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The Four Worlds of lsquoWelfare Realityrsquo ndash Social Risks andOutcomes in Europe

Emanuele Ferragina Martin Seeleib-Kaiser and Thees Spreckelsen

Social Policy and Society FirstView Article December 2014 pp 1 - 21DOI 101017S1474746414000530 Published online 30 December 2014

Link to this article httpjournalscambridgeorgabstract_S1474746414000530

How to cite this articleEmanuele Ferragina Martin Seeleib-Kaiser and Thees Spreckelsen The Four Worlds of lsquoWelfareRealityrsquo ndash Social Risks and Outcomes in Europe Social Policy and Society Available on CJO 2014doi101017S1474746414000530

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Social Policy amp Society page 1 of 21Ccopy Cambridge University Press 2014 doi101017S1474746414000530

The Four Worlds of lsquoWelfare Realityrsquo ndash Social Risks andOutcomes in Europe

E m a n u e l e F e r r a g i n a lowast M a r t i n S e e l e i b - K a i s e r lowastlowast a n d T h e e s S p r e c k e l s e n lowastlowastlowast

lowastOxford Institute of Social Policy University of OxfordE-mail emanueleferraginaspioxacuklowastlowastOxford Institute of Social Policy University of OxfordE-mail martinseeleibspioxacuklowastlowastlowastOxford Institute of Social Policy University of OxfordE-mail theesspreckelsenspioxacuk

After three decades of welfare state crisis change and transformation can we still speak ofwelfare state regimes when looking at their outcomes The analysis of outcomes providesa picture of lsquothe real worlds of welfarersquo and is of considerable importance to understandingpolitical legitimacy across countries We use aggregate longitudinal data for West Europeancountries in order to map welfare outcomes and cluster countries The cluster results arealso assessed for their sensitivity to the choice of different countries years or indicators AllEuropean welfare states have a significant capacity for reducing poverty and inequalityHowever the degree of this reduction varies considerably especially when examiningdifferent social groups ie unemployed people children youths or the elderly Outcomescluster countries largely in line with previous institutionalist literature differentiatingbetween conservative liberal Mediterranean and social-democratic regimes As the mainexception we identify Germany which can no longer be characterised as the proto-typical conservative welfare state When analysing old social risks such as unemploymentand old age Europe appears to be characterised by two groups ie one consistingof liberal and Mediterranean countries and a second made up of social-democraticand conservative countries New social risks such as child and youth poverty bycontrast replicate very closely the theoretical four-cluster typology Our sensitivityanalyses reveal that our clusters tend to be stable over time Welfare regimes continueto serve as a useful analytical tool and relate to outcomes experienced by Europeancitizens

Keywords Welfare state regimes poverty inequality comparative social policy clusteranalysis EU-SILC

Wor lds o f We l fa re i ns t i tu t iona l configura t ions and outcomes

Esping-Andersenrsquos (1990 1999) seminal work on lsquoWorlds of Welfarersquo has inspiredcomparative social policy research for the past twenty-five years Empirically he identifiedregimes as clusters based on the concepts of decommodification social stratification andthe statendashmarket relationship ie the specific welfare mix lsquoDecommodification refers tothe degree to which individuals or families can uphold a socially accepted standard ofliving independently of market participationrsquo (Esping-Andersen 1990 37) In contrast

1

httpjournalscambridgeorg Downloaded 31 Dec 2014 IP address 934992178

Social Policy amp Society page 1 of 21Ccopy Cambridge University Press 2014 doi101017S1474746414000530

The Four Worlds of lsquoWelfare Realityrsquo ndash Social Risks andOutcomes in Europe

E m a n u e l e F e r r a g i n a lowast M a r t i n S e e l e i b - K a i s e r lowastlowast a n d T h e e s S p r e c k e l s e n lowastlowastlowast

lowastOxford Institute of Social Policy University of OxfordE-mail emanueleferraginaspioxacuklowastlowastOxford Institute of Social Policy University of OxfordE-mail martinseeleibspioxacuklowastlowastlowastOxford Institute of Social Policy University of OxfordE-mail theesspreckelsenspioxacuk

After three decades of welfare state crisis change and transformation can we still speak ofwelfare state regimes when looking at their outcomes The analysis of outcomes providesa picture of lsquothe real worlds of welfarersquo and is of considerable importance to understandingpolitical legitimacy across countries We use aggregate longitudinal data for West Europeancountries in order to map welfare outcomes and cluster countries The cluster results arealso assessed for their sensitivity to the choice of different countries years or indicators AllEuropean welfare states have a significant capacity for reducing poverty and inequalityHowever the degree of this reduction varies considerably especially when examiningdifferent social groups ie unemployed people children youths or the elderly Outcomescluster countries largely in line with previous institutionalist literature differentiatingbetween conservative liberal Mediterranean and social-democratic regimes As the mainexception we identify Germany which can no longer be characterised as the proto-typical conservative welfare state When analysing old social risks such as unemploymentand old age Europe appears to be characterised by two groups ie one consistingof liberal and Mediterranean countries and a second made up of social-democraticand conservative countries New social risks such as child and youth poverty bycontrast replicate very closely the theoretical four-cluster typology Our sensitivityanalyses reveal that our clusters tend to be stable over time Welfare regimes continueto serve as a useful analytical tool and relate to outcomes experienced by Europeancitizens

Keywords Welfare state regimes poverty inequality comparative social policy clusteranalysis EU-SILC

Wor lds o f We l fa re i ns t i tu t iona l configura t ions and outcomes

Esping-Andersenrsquos (1990 1999) seminal work on lsquoWorlds of Welfarersquo has inspiredcomparative social policy research for the past twenty-five years Empirically he identifiedregimes as clusters based on the concepts of decommodification social stratification andthe statendashmarket relationship ie the specific welfare mix lsquoDecommodification refers tothe degree to which individuals or families can uphold a socially accepted standard ofliving independently of market participationrsquo (Esping-Andersen 1990 37) In contrast

1

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Emanuele Ferragina Martin Seeleib-Kaiser and Thees Spreckelsen

Esping-Andersen used the lsquosocial stratificationrsquo dimension to assess how welfare stateinstitutions structure classes and consequently social order (Esping-Andersen 1990 55)He operationalised lsquodecommodificationrsquo1 by including indicators for eligibility rules andlevels of income replacement for cash benefits insuring against risks from unemploymentsickness2 and old age (Esping-Andersen 1990 47) and lsquosocial stratificationrsquo throughseven indicators that aim at capturing the three worlds of welfare corporatism etatism ndashusing indicators of pension segmentation ndash (conservative index) means-tested poor reliefspending private pension and health care spending as a share of the total respectivespending (liberal index) average universalism and average benefit equality (socialistindex) Social policy can be provided through different institutional arrangements andcombinations of the market non-profit organisations and the state

This operationalisation of decommodification and social stratification across eighteenOECD countries resulted in a parsimonious taxonomy based on different institutionalconfigurations and legal entitlements for the average production worker (APW) Esping-Andersen classified these configurations by their underlying political traditions ie socialdemocracy Christian democracy and liberalism His three-fold taxonomy has been widelyscrutinised criticised and updated (for a summary of the debate see Arts and Gelissen2002 2010 Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011 for an in depth theoretical discussionsee Powell and Barrientos 2011)

At the substantive level this literature on the welfare regime debate has mainlyfollowed four streams of criticism (1) the identification of additional regimes (2) thepresumed misclassification of specific countries (3) the application of the regime theoryto other policy domains and (4) the taxonomyrsquos limitations resulting from being based onlegal entitlements for the APW (for a summary of all four criticisms see Ferragina andSeeleib-Kaiser 2011) Our work mainly contributes to the fourth stream

We analyse welfare regimes on the basis of outcomes for different groups Thiscontrasts with previous analyses based only on inputs Outcomes such as achievedpoverty reduction we argue are essential to the legitimacy of welfare states Legitimacyin turn we assume is the basis for enduring welfare state arrangements that can berecognised as regimes

From a theoretical point of view polities obtain a general political legitimacyeither through the democratic institutional process (input legitimacy) or through theirproblem-solving capacity (outcome legitimacy) (Scharpf 1999) For instance researchhas demonstrated that support or the lack thereof for the European Union is stronglybased on EU citizensrsquo perceptions of (welfare-) state outcomes (Gabel and Whitten 1997Haller 2009) We argue similarly that welfare states obtain their legitimacy from theirlong-standing institutional structures but also from their ability to reach certain societalgoals Legitimacy provides the basis for acceptance of a given structure therefore ourkey hypothesis is that

Welfare regimes persist not only when looking at institutional configurations but also whenconsidering main lsquodesiredrsquo outcomes

Welfare statesrsquo lsquodesiredrsquo outcomes can be defined in general as the results fromthe objectives of social policies and welfare states Depending on their institutionalconfigurations the literature (Goodin et al 1999) often distinguishes three objectivesof welfare states They aim to (a) provide autonomy to citizensresidents (b) providesocial stability in case of risk and (c) reduceameliorate poverty

2

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The Four Worlds of lsquoWelfare Realityrsquo ndash Social Risks and Outcomes in Europe

Historically as well as in Esping-Andersenrsquos original work these objectives (oftenimplicitly) related to outcomes for one specific societal group the APWs These outcomesare the reduction of risks of old age poverty unemployment rates and poverty of the malebreadwinners

Changing socio-economic conditions including globalisation de-industrialisationdemographic change and changed gender roles as well as welfare state changesincluding retrenchment recommodification and recalibration (Pierson 2001) are saidto have had a major impact on changing risk structures Hence to establish a morecomprehensive assessment of outcomes for different societal groups we extend theanalyses beyond the APW and old risks to also include new social risks (NSR) (Taylor-Gooby 2004 Bonoli 2005 2007) We deliberately chose the old versus new risksdistinction as it builds on the core aim of welfare states ndash to insure against social risks ndashand is less problematic than the normatively and analytically blurred distinction betweenthose policies that primarily focus on social investment and those that primarily deal withcompensation (Nolan 2013) Core NSR are the (in)ability to reconcile work and familylife single parenthood with the increased risk of child poverty low skills and educationas well as insufficient social security coverage for atypical workers NSR tend to bemost prevalent among younger people families and women (Bonoli 2005) Countriesthat effectively address these new risks should have low child and youth poverty ratesa high percentage of youth in education to improve human capital formation (ibid)as well as high female labour force participation to minimise the risk of poverty andreduce inequality in societies that are increasingly characterised by homogamy (Esping-Andersen 2009) Hence on the one hand we capture the extent of insurance againstold social risks measuring the incidence of poverty among pensioners unemployedand prime-aged workers as well as replacement rates for pensioners and the overallunemployment rate and we assess the incidence of new social risks by consideringchild and youth poverty rates percentage of youth in education and female labour forceparticipation

There have been intense debates numerous empirical studies of regimes using clusteranalysis (for example Kangas 1994 Gough 2001) and regimes are in continuous useas analytical tools for comparative social policy analysis Despite this few studies havetested whether welfare regimes translate into clusters similar to the original worlds ofwelfare when one considers welfare state outcomes (but see Goodin et al 1999 andwith a redistribution focus Kammer et al 2012) and particularly outcomes for newsocial risks

Such a test needs a longitudinal perspective since theoretically regimes are saidto be stable over time (Esping-Andersen 1996 1999 Pierson 2001) Danforth (2014)identifies variations in welfare arrangements over a long time period (1950ndash2000) andargues that the three regimes were only established by 1975 Outcomes of welfare statechanges will only become manifest over time with lags some would suggest of adecade (ie Sabatier 1988) as well as variation due to contextual factors Accordingto some observers the 1980s and 1990s were primarily characterised by welfare stateretrenchment and recommodification while more recent reforms are said to have been ofa more transformative nature including recalibration (Pierson 2001 Hemerijck 2012) Asthese processes (especially since the early 2000s) have also been said to be characterisedby lsquonew politicsrsquo (Pierson 2001) it cannot be assumed that the outcomes follow the logicpreviously observed

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Emanuele Ferragina Martin Seeleib-Kaiser and Thees Spreckelsen

Esping-Andersenrsquos original taxonomy is based on three regimes Following Ferrera(1993 1996) as well as Leibfried (1992) we hypothesise the existence of a fourthMediterranean regime type different from the original three regimes In our analyseswe consider empirically four distinct country clusters representing these welfare stateregimes

Methodologically cluster solutions for a given dataset are necessarily sensitive to theavailability and choice of data (Aldenderfer and Blashfield 1984) Past cluster analysesof welfare regimes did not account for cluster stability in relation to such factors (forexample Castles and Obinger 2008 Kammer et al 2012)

In summary this article (a) revisits welfare state regime classifications from anoutcome perspective (b) distinguishes analytically and empirically welfare regimes inrelation to old and new social risks and (c) for methodological and empirical reasons teststhe stability of a four-fold typology across fourteen EU countries during the period 2005to 2012

Data and methods

Data

Our analyses are based on aggregate data published by Eurostat They are mostlygenerated from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) or in the case of informationon education the joint UNESCO Institute of StatisticsOECDEurostat questionnaires oneducation statistics (for details on the measures and data sources see Appendix 1) Thesedata are regarded as a unique source of comparative data on incomes and householdsrelating to welfare states (for example EU-SILC cf Iacovou et al 2012)3

Methods and ind i ca to r s

The empirical analysis is divided into two parts The first part based on descriptivestatistics analyses inequality and poverty outcomes before and after benefits and taxesalongside the insurance against old and new social risks The second based on clusteranalyses (for details see Appendix 2) assesses the similarity between institutional andoutcome-based typologies (for an extensive literature on past research see Appendix 3)in four steps We cluster countries according to4

1 all selected measures relating to old and new social risks simultaneously2 their outcomes in covering old social risks by including indicators such as poverty

levels after social transfers for male workers5 the elderly6 and the unemployed andold-age pension replacement rates7

3 their outcomes in covering new social risks including indicators such as poverty ratesafter social transfers for children and youths female employment rates and rates ofenrolment in education for people aged between fifteen and twenty-four

We assess the stability of cluster analyses using

4 iterative methods (Hennig 2007) dropping in turn indicators countries and years (formore details see Appendix 1)

4

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The Four Worlds of lsquoWelfare Realityrsquo ndash Social Risks and Outcomes in Europe

We present analyses for two time periods (a) we investigate welfare state outcomes ina single cross-section for 2012 to provide a descriptive picture for the outcome measures(b) we conduct a cluster analysis for the pooled data over the period 2005ndash12 Finallybased on the literature differentiating between liberal conservative social-democraticand Mediterranean regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990 Leibfried 1992 Ferrera 1993 1996Bonoli 1997) we include an a priori cut-off of four clusters rather than simply lookingfor the highest degree of dissimilarity

Geog raph i ca l f ocus

Our research is focused on EU Member States Europe is the continent most heavilyinfluenced by the three political movements liberalism Christian democracy and socialdemocracy which are said to be the ideological basis for the three worlds of welfareThus we exclude other rich OECD countries from our analysis where these ideologicalunderpinnings are less clearly shared ie Japan (on lsquoJapanese uniquenessrsquo see Dale1986 Esping-Andersen 1997) the United States (on lsquoAmerican exceptionalismrsquo seeLipset 1996) Australia and New Zealand (on the different natures of lsquoradical welfarestatesrsquo see Castles and Mitchell 1992 1993) EU countries have agreed to strive for lsquothepromotion of a high level of employment the guarantee of adequate social protectionthe fight against social exclusion and a high level of education training and protectionof human healthrsquo (Council of the European Union 2008 Article 9) Furthermore theadoption of the Europe 2020 strategy places social policy at the core of EU policy settingtargets for raising the (female) employment rate reducing early school leaving increasingthe proportion of young people completing tertiary education or equivalent and liftingat least 20 million people out of poverty These indicators are said to be at the heart ofthe EU strategy for growth and are very likely to impact on the legitimacy of the EUFinally we limited our analyses to countries that had joined the European Union beforethe enlargement in 20048 as central and eastern European countries have not reachedlsquonew social policy equilibriarsquo (Potucek 2008 95)9

Resu l ts

Desc r i b i ng we l f a r e s t a t e ou tcomes

Our first objective is to examine welfare state outcomes amongst the EU 14 Across allcountries the welfare state has a remarkable effect in reducing poverty and inequalitylevels (Table 1 summarises poverty and inequality data before and after social transfers)Data also suggest a remarkable similarity in poverty reduction levels among EU 14countries Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Sweden andthe United Kingdom (nine out of fourteen countries) have a poverty reduction level aftersocial transfers ranging between 65 and 68 per cent

However if we look simultaneously at poverty and inequality a distinctive rankingacross countries appears It is almost as if poverty and inequality reduction are in contrastThis relates to the aforementioned distinction between two objectives of the welfare state(Goodin et al 1999) on the one hand to provide autonomy (hence reducing inequality)and on the other hand to reduce poverty Our outcomes-based perspective suggests threedifferent patterns ie (a) Germany and Sweden seem to be committed in similar ways

5

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Emanuele Ferragina Martin Seeleib-Kaiser and Thees Spreckelsen

Table 1 Welfare state outcomes poverty levels and inequality across the EU 14(pre-2004 EU members) in 2012

Poverty level (all ages)a Gini coefficientDifference in change

Country Before After Change Before After Change (Gini- poverty)

Austria 442 144 minus674 471 276 minus414 260Belgium 423 150 minus645 477 266 minus442 203Denmark 412 131 minus682 534 281 minus474 208Finland 413 132 minus680 464 259 minus442 239France 437 141 minus677 498 305 minus388 290Germany 433 161 minus628 544 283 minus480 148Greece 498 231 minus536 569 343 minus397 139Ireland 504 157 minus688 535 299 minus441 247Italy 445 194 minus564 475 319 minus328 236Netherlands 367 101 minus725 461 254 minus449 276Portugal 454 179 minus606 559 345 minus383 223Spain 462 222 minus519 528 350 minus337 182Sweden 418 141 minus663 524 248 minus527 136United Kingdom 454 162 minus643 573 328 minus428 216

Notes aGross and net household income lt60 median household incomeSource Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income Gini coefficient of equivaliseddisposable income before social transfers (pensions included in social transfers Eurostat (2014a)

to reducing poverty as well as inequality (b) France seems committed mainly to povertyreduction and (c) Greece appears to lack a strong commitment to reduce both (for areview of the debate on the redistributive power of the welfare state see Esping-Andersenand Myles 2009)

Despite the fact that poverty and inequality reduction for the overall populationprovide good general measures of substantive welfare state outcomes they do not accountfor the potential differential outcomes for different societal groups Bonoli (2005) forexample argued that welfare states are still primarily geared towards covering old socialrisks such as unemployment sickness and old age Hence together with the descriptionof overall poverty and inequality reduction it is important to further distinguish outcomesin relation to old (ie unemployment and old-age replacement rates)10 and new (ie childand youth poverty educational participation and female employment rates) social risks

In all countries poverty rates are higher among the unemployed (an old socialrisk) providing an indication that this societal group is the least protected if comparedto children youth or pensioners (see Table 2) Moreover poverty among the elderlyis significantly more widespread than poverty among children in Belgium DenmarkIreland Italy the Netherlands Spain and the United Kingdom providing further evidencethat in some countries insurance against old social risks would seem less comprehensivethan against new social risks Poverty levels for young people and the elderly seem to bequite high in most nations and surprisingly so in Scandinavian countries However thisis partially a statistical artifact due to the high percentage of people living independentlyrather than being part of a larger household Since poverty is measured at the householdlevel poverty tends to be higher in those countries with smaller households including

6

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TheFourW

orldsoflsquoW

elfareRealityrsquondash

SocialRisksand

Outcom

esin

Europe

Table 2 Detailed welfare state outcome indicators poverty levels by social group after social transfers (and change compared to beforetransfers levels)

New risks Old risks

Total poverty Children (lt16) Youth (16ndash24) Male workera

Old (75+) UnemployedCountry Level Change Level Change Level Change Level Change Levelb Levelb

Austria 144 (minus674) 183 (minus568) 173 (minus419) 125 (minus472) 166 449Belgium 15 (minus645) 166 (minus495) 167 (minus492) 125 (minus506) 184 345Denmark 131 (minus682) 100 (minus590) 394 (minus273) 121 (minus492) 224 269Finland 132 (minus680) 112 (minus641) 249 (minus397) 107 (minus448) 276 453France 141 (minus677) 188 (minus463) 230 (minus412) 120 (minus478) 114 362Germany 161 (minus628) 149 (minus530) 207 (minus367) 137 (minus609) 126 693Greece 231 (minus536) 265 (minus159) 331 (minus264) 219 (minus608) 200 458Ireland 157 (minus688) 167 (minus634) 233 (minus602) 139 (minus364) 130 341Italy 194 (minus564) 259 (minus258) 254 (minus314) 175 (minus612) 179 447Netherlands 101 (minus725) 136 (minus438) 198 (minus450) 85 (minus470) 59 340Portugal 179 (minus606) 211 (minus347) 222 (minus422) 153 (minus512) 215 385Spain 222 (minus519) 289 (minus227) 284 (minus357) 220 (minus630) 159 464Sweden 141 (minus663) 139 (minus579) 274 (minus343) 116 (minus460) 253 423United Kingdom 162 (minus643) 181 (minus601) 241 (minus409) 130 (minus494) 189 522

Notes a25ndash54 years oldbNo before-transfers risk-of-poverty levels available hence no information on change Sources lsquoAt-risk-of poverty rate by most frequent activity statusrsquoEurostat (2014b) and lsquoat-risk-of poverty rate by detailed age grouprsquo Eurostat (2014c)

7

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Emanuele Ferragina Martin Seeleib-Kaiser and Thees Spreckelsen

youths as well as elderly people who live independently (as in the case of Scandinaviancountries)11

Child poverty seems to be especially high in Mediterranean countries12 Thepercentage of young people in education is high in Nordic countries and the Netherlandswhilst it is particularly low in the United Kingdom Austria Italy and France (see Table 3)Female employment rates are the lowest in Greece Italy Spain and Ireland followed byPortugal and France

It is worth noting that the relative reduction of poverty across different societalgroups is much less consistent across countries than the levels of poverty reductionsobserved for the overall population We find large differences ranging for examplefrom a 159 per cent child poverty reduction in Greece to a 641 per cent reduction inFinland highlighting the much greater effectiveness of the Finnish benefit and tax systemin reducing child poverty The data also suggest there might be more variation acrosscountries when looking at new rather than old social risks This means that despite the aimof institutional convergence amongst European countries towards employment-orientedsocial investment policies and some convergence in overall poverty rates (Cantillon andVandenbroucke 2014 xiii) many differences continue to persist among European welfarestates

We l f a r e r eg imes ou tcome c lus te r s

Our second objective is to cluster welfare states according to their outcomes In a first stepwe include all outcome indicators (including change in Gini before and after transfers)13

in our analysis pooled over the period 2005 to 2012 Where Tables 1 and 2 only look atfor example child poverty in 2012 we now include child poverty for each year between2005 and 2012 in each country This provides for more robust results and takes intoaccount variations over time

We find a set of outcome-based regimes similar to those based on institutionalconfigurations with the following exceptions (see Figure 1) Germany clusters with theUnited Kingdom and Ireland falls into the conservative cluster The clustering of Irelandwithin the conservative group might be dependent on achieving lower poverty ratesamongst the unemployed and the elderly compared to the UK (data for 2012 see Table 2)

Although these findings are largely in line with the welfare regime literature we alsochecked the robustness of clusters proposing a battery of sensitivity analyses Ideally wewould find similar countries in each cluster even if we changed some of the indicators ordropped a country or year of observation In the following sensitivity analyses Jaccard14

coefficients represent the effects of such data variationsWe examine the influence of omitting single indicators by looking at the overall

set of clusters and each cluster separately (see Table 4) Jaccard coefficients superiorto 075 indicate cluster stability even after dropping from the sample a variable or anobservation Values below 075 and superior to 065 suggest the existence of patternsin the data however in this case clusters are generally not perfectly stable against thevariation in the data used Our findings are rather sensitive to the omission of any indicatorwith a coefficient of 057 for the overall solution In contrast to the other clusters theconservative cluster (Table 4) is robust to the omission of indicators except for the rateof female employment similar levels thereof seem to define the conservative regime Bycontrast the sensitivity analysis provides an explanation of the lsquosurprisingrsquo classification

8

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TheFourW

orldsoflsquoW

elfareRealityrsquondash

SocialRisksand

Outcom

esin

Europe

Table 3 Proxy indicators for welfare state output targeting new and old social risks

Old risks New risks

Replacement rate Unemployment rate Youth in education Female employmentCountry ndash old age ()1 ()2 ( 15ndash24) 3 ( 16ndash64) 2

Austria 58 43 555 673Belgium 47 76 694 568Denmark 42 75 716 700Finland 49 77 690 682France 65 98 593 599Germany 47 55 659 680Greece 52 245 644 419Ireland Na 147 650 551Italy 58 107 560 471Netherlands 47 53 727 704Portugal 58 158 621 587Spain 58 248 649 512Sweden 56 80 635 718United Kingdom 50 79 519 651

Sources 1Aggregate replacement ratio lsquoratio of the median individual gross pensions of 65ndash74 age categoryrelative to median individual gross earnings of 50ndash59 age category excluding other social benefitsrsquo Eurostat(2014d) 2lsquoEmployment rates by sex age and nationality ()rsquo Eurostat (2014e)3lsquoParticipation rates in education by age and sexrsquo (based on the joint UNESCO Institute of StatisticsOECDEurostatquestionnaires on education statistics) Eurostat (2014f)

9

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Emanuele Ferragina Martin Seeleib-Kaiser and Thees Spreckelsen

Conservative Social democratic LiberalMediterranean

Countries

050

100

Belgium

Irelan

d

Franc

e

Austri

a

Denm

ark

Sweden

Finlan

d

Nethe

rland

s

Germ

any

United

King

dom

Greec

eSpa

inIta

ly

Portu

gal

Figure 1 (Colour online) Country clusters by welfare state outcome

of Germany among the liberal cluster high levels of poverty among the unemployedrather than female employment rates are the most defining feature of liberal welfarestates (hence Germany with its high poverty level is fully part of this group)15 This isin line with previous research focusing on institutional change (Seeleib-Kaiser 2002Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004 Fleckenstein et al 2011) but at odds with the notionwhereby Germany continues to be the proto-typical conservative welfare state rooted inthe lsquoBismarckian traditionrsquo16

The social-democratic and Mediterranean clusters are quite sensitive to the choice ofindicators without a single indicator reaching the low cut-off point (065) established bythe Jaccard coefficient to indicate a certain level of stability

Following the same metric we investigate the potential random omission of years orcountries from our dataset (Table 5) Welfare outcome clusters are more or less stable overtime despite considerable welfare state change at the institutional level for examplein the policy domain of family policy (Ferragina et al 2013) Clusters are howevermore sensitive to the omission of countries As the liberal cluster consists of only twocountries it is thus more prone to dissolution when randomly dropping one countryAmongst the social-democratic and Mediterranean clusters one country is always lesssimilar to the others It is not surprising that the Netherlands do not squarely fit the social-democratic cluster as they have been characterised as social-democratic conservative orhybrid welfare regime depending on the indicators chosen Also Portugal is institutionallydifferent from the other Mediterranean countries (Ferrera 1996)

To summarise welfare state outcome clusters are largely in line with the previousregime literature based on institutional configurations Clusters are also stable over time

10

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TheFourW

orldsoflsquoW

elfareRealityrsquondash

SocialRisksand

Outcom

esin

Europe

Table 4 Welfare state output clusters stability by indicator

Overall Conservative Social-Democratic Liberal Mediterranean

Complete solution 057 079 043 058 049Child povertya 071 084 052 065 059Youth povertya 043 083 033 064 029Female Employment 038 058 031 040 057In-education 049 075 030 055 051Male worker povertya 072 083 051 063 059Old age povertya 038 076 031 056 031Unemployment povertya 051 083 051 036 035Replacement rate 072 084 052 064 059Inequality reductiona (Difference Gini) 067 082 049 065 053

Notes Numbers in bold indicate variables whose removal results in considerably different cluster solutions or clustermemberships (for the individual clusters) Cluster stability expressed as average Jaccard coefficient for 1000 runs ofrandomly dropping observationsyears Coefficients gt075 Stable cluster solution gt065ndashlt075 Patterns in data Seed823910233a(after transfers)

11

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Emanuele Ferragina Martin Seeleib-Kaiser and Thees Spreckelsen

Table 5 Welfare state output clusters stabilitya by number of observationsyearsdropped

Welfare state regimes Overall Conservative Social-Democratic Liberal Mediterranean

1 year dropped 081 095 076 071 0792 years 060 085 045 057 0531 country dropped 063 093 054 065 0692 countries 041 078 036 053 044

Notes aCluster stability expressed as average Jaccard coefficient for 1000 runs of randomlydropping observationsyears Coefficients gt075 Stable cluster solution gt065ndashlt075 Patternsin data

020

4060

8010

0

Belgium

Denm

ark

Sweden

Austri

a

Finlan

d

Franc

e

Nethe

rland

s

Germ

any

Irelan

d

Greec

eSpa

in

Portu

gal

Italy

United

King

dom

Figure 2 (Colour online) Outcome clusters for old social risks

however they are quite sensitive (with the exception of the conservative cluster) to thechoice of indicators and countries included in the sample

The cluster analysis for old social risk outcomes partitions countries into two largeblocks and two smaller groups of outliers which include only three countries (seeFigure 2) Germany stands alone mostly because of the high rate of poverty among theunemployed and France and the Netherlands form another cluster due to the considerablylow rates of old age poverty The two large clusters include Belgium Denmark SwedenAustria and Finland (the first group) with higher levels of inequality reduction comparedto those in the second group Ireland Greece Spain Portugal Italy and the UnitedKingdom

12

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The Four Worlds of lsquoWelfare Realityrsquo ndash Social Risks and Outcomes in Europe

ConservativeMediterranean

Countries Social democratic Liberal

020

4060

8010

0

Belgium

Irelan

d

Franc

e

Greec

eIta

ly

Spain

Portu

gal

Denm

ark

Sweden

Germ

any

Nethe

rland

s

Finlan

d

Austri

a

United

King

dom

Figure 3 (Colour online) Outcome clusters new social risks

The cluster based on new social risk outcomes stands in sharp contrast to the oldsocial risks cluster New social risk indicators almost reproduce the clustering presentedfor the overall analysis (Figure 3) with the exceptions of Germany and Austria WhilstGermany joins the social-democratic cluster Austria joins the United Kingdom in theliberal world This liberal cluster formed only by two countries should be treated withcaution as it is largely determined by a combination of high levels of female labourmarket participation and low rates of youth enrolment in education programs Potentialproblems of accounting for vocational training in Austria might undermine our findingsAs an aside when disregarding the theory- and literature-driven four-cluster cut-off thecluster analysis seems to be dominated by two super-clusters containing within each otherthe conservative and the social-democratic on the one hand and the Mediterranean andliberal cluster on the other hand

Different to the general clustering the sensitivity analysis presented for old and newsocial risks is more limited This is due to the small number of indicators used (Table 6provides a comparison of the stability of the old and new social risk clusters) The oldsocial risk clusters are not very stable to dropping any year but are more stable to theomission of single countries This is due to the presence of two large clusters and twosmall middle groups (as we have mentioned they only include Germany the Netherlandsand France) Also the cluster analysis based on new social risks is quite sensitive tothe choice of indicators and countries included with the remarkable exceptions of theconservative and liberal worlds

In sum our cluster solutions for old and new social risks suggest three interestingpoints First we find a significant difference in regimes depending on the analysis ofold social and new social risk outcomes Second the old social risk clustering differs

13

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Emanuele Ferragina Martin Seeleib-Kaiser and Thees Spreckelsen

Table 6 Old and new social risks clusters stabilitya by number of observationsyearsdropped

Overall Conservative Social-Democratic Liberal Mediterranean

Old risk regimesb

1 year dropped 056 062 073 043 0382 years 053 058 071 040 0351 country dropped 065 078 087 078 0582 countries 046 064 077 062 038New risk regimesb

1 year dropped 047 074 041 040 0542 years 071 088 052 052 0841 country dropped 046 064 077 062 0382 countries 033 064 028 032 040

Notes aCluster stability expressed as average Jaccard coefficient for 1000 runs of randomlydropping observationsyears Coefficients gt075 Stable cluster solution gt065ndashlt075 Patternsin databCluster solutions correspond to Figures 2 and 3Random drops of observationsyears starting with seed 823910233 runiform() function in Stata110

significantly from the original welfare state analysis whereas new social risk outcomeclustering seems to be closer to the more conventional welfare regimes typologies Thestability test finally points towards the combined importance of the old and new socialrisk outcomes for identifying typologies Neither the old nor the new social risks clustersare as stable as the general cluster solution (Table 4)

Discuss ion and conc lus ion

The aim of this work is to assess the potential use of welfare state outcomes to delineatefour welfare regimes In doing so we also distinguish outcomes according to old and newsocial risks going beyond policies focusing solely on the APW To this end we selectedeleven outcome indicators largely inspired by Goodinrsquos (1988) reasons for welfare ndashautonomy social stability and poverty alleviation minus and distinguished by the type ofsocial risk addressed ndash old or new

The results presented above show that all European welfare states have a strongeffect in reducing poverty and inequality across the overall population However thehigh level of similarity measured when looking at poverty reduction for the overallpopulation is not replicated when considering different societal groups For example theFinnish and Irish welfare states have a similar capacity in reducing poverty among theoverall population but they radically differ in relation to new social risks such as childpoverty (see Tables 1 and 3) The different levels of outcomes related to social protectionfor societal groups confirm the continued importance of welfare regime typologies butsimultaneously demonstrate the need to carefully consider the outcomes of the welfarestate for different societal groups to identify regime variations

The clustering based on the whole set of outcome indicators does provide a similarpicture to previous welfare typologies with the important exceptions of the classification

14

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The Four Worlds of lsquoWelfare Realityrsquo ndash Social Risks and Outcomes in Europe

of Germany and Ireland In particular while the classification of Ireland as belonging tothe conservative cluster might be the result of achieving lower poverty rates amongst theunemployed and the old compared to the UK (the prototypical European liberal country)the classification of Germany within the Liberal regime is rather lsquounexpectedrsquo

When analysing old social risk outcomes Europe appears to be split into twogroups lsquoThe peripheryrsquo which includes Liberal and Mediterranean countries seems to becharacterised by lower replacement rates and higher levels of inequality than lsquothe corersquocountries (the social-democratic and continental clusters) Furthermore considering oldsocial risk outcomes Germany stands alone following a unique pattern compared to therest of the continent

For new social risks the most striking finding is that the clustering replicates veryclosely the theoretical four-cluster typology In addition the clustering of new social risksdivides European countries into two groups on the one hand the social-democratic andliberal countries characterised by higher youth education and female employment andon the other hand with opposite characteristics the conservative and Mediterraneancountries

Our cluster analysis is robust against the choice amongst the indicators in additionthe clusters are stable over time but quite sensitive when old and new social risks areconsidered separately The conservative cluster seems the most stable while the othersshow more erratic patterns determined by the choice of indicators and countries In sumour findings carry a clear implication across the EU 14 several groups of countries showa strong persistence in producing a certain set of social outcomes This suggests that thecontextual changes for example the 2008 crisis might have had less impact than onewould expect particularly with regard to insurance against new social risks

The above findings should be interpreted with caution in the light of three majorcaveats the limitation of data availability the dependence on the context of outcomedata and the fact that clusters are data-driven First the present study uses data from2005 until 2012 and thereby is restricted to a rather short period of observation formost countries this eight-year period equates to two terms of parliament Whilst werestricted the country sample on theoretical grounds the choice of indicators was in partdetermined by the available data Ideally a detailed analysis of new and old social risksusing poverty levels for different societal groups should have been complemented withthe inequality reduction rates for the same groups The limited availability of comparableindicators and data over time is a major limitation of this study Second welfare stateoutcomes are more context-dependent than welfare state inputs Hence the outcomesinvestigated above (and mainly ascribed to the welfare states) might vary considerablydue to other factors than social policy Third our analyses are not a formal statisticaltest of the outcome regimes approach They are data-driven and exploratory attempts todemonstrate the substantive validity of the approach

Considering these limitations future research should investigate longer time periodsand perform analyses on the basis of individual level data (for example EU-SILC and EU-LFS) Such research should aim at statistically testing the robustness of the outcome regimeclusters The most fruitful avenue might be to systematically contrast input- and outcome-based welfare state regimes In particular such research should focus on assessing thedifferences in terms of welfare state efficacy (see a similar analysis by Vandenbroucke andDiris 2014)

15

httpjournalscambridgeorg Downloaded 31 Dec 2014 IP address 934992178

Emanuele Ferragina Martin Seeleib-Kaiser and Thees Spreckelsen

Despite the limitations this article clearly shows that welfare state regimes are lsquoaliversquoThey serve as useful analytical tools and also relate to the outcomes experienced bycitizens For them small social policy changes that do not radically affect welfare statestructures are highly unlikely to reduce poverty and inequality Consistently high levels ofinequality and poverty are very likely to have a detrimental impact on political legitimacy

Notes1 For a critique of the decommodification concept see Room (2000)2 As argued by Moran (2000) the development of health care systems follow different logics

compared to other policies3 A limitation with regard to the data published by Eurostat is the absence of any confidence

intervals reflecting the uncertainty of the estimates (cf Goedeme 2013) This seems to be a limitation ofcomparative welfare literature

4 All indicators were clustered using complete linkage with Euclidean distance as the dissimilaritymeasure

5 Males aged between twenty-five and fifty-four years6 In order to measure autonomy poverty rates for pensioners aged seventy-five plus might be

indicative A low rate of pensionersrsquo poverty is an indicator of the decommodifying potential of thepension system It can be argued that by this age most people will have used up their savings Finally thereplacement ratio for pensioners is a proxy measure for social stability

7 Rates for people receiving pensions aged sixty-five to seventy-four as compared to working peopleaged fifty-five to sixty-four

8 However excluding the very small and in many ways exceptional Duchy of Luxembourg9 This manifest diversity has let some researchers to suggest that the CEE countries constitute a

welfare regime in their own right (Aidukaite 2009) however unlike the Mediterranean regime and itsfamilial solidarity unpinning (Ferrera 1993 Ferragina 2012) the lsquopresumed CEE clusterrsquo does not seemeasily linked to common structural features of the welfare state

10 Measuring social stability11 Indeed calculations on the 2012 EU-SILC data show exactly that Scandinavian countries have

a smaller average size of families and higher number of young and old people living independently thanthe other countries analysed (analyses available from the authors on request)

12 The top performers are Scandinavian countries and Germany13 Before and after social transfers data are not available for the whole period through Eurostat We

discuss the implications in the limitations section14 The Jaccard coefficient measures the ratio of observations which have changed their cluster

membership relative to all observations when comparing two cluster solutions As Hennig (2007) pointsout the coefficient is advantageous compared to other measures of stability as it is not sensitive to samplesize differences

15 To a lower extent than for the conservative cluster female employment rates seem to play asimilar role

16 As it has been pointed out in the literature the EU-SILC data for Germany prior to 2008 shouldbe treated with caution (Hauser 2008) as it was based on potentially not representative quota samples(Decancq et al 2014) however the high poverty rates amongst the unemployed materialised particularlyafter 2008

Refe rences

Aidukaite J (2009) lsquoOld welfare state theories and new welfare regimes in Eastern Europe challenges andimplicationsrsquo Communist and Post-Communist Studies 42 1 23ndash39

16

httpjournalscambridgeorg Downloaded 31 Dec 2014 IP address 934992178

The Four Worlds of lsquoWelfare Realityrsquo ndash Social Risks and Outcomes in Europe

Aldenderfer M S and Blashfield R K (1984) Cluster Analysis Thousand Oaks CA SageArts W A and Gelissen J (2002) lsquoThree worlds of welfare capitalism or more A state-of-the-art reportrsquo

Journal of European Social Policy 12 2 137ndash58Arts W A and Gelissen J (2010) lsquoModels of the welfare statersquo in F G Castles S Leibfried J Lewis

H Obinger and C Pierson (eds) The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State Oxford OxfordUniversity Press pp 569ndash83

Bambra C (2005) lsquoWorlds of welfare and the health care discrepancyrsquo Social Policy and Society 4 131ndash41

Bleses P and Seeleib-Kaiser M (2004) The Dual Transformation of the German Welfare State Basingstokeand New York Palgrave

Bonoli G (1997) lsquoClassifying welfare states a two-dimension approachrsquo Journal of European Social Policy26 3 351ndash72

Bonoli G (2005) lsquoThe politics of the new social policies providing coverage against new social risks inmature welfare statesrsquo Policy and Politics 33 3 431ndash49

Bonoli G (2007) lsquoTime matters postindustrialization new social risks and welfare state adaptation inadvanced industrial democraciesrsquo Comparative Political Studies 40 5 495ndash520

Cantillon B and Vandenbroucke F (2014) Reconciling Work and Poverty Reduction How SuccessfulAre European Welfare States Oxford Oxford University Press

Castles F C and Mitchell D (1992) lsquoIdentifying welfare state regimes the links between politicsinstruments and outcomesrsquo Governance An International Journal of Policy and Administration5 1 1ndash26

Castles F G and Mitchell D (1993) Worlds of Welfare and Families of Nations Dartmouth AldershotCastles F G and Obinger H (2008) lsquoWorld families regimes country clusters in European and OECD

area public policyrsquo West European Politics 31 12 321ndash44Council of the European Union (2008) Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Brussels Council of the European UnionDale P (1986) The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness London Croom HelmDanforth B (2014) lsquoWorlds of welfare in time a historical reassessment of the three-world typologyrsquo

Journal of European Social Policy 24 2 164ndash82Decancq K Goedeme T Van den Bosch K and Vanhille J (2014) lsquoThe evolution of poverty in the

European Union concepts measurement and datarsquo in B Cantillon and F Vandenbroucke (eds)Reconciling Work and Poverty Reduction How Successful are European Welfare States OxfordOxford University Press pp 60ndash93

Esping-Andersen G (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism Cambridge Polity PressEsping-Andersen G (ed) (1996) Welfare States in Transition ndash National Adaptations in Global Economies

London SageEsping-Andersen G (1997) lsquoHybrid or unique The Japanese welfare state between Europe and Americarsquo

Journal of European Social Policy 7 3 179ndash89Esping-Andersen G (1999) The Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies Oxford Oxford University

PressEsping-Andersen G (2009) The Incomplete Revolution Cambridge Polity PressEsping-Andersen G and Myles J (2009) lsquoEconomic inequality and the welfare statersquo in W Salverda

B Nolan and T M Smeeding (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality Oxford OxfordUniversity Press pp 639ndash64

Eurostat (2014a) lsquoGini coefficient of equivalised disposable income [ilc_di12ab]rsquo httpappssoeurostateceuropaeunuishowdodataset=ilc_di12amplang=en [accessed 23062014]

Eurostat (2014b) lsquoAt-risk-of poverty rate by most frequent activity status [tessi124]rsquo httpeppeurostateceuropaeutgmtabledotab=tableampinit=1amplanguage=enamppcode=tessi124ampplugin=0[accessed 23062014]

Eurostat (2014c) lsquoAt-risk-of poverty rate by detailed age group [tessi120]rsquo httpeppeurostateceuropaeutgmtabledotab=tableampinit=1amplanguage=enamppcode=tessi120 [accessed 23062014]

17

httpjournalscambridgeorg Downloaded 31 Dec 2014 IP address 934992178

Emanuele Ferragina Martin Seeleib-Kaiser and Thees Spreckelsen

Eurostat (2014d) lsquoAggregate replacement ratio [ilc_pnp3]rsquo httpappssoeurostateceuropaeunuishowdodataset=ilc_pnp3amplang=en [accessed 23062014]

Eurostat (2014e) lsquoEmployment rates by sex age and nationality () [lfsa_ergan]rsquo httpappssoeurostateceuropaeunuishowdodataset=lfsa_erganamplang=en [accessed 23062014]

Eurostat (2014f) lsquoParticipation rates in education by age and sex [educ_thpar]rsquohttpappssoeurostateceuropaeunuishowdodataset=educ_thparamplang=en [accessed23062014]

Ferragina E (2012) Social Capital in Europe A Comparative Regional Analysis Cheltenham Edward ElgarFerragina E and Seeleib-Kaiser M (2011) lsquoThe welfare regime debate past present futurersquo Policy and

Politics 39 4 583ndash61Ferragina E Seeleib-Kaiser M and Tomlinson M (2013) lsquoUnemployment protection and family policy

at the turn of the 21st century a dynamic approach to welfare regime theoryrsquo Social Policy andAdministration 47 7 783ndash805

Ferrera M (1993) Modelli di Solidarieta Bologna Il MulinoFerrera M (1996) lsquoThe ldquosouthern modelrdquo of welfare in social Europersquo Journal of European Social Policy

6 1 17ndash37Fleckenstein T Saunders A and Seeleib-Kaiser M (2011) lsquoThe dual transformation of social protection

and human capital comparing Britain and Germanyrsquo Comparative Political Studies 44 12 1622ndash50Gabel M and Whitten G D (1997) lsquoEconomic conditions economic perceptions and public support

for European integrationrsquo Political Behavior 19 1 81ndash96Gal J (2004) lsquoDecommodification and beyond a comparative analysis of work-injury programmesrsquo

Journal of European Social Policy 14 1 55ndash69Gallie D and Paugam S (2000) Welfare Regimes and the Experience of Unemployment in Europe

Oxford Oxford University PressGoedeme T (2013) lsquoHow much confidence can we have in EU-SILC Complex sample designs and the

standard error of the Europe 2020 poverty indicatorsrsquo Social Forces 110 1 89ndash119Goodin R E (1988) Reasons for Welfare The Political Theory of the Welfare State Princeton NJ Princeton

University PressGoodin R E (2001) lsquoWork and welfare towards a post-productivist welfare regimersquo British Journal of

Political Science 31 1 13ndash39Goodin R E Headey B Muffels R and Dirven H (1999) The Real Worlds of Welfare Capitalism

Cambridge Cambridge University PressGough I (2001) lsquoSocial assistance regimes a cluster analysisrsquo Journal of European Social Policy 11 2

165ndash70Haller M (2009) lsquoIs the European Union legitimate To what extentrsquo International Social Science Journal

60 196 223ndash34Hauser R (2008) lsquoProblems of the German contribution to EU-SILC a research perspective comparing

EU-SILC microcensus and SOEPrsquo SOEP Papers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research No 86DIW Berlin The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)

Hemerijck A (2012) Changing Welfare States Oxford Oxford University PressHennig C (2007) lsquoCluster-wise assessment of cluster stabilityrsquo Computational Statistics and Data Analysis

52 1 259ndash71Henning C (2008) lsquoDissolution point and isolation robustness robustness criteria for general cluster

analysis methodsrsquo Journal of Multivariate Analysis 99 6 1154ndash76Hudson J and Kuhner S (2009) lsquoTowards productive welfare A comparative analysis of 23 OECD

countriesrsquo Journal of European Social Policy 19 1 34ndash46Iacovou M Kaminska O and Levy H (2012) Using EU-SILC Data for Cross-National Analysis Strengths

Problems and Recommendations Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER) Working Papers2012ndash03 Colchester University of Essex ISER

Kammer A Niehues J and Peichl A (2012) lsquoWelfare regimes and welfare state outcomes in EuropersquoJournal of European Social Policy 22 5 455ndash71

18

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The Four Worlds of lsquoWelfare Realityrsquo ndash Social Risks and Outcomes in Europe

Kangas O E (1994) lsquoThe politics of social security on regressions qualitative comparisons and clusteranalysisrsquo in T Janoski and A M Hicks (eds) The Comparative Political Economy of the WelfareState Cambridge Cambridge University Press pp 346ndash64

Kautto M (2002) lsquoInvesting in services in West European welfare statesrsquo Journal of European Social Policy12 1 53ndash65

Korpi W and Palme J (1998) lsquoThe paradox of redistribution and strategies of equality welfare stateinstitutionsrsquo American Sociological Review 63 5 661ndash87

Leibfried S (1992) lsquoTowards a European welfare state On integrating poverty regimes into the Europeancommunityrsquo in F Zsuza and J E Kolberg (eds) Social Policy in Changing Europe Frankfurt Campuspp 245ndash79

Lipset S M (1996) American Exceptionalism A Double-Edge Sword New York NortonMoran M (2000) lsquoUnderstanding the welfare state the case of health carersquo British Journal of Politics and

International Relations 2 2 135ndash60Nolan B (2013) lsquoWhat use is ldquosocial investmentrdquorsquo Journal of European Social Policy 23 5 459ndash68Obinger H and Wagschal U (1998) lsquoDrei Welten Wohlfahrtsstaates Das Stratifizierungskonzept

in der Clusteranalytischen Uberprufungrsquo in S Lessenich and I Ostner (eds) Welten desWohlfahrtskapitalismus Frankfurt and New York Campus Verlag pp 109ndash35

Obinger H and Wagschal U (2001) lsquoFamilies of nations and public policyrsquo West European Politics 241 99ndash114

Pierson P (2001) lsquoCoping with permanent austerity welfare state restructuring in affluent democraciesrsquo inP Pierson (ed) The New Politics of the Welfare State Oxford Oxford University Press pp 411ndash55

Potucek M (2008) lsquoMetamorphoses of welfare states in Central Eastern Europersquo in M Seeleib-Kaiser(ed) Welfare States Transformations ndash Comparative Perspectives Basingstoke Palgrave Macmillanpp 79ndash95

Powell M and Barrientos A (2004) lsquoWelfare regimes and the welfare mixrsquo European Journal of PoliticalResearch 43 1 83ndash105

Powell M and Barrientos A (2011) lsquoAn audit of the welfare modelling businessrsquo Social Policy andAdministration 45 1 69ndash84

Ragin C C (1994) lsquoA qualitative comparative analysis of pension systemsrsquo in T Janoski and A M Hicks(eds) The Comparative Political Economy of the Welfare State Cambridge MA CambridgeUniversity Press pp 320ndash45

Room G (2000) lsquoCommodification and decommodification a developmental critiquersquo Policy and Politics28 3 331ndash51

Sabatier P A (1988) lsquoAn advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy-orientedlearning thereinrsquo Policy Sciences 21 2ndash3 129ndash68

Saint-Arnaud S and Bernard P (2003) lsquoConvergence or resilience A hierarchical cluster analysis of thewelfare regimes in advanced countriesrsquo Current Sociology 51 4 499ndash527

Scharpf F W (1999) Governing in Europe Effective and Democratic Oxford Oxford University PressSchroder M (2009) lsquoIntegrating welfare and production typologies how refinements of the varieties of

capitalism approach call for a combination of welfare typologiesrsquo Journal of Social Policy 38 119ndash43

Scruggs L A and Allan J P (2006) lsquoWelfare state decommodification in 18 OECD countries a replicationand revisionrsquo Journal of European Social Policy 16 1 55ndash72

Seeleib-Kaiser M (2002) lsquoA dual transformation of the German welfare statersquo West European Politics25 4 478ndash96

Shalev M (1996) lsquoIntroductionrsquo in M Shalev (ed) The Privatization of Social Policy London Macmillanpp 1ndash23

Shalev M (2007) lsquoLimits and alternatives to multiple regression in comparative researchrsquo ComparativeSocial Research 24 261ndash308

19

httpjournalscambridgeorg Downloaded 31 Dec 2014 IP address 934992178

Emanuele Ferragina Martin Seeleib-Kaiser and Thees Spreckelsen

Soede A Vrooman C Ferraresi P M and Segre C (2004) Unequal Welfare States DistributiveConsequences of Population Ageing in Six European Countries The Hague Social Cultural PlannigOffice

Taylor-Gooby P (2004) New Risks New Welfare Oxford Oxford University PressVandenbroucke F and Diris R (2014) lsquoMapping at-risk-of-poverty rates household employment and

social spendingrsquo in B Cantillon and F Vandenbroucke (eds) Reconciling Work and PovertyReduction How Successful Are European Welfare States Oxford Oxford University Presspp 1ndash59

Vrooman J C (2009) Rules of Relief Institutions of Social Security and Their Impact The Hague TheNetherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP)

Wildeboer Shut J M Vrooman C and De Beer P T (2001) On Worlds of Welfare Institutions and TheirEffects in Eleven Welfare States The Hague Social and Cultural Planning Office

Append ix 1 D ata sources fo r ind ica to rs (Euros ta t )

The following data tables have been used (accessed 23062014) square bracketsgive the stable name of the table on httpeppeurostateceuropaeuportalpageportalstatisticssearch_database

bull Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income (source SILC)[ilc_di12]bull Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income before social transfers (pensions

included in social transfers)[ilc_di12b]bull Eurostat at-risk-of poverty rate by most frequent activity status (source SILC) [tessi124]bull At-risk-of poverty rate by detailed age group (source SILC) [tessi120]bull Aggregate replacement ratio (source SILC) [ilc_pnp3]bull Employment rates by sex age and nationality () [lfsa_ergan] based on EU-Labour

Force Surveys (EU-LFS)

Participation rates in education by age and sex [educ_thpar] (based on the joint UNESCOInstitute of StatisticsOECDEurostat questionnaires on education statistics)

Append ix 2 C lus te r s tab i l i t y ana lyses

The stability analyses are conducted for variables countries and years Summary stabilitycoefficients are reported for 10000 and 1000 iterations respectively Instead of assessingthe variations between cluster solutions one by one iterative methods of cluster stabilityassessments examine all variations in random order repeating the variations a large number oftimes In addition to the obvious statistical advantages these procedures do not depend on aresearchers subjective choice as to which variation to investigate

Stability coefficients should be interpreted as the general stability of a cluster (solution) tovariations in the data Large changes indicate a low stability of the overall cluster solution for allcountries This follows the procedure proposed by Henning (2007 2008) Often cluster stabilityassessments also investigate random perturbation of the values of the observed indicatorsso-called jittering The choice of the random variation is however very subjective for thisreason such analyses were not undertaken

Append ix 3 E x is t ing l i t e ra tu re on empi r i ca l we l fa re s ta te c lus te r ings

Previously scholars have used different methods to assess welfare regimes descriptive statistics(Esping-Andersen 1990 Castles and Mitchell 1992 Bonoli 1997 Korpi and Palme 1998

20

httpjournalscambridgeorg Downloaded 31 Dec 2014 IP address 934992178

The Four Worlds of lsquoWelfare Realityrsquo ndash Social Risks and Outcomes in Europe

Gallie and Paugam 2000 Goodin 2001 Gal 2004 Scruggs and Allan 2006) qualitativecomparative analysis (Ragin 1994 Hudson and Kuhner 2009) cluster analysis (Kangas 1994Obinger and Wagschal 1998 2001 Gough 2001 Kautto 2002 Saint-Arnaud and Bernard2003 Powell and Barrientos 2004 Bambra 2005 Castles and Obinger 2008) principalcomponent analysis (Shalev 1996 2007 Wildeboer Shut et al 2001 Soede et al 2004Schroder 2009 Vrooman 2009) and multiple correspondence analysis (Ferragina et al2013)

21