1

Assessing Possibilities of Corruption:

the Example of the Punjab Education Foundation

Roy Carr-Hill1 and Ali Murtaza2

for

UKFIET International Conference on Education and Development –

Education & Development Post 2015: Reflecting, Reviewing,

Revisioning.

Sub-Theme: Futures of Development Assistance

Oxford, 10 – 12 September

1. Professor Roy Carr-Hill, Institute of Education, 20 Bedford Way, LONDON, WC1H 0AL;

roycarrhill@yahoo.com; tel: +44(0)1904 426388

2. Ali Murtaza, Independent Consultant, Lahore, Pakistan.

Abstract

Corruption in education, widely interpreted to include inappropriate behaviour, is difficult

to discuss in print because of legal implications, but also because monitoring is weak. This

paper proposes a way of identifying possibilities of corruption based on an analysis of the

activities and processes involved, illustrated through an analysis of the Education Voucher

Scheme implemented by the Punjab Education Foundation in Pakistan.

Analysis of documents and a bespoke household and school survey showed there were

several activities and decision points where there were opportunities for inappropriate

behaviour: in particular, there were high risks of the very poor and vulnerable children being

left out because of the way areas are selected, poor attendance rates because of lack of

parental motivation, fees being charged for absent students, and poor educational

outcomes because of poor quality teaching.

The design almost certainly means that the very poor are excluded; that half of the teachers

– most of them women – were being paid less than a dollar a day; freedom of choice has not

led to schools being more accountable to parents, and competition hardly exists because

the failure rate is less than 1%. The equity, productive efficiency objectives are not being

met.

1

Assessing Possibilities of Corruption: the Example of the Punjab Education Foundation1

Introduction

Corruption in Education

There has been a growing literature on corruption in education (Andvig et al. 2000, Hallak and Poisson 2009):

they make it clear that because education is about more than just financial transactions, it is important to

identify not only the possibilities of discretion2 in distributing or handling financial resources but also the

potential for inappropriate behaviour of all types and at all levels. At system level, inappropriate behaviour

includes actions which are not in accord with the stated objectives or goals of an organization or grant.

Administrators can embezzle funds allocated for building, transgress rules and procedures for handing finance,

by-pass criteria for selecting schools, appointing teachers or the award of vouchers3 through favouritism or

nepotism; teachers and parents can bribe to get a voucher for their child or exchange vouchers for cash.

Where there is any substantial support for construction, maintenance and repair or distribution of equipment,

furniture and materials, then there can be: fraud in public tendering, collusion among suppliers or pressure on

parents to buy only from ‘approved’ (higher priced) suppliers, manipulation of data used to decide upon target

areas, ghost deliveries, purchase of unnecessary equipment. If the support includes funds for the appointment

of new teachers, then their management, payment and training then fraud in appointment and deployment,

discrimination, falsification of credentials, bypass of criteria, delay in payment salaries sometimes with

unauthorised deductions may involve corruption,

Although the theoretical possibilities of corruption at various levels in the education sector have therefore

been detailed although only in a piecemeal way without taking into account the inter-linkages between goals,

administration, maintenance and repair, mechanisms of targeting and training, there is only very limited

evidence about the existence of corruption partly of course because of the possibility of being sued without

cast-iron evidence. Equally in Pakistan, although there is an extensive literature on corruption in Pakistan and

several allusions to corruption in Pakistan’s education system, there is no concrete evidence on the extent of

different practices.

This paper proposes a different approach which can be used more generally based on process mapping

supplemented by a ‘quantitative’ survey to identify possibilities of corruption in the field.

The approach is illustrated through an analysis of inappropriate behaviour (and therefore wider than monetary

corruption) in the public private partnership schemes designed and administered by the Punjab Education

Foundation (PEF) in Pakistan. In case of PEF and/or PEF schemes, inappropriate behaviour possibilities include

non-adherence to goals, non-compliance with conditions of financial grants, application of funds for purposes

not supported by PEF or the provincial government, and/or embezzlement or misapplication of funds. It is

important to emphasise that the purpose is not to demonstrate that discretion has been inappropriately

exercised so many times or that there has been impropriety in a specific number of instances, but on

identifying the possibilities – not the probabilities - for discretion or inappropriate behaviour. The corruption

risks assessed are:

Lack of clarity in specification of standards/criteria

Quality of standards/entry thresholds

1 DFID intends to up-scale its support to PEF in order to reach more out of school children more effectively. They wanted to

be sure that PEF systems and programmes (especially Education Vouchers Scheme) were corruption free; this article is based on the work done to make that assessment. 2 Discretion here is understood as the exercise of choice by a bureaucrat or official about the delivery or granting of a

service to an individual or a household 3 A voucher is a credit note given to a parent for using on a specific school; similar to vouchers given by supermarkets for

spend on a specific class of goods.

2

Non-implementation of policies/criteria for any reason

Level of discretion available to different levels of decision makers and the need for such discretion

Absence/presence of monitoring and financial systems

Robustness/effectiveness of systems]]

In the remainder of the introduction, we provide a little context of primary education in Pakistan

Education System in Pakistan: Public-Private divide and Out-of-School children in the Punjab

Public and Private Schools

Pakistan inherited the English system of state and public (meaning elite private) schools and, although this

continues to this day, there are many other distinctive features. First, although teaching is no longer a

respected occupation, within the state system, the employment security makes it virtually impossible to sack

teachers even when they do not turn up for work and the pension rights are highly valued; the combination

makes the state system simultaneously expensive, inefficient and ineffective, Second, also within the state

system and especially at the secondary level, there are prestigious elite schools which are seen as better than

the best private schools, where entrance is determined - mostly - by competitive examination. Thirdly – and

mainly because most of the state system is seen as providing low quality education, there has been a steady

growth in ‘low-cost’ private schools. Private sector schools account for 30% of the total enrolment in Pakistan

at the primary level. In Punjab, the share is higher than other provinces, 37% as per DFID’s supported DFID-

Nielsen survey (2012). The growth of private sector involvement in providing education increases the

likelihood and possibilities of corruption.

Out-of-School Children

In Punjab, the Nielsen surveys suggest that, currently, overall 21.5% of children are out of school (19.0% of

boys and 24.2% of girls) with wide variation between 13.6% in urban areas (with only 1% difference in boys

and girls) and 23.9% in rural areas (20.9% of boys and 27.7% of girls). According to the Nielsen survey, the

percentages out-of-school of school-going age (13% of boys and 17% of girls) in Punjab are lower than the

national figures; and the percentages in urban areas are even lower at 7% and 8%. In Lahore, the overall

percentages are lower again at 5% and 9% respectively. There have been a number of schemes in Pakistan to

get more girls enrolled in school (REFS) where the choice of school is left to the parent or guardian. Of course,

in societies like Pakistan where ‘corruption’ is endemic – the inverted commas is used here because the

‘corruption’ is often simply the use of family relations to bypass bureaucratic procedures - these vouchers are

often misused e.g. for another child.

Organisation of Paper

In the following section, we describe the institutional background before setting out the conceptual

framework and methodological approach in the third section. The results of our field work and interviews are

presented in the fourth and fifth sections; and, in the concluding sections, we discuss design issues in the

seventh section.

Institutional background: description of PEF, PEF Schemes and third parties Involved

Description of PEF (based on in-house documents and interviews except where cited)

The Punjab Education Foundation (PEF) is a government foundation originally established under the Punjab

Foundation Act, 1991 and subsequently re-established under the Punjab Education Foundation Act, 2004. The

Foundation’s mission is “the promotion of quality education through Public-Private Partnership, encouraging

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and supporting the efforts of private sector through technical and financial assistance, innovating and

developing new instruments to champion wider educational opportunities at affordable cost to the poor.” (PEF

website).

Currently, PEF receives 6 billion rupees and accounts for 4 percent of the provincial education budget. The

Foundation is an autonomous organization attached to the Punjab School Education Department. It is

supervised by a Board of Directors and administered by a Managing Director. PEF has three major public-

private partnership education schemes – the Education Voucher Scheme (EVS), the Foundation Assisted

Schools (FAS) and the New School Program (NSP). Separate directorates within the PEF management structure

administer these schemes. An independent monitoring and evaluation directorate performs M&E work for

these three schemes. In total, PEF is supporting 1.4 million kids. We focus in this paper on the EVS scheme.

PEF manages and administers its public –private partnership schemes directly except administration of

external financial audits, conduct of quality assurance tests and third party system evaluations. Third parties

involved in testing work are the National Testing Service (NTS) and the University of Management and

Technology (UMT). Financial audits and system analysis/validation of controls is performed by statutory

auditors like the Auditor General of Pakistan and private parties like Grant and Thornton.

Education Voucher Scheme (EVS)

The Education Voucher Scheme provides vouchers to parents of children, who cannot afford to pay for their

education in specially selected private schools called EVS schools. The scheme’s stated focus is on children

aged 4-17 years belonging to less affluent and underprivileged areas, who cannot get education due to

financial and social constraints. The aim of the EVS is to ensure equity, productive efficiency, social cohesion

and freedom of choice.

Parents can get children enrolled in EVS schools of their own choice. In FY 2011-12 around 100,000 children

were using vouchers under the EVS. Most of these children were not out-of-school children but students who

were deemed likely to drop out (see Figure 1). Nine phases of enrolment have been completed. From July 1,

2012 vouchers have been paid as follows: PKR 400 for class 1-8, PKR 450 for Matric (Arts) students, PKR 550 for

Matric (science) and Higher Secondary (Arts) students and PKR 750 for Higher Secondary (science) students.

The Scheme entails selection of both children and schools. Children are selected on the basis of in-house

surveys; schools are selected on the basis of applications. The main monitoring tool is a Quality Assurance Test

(QAT), which tests students’ learning outcomes thereby ensuring that students have attended school and/or

received tuition. The test clearance bar is however low – only half of the students are required to obtain 40%

marks. There is widespread demand from schools for being partners in the EVS; given the high profits

potentially generated by these schools, this is not unexpected. EVS schools are however not a competitor to

public schools because most EVS children are ostensible drop outs due to poverty, and poor children would

theoretically not drop out from public schools because the latter do not charge fees (although there are

hidden costs such as uniforms and transport as government schools are more dispersed especially in rural

areas).

Third parties involved

Several third parties are involved in the operational activities of PEF; and in particular in the administration of

the Quality Assurance Test. These include the National Testing Service (NTS) for administration of the test;

and the Aga Kahn University for marking. The Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) of the NTS are clearly

very detailed and precise; we did not, however, have the opportunity to observe how or where they were

implemented.

4

Conceptual framework and methodological approach

Conceptual framework

The literature on corruption tends to focus on the incentives on public agencies to defraud, embezzle or accept

payments (bribes) for appointments or procurement (Andvig et al 2000). We shall, of course, identify the

possibilities for bribes, embezzlement and fraud but, as many of the corruption risks in the operation of EVS

are based on the exercise of discretion, we shall focus on the circumstances in which discretion arises, the

factors influencing the level of discretion and the possible consequences of that disercretion being exercised.

Approach to assessment

We undertook a mapping exercise of existing processes and practices including review of existing standards

and criteria which regulate and guide decision-making in PEF. It became obvious that these had not been

defined and consequently the level of discretion available to decision makers was high. The mapping exercise

relied on review of PEF documents including Minutes of the Board meetings and program committee, PEF

guidelines/notifications/SOPs, interviews with departmental heads and staff, field visits to 7 EVS schools

selected by the corresponding department (these were not intended to be random representative samples –

see below). The appropriateness of standards was determined on the basis of stated and perceived objectives

of PEF generally and the EV programme specifically, and solicited views of leading economists currently

working in the education sector in the Punjab. The impact of the programs and target populations were doubly

checked through beneficiary surveys conducted in the schools and selected households serving these schools.

Rationale and content of beneficiary surveys

The ultimate beneficiaries are those children who had been out of school and their households. Students in

PEF scheme schools of grades 5 and above were interviewed asking about their previous school history and

specifically whether or not they had been out—of-school for any period and if so for how long; the restriction

to grades 5 and above was to facilitate the interviewing process. Households with EVS students in any grade in

the immediate area of the school were interviewed to obtain similar information. There has been no attempt

to carry out a random representative sample survey across the whole district because the purpose of our

fieldwork was diagnostic, searching for possibilities not probabilities.

Therefore, although percentages are presented, they are not intended as point estimates or as demonstrating

statistically significant differences but only indicative of possible patterns in the different schemes.

Survey of students in schools and selected households in the vicinity of those schools

The hypothesis is that the students who are in EVS schools are not the ‘most deserving’. The focus of this

question was the EVS scheme and the comparison between the earlier and expansion phases. The question of

whether schools bribe parents to stay in school4 is a central to an assessment of corruption; we found the

answer to that question by identifying students who had had a long school career but a short gap before

joining a new EVS school for the first time, and carrying out a supplementary survey among them.

At each school, all students 5th

grade and above were brought together so that they could self-complete the

questionnaire when guided by a facilitator. With the help of EVS staff, our researchers also interviewed

households near the school whose children were beneficiaries of EVS. The rationale here was to check the

selection of households to be beneficiaries of EVS, comparing them to their characteristics to those of the

Poverty and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PLSM various years) for urban Lahore.

4 There are clear advantages in being a partner school, as demonstrated by the numbers of schools applying to be included

in the scheme (PEF documents).

5

In order to assess ‘wealth of household’, the current preferred approach is to ask about assets. For

comparison, we made the questions similar to those of the EVS Household Survey form which asks about

electricity, gas, telephone and transport; and we also asked about number of rooms.

Other Surveys

The principal of each school and 6 teachers were also interviewed: the former to understand the advantages

of being in EVS, the latter to find out their salaries because previous studies of private schools in rural areas

had shown that they depended on very poorly paid (mostly female) teachers (Andrabi, 2006a and 2006b).

Results of surveys

Achieved samples and their ‘validity’

Data has been collected from 323 students in grades 5 upwards in 3 EVS schools in earlier phase and 4 EVS

schools in the expansion phase. Households with EVS students in any grade in the immediate area of the

school were interviewed (N=137). There has been no attempt to carry out a random representative sample

survey across the whole province because: the purpose of our fieldwork was diagnostic, searching for

possibilities not probabilities. Therefore, although percentages are presented, they are not intended as point

estimates or as demonstrating statistically significant differences but only indicative of possible patterns.

Students in EVS schools

Education level of parents

The percentages of parents with primary or above can be compared approximately to the Poverty and Living

Standards Measurement Survey. The comparison is only approximate because the PLSM presents figures for

the percentage of population over the age of 10; and clearly with the rapid expansion of educational provision,

younger age groups are much more likely to have completed primary but they will not yet be parents. Overall

28% of mothers and 44% of fathers for EVS students, and 40% of mothers and 58% fathers of non-EVS

students in the survey have at least primary: this compares with 70% of females over 10 and 74% of males

over 10 in urban Lahore (and 39% of females over 10 and 60% of males over 10 in rural Lahore).

Comparing students in EVS schools in the earlier and expansion phases, the gap between the proportion of

mothers of EVS and non-EVS students with primary in the earlier phase (34% and 67% respectively) is wider

than overall; but, in the expansion phase, although there is a similar gap between the proportion of fathers

with primary, there is a much smaller gap between the proportion of mothers with primary (21% and 24%

respectively). The percentages for fathers hardly change between earlier and expansion phases.

Within EVS schools, the percentages with higher education are higher for those not in the scheme (19% and

26% respectively) compared to those in the EVS scheme (10% and 23% respectively). But when we compare

the earlier and expansion phases, the gap was much larger in the earlier phase (26 ppt difference for mothers

and 19 ppt difference for fathers); whilst in the expansion phase, EVS students were from households with

better educated parents than non-EVS students, although the differences are relatively small.

Surveys of households with EVS students

Educational level of mothers and fathers

If the responses of households are compared with the responses of the students in the corresponding schools,

the proportions of fathers and mothers reported to having completed at least primary in the earlier phases are

very similar, whilst the proportion of father and mothers reported to having completed primary in the

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expansion phase are lower than the proportions reported by the EVS students (but not substantially). Very few

of the households reported anyone with higher education so that comparison is not included here.

Did their children need EVS?

Several of the parents reported quite long schooling careers of their children: of those reporting a child with 6

or more years schooling (n = 33), 26 (79%) of those had spent more than 3 years in school without EVS; of

those who had spent 2 to 5 years in school (n = 49), 29 (59%) had spent more than 2 years in school without

EVS. This seemed odd; and so we decided to investigate this by interviewing students in ‘new’ EVS schools who

had reported long school careers. Out of 43 students interviewed, the average gap since their previous

schools was 5.7 months with smaller gaps for those who were in grades 6, 7 and 8; gaps were slightly longer

for girls (5.7 months) than for boys (4.7 months); and nine of the students had been in the same school. In

most cases, the student reported that her/his parents had not been able to pay fees for the last few months,

despite having been in school for several years. Given that these were all ‘new’ EVS schools – which had of

course been functioning as private schools beforehand –these short gaps are rather too coincidental to believe

they represent a sudden inability to pay fees after several years of paying fees.

Surveys of teachers

Of the 51 teachers, 44 were female and 7 were male. The average monthly salary of teachers is 3,550/-,

ranging from 1,500/- to 10,000/- depending on qualifications: the salaries of those with Matric averaging

2,070/- but those with a Higher qualification averaging 6,920/-. Exactly half of the 44 teachers had a salary of

3,000/- or less.

Conclusions

Compared to the average for Lahore urban the parents of students in EVS schools overall have lower education

levels. Among the students in EVS schools, in the earlier phase there was a marked difference between EVS

and non EVS students with the former having less educated parents, but this difference was reduced

considerably – and sometimes reversed -in the expansion phase. The expansion phase has been less targeted.

The special additional survey showed that there were many paying students who had left school – sometimes

the same school - for a few months because ‘they could not pay the fees’, it is also not clear that many of the

students ‘needed’ the EVS.

Activities and processes

The schemes involve a number of key activities and processes. These processes and activities are mapped in

order to document standards and criteria regulating decision- making and possibility and/or instances of

deviant behaviour.

Process matrix

Evidence has been compiled on decision points from selection of an area/ household for grant of vouchers,

recruitment/ selection of schools, requirements for the correct use of vouchers, PEF inputs, administering the

QAT, Learning Outcomes and Discontinuation of the partnership, ensuring schools adhere to the terms and

conditions of the partnerships. Each activity or process named in the first column is described in detail in the

second column, based on analysis of PEF and other documents and, where appropriate, the results of the

surveys discussed ;above and the risk assessment is made in the third column. The full tables can be seen in

the original report; the example of the selection of an area/ household for the grant of vouchers is given

below:

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Extract from Full Process Matrix for the Education Voucher Scheme

Selection of an area/households for grant of vouchers

Selection of an area/sub areas within a district

Districts are selected on basis of poverty maps e.g. from PLSM; Sub areas within the district are selected on the basis of information from Government offices and key personnel

5; A survey of 30 households is conducted to

ensure that the area is less affluent and/or under privileged.

There is moderate risk of poor areas being left out (Areas with sewerage problems and law and order issues seem to be avoided by surveyors). Due to high demand for EVS schools there is high risk of discretionary choices by PEF staff regarding poor areas.

Selection of households

Households for purposes of voucher registration are selected on the basis of the EVS Voucher Registration Data Collection Form. The form includes information about income and about children who had never been or were no longer at school. The survey is stopped when the number 5,000 is achieved and restarted where it had ended.

There is a high risk of very poor households not being accessed and hence not getting selected. This may happen because of absence of fixed address, the whole family out working, the lack of National Identity Cards, child labour, etc.

Selection of children

Criteria for selection of children are established. There are some post checks but information is based on replies of parents/guardians/care givers. Principals can propose children for registration. Break down of various categories of children (100,000) in EVS during 2011-12 is as follows:

Category % No

Out of School Children 22.8 22,800

Orphans 1.9 1,900

Children of divorcees 0.24 240

Children of parent with special needs 11.4 11400

Children at risk of drop out6 63.59 63,590

Total 99.93

Clearly the Program has been unable to attract many of the out–of–school children. Children deemed at risk of drop out are very high when they are apparently the lowest priority. Nomination of out-of-school children by principals carries a high risk of inappropriate selection. This should be replaced by an opportunity to apply to PEF for registration outside of the Voucher Registration campaigns. There is risk of incorrect entries being made in MS Excel, which is used for data entry, from Eligible Children Identification Forms (Ernst & Young, 2011, 10).

Summary of high risks of corruption in the EVS scheme

Risk area Risk group High risk of …

Selection of areas Poorest of the poor and vulnerable children being left out

Attendance of children Parents/Children with low motivation levels poor attendance rates/fee charging for absent students

Quality of tuition Children in schools with poor quality

teachers

poor educational outcomes

Quality of QAT Poor performing children the lowest percentile of students not studying/attending

Design issues Objective: PEF-EVS will ensure equity, productive efficiency, freedom of choice and social cohesion.

Equity: targeting in the EVS

District areas are chosen on the basis of the PLSM but the sub-areas are based on advice from key informants

rather than on objective criteria; and this is still the case despite the recommendation by Ernst & Young (2011,

p.5). Areas judged to be dangerous (possibly including those most needing education!) are not covered by the

EVS census.

5 Guidelines for EVS Area Assessment; Grant and Thornton Report, p 39

6 Assessed through the following questions in EVS VRDCF: ‘Have ever sent to school?’; ‘If yes was it Govt./ Pvt./

Madrasah?’; ‘Want to send to school again?’; These questions do not provide any information about likelihood of dropping out of school which is apparently determined through ‘discussion’.

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Nearly two thirds (64%) of children are registered because they are ‘at risk of dropping out’ assessed not

through specific questions but through discussion with the interviewer (possibly an intern) which gives her or

him a large amount of discretion and is likely to lead to the selection of the ‘nicer’ poor.

The registration process is based on a sequential house-to-house survey: the 2010-11 exercise which

registered 100,000 children from 41,000 households, children from about 47,000 households were not

registered because the household did not meet any of the above criteria, and children from a further 12,000

households were excluded because they were deemed non-responsive (including 6,000 where the relevant

children were in government schools); an unknown number of households were ignored because they were

empty or because the doors are locked, etc.

The omission of dangerous areas and perhaps other areas that key informants do not like, and the discretion

afforded the interviewer because of the lack of specific questions about ‘drop-out’ means that the very poor

are almost certainly excluded7, although children of the poorest of the poor are not an explicit target of EVS

8.

But the proportion of out-of-school children identified in the voucher registration process is almost exactly the

same as the proportion out-of-school estimated by the PLSM survey in urban Lahore of 21% of boys and 25%

of girls9 which suggests that the EVS is not targeting at all.

The numbers of vouchers distributed to each area is based on numbers of out-of-school, number of schools,

etc. but such factors are not formally considered by assigning proper ratings to each factor (Ernst and Young,

2011, p.6).

Productive efficiency

Half of teacher salaries in our sample – most of them women – are less than a dollar a day; given the urban

bias in our sample, this is likely to be an underestimate of the proportion of very low paid teachers. Low paid

women teachers provide a negative role model for girl students and their parents10

? Yet DFID’s own policies

include: “We want to see girls and women, who so often hold the key to development, becoming empowered

members of their communities. We will work to strengthen women’s voice and engagement in decision

making.” DID Business Plan 2011-15 Vision Statement.

DfID has also signed up to ILO’s Decent Work programme in which “Decent work involves opportunities for

work that is productive and delivers a fair in­come ...”(ILO ) The exploitation of labour is never efficient

because total welfare (consumer + producer surplus) decreases. EVS and NSP schools are a monopsony

purchaser of labour because there is no other job choice. Essentially this is an exploitative exercise of non-

competitive (monopsony) market power. UNESCO/ USAID (2008) commented that “Contract teachers hired as

educators with pay between 4,500 and 6,500 per month; and they have been complaining” (p.19)

The promotion of low cost private schools as a short term measure in the context of high cost public schooling

because of high teacher salaries, and until public schooling can be reformed, is probably sensible but not at the

7 This may well also be a problem with the PLSM and the Nielsen Survey, implying that they almost certainly underestimate

the percentages out-of-school. 8 This is despite a widespread impression outside PEF that EVS does target the poorest of the poor: Salman (2008), having

spent some time interacting with PEF staff over 2 years, states in his Executive Summary that “The EVS has been designed to extend maximum benefits to the poorest households” (p.xix). Four years later, during a visit to EVS schools in Rawalpindi, a “DfID team shown keen interest in PEF model of education which has ensured quality education for the poorest of the poor”, The Hope 14, p.9. 9 The Nielsen survey restricted to those aged 5-9 gives much lower – and rather unbelievable - estimates (5% of boys and

9% of girls) of the percentages out-of school in urban Lahore; and that should be reconciled with the PLSMS estimates. 10

It is also ironic that one of the expected outcomes of the EVS scheme is women’s empowerment.

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cost of exploiting large numbers of women at less than a dollar a day11

. Minimum wages should be raised;

opportunities for additional qualifications and training should also be a statutory right provided to the

teachers.

Freedom of choice and social cohesion

For Salman “The main purpose of educational vouchers is to enhance school choice for low income families”

Executive Summary, p.xviii) “The EVS makes the school accountable to the parents instead of government

departments” (ibid). Salman (2009) went on the point out that one of the unintended consequences of

‘freedom of choice’ for parents was that some EVS schools had started paying parents to attract more

students. Indeed, when he was investigating parents were playing schools off against each other; and in turn

schools competed by offering different incentives. We were assured that this no longer happens as once a

student is enrolled for the year s/he cannot change school.

There is however another situation in which this may happen because Principals can propose children for

registration after the Partnership has been established. During the pilot phase of registration in any area only 2

children per household can be registered but in the expansion phase that restriction was lifted; it is obviously

easier for the Principal to enrol 3rd

and 4th

children of households rather than recruit new households.

In principle, freedom of choice should mean schools are more accountable to parents. There was, in fact, no

evidence that parents became involved in school governance12

. nor that parents had chosen the school

because it was presumed to have better quality (cf. IDS 2008, .49).

Value For money

Competition:

The basic purpose of turning to private sector provision is to promote competition to improve quality. But

there have been very few failures (less than 1% a year) which is much less than the usual failure rate in the

private sector even in a booming economy.

Measurement of learning outcomes

The measurement of Learning Outcomes through the QAT tests is unclear as there is no detailed feedback to

schools, and there is no real comparison with external tests. Discontinuation should be based on a wider

range of indicators especially for children from poor households who have more difficulty with formal tests

(IDS 2009).

Findings and Conclusions

Whilst PEF is a functional organization with functional controls and systems, there are key design and

implementation issues in the EVS. Design issues are that:

a. Due priority is not accorded to the poorest of the poor and vulnerable children. There is nothing to encourage

schools to reach out to poor students

b. Efforts to maintain teacher quality are absent or minimal; and the very low salaries for many women are a

disgrace. There is no effort to improve educational outcomes of the lowest 20th

percentile of students who

learn little if anything.

11

Pace Andrabi, Das and Kawaji (2006, 2008)) who in writing “Pakistan at this stage presents a fascinating glimpse of an

environment that many higher income countries witnessed 50 years ago” (Andrabi 2006, p.19) appear to rather welcome their situation. 12

It is surprising that DFID has not been more concerned about this.

10

c. The threshold to clear the QAT is low, which affects the usefulness of QAT as an anti-corruption tool; and,

along with several other commentators, we recommend that the QAT should be aligned with PEC or NAES in

order to be able to assess learning outcomes comparatively.

d. Freedom of choice has not led to schools being more accountable to parents and competition hardly exists

because the failure rate is less than 1%.

e. There is no programme of external evaluation of the scheme.

Implementation issues are that:

a. There is a lack of focused efforts to reach out to the poorest of the poor and vulnerable children like children

engaged in labor. This issue is closely linked with the design of the three schemes.

b. PEF depends on school records to check attendance. However schools frequently fake records and PEF can

only monitor attendance through surprise checks, which cannot check the widespread incidence of this

practice. Due to the low clearance threshold of QAT, Schools have no reason to push all students to attend and

do well.

c. Students are forced to take private tuition and/or buy help books etc. Private tuition means that while PEF

pays for students they do not get requisite inputs and they have to pay to obtain some or all of them. This

practice also reduces the value of QAT as an anti-corruption or measurement tool regarding PEF inputs

d. The work of the M&E is hampered by its staff being borrowed by other departments and by the lack of

seriousness with which its reports of possible irregularities are treated by senior management (long delays and

lack of any serious penalties).

The proliferation of public-private partnerships means that extra care has to be taken about formulating

contracts in order to minimise corruption. We have shown how corruption possibilities can be identified

through analysis of documents, interviews and purposive surveys of local providers and service users. This can

then be the basis of more appropriate contracts. In this particular case, a floor of 3,000PKR should be brought

in immediately to teachers’ salaries and then they should be raised progressively, quality auditors – not the

‘Big Six’ - should be brought is to monitor what is happening and in particular, the rates of return available to

aspiring entrepreneurs and the probability that PEF is substituting for parents who are already paying should

be thoroughly investigated.

11

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