ENGAGING THE NIGERIAN OIL POLICY AND NIGER DELTA CONFLICTS

By Andrew Ovienloba, Ph.D.c.

Nova Southeastern University, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, USA Presented at the Niger Delta University Conference, March, 2010

Abstract

The rise of the crude oil market and the significant boom in the 1970s, made Nigerian discovered crude oil at Oloibiri in 1956 within the Niger Delta regions of the country, a golden mine. This same commodity that brought blissful euphoria to the Nigerian state and people has equally become her political Achilles’ heel. The unanswered question has been bothered on the real cornerstone surrounding the unabated crisis in the region. It is in search of this crisis livered contention that this research attempts to critically examine the incremental oil policy, and land tenure in Nigeria as an oversight variable that the Nigerian government has yet to seriously consider in search of peace in the Niger Delta conflict resolution project. This paper therefore considered a focus on Nigerian oil policy from 1956 to the Nigerian Petroleum Act 2000, a major policy cancer that needs to be cured in order for other policies on Niger Delta to be effective. Keywords: conflicts, Niger Delta, oil and gas policies, resource control, ethnic identity, and Militants

INTRODUCTION rude oil was discovered in Nigeria in 1956 with exploration in 1958

(Ojakorotu, 2009). The discovery created the arena of influence with

leadership opportunity for Nigeria both in the Sub-Saharan region of

Africa and the continent as whole. However, the strategic influence of oil in the Nigerian

economy came to limelight in the 1970s with an unexpected boom in oil and gas

industries. Inadequate policy formulations on the new found economic strength resonated

in building blocs for intricate conflicts in the Nigerian main streets. The cause of these

conflicts could be traceable to the problem of over centralization of power and control of

oil revenue by the federal government of Nigeria. This gave room to politicization of

ethnicity around asset sharing quota with increasing proliferation of non-state armed

groups, especially in the oil rich Niger Delta region. (www.crisiswatchgroup.org)

Between 1999 and 2007, over 14, 000 lives were lost to both religious and ethnic

conflicts. About 60% of these lost lives were precisely in the core Niger Delta region of

C

Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States predominantly inhabited by the Ijaws, the Itsekiris,

Ogonis, Urhobos and the Isokos. Between December 2005 and August 2006, the militant

activities in the Niger Delta led to the shut down of up to 800, 000 barrels per day not

negotiating the spade of security risk of kidnappings of oil workers, piracy and increasing

bunkering activities in the region (Africa Report N.118, September, 2006). Nigeria’s sad

history since independence demonstrates a case of “politicization of ethnicity and religion

and factional mobilization along these lines as a direct by-product of monopolization of

power and assets by ruling [class, both military and civilian] that continually frustrates

open and fair competition” (www.crisiswatchgroup.org). These unattended political and

economic misnomers have engineered frustrations and mistrust of government ability to

respond purposively to the needs and aspirations of the people thereby resulting in the

freelance militant group formations in the region.

It could be argued that the same commodity that had poised the Nigerian state for

African leadership, international influence, and economic opportunities for a fast pace

development has increasingly become the pillar of conflicts and identity definition from

the years of her independence in 1960 to the present date. Reporting on the Nigerian

economic dilemma in 1996, the World Bank “described Nigeria as a paradox: the country

is rich but the people are poor…. Nigeria is rich in land, people, oil and natural gas

resources. If more wealth had been channeled to the development of its people…. Nigeria

could have been poised for a promise.” (Awe 1999, p.3)

As the wealth of the Nigerian oil industry grows with a lot of economic euphoria,

so has its attendant conflicts multiply in the Niger Delta where zero-sum thinking has

continually led to group formation and identity definitions. Niger Delta is the major

source of oil revenue generation in Nigeria accounting for about 96% of state foreign

earnings and about 85% of [internal revenue]. Yet it is the poorest region in Nigeria

(Ikelegbe, 2001, p. 437; Shaw, 1984, p.394). Niger Delta (ND) is made up of nine

regional states of the South, South and South Eastern part of Nigeria: Abia, Akwa-Ibom,

Beyelsa, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, Rivers, and Cross River state. These states represent a

good percentage of the ethnic minorities in Nigeria (predominantly the Edos, Ijaws,

Urhobos, Itsekiris, Isokos, Ogonis, Ibibios, Aguleris and Umuneris). Their creations were

originally a policy response to the agitations of the Niger Delta indigenes for a manifest

federal presence in their region. Even though oil exploration gained influence in the

region beginning from 1958, the advent of conflict between the local communities of this

region and the federal government of Nigeria and the multinationals came to lime light

especially in the 1990s with the strong advocacy of Late Ken Saro Wiwa (Ojakorotu

2009, p.2). The crux of the matter lies not on power balancing in the region, but on the

policy of asset sharing of oil revenue between the government and the people who bore

the brunt of the oil extractions. But these position-laden advocacies are yet to be matched

with its underlining hidden agenda and interests hence the sustenance of conflicts.

My attempt in this paper is to access and evaluate the policies underpinning oil

and gas explorations in Nigeria and its corresponding conflicts interest in the Niger Delta.

As I analyze the various governmental incremental oil policies over the years in Nigeria,

I equally hope to provide analytical recommendations on the way forward for mediation

and consequent resolutions of the region’s age-long crisis.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONTEXT ANALYSIS OF THE OIL AND GAS

INDUSTRIAL POLICIES IN NIGERIA

etroleum discovery and exploration as noted above elevated the

economic opportunities of Nigeria both domestically and internationally.

The domestic advantage afforded Nigeria the economic power for

development and economic empowerment of her citizens, while improving her power of

international bargaining. However, the inability to equitably translate the abundant

economic resources into infrastructural development and economic empowerment has

been the bane of Nigerian crisis of cohesion as a nation. The Niger Delta region being the

heart of the oil wells and extraction activities in Nigeria is trailed with a history of

insurgence and inter/intra ethnic conflict of survival and agitation for local resource

control as symptomatic of yearning for ethnic identity recognition. The phenomenal

incidence of rising magnitude of conflicts in this region has been a case for

environmental insecurity, economic deprivation, and accelerated environmental

degradation resulting from activities of oil extractive industries. “The situation manifests

in the form of a multiplicity of threats, and contradictions resulting from the absence of or

P

inefficiency of regulatory mechanisms for interaction between human beings and

nature…complicated by the paradox of poverty in plenty, which characterizes the area”

(Omotola, 2006, p.74). The Niger Delta is estimated to be of a population of about 27

million people occupying a landmass of about 70,000 kilometers of land. 75% of the

people live in rural settlements as agrarians, while 25% lived in urban area. Whereas 66%

of the population lives on a less than $75 per month, over 70% living in the rural areas

lives at a subsidence level (NDDC 2004, Ite 2007).

The political agitation for self determination and recognition by the Niger Delta

led to the creation of the then Midwestern state in 1963 comprising the Edos, Ijaws,

Ogonis, Itsekiris, Urhobos, Ibibios, and Isokos. Poor administration and management of

national resources and provisions for the region led to a multiple upsurge of violent

agitations in the region not excluding attempts to break away from Nigeria led in 1966 by

Major Isaac Adaka Boro, an Ijaw from Kiama (Akinwumi 2004, Omoweh 2003:194-195;

in Omotoloa 2006, p.74). The demand for minority state creation, (Osaghae 1995; Suberu

1996 in Omotola 2006) local autonomy and resource control (Akinwumi 2004, 2005; Jike

2005, Osaghae 1995, Omotola 2006) originated organized conflicts in the region

beginning especially with the Ogoni Uprising (Osaghae 1995; Welch 1995). Hence the

rise of ethnic militias, such as the Egbesu Boys, the Chicoco Movement, the Ijaw Youth

Council, the Niger Delta Volunteer Forces (Adebanwi 2004, Akinwumi 2004, 2005,

Omotola, 2006), the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) (Sach, 1996),

“Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities, The Niger Delta Volunteer Forces,

representing the Ijaw, Isoko, Itsekiris, the Urhobo, the Ogoni, the Efik, and the Edo and

other ethnic groups” (Omotola 2006) including the Movement for the Emancipation of

Niger Delta (MEND). The underpinning factors surrounding these group agitations are

the demand for effective environmental governance and resource allocation for

infrastructural developments coupled with socio-economic empowerment of the above-

mentioned local people. The militant activities of these groups have continued to elicit

both negative and positive response from both the government and the multinationals.

On the part of the federal government, more sates were created: Akwa-Ibom,

Delta, and Bayelsa States carved out from the Old Midwestern/Bendel and Rivers States

in 1987, 1991 and 1996 respectively (Osaghae 1998b, Omotola 2006). This was intended

to increase financial allocation to the region in addition to the establishment of

development agencies like the Niger Delta Development Board in 1961, the Oil Mineral

Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC, 1992), the Petroleum Trust

Fund (PTF, 1996), and the Niger Delta Development Fund (NDDC, 2000) (Omotola

2006). Unfortunately, lack of accountability and corruption that has been the hallmark of

the Nigerian government at creation affected the effective delivery of these

interventionist boards and commissions created.

The multinationals, particularly Shell which has about 30% holdings in the

Nigeria petroleum industry next to the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (55%)

ELF (10%) and Agip (5%) (Ite 2007), responded by creating community development

funds. But the limitations of the Shell’s industrial effort reside in its inability to create an

inclusive environment of program development and implementation. In spite of the

company’s shift in its policy paradigm in community development intervention, their

initiatives were more of an “ad hoc development projects rather than coordinated plans. It

focused on what shell felt the communities lacked, or Shell’s perception of poverty

within communities” as against what the communities actually feel they needed (Ite

2007; Zalik 2004). Even though roads were constructed, these roads are predominantly

roads that provide access to the oil locations for extractive endeavors. Another benefits of

the paradigmatic shift in policy within Shell oil company registers on the number of

Nigerians hired in obedience to the Nigerian government policy of indigenization of

employment of 60% of their staff as Nigerians (Petroleum Act 1990).

Shell employs about 10,000 staff 95% of which are Nigerians (Ite 2007) but the

percentage of Niger Delta indigenes in that employment profile is another bone of

contention. In the quest for more creation of infrastructures in the area, it is claimed that

in the last forty years Nigerian government has received a substantial amount of oil rent

to the tune of about $230 billion generated by Shell Petroleum Development Corporation

and other multinationals operating in the Niger Delta. Whereas in 2003 shell alone paid

$1.2 billion to the federal government in Petroleum Tax, by 2004 there was a substantial

increase of 83% amounting to $2.2 billion paid to the coffers of the federal government.

Sadly, corruption and want of accountability in bad governance left the Nigerian

populace with nothing to show for the vast wealth generated from the natural resources

(Ite 2007). In the increase blaming and demand for the Multinational’s development

efforts in the Niger Delta, the Multinationals argued that it is the responsibility of the

government to build roads and other infrastructures in the country and not the licensed

industries who pays their required dues to the government for their activities. (Ifeka

2001)

Nigeria government operates a Unitary, federal system of governance, which

comprise of the federal, state and local government levels of governance. The executive,

the legislature and the judiciary constitute the federal and the state system respectively.

The local government level was meant to constitute government meeting the needs of the

common people. The irony of the system is such that incremental and gaming policies

over the years favors the overriding influence of the federal government which leaves the

state government as a mere trustees as against owners of government properties. For

example, the Land Use Act of 1978 appropriates all land within and along international

boundaries as belonging to the federal government (FGN). In order words the land where

multinational operates belong solely to the federal government whereas the local states

has the rights of guidance thereby rendering the sole right to rents from Petroleum Tax

and royalties to the federal government because she owns the onshore and offshore

within the Nigerian waters. Nigeria currently under the Niger Delta Development Act

2000 repatriates 13% derivation of oil revenues to oil producing states. But inadequate

order of power sharing modalities has further created a conflict of to whom should the

13% go? Whereas the State government lays claim to the resource, the Local government

contest the constitutional right of the state to the use of the fund. The local community

based organization and civil society group hold that the Land Use Act is both

unconstitutional and inimical to the wellbeing of the Ijaws, Urhobos, Edos, Itsekiri, and

Ogonis. There are therefore two schools of thought regarding the sharing formula of the

oil resources. One school of thought holds that the oil revenue should go to the Local

government from source with 20% allocated to the federal government, while another

school of thought predominantly held by the Militant groups hold that the community

should claim the rent and royalties for self determination and community based

development. The determination of actual land ownership that is housing the oil creeks

and wells remains the bedrock of inter-village wars and migrations beginning from the

1990s. (Ifeka 2001)

In order to understand the generic policies of the oil and gas industry in Nigeria it

may serve a useful purpose to briefly articulate the historical linings of the Petroleum

endeavor in the country. Crude oil was discovered in Nigeria and effectively commenced

exploration in 1958. At the initial stage of the exploration, the oil industry was solely

managed by the joint ownership of the royal Dutch-Shell Group and British Petroleum

Company of Nigeria. The evident success coupled with the oil boom of the 1970s

attracted other multinationals such that by 1974, a total number of “19 companies -11

United States, one British-Dutch, one French, one, German, one Italian, one Japanese,

and three Nigerian-were involved in the Nigerian venture.” (Madujibeya, 1976, p.285)

As the number of oil extraction industries multiplied so was there increase in the

discoveries of the oil basins in Nigeria with its consequent increase in production. For

example, from a mere 17 million tones in 1958, it rose to 4,800 million tones by 1974. By

the end of 1974 a huge reserve of 45,000 billion cubic feet of natural gas of associated

and none associated crude oil was discovered. A good proportion of the Nigerian surface

areas of about “375,000 square miles calculated to be covered by sedimentary basins

where oil-bearing rock is most likely to be found” in the Niger Delta part of Nigeria.

During the same period, “the British Government, the International Management and

Engineering Group (IMEG) commented that offshore Niger Delta is regarded as one of

the most prolific oil-producing prospects in the world, and excellent quality of its crude

and Nigeria’s relative proximity to markets in Western Europe, North and South

America, should ensure that it will continue to be a major area of offshore interest and

activity.” (Madujibeya, 1976, p.284)

The infancy state of the independent Nigerian nation coupled with the relative

developmental stage of the Nigerian oil industry made her bargaining power rather low at

the initial stage of oil exploration. The income generating capacity of the oil industry was

at its miniature stage between 1958 and 1969. In any case, the presence of this fortune,

factored greatly into the incidence of the Nigerian civil war between 1967 and 1970 as an

economic power derivation element of interest for regional and national political

influence. With the growth of the oil industry market, the Nigeria bargaining power

equally gained momentum. Thus the initially bargained royalty with the Shell-BP

Petroleum Company of Nigeria of a 12.5% royalty paid based on realized prices and

large capital allowances (Madujubeya, 1976), were revised. In 1966, the federal

government decreed a “Tax (Amendment) policy, which reduced capital allowances in

the previous arrangement. In January 1967, another policy was issued: Petroleum Profit

Tax (Amendment) Decree which provided for the establishment of posted prices, the

payment of royalties on the basis of posted prices and the expensing of royalties. Royalty

policy was re-enacted by 1969, that provided for compulsory 51% state participation in

all new concession granted under the decree” (Madujbeya, 1976, pp.287-288). By 1971

when Nigeria joined OPEC, the Nigerian economy has doubled 95% dependent on oil

revenue generation while the drilling of crude oil increased by a reasonable percentage.

The Nigerian petroleum policies from its development took the shape of

incremental design in spite of the various changes in government from civilian to military

dictatorship and verse versa. Whereas policies were drafted to increase the benefits of the

state, the developments of the territories were undermined. Majorities of the employed

workers at the oil and gas industries were expatriates. Continuous environmental

degradation as a consequence of drilling threatened the economic survival of the ND.

These visible contradiction of wealth generation amidst poverty generated deep

resentments towards the state and multinational oil corporation (Ikelegbe, 2001, 437).

Folger et al (2005) reasoned that where power imbalance exist both the stronger and

weaker parties are at a precarious position as they make move in a conflict interaction.

(p.128) Again, in a situation where power is equally shared “the greatest danger for the

weaker parties is that their needs will not be viewed as legitimate, such that they will not

be taken into account when the conflict is resolved” especially given the fact that the

stronger party may have the unwholesome advantage of relatively determining what is

right and fair enough for everyone in their own favor (Folger et al. 2005, pp.133-134).

The immediate communities that rose confronted with this kind of dissonant environment

as analyzed by Folger et al (2005) in the Nigerian case, resorted to violence and

disruption of oil exploration activities in the localities.

The historical context of oil and gas conflict in Nigeria therefore can be

understood in the words of Ikelegbe (2001) when he noted that: “first, it is a challenge by

groups and communities in the ND over the control of oil and the distribution of its

benefits among the constituent units of the nation. Second, it is a challenge to the state

and its multinational partners of policies and practices that disadvantaged the region

destroy its environment and impoverished the people.” (Ikelegbe, 2001, p.438) But the

unequal power sharing and structural apparatus between the civil society and the

government already put the civil society a priori, at a very disadvantaged position

especially during military dictatorship that lasted for well over 30 years. Confronted by

the poor logic of its policy deliberations and implementations the federal government of

Nigeria resorted to a face saving mechanism. Folger, et al., (2005) defined face saving

“as an attempt to protect or repair relational images in response to threat, real or

imagined, potential or actual” (p.148). The imagined and real threat here is the possible

disintegration of Nigeria from the unpredictable consequence of sustained conflicts in the

ND.

The criticisms that have often been levied against oil and gas policies in Nigeria

were that they were elitist, segregational, incremental and so represented only the

selected few and the interests of military generals and northern hegemony. Responding to

these policy gaps in the oil and gas industry, the Niger Delta Development commission

(Establishment etc) Act 2000 Act No. 6 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria was enacted.

One pervasive element in all the civilian laws and military decrees created regarding oil

and gas in Nigeria is that they are carefully created with a gaming and rational choice

specifics. They skillfully ignore attendance to the palpable issues of over centralization of

governance with reference to resource allocation, and the arbitrary land use act of 1946

and 1978, that represents the genesis of all pervasive conflicts in ND. The NDDC Act

2000 in all its details is evasive of these issues. At best such policies are nothing short of

face saving and a manifestation of prisoner’s dilemma where party’s game for what is the

best choice that will save them from the worst-case scenario. For example, at the

developmental stage of the NDDC policy, series of protests were held and offered by the

Movement for the emancipation of Niger Delta on the need to consult and involve the

beneficiaries of the policy. Local voices were ignored and consultations were elitist thus

making the policy more of an elitist policy, distanced from the actual needs of the Niger

Delta suburbs but attending to what the FGN perceived as its interest. (Omotola 2006,

p.80)

As a demonstration for the inadequacies of the NDDC policy arrangement, the

Niger Delta region has become even more militant than it was before the policy creation.

The militants’ ammunition and strategic design equals that of the national armed forces.

The activities of abduction for ransom have grown in leap and bound to include the

abduction of even local citizens and children. About 400,000-900,000 barrels per day

equaling about 20-25% of Nigeria’s total oil production have been affected by the

activities of militant ethnic groups. Environmental degradation activities by the

multinationals are on the increase. “Gas flaring, a process whereby crude oil is burnt off

pollutes the Delta’s rivers and streams and emits some 35 million tons of carbon dioxide

and 12 million tons of methane a year, making it the world’s largest single contributor to

global warming. Service road construction and canals had lead to deforestation, flooding

and stagnant ponds. Pollution in the Delta region is reported to be on a yearly rise by

2.3billion cubic meters of oil, making fishing activities, which is the economic main stay

of the people impossible. Oil spillages has depleted aquatic lives and rendered the Delta

region fishermen jobless. SPDC reported that 50,200 and 123,777barerels of oil were

spilled in 1998 and 1999 (Wamala 2002). In a “research done for Shell Petroleum

Development Company (SPDC) in its areas of operation in the Niger Delta, it was

reported that 84 percent of the people believed that the oil companies (including

Chevron) had adversely affected the economies of the host communities, and 69 percent

felt that there was a high level of deprivation and neglect []” (Bustany & Wysham, 2000).

This challenges the effectiveness of the Environmental Impact Assessment Act of 1992

(EIA) and defiles various international provisions like the Rio Declaration (1992), the

Brundtland Report (1987) and other International environmental laws to which Nigeria is

Signatory. Consider the attendant human development index of the region.

The region’s human development index is 0.564 and while this is slightly higher

than the Nigerian HDI of 0.448, the area rates fall below regions or countries with

similar gas or oil reserves (Venezuela is 0.772 and Indonesia is 0.697) (Niger

Delta Human development Report (NDHDR) UNDP, 2006). As well, when

further disaggregated to the local government level, the Niger Delta Human

Development Report shows that state and regional HDI scores mask inequalities

in human development among oil producing communities. Significantly, local

government areas without oil facilities appear to have fewer poor people than

those with oil facilities (NDHDR, 2006) (Higgins, 2009).

These are evidence of failed and ineffective application of policies that is leading to

abusive practices such as oil bunkering and conflict escalations in ND.

Between June and July 2000, the Shell Petroleum Development Corporation

reported to have lost over one million barrels of crude in vandalized pipe lines and flow

stations, the equivalent of a two days output from its wells in the /country.” In that same

year, over one hundred pipelines maintainer workers were lost to the kidnapping

activities of ethnic militant groups (Ifeka 2001). In 2002, thousands of lives were either

deformed or lost to the Jesse oil pipeline bust leading to fire outbreak in Delta State.

Since 2006, the Movement for the emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has

continued to wage militant war against oil companies, pipelines and Nigerian security

agents. In May 2008, about 175,000 barrels per day of oil production were shut in by

militant activities whose responsibilities were claimed by MEND. The conflict drivers

for these endless wars are the lack of good governance both at the local, state, and federal

levels of governance to provide for the effective administration of policy resources. The

vacuum created by these administrative flaws led to the demand for a sovereign National

Conference to renegotiate the basis of (Unitary) constitution with the hope that the power

of control over petroleum resources will be transferred from the FG to the State

Government. A situation that was highly contested by Northern hegemony for fear of its

consequence of stripping the North of Economic equality with the South should the

States exercise control over their generated resources (Ifeka, 2001). Secondly, the

absence of visible presence of government development projects in the Niger Delta

region is a case for concern. For example, Bayelsa is estimated to have been the producer

of about 40% of Nigeria’s crude oil but essentially lack hospitals, pipe borne waters,

functional schools, connection electricity; they could only boast of one motor able road

(Port Harcourt to Yenagoa) as a company service linking access.

While the government of Umaru Yar’Adua made deep commitment and even in

his choice of his Vice President Joshua Goodluck a former governor of Bayelsa State and

an Ijaw by birth, his slow paced response to the needs and agitations of the Niger Deltas

has seemingly eroded confidence in his ability to make good his electoral promises for

resolution. In his inaugural address, President Yar’Adua made ND one of the cardinal

points of his administration. “On July 2, 2007, the federal government inaugurated a

peace and conflict resolution committee for the Niger Delta chaired by Senator David

Brigidi, a highly respected Ijaw from Bayelsa State.” Even though the committee was

constituted under the aegis of fair representation from all stakeholders, the vintage

position of the committee was minimized by various reasons not excluding growing

mistrust of the federal government by the militant groups and the fact that some of the

members of the committee were identified by groups like the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC)

as the agents responsible for nefarious activities in the region (Africa Report No. 135,

December 2007, p.4).

Additionally, the Appointment of Professor Ibrahim Gambari, the United Nations

Under Secretary General as the chairman for the Niger Delta summit was highly

criticized as a purposeful political undermining of the ND peoples being that the

Professor Gambari is a Northerner who lack first hand experience in the affairs of the

region. While the condition of life and security remain pathetic, with about 70% of rural

dwellers living on less than $2 per day, what is needed therefore is a political process that

includes all stakeholders (government, respected and trusted community representatives,

reliable militant groups and multinationals) and a trusted intermediary not excluding

international communities. There is the need for a deliberate and increased government

involvement with a process that goes beyond cosmetic window dressing of the way

forward. The appointment of a minister of the Niger Delta and the declaration of amnesty

in the region begs the question if the prisoner dilemma of the government persists. By the

way what is the ground for amnesty, does that not foil the existing policy stereotypes of

the agitators as criminals rather than legitimate citizens seeking for a legitimate interests?

(McGarty, Yzerbyt & Spears, 2002) For me voting millions of Naira to individuals and

groups rather than engaging in massive community development is nothing short of

mediating on positions rather than on interests. There is the dire need to re-examine the

focus of the amnesty policy?

OBJECTIVES OF THE NIGERIAN OIL AND GAS POLICIES he objectives of the Nigerian policies on the management of her oil

resources could be viewed on two platforms. First, prior to the 1973,

about 95% of the management of the oil industry was predominantly

managed by expatriates since Nigeria at the time lacked the technical man power needed

to manage such resources. Again the certainty about the exact quantity and future

importance of the oil industry in the Nigerian growing economy that was emphasizing

diversifications was rather not well established. But with the ground breaking success of

the BP-Shell Petroleum Company, the oil boom of 1970-1974 and the subsequent interest

of more American, German, French, and Japanese in the industry, a keen interest was

paid to the growing industry making the sharing system of the accruing revenue a subject

of incremental interest to the federal government. This is reflected in the interval

modification of policies regarding royalty accruing to the national purse. At this point,

the primary objective was to promote a state presence and control of the oil industry that

was increasingly becoming the main stay of the national economy. The rationality of this

policy caveat was more of self-serving interest as against a public choice debate by the

federal government.

The second objective of the government in the oil and gas policy was more of a

gaming theory related default. Negotiation of a more assertive presence in the industry

became recourse of the federal government largely because of the increasing relevance of

the oil and gas industry in the growing domestic economy and international dependence

on petroleum products. Thus, the game was to create a situation where whereas the

expatriates will provide the needed technology for oil explorations, the Nigerian

government will take overt control of the management of the industry. In order to achieve

this objective a quota allocation board was established in 1967 to limit the employment of

expatriates and to force the pace of Afrinanization of the growing industry. This was

followed by a 1972 policy Decree: “the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree,” which

stipulates that “important areas of the economy were to be handed over to and in future

reserved, either wholly or in part, for Nigerians.” (Mayall, 1976, p.321) Even though this

T

policy did not specifically include the oil and gas industry employment policy largely

because of its peculiarities and technical limitations at the time, the Petroleum Decree of

1969, bridged this policy gap and provided for a 51% state participation. By 1974, the

government had taken over a majority holding in all oil exploration in Nigeria with the

exception of importation of technologies needed to execute the business. By 1975, 60%

of the Anglo-Dutch Shell marketing organization had been acquired already by the

Nigerian government (Mayall, 1976). The Establishment of the Petroleum Training

Institute in 1975 under an alliance with the Soviet Union was a particular gesture to

ensure the effective take over of the industry by Nigerian experts as a policy execution

strategy through technical training of personnel at the Institute.

It has equally been argued that the objective of the petroleum policy in Nigeria

had been to facilitate those conditions necessary to generate capitals needed for the

development of the oil industry and to obtain as much benefit as possible accruing from

the oil operations. Additionally, these policies were developed to effectively pursue

government strong determination to maximize the oil revenue receipts and Nigerianized

the industry. (Madujibeya, 1976, 299) The question is: what does Nigerianization mean

to the people? It could be argued that the concept of indigenization does not mean for the

local farmers and fishermen what it meant for the government. Decree NO.51 of 1969 for

instance, vested the federal government with full ownership and control of “all petroleum

in and upon any land in Nigeria; under the territorial waters of Nigeria with increase in

Nigeria territorial waters by decree No. 38 of 1971 to 30 miles; or all land forming part of

continental shelf of Nigeria. Section 2 of the same decree gave the federal commissioner

of Mines and Power (Now Minister of Petroleum resources) sole power for granting oil

exploration, oil prospecting and oil mining leases to Nigerian citizens or to companies

incorporated in Nigeria. To further consolidate this hold, decree 9 provided that the

federal government has the sole right to the offshore oil revenues from wells located in

the coaster waters adjoining oil minority states. This decree cuts the oil minorities of the

Niger Delta off from any direct access to oil.” (Soremekun and Obi, 1993b: 219-220, in

Obi, 2001, p.26) The incremental flaws of these policies lies in the fact that whereas the

facilitated objective of the government was to ensure effective indigenization of the oil

and gas industry, thereby ensuring equal distribution of the vast resources accruing from

the petroleum resources, its implementation in reality denied the people for whose

interest the laws were made. It eroded access to their land inheritance, frustrated their

expectations and dashed their hopes for a better future.

The ceding of land ownership to the federal government by the Land Use Decree

of 1978 and the vesting of the power of oil exploration to the Petroleum Minister did not

only politicized the objective, it equally created room for bunkering activities that

enhanced corruption and illegal oil exploration for politicians’ self serving goals. Under

this arrangement, the resources that should have gone for the interest of all became a

political elitist blessing covered and protected by law. Thus corruption is not only being

baptized at the corridors of power, it equally makes prosecution impossible given the fact

that the very persons entrusted with the vestige of power by the people are the creators

and implementers of the laws which alienates these people but serving the politicians’

personal interest. The potential for conflict here is quite apparent given the fact that

whereas the policy objectives zeroed on indigenization, it has become an indigenization

that is self-serving, and short of providing for the environmental and development

opportunities particularly for the Niger Delta communities where the extractive agenda

were to be executed. Between 1989 and 1993, there were 34 and 169 anti-oil protests

which made the oil industries in the delta areas to record a lost of 117 working days as a

result of persistent disrupting protests. We cannot fail to register multiple ethnic protests

in struggle for survival over the limited farmable and fishable swamps and land in the

region greatly decimated by oil spillage resulting to lose of lives and properties. In the

ethnic war for instance between the Andoni and Okirika, about 1000, Ogonis lost their

lives in 1993 (Osaghae 1995; Omotoa 2006, p.78). The evidence of conflict exacerbation

in the Niger Delta as a result of Oil and gas industrial activities demonstrates a lacuna in

its guiding policy. Besides, a policy that does not provide for the protection of lives and

properties is a failed policy ab initio.

The political implication of the policies themselves, where the federal government

and petroleum and Mineral resource Minister has an overriding influence in the

management of the industry already defines the praxis for failure in implementation. The

case has been analyzed to be that of employment of political friends and family groups as

against equal access. Given the case that politics is a game of common interests, the

political temperature of the time has greatly favored Northern and Western hegemony

that has dictated the employment quota of the industry. Consequently, the oil industry is

argued to have been predominantly staffed by persons from the Northern and Western

Nigerian regions of the country; with a minimal presence of the core Niger Delta

indigenes of Bayelsa, Akwa-Ibom, Edo, Ondo, Rivers, Cross Rivers, Delta, and Imo local

people. Even though Section 9 (b) empowered the appointed Minister with the power of

ensuring safe working environment and prevention of pollution of watercourses and

atmosphere, these legislations are useful only on the shelves of government libraries.

Economic opportunities have been greatly frustrated by the ills of environmental

degradation and constant oil spillage. Being increasingly denied direct and indirect

economic and political recognition and survival, a theory of domination pursued

vigorously by violence became the way of self-determination by the local indigenes of

Niger Delta. The perception of the theory of determination as it is in the Niger Delta

holds that federal government policies are set in such a way that it disregards the

common interest and survival of the local people while exploiting their natural resources

to the utmost neglect of the rights and privileges of the indigenes from whose land those

resources are generated for the survival of all. The domination theory is link to a zero-

sum thinking which is both comparative and analytical. In the zero-sum thinking it is

reasoned that whereas the political and military elites of Nigeria are better of from the

resources derived from the natural resources extracted from the Niger Delta, the Niger

Deltas themselves are made worse off. Whereas the objectives of the Nigerian oil and gas

policies appeared to have achieved its goals of indigenization, the impact of its

articulation and implementation were both exclusivists, incremental, and politically

biased. This is the source of conflict and unresolved tension between the federal

government and the Ijaws, Itsekiris, Urhobos and so on.

RESOURCES, METHODS AND CONSTRAINTS OF NIGERIAN PETROLEUM

POLICIES

ne of the greatest resources at the disposal of the federal government in

promoting oil and gas policies is the weapons of power of law and the

security apparatus of the state armed forces. The methodological O

designs of these policies are predominantly incremental and elitist. Some of the

constraints remain the resistant effort of the Niger Delta Militant Groups and the

conscious efforts of the civil society organizations serving as mobilizing agents against

the social ills within the region.

There are two major areas of interest that the Nigerian oil and gas policies are

tailored towards. These are the various policies for indigenization, and resource control.

In this regards the various decrees and democratic laws were made to promote full

ownership of the oil wells or give the federal government higher percentage of ownership

of holdings of the oil and gas industry. For instance, “The Petroleum Act of 1990”

effectively reiterated the full ownership of the industry to the government as entrenched

in the Land Use Decree of 1978, with the full management of the petroleum resources

under the ministry of Petroleum Resources, that regulates the industry under the auspices

of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and its ancillary companies

responsible for setting wholesale and retail prices. Whereas section 35 articles a & b

vested the power of direct involvement on the federal government in any discovered

natural gas in the country with the sole right to receive royalties, section 38 article a (i

&ii) attempts an improvement of the percent of Nigerians employed by oil and gas

companies as politically deem fit by the minister of petroleum resources.

Under this decree, the indigenization effort of the federal government is been

pursued with the powers of the law. But the question is not in the creation of the law but

in the details of the law and its implementations. First ceding the ownership of all lands

and waters to the federal government centralizes power of control around the federal

authority in a sense that minimizes the influence of both the regional state and local

governments. In this arrangement, developmental provisions are undermined both within

the law itself and in the ambience of the regional government. Over-centralization in

itself creates conflict of interest because it empowers a few while disempowering the

majority (Davidheiser, 2007). This therefore is part of the fulcrum of the crisis engine in

the Niger Delta. Over-centralization of power in the federal government has weakened

the influence of the regional and local government over and against the activities of the

multinationals in the regulations of environmental gradation and community development

initiatives. For instance, even though the federal government has insisted that the Niger

Delta crisis is an internal affair, experience of conflicts between the communities, ethnic

militias and the multinationals shows that the interventions of the federal forces only

serves to escalate the conflict. Odi genocide of 1999 is case in point. Odi is an Ijaw

community of about 60, 000 population in Bayelsa State, where six policemen were

abducted and murdered by some unknown militant group in 1990. In the wake of the

helplessness of the Bayelsa State government, at the directive of the federal government

of President Olusegun Obasanjo, a military operation was carried out that leveled the

entire community” (Oroh, 1999). This is nothing but a punitive method of policy pursuit

and implementation.

When then Nigerian government changed from the 1963 republic design of a

federal regional system to a state model in 1975, through the creation of twelve states

with at least three in the Niger Delta in addition to the then Midwestern state; it was

perceived as an arrangement that was going to better off the lot of Nigerian minority

states especially given the case that it was going to facilitate increased access to the

benefits from their endowed natural resources. In the old regional dispensation,

derivation from natural resources was allocated based on the strength of ethnic

populations, which did not favor the Niger Deltas in comparison to the Northern, Eastern

and Western parts of Nigeria where the population was estimated to have quadrupled the

size of the Niger Delta. Nonetheless, the celebrated euphoria did not last long as the

power of ownership and access to control of the natural resources was taken over by the

federal government using the Land Use Act of 1978. A resource used by the federal

government to acquire absolute control of land with the right to revoke the right of

occupancy. Under this arrangement, the federal government had supreme control of the

natural resources. In 1993, the President Ibrahim Babangida administration again

reinforced this land use decree with additional impetus to the Land use Act by Decree 52,

which appropriated lands within 100 meters of the 1967 shoreline of Nigeria” (Obi, 2001,

p.26). The impact of this methodic revocation of the right to land resonated very

negatively with the Niger Deltas. The provisional restrictions and limitations created

inter/intra ethnic conflicts since they were now left to struggle over a limited land space

for their farming and fishing activities.

The major resource utilized by the federal government in articulating and

implementing petroleum policies were more of gaming and less than public centered. The

advantage of imbalance of power favored the federal government and disadvantaged the

people. The Land Use Act, of 1978 and 1993, arbitrarily took away the rights of land

ownership from the people and vested the full ownership of all land and waterways on

the federal government. This makes claim on the oil multinational by the people as

regards the use of land and mineral resources illegal (Obi, 2001, pp. 26-27).

It suffice to note that various institutional resource have been utilized by the

federal government to address the side effects of the various controlling policies. These

policy outfits include: Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB, 1961), the Niger Delta

Basin Development Authority (NDBDA, 1976), Oil, Mineral Producing Areas

Development Commission (OMPADEC, 1992) created by President Ibrahim Babangida

under Decree 23 of 1992 to increase the financial contribution to the oil producing areas

from 1.5 to 3 % of government revenue. The main objective of OMPADEC for instance,

was to utilize the 3% (N13.6billion in 1998) for development projects in the oil

producing communities (Omotola 2006). But the cold hands of misappropriation of funds

and corrupt practices engulfed the agenda. OMPADEC’s failure is a reflection of the

absence of political will, and intransigent government bureaucracy (Omotola 2006 p.80).

Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF, 1996) was another experimental outfit that came with

laudable promises but failed the test of time. Niger Delta Development Commission

(NDDC) is a subsequent response in 2000 under President Obasanjo that faced similar

flaws because of the exclusive nature under which it was prepared and passed into law by

the National House of Assembly. The failure in these experimental outfits demonstrates,

government bureaucracy lacking the where with all to execute its policies.

In recent times, we have various government and private effort at resolution of the

Niger Delta conflicts. We have the July 2007 Peace initiative from the Government of

President Umaru Yar’Adua. The Niger Delta Peace Forum an effort from General Azazi,

the Nigerian Chief of Joint Staff and a Niger Deltan himself provided another mediation

and reconciliation outlet. These resources includes other efforts from local NGOs are

working in the region. But even in the face of best private efforts if the cooperation and

contribution towards the socio-economic improvement on the life of the people are not

matched by commensurate government efforts, violent agitations is inevitable. In order

words mediation that focuses on positions rather than interest is a cancer that only serves

to test the level of patience from the conflicting parties and bound to lead to another level

of conflict escalation. This is where the policy substance of the 60-day offer of Amnesty

to ND militants (August 4-October 4, 2009) from President Umaru Yar’Adua is

troubling. It is like a dangling carrot policy design. It simply begs the question. The gaps

in all these fancy initiatives is that they fail to respond to the fundamental policy question

of the root causes of the problem in order to proffer solution even during stalemates.

STRENGTH, WEAKNESSES, THREATS, AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE

OIL AND GAS POLICIES IN NIGERIA

he petroleum Act decree of 1972 that established the ceding of

important positions of employment opportunities to Nigerian citizens,

that was re-emphasized in the Petroleum Act of 1990 is a major policy

strength. It made it possible for the Nigerianization of the industry to become a law. In

the absence of this federal policy presence, chances are high that the industry could have

grown to become a source of re-colonialization of Nigeria. It could have given room for

the growth of apartheid given the fact that the nation was young and lacked both political

and economic management experience. Besides it has been severally noted that the

quality of colonial education given to Nigerians during the colonial period was more of a

basic training to the indigenes to enable them provide needed administrative assistance as

clerks and literate drivers for the colonial administration. The oil industry would have

taken advantage of the shortage in indigenous manpower to colonize that vital part of the

country’s resources. Therefore the presence of the federal government policy for

indigenization was indeed a policy decision made at the right time and in the right

position of strength.

The Nigerian government taking full hold of the oil wells was a position of

strength because it created a basis for federal legal holdings and management on behalf of

the people. The strength derive from the fact that a non centralized ownership of the

mineral resources would have created a competing conflict strategy which would have

not only created civil strife, it could have gone further to disintegrate the unity of Nigeria

T

in the guise of complicated inter and intra ethnic struggle for economic influence beyond

what it is now. The various policies equally strengthen the foreign bargaining power of

Nigeria in the international community. It created the ability of Nigeria to propel herself

into international community especially in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries (OPEC); an international outfit that shapes international oil administration.

Petroleum policy enabled the Nigeria government to acquire economic power needed at

the time to assert her position of leadership in the African continent. These opportunities

were made possible because of the strategic policy derivation around the oil industry

especially in the events of the windfall of the 1970s. Without the ownership of the

petroleum industry, the revenue receipts from the oil royalties needed to revamp or

accelerate the national economy would have been almost impossible at the level it did.

Notwithstanding the plausibility of the various indigenization policies of the

federal government of Nigeria to manage the petroleum resources of the country, the

designing process and implementation left a defecting gap that has left much to be

desired and so positioned the country particularly the Niger Delta region for paralyzing

conflicts. In the first instance, the policies baggage flaws because of its ambiguous

utilization of the rational actor model variation. A variation that is known as “public

choice,’ the application of self-interest as an explanation of individual and political

decisions, such as voting and the behavior of congressional committees.” (Hird et al.

2004, p.3) We could identify this consequential weakness in the overbearing and over

controlling tone of the policies with a deficiency of a public voice of interest in the

policies themselves. For example in the developmental process of the Niger Delta

Development Commission bill of 2000, it was noted that while the policy was being

designed, public participation was excluded in a senate that was highly elitist and

Northern influence laced. Ifeka (2001) had argued that the Northern hegemony made up

of military generals and senior civil servant under whose administrations majority of the

policies were evolved for the past thirty six years feared the danger of impoverishing the

oil draught north should the power of ownership or overbearing presence of the oil

producing states of the Niger Delta be engendered in the policy.

Inter group pluralism was therefore favored in that it selectively reflected the

values and interest of a powerful few who perceive their social class interest as equal to

that of the vast majority. Consequently, commissions and boards or outfits like NDDC,

PTF, OMPADEC, etc, that were established lacked transparency and effectiveness for the

fact they were outfits put together to benefit political clients rather than the core

communities that housed the majority of the oil beds in Nigeria. Ovwasa (1999) for

instance contended, “OMPADEC was ‘a contract rather than development outfit.’ This

situation may not be unconnected with lack of regulatory mechanisms to monitor its

activities” (Okonta and Oro 2006; Sanya 2006:35; Omotola, 2006, p.80). Such in

adequacies only serves to benefit a few at the echelons of power like it did.

The consequences of the over emphasis of the federal ownership of the oil and gas

industry did not only weaken the power of the local and state governments in the

monitoring of the activities of the oil multinational, it equally minimized the all important

environmental impact assessment of the extractive ventures or the consequence of oil

spill which posses grave danger to both aquatic life and farmlands. For example, Brown

(2006) reported “up to 1.5 million tons of oil, 50 times the pollution unleashed in Exxon

Valdez tanker disaster, has been spilt in the Niger Delta over the past 50 years. It equally

noted from an independent experts that damage to the fragile mangrove forest over the

past 50 years was tantamount to a catastrophic oil spill occurring every 12 month in what

is one of the world’s most important ecosystems, threatening rare species including

primates, fish and birds; destroying the livelihood of over 20 million people fueling the

upsurge in violence” (As cited in Independent Newspapers UK Limited, 2006).

In all these evidenced cases, no prosecution was carried out because of known

involvement of high profile politicians in the bunkering business. The crux of the matter

is that the petroleum Act of 1972, down to 1990, even though they were designed to

protect the interests of Nigerian Citizens, trumps the fundamental human rights of the

people whose interest the state was suppose to protect. International Convention on

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) Article 1 (i) holds that “All peoples have

the right to self –determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their

political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”

(Osaghae, 1996, p. 179) But the various Petroleum Acts neglected the right to self-

determination especially in the perils of the Land Use Act of 1978, & 1993, which

deprived the people of their right to settlement and ownership of their ancestral heritage

and the right to earn their living in safe and troubled free environment. This denial visibly

provided avenues for competing rivalry and a total rejection of the state as a domineering

entity.

Another important point of weakness is in the non performance of the various

window dressing boards, commissions and committees set up by the federal government

with little or no result save sites of uncompleted and abandoned project sites as a result of

political corruption. Between May 29, 2007 and December 2007, for instance, during the

Presidential administration of President Umaru Yar’Adua, multiple appointments were

made to the committee aimed at resolving the Niger Delta conflicts. The vice President

Jonathan Goodluck (An Ijaw, Beyelsa State indigene) was deputed to head the

committee, “Benjamin Wilcox a Peoples Democratic Party leader in Rivers State critique

this as ill designed when he noted that: “but everybody knows the role of the Vice

President…. the Vice President is a non-star…why is it that it is when it comes to the

Niger Delta that they mandate to the deputy?” (As cited in African Report No, 135, 2007

p.5) This is a reflection of the mistrust of the federal government’s policies towards the

Niger Delta crisis. Again, to the same committee, within a short space of time the Vice

President was replaced by the Secretary to the federal government Babagana Kingibe

who was equally replaced by the Defense minister Mahmud Yayale Ahmed which the

Niger Deltas interpreted as indicative of the fact that the government still views the Niger

Delta problem as one that can be resolved within a military context rather than a

comprehensive developmental framework.” (Ibidem) The policies of engaging only the

militant groups in the various dialogue process by the federal government is equally

another weakness, which creates tension and distrust for the good will of the government

policies. In this wise, conflicts are not only escalated and sustained it equally makes

opportunities for a problem solving agenda unrealistic.

ALTERNATIVES FOR RADICAL CHANGE

ne of the great points analyzed above in the conflicting values between

the state and the Niger Delta communities is the fact of the over

centralized and weak federal system in Nigeria leading to weak

administrative structures. Under effective federal system of government,

Federal government exists…when the power of government for a community is

divided substantially according to the principle that there is a single independent

authority for the whole area in respect of some matters and that there are

independent regional authorities for other matter, each set of authority being

coordinate with and not subordinate to the others within its own prescribed sphere

(Wheare, 1963, p.35, in Adejuyigbe, 1973, p.161)

What is needed therefore is a decentralization of the federal government structure while

empowering the state and local governments through the principle of subsidiarity

(Davidheiser, 2007). Granting some measure of resource control to local communities

will minimized incentives for violence and improves job creation for the local

communities, and enable cohesive monitoring of the activities of various oil

multinationals. This will make using poverty and environmental destruction less

attractive as conflict drivers. Additionally, over-centralization of the federal character has

breed corruption from bogus administrative bureaucracies that fans the embers of lack of

transparency and accountability. Over-centralization equally breeds absence of popular

participation in governance because of its tendencies towards a totalitarian government.

More power at the local level will make the government more responsive to the needs of

the local people, accountable and more efficient. With this in place conflict at the local

level can easily be managed.

The Niger Delta conflict can be effectively perceived as having reached a

stalemate given the fact that many of the indigenes are tired of crisis and demand for a

resolution with outlined conditions is a plus. An authentic amnesty in this caveat will be a

policy commitment to the implementation of the policy findings of the various

government constituted commissions and committees on the Niger Delta that are still

tenable. These include: more resource control, creation of jobs for the youths of the

region and industrialization of the Niger Delta. The reports of the Special Security

committee on Oil Producing Areas (2005) headed by the former Chief of Defense Staff,

O

General Alexander Ogomudia that recommended an upgrade of the current 13% oil

derivation allocation to the oil producing states to 50%, coupled with “training of Niger

Delta indigenes for employment in the oil industry, provision of infrastructures such as

electricity, water, roads and the repeal of the Land Use Act, Petroleum Act, Gas Re-

injection Act and other laws dispossessing the oil producing areas of their land, and the

full industrialization of the Niger Delta” (as cited in Vanguard Newspapers Nigeria

Limited, (2008). June 6, Edition & The Adaka Boro Center) is very relevant here. Also

consider the March 3, 1999 22-member committee headed by Major General Oladayo

Popoola deputed to make recommendation for what can be done for the Niger Delta

before the end of the General Abdulsalami Abubakar military administration in May

1999. This committee had recommended a 20 year development plan for the region

beginning with the immediate expenditure of $170 million on infrastructure projects in

addition to their budgetary allocation and the establishment of diverse representative

group of Niger Delta Consultative Council (Ibidem). It is important to note that

multiplications of committees and commissions on the same known subject matter

without the necessary commitments to the policy recommendations of these august

bodies make problem solving in conflict situation a mirage. It equally exacerbates the

conflict by giving rooms for the formation of negative group perception and group

identity that is a true case in Niger Delta today.

My recommendations therefore is that Niger Delta problem is a political policy

problem that needed to be engaged for solutions through the various federal policies that

legalizes the structure of perceived injustice. Let us begin to appreciate and move Niger

Delta conflict solutions through federal policies that validate their actions and inactions.

Let the federal government implement key recommendations from the previous

committees held in the past and employ the services of independent mediators to mediate

the full resolution of the conflict as against conducting another extra-budgetary summit

and face-saving amnesty programs whose fate may not necessarily differ from previously

held ones.

1 CONCLUSION

onflict as a social entity is not sustainable unless there are fuming ideas

and infrastructural designs giving verve and identity for the parties

involved in the conflict to continue in the conflicting situation. The

Niger Delta conflict as analyzed in the course of this paper is both institutionally

generated and politically sustained. The key issues facilitating the life wire of the conflict

are resource control, industrialization, and ethnic identity recognition with socio-

economic empowerment. At the heart of the conflict is the question of what existential

and pragmatic role do the Urhobos, Itsekiris, Edos, Ijaws, Isokos, Ogonis and the Ibibios

in the core Niger Delta States of Bayelsa, Edo, Delta, and Rivers States play in the

exploration and management of the oil and gas industry that had brought so much fortune

to Nigeria and yet devastated the environment and socio-economic fate of their life?

Moreover, we can talk about the common interest of the government and the equitable

relevance of the Niger Delta indigenes in the socio-infrastructural design of the Nigerian

nation.

The interest in this conflict lies in the undeniable fact that whereas petroleum

resources has created wealth and international political influence for Nigeria, the

effectiveness of policies guiding the industry has empowered a few political elites, while

over 20 millions people resident in the oil rich Niger Delta are left with the question of

equity and efficiency in the management of the accruing resources from the natural

endowment. The recommendations favored in this paper therefore is the revision of the

Nigerian oil and gas policies that will engender increased resources accruing to the Niger

Delta by 50% while indulging in massive industrialization of the region, with

enforcement of international environmental regulation as a transformational conflict

resolution model.

REFERENCE

Adejuyigbe, Ọ. (1973). The size of states and political stability in Nigeria. African

Studies Review, 16(2), 157-182

C

Amaizie, E., (2008) Nigeria: Why Niger-Delta Leaders Don’t wants another Summit,

Vanguard Newspaper Nigeria Limited

Awe, B. (1999). Conflict and divergence: Government and society in Nigeria. African

Studies Review, 42(3), 1-20.

Baker, J. (1977). Oil and African development. The Journal of Modern African Studies,

15(2), 175-212

Brown, J. (2006). Niger Delta bears brunt after 50 years of oil spills. In UK: Independent

News and Media Limited.

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/niger-delta-

bears-brunt-after-50-years-of-oil-spills-421634.html

Davidheiser, M. (2007). Governance and Legal Reform in The Gambia and beyond: an

anthropological critique of current development strategies. Halle / Saale: Max

Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Working Papers No. 93.

Folger, J.P., Poole, M.S., Stutman, R.K., (2005), Working Through Conflict, Strategies

for Relationships, Group, and Organizations, 5th Edition, New York: Pearson

Education, Inc.

Higgins, K. (2009). Regional Inequality and the Niger Delta, Policy Brief No. 5, Prepared

for the World Development Report 2009. Overseas Development Institute

http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/2507.pdf

Hird, J.A.; Reese, M.; Shilvock, M.; (2004), Controversies in American Public Policy, 3rd

Edition, Australia, Thomson, Wadsworth Learning INC

Hveem, H. (1979). Militarization of nature: Conflict and control over strategic resources

and some implications for peace policies. Journal of Peace Research, 16(1), 1-26.

Ifeka, C., (March 2001) Oil, NGOs & Youths: Struggles for Resource Control In the

Niger Delta. Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 87, pp.99-105

Ikelegbe, A. (2001). Civil society, oil and conflict in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria:

Ramifications of civil society for a regional resource struggle. The Journal of

Modern African Studies, 39(3), 437-469.

Ikelegbe, A. (2005). Encounters of insurgent youth associations with the state in the oil

rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Journal of Third World Studies, 22(1), 151-181.

International: A specter of turmoil and conflict; Nigeria. (2006, February). The

Economist, 378(8466), 62.

International: Blood and oil; Nigeria. (2007, March). The Economist, 382(8520), 71.

Nigeria: Enduring Unrest in the Niger Delta, (2007). As cited in Africa Report No. 135,

International Crisis Group

Ite, Uwem (2007) ‘Changing Times and Strategies: Shell’s Contribution to Sustainable

Community Development in the Niger Delta, Nigeria’, Sustainable Development,

Vol. 15, pp.1-14

Jike, V. T. (2004). Environmental degradation, social disequilibrium, and the dilemma of

sustainable development in the Niger-Delta of Nigeria. Journal of Black Studies,

34(5), 686-701.

Jr., C. E. W. (1995). The Ogoni and self-determination: Increasing violence in Nigeria.

The Journal of Modern African Studies, 33(4), 635-650.

Madujibeya, S. A. (1976). Oil and Nigeria's economic development. African Affairs,

75(300), 284-316.

Mayall, J. (1976). Oil and Nigerian foreign policy. African Affairs, 75(300), 317-330.

Niger Delta Human Development Report, (2006). Abuja, Nigeria: United Nations

Development Program, (UNDP) UN House, Plot 617/618, Diplomatic Zone.

http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/africa/nigeria/nigeria_hdr_report.pdf

http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR06-complete.pdf

Nigeria, Major Legislations affecting the Petroleum Industry.

http://www.nbrservices.com/nigeria_major_legislations_affecting_the_petroleum_i

ndustry.htm

McGarty, C., Yzerbyt, V. Y., & Spears, R. (2002). Stereotypes as Explanations: The

Formation of Meaningful Beliefs about Social Groups. Cambridge, England:

Cambridge University Press.

Obi, C. I. (2001). The changing forms of identity politics in Nigeria Under economic

adjustment: the case of the oil Minorities movement of Niger Delta. A Report from

the research program, the political and social context of structural adjustment in

Africa Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet research reports no. 119. Elanders

Digitalryck AB, Goteborg

Odell, P. R. (1968). The significance of oil. Journal of Contemporary History, 3(3, the

Middle East), 93-110.

Ojakorotu, V. (2009), (Ed.). Fresh Dimensions on the Niger Delta Crisis of Nigeria Part

of the Conflict and Development Series, Series Editor: Otto F. von Feigenblatt,

M.A. Bangkok / Houston: JAPASS Press, Inc.

Okello Oculi (2007). Where Vultures Feast: Shell, Human Rights, and Oil in the Niger

Delta. Review of African Studies Review, 50(2), 259-260

Omotola, J. S., (2007). From the OMPADEC to the NDDC: An Assessment of State

Responses to Environmental Insecurity in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. Africa

Today, 54(1), 72-89

Oro, A. (Presenter), (1999). Genocide in Odi. Being the Text of a Press Conference by

Leaders of Human Rights and Civil Society Groups Who Visited Odi, Bayelsa

State on Wednesday December 8th 1999. African Policy E-Journal.

http://www.africaaction.org/docs99/odi9912.htm

Osaghae, E. E. (1996). Human rights and ethnic conflict management: The case of

Nigeria. Journal of Peace Research, 33(2), 171-188.

Petroleum Act, Chapter P10, (Chapter 350 LFN 1990). Laws of the Federation of

Nigeria. http://www.nigeria-law.org/Petroleum%20Act.htm

Shaw, T. M. (1984). The state of Nigeria: Oil crises, power bases and foreign policy.

Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines,

18(2), 393-405.

The Adaka Boro Center: http://www.adakaboro.org/resources/37-articles/76-

theogomudiarep

Vanguard Newspapers Nigeria Limited, (2008). June 6, Edition.

Wamala, I., (2002), Nigeria Protest, Nigerian Women Take on the Oil Companies,

Women and Environment International Magazine

Welch, C. E., (1995). Protecting Human Rights in Africa: Strategies and Roles of

Nongovernmental Organizations. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press

Zalik, A. (2004). The Niger Delta: Petro-violence and partnership development. Review

of African Political Economy, Vol. 31, 101, An African Scramble? Pp. 401-424