The Enbaling and Constraining Effects of Strategic Narratives: Nationalist Discourse and China's...

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Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences A Quarterly Volume 6 Number 2 June 2013 Contents Special TopicChina Studies The Dimensions and Influence of Chinas African PowerApplying Theo retical Considerations in Practice Fanie HermanAndrew Szanajda 23 The Enabling and Constraining Effects of Strategic NarrativesNationalist Discourse and Chinas Foreign Relations Liao Ning 56 Political Confidence in the New Emerging EconomiesA Comparative Analysis of the BRICS Countries Lü Peng 87 Incorporating Civil SocietyChinas NGO Strategy Curtis Stone Articles 110 Translation and ImitationFrom Pygmalion to Confucius Saw Nancy Li Ping  Sin Kingkui 128 The Secret of Secret Germany”: An Unknown Story behind Operation ValkyrieWu Yongli  Zhao Yi Book Reviews 143 Wang YuankangHarmony and WarConfucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics by Gregory J. Moore 151 Sujian Guo and Baogang Guoeds. Greater China in an Era of Globalization by Justine Zheng Ren 157 Mikhail Aleksandrovich BakuninBakunin on AnarchySelected Works by the ActivistFounder of World Anarchism by Lin Xi 164 New Books Within the Academe 168 Economic Growth in the PostCrisis Period Daniel Lam 178 Contributors

Transcript of The Enbaling and Constraining Effects of Strategic Narratives: Nationalist Discourse and China's...

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Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social SciencesA Quarterly

Volume 6 Number 2 June 2013

Contents

  1   Special Topic:China Studies  1 The Dimensions and Influence of Chinas African Power:Applying Theo

retical Considerations in Practice Fanie Herman,Andrew Szanajda23 The Enabling and Constraining Effects of Strategic Narratives:Nationalist

Discourse and Chinas Foreign Relations Liao Ning56 Political Confidence in the New Emerging Economies:A Comparative

Analysis of the BRICS Countries Lü Peng87 Incorporating Civil Society:Chinas NGO Strategy Curtis Stone

Articles110 Translation and Imitation:From Pygmalion to Confucius Saw Nancy

Li Ping  Sin Kingkui128 The Secret of “Secret Germany”:An Unknown Story behind “Operation

Valkyrie” Wu Yongli  Zhao Yi

Book Reviews143 Wang Yuankang:Harmony and War:Confucian Culture and Chinese Power

Politics by Gregory J. Moore151 Sujian Guo and Baogang Guo,eds.:Greater China in an Era of Globalization

by Justine Zheng Ren157 Mikhail Aleksandrovich Bakunin:Bakunin on Anarchy:Selected Works by the

ActivistFounder of World Anarchism by Lin Xi

164 New Books

Within the Academe168 Economic Growth in the PostCrisis Period Daniel Lam

178 Contributors

Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social SciencesVol. 6,No. 2,2013

The Enabling and Constraining Effects of Strategic Narratives:Nationalist Discourse and Chinas Foreign Relations

Liao Ning

Abstract:This paper examines the projection and reception of strategicnarratives in the realm of Chinese nationalism and the impact of contemporaryofficial nationalist discourse on Beijings foreign policy making. Within the analyticframework of political symbolism,the paper dissects the divergent national identitiesreflective in different semantic and syntactic relationships inherent in the statecraftedhistorical narratives in contemporary China. In the postTiananmen era, thesignification of the traumatic symbol of national humiliation in modern Chinesehistory,projected in the form of strategic narratives by the Partystate in patrioticeducation,has given rise to a societal force that threatens to internalize the historicalconflicts on the foreign relations front. The countereffect of strategic narratives,which has constrained the rationality of the states foreign policy making,impliesthat collective memory is not an ondemand resource for the authoritarian regime toexploit to enhance its legitimacy. The relationship between the Chinese state andsociety as the constructor and consumer of communicative nationalism cannot besimplistically dichotomized.

Key words:strategic narratives;collective memory;Chinese nationalism;foreign policy making

1. Introduction

As a Weberian social fact, memories are not only possessed byindividuals, but also consumed by collectivities. Considering thefrequent lack of immediacy in firsthand recollection,the constructionof socially embedded memory needs to rely on cultural representation bymeans of symbolic techniques,which encode and preserve memoriesinto narrative stories that are distributed among group members. Byexploiting the symbolic resources in the repertoire of political culture,political actors can narrate the past to reflect the present and even toformulate the future. In the process of cultural representation, theconstruction of collective memory can be seen as the projection ofstrategic narratives,which,according to Miskimmon,OLoughlin,andRoselle(1),are “a means . . . to construct a shared meaning . . .,[so

as to] to shape the perceptions,beliefs,and behavior of[political]actors.”Insofar as narratives serve to define the role of the state in itsinteraction with domestic societal forces and its position on theinternational stage,the strategic deployment of historical narratives iscentral to social identification and policy legitimization in the domains ofdomestic politics and foreign relations. Thus,political actors seeking tomobilize societal resources typically resort to strategic narratives to invokepublic memory,which has the promise to enact collective identity andlegitimize their policies.

Along this line of reasoning,the construction of collective memoryand national identity naturally becomes a contested arena. This isespecially true in an authoritarian state like China. History educationstaged by the Chinese Communist Party(CCP),as a crux element ofthe moralideological pedagogy of the socalled “patriotic educationcampaign,”has constituted an integral component in the indoctrinationof master historical narratives crafted by the Partystate. In the aftermathof the 1989 Tiananmen prodemocracy movement, the CCP wasengaged in the political endeavor of strategically narrating nationalhistory by virtue of the nationwide patriotic bandwagon. To glorify theCommunist Party and consolidate the national identity conducive to thefilial devotion of the general populace to the state government,nationalvictimization by foreign aggression was highlighted in officialnationalism. Such strategic narratives,to some extent,served to directChinas popular demand for internal democratic movements to theexternal targets attributed as the prime culprits of national humiliation inits modern history. However,the projection and reception of strategicnarratives is not a simple linear or a topdown process,but rather adiscursive terrain wherein both the Partystate and popular masses,withtheir interchangeable roles of actor and audience on the performingplatform of nationalism,are mutually constitutive(Gries 2004a). Whileeffectively enlisting public political loyalty to the nationstate andboosting the regime legitimacy,the strategic narratives employed by theauthoritarian regime to mythologize national history have transformedinto what Goldstein and Keohane(9)call the “principled beliefs”heldby likeminded actors,who judge diplomatic events as simply right(just) or wrong (unjust). Once foreign provocations concerningcontroversial historical issues breach these “principled beliefs,” the

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inconsistency between Beijings diplomatic stance and the legitimateddomestic convention will put the authority and legitimacy of the regimedirectly at stake. Given that popular agency has rendered the opinions ofdomestic audiences an endogenous variable of the CCPs foreign policymaking,the counternarratives of societal forces,appropriated from thestateimposed category of political communication and projected throughcommercialized media,threaten to undermine the regimes efforts tomediate conflicts or disagreements in foreign affairs. In view of therhetorical transaction between the Chinese state and society, it isplausible to argue that the warranted domestic expectations churned upby the strategic narratives fomented by the authoritarian regime can forceitself into a predicament.

This paper contextualizes the “linkage politics”(Rosenau 1969,1997)of Chinese foreign relations in the discursive texture of strategicnarratives that are implicated in memory construction and consumption.It attempts to explore the communicative dynamics of Chinese politicalculture,which have been instrumentalized by both the authoritarianregime and societal forces in their political claimmaking. The first partof the paper offers an overview of the formation,projection,andreception of the strategic narratives employed in the CCPs patrioticeducation campaign. To demonstrate the symbolic function of strategicnarratives,the second section deconstructs the transformation of strategicnarratives in the mythmaking of modern Chinese historiography,illuminating the way in which the narrative construction of divergentnational identities reflect varied semantic and syntactic relationships instatesanctioned historical accounts. The third part elucidates how themaster historical narratives,from which nationalist discourse is derived,are turned against the CCP leadership in its foreign policy making,andthe contribution of commercialized media to the delegitimizing effects ofstrategic narratives under the legitimate banner of patriotism.

2. Patriotic Education:Historical Representation and the SocialPragmatics of Strategic Narratives

Too often,the dissemination and consolidation of the meanings that aredistilled into collective memory are processes of creating “true”

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discourse through the narrative arrangements of the symbolic elementsexisting in national history. In this sense,the construction of masterhistorical narrative and the enactment of national identity in the form ofstrategic narratives can be canvassed within the symbolic canopy ofpolitical communication. According to the semiological approachadopted by Lowell Dittmer in his definition of political culture,politicalsymbolism consists of the linguistic components of signs,referents,andsignifications,in addition to the communicative variables such as codes,transmitters,channels,and so forth. Such a communicative systemfunctions as a dynamic link between two categories of actors—elites andmasses—on the basis of the pragmatic, semantic, and syntacticrelationships among its variables(Dittmer 556,570 571). In theenterprise of Chinese official nationalism, the symbolic system ofpolitical communication is embodied in the cognitive and normativeconnotations of national historical memory as constructed in the patrioticeducation campaign.

In terms of the social pragmatics of political culture, unlikereligious or literary symbolism, one defining feature is politicalexpediency, which inevitably involves the manipulation ofcommunicative symbols by political elites in an attempt to concoct aseries of strategic narratives that are expected to influence the opinionsheld by the masses. “Social groups,”Dittmer(571)points out,“areirrelevant to the political culture system unless they participate in themanipulation of symbols(in which case they become elites).”Politicalactors wielding regime power have their vested interest in constructingthe symbolic memory. Given that nationalism is often treated as acentripetal force turning national affiliation into political solidarity,collective memory,as a primary raw material to construct nationalidentity,is an ideal and convenient resource to promulgate strategicnarratives in the nationalist discourse. As Stephen Crites(172)claims,“A self without a story contracts into the thinness of its personalpronoun.”The storylines narrated in the collective memory providesignificant epistemic resources to ratify national identity and reinforcesocial cohesion,which is mobilized in accordance to the current politicalagenda. Here,an important theoretical element in understanding the“strategic agency”(Antoniades,OLoughlin,& Miskimmon 6) inconstructing memory and identity is the “schemata”(Bartlett 208)that

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dictates the narration of historical episodes. To institute a “regime oftruth,”Chinas patriotic education revolves around the centerpiece ofthe relationship between the Partystate and the Chinese nation,whichcan be construed as what James Wertsch(2002;2009:12832)termsthe “schematic narrative template”characterizing the configuration ofstatecrafted historical narratives. Following such a primary plot line,patriotic education was patterned into the incessant articulation of theCCPs role identity as the sole savior and guardian of the nation and itscredentials for the entitlement to the monopolistic grip on politicalpower. This “schemata”has constituted a stable and constant themeepitomizing all the “specific narratives”relating the role identity of theCommunist Party to the historical vicissitudes of the Chinese nation. 〔1〕This fundamental structuring logic has guided current nationalistdiscourse concerning the involvement of the Communist Party in theChinese revolution. As asserted by Hu Jintao,then General Secretaryof the Party,at the congregation commemorating the 90 th anniversary ofthe founding of the CCP:

In the 170 plus years since the Opium War of 1840,our great country has weathereduntold hardships,our great nation has waged earthshaking struggles,and our great peoplehave scored splendid achievement in the annals of history. Following the Opium War,China gradually became a semicolonial and semifeudal society,and foreign powersstepped up their aggression against China. The feudal rule became increasingly corrupt,the country was devastated by incessant wars and turbulence,and the Chinese peoplesuffered from hunger,cold,and oppression. To salvage China from subjugation was anurgent mission for the Chinese nation. And the Chinese people faced the historic tasks ofwinning independence and liberation . . . . The birth of the[CCP]was a natural productof the development of modern and contemporary Chinese history as well as theindomitable exploration of the Chinese people for survival of the nation. [It]put theChinese revolution on the right course,gave the Chinese people a powerful motivation,and created bright prospects for Chinas future development.(July 1,2011)

After recounting the historical role the CCP has played in the newdemocratic revolution,the socialist revolution and the establishment ofthe socialist system,and the reform and opening up over the past 90years,which was described as “a grand epic in the history of humandevelopment on[the]ancient land of China,”Hu continued to state:

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〔1〕 For the differentiation between “specific narratives”and “schematic narrative templates,”seeWertsch(2002).

These three major events reshaped the future and destiny of the Chinese people and theChinese nation. They irreversibly ended the misery endured by China in modern timeswhen it suffered from both domestic turmoil and foreign invasion and was poor and weak.They also irreversibly started the Chinese nations historic march for development,growth,and great rejuvenation. They gave China,a civilization of over 5,000 years,acompletely new look and created unimagined prospects for the great rejuvenation of theChinese nation. What has happened shows that in the great cause of Chinas socialdevelopment and progress since modern times,history and the people have chosen the[CCP]. . . History has also fully shown that the[CCP]truly deserves to be called agreat,glorious and correct Marxist political party,and the core force leading the Chinesepeople in breaking new ground in development.(July 1,2011)

As shown in Hus official statement,the regime legitimacy of theCCP is symbolized in its role identity as the genuine representative ofthe Chinese nation. The strategic narration of historiography often needs“an evaluative framework in which good or bad character helps toproduce unfortunate or happy outcome”(MacIntyre 456). Within sucha mainstay structure reigning in Chinas patriotic education, causallinkage is established between the source of the traumatic humiliationinflicted on the Chinese nation—the corrupt feudal rule and foreignsubjugation—and the foundation of the CCP,depicted as an inevitableoutcome of Chinas modern history. The decisive role that theCommunist regime has played throughout the path taken by the Chinesenation along its independence, liberation,and modern developmentvalidates the capability of the Communist leadership. This “sourcepathgoal schematic pattern,”as termed by Polkinghorne(142),is a tellingexample of the “causal transformation”(Antoniades et al. 4;Todorov45)in modern China—“a semicolonial and a semifeudal society”toan independent and strengthening nationstate,thanks to the leadershipof the Communist regime—that has been demonstrated in the narrativeframing of the Chinese patriotic education.

In terms of the rhetorical transaction between the elites and massesin the political communication system, how well the statedrivenstrategic narratives are received by the general populace is,according toMichael Schudsons(1989a)analysis on the power of cultural symbols,less dependent on the audiences personal interests in the content ornature of the narratives themselves than on the position of the narratedmemory “in the cultural tradition of the society the audience is a partof”(169). Only when historical representation is contextualized within

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such social milieu can it become intelligible. Given that reconstructing amodern state is an unfailing dynamic driving the tenacious struggle ofgenerations of Chinese political elites,the representativeness of the CCPfits the ongoing purposive action of the Chinese nation in recovering itspowerful status in the international community,and is thus resonantwith the targeted audience of the strategic narratives formulated for thesake of political mobilization. In fact,the historical identification of theCCP has become a “stability narrative” in the official nationalistdiscourse,through which the experiential elements of the Chinesecollective memory are indexed “in a way that the trajectory remainsessentially unchanged”(Gergen 104). To achieve the rhetorical efficacyof such a “stability narrative,” the ruling elites, in the “symbolicenhancement”of the incumbent regime,as Dittmer proposes(542,574),“may attempt to enhance the status of the collectivity[it]represents,and emphasize the indissoluble linkage between the office[it]holds and the high status and great power of that collectivity,alluding frequently to[its] own competence as an incumbent andderiding[its] opponents inexperience.” This technique of socialrepresentation is widely used in the formulation of strategic narratives inthe CCPs patriotic education. For instance, Jiang Zemin,Huspredecessor,once articulated the “indissoluble linkage”of the Partystate and the Chinese nation in an assertive manner:

Our party has inherited and carried forward the Chinese nations outstanding tradition,andhas made the biggest sacrifice and the biggest contribution in the struggle of nationalindependence and safeguarding the national sovereignty. We have therefore won theheartfelt love and support from people of all nationalities in China. The ChineseCommunist is the firmest,the most thoroughgoing patriot. Chinese Communist Partyspatriotism is the highest model of conduct for the Chinese nation and the Chinese people.(October 10,1996)

Given the bitter memory of extraterritoriality and concession imposed byforeign aggression and subjugation,the absolutist notions of “nationalindependence”and “national sovereignty”inferred from the traumaticexperience of national humiliation have been ingrained in Chinesepolitical culture as the “ideational codes,”or the “distinctive patterns ofassumptions”(Elkins & Simeon 12829;Keesing 71),of the basicproperty of the Chinese nation. The historic agency of the CCP in

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restoring national unity has,as claimed in Jiangs speech and otherauthoritative political documents,effectively enacted the “indissolublelinkage” between the state—the alleged indefatigable defender ofChinas territoriality and sovereignty—and the nation,whose felt needof cleansing national humiliation can be fulfilled by the incumbentregime. Within such a mainstay scheme,the identity role of the regimeis symbolized as the paramount patriotic force capable of protecting thenation from foreign intrusion and leading it to modernization. To theextent that the Partystate is legitimized through appeals to theconsensual assumptions inherent in Chinese political culture, theChinese general populace is exhorted to rally around the CommunistParty on the basis of the instructed motto that love of the nation isindistinguishable from support of the state.

How,then,does this “mnemonic legitimation,”as JanWernerMüller(26)names it,make its way into public awareness?To enhancetheir communicative efficacy,the reception of the elitedriven strategicnarratives projected in patriotic education is to be guaranteed by anothervein of “strategic agency”—the social and institutional reinforcement ofthe patriotic education. Just as memory is a social undertakingmanifested in cultural practices,so do commemorative narratives,the“meaningmaking apparatus”(Schwartz 17) of political culture,function in institutionalized social relations,where the shared meaningslodged in the collective memory are enacted(Schudson 1989a:170;1992:347). To shore up the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime,patriotic education perpetuates in Chinese political institutions as animportant venue of consensus building. Today,more than two decadesafter the pro democracy protests,patriotic education is still crucial tomustering allegiance to the unity of the nationstate and thus underscoredin the CCPs renewed strategy of cultural revival. In an officialdocument rectified in the sixth plenary session of the 17 th CCPsCommittee,patriotism is affirmed as one of the “core socialist values”:

Patriotism is the deepest intellectual tradition of the Chinese nation,and it is the thingmost able to arouse Chinese sons and daughters to unite in struggle . . . . We need to carryout education in a national spirit on a broad scale,put great effort into fostering ideologiesof patriotism,collectivities and socialism;strengthen peoples sense of national pride,selfconfidence and selfesteem;encourage people to turn their patriotic fervor into practicalaction to revitalize the country;and view it as the greatest honor to love the motherland

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and contribute all their strength to developing the motherland and as the greatest disgraceto harm the motherlands interests and dignity. (The CCP Central Committee October18,2011)

To sustain social recognition,public acceptance,and ethical practice ofthe “national spirit”with patriotism,the Partystate is aware that theideological pedagogy aimed to mobilize and unite the whole nationshould be “physically present”and “cognitively memorable”in socialrelations(Schudson 1989a:163). History education is a social channelto achieve such institutionalization,whereby statesanctioned narrativescan be readily retrieved by the general populace. As nationalhistoriography has been integrated into the national educationalcurriculum up to the postgraduate levels,all college students are requiredto study modern national history,an indispensable component in thecompulsory politics course. In statecentric history education,the testingof national historiography is an irreplaceable means for “memoryentrepreneurs,”to borrow Elizabeth Jelin et al. s term(3336),toexecute the retention of master commemorative narratives withoutcontestation. Apart from the college entrance examinations,the modernChinese history is an essential part in the nationwide matriculation examof graduate schools. Regardless of their major,students in the admissiontest of politics subject,which is required for all the examinees,have toretrieve the “true”historical knowledge and relate the information tocontemporary Chinese politics. Their answers,of course,must dovetailwell with the official discourse printed in statesanctioned textbooks—another pedagogical element of history education manifesting thequintessence of institutionalized patriotic education. To be erected asorthodox knowledge,collective memory is always distributed throughthe usage of textbooks. Viewed in this light,textbook writing is a“memory regime,” whereby master commemorative narrativespromulgated by the “privileged interpreters”of national history,alongwith the codified judgment of historical events,are transmitted into theminds of the national audience(Langenbacher 30 32). In order tomaximize the discursive power of patriotic education, the Chinesegovernment draconically assumes dominant control over historytextbooks,which are mandatory for all the school education. Thecompilation and revision of these textbooks are unconditionally subject

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to rigid censorship by the government. In the process of the selectionand organization of historical knowledge,the CCP has managed toinsulate the master discourse of national history from any form ofalteration. Through discursive colonization,the molding of collectivememory in the symbolic system of patriotic education provides a pretextto purge various forms of “unofficial history”(Jin 2004;2006:36),which is perceived by the regime to deflect the dogmatic conclusion ofpast events drawn by state authorities. Any attempts to challenge thesymbolic relationship between the Partystate and the nation aretantamount to treason(Zhao 2004). In this way,heterodox socialvoices in discord with the consensual narrative of national history arerelentlessly coerced,which facilitates the “symbolic enhancement”ofregime legitimacy.

3. The Selectivity of Master Historical Narratives: MythicSymbols and Signified Identities

In a stereotypical manner,the construction of collective memory iscollapsed into the enactment of myth. That is why historical events incollective memory are often simplified by being reduced to singledimensional pictures(see,e. g.,Nora 1989;Novick 1999). In thecommunicative system, mythmaking national history is basically amanifestation of strategic narratives formulated by the state in its politicalundertaking such as the “symbolical enhancement” of regimelegitimacy,which,in turn,is associated with the reconfiguration ofnational identity implicated in the statecrafted historical narratives.

In the system of political symbolism proposed by Dittmer,thestrategic mythmaking of modern Chinese history in the form of officialnationalist discourse can be dissected into two types of politicalcommunications:the semantic and syntactic relationships between thecommunicative constituents. Since the selection of mythic symbols iscontextspecific,it is invariably subject to the imperative that thesesymbols remain relevant to shifting domestic and / or internationalcircumstances. This process of selectivity inherent in the formation ofstrategic narratives,wherein national history is mythologized,reflectsthe semantic dimension of political culture, demonstrating “the

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relationship between the symbol and the political reality . . . it refers to”(Dittmer 571). To justify state behavior in domestic politics and itsforeign relations,historical narratives are often framed into “structures ofattention”and “structures of inattention”in different semantic contexts(Bal). Meanwhile,within the enterprise of Chinese nationalism,abanner under which historical narratives are wrapped, the mythicsymbols bearing diverse socially binding connotations are signified intodiverging identities. This communicative process can be interpreted interms of the syntactic relationship between the dichotomized identities ofingroup(self) and outgroup(others)—the adversarial signs in thesyntax of historical narratives—engraved on the Chinese collectivememory. Since the founding of the Peoples Republic of China(PRC),diverse narrative paradigms have been applied to Chinesemodern historiography. Correspondingly, in the stateled historyeducation,two paradoxical symbols for historical representation,amongothers,have been employed in the mythmaking undertaken by thePartystate:the triumph of the Chinese people in the Communistrevolution led by the CCP and the trauma that the nation suffered in the“century of national humiliation.”The distinctive connotations of thesymbolic polarities are communicated through diametrically opposedsigns and signified into antithetical identities:China as a victor andChina as a victim(see,e. g.,Gries 2004a:6985;Wang 2008;2012:95117).

During much of the Cold War period,given that the imminentthreats from the superpowers and the backwardness of its socioeconomicdevelopment predicated Chinas weak position on the global stage,thefledging regime was in bad need of a political symbol to substantiate itsalleged capability of safeguarding national security in adverse diplomaticconditions. Moreover,for a Party that was headed by a charismaticleader who was obsessed with the purported “grand enterprise ofcontinuous revolution”(Chen), symbolic representation that coulderect the heroic image of the regime was essential to the mobilization ofthe broadbased popular support for a series of radical initiatives staged bythe revolutionary state. Among a myriad of candidates for the masterhistorical narrative,the triumphant account of the Communist Party andthe Chinese people—depicted as a collective individual due to their“indissoluble linkage”—in warfare of national liberation,was privileged

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as the most appropriate theme fitting the structuring logic of the statecentered historiography in Maos China. Mandated by domestic andinternational political considerations,“structures of attention” areconcomitant with “structures of inattention.”Some narratives,whichdid not to align with its selflegitimation of the state,were dealt withcursorily in the construction of collective memory. Most notably,thetrauma of the Chinese nation endured in the second SinoJapanese War,officially labeled the AntiJapanese War(kangri zhanzheng,19371945),was stylized as a peripheral issue in public remembrance(see,e. g.,Reilly 2006:192). A case in point was the scant attention that historyeducation paid to the Nanjing Massacre,one of the most appallingatrocities of the Japanese invasion. Until the 1980s,not only did theofficial propagandized historiographical teleology of the PRC chose tosoftpedal this wartime suffering of the Chinese people,as noted byYang Dali(858),scholarly investigation of this holocaust was alsocriticized for stoking nationalist resentment against Japan, and thussuppressed into silence. Such intended amnesia,it should be noted,didnot consign the Japanese invasion of Manchuria to historical oblivion.Due to the totalitarian regimes marked focus on class struggle,the starkcontrast between the virtue of the Communist Party and the evil ofNationalist Kuomintang (KMT), the two protagonists representingdiametrically opposed classes,overshadows the SinoJapanese conflict tobe the ideal signs for the ingroup and outgroup categorization in thestrategic mythmaking(see,e. g.,Mitter:282283). It is thus hardlysurprising that the positive contribution of the KMT led by Chiang Kaishek in the SinoJapanese War was dealt with cursorily, or evenignored,in official discourse. On the 20 th anniversary of the Communistvictory over Japan,Lin Biao(12),then Vicechairman of the CCPsCentral Committee,wrote,“The basic reason[for the victory][was]that the War of Resistance against Japan was a genuine peoples war ledby the[CCP]and Comrade Mao Tsetung.”More significantly,thefissure between the two Parties is directly related to the syntacticconnotation of the triumphal symbol. The demarcation of the oppositesign occurring in the same historical event provided a peculiar referent—Chiang Kaisheks troops whose passive resistance against Japaneseinvasion was highlighted—to extol the competence of the ingroup. Inan authoritative document of the CCP,Chiangs resistance to Japan was

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pinned down as the “consequence of the serious blow Japanese invasiondealt to the interests of AngloU. S. imperialism in China as well as tothose of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie whom Chiang Kaishekdirectly represented.”With regard to the impact of the KMT on theCommunist victory, it specifically noted that “Chiang opposed thegeneral mobilization of the people for total war, and adopted thereactionary policy of passivity and resisting Japan but actually opposingthe Communist and the people”(Mao iii). What is connoted fromsuch historical representation was the juxtaposition of a competentCommunist Party,which was given full credit to the triumphal nationalindependence and affirmed the “victor”identity of the nationstate,andits Nationalist opponent that was demonized as a corrupt,incompetent,and reactionary regime mainly responsible for the suffering of theChinese nation in its modern history. In the syntactic sense,the selfother categorization textually derived from the master historical discoursecommunicates the selfglorifying connotation of the incumbent regimepaired with the othermaligning connotation that was used todelegitimize the competing regime. As the communicative componentsof the “symbolic enhancement” project of regime legitimacy,thesebinary connotative meanings of strategic mythmaking accord with theclassstruggle thesis,the preordained mission of the revolutionary state.

In the postMao reform era,with the significant transformation ofChinese society and the regime itself,the mantra of class struggle,theCCP leadership was aware,could not ameliorate intraparty factions andthe rampant complaints made by a large part of the populace that wasadversely affected by the economic reform. Rather,given the glaringdisparity of wealth distribution—a byproduct of the socioeconomicdevelopment and centrifugal force of social cohesion, narrativesjustifying classstruggle initiatives would go against the initiative oftransforming the planned economy to a market economy. The volatiledomestic politics,which was intricately linked to the waning appeals ofMarxistLeninistMaoist vision and the collapse of EuropeanCommunism and the sanctions imposed by the West in the aftermath ofthe Tiananmen crackdown, pushed the authoritarian regime torummage in the reservoir of political culture for an ideology that couldeffectively mitigate the social and political fissure. The shift in theinternal and external environments marked the onset of a renewed

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promotion of nationalism. Similar to the historical representation inMaoist era,patriotic education in the late 1980s and the early 1990sresorted to this “symbolic reserve”(J. H. Liu & Atsumi 330) ofmythmaking to inspire the unity of the nationstate. However,facingnew sociopolitical challenges, the triumphant theme of Chinesehistoriography,which shaped the image of the heroic revolutionary statethat was at odds with the social reality of market economy,wasrevamped in a narrative paradigm wherein different mythic symbols wereconjured. To direct popular grievance emanating from the deterioratinginternal tension to external entities, the ruling elites needed somesymbolic targets as a source of scapegoat that had little to do with themajor issues besetting the sustainment of regime legitimacy. Within sucha semantic context,the endemic memory of national victimization byforeign aggression stood out from the “symbolic reserve,” serving torekindle popular rancor toward external targets and thus to energize thepopulace disillusioned by the discrediting Communist ideology.

Revolving around the newlyselected symbol,or the “chosentrauma,”as termed by Vamik Volkan(Volkan 1997:3669;2004a),what the master historical narrative really “chose”was “to mythologizeand psychologize the mental representation of [a tragic] event”(2004b). To augment the breadth of acceptance of the symbolicrepresentation and the intensity of its rhetoric resonance, Chinastraumatic experience as a result of the imperialist encroachment waswidely propagated in history education. As the most recent and worsthumiliation in modern Chinese history,the Japanese invasion that wasdownplayed in Maoist historiography became one of the showpieces inthe trend of the “new remembering of World War II,”to borrow aphrase proposed by Arthur Waldron(869). Detailed information aboutthe Chinese suffering in the SinoJapanese War,which had beenepitomized in the rapeofChina theme prevalent in the preMaoist era,was again presented in detail in both official media and popular culture.Research delving into the Japanese invasion, once marginalized inMaoist years,was packaged into the agenda of patriotic education.Consistent with the official discourse and media coverage,whichfeatured what Parks Coble(404405)describes as the “number game”to sensationalize the horror of the Japanese imperialism in the cataclysmicwar, collections of archival material and academic volumes,

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documenting the magnitude of the atrocities committed by the Japanesetroops,sprang out in the patriotic education campaign. It is in this sensethat the statesanctioned historical accounts are in effect the “livednarratives,”defined by Gergen(112) as a form of intersubjectiveunderstanding with its emotional performance embedded within a broadpattern social relationship. By activating the “connotative property”(Dittmer 568)of the mythic symbol,the “mental representation”ofnational trauma at the hands of Japanese invaders has infused the empathyof the audience.

Through the empathetic representation of memory agents, the“tragic narratives”(Gergen 105)of the Chinese nation are naturallysignified into victimhood identity. The shifting focus on the “chosentrauma,” however, does not rule out the significance of heroicnarratives in the mythmaking of modern Chinese history. In theirrepresentation of Japanese brutality,the war museums,as well as thewritings highlighting the national humiliation,have to strike a balancebetween the depiction of Chinese trauma and the narration of thefortitude of the Chinese nation in resisting against imperialist incursion(Denton 251). Under the overriding theme of “not forgetting nationalhumiliation”(wuwang guochi),the literature detailing the defiant struggleof the Chinese people coexists with the historical narration of brutalJapanese imperialism (see, Coble 404; Cohen 18). Thus, thevictimhood identity, signified from the mythic symbol of “chosentrauma”and nuanced master narratives,is borne out by the syntacticconnotation that “Chinas goal for the great national rejuvenation relieson the solidarity of the people and the strong leadership of the[CCP].”〔2〕As the renewed nationalist discourse has been inscribed inhighlyinstitutionalized education practices,the mediated consumptionof the “chosen” traumatic symbol has created a sense of nationalcommunity equating the Chinese nation with its state. In this sense,thenationalist sentiment conveyed through the “connotative property”ofthe selected symbol becomes a legitimating glue to solidify nationalcohesion and nurture the filial devotion of the citizenry to the Party

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〔2〕 This nationalist call was made Peoples Daily(renmin ribao),CCPs pivotal propaganda organ,inthe editorial commemorating the 80th anniversary of the September 18 Incident,a milestone event indicating thecommencement of the Japanese invasion of China.

state,which was precisely what the CCP expected from projectingstrategic narratives in its patriotic education.

In terms of its scapegoat function,the mythmaking of nationalhistory—endowed with a changed endpoint dictating the strategicnarratives and the values to be held by historical accounts—needs to bepopulated “with certain actors and certain facts as opposed to others”(Gergen 110). In this regard,the categorization of ingroup and outgroup identities relevant to the mythmaking of the postTiananmen CCPleadership differs from the selfother demarcation that was connoted fromthe national history mythologized in Maos China. As mythmaking inthe postMao reform era has shifted away from the outdated classstruggle theme,the way in which the same historical event is related tothe current situation is accordingly changed, thereby causing thereconfiguration of the “schematic narrative template.”The adjustmentof the fundamental plot structure entails the application of newlyselectedmythic symbols to different signs. The juxtaposition of opposite signs inthe varied context of patriotic education is less premised upon the fissurebetween the Communist regime and its Nationalist opponent than onthe categorization between the Chinese nation and foreign invaders(He;Wang 2008:791). Consonant to the call for the great unity of all ethnicgroups and the broadest possible patriotic united front,the outgroupidentity attributed to Chiangs KMT has been disassociated from theoriginal context and linked to another sign:Japanese imperialism,themost egregious invaders responsible for the humiliations in Chinasmodern history. By highlighting the ulterior conspiracy of “peacefulevolution”schemed by the Western camp,which was believed to becloaked behind the criticism of the lack of democracy in China,themythmaking of “chosen trauma” featuring the transformed strategicnarratives has instigated virulent antiforeign sentiments from the generalpopulace. In the case where Chinese people feel offended, orhumiliated, by foreign provocation, antiforeignism becomes acoalescing force to solidify national cohesion,which holds true,forinstance,for the unanimous outrage of the Chinese public for theJapanese intention to nationalize the disputed Senkaku(Diaoyu)Islandsin 2012. Confronted with the shared victimizing “other,”the Chinesepopulace is bonded by a sense of nationhood based on the ingroup / outgroup identity categorization. Viewed in this vein, the symbolic

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mythmaking of national history as a means of scapegoat has distracted thegeneral populace from the domestic intensions and rallied popularsupport for a regime inflicted with volatile domestic politics.

In conjunction with the domestic considerations of regimelegitimacy enhancement, the employment of strategic narratives inmythologizing national history is an important venue for Beijing to seekits external legitimacy. On the current international stage,to a certaindegree,China has attained recognition as a great power based on itsimpressive economic prowess and its critical role in global and regionalaffairs. However,considering the frequent criticism of its human rightsproblems,among other conspicuous traits of an authoritarian regime,Chinas social position in the hierarchical international society isperceived to be incommensurate with its grandiose national history,which makes it what Shogo Suzuki terms a “frustrated great power.”Given the historical legacy of national humiliation ingrained in thecollective memory,establishing a rightful place on the internationalstage—or to be more specific,attaining the social status of a “legitimategreat power”—has constituted a purposive element of Chinese nationalidentity. To reconstruct the “othering” status and achieve the socialpurpose ingrained in the national identity, as part of the strategicnarratives projected within the enterprise of nationalism,China needs to“invoke a convincing ‘ethical argument’”to justify its aspiration forinternational status,which it is constantly seeking in foreign relations(Narlikar 986;Suzuki 50). The mythic symbol of victimization bycolonialist predation and imperialist invasion creates the ethicalfoundation to justify its quest for power status. Further,just as theCCPs domestic “symbolic enhancement”of regime legitimacy needs anopposite sign, so is the enactment of Chinas external legitimacycontingent upon the “relational comparison”with an outgroup entity(see Abdelal,Herrera,Johnston,& McDermott 699). Thus,somesalient “victimizing others”are required to serve as a foil,or a referentcountry,for China to accumulate its moral power on the world stage.As Gergen cogently puts it,“the incidents woven into ones narrativeare seldom the actions of the protagonist alone,others are included aswell. In most instances,others actions are used to contribute vitally tothe events linked in narrative sequence”(114). In this vein, thealarming signal that rightest Japanese politicians refuse to atone for its

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atrocities committed in the World War II and attempt to whitewashJapanese history textbooks provides a symbolic marker to makeintelligible Chinas moral image as a“responsible great power.”Inasmuchas the traumatic symbol for the mythmaking of national history is keptalive through the fanfare of pervasive discursive patriotic education,Japans audacious moves concerning Taiwan and the disputed DiaoyuIslands prompt the Chinese government to portray it as a “threateningother”in its security diplomacy(AtanassovaCornelis 102). With thefunction of “time collapse,” as Volkan (2001:89) posits, the“contemporary threat”from the past invader is inevitably associated withthe “chosen trauma,”which fortifies the ingroups “sense of entitlementto regain what was lost,or seek to revenge.”Viewed in this vein,historical grievance of Japanese aggression is,in the pragmatic sense ofstrategic narratives,appealing to the Chinese leadership,as it reifiesChinas undeserved treatment in the international society and undergirdsthe governments demand made in the international negotiation. Themythmaking of the past can be connected to enhance Chinas moralidentity to persuade domestic and international audiences of the legitimacyof the state behavior on the front of foreign relations.

4. Resistance and Negotiation: The Constraining andDelegitimizing Effects of Strategic Narratives

In the contested arena of memory politics,according to Wulf Kansteiner(180),the construction of collective memory is a complex processinvolving three types of historical agents:the political culture in whichthe collective remembrance is embedded,the “memory makers,”whocapitalize on the cultural repertoire to formulate the historical narratives,and the “memory consumers,”who “use,ignore,or transform”thesenarratives in their own interests. In the process of “symbolicenhancement,”the CCP is legitimized through appeals to the politicalculture that is exploited to highlight its unique representativeness. Suchmemorybased legitimacy is premised on the memory makers adherenceto the “proper modes of conduct” widely shared in the politicalculture—the basic “mindset” of which is carried by the collectivememory(see Elkins & Simeon:128). Given the dismemberment and

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subjugation of the Chinese nationstate in the “century of nationalhumiliation,” these normative underpinnings are envisioned as theindependent sovereignty and indivisible territoriality of the nationstate inthe context of Chinese political culture. As these “quintessentiallyChinese[ideas],”to borrow Samuel Kims(1994:428)words,havebeen enshrined in the collective memory,the mythic symbol of nationaltrauma communicated in the master historical narratives can accumulatewhat Schudson (1989b:109) calls a “selfperpetuating rhetoricalpower” in the popular imagination. Thus, the victimhood identityinstantiated in the historical accounts is all the more likely to predisposepopular perceptions toward the perceived culprits of national trauma.While taking a close look at Chinas projected soft power, theinternational society is often taken aback by Beijings “emotional face”that expresses itself in outbursts aimed at Japan,and the United States,among others,when it is embroiled in diplomatic skirmishes with them(Shirk 2007b). In these instances,the CCPs leadership,whose policyoptions are circumscribed by the frenzied nationalist public opinion,canbe compelled to maintain a hardline diplomacy. In effect,Chinascontroversial images reflect the predicament of the CCPs foreignpolicymaking,which is, to a considerable extent, induced by theresurgence of popular nationalism as an inevitable result of the statecentric strategic narratives in history education and the consumption ofcollective memory into which the master historical narratives are signified.

The contradiction between the manipulator and the consumers ofcollective memory makes clear that public recollection can be resistant tothe present interests of the memory maker in a way that transcends thevolition of the formulator of historical narratives. In contemporaryChinese history education, the traumatic memory has become a“sociobiological memory,”highlighting the sense of agony as a shareddestiny based on the common past of the community(E. Zerubavel1996:290; also see Y. Zerubavel 1995). In the case of highlyemotionally charged events,which often serve as focal points for therepresentation of past massive national trauma, this sort of memorysignificantly influences the cognition and behavior of the domesticpopulace. In the animositybuilding situation when the “timecollapsing” function of the “sociobiological memory” is especiallysalient,memory consumption is typically manifested in the usage of the

14The Enabling and Constraining Effects of Strategic Narratives 

“chosen trauma” as what Jerome Bruner (1962:1314) calls the“preemptive metaphor”to amplify the negative image of the outgroupidentity. In the ongoing tension between China and Japan over theDiaoyu Islands, since Japanese action is intimately analogized to itsannexation of the territory in the Chinese maritime sphere as a symbol ofthe onset of Japanese imperialist invasion,the islandbuying motion isperceived as a fundamental breach of the constitutive norms of Chinesenational identity. As a protesting commentary of the official XinhuaAgency sternly stated, “In history, Japan stole the socalled‘administrative rights’of the Diaoyu Islands through unjust means.”To evince Chinas determination to protest against Japans action,itfurther announces,“Long gone are the days when the Chinese nationwas subject to bullying and humiliation from others. The issue of theDiaoyu Islands concerns sovereignty,territorial integrity,and nationaldignity. [There]is no room for making a concession”(Wu). Suchhistorical analogy enables the memory of collective suffering,as JerezJedlicki(226) puts it,to “burden the present conflict with strongresentments and make it appear to be either a historical repetition,or ahistorical redress.” Given that the regime has styled itself as theparamount patriotic force capable of leading the Chinese nation tocleanse itself of national humiliation,the CCP is obliged to live up tothe expectation of the Chinese citizenry to prevent historical repetition.In this sense,collective memory,while serving as a foreground tovalorize the regime as a moral being in domestic and internationalpolitics,has given ground to the “dominant ideas,”or the “nationalideas,”as Jeffrey Legro(516,522)terms it,defining “the collectivebeliefs of societies and organizations about how to act.”When thehistorical grievances come to the center of Beijings diplomacy,suchsocietal “ethos,”〔3〕 reified as safeguarding national sovereignty anddignity in Chinese political culture,resembles the “scripts”for the stateactor to follow(see,e. g.,Alexander:5864;?Tuathail:61920). IfChinese diplomacy is viewed as a performance stage,the formulationand execution of Chinas foreign policy,as a form of communicative

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〔3〕 According to Daniel BarTal,the collective beliefs in the victimization,which focus on theatrocities penetrated by the outgroup,and the patriotic beliefs generating the dedication to the country andsociety are both important sources of “ethos.”See BarTal(2000:137150).

behavior,must uphold these sociallyheld beliefs,which are derivedfrom the strategic narratives projected by the Partystate as nationalistdiscourse while providing the domestic audience the criteria to assess thestates performance. In the case of territorial disputes with Japan,forinstance, how the Chinese public interprets Beijings diplomaticperformance is directly related to the issue of historical redress. The“ethos” of sovereignty,territoriality,and dignity significantly limitspublic attention. With regard to policy options,the costefficient tradeoffs rationalized by lucrative bilateral economic cooperation can be ruledout,as they are inconsistent with the “scripts” guiding the statesdiplomatic behavior. Take the current SinoJapanese Diaoyu crisis forexample. After Japans announcement of its decision to purchase Diaoyuin September 2012,Hong Kong baodiao activists,the civilian groupdevoted to maintaining Chinese sovereignty over the islets,landed onthe island to display Chinese determination to defend its sovereignty.Many Chinas bloggers raised doubt as to why the patriotic feat was notinitiated by mainlanders with the support of the Peoples LiberationArmy(PLA). As shown in the thinly veiled critique by an unsignededitorial published in Global Times(huanqiu shibao),a commercializedbut authoritative media devoted to international news,“The Chinesepublic is wondering why the Diaoyu Islands,a part of Chinas territory,is occupied by Japan and why the PLA doesnt send ships to escortactivists. The Chinese government is thought of as being ‘weak’”(Minter). In such instances,although the top leadership explicitlypledged that China wont back down on issues surrounding the islands,anything less than a forceful move on Chinas part could be perceived asthe regimes lack of commitment to fulfilling the social normsinstitutionalized in Chinese political culture.

As such,while public agitation shaped by the victimhood identitycan be directed against foreign countries,nationalist demand invokedfrom the mythic symbol of the traumatic memory is likely to underminethe autonomy of the states policymaking. The predicament in whichthe CCP is locked is highly related to its commercialized media,whichplays a significant role in the social consumption of collective memoryand the distribution of nationalist discourse.

When it was initially launched after the Tiananmen crackdown,Chinese official nationalism centered on patriotic education did score

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great success in gaining public resonance. Yet,the situation has changedtoday when the Chinas media ecology has been qualitativelytransformed in the opening up of the marketplace. While the agenda ofpatriotism remains chiefly in the custody of the regime and itsideologues,commercialized mass media also joins the state in whippingup the subject of patriotism. As Geremie Barme(21112)observes,“Patriotic sentiment is no longer the sole province of the Party and itspropagandists . . . . [Nationalism]is functioning as a form of consensusbeyond the bounds of official culture.”Chinese public,fed up withstale sloganeering fashioned in the totalitarian political thought work,will not take much credence in the propagandized information. Toincrease the persuasive power of statecrafted strategic narratives,thePartystate needs a more innovative, informative, and empatheticmedia. Thanks to commercialization,most of the Chinese nonofficialmedia,including some subsidiaries of the propaganda press,has evolvedfrom being solely the mouthpiece of the Partystate,on Susan Shirks(2007a:61)account,to the “marketized semicontrolled media thatpropagates ‘nationalist mythmaking.’”〔4〕 For the marketorientedmedia still operating along the statedefined orbit,nationalist discourselabeled with the constellation of patriotism provides a content area towin more readers without sinking in the political quicksand. Whilecontributing to the popularization of the “new remembering,”commercialized media is capable of drumming up hypernationalism andcompounds the CCPs diplomatic dilemma. In todays China,diplomatic issues related to conflicts in the SinoJapanese and SinoU. S.relations as well as Taiwans independence,which are most likely,among other foreign provocations,to catalyze the “time collapsing”function of “chosen trauma,”provide expedient materials to highlightthe historical exigencies in the contemporary era. In light of thelikability of these events in activating nationalist emotion,publicitygiven to the focalpoint issues can easily meet popular demand forsensational stories(Shirk 2007a:45,47). In the process wherein the“mobilizing information”highly related to historical narratives stimulatesthe popular “resolution” in “concrete, visible, immediate, andmeasurable ways”(Lemert 1982;Schudson 1989a:172),statecrafted

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〔4〕 The phrase “nationalist mythmaking”is quoted in Snyder(59).

historical narratives are transformed,via the communicated messagescovering the present diplomacy,to the collective or personal use ofmemory consumers. In the cutthroat competition,radicalizing theseevents has become a common market strategy for the media,in itsaggressive exploitation of a commercial goldmine, to make culturalproducts distinguishable. The marketdriven media,whose professionalpendulum sways between the “commercial ‘bottom line’”and “Partyline,”is often driven to take more risks breaking the regulation of thepropaganda state to run the emotionallycharged stories that could appealto nationalist sentiments against Western powers and Japan(Shambaugh2007:55). When foreign provocation involving “hot”historical issuescome to the stage,the abundant source materials for media coverage andpopular demand enable the marketoriented media to provide “realpolitik account”of foreign affairs(Cao 44243). When it comes toSinoJapanese conflicts,consonant with the onslaught of the populist andscholarly writings detailing Japanese wartime atrocities,tabloid journalistsare tempted to deploy vitriolic rhetoric to present an overly negativeoutgroup image. In reporting high profile events that can readily evokeChinese traumatic memory of Japanese aggression,divergence betweenthe propagandaoriented official media and commercialized media isevident. For instance,after Junichiro Koizumis final worship at theYasukuni Shrine, which enshrines fourteen Class A Japanese warcriminals,Peoples Daily(renmin ribao),the CCPs chief propagandaorgan,not only criticized Koizumis visits,but also documented thedomestic opposition he met in Japan for his Yasukuni visit(Reilly 2324). Deviating from the realm of interpretation desired by the Partystate,Global Times described Koizumis visit as a focal point arousingChinas and South Koreas outrage and attracting the worlds gaze. Oneof the featuring articles condemning Koizumis action pointed out that itwas a nasty trick played by Japanese politicians. If Koizumis successorsdo not follow his suit,it claimed,that would be a “bargaining chip”for Japan to demand compromise from Chinas side(Reilly 24). Duringthe 2010 Diaoyu crisis, an intense confrontation starting from thedetainment of a Chinese captain whose boat collided with two Japanesepatrol ships near the islands, the “tiemending meeting” betweenChinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Japans Prime Minister Naoto Kanwas cancelled at the ASEAN summit meeting in Vietnam. Global Times

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imputed the cancellation to then Japans Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara,who referred to Chinas response to the Diaoyu dispute as “hysterical.”In its shrilling attack,the satirizing comment on the Japanese leaders andits foreign policy was especially eyecatching:

It may be better to call Maehara a defense minister rather than a foreign minister . . . .Apparently,Kan has chosen the wrong guy to represent Japan in international relations.The young and promising newgeneration politician proved to be more like a politicalextremist than a diplomat . . . . Japans foreign policy shows no sign of viewing China asJapans largest partner in trade,but as a war machine,ready to attack Japan at anytime.(“Maehara:A Foreign or Defense Minister”November 1,2010;quoted in Tiberghien2010:7576)

In the case of Chinas unpleasant encounters with the Japanese outgroup,which is reported by the state propaganda with caution,the“dramatic and melodramatic events”in the media coverage can awaken“manifest nationalism”from “a cognitive slumber into a state of fistraising agony of flagwaving ecstasy”(Guo,Cheong,& Chen 2007:469). In the 2010 SinoJapanese confrontation,the crisis continuedafter the release of the Chinese Captain. With the outpouring ofnationalist sentiments, largescale antiJapanese protests swept manyChinese cities. The pressure of public opinion played a significant role inpushing the Chinese government to demand Japans official apology andcompensation,thereby pushing the conflict to a more complex level(Tiberghien 75 ). As evidenced in such circumstances, thecommercialized media and its commodified coverage, whilecontributing to the dissemination of statesanctioned strategic narratives,can constitute a cumbersome burden on the Partystate. Amid the risingride of domestic antiJapanese nationalism,the Chinese government isoften compelled to display a muscular posture toward Japan to assuagepublic rage. The hairtrigger flipside of nationalism vehemently fannedby the media can backfire on the CCP leadership,whose foreignpolicymaking is hijacked by public animosity. The commercializedmedia has,in this sense,become a significant societal force facilitatingthe influence of public opinion on Beijings diplomatic decision making.

The agency of commercialized media and its negotiation with thepropaganda state points to the dominance of and resistance to strategicnarratives projected by the authoritarian state. Through the mythmaking

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and “symbolic enhancement”in the patriotic education campaign,thestatecrafted strategic narratives, embodied as historical narrativesconnoted from the chosen symbol,have been essentialized as “truth.”In the political agenda of regime legitimacy enhancement, strategicnarratives in the realm of official nationalism can be viewed as ahegemonic construct. Rather than a fixed state of domination,hegemony is, according to Raymond Williams (112), a dynamicprocess that “has continually to be renewed,recreated,defended,andmodified,” and is thus “continually resisted, limited, altered,challenged by pressures not at all of its own.”Inasmuch as the CCPsregime legitimacy depends on the “indissoluble linkage”between thestate and nation,the strategic narratives crafted by the Partystate toenhance its regime legitimacy entail an “agency(state / regime)principal(nation)relationship,”which has,as Jungmin Seo(142)contends,generated a strong sense of entitlement on the part of “national subjects”to the principal of the nation. In the case when such strategic narrativesfail to ring true,societal forces,in their effort to challenge the leviathanstate in the name of patriotism,can formulate counternarratives byappropriating the official nationalist discourse. Such “counter”projection of strategic narratives from the original recipients is indicativeof the internal dynamism of resistance in the hegemonization of elitedriven nationalism. The commercialized media has provided a releasevalve for the articulation of societal discontent,which has underminedthe states monolithic control of the nationalist discourse. This isparticularly evident in the growing torrent of nationalist literature in themarketplace of popular culture. 〔5〕While affirming the normative andpurposive contents of Chinese national identity and the loyalty to thenation,the authors of these books may not identify themselves with thePartystate. In Chinese collective memory, nationalist sentiments

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〔5〕 The genre of popular nationalist literature started from a book written by three young authors,entitled “Zhongguo keyi shuo bu”(China Can Say No),which was published in 1996. The publication of thevolume was soon followed by more “sayno”literature attacking the West,particularly the U. S. and Japan.Examples include Zhongguo haishi neng shuo bu(China Can Still Say No,1996),Yaomohua Zhongguo debeihou(Behind the Demonization of China,1996),Zhongguo zenme shuo bu?(How can China Say No,1996),Zhongguo heyi shuobu?(How Can China Say No,1996),Chinas Road under the Conspiracy ofGlobalization(Quanqiuhua yinmou xia de zhongguo zhi lu,1999),Unhappy China(Zhongguo Bu Gaoxing,2009),and Why Is China Unhappy?(Zhongguo weishenme bu gaoxing,2009),Zhongguo meiyou bangyang(China Has No Example,2009),and China Has Stood Up(Zhongguo zhanqilai,2010).

derived from the shared agony of the Chinese people are associated withthe “emancipative character” and “democratic dimension” ofnationalism(Schubert 140). As the origin of Chinese nationalisticmovement,the May Fourth Movement in 1919,which resulted fromoutrage against the Treaty of Versailles,which transferred GermanysChina concession to Japan, was a symbol of social reform ofoverthrowing a regime that failed to protect the nationalist interest bysurrendering territories and sovereignty to foreign demands. Thissubversive vein of collective memory,as a symbolic implication of themass demonstration in 1989,has made the CCP ultrasensitive to anysign of student movement on the anniversary of the nationalist protest.While defending the government against Chinas putative enemies,somepopular nationalists have asked for “peoples diplomacy”(Gries 2004b:186;Song Qiang et al. 1996). In proposing their rival claims,theycan shift the nationalist emotion stemming from the original events tothe current concern of Chinese domestic politics. For instance,whenWang Xiaodong,a leading liberal nationalist,expressed his discontentof the governments news blackout over the ! 2. 87 millioncompensation payment to the United States for the damage inflictedupon U. S. diplomatic property in China by antiAmericandemonstrators protesting the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy,he demanded popular participation in Chinas foreign policy making.Only in that way, he believed,would the government be heldaccountable to the Chinese public for safeguarding national interests(Lawrence January 132,000;Zhao 2005:138). Most recently,in theDiaoyu crisis,while deploring the protesting landing of Diaoyu Islandswas initiated by the baodiao activists in Hong Kong but not mainlanders,Zhao Chu, a military affairs expert,boldly tweeted an equivalentversion of nationalist demand for democratic freedom in Sina Weibo,Chinas most popular microblog:

In a place where patriotism and protest require approval,its all but inevitable that thepursuit of the national interest will be impaired . . . this is a lesson the Hong Kong peoplehave taught the mainland people. So how can we protest the national interest,and thebest interest of the community?We need the freedom of association,speech and press.Only a free man can keep his country in his heart.(Minter August 20,2012)

Indeed,casting liberal ideas in the fabric of patriotism has become an

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effective channel for popular nationalists to advance their political agendaand a coded way of expressing dissent at the state. More importantly,the projection of counternarratives has shown that the foreignpolicymaking of the authoritarian state is not free from domestic publicopinion,which,given the marketization of nationalist discourse,cannotbe easily checked by the propaganda state. In view of the significanttransformation of the domestic context of Beijings diplomacy,ZhaoSuishangs(2004:265)prediction is not implausible,“[It] is verypossible that if the Chinese people should repudiate the communistgovernment of China, it could be for nationalist reasons after aconspicuous failure of the governments program of national constructionor after the people of China conclude that the governments foreignpolicies run counter to the national interest.”

5. Conclusion

The projection of strategic narratives is essential to the construction ofcollective memory,which is constitutive of national identity enacted inthe consumption of memory and the interests of the memory markers.As the key component of Chinese official nationalism under the guise ofpatriotic education, the projection of statedriven strategic narrativesparallels the construction of collective memory. In the system of politicalcommunication,master historical accounts are reconfigured to instantiatethe normative and cognitive templates inherent in Chinese politicalculture,based on which the popular worldview is forged and theinstrumental awareness of the state linking its goals and purposive actionsis clarified. To the extent that the normative underpinnings—thedetermined meanings encoded in the Chinese collective memory—haveshaped popular cognition in the ethical judgment of the statesperformance,the states behavior can be both facilitated and constrainedby the strategic narratives projected in nationalist discourse. The strategicnarratives projected by the Partystate have animated the formation ofwhat Thomas Rochon (22 53) deems the politically and morallyengaged “critical community,”in which the meanings communicatedthrough historical accounts are institutionalized as codified “scripts”thatthe states diplomatic performance has to follow. While the appeal to

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patriotism can touch off the state emotion related to the traumaticnational experience, the mythmaking of selective symbols, as ahegemonic construct,simultaneously engenders the internal dynamismof social resistance, something that the state projector of strategicnarratives does not intend to provoke. With the connotative property ofthe mythic symbol of “chosen trauma,”collective memory has evokedvirulent nationalist sentiments toward those countries that are deemedresponsible for the Chinese national disgrace in its modern history. Thesurge of popular nationalism,while forging national coherence in crisismoments,is causing a backlash against Beijings rational and flexibleforeign policy making. In light of the discursive power of historicalnarratives that has been reinforced by the marketized media,collectivememory has obtained a life of its own in Chinese public opinion andpossesses the potential to challenge the autonomy of the states decisionmaking. The essentialized “true”discourse of national history projectedas elitedriven strategic narratives has, in accordance with StanleyHoffmans(198)proposition on the discursive power of nationalism,“mobilized believers who will propagate it and do battle for it.”In thissense,the traumatic collective memory,constructed for the purpose ofdirecting domestic social grievance to outgroup entities and enhanceregime legitimacy, has lurked to internalize the external historicalconflicts. Formulated in the endeavor of “symbolic enhancement” inpatriotic education, historical narratives blowing up the publiccommemoration of Chinese wartime sufferings have bounded therationality of Beijings foreign policy making. As the constructor andconsumer of communicative nationalism,state and society cannot besimplistically dichotomized. Just as Joel Migdal(2001;2002:76)posits,the interaction of state and society is “mutually empowering.”Whilethe state can engineer social consent to meet its interest by molding thecollective memory,as exemplified in the projection and reception ofstrategic narratives, the state can be “hemmed in—indeedtransformed”—by the internal forces of a transformative society.

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