The Emperor Has No Clothes: Power and Resources within the Greek Core Executive

The Emperor Has No Clothes! Power andResources within the Greek Core Executivegove_1610 1..23

KEVIN FEATHERSTONE* and DIMITRIS PAPADIMITRIOU**

International attention has focused recently on the reform “failures” ofGreece in the context of its European Union membership. Systemic con-straints are increasingly recognized. The present article argues that atten-tion ought also to be given to the inner workings of government at thecenter and their undermining of reform capacity. It explores the nature ofthe Greek core executive across five premierships and argues the supposedsupremacy of the prime minister is something of a fallacy. In reality, thestructure is one of a “solitary centre” amid a “segmented government.” Assuch, the closest parallels are with Central, rather than Southern, Europe.In developing its empirical analysis, the article makes a methodologicalcontribution to the examination of core executive relations and resources.

Introduction

The sovereign debt crisis in Greece has highlighted deep-rooted problemsof the reform capacity of the domestic polity, raising questions as to itsposition within the euro zone. Prior to the crisis, the repeated reformfailures at home could be attributed to constraints and distortions of asystemic nature (Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008; Mitsopoulos andPelagidis 2011). However, in a political culture that has long emphasizedthe importance of the “leader,” successive prime ministers (PMs) havebeen castigated for their failure to do more. To what extent might thesefailures be attributable, in part, to the very inner workings of the Greekgovernment at the center? This is a subject that has received barely anyacademic attention: contrasting the relevance of leadership personalityand the structural location of the PM’s position to questions of direction,planning, and coordination.

The present article explores the nature of the Greek core executive.1 Itfits neither the thesis of the “presidentialization” of politics nor really thatof a “hollowness” resulting from a complex fragmentation of governmen-tal processes (Poguntke and Webb 2005; Rhodes 1994). Instead, it is shownthat it is akin to the “solitary centers” identified in Central Europe (Goetzand Margetss 1999). Like them, it has resisted the “imperative towardscoordination” within the contemporary core executive (Davis 1997, 144)

*London School of Economics**University of Manchester

Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Vol. ••, No. ••,•• 2012 (pp. ••–••).© 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.doi:10.1111/j.1468-0491.2012.01610.x

and has struggled with the demands of adaptation to European Union(EU) membership. Unlike them, it is a solitary center that has lasted foralmost four decades. The article asserts that the supposed supremacy ofthe PM in the Greek system is something of a fallacy and as such it hascontributed to an incomplete understanding of the problem of reformcapacity. The article follows Elgie’s call for research to examine core execu-tives in depth and to assess their degree of change over time (1997, 231):locating the Greek case within a wider European spectrum and thenexamining its evolution across five major premierships of the recentperiod—the “metapolitefsi” since the restoration of democracy in 1974.

In doing so, the article seeks to make three contributions.Methodologically—and of potential general relevance—it develops amatrix of indicators by which to evaluate the relations between actorswithin a core executive, facilitating both the location of cases within con-ventional typologies and international comparison, with special referenceto the position of the PM. Conceptually, it extends our understanding ofthe PM domain as a “solitary center” by its application to a differentsetting. Finally, empirically, it deepens the characterization of the Greekcase as being one of “segmented government” (Elgie 2011) with shiftsbetween subtypes. The conclusion draws out the wider conceptual andempirical implications. To our knowledge, this is the first systematic studyof the evolution of the core executive in Greece in any language.

“Solitary Centers”: The Greek Core Executive in Context

There are certain features of the Greek core executive that have remainedrelatively stable. The PM is widely seen as “primus solus” in a setting of“prime minister centrism” (Koutsoukis 1994, 280). In constitutional terms,he (there has never been a female PM) may be more powerful than any ofhis counterparts in the West (Dagtoglou 1986). The Constitution of 1975had established a parliamentary system, but with an indirectly electedpresident possessing some De Gaulle–type powers as the guardian.Andreas Papandreou swept these away in 1986, greatly strengthening theconstitutional position of the PM. Though the Constitution was furtherrevised in 2001, it did not significantly alter the position of the PM. More-over, the wider constitutional system offers few checks and balances onthe power of the PM (with a unicameral Parliament, weak judicial over-sight, and strong party discipline). There is a record since 1974 of relativelylong periods of tenure for PMs, with four of the eight incumbents to 2009each serving between 5 and 10 years (see Table 2 later).

This position contrasts, however, with the reality of limited resources tosupport the PM’s role. In 2005, for example, the Greek PM Office had justunder 90 staff, and the vast majority of these appear to have been inactive,presumably fulfilling roles elsewhere outside the PM Office. Other, com-parable, states have much larger offices around the PM: The Austrian

2 KEVIN FEATHERSTONE AND DIMITRIS PAPADIMITRIOU

Federal Chancellery was nearly 10 times larger, the Dutch Ministry ofGeneral Affairs four times, and the Irish Department of Taioseach wastwice as big.

Two further features have endured. One is the considerable degree ofoperational independence enjoyed by individual ministers in the contextof an administrative system with tightly defined competences, built on theimperative of the “minister’s signature” (Flogaitis 1987). In effect, minis-ters exercise authority in their own right, rather than by delegation fromthe Cabinet (Davis 1997, 137). The other long-term feature is the passivityof the bureaucracy: “Permanent civil servants are transformed into mereobservers of the policy process without a direct stake in it” (Dimitrako-poulos 2001, 607). Ministries are politicized: The upper echelons are politi-cal appointees that normally move post with the minister and adependency circle is thus created (Sotiropoulos 1999, 15). Alongside theselong-term features, the “Cabinet” system2—as the later empirical investi-gation will illustrate—has, historically, often been weak in its status andoperation.

Against this background, placing the Greek case in the prevailingtypologies on the core executive is problematic. Dunleavy and Rhodes(1990), for example, outlined six such variants and none fit well the Greekcase. It comes closer to what Andeweg (1997, 62) refers to as “monocratic-segmented” core executive, with a powerful PM and groups of ministers.Similar is Elgie’s (1997, 225) depiction of “segmented government” inwhich a sectoral division of labor exists among core executive actors, withlittle crossover. We argue that Greece has reflected its subcategory of“monocratic-ministerial”—where the PM focuses on certain priorityareas, and ministerial colleagues are left with decision-making responsi-bilities in their domains with “the cabinet simply being a residual organi-zation and bureaucrats merely implementing decisions” (Elgie 1997, 225).Over the five cases examined here, there are variations in the PM’s role,but the general structural characterization remains. Two premiershipsrepresented modest deviations to another subcategory—“Cabinet-ministerial”—in which the Cabinet as a collectivity was more central.

The segmented system also reflects a lack of coordination, monitoring,and planning. For example, there is no tradition of “a vast network ofinter-departmental committees which are a characteristic and importantfeature of the decision-making structure of Western governments”(Mackie and Hogwood 1985, 27) and something of a starting point for thecomplexity inherent in the “hollowness” transition depicted in Whitehall.Intragovernmental coordination is a deep-rooted problem in Greece(Dimitrakopoulos 2001); indeed, it is often personalized and “anarchical”at both the political and administrative levels (Passas and Makridimitris1994, 73–74). Coordination must be contextualized within a state tradition(Davis 1997) and that of Greece has juxtaposed a German legal order anda Napoleonic centralism, with the subordination of the state to politicalinterests and one fragmented with endemic clientelistic practices and

GREECE AND THE HOLLOW CORE EXECUTIVE 3

networks (Papakostas 2001; Pollis 1992). Against this background, organi-zational development by stealth has led to overlapping responsibilitiesthat are often little understood or expected even by those directly involvedin its operation. The overlaps sustain internal blockages and clientelisticinterests.

At the center is a detachment. In their conception of “solitary centers”in Central and Eastern Europe, Goetz and Margetss (1999) draw on Hood(1983) and define the type as lacking: nodality (centrality of the PM Officein information networks), effective authority (legal power and legitimacyto act quickly), organizational capacity, and treasure (resources). Thus, thevery center of government in the nine systems they examined were“largely unable to perform the coordinative tasks that are commonlyassociated with Prime Minister’s Offices and Cabinet Offices in the lit-erature on consolidated Western democracies” (Goetz and Margetss 1999,426). Indeed, in important respects, the solitary centers “operate in iso-lation” from their political and institutional environment (Goetz andMargetss 1999, 427). As the later empirical examination will illustrate, theGreek case displays similar problems of nodality, organizational capacity,resources, and confused authority that they identify in post-CommunistEurope. In an earlier work, Goetz (2001, 1043) draws parallels betweenthe “pathologies” of the central state administrations of Central andSouthern Europe that included inter alia institutional fragmentation andinsufficient mechanisms for policy coordination and coherence. He seesthe parallel pathologies as “typical of democratizing settings in compara-tively poor countries” (2001, 1043). Goetz and Margetss (1999) see theoccurrence of a “solitary center” in Central Europe as a phase in thepost-Communist transition. It is significant that the “solitary center”identified in Greece also grew out of the conditions of a return to democ-racy in 1974, but equally, as the later cases will show, its basic parametershave proved durable over almost four decades. This suggests that beyondthe democratic transition, its endurance is a result of both institutionalinertia and a culture of elite political attitudes to sustain it. This is not todeny change can and does occur within a solitary center. In their studiesof EU transposition processes, for example, Zubek (2011) portrays a con-tingency in Central Europe and Dimitrakopoulos (2011) a case of EUintervention supporting innovators within the Greek bureaucracy onpublic procurement.

However, Goetz’s parallel of Central and Southern Europe appearsmore circumscribed. The traditional description of Italian government as“direzione plurima dissociata”—lacking centralized coordination—is evoca-tive of Athens and, to some degree, Central Europe (Criscitiello 1993, 581).Again, ministers have regarded their departments as “personal fiefdoms”and the PM Office suffered from poor quality staff and high turnover(Hine and Finocchi 1991). Yet, Italy has changed: PMs have “gained astronger hold over the executive branch of the state through the growingautonomy of the Prime Minister’s office and the exercise of an increasingly


monocratic form of rule” (Calise 2005). Unlike in Greece, the political classovercame institutional inertia and shifted the model. By contrast, bothbefore and after the return to democracy, the Spanish system has long-been centralized: “the president [PM] stands at the centre of Spain’s politi-cal system, backed by an extensive staff of advisers and affordedconsiderable security of tenure” (Heywood 1991, 111). Thus, the occur-rence of “solitary centers” does not extend across the south. Elsewhere, itis not unusual, of course, to read of constrained PMs—Muller-Rommel(1994), for example, depicts such for the German chancellor, but thesederive from different factors (coalition politics and federalism); the“Bundeskanzleramt” is a large and powerful office in its own right, witha strong institutionalization.

Methodology and Data Collection

Much of the literature accepts that power within a core executive is fluid(without an a priori hierarchy) and relational (based on a “resource depen-dency”) between four sets of actors: the PM, the Cabinet and its commit-tees, individual ministers, and the senior bureaucracy (Elgie 2011; Rhodes2007). While Elgie (1997) provides a typology to contrast various models ofexecutive politics, he says much less on how these might be operational-ized. The existing literature provides a plethora of variables: ranging fromthe imprecise to the all encompassing and applied to comparisons bothacross (Jones 1991; King 1975; Norton 1988) and within differenttypes (Helms 1996; Weller 1985) of executive constellations (i.e., parlia-mentary, presidential, and semi-presidential). Here, the focus is limited toparliamentary systems, providing a matrix of indicators, drawn both fromquantitative and qualitative data sets. The latter are placed on a simple,three-part ordinal scale to facilitate historical (or international) comparison(see Table 2).

The general matrix is outlined in Table 1. Under the “Prime Minister”category, we cover the formal constitutional powers bestowed on the PM:the personal leadership style (i.e., PM activism) and the strength of the PM

TABLE 1A Matrix for the Comparative Study of the Core Executive

Prime Minister CabinetCore Executive

Bureaucracy Ministers

Constitutional powers Stability Size Constitutional powersActivism Frequency Independence ActivismParty strength Nodality (of key

formations)Activism Party strength

PM Office (size andactivism)

Longevity


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98.


within his/her own party. The entry on the PM Office highlights the levelof institutional resources at the direct disposal of the postholder. Quanti-tative data on the number and seniority of relevant staff indicates theresource and a qualitative judgement on the activism reflects the PMOffice’s prominence in decision making. Under “Cabinet,” data are pro-vided on both its stability and the frequency of its meetings. The formerdata set reveals the frequency of major Cabinet reshuffles, whereas thelatter provides information on the average number of meetings of the“full” Cabinet each year. The entries on “nodality” suggest its significance(in whole or in its key formations) in decision making, reflecting thedifferent management styles of PMs. The “Core Executive Bureaucracy”comprises one quantitative and two qualitative values. The former looks atthe number of staff employed in institutions performing the tasks of aCabinet Office or a Government Secretariat but not including senior civilservants in individual ministries. The first qualitative value relates tothe independence of this senior bureaucracy as demonstrated by the modeof appointment of its staff and the “administrative culture” underpinningthe relationship between political personnel and the civil service. Thesecond value relates to its activism, as this may be empowered/constrained by the management style of different PMs in the context ofspecific party political or functional needs. Finally, the category on “Min-isters” includes some qualitative values already used for PMs. In this case,“constitutional powers” denotes the centrality of individual ministers inthe decision-making process. On the other hand, “activism” refers toministerial understandings of their role and the assertiveness with whichindividual ministerial “turfs” are protected. “Party strength” highlightsthe position of individual ministers as potential challengers to the PM’sauthority or as alternative centers of power within the Cabinet. Finally,“longevity” may be interpreted as the length of service of individualministers, reflecting the level of “ministerial entrenchment” as a counter-weight to PM power.

Table 1 is relevant to the exploration of the power of each of the actorswithin the core executive, though for the present analysis the specificconcern is with the position of the Greek PM, and the coverage has beenpared down accordingly. In a longitudal study of this type (covering1974–2004), the countervailing but variable power of a plethora of minis-ters at any given time across different policy areas cannot be properlyaccounted for. For this reason, we focus only on the more “structural”aspects of ministerial counterweights to PM power, such as longevity (inaggregate terms, focusing on senior ministers) and constitutional power.Table 2 allows us to assess our key dependent variable—variations in thepower of the Greek PM within the core executive—by reference to theproperties of the columns in Table 1. The configuration of the latter is seenas determining gradations on the dependent variable, that is, not only the“scores” across the Cabinet, ministers and bureaucracy, but also the entriesunder the PM (what the constitution provides in formal powers, the


resources offered by the PM Office, the support of the party, and the PM’sown activism in the role). The configuration is the relational power withinthe core executive, though not necessarily the PM’s power in the widerdomestic system.

The data for Table 2 derive from a variety of sources. Several obstaclesexist: the incomplete nature of the Cabinet archives, the severe restrictionson access, and the absence of a single legal framework on the operation ofthe government until 2005. Here, the examination of over 300 differentlegislative acts has been undertaken to build a retrospective picture of itsevolution (see Table 2). Further empirical evidence is based on 75 personalinterviews with all four surviving Greek PMs, heads of the PM Office, andthe Government Secretariat as well as a large number of senior ministersand PM aides. Many of the interviews were conducted on a confidentialbasis, and references to them have been anonymized in the text.

PM Leaderships and the Greek “Core Executive”

Setting the Mold: The PM Tenure of Konstantinos Karamanlis(1974–1980)

During the early stages of Greece’s transition to democracy (the Metapo-litefsi), the constitutional position of the Greek executive, and more espe-cially of the PM within it, was heavily shaped by the dominant personalityof Konstantinos Karamanlis. During his earlier period as PM (1955–1963),he had been seen as the arch-modernizer of Greece’s antiquated economy,but he was eventually forced into self-exile following an increasinglydysfunctional relationship with the Palace. Living in Paris throughout theJunta, he returned as the savior in 1974 to steer Greece to democracy.Strong leadership was needed—and was very much his own instinct—tomanage not only the military but also defeat in Cyprus and a threat of warwith Turkey.

Karamanlis was to mold a constitution (1975) that showed distinctlyGaullist traits. By engineering the abolition of the monarchy—an institu-tion that had frequently sought to manipulate parliamentary politics—heremoved a major counterweight to the position of the PM. However, inthe new Constitution, he ensured that the powers of the new indirectlyelected President of the Republic would be extensive giving him/her theright to unilaterally dismiss Parliament, veto legislation, and declare thecountry to be in a state of siege. Karamanlis was offered the option to“move up” to the presidency at a time of his own choosing and throughthat to exercise significant influence over the direction of Greece’s demo-cratic transition well after his departure from the premiership.

Resource Deployment. Despite his apparent commitment to strong lead-ership, Karamanlis found himself at the center of a major paradox: a


dominant political figure who surrounded himself with very fewresources to help him deliver his challenging mission. The task of settingup his PM Office was delegated to Petros Molyviatis. A career diplomat,Molyviatis had little experience in organizing government business andno intimate links with Karamanlis’ New Democracy party. Upon Kara-manlis’ instruction, Molyviatis’ blueprint provided for a PM Office with aminimal structure (Interview #1). Just six advisers were appointed tocover broad policy areas such as the economy, defense, foreign affairsrelations, public works, and legal matters, supported by a team of foursecretaries. To all intents and purposes, this was a personal support teamto the PM and not an institutionalized service for coordination ormonitoring.

Despite their good personal chemistry and close working relationship,Karamanlis’ closest associates never really developed into a cohesiveunit, with a regular pattern of meetings and a clear job description(Interview #2). Indeed, the team lacked a single office space, and theiraccess to the PM varied considerably. Of the five key advisers, onlyMolyviatis shared an intimate working environment with Karamanlis,who exercised his duties from a rather small office in the Parliamentbuilding. Yet for all the considerable “gate-keeping” powers, Molyviatisdid not exercise significant influence over government policy (Interview#3). Although he was the only member of the PM Office to feature regu-larly in senior ministerial meetings, his role was largely confined to thatof a “gentle” government enforcer and a communicator of the PM’swishes to his ministers.

Management of Cabinet. Indeed, Karamanlis’ commitment to “govern viahis ministers” was a key feature of his post-1974 premierships. He reliedon a small group of senior ministers with whom he had developed a closeworking relationship since the mid-1950s. Although the group was by nomeans ideologically coherent or politically harmonious, its membersshared a strong personal commitment to Karamanlis (Interview #4). Thegroup lacked neither experience nor talent, including figures such asEvangellos Averoff, Panagis Papaligouras, Konstantinos Papakonstanti-nou, and George Rallis, all of whom retained key posts in Karamanlis’governments between 1974 and 1980. Karamanlis reciprocated by main-taining a small and relatively stable ministerial setup (see Table 2).

Karamanlis’ dominance over his government colleagues was almostabsolute. His austere lifestyle and legendary self-discipline inspired fearand admiration in equal measure, with not even his most senior associ-ates daring to address him by his first name (Interview #2). Karamanlishad courtiers, rather than “friends.” The Ministerial Council (i.e., the“full” Cabinet) met infrequently (see Table 2) and was very rarely utilizedas the government’s decision-making body or planning forum. Dissent-ing voices were strongly discouraged, and its largely ceremonial proceed-ings were completed swiftly, normally after a short “headmasterly”


speech by Karamanlis. With little or no discussion, formal provisions forvoting became a dead letter, their activation to be seen as an insult to thePM (Interview #1). The marginalization of the Ministerial Council wasalso reflected in the arrangements for its administrative support. A smallSecretariat of the Ministerial Council, housed within the Ministry of thePresidency of the Government, offered minimal secretarial support butno means of coordinating government activities. Indeed, the meetings ofthe Ministerial Council were neither fully transcribed nor properlyminuted, containing little more than a list of participants, a summary ofdecisions, and the opening or closing remarks of the PM. As a matter ofpractice, these minutes were never distributed to the ministers attendingthe meetings.

Karamanlis’ apparent reluctance to utilize the Ministerial Councilaccording to the letter of the 1975 Constitution, reflected his preferencefor “lighter” and more flexible fora for conducting government business(Interview #5). Indeed, ever since his early ministerial days, Karamanlishad developed a reputation as a meticulous and hands-on administrator,who personally oversaw in detail the implementation of the government’sagenda. Pappas (2008, 443) estimates that during the course of his Meta-politesfi premierships, Karamanlis personally chaired over 259 ministerialmeetings. The bulk of these sessions were of the Government Commis-sion (�ubernhtik� �pitrop�), a “mini-Cabinet” of senior ministersmeeting on a weekly basis under the chairmanship of the PM. Indeed, thiswas the “engine” of Karamanlis’ government, with important responsi-bilities over policy development and preparation of the government’slegislative agenda. Alongside it, the Economic and Monetary Committeesunder the chairmanship of the Minister of Coordination (i.e., of Economy)were also central in the conduct of the government’s day-to-day business(Interview #2). Tellingly, the administrative support for the various gov-ernment committees was not placed under the responsibility of the Sec-retariat of the Ministerial Council but instead remained the prerogative ofthe PM.3

This pattern of light institutionalization within the core executive was tobe one of Karamanlis’ most puzzling and enduring legacies. Eschewing astrong office of personal aides or a regularized pattern of Cabinet coordi-nation, the government operated under the personal authority and inter-vention of the PM with a privileged circle of senior ministers lackingsystematization. Karamanlis’ PM Office—though professionally run—wasminimal by contemporary international standards, offering inadequatecentral resources for government coordination. In this sense, it is arguablethat Karamanlis had presided over a “segmented” government (of a“monocratic/ministerial” nature) whose sense of discipline and directionwas underwritten by the PM’s own personal standing and work ethic,rather than institutional counterweights to ministerial autonomy.

The mold had, therefore, been set by the uniqueness of Karamanlis asthe political hero, within a prevailing culture that placed a high premium


on small networks built on trust. His frugal and hermetic lifestyle wasmatched in its premodern character by the structures he establishedat the center of government. Ironically, Karamanlis’ greatest personalachievement—securing Greece’s accession to the then EuropeanCommunity—accelerated the pressures for better coordination and plan-ning. Such pressures were to be experienced first by Andreas Papandreou,whose own style of leadership had been shaped by a very different set ofpersonal and party-political circumstances.

Managing a Galaxy: The PM Tenure of AndreasPapandreou (1981–1989)

The electoral victory of PASOK: Panhellenic Socialist Movement(Panell�nio Sosialistik� ��nhma) in October 1981 marked the firstdemocratic hand over of power since the Metapolitefsi. The arrival ofAndreas Papandreou as PM brought with it promises not only of socialist-inspired “change” (Allaghi) but also of a new style of government.“Andreas” was a charismatic leader in his own right but of a very differenttype from the austere Karamanlis or the restrained George Rallis, who hadbeen his immediate and short-term successor. An earthy, volatile charac-ter, he had returned to Greece as highly regarded academic from theUnited States and later became a leader of the anti-Junta movement.Papandreou was at the head of a generation of cadres steeped in thepolitics of anti-Junta protest, affecting their sense of “us” and “them” andalso animated by grand political struggle. As the leader of his “move-ment,” Papandreou had a totemic dominance, his personal charismahelping to offset the underdevelopment of his party and the diversity ofits political base (Spourdalakis 1988).

By the late 1970s, Papandreou had turned much of his attention towardsteering PASOK’s electoral campaign and fleshing out the party’ govern-ment program. During the same period, however, he gave scant atten-tion to organizational matters of governance, maintaining an attitude ofimprovisation (Interview #6). A feud with his long-standing confidante,Antonis Livanis, in 1976, had deprived Papandreou of a loyal “fixer” anda “natural” candidate for the top job in the PM Office. After the electionvictory, this role was assigned to Grigoris Kassimatis who, nevertheless,failed to establish an effective working relationship with Papandreou andwas removed after a few months in the job (Interview #7).

Resource Deployment. The strong centrifugal tendencies within his gov-ernment during its first year in office convinced Papandreou that a radicaloverhaul of its core operations was needed. This realization broughtwith it both institutional reform and changes in personnel. In autumn1982, Papandreou’s legal adviser, George Kassimatis, was entrusted withdrafting a blueprint, though symptomatically he was given little time to doso (Interview #8). Kassimatis’ proposals sought to bring together all ser-


vices responsible for the coordination of the government (including itslegislative initiative) with a corresponding strengthening of the PM Officeas an independent hub of advice and monitoring at the disposal of the PM.Within this context, both the Secretariat of the Ministerial Council and theCentral Law-Preparation Committee were subordinated directly underthe PM.4

Papandreou, who had provided almost no personal input into thedesign of the new setup, happily accepted the proposals of his adviser(Interview #8). As a result, a new law (1299/82) “on the re-organisation ofthe PM services” was passed through Parliament in November 1982. Thelaw designated a total of 113 posts in the PM Office alone, including 50senior advisers spread over six main offices (Director’s Office, Legal,Economic, Diplomatic, Military, and Technical Office) or deployed onspecific tasks assigned to them directly by the PM. Significantly, the arrivalof Antonis Livanis as the General Director of the PM Office (as well asDirector of PASOK’s Parliamentary Group) in 1983 brought a majorheavyweight to the center of the government’s operations.

However, the new setup achieved little of its original promise. Lessthan half of designated posts were filled (see Table 2), and many of thejunior staff of the PM Office appeared to have contributed very little,evidently securing their appointments through clientelistic networks(Interview #9). Although senior advisers within the PM Office retained asignificant degree of influence in their respective policy domains, theoffice was physically split between different premises in the Parliamentand the Maximou Mansion (the official PM’s headquarters since 1983)and never acquired a great deal of coherence or collective ethos (Interview#10). For Livanis—a man immersed in PASOK’s internal partymachinations—the oversight of the Parliamentary Group became a majorpreoccupation, restricting his ability to engage with the more technicalside of policy elaboration or the day-to-day management of the PM Office(Interview #7). This allowed other “big beasts” in Papandreou’s innercircle to develop their own direct channels of communication with the PM(Interview #11). To all intents and purposes, this was also the spirit of Law1299/82, which had deliberately provided for a “hub-and-spoke” patternof interaction between the PM and his senior advisers without placingthem under a robust chain of command or a regular pattern of meetings.This modus operandi might have suited Papandreou’s style (and his aver-sion to institutionalized decision making), but it severely undermined theefficient operation of his PM Office.

Management of Cabinet. The same sense of fluidity underlined Papandre-ou’s approach to the Cabinet system. Unlike Karamanlis, Papandreou leda team of totally inexperienced ministers. The sense of improvisation wasmatched by Papandreou engaging in frequent government reshuffles (seeTable 2) and experimenting widely both with the size and shape of hisgovernment. To Papandreou’s supporters, the frequent reshuffles were an


effective means of keeping the party together and creating a “criticalmass” of cadres with ministerial experience (Interview #12). His oppo-nents, however, accused Papandreou of an excessively volatile tempera-ment that undermined the coherence of the government and destabilizedthe implementation of its policy agenda (Interview #1).

Papandreou shared with his predecessors (particularly Karamanlis)an aversion toward the Ministerial Council, which he regarded as toounwieldy to provide strategic direction. As a result, its functions werereduced to a mainly ceremonial platform for the PM to address his min-isters. Although the precise number of meetings of the Ministerial Councilunder Papandreou is not known, Loverdos (1991, 243) suggests that thismight not have exceeded 16 in PASOK’s eight years in office. Moreover,the marginalization of the Ministerial Council was not counterbalanced bythe operation of a robust system of Cabinet committees. Although in 1982,Papandreou had restructured the Cabinet committee system it had inher-ited,5 the new setup (modeled around the operation of a GovernmentCouncil in the role of a “mini-Cabinet”) was never properly embedded inthe government’s mode of operation (Interview #9).

In the event, in 1985 Papandreou himself acknowledged major short-comings in the coordination of his government and he promised a newsystem of regular meetings. The new law introduced for this purpose in1985 (1558/85) sought to delegate even further powers of coordinationto the PM Office by appointing senior advisers in charge of servicinggovernment committees. Papandreou’s own commitment to chair moregovernment meetings, however, was soon forgotten (Interview #9). Inaddition, the further strengthening of the PM Office raised criticisms thata “parallel government” was now operating from within Maximou (Inter-view #12). By that time, the Secretariat of the Ministerial Council hadbecome an empty shell, paralyzed by a high turnover of political appoint-ments and without a functioning Ministerial Council to serve.

By the end of the 1980s, Papandreou’s failing health only served toexacerbate the segmented nature of his government, so vividly manifestedin the outbreak of the Koskotas scandal, which signaled the end forPASOK’s reign on power. Papandreou was temporarily wounded buteventually able to restore his authority within the party, supported byLivanis as his arch-confidante and his new protective wife-to-be. All thisseemed a long way from the early plans to strengthen the strategic capa-bilities at the very center of government. In this sense, Kassimatis’ planmight have offered a window of opportunity for the modernization of theGreek core executive, but the mold of fragmentation not only remained,but was indeed further entrenched by Papandreou’s own volatility andhigh premium on loyalty and trust. The net effect was a pattern of gover-nance akin to a galaxy, in which Papandreou stood at the center of a“monocratic/ministerial” government in which competing ministerialagendas undermined a well-organized, linear decision-making operation.In this context, the strengthening of the PM Office resulted in the creation


of yet another power base with a claim to speak on behalf of an elusiveleader who, ultimately, remained far more interested in the grand narra-tives of Greece’s democratization process, rather than the grinding busi-ness of managing government.

Stillborn Institutionalization: The PM Tenure of KonstantinosMitsotakis (1990–1993)

In the election of April 1990, New Democracy, under the leadership ofKonstantinos Mitsotakis, was able to secure a wafer-thin parliamentarymajority (of just one seat) and formed the first center-right government innearly a decade. The new resident at Maximou had a long career—havingfirst been a minister in 1951—often mixed with controversy, as he hadtransgressed some of the dividing lines of Greek politics. The new PMidentified himself with a broadly neoliberal stance, against what heattacked as PASOK’s populism.

Resource Deployment. Despite his own projection as an experienced andmanagerially competent leader—very much defined in contrast to Papan-dreou’s diffused governing style—Mitsotakis made no effort to reform thestructure of the PM Office he had inherited (see Table 2). The assassinationof his closest associate, Pavlos Bakogiannis, in September 1989 had cer-tainly deprived Mitsotakis of a potential heavyweight as director in hisPM Office. The appointment of his relatively inexperienced daughter,Dora Bakogianni (Pavlos’ widow), to this post in April 1990 reflected hispreoccupation with trust above managerial experience.6 Despite its con-siderable size, however, the PM Office under Bakogianni had ratherlimited influence over policy (Interview #13). A partial exception to thispattern was the Head of the PM’s Economic Office, Miranta Xafa, whoseinfluence increased substantially when fellow neoliberal Stefanos Manosbecame Minister of Economy (Interview #2).

The relative weakness of Mitsotakis’ PM Office came as no surprise tothose familiar with his personality and management style. A supremelyconfident man who lived and breathed politics, Mitsotakis had placedhimself at the epicenter of a huge web of informal contacts and adviserswhom he micromanaged with ruthless efficiency (Interview #3). Thisunmistakable feature of an “old-style” politician coexisted alongsidehis apparent openness to new ideas and fondness of modern campaigntechniques. During the electoral campaigns of 1989/1990, for example,Mitsotakis had assembled a young team of experts (nicknamed the “kin-dergarten”) to lead the party’s communication strategy. Many of themlater followed Mitsotakis to Maximou, only to feel that the PM’s tendencyto micromanage on the immediate, obscured the larger priorities andstrategy, disrupting the decision-making processes (Interview #14).

Management of Cabinet. Mitsotakis’ timidity in reforming his own PMOffice stood in sharp contrast to his significant activism in revitalizing the


operation of the Cabinet system. This was the result of both conviction andcircumstance. Despite his electoral victory in 1990, Mitsotakis’ positionwithin his own party was never dominant, suspected by both Karamanlis’supporters and the more traditionalist/populist wing of the party (Inter-view #15). Mitsotakis was experienced enough to realize that the domi-nant management style of his predecessors (Karamanlis and Papandreou)over their ministerial colleagues would not be an option available to him.

As a result, his prime ministerial tenure was the first of the Metapolitefsito institutionalize a pattern of regular meetings for both the GovernmentCommission (which he, informally, reinstated in 1990) and the full Minis-terial Council, which was now to meet every second week in lengthysessions. One of his most significant innovations was the introduction of anew Code of Operation of the Ministerial Council replacing the oneadopted by Karamanlis nearly 15 years earlier. The new Code stipulated,for the first time since 1974, the frequency of the Ministerial Council’smeetings and introduced a range of measures that clarified its modusoperandi. These included rules on drafting and distributing its agenda, therecording and transcribing of its proceedings, as well as clauses on theconfidentiality of its archives.7 Much of the impetus behind these reformswas provided by then Secretary of the Ministerial Council, EvangelosVoloudakis, a professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Athens.When first appointed to his post in July 1989, Voloudakis had reportedlyfound the Secretariat in complete disarray, with just two junior secretarialstaff (Loverdos 1991, 247f). Reflecting on the resources available to theGreek Ministerial Council, Voloudakis later wrote that they were “com-parable to those of a small rural council” (Kathimerini, June 2, 1996).

Despite the significant improvement in the formal modus operandi ofhis government, Mitsotakis’ own interfering governing style soon becamea source of conflict with many of his senior ministers (Dimas, Kefalogian-nis, Evert, and Kannelopoulos) who left the government after a series ofdamaging public rows. Hence, despite the earlier promise to lead a leanerand more stable government than his PASOK predecessor, Mitsotakis wasunable to deliver on either front. The ministerial turnover in his govern-ment was, indeed, the second highest of the Metapolitefsi period (seeTable 2), reflecting the difficult landscape in which the PM had to operatebefore the loss of his parliamentary majority in September 1993.

By the end of his three years in office, Mitsotakis’ legacy on the Greekcore executive was a mixed one. The institutionalization of the meetings ofthe Ministerial Council had certainly restored a sense of normality, shift-ing the paradigm of his government to that of a “Cabinet/Ministerial”type. Yet, the overall pattern of “segmented government” remained. At thelevel of Cabinet committees, for example, much informality remained,with the operation of the Government Commission never having beenassigned clear competences or a legal personality and few other collectivebodies functioning on a regular basis. The important work undertaken byVoloudakis in the Secretariat of the Ministerial Council had modernized


its legal framework, but these improvements did not cover the operationof the Cabinet committees, which essentially remained outside its remit.Against this background, much of the follow-up to the government’sdecisions was diffused between a workaholic (but micromanaging) PMand his PM Office, which lacked clout and was rarely listened to. Underthese conditions, significant ministerial autonomy remained. As a result,Mitsotakis’ ambitions of replicating the managerial brilliance of Konstan-tinos Karamanlis and combining it with the collective government ethosof his former patron, George Papandreou, were fatally compromised amidhis precarious parliamentary position and the eternal in-fighting of agovernment that eventually imploded.

Bounded Institutionalization: The PM Tenure of KostasSimitis (1996–2004)

Of all the premierships of the Metapolitefsi period, the arrival of KostasSimitis at Maximou was perhaps the most unlikely. Simitis was, in manyrespects, an “accidental” PM, having narrowly and unexpectedly defeatedthe candidates of the traditionalist fraction of PASOK to replace, the seri-ously ill, Andreas Papandreou as PM in January 1996.8 Simitis had culti-vated patiently his leadership credentials since the early 1990s, but at nopoint until then had his “modernization” agenda become a dominantdiscourse within PASOK. His rise to power was more a reflection of theinability of his party rivals to unite under a single candidate and of Simitis’broader electoral appeal.

Resource Deployment. This latter period of PASOK’s history had beenformative for Simitis, whose own retiring manner and managerialismstood in sharp contrast to the extravagance and fluidity of Papandreou’stwilight years. Now at Maximou, Simitis was keen to emphasize a breakfrom the past (Interview #16). Less than four weeks into his post, the newPM proceeded to restructure the PM Office in an apparent attempt toreduce its overall size, improve the quality of its staff, and professionalizeits operation. This task was assigned to one of the PM’s closest allies, NikosThemelis, a former EU official who had followed Simitis in all his minis-terial appointments since the mid-1980s. Although never officiallyappointed as Director of the PM Office (keen not to be seen as the “newLivanis”), Themelis was, indeed, a hugely influential figure in shaping theoutlook and role of the new office (Interview #17). The brief from hispolitical master was indeed a delicate one: to raise the level of expertiseavailable to the PM without antagonizing Simitis’ senior ministerialcolleagues.

Themelis’ own profile suited the brief very well. Similar to Livanis, hehad no political ambitions of his own, and his loyalty to the PM was total.Unlike his predecessor, however, Themelis was able to reach “beyond theparty” (in which he had little interest) in selecting a relatively small, but


highly qualified, group of close associates around him (Interview #17). HisOffice of Strategic Planning (with seven staff) might have been the “hub”of Simitis’ inner circle, but other “big beasts” within the PM Office alsoyielded significant power. Although most of the PM’s close associatesretained their direct channels of reporting to him, the PM Office did,indeed, develop a strong collegial ethos, allowing it to exercise a signifi-cant degree of activism both in terms of shaping policy and monitoringthe implementation of the government’s agenda. This power shift was notwithout its critics among Simitis’ senior ministerial colleagues (Interview#18).

If Themelis provided the intellectual fire-power at the core of Simitis’inner circle, much of the grinding work of coordinating the government’sactivity fell to Socratis Kosmidis, a lawyer by trade, who was appointedSecretary of the Ministerial Council in September 1996. For much of theMetapolitefsi period, the Secretariat had been assigned a rather minor role,with few of Kosmidis’ predecessors (except Voloudakis) making theirpresence felt (Interview #19). Simitis, however, attributed great impor-tance to the strengthening of the office, which was upgraded to a GeneralSecretariat in 1996, before it was renamed “General Secretariat of theGovernment” (GSoG) in 2004.9 During that period, the GSoG’s staff androle expanded significantly (see Table 2), bringing under its authority allavailable resources for the exercise of the government’s legislative initia-tive10 as well as extending its remit across the entire range of Cabinetcommittees, rather than simply the Ministerial Council. Under Kosmidis’energetic and combative style, the GSoG became a major point of refer-ence in Simitis’ governments, often exercising significant activism inresolving conflicts over shared ministerial competences, a problem sovividly exposed during Greece’s preparation for the 2004 Olympic Games(Interview #20).

Management of Cabinet. Simitis’ governing style reflected both his back-ground and his position within the party. As a German-educated professorof law who had spent many of his formative years abroad, Simitis wasrenowned for his institutionally driven mindset that had often conflictedsharply with Papandreou’s management style in both party and govern-ment (Interview #21). Now at the helm, Simitis had a point to prove.Within a week of assuming power, the Governing Commission (a “miniCabinet” comprising 10 senior ministers)11 was reactivated, and thesystem of Cabinet committees that had been dormant during the latterPapandreou years was reformed and their competences clarified. By theend of his tenure, Simitis could point to the operation of five seniorCabinet committees, supported by 12 interministerial committeesaddressing specific policy issues. Although many of these structures neverbecame fully operationalized (their outlook shaped, by and large, by thewill and skill of the presiding minister), the degree of institutionalizationwithin Simitis’ government was unprecedented by the standards of the


Metapolitefsi. Both the Ministerial Council and the Government Commis-sion met—at fixed days and times—every two weeks, and all seniorCabinet committees met at regular intervals.

This strongly institutionalized pattern of governance provided theinclusiveness that Simitis needed. His weakness within the party obligedhim to accommodate a number of high-profile members of the party’s“traditional” wing (like Akis Tsochatzopoulos and Gerasimos Arsenis)who commanded considerable support both among PASOK’s rank andfile and its parliamentary group. Simitis also owed a great deal to some ofthe party’s “modernizers” (like Theodore Pangalos and Vasso Papan-dreou) who had supported his leadership bid. This put the PM in chargeof a diverse and fragile “coalition” of ministers, and its institutionalizationoffered the best chance for the realization of Simitis’ “modernization”project. The hugely destabilizing effect of Pangalos’ exit from the govern-ment in November 2000 was a poignant reminder of Simitis’ fragility. This,alongside the PM’s known antipathy to Papandreou’s frequent reshuffles,may also help to explain the relative stability of Simitis’ governmentsbetween 1996 and 2004 (see Table 2).

By the end of his two terms in office, Simitis had brought widespreadchange to the operation of the Greek core executive. This encompassedboth institutional reform and a more collective (and stable) pattern ofdecision making. Despite his considerable achievements, however, deeplyentrenched systemic constraints bounded the extent and effectiveness ofthis institutionalization process. Although the operation of the govern-ment’s key collective bodies functioned with unprecedented regularity,Simitis’ earlier vision of establishing a working “Cabinet system” fellshort of materializing. The mold of “segmented government” had beenshaken (shifting firmly to a “Cabinet/ministerial” type) but not broken.Especially in his second term, Simitis was regarded as having accepted thelimits of his position within the party and was governing despite theinternal opposition, not with it. Moreover, the fact that the PM himself hadto chair the Olympic Games Inter-Ministerial Committee in order toensure the timely delivery of targets also indicated the ongoing problemsof bureaucratic coordination. Furthermore, his PM Office included someconsiderable talent, but its size and resources were well below comparableEuropean examples, reflecting at least in part a strong preference towardsmall networks operating on trust. Ultimately, however, this denied himboth the resources and the linkages to overcome the wider, lethargicbureaucratic machine.

Conclusion

The present article has argued that the constitutional notion of thesupremacy of the Greek PM is a partial fallacy. At one level, the Greek coreexecutive is something of a conundrum: a case of prime ministerial powerthat is near “presidential,” yet without the centralization of resources, one


without the dominance of a Cabinet structure but with the independenceof ministries. The present study went further: by developing a generalmatrix by which to assess the structure of core executive relations and tocontextualize prime ministerial power within it. This served to test therelevance of conventional typologies for the Greek case. It also helped togive further substantiation to the notion of a “solitary centre”—indicatingthe parallels with Central Europe—and of a “segmented government.”

While recognizing certain long-term features of the Greek core execu-tive, the detailed empirical investigation pitted the impact of differentleadership styles and party strength against the extent of PM resources(for control from the center) and the utilization of the Cabinet system (forintragovernmental coordination). As Table 2 indicates, there was no con-sistent pattern: Simitis was the only PM to combine a high activism forhimself, his office, and his Cabinet (“full” and “mini”); Karamanlis had astrong “mini” Cabinet but a tiny PM Office. Papandreou was the extremecase in neglecting the Cabinet. Mitsotakis privileged the Cabinet but nothis Office. Overall, the permutations showed the underlying limited insti-tutionalization of the PM office and of the Cabinet. The individual casehistories explained the variation in more detail. With such instability, coreexecutive politics a la Grecque have sustained a center that has lackednodality, organizational capacity, and resources. The implications forprime ministerial power and the ability to steer policy, to monitor andcontrol activity across ministries, and to understand impacts are clear.

Acknowledgments

This article is based on the authors’ presentation, “The Naked Emperor:Prime Ministerial Leadership and Core Executive Management in Post-1974 Greece,” Yale, May 2009. Unpublished drafts have been commentedon by practitioners and academic colleagues to whom we are very grate-ful. Any errors are our responsibility alone. In 2010, one of the authorsserved on an advisory committee to the Greek PM for the reform of hisoffice.

Notes

1. The usage here follows the classic definition of Dunleavy and Rhodes (1990,4) that includes “all those organizations and structures which primarilyserve to pull together and integrate central government policies, or act asfinal arbiters within the executive of conflicts between different elements ofthe government machine.” We refer, in particular, to the offices and net-works around the PM. We prefer this to the Goetz and Margetss (1999)formulation of “centre of government,” for consistency.

2. “Cabinet” is used here to refer to a constitutional form that generically maycomprise various committees as well as a “cabinet” of ministers responsibleto parliament. In the Greek case, the formal nomenclature differs. The “full”cabinet is known as the “Ministerial Council” (Upourgiko Sumboulio) and


this is the term used here. In addition, a “mini-” or “inner-Cabinet” operates,termed initially the “Government Commission” (�ubernhtik� �pitrop�),then renamed Government Council (�ubernhtik� Sumbo�lio—�USU�)under Andreas Papandreou. Here “Government Commission” and “Gov-ernment Council” are used in their relevant historical context. The “cabinetsystem” is used as an umbrella term.

3. In practice, this became the responsibility of Petros Molyviatis.4. The Central Law-Preparation Committee was an advisory service aimed at

improving the standards of draft bills brought to the Parliament. It waspreviously housed in the Ministry of the Presidency of the Government.

5. See Law (��moς) 1266/82, Official Gazette, Vol. A, no. 81.6. Bakogianni remained the de facto head of the office even after she entered

government as a minister.7. Ministerial Council Act 50/1990, Official Gazette, Vol. A, no. 76.8. PASOK had returned to power in October 1993.9. See Presidential Decree (Proedrik� Di�tagma) 86/96, Official Gazette,

Vol. �, no. 70 and Presidential Decree (Proedrik� Di�tagma) 32/04, OfficialGazette, Vol. �, no. 28.

10. Including the Central Law-Preparation Committee (since 1998) and theCentral Commission for Legal Codification (since 2004).

11. See Prime Ministerial Decision (Prwqupourgik� �p�jash) 208/1996, Offi-cial Gazette, Vol. B, no. 72. The Government Commission was formallyreinstated by Papandreou in July 1994, but during the later stages of hisPremiership, it had ceased to operate.

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List of Interviews

1. Senior official in Karamanlis PM Office, Athens, March 3, 20092. Minister in Karamanlis’ government, Athens, February 13, 20093. Deputy Minister in Karamanlis’ government, Athens, February 11,

20094. Minister in Karamanlis’ government, Athens, March 13, 20095. Deputy Minister in Karamanlis’ government, Athens, April 7, 20096. Minister in Papandreou’s government, Athens, July 7, 20107. Senior Official in Papandreou’s PM Office, Athens, March 26, 20098. Senior Official in Papandreou’s PM Office, Athens, January 12, 2010

and July 2, 20109. Senior Official in Papandreou’s PM Office, Athens, January 10, 2011

10. Senior Official in Papandreou’s PM Office, London, March 23, 201111. Minister in Papandreou’s government, Athens, April 8, 200912. Minister in Papandreou’s government, Athens, February 11, 200913. Senior Official in Mitsotakis’ PM Office, Athens, March 24, 201014. Senior Official in Mitsotakis’ PM Office, Athens, February 13, 200915. Minister in Mitsotakis’ government, Athens, March 24, 201016. Senior Official in Simitis’ PM Office, Athens, March 24, 201017. Senior Official in Simitis’ PM Office, Athens, July 5, 201018. Senior Official in Simitis’ PM Office, Athens, July 6, 201019. Minister in Simitis’ government, Athens, February 10, 200920. Senior Official in the Government Secretariat, Athens, March 12,

200921. Minister in Simitis’ government, Athens, February 12 and 19, 2009


The Emperor Has No Clothes: Power and Resources within the Greek Core Executive

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