INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ASSOCIATION ANNUAL CONVENTION

SAN FRANCISCO 2013

Panel: Emerging Powers and Diplomacy

Author: Mariana Kalil – Institute for Strategic Studies, Fluminense Federal University

(INEST-UFF)

THE FOUR DIMENSIONS OF THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS

AFRICA AND THE CHINESE CHALLENGE

April, 2013

INTRODUCTION

This article results from the author’s final project in her Bachelor’s Degree that

counted with the advice of Dr. Diego Santos at the Institute of International Relations from

the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (IRI/PUC-Rio). The thesis compared

Brazil’s and China’s insertion in global economic affairs in the light of Joseph Grieco’s

contributions (GRIECO, 1997). Through an analysis of their relations with the United States,

the African Continent and the World Trade Organization, the author aimed at finding

similarities and differences between the behavior of a rising State that holds traditional

leverage such as hard power, China, and of another rising State that, in its turn, presents the

status of a medium power. Moreover, this article advances the work of the author into the

analysis of the relations between Brazil and the African continent, transcending financial and

economic variables to encompass four pillars, namely Ethnicity and Culture; Trade and

Investments; Technical Cooperation; and Political Cooperation. Ultimately, pragmatism and

solidarism will be considered to underscore Brazil’s national interests and impulses to shape

an “organic multilateralism”, in the words of the former Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Celso

Amorim (AMORIM, 2012).

The common belief that the road to hell is paved with good intentions finds enough

evidence in the history of foreign affairs. In International Relations, solidarism has been

accused of idealism or hypocrisy – usually, both. While it’s reasonable to find overrated the

idealism intrinsic to a common belief-led perception of solidarism on an international stage

that insists in power politics, hypocrisy has also been targeted as a common trace of

solidarism. In order to approach this value in the 21st century, one could reach out for the

Illuminist liberté, égalité et fraternité, the bases for the normative stance that pervades

positivism. The outcomes of the Illuminist ideas are quite distant from the actual spirit of the

French Revolution – suffice it to remember the nip and tuck between leftish trends that

embrace Robespierre and Babeuf and moderate wings that present the mild impulse of change

among the bourgeoisie.

Once the bourgeoisie embraced the French Revolution spirit to the extent that

bourgeois-States did not hesitate to engage in the spread of capitalism through imperialism in

the scope of excluding and competing nationalisms, liberté, égalité et fraternité laid the

foundations for both World Wars. Also, solidarity underpinned communism/socialism in the

20th

century, what sailed away from the borders of sympathetic ideas to result in Stalin’s

regime. Besides that, the white men burden represented a revisited narrative of solidarism to

colonize such continents as Africa or to bring the “best” ideology to places like Hungary.

During the Cold War, solidarity represented the crux of the relations between the superpowers

and their areas of influence, as well as their aggiornada ‘scramble for Africa’, in order to

conquer governments to their side. Additionally, the theory of democratic peace also takes

solidarism as key to support the export of democracy through offensive foreign policies that

aim at bringing on the end of history even through unilateral means. Nonetheless, after the

Cold War, the overt idea of solidarism was replaced by issues concerning the multilateral

agenda. Alas, the environment, human rights and disarmament were deemed essential for

world peace only to result in tragedies like Rwanda, Srebrenica and East Timor. Solidarity,

hence, enters the 21st century rather discredited.

Notwithstanding, if explicitly associated with pragmatism, solidarism may engender a

useful paradigm for the analysis of foreign policies that, in spite of their recent emergence in

the International System, do not carry the will or the capacity to play by the rules of

traditional power politics. Thus, the expansionism that permeates the behavior of revisionist

States would not necessarily explain the strategy of international engagement of rising

revisionists nowadays. In this sense, Brazil offers a useful example of Pragmatic Solidarism

via its relations with Africa.

In Brazilian Foreign Policy, revisionism has long been the center of the agenda, but

the country entered the dawn of the 21st century with no issues involving its borders or a

possible dissatisfaction regarding its territorial size or even its own population as a potential

market. On the contrary, in the first decade of the ongoing century, Brazil has discovered a

reasonable share of its population that has recently been lifted out of poverty to participate in

a new middle class, and there are still more than those roughly 30 million citizens to be

included. Its economy, in its turn, does not grow out of proportion to cause an uncontrollable

thirst for new markets. It turns out that Brazil’s PIBinho, as critics enjoy dubbing Brazil’s

growth, has reflected a country that fits within its own borders.

In the aftermath of the war on terror hysteria, Jim O’Neil’s BRIC launched the trend of

matching economic power to political clout in the International System. The 2008 financial

crisis fueled such prism. Market sizes and growth began essential variables to label emerging

powers. Maria Regina Soares de Lima sharply understands that as part of a semi-periphery à

Wallerstein, Brazil belongs to a class of States that are not either the most powerful or the

richest, nor the least developed (LIMA, 2012). This concept entails an economic perspective

of power, but, since the powerful and “nuclearized” Chinese are still considered an emerging

nation, it seems economy has taken the saddle of conceptualization in contemporary

International Relations (SHARMA, 2012).1

Therefore, Brazil occupies a relative position in the International System in which it is

interpreted as a rising State and a developing nation, all which leads to a perception of an

inevitable revisionist foreign policy. Indeed, Brazil’s revisionism is rather explicit. The

country demands a more democratic Security Council in the United Nations, the conclusion of

the Doha Round in the terms of its first manifest, the democratization of the IMF and the

World Bank, and so on. Nonetheless, the assertive and requesting tone of Brazilian foreign

policy is mostly restricted to the multilateral sphere. According to Mr. Amorim, the country

intends to emphasize institutions that could create a more multilateral world, what he names

“organic multilateralism” (AMORIM, 2012). The former foreign minister, and currently

Minister of Defense, believes in multilateralism as a tool to shape and advance Brazil’s and

most of the countries’ interests in the face of an increasingly multipolar array. Brasília would

not defy the status quo at any cost, but would leave aside its reluctance to engage in a Foreign

Policy that would offer a new pattern of behavior.

Be that as it may, in multipolar or unipolar society, Brazil’s main objective as a rising

State would be to generate a new multilateralism that reflexes the reality of the many – a

strategy that creates a context in which there are indirect gains. Solidarism appears, thus, as

paramount – especially if the organic vernacular is closely examined, since it brings us back

to a Durkheim-like organic solidarism (DURKHEIM, 1893). The so-called organic

multilateralism would be a generalized behavior in which actors elect multilaterally agreed

rules as ways to unequivocally relate to each other. The “rise of the Rest” would make it

easier to shape such a world, because it would reflect the participation of more than 2/3 of the

world’s population via behaviors that would differ from the traditional and, for some,

inexorably tragic power politics.

Furthermore, as an emerging power and a developing nation, Brazil still struggles with

matters of underdevelopment, such as illiteracy and child mortality. While it uses its rising

financial leverage to invest in know-how to overcome such hurdles, it insists in breaking

1 It is of the utmost relevance to understand that, although economic growth and potential markets are keys to

power in the current international political landscape, political domestic stability still matter; otherwise, African

countries that include citizens in the consumers’ market would doubtlessly be the latest up-incomers.

pharmaceutical patents and in transferring technology to other developing nations, even

during and after the financial crisis of 2008. And this, among other spheres, is where Brazil’s

solidarism and multilateral revisionism meet material results that spread not only to its own

society.

Learning the difference between Brazil’s actions and those of former metropolises or

superpowers is a matter of grasping elements of identity, perception and discourse, all bases

for a constructed narrative that encompasses the fortune of history, the shape of the national

interest and the methods of governments. When the European Union and European countries,

especially former metropolises, position democracy and the export of development at the core

of their agenda for developing nations like those in Africa, they usually generate the

perception of hypocrisy, distrust or hierarchy. Since it connects its aid to OECD parameters, it

corroborates the narrative of the white European that wants to spread “better values” to the

black. In their turn, countries, such as Brazil or even China, do not share this stigma.

Nonetheless, while there are similarities between Sino-Brazilian’s insertions, there are also

pointed differences.

The Chinese have built a network of businesses and politics that match their capacities

financially and politically, silently as they usually are. Apparently less threatening, Brazil’s

recent booming entrance in Africa has made more noise, with its culture legitimizing the soft

power of the investments in the region – Brazilian soap operas, for instance, are loud in such

cultures as Mozambique. China and Brazil both share with Africa matters of

underdevelopment, like the need to create infrastructure and means for the progress of rural

populations. Thus, they both enter Africa offering know-how in terms of development. They

have even done so together through the CBERS for Africa, a bilateral initiative that provides

free knowledge on natural resources for the Continent. However, the Chinese expansion may

symbolize the rise of a nation that the Brazilian intense participation in the black continent

does not. While China and Brazil are both pragmatic in their solidarism, pragmatism ends up

fitting as the noun in this equation. Brasília’s narrative, in its turn, brigs pragmatism as an

adjective to the noun, solidarism, hence, creating a seemingly contradictory self-image of a

Pragmatic Solidarism, in particular after Lula’s administration.

Brazil does not have the capacity to be a global player in military terms, but China

does (MEARSHEIMER, 2001). And this is one of the reasons the Chinese in Africa sound

like a challenge not only for Brazil’s businesses and interests, but also for the entire

International System, including Africa. China’s role in the Black Continent provides an

enticing subject for the Academia, since it generates different views on Beijing’s interests,

potential and defies traditional prisms on power politics. The Brazilian presence in the

African continent may or may not compete directly with the Chinese. However, the level of

fierceness in the Chinese stance may point to more than the need of oil or the recognition of

mainland China over Taipei. Hence, the ‘Beijing Consensus’ may publicize its intentions

towards Africa, but the country’s mere status in the International System generates a more

apprehensive response from other actors. Joseph Grieco states that, as a rising great power,

China would be interested in rationalizing its dominance to avoid a fatal counterbalance –

clearly imminent in a Southeast Asia with the unquestionable presence of the United States,

not to mention India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear capability and North Korea’s ongoing

brinkmanship (GRIECO, 1997). Developing a trustworthy narrative over its own intentions

in Africa would provide a more comfortable rise for the Chinese in the International System.

Aside from the Chinese question that brings analyses back to discrediting solidarity,

when pragmatism is not explicitly admitted, Brazil does not hesitate to clarify its interests in

Africa by a two-hinged approach: multilaterally and bilaterally. Multilaterally, medium

powers like Brazil need the legitimacy and the voice of several States to echo its own

(GRIECO, 1997). If in the WTO least developed nations are less reluctant to underpin

Brazil’s (and its partners) claims, what results in liberalization of pharmaceutical intellectual

property, for example; in the climate change field, the 2009 Copenhagen Conference proved

Brazil, as well as South Africa, China and India (the BASIC) alone do not necessarily have

leverage enough to enforce change over the positions of center States, namely Japan and the

United States, especially if their positions are not backed up by the G77.

In the perspective of Nicholas Onuf, in the post-Cold War scenario, in order to change

rules that could shape the International System and, eventually, the behavior of the States, a

medium power would indeed have the voice and the possibility to do so (ONUF, 1989).

Alongside with Grieco’s stance, enhancing the legitimacy of narratives would be essential for

a country like Brazil. Nonetheless, since the System still plays by some rules of traditional

power politics, alliances would be paramount for what Joseph Grieco understands as to

enhance the opportunity of voice of these medium-States to provide them with enough

bargaining power to finally shape the system as they wish. The concession the neorealist

makes to the upcoming reality of the post-Cold War world helps to sustain the constructivist

scrutiny of Onuf (ONUF, 1989). Alexander Wendt, in his turn, would gladly understand that

anarchy can indeed be what States make of it in the 21st century (WENDT, 1992). However,

Mearsheimer would underscore the persistence of the protagonist mechanisms of the balance

of power as hindrances to an actual change in the system, if, in fact, norms will someday

manage to shift and restrain the whims of Hobbesian States, surtout in terms of International

Security (MEARSHEIMER, 2001).

In Brazil’s foreign policy towards Africa, Keohane’s diffuse reciprocity is also to be

considered. The nation’s desire to participate as a permanent member in the Security Council

of the United Nations demands a rally around the country in the General Assembly of the

organization. A positive image of the country among its counterparts in Africa would,

ultimately, lead to a better acceptance of its legitimacy and potential representativeness in the

decisive organ of the UN. Therefore, in the multilateral scope, one could easily grasp Brazil’s

share of Pragmatism in its solidary relations with Africa. These political and diplomatic

diffuse gains would be part of the forth pillar that constitute the Pragmatic Solidarism, the

political cooperation dimension.

In bilateral relations with African countries, Brazil advances a foreign policy that

encompasses the four pillars previously mentioned that shape this so-called Pragmatic

Solidarism to the region. Through relations that emphasize a) ethnicity and culture, b) trade

and investments, c) technical cooperation and d) political cooperation, Brazil puts forward its

national interests, as well as its primary will to shape a world of different dynamics in which

development plays an important role in matters of security, which, finally, would lead to a

more democratic International System, what favors a medium power such as itself (KALIL,

2012a).

The aim of this paper is to understand these 4 pillars that seem to constitute the

Brazilian Pragmatic Solidarism towards Africa. There will be only one part in this article.

Nevertheless, it will be divided into the 4 pillars. In the conclusion, the Pragmatic Solidarism

will be contrasted with the Chinese allegedly ambiguous insertion in Africa, willing to

pinpoint questions that could be addressed to those who intend to understand the Chinese

behavior, as well as a possible new “scramble for Africa” among emerging States.

THE FOUR PILLARS OF THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY

TOWARDS AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW2

The four pillars of the Brazilian Foreign Policy towards Africa were withdrawn from

the World Bank’s report (2011) named Bridging the Atlantic: Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa:

evolving South-South Cooperation . Namely Susana Carrillo and José Flávio Sombra Saraiva

point out five periods in the history of Brazil-Africa relations, while tracing aspects of the

relations that have shaped the current scenario. Thus, ethnicity and culture, trade and

investments, technical cooperation and political cooperation would constitute the pillars of

supposedly increasingly solid relations. This paper aims at analyzing the role of those

elements in the broader strategy of the Brazilian Foreign Policy, the Pragmatic Solidarism,

which the African-Brazilian liaisons would epitomize.

Bellamy (2002) challenges the incorporation of pragmatism as an adjective to a

solidary foreign policy. Although the author treats namely dilemmas of humanitarian

interventions, some of his reflections relate to the opportunities and challenges of labeling the

Brazilian Foreign Policy towards Africa as a Pragmatic Solidarism. At a glance, pragmatism

would project a hurdle unlikely to be transcended, when it comes to a coherent narrative on

solidarism. One of the major hindrances would be that:

Pragmatism therefore holds out the possibility of justifying humanitarian

principles and courses of action that demand the suspension of sovereign

prerogatives whilst simultaneously rejecting foundationalism and the quest for legitimising criteria. A solidarism rooted in pragmatism holds that human

solidarity is based on sentimentality rather than ‘common humanity’ and that

humanitarian intervention ought to be seen not in terms of the upholding of universal moral principles, but rather as theory informed practice based upon

the extension of values created within particular communities (Bellamy,

2002).

The author states that pragmatism would reject any form of true Solidarism, since it

would engender an undisputed instrumentality that surpasses any moral or less instrumental

intentions. Moreover, according to Bellamy, the existence and recognition of Solidarism

would necessarily encompass the existence of shared values which would only be possible in

certain communities. It is of the utmost relevance, nonetheless, to underscore that the

Solidarism of the Brazilian Foreign Policy is not rooted in Pragmatism. The Pragmatic aspect

of the concept comes out of the indirect results that solidary practices generate for the country

2 The data regarding Brazil’s relations with Africa was found in the Itamaraty website.

and allows the State to legitimate its strategy in the domestic scenario, while corroborating the

country’s aim to diversify its partnerships in order to attain an economy less vulnerable to

center-States.

The inevitable gains outcomes of Brazil’s policies do not taint with instrumentality

Brasília’s overall goal to shift practices in the world order. The objective bit of Brazil’s

Solidarism in the 21st is a consequence of individual strategies that appear by the side of

Solidarism in the scope of Brazil’s Foreign Policy, namely the aim to diversify partnerships.

Also, the maximization of political gains in the shape of political support in multilateral

organizations would stem from the Solidarism rather than would motivate it, since the country

does not hold significant relative military or economic capacity neither to speak softly, while

carrying a big stick nor to advance a dollar diplomacy.

Several discourses from diplomats, chiefs of State and foreign ministers lead us to a

narrative of foreign policy that underscores its principles and goals in each and every sphere

(MRE.gov, 2012). Overall, one could summarize three purposes that surround Brazil’s

Pragmatic Solidarism towards Africa: 1) The promotion of international development, 2) the

diversification of partnerships and 3) the constitution of a more democratic world order are

repeatedly mentioned when it comes to the relations with Africa.3

Intrinsic to the pillars of Trade and Investments and of Political Cooperation in the

Brazilian Foreign Policy towards Africa, the diversification of partnerships and the

constitution of a more democratic world order add a pragmatic hint to the aim of promoting

international development. Nonetheless, unlike Muggah’s and Hamann’s (2012)

understanding, Brazil’s foreign policy towards less developed nations, not only to Africa,

begins with the notion of promoting development as a way of spreading and legitimating the

Labor Party’s understanding of politics and of moving forward with the notion of non

indifference that represents the historical synthesis of the Brazilian Foreign Policy’s official

cordiality and understanding of development and to security.

According to Fonseca (2004), in the 1990’s, the Brazilian Foreign Policy advanced a

strategy of autonomy via participation. Vigevani & Cepaluni (2007), in his turn, understands

the Lula’s administration input on foreign policy as autonomy via diversification.

Diversifying partnerships would relevant the central tone of the Labor Party’s aims in

international politics, but affirming that economic gains are the primary guidance to the

3 These were withdrawn from the speeches, statements to the press and other means, such as interviews with the

Foreign Affairs Ministry’s members, to advance the country’s narratives on foreign policy.

country’s entire agenda runs the risk of neglecting not only the peculiarities of Presidential

Diplomacy, but also Itamaraty’s historically constructed rationale.

To highlight solely the economic elements of the diversification in the autonomy via

diversification means placing trade and investments as the only bases of Brazil’s relations

with Africa. Trade and investments are indeed important issues, and Brazil’s foreign trade

relies on Africa for a significant part of the country’s exports of manufactured goods, while

represents fertile ground for what Cervo (2011) pinpoints as the current internationalization of

the economy, in light of Africa’s ongoing rebirth. In fact, bilateral trade increased from US$ 4

billion to US$20 billion between 2000 and 20104. State-driven and private investments in the

continent have also risen considerably. According to the World Bank Report, the former

began in order to promote better environment for the latter, but the Report contradicts itself in

the same section, when it traces to the 1980’s Brazil’s private sector-driven investments in the

continent, a decade in which the Brazilian bankruptcy inhibited the country’s economic ties

with Africa. Trade, in its turn, has been increasing since the 1970’s, when Brazil supported

controversial independences in the continent, although it decreased in the 1980’s, in the face

of Brazil’s economic pickles, and remained timid in the 1990’s. It is, therefore, reckless to

link Brazil’s solidarity with Africa solely to Trade and Investments, or to the country’s

economic goal of diversifying partnerships.

The Brazilian Solidarism towards Africa actually first appeared overtly in the

country’s agenda in its relations with Portuguese-Speaking nations. Culture and ethnicity are,

thus, fundamental roots for the Solidarism. In the 1996, solidarity was placed basilar to the

foundation of the Community for Portuguese-Speaking Countries (1996), while Brazil did not

carry a foreign policy the was willing to diversify its partnerships with Africa, nor did it have

the domestic economic stability to outreach in that direction.

4 The CPLP was officially created in 1996. Thenceforth, the exchange between Brazil and Portuguese-speaking

nations rose steadily from a surplus of around 21 million dollars in the year of the creation to a surplus of around

1 billion dollars in 2011 whose top was in 2009, when it achieved a bit more than 2 billion dollars. The total

amount of trade between Brazil and CPLP members sums up to around 800 million dollars-average/year, since

1996 until 2011. When it comes to the African continent, Brazil carries a deficit because of its imports of oil and its derivatives especially from North African nations. Since 1996 until 2011, the average deficit is one of around

1 billion dollars, while the total trade sums up to around 11 billion dollars. Thus, the CPLP countries represent

almost 10% of the trade with the entire continent. The figures must be carefully analyzed, since most of

Portuguese-speaking nations in the continent have recently come out of fragile contexts or face the hurdles of

such landscape, not to mention the size of the markets in places like Cabo Verde, São Tomé e Príncipe and East

Timor, what Angola and Mozambique striving largest share of the population could not compensate more than it

already does. Therefore, the participation of CPLP members in Brazilian trade figures with Africa reveals steady

and increasing connects with Portuguese-speaking nations since the advent of the organization. Concomitantly,

trade numbers also show that trade with Africa tended to rise steadily (MDIC.gov, 2013).

Brazilian enthusiasts of African studies usually neglect cultural and ethnical elements

of Brazilian-African relations, while historical aspects are often approached (SARAIVA,

2011). This article aims to provide a general landscape of Brazilian-African cultural and

ethnic ties that have risen throughout history. The country’s independence in 1822 was

followed by Benin’s statement recognizing Brazil as a freed State and proclaiming the African

country’s desire to be part of the brand new Empire. The Portuguese-Brazilian treaty

establishing the recognition of the independence included a clause in which Brazil gave up

any intentions of expanding its jurisdiction to Africa, what was guaranteed by Britain’s naval

leverage. Moreover, in the second half of the 19th century, Brazil’s population was of roughly

2 million people, except that at least 1.5 million of them were African descents. Thus, Brazil’s

nationality is entrenched with the African ethnicity and culture. Nowadays, more than half of

the Brazilian population considers itself of African descent.

Social and ethnic inequalities still hinder the participation of African descents in

society, which was alerted by abolitionists in the 19th

century already. One of the most

prominent Brazilian abolitionists, Joaquim Nabuco stated in 1883 that the abolition

represented only the first step for the full integration of the black population into the Brazilian

society, what has not yet been achieved and has only begun to be properly addressed after the

1988 Constitution. Under the guise of the recent fundamental law, reminiscent of maroons

have gained the property of the lands they historically inhabit, as well as had their cultural

idiosyncrasies officially recognized; affirmative action has been delivered to decrease the

educational gap between the blacks the whites in the country; criminal organizations in

favelas have been dismantled and communities have been revitalized, in order to include

those societies, majorly populated with non whites, in the Brazilian mainstream, what ends up

challenging the prejudice towards the black. The simple urgency of this matter already

bridges Brazil to many African societies nowadays, not only to those that have experienced

apartheid, but also to others that face deep social inequalities.

Gilberto Freyre’s Casa-grande & senzala treats the subject of syncretism vastly.

According to Freyre, the most traditional religion institution and with more adepts in the

country, the Brazilian Catholic Church and faith feature African traditions, such as the

mysticism of the cult of many saints (its seriously a humongous amount of figures, what

brings one back to African manifold gods), superstitions regarding promises, objects donated

to the walls of the Churches after the fulfillment of the wishes through the constant prayer for

certain saints, and so on. Multiculturalism is also addressed by the author, as he underscores

the African descent’s contribution on Brazil’s Portuguese, with the widespread use of

diminutives to portray affection towards people and objects, not to mention on food. Brazil’s

typical cuisine would stem from the participation of the black women in the kitchens of the

Big Houses. In their turn, Brazilian mixed ethnic traces would result from repeated sexual

violence, but also, as Sérgio Buarque de Hollanda expresses, from the Portuguese’s less

reluctance to engage in relationships with other ethnicities.

Several Afro-Brazilian museums throughout the country celebrate these ties. The Afro

Brazil Museum in São Paulo and the recently inaugurated MUNCAB – National Museum for

Afro-Brazilian Culture, in Salvador, unite art and history to show the many similarities that

join Brazil and Africa culturally and ethnically. Moreover, one of Pierre Verger’s discoveries

through photography epitomizes the connections. Again, Benin appears in the scenario.

During the first half of the 19th

century, when slave trade was legal in Brazil, Brazilian

traffickers would buy from Africans those who nationals had lost wars or were imprisoned.

Back then, a dynastic struggle took place in Benin and the winner sold his mother and his

brother to Brazilian traffickers. Later in the 20th century, Pierre Verger’s incursions in

Brazilian maroons found engravings in thrones that connected his photographic memory to

Benin’s dynasty, hence, reuniting the dynasty.

Alberto da Costa e Silva, one of the most prominent Africanists in Brazil nowadays,

usually refers to the Ocean that separates Brazil from Africa as ‘the river named Atlantic’ to

emphasize the ties among the regions. In 2003, such peculiarity was recognized by the

African Union that proclaimed Brazil as the sixth region of the Continent. Nowadays, it is

discussed whether Haiti could or not participate as an actual member in the Union, since it is

not geographically in Africa – Brazil is just an observer and has not shown interest to enter

the organization, nor has it been invited. However, narratives exist to be deconstructed, and

geography could easily be read to turn the middle Atlantic into a river just as it did to the

South Atlantic. Timing is appropriate, since Brazil leads the United Nations’ efforts to rebuild

the Haitian State.

As positive as they may seem, ethnic ties among Brazil and Africa may also come as

an issue to the bilateral relations. Brazilian civil servants and military of the highest

commands are still white, as well as the Brazilian investors that go to Africa. Therefore,

turning ethnicity into capability is one of the highest challenges for Brazil’s Pragmatic

Solidarism towards Africa – what adds up to the importance of bringing race to the political

discussion domestically, since Brazil’s international multiracial identity still shocks

significant parts of the Brazilian population.

Culture and ethnicity, therefore, are core elements of Brazil’s foreign policy strategy

towards Africa. Moreover, they are the elements that motivated Brasília’s first assumption of

solidarity towards Africa, in the CPLP. Such Solidarism is, however, a result of a broader

historical process. While cultural and ethnic links have sparkled the institutionalization of

Solidarism, the evolution of Brazil’s official cordiality and autonomy via diversification

explain the country’s apparent benevolent narrative. In hindsight, the autonomy via

diversification can be portrayed as Brazil’s general intent to diversify not only partnerships,

but namely the agenda of the International System. By bringing the aspects of development to

the concept of International Security, through the responsibility while protecting and the

resolutions it pushed in the Security Council in order to spread the notion of interdependence

between those two elements, Brazil diversified the Council’s approach over International

Security. Brasília also pushed for G20F meetings that would treat financial matters as relevant

to economic stability, but especially to the fulfillment of the Millennium Development Goals.

Among the BRICS and the IBSA, Brazil has sustained positions that bring to the spotlight the

well-being of the people in its multifaceted manner. South-South cooperation,

notwithstanding, is not the only table in which Brazil diversifies the narrative, which would

not be that groundbreaking. Brazil’s almost each and every declaration or treaty with a center-

States has included clauses of trilateral cooperation – or has mentioned the urgency of

spreading development to attain a safer International System.

Therefore, although the internationalization of the Brazilian economy via spreading

national direct investments in places like Africa runs together with the goal of diversifying

partnerships to depend less on center-States, the overall tone of Brazil’s Foreign Policy is one

that overcomes the simple generation of profits. Muggah’s and Hamann’s perspective,

furthermore, fall short of grasping Brasília’s historical narrative of foreign policy – and again

Africa appears as the sharp illustration. To label Brazil’s solidarism as generous is to

misunderstand the emphasis on less hierarchical patterns. Generosity is embedded in the self-

image of more capacity of delivering certain results. The authors’ lexical choice project an

image of a weak Africa and a growing Brazil that would deem itself better and occasionally

bend to the needs of the many, but only to the extent that its own status remains safe. A slip

could describe Muggah’s and Hamann’s choice of word, but in the 21st century Africa’s

economic boom is met with urbanization and social improvements. The mobile and Internet

penetration in the continent still contrasts with high mortality rates. However, the outlook is

not as grim as it has been, and GDP rates are only the tip of the iceberg (Special Report:

emerging Africa on The Economist, March, 2nd

-8th

, 2013).

Brazil’s Pragmatic Solidarism understands Africa as a partner, not as a mere receiver

of its aid or investments, in exchange for a warm reception of goods. Brazil’s foreign policy

narrative insists that solidarism has brought benefits for the African continent, as well as for

the Brazilians, what would result especially from Technical Cooperation. The third pillar of

Brazil’s Pragmatic Solidarism towards Africa is far from one of the least important. Brazil’s

Agency for Cooperation, under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, underlines the aim of that

cooperation as to promote development. This highlight comes in the wave of domestic social

change under the Lula administration (SARAIVA, 2011). President Lula’s humble origins

and the Labor Party’s understanding of politics led to a rally around the idea of exporting such

programs as Zero Hunger, Light for Everyone, Water for Everyone, not to mention several

initiatives of affirmative action and so on.

Brazil’s dense relations with Africa are relatively recent. In the 1960s and 1970s, the

country hesitated to engage into an Africanist foreign policy (SARAIVA, 2011). The year of

1975 could be considered a watershed, but the 1980’s bankruptcy led to a decade of sparse

cooperation which was followed by another one of few initiatives. Thus, the Lula

administration deliberately inserted Africa in the core of its strategy. Analyses that favor

economic gains as paramount for Brazil’s foreign policy of technical cooperation have been

proved fragile. Lula’s choice of Africa matches his own cultural and ethnical backdrop, as

well as the Labor’s Party approach to politics domestically. When President Obama

congratulated Lula for being ‘The Man’, in light of his achievements in Brazil, but also of his

efforts in the international arena, the Party indirectly gained the legitimacy it lacked in the

1980’s and 1990’s among the country’s middle class. Thus, the Solidarism that appeared as a

facet of a new government also enters the logic of Keohane’s diffuse gains.

The idiosyncrasies of Lula can be pointed as essential for the many trips to Africa, as

well as to speeches in such scenarios as the Davos Economic Forum when the President urged

the prevalence of development over finances (SARAIVA, 2010). Lula was active in Foreign

Policy and wanted to spread the government’s strategies to end poverty throughout the world.

That was the tone of his many encounters with French Presidents and other leaders that

recognized in him a symbol of prosperity against all odds. Thus, during his administration,

Brazil was not reluctant to forgive the debts of African countries. While the G8 suffered

pressure from civil society, Lula managed to turn Brazil into an example of how Solidarism

could be pragmatic, since it would not only engender better lives for the citizens in least

developed countries, but also would indirectly reduce the risks of Security issues like

terrorism or drug traffic.

Concocted by his Foreign Ministry Celso Amorim, the non indifference was the

principle that guided Brazil’s participation in several issues. In spite of the country’s firm

belief in non intervention and sovereignty, Brazil would not be indifferent to situations where

Human Security, but especially development was at stake. The global outreach of non

indifference, with all its Solidarism, stems from Brazil’s historical official cordiality.

Brazil’s historical understanding of partnership with countries that carry asymmetries

with the nation in the International System is a result of Viscount of Rio Branco’s paradigm

of official cordiality (CERVO, 2008). In the 1870’s, the Viscount of Rio Branco stated that

Brazil should speak softly and make concessions to countries in South America that bared

unfavorable asymmetries with the South American giant. The Baron of Rio Branco later

institutionalized his father’s paradigm in what Francisco Doratioto (2000) considers the

attempt to build a shared sovereignty in South America. Brazil would then prevent itself from

intervening in Uruguay and Paraguay to avoid balancing against its rise in the South

American sub-system.

In the 1930’s, Brazil and Argentina prevailed in the sub-continent’s System, adopting

the official cordiality as paradigms for participation in conflicts in the neighborhood – suffice

it to bring up their mediation in the Chaco War, between Paraguay and Bo livia. In the 1950’s,

Brazil’s Pan American Operation (OPA) extended the official cordiality to Latin America and

Africa, when the government argued in favor of not only the country’s own development, but

also and especially of those least developed. Also, in 1958, the Brazil-Bolivia Roboré Treaties

proved that the Brazilian Foreign Policy intended to underscore the official cordiality. In

Roboré, Brazil consciously failed to protect its own economic interests in terms of oil

exploitation and land demarcation to promote a bigger national interest: an official cordiality

with its neighbors to avoid a perennial imminence of counterbalance.

The Independent Foreign Policy deepened the official cordiality providing it with the

notion of social justice, and, in spite of differences between the countries’ Military Regimes,

so did the dictatorships from the ‘60s to the 80’s in the region. Brazil’s and Paraguay’s

bilateral treaty on Itaipu proves the South America’s biggest country’s intentions to put vanity

aside, when Paraguay insisted on not adapting the country’s energy devices to the voltage of

the new hydroelectric, which meant even more costs for Brazil, which was already financing

most of the project and would buy Assunción’s share of the production at an agreed and, back

then, overvalued price.

In the 1980’s, Brazil and Argentina engaged in a process that culminated with

MERCOSUR, but the country’s official cordiality is more explicit in its relations with

Northern South America and Latin America. Figueiredo travelled all over South America and

Sarney founded the Group of Rio, while Brazil did not hesitate to engage in global initiatives

to mitigate poverty, such as the South-South Preferential Trade System. Although most of

the authors acknowledge the 1990’s as a more selfish moment of Brazilian Foreign Policy, in

which its own development and the participation in multilateral spheres overcame the

country’s proximity with developing nations; in 1996, the previously mentioned creation of

CPLP marks the transition between official cordiality and Pragmatic Solidarism.

Non indifference once again brought official cordiality back to the narrative, namely

when Brazil engaged in MINUSTAH. After the 1960’s, when social justice was added to the

notion of official cordiality, such solidary approach plummeted, although the foreign policy

discourse of the right-wing military regime insisted in promoting global development as the

only mean to achieve peace. If, back then, developing recently independent nations would

provide Brazil with markets and sources for its own good, and the goal of diversifying

partnerships indeed tainted Brazil’s honest call to be the gatekeeper of human rights, in light

of domestic characteristics, the current impulse of joining the promotion of development with

official cordiality reflects Brazil’s own accomplishments. Macroeconomic stability was

achieved and the country no longer depends on international financial institutions. Moreover,

the social landscape has been improved to the extent that Brazil has long fulfilled the MDGs.

Solidarism is, hence, a result of a historical process that encompasses Brazil’s

narrative of Foreign Policy and the country’s domestic evolution. Brazil’s Technical

Cooperation with Africa illustrates this concomitance. Mainly, when it comes to such pillar of

the Brazilian-African relations, Brazil exports agricultural expertise and social technology.

Africa’s prevalence in Brazil’s international technical cooperation, above even Latin America,

is a consequence not only of Africa’s dim context, but also of the similarities between Brazil’s

and continent’s societies and landscape. Culture and Ethnicity appear again relevant for

Brazil’s Solidarism.

In terms of Trade and Investments, however, Africa or the Least Developed countries

are not exceptions. Brazil’s figures have all risen at significant rates. Hence, Solidarism has

not influenced directly Brazil’s foreign trade – and neither did culture and ethnicity. The merit

of Solidarism is to distinguish Brazil’s presence in Africa from others, such as the Chinese,

for it constitutes an identity that differs from the general perception of China. Once again,

Pragmatism ought to be taken into account. While China is frequently labeled imperialist in

its quest for Africa, Brazil tends to provoke less fierce reactions. However, Brazil’s

Solidarism results in indirect gains that feature also political matters. The Political

Cooperation between Brazil and Africa are paradigmatic.

The Africa-South America Cooperation Forum (ASA) and other institutions offer

opportunities for the countries to dismantle distrusts and to promote relations that offer

opportunities for both sides, as well as the chance for the bigger countries like Brazil and

South Africa to offer the most, in order to show their commitment to the region. The

opportunities provided by the Brazilian participation as an observer in the African Union are

also outstanding, especially when the organization recognizes Brazil’s will to build closer ties

with the region and invites the Brazilian Chief of State to participate actively in negotiations.

In this sense, former President Lula is a symbol of what Brazil represents for Africa, and, for

that matter, a capability for Brazil’s relations with the continent. As he was not recognized

necessarily as white, Lula represented what Brazil meant for those African countries who

were struggling to overcome harsh underdevelopment. Lula and Brazil have both managed to

surpass hardship, and the South American friend not only could share the strategies to move

away from fragile contexts, but was also willing to do so.

The Dilma administration lost Lula’s appeal, but the strategy remains fairly the same..

In her General Assembly speeches, Dilma did underscored the need for an economic

collective security, as well as an islamophobia that could hinder North Africa’s participation

in global affairs on the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Moreover, the current government

sustains the narrative of the essentiality of closing the Doha Round in terms that favor

developing nations, but especially those least developed in the African continent.

What Brazil has been asking in return is what Keohane dubs diffuse reciprocity. The

country has not showed its Big Stick, namely because it does not have considerable military

forces. Investments in the military arsenal in Brazil are smaller than those in such African

countries as Nigeria. The Brazilian Military Arms are more than ever subdued to a civil

power, and nowadays to diplomacy, since the former Ministry of Foreign Affairs is now

occupying the post of Minister of Defense. Consequently, differently from China, Brazil does

not have the capacity or the will to use force in Africa. For Brazil, it seems like the desirable,

albeit indirect, outcome of its relations with Africa is reaping the political rewards of its soft

power. Politically, it means gathering support in multilateral arenas, or at least convenient

abstentions. It means also guaranteeing a sphere of influence that transcends South America

and its historical suspicion towards Brazil.

The Pragmatic Solidarism has, hence, a solid political dimension in which political

cooperation is advanced not only in terms of narrative, but also of international institutions

that connect Brazil and Africa and allow the region and the Brasília to concert positions that

could, thus, constitute the expected diffuse reciprocity for the South American giant.

Nonetheless, the diffuse gains of pillar of political cooperation of Brazil’s Pragmatic

Solidarism to Africa are not restricted to outcomes regarding Brazil’s immediate interests in

multilateral arrays.

The mere exercise of a solidary narrative and the constitution of those organizations

engender a new world order. An approach à Gramsci would present an argument that Brazil,

and perhaps the BRICS, are to demand a new hegemony. Mr. Amorim underscores Brazil’s

intensions to form an organic multilateralism. The Brazilian Foreign Policy has historically

constituted a narrative that intends to build a more democratic international arena in which

development surpasses matters of security to provide a sustainable world peace. Therefore,

the exercise of Pragmatic Solidarism in Africa is in itself the exercise of a new way of

performing Foreign Policy. Pragmatic Solidarism would be the exercise of Foreign Policy in a

way that guarantees national interests and overcomes the dynamics of power politics.

Pragmatic Solidarism and its four pillars towards Africa would constitute a new

paradigm of behavior in the international system that may reflect new behaviors, especially

from center States. Brazil’s active role in the multilateral arena would be a reflect of such

attempts – and the concept of Responsibility While Protecting would epitomize the intent of

changing behaviors via rules, an endeavor especially challenging in terms of rWp, for its

intentions to restrain power politics in humanitarian interventions (KALILb, 2012). The

Pragmatic Solidarism of Brazil’s relations with Africa would, therefore, represent an indirect

desire to endorse new behaviors in the international arena. Whether or not bringing about a

new hegemony, the challenge is posed.

CONCLUSION: PRAGMATIC SOLIDARISM VIS-À-VIS THE CHINESE RISE

Kaplan’s (2010) take on China’s geographical relevance lies upon the traditional

realist point of view of the prevalence of a zero sum game in the International System.

Although the author acknowledges the unlikelihood of a direct conflict between the United

States and China, he finds threatening China’s increasing influence in places such as Africa,

since it would provide Beijing with the possession of the ‘geographical pivot of history’.5

Kissinger (2011), in his turn, opens the black box of China to describe its initial rise in

the international arena as conservative, since it aimed at fitting in multilateral institutions and

reached out for traditional Confucian concepts to guide the State’s international relations. The

author, as well as the current American Foreign Policy, according to Kissinger’s own

perspective, tends not to enter the hysteria of geopolitical stances. Au contraire, the former

Secretary of State underlines that China might indeed be engendering efforts to what Joseph

5 “The English geographer Sir Halford Mackinder ended his famous 1904 article, "The Geographical

Pivot of History," with a disturbing reference to China. After explaining why Eurasia was the geostrategic

fulcrum of world power, he posited that the Chinese, should they expand their power well beyond their borders,

"might constitute the yellow peril to the world's freedom just because they would add an oceanic frontage to the

resources of the great continent, an advantage as yet denied to the Russian tenant of the pivot region." Leaving

aside the sentiment's racism, which was common for the era, as well as the hysterics sparked by the rise of a non-

Western power at any time, Mackinder had a point: whereas Russia, that other Eurasian giant, basically was, and

is still, a land power with an oceanic front blocked by ice, China, owing to a 9,000-mile temperate coastline with

many good natural harbors, is both a land power and a sea power. (Mackinder actually feared that China might

one day conquer Russia.) China's virtual reach extends from Central Asia, with all its mineral and hydrocarbon wealth, to the main shipping lanes of the Pacific Ocean. Later, in Democratic Ideals and Reality, Mackinder

predicted that along with the United States and the United Kingdom, China would eventually guide the world by

"building for a quarter of humanity a new civilization, neither quite Eastern nor quite Western (…)To

accomplish this task, China has built advantageous power relationships both in contiguous territories and in far-

flung locales rich in the resources it requires to fuel its growth. Because what drives China abroad has to do with

a core national interest -- economic survival -- China can be defined as an über-realist power. It seeks to develop

a sturdy presence throughout the parts of Africa that are well endowed with oil and minerals and wants to secure

port access throughout the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, which connect the hydrocarbon-rich Arab-

Persian world to the Chinese seaboard. (…) To be sure, China is not an existential problem for these states. The

chance of a war between China and the United States is remote; the Chinese military threat to the United States

is only indirect. The challenge China poses is primarily geographic -- notwithstanding critical issues about debt,

trade, and global warming. China's emerging area of influence in Eurasia and Africa is growing, not in a nineteenth-century imperialistic sense but in a more subtle manner better suited to the era of globalization.

Simply by securing its economic needs, China is shifting the balance of power in the Eastern Hemisphere, and

that must mightily concern the United States. On land and at sea, abetted by China's favorable location on the

map, Beijing's influence is emanating and expanding from Central Asia to the South China Sea, from the

Russian Far East to the Indian Ocean. China is a rising continental power, and, as Napoleon famously said, the

policies of such states are inherent in their geography. (…) Beijing is preparing to envelop Taiwan not just

militarily but economically and socially, too. Some 30 percent of Taiwan's exports go to China. There are 270

commercial flights per week between Taiwan and the mainland. Two-thirds of Taiwanese companies have made

investments in China in the last five years. Half a million tourists go from the mainland to the island annually,

and 750,000 Taiwanese reside in China for about half of every year. Increasing integration appears likely; how it

comes about, however, is uncertain and will be pivotal for the future of great-power politics in the region. If the United States simply abandons Taiwan to Beijing, then Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and other

U.S. allies in the Pacific Ocean, as well as India and even some African states, will begin to doubt the strength of

Washington's commitments. That could encourage those states to move closer to China and thus allow the

emergence of a Greater China of truly hemispheric proportions (KAPLAN, 2010).”

Grieco (1997) would call ‘rationalize its dominance’6. By understating nationalist and

triumphalist voices in the domestic sphere, the Chinese Foreign Policy deploys its efforts in

advancing a strategy of foreign policy that they call “Peaceful Development”. Therefore, the

Chinese outreach to Africa would mainly respond to the country’s efforts to overcome

hindrances to full development, what would explain Beijing’s preferential relations with

African nations that possess natural resources.

In this sense, China’s presence in Africa would not differ from its increasing

participation in Latin American affairs. Therefore, a Latin American approach to China’s rise

in Africa would have to deal with the former Empire’s prevalence in international trade within

the region. Yet, studies have not multiplied to question the American hegemony in Latin

America, even in the light of China’s role as the main trader with several countries in

America’s immediate are of influence in the context of a trend of leftish Bolivarianismo. It

turns out that studies regarding the Chinese presence in Africa have focuses more on strategic

terms than have others about Beijing’s Foreign Policy. When it comes to Brazil, diplomacy

has been trying to place China as a partner for the South American country’s own prosperity,

as well as to advance new dynamics in the International System. Brazil may consider Africa

its preferential area of influence under the nation’s latest global player status, but the

concomitance of Chinese businesses in the continent is not Brasília’s most urgent task

regarding its presence in Africa.

China’s relations with Africa have come and gone. Since the Revolution, there are

moments in which they are denser than in others (LARGE, 2008). George Yu’s reports on

Sino-African relations bring up this discontinuity. In 1965, Africa occupied a central role in

the Chinese Foreign Policy, and the recently independent countries tended to identify with

former colonized China. Since then, Communist China has been a model for the development

6 “China’s rise, Liu prophesies, will usher in a golden age of Asian prosperity in which Chinese products,

culture, and values set the standard for the world. The world will be harmonious because China’s leadership will

be wiser and more temperate than America’s, and because China will eschew hegemony and limit its role to

acting as primus inter pares of the nations of the world. (…) Peaceful rise. (…) China’s leaders decided to take a

hand in the debate at this point, to demonstrate that the published triumphalism is far from the mood of the

leadership. (…) , 2010, a comprehensive statement policy: Persisting with Taking the Path of Peaceful

Development, which is neither a ruse by which China hides its brightness and bides its time nor a naïve delusion

that forfeits China’s advantages. It is a genuine and enduring policy because it best serves Chinese interests and comports with the international strategic situation. ‘Persisting with taking the path of peaceful development is

not the product of a subjective imagination or of some kind of calculations. Rather, it is a result of our profound

recognition that both the world today and China today have undergone tremendous changes as well as that

China’s relations with the world today have also undergone great changes; hence it is necessary to make the best

of the situation and adapt to the changes’. (…) The earthshaking changes require that China abandon the vestiges

of Mao’s doctrine of absolute self-reliance, which would isolate China. China is not in a position to be arrogant

and boastful, because it still faces tremendous challenges domestically (KISSINGER, 2011).”

of some African nations, such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Gambia (LARGE, 2008). Some

state that China preferably relates to countries that followed the communist lead or belonged

to the third world movements; others highlight China’s preferential liaisons with regional

great powers. Be that as it may, in the first decade of the 21st century, Beijing spreads its

relations with countries throughout Africa, mostly in those that offer natural resources and

trade. Relations that are solely based on trade tend to be seasonal – and what’s been recently

noticed is a trend of continuity in Sino-African relations. China has enhanced its contributions

to United Nations peace operations in Africa and, by 2007, had roughly 1.300 nationals in the

continent. In 2000, the China-Africa Joint Business Council institutionalized the State’s

support to Chinese businesses in the region (GILL & REILLY, 2007). China has also been

aiding the modernization of military forces in Africa, while its presence is known for lax

accountability over human rights violations.

Beijing’s participation in African affairs is, nonetheless, far from outstanding, if

compared to China’s general strategy. The peculiarities of the Chinese entrance in the

continent are more connected to local aspects as opportunities, such as natural resources, and

as hindrances to what the West would deem legitimate relations, such as non democratic

governments. Nonetheless, if China does not insert democratic or human rights clauses in its

contracts with Africans, neither does Brazil.

Brazil’s persistence in overcoming stereotypes of traditional hegemony when it comes

to its ascension in the international arena has not caught the attention of many researchers in

International Relations. An analysis of the discourse via a post-positivist theory would be of

great value to the understanding of Brazil’s narrative, while Brazilian Foreign Policy insists in

pointing out the practices of its narrative. This article intended, thus, to provide the rationale

behind the current Brazilian Foreign Policy through the country’s relations with Africa. By

bringing up China’s presence in the continent, it aimed at providing an opportunity to rethink

the Eastern Great Power actual impact and intentions in the International System. The

Pragmatic Solidarism appears, thus, as an opportunity to further analyses that may compare

and contrast China’s self-proclaimed Peaceful Development with Brazil’s foreign strategy in

the 21st century. Politically, China has established a diplomatic network that is very similar to

that of other countries, but does the country expect only diffuse reciprocity? Unlike Brazil,

China conditions its aid to its recognition over Taipei, what is in itself an exercise of power.

This goal lies within the Beijing Consensus, as it states that China aims at acquiring the

recognition of mainland China and maintaining the PCC.

If Joseph Grieco’s perspective is correct, China is not going to use its relations with

Africa to exercise its offensive power far from the annoying détente of Southeast Asia, and,

hence, the political cooperation dimension of their relations would not include potentially

offensive military ties. Nonetheless, a neorealist approach would be essential to understand

China’s show-off in terms of Trade and Investments and Technical Cooperation in the black

continent. As Mearsheimer argues in his The tragedy of Great Powers politics, one of the

pillars of the country’s emergence as a great power is its mammoth funds. The other would be

its huge population – and in this sense sending Chinese workers to Africa, instead of hiring

the local force, sounds rather coherent. Therefore, to fully understand China’s aim in Africa

could be to address how it differs from the four pillars of Brazil’s Pragmatic Solidarism

towards the continent.

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