

Following this statistical procedural provision from the test above in figure VI,

-.589 reproduced by the test does not fall within the critical region marked by t (critical).

This means we fail to reject the null hypothesis of association between oil spillage and

human security risk in the Niger Delta. Even though the variables are substantially related

in the population, We do not have sufficient evidence to demonstrate the association. The

value of r = 20.164 could have occurred alone assuming the null hypothesis is true and

the dependent and independent variables are unrelated in the sampled population of Niger

Delta. However, the fact of insufficient evidence to prove strength of association between

the variables does not necessarily mean that there is not relationship. But it could mean

that oil spillage alone is not significant in isolation to create human security risk. Oil

spillage variable could have been working in consonance with other variables to


Ovienloba, A 47

influence security risk in the region. Hence in the next model I have attempted in the next

model of this research to test for that variable.

Model III: Multiple regression table and Controlling for a third variable

If the relationship between oil spillage and human security is not statistically

established despite the significant relationship between the variables and presence of

insecurity in the Niger Delta, then it could have been a combination of other variables

that constitutes the high level of security risk in the region. In order to further test for the

validity of this hypothesis, a combine statistical test was conducted for oil spillage,

militant activities, and garbage dump in the region while measuring their respective

impact on the security level in Niger Delta. The statistical result is displayed in figure

VIII below.

Figure VIII: Multiple variables correlation table.

1) Case Processing Summary

N %

Cases Valid 54 91.5

Excludeda 5 8.5

Total 59 100.0

a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the

procedure.

2)

Item Statistics



Oil Spillage and militant

activities 2.35 2.332 54

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's

Alpha

Cronbach's

Alpha Based on

Standardized

Items N of Items

1.426E-6 .366 4


Ovienloba, A 48

Impact of variable on the

population 2.70 .964 54

Domestic and commercial

refuse dumps is more related

to security risk

2.35 2.741 54

3)

Inter-Item Correlation Matrix

Frequency of oil

spillage Militant activities

Impact of oil

variable on the

population

Domestic and

commercial

refuse dumps is

more related to

security risk

Frequency of oil spillage 1.000 .116 -.081 .090

Militant activities .116 1.000 .098 .143

Impact of oil variable on the

population -.081 .098 1.000 .390


refuse dumps is more related

to security risk

.090 .143 .390 1.000

Summary Item Statistics

Mean Minimum Maximum Range

Maximum /

Minimum Variance N of Items

Item Variances 1.698E11 .929 6.791E11 6.791E11 7.307E11 1.153E23 4


Ovienloba, A 49

ANOVA

Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig

Between People 8.999E12 53 1.698E11

Within People Between Items 1.194E12 3 3.980E11 2.344 .075

Residual 2.700E13 159 1.698E11

Total 2.819E13 162 1.740E11

Total 3.719E13 215 1.730E11

Grand Mean = 42928.09

Whereas the various tables above provide substantial information for us to be able

to evaluate the correlation, our focus will be table 3 (inter-item correlation matrix) and

the ANOVA table that explains the significance of variables’ association. Reading the

statistical information from the table, it does show that the correlation between garbage

dump and the impact of oil variable on the population score highest (.390) followed by

the correlation between garbage dump and militant activities (.143). the correlation

between oil spillage and militant activities in the region is equally significant (.116). a

test for the significance of the association between these variables with the ANOVA table

indicates a strong relationship. Sig. (.075). The hypothetical projection here could be

stated that it is a combination of these variables that creates human security risk in Niger

Delta.

Having said that, let us now attempt to critically examine the test for control for a

third variable to ascertain the strength of the relational association that may be

responsible for the non-rejection of the null hypothesis.


Ovienloba, A 50

Figure IX Control for a third Variable. (Garbage)

Correlations

Control Variables

Frequency

of oil

spillage

Impact of

variable on

the

population

Domestic and

commercial refuse

dumps is more

related to security

risk & Oil Spillage

and militant activities

Frequency of oil

spillage

Correlation 1.000 -.133

Significance (2-

tailed) . .347

df 0 50

Impact of variable on

the population

Correlation -.133 1.000

Significance (2-

tailed) .347 .

df 50 0







refuse dumps is more

related to security risk

2.35 2.741 54




Ovienloba, A 51

The statistical test for the controlled variable indicates a same level of correlation

between garbage dump and the impact of oil spillage on the population and garbage

dump and oil spillage (r = -.133; degree of freedom df: = 50). again it could be assumed

that these variables combine to create human security risk in Niger Delta. But before we

make our final decision let us test for a third variable of militant activity and then make a

comparative judgment on the strongest level of association.

Figure X; Controlling for a third variable, Militant activities








Correlations

Control Variables

Impact of

variable on

the population

Frequency of

oil spillage


activities

Impact of variable on

the population

Correlation 1.000 -.094

Significance (2-

tailed) . .504

df 0 51

Frequency of oil

spillage

Correlation -.094 1.000

Significance (2-

tailed) .504 .

df 51 0


Ovienloba, A 52

The statistical test here indicates a weak negative correlation between the

controlled variable (militant) activity in the Niger Delta and oil spillage, and impact of oil

variable on the population (r = -.094). comparing this association with the controlled

association of garbage, we could estimate that there is a stronger correlation between the

controlled variable of garbage dump with oil spillage and impact (r = -.133) compared to

militant activities in the region (r = -.094).

Based on the various statistical test conducted and analyzed in this research, we

could conclude that human security risk is significantly present in the Niger Delta. But

the factors contributing to the level of insecurity of life and property in the Niger Delta is

multidimensional. From the inter-item correlation matrix and the statistical results from

the null hypothesis test we could conclude with variable correlation of association leading

to human security risk in the Niger Delta as follows; 39% garbage dump, 14% militant

activities, 16% oil spillage, 31% could be a combination of oil bunkering and

unemployment factors in the region.

5. Policy Implications and Recommendations

According to the United Nations’ human security report (2005), “the traditional

goal of national security has been the defence of the state from external threats. The focus

of human security, by contrast, is the protection of individuals” (Section 2: VIII). Oil

spillage in the Niger Delta speaks to the heart of national negligence and a compromise

on the individual needs of the people whose life have been grossly affected negatively by

the inability of the federal government of Nigeria to apply the rule of law in attending to

the protection of life and property in the region. These policy gaps pose significant


Ovienloba, A 53

implication for the stability and democratic process in Nigeria. This is where

understanding the concept of human security within the frontiers of national development

strategy is of paramount importance. One may observe that Nigeria is presently not at

war in the right sense of the word especially when understood within a national security

caveat as a freedom from war with other states but does that spell security of individuals

within the state? “Human security and national security should be— and often are—

mutually reinforcing. But secure states do not automatically mean secure peoples.

Protecting citizens from foreign attack may be a necessary condition for the security of

individuals, but it is certainly not a sufficient one. Indeed, during the last 100 years far

more people have been killed by their own governments than by foreign armies.”

(UNHSR, 2005) Government working against its own people is a policy misnomer and a

compromise of the United Nation’s policy document on “the Responsibility to Protect.”

In this policy document the UN defines sovereignty as embodying a state’s responsibility

to protect its citizens from hunger, unemployment and those existential circumstances

that undermines individual’s fundamental human rights and dignity. (The Responsibility

to Protect, Article 2.22) When we contrast this sovereign demands to the thousands of life

lost to activities of oil spillage in the Niger Delta between 1958 and 2009, its significant

implication for Nigerian national security is incontestable. Its relevance has both national

and international reputation discourse for the already battered economic and democratic

image within the international community.

Furthermore, the policy implications of human security risk accruing from the

complex mix of oil spillage and other interplaying variables could be assessed through

the following points for considerations:


Ovienloba, A 54

I.) International Protocols and Conventions on the Environment. Nigeria is

signatory and member of various international commissions and conventions for

International laws of the environment including international laws on oil pollution.

(MARPOL, 1954-1992) At present the following laws on the environment are on force in

Nigeria:

(a.) Endangered Species Decree Cap 108 LFN 1990., b.) Federal Environmental

protection Agency Act Cap 131 LFN 1990. (c.) Harmful Waste Cap 165 LFN 1990. (d.)

Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations, 1969, (e.) Mineral Oil (Safety)

Regulations, 1963,

(f.) International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for

Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971 (g.) Convention on the Prevention of

Marine pollution Damage, 1972, (h.) African Convention on the Conservation of Nature

and Natural Resources,1968 (i.) International Convention on the Establishment of an

International Fund for the Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971. (J.) The

Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) decree No 86 of 1992 (K.) Oil Pollution Act

(OPA) of 1990, and (o) National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA)

(Nwilo & Badijo, 2005)

These laws as it were are put in place to attend to the both the environmental

needs of the region while significantly addressing the legitimate concerns of the

population. However, the question is not about the number of laws and international

conventions on the environment that have been ratified by Nigeria that is the problem but

the enforcement process. The increasing conflict surrounding cases of oil spillage in the

region that represents 16% human insecurity as already established above only goes to


Ovienloba, A 55

show a weakness in the rule of law regarding the environment in Nigeria. Unless this

problem is significantly addressed conflicts around this challenges will further degenerate

into national economic loss as it is the case already for the Nigeria economy that is losing

millions of dollars to vandalization of oil pipeline and cases of kidnapping of oil workers.

According to Nwilo and Badejo, “Oil spills in the Niger Delta have been a regular

occurrence, and the resultant degradation of the surrounding environment has caused

significant tension between the people living in the region and the multinational oil

companies operating there.” (p.7) Nigeria will need to establish judicial system that

enforces environmental laws beyond the creation of moribund agencies weaken by

corrupt practices and gross inefficiency.

II. Weak Federal System. One of the great points analyzed above in the

conflicting values between the state and the Niger Delta communities is the fact of the

over centralized and weak federal system in Nigeria that has resulted in the weak

administrative structures from the federal to the state down to the local government level

of governance. Under effective federal system of government,

Federal government exists…when the power of government for a community is

divided substantially according to the principle that there is a single independent

authority for the whole area in respect of some matters and that there are

independent regional authorities for other matter, each set of authority being

coordinate with and not subordinate to the others within its own prescribed sphere

(Where, 1963, p.35, in Adejuyigbe, 1973, p.161)

This is hardly the case in Nigeria as it is today. To combat this weakness decentralization

of the Nigeria federal government structure with further empowerment of the state in


Ovienloba, A 56

resource management may be an option. Granting some measure of resource control to

local communities will minimized incentives for violence and improves job creation for

the local communities given the fact that the local and state government will have the

economic and political power to generate employment opportunities and monitor the

irresponsible double standard activities of multinational oil company in environmental

friendly oil explorations. This will make using poverty and environmental destruction

case less attractive. Additionally, over-centralization of the federal character has breed

corruption because of the absence of transparency and accountability resulting from the

lack of popular participation in governance. Hence policy sustenance and effectiveness

became the Achilles’ heel of the government. More power at the local level will make the

government more responsive to the needs of the local people, accountable and more

efficient. This point will equally make response to oil spillage swift and immediate. With

this in place conflict at the local level can easily be managed.

III. Oil conflict and Domestic terrorism: Oil spillage understood with the

relevance of statistical data of not have given legitimacy and effrontery to the

multiplication of a number of militant ethnic groups in the Niger Delta. The level of

sophistication of their weapons coupled with the ability to withstand federal security

agents is factor that policy makers need to take into serious consideration. The fact that

my statistical analysis accords 14% of the human security risk in the region to militant

activities only serves to recognize why a case for militant activities linked to oil spillage

is course that Nigerian government at and the international communities will definitely

need to strategically address with enormous security intelligence. Given the level of the

feet they have attained in the game of kidnapping both expatriates and domestic staff,


Ovienloba, A 57

they could metamorphose into a national security nuisance and breeding ground for

international terrorism in the foreseeable future. The federal government could engage

this group by first of all demolishing the ground of their legitimacy nay oil spillage.

Furthermore, it could be analyzed that the Niger Delta conflict reached a

stalemate given the fact that many of the indigenes are tired of crisis and demand for a

resolution with outlined conditions anchored on the implementation of the findings of the

various government constituted commissions and committees on the Niger Delta conflict.

Some of those telling conditions include more resource control, creation of jobs for the

youths of the region and industrialization of the Niger Delta and effective cleaning model

for spilled oil on the environment. The constituted reporting committees and

commissions are as follows: The Special Security committee on Oil Producing Areas

(2005) headed by the former Chief of Defense Staff, General Alexander Ogomudia;

which recommended an upgrade of the current 13% oil derivation allocation to the oil

producing states to 50%, coupled with “training of Niger Delta indigenes for employment

in the oil industry, provision of infrastructures such as electricity, water, roads and the

repeal of the Land Use Act, Petroleum Act, Gas Re-injection Act and other laws

dispossess the oil producing areas of their land, and the full industrialization of the Niger

Delta” (Vanguard Newspapers Nigeria Limited, June 6, 2008) March 3, 1999 22-member

committee headed by Major General Oladayo Popoola deputed to make

recommendation for what can be done for the Niger Delta before the end of the General

Abdulsalami Abubakar military administration in May 1999; this committee

recommended a 20 year development plan for the region beginning with the immediate

expenditure of $170 million on infrastructure projects in addition to their budgetary


Ovienloba, A 58

allocation coupled with the establishment of diverse representative group of Niger Delta

Consultative Council (Vanguard Nigerian Newspaper Limited, June 6, 2008) others are:

the Presidential Standing committee on the Niger Delta, the NNPC-Youth Standing

Committee, and the most current Presidential Committee on Peace and Reconciliation in

the Niger Delta; the Niger Delta Peace and Security Strategy (PASS).

Multiplication of committees and commissions on the same known subject matter

without the necessary commitments to the recommendation of these august bodies make

problem solving in conflict situation a mirage. It equally exacerbates the conflict by

giving rooms for the formation of negative group perception and group identity formation

that is the true case in Niger Delta. What is need ultimately is government that will be

responsive to the need of the local people especially in the oil and gas management in the

Niger Delta. If this is not realized the security risk will be catastrophic for the country.

This may not exclude growing population of internally displaced person as a result of oil

spillage and nefarious activities of militant groups that constitutes 14% of the security

risk in the region.

Constitution of a fresh committee or calling for a summit as the President Umaru

Yar’Adua intends to hold in the current dispensation when none of the recommendations

of the previous bodies have been tested is a conflict building psychology for the crisis. To

further buttress the lack of faith in the political will of the federal government to create a

sustainable policy towards an achievable solution to the problem of the Niger Delta,

Chief Edwin Clark and notable ethnic leader in the Niger Delta is credited to have

queried the non involvement of the native Niger Deltas in the preparatory committees for

the Niger Delta Summit. Additionally he queried: “how many summits were held before


Ovienloba, A 59

Abuja was developed to become the capital of Nigeria?” (Vanguard Newspaper Nigeria

Limited, June 6, 2008) My recommendations therefore is that the federal government

implement key recommendations from the previous committees held in the past and

employ the services of independent mediators to mediate the full resolution of the

conflict as against conducting another extra-budgetary summit whose fate may not

necessarily differ from the previously held ones. This is especially informing given the

fact that majority of the Niger Deltas are demonstratively committed to the truth content

of the Ogomudia committee recommendations above. Finally, if all the recommendation

at to be strategically adhered to, and an agenda for a constructive policy that engages the

multinationals regarding oil spillage management and environment, hoodlums will

continue to undermine the efforts of both sides of the bargain.

IV. Oil Spillage and Nigerian Economic Development index: Nigeria’s

economy as has already been analyzed above is 96% based on the resources accruing

from the oil and gas industry. Niger Delta is that golden hen that lays the golden egg for

the country. Within the first nine months of 2008, the Niger Delta Technical Committee

revealed that the country has lost at least $23.7 billion to oil theft and sabotage in the

region. “Militants' attacks and crude theft since 2006 have resulted in the shut in of more

than 500,000 barrels a day of production. Prior to the escalation of the crisis, Nigeria

produced between 2.5 million and 2.6 million barrels of oil per day. The current

production fluctuates between 1.6 and 2.2 million barrels a day.” (Amanze-Nwachuku,

2009) Besides, “there are unaccounted costs in human misery, with about 1,000 persons

killed within the same period and another 300 taken as hostages."(ibid) The fact of the

matter is that, these insurgence and militant activity costing Nigeria both human and


Ovienloba, A 60

economic loss craves the pace of oil spillage and negligence as legitimacy for their

activities. As at January 2009 the economic cost of human insecurity in the Niger Delta

was estimated to have contributed to the short fall in the country’s revenue to a tune of

about $1 billion. If this trend continues unchecked, Nigeria could never be able to sustain

its economic development index. “Energy Information Administration (EIA), the

statistical arm of the US Department of Energy, estimates that Nigeria currently has a

capacity to produce 3mbpd, but for the shut-ins. Nigeria’s plans of hitting 4mbpd by 2010

are also in peril as militants disrupt operations in the industry.” (THISDAY OIL

REPORT 2009, p.1) The policy consequence will be enduring poverty for the entire

population of Nigeria and inability to compete for economic relevance within the

international community.

V. Health of the Population: Given the context that a healthy nation is a wealthy

nation, it could be justifiably analyzed that soil and water pollution from oil spillage

could significantly compromise the health indices of the Niger Delta population and

consequently risk the future of its growing labor force cum institutional memory. For

example, “in April 1997, samples taken from water used for drinking and washing by

local villagers were analyzed in the U.S. A sample from Luawii, in Ogoni, where there

had been no oil production for four years, had 18 ppm of hydrocarbons in the water, 360

times the level allowed in drinking water in the European Union (E.U.). A sample from

Ukpeleide, Ikwerre, contained 34 ppm, 680 times the E.U. standard.” (Nwilo and Badejo

2005, p.7) it may take a while for the impact of this pollution to become noticeable in the

population but when it does appear, its impact could become monumental. This is the

core of the landmark of human security risk for the present and future generations of


Ovienloba, A 61

Nigerians.

VI. Environmental implication. Oil spillage not sufficiently attended to

scientifically could endanger not only the human economic and social or health culture, it

could equally reverse the ecosystem of the environment. For instance,

On February 28, 1996, the food chain off the coast of Rhode Island was

obliterated after the "North Cape" spilled some 850,000 gallons of refined oil.

Lobster mortality was measured at 1,000,000 and estimated at 3,000,000, and

devastating long-term consequences are expected. Studies of the impact of the

1989 "World Prodigy" spill show significant ��long-term effects present even seven

years later. In 1994, the Center for Economic and Social Rights released

documentation of the human health effects of oil in Ecuador, where Texaco oil

pollution left a legacy of waters and soils contaminated with highly toxic

polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons. "Those exposed to oil had a higher incidence

of abortion, elevated rates of fungal infections, dermatitis, headaches and nausea,"

the Center concluded. The Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute has reported

that ecological studies of a 50,000barrel crude spill in the Caribbean show

extensive long-term damage to subtidal corals, seagrass beds and coastal

mangroves, and "that the damage was far more extensive than expected."

(Harmon 1997)

The quantity of oil spillage in Rhode Island as noted above is by far less than what have

been reported in the Niger Delta. If the 850,000 gallons of refined oil could become as

catastrophic as it did, what about 15 million gallons of refined oil could effect on the

region could only be imagined. Based on this scientific nexus Nigeria will need to evolve

policies that will scientifically check the tide of oil spillage in order to either reverse the

course or scientifically restore the consequence of oil spillage.


Ovienloba, A 62

6. Concluding Comments

One of those clarity that the document on “The Responsibility to Protect” has

emphatically engenders is the new meaning facilitated around the concept of security.

The document intentionally shifted its definition of security “from territorial security,

and security through armaments, to security through human development with access to

food and employment, and to environmental security. The fundamental components of

human security – the security of people against threats to life, health, livelihood, personal

safety and human dignity – can be put at risk by external aggression, but also by factors

within a country, including “security” forces.” (Article 2.22) From this analysis we could

contextualize the ground of agitation within the Niger Delta community and understand

how 16% of oil spillage in the region creates a crisis for the people. First, it compromises

the people’s environmental security, takes away their tradition means of gainful

employment (fishing and farming) through soil and water pollution.

Secondly because of incessant fire outbreak often associated with oil spillage in

the region, life safety is grossly minimized. Thirdly, as a result of oil pollution assess to

clean water for drinking and other domestic chores have been but at great risk. Fourthly

the poverty index level of the region have been greatly increased because of the limited

resources created by over centralization of land by the federal government through land

use decrees (Land Act 1978) for oil drilling and over degradation of the environment by

excessive oil spillage in the region. These fundamentally are the association between oil

spillage and human security risk in the Niger Delta. Given the fact that the federal

government of Nigeria is either unable or unwilling to address these anomalies, it may


Ovienloba, A 63

not be out of place for the intervention of the international communities with a resources

to the responsibility to protect this population before it becomes another Gaza in the

Middle East or recruiting zone for international terrorism.

Furthermore, if we take oil spillage as a conflict driver then the federal

government of Nigeria may need to evaluate the relationship between endemic conflicts

in the region and oil spillage extensively. Conflict as a social entity is not sustainable

unless there are fuming ideas and infrastructural designs giving verve and identity for the

parties involved in the conflict to continue in the conflicting situation. The Niger Delta

conflict as analyzed in the course of this paper is both institutionally generated and

politically sustained. The key issues facilitating the life wire of the conflict are resource

control, industrialization, and ethnic identity recognition with socio-economic

empowerment. At the heart of the conflict is the question of what existential and

pragmatic role do the Urhobos, Itsekiris, Edos, Ijaws, Isokos, Ogonis and the Ibibios in

the core Niger Delta States of Bayelsa, Edo, Delta, and Rivers States play in the

exploration and management of the oil and gas industry that had brought so much fortune

to Nigeria and yet devastated the environment and socio-economic fate of their life?

Moreover, we can talk about the common interest of the government and the equitable

relevance of the Niger Delta indigenes in the socio-infrastructural design of the Nigerian

nation.

The interest in this conflict lies in the undeniable fact that whereas petroleum

resources has created wealth and international political influence for Nigeria, the

effectiveness of these policies guiding the industry has empowered a few political elites,

while over 27 million people resident in the oil rich Niger Delta are left with the question


Ovienloba, A 64

of equity and efficiency in the management of the accruing resources from the petroleum

resource. The recommendations favored in this paper therefore is the revision of the

Nigerian oil and gas policies that will engender increased resources accruing to the Niger

Delta by 50% and above while indulging in massive industrialization of the region and

enforcement of international environmental regulation as a conflict resolution model.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Data Description

Appendix 2: Methodology

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The Human Security Implications of Oil Spillage in Niger Delta, Nigeria

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