The elements of cause and effect

Abstract

Cognitive science has developed many different theoretical approaches to causal-

ity. All of these approaches assume (sometimes implicitly) that we conceptualize

causality in terms of cause and effect. It is argued that the elements—the concep-

tual primitives—of a cause and of an effect have not been identified yet. Thus,

this paper sets out to carry out cognitive-linguistic analysis (systematic sentence

manipulations) to answer the following two questions: (1) What are the mental el-

ements that make up a cause? And (2) what are the mental elements that make up

an effect? It is argued that Talmy’s force dynamics—with three revisions—can be

used as a basic framework to identify these elements. The causal concepts investi-

gated are: successful causation (CAUSE), failed causation (DESPITE), negative

causation (PREVENT), and disengaged potential negative causation (ENABLE).

This account of “force-dynamic elementary causality” is then also compared with

other variants of force-dynamic theory. It is furthermore demonstrated how force-

dynamic elementary causation can be integrated with epistemic and with coun-

terfactual and probabilistic accounts. Finally, it is discussed how these causal

elements might manifest in mental spatiotemporal structure.

Keywords: force dynamics; causation; counterfactual; Talmyan concept struc-

turing; mental time line

(about 13800 words, including references)

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Contents

1 Introduction 3

2 Revising three basic concepts in Talmy’s force dynamics 4

2.1 Revising Talmy’s force-dynamic “action/rest” dichotomy . . . . . . 4

2.2 Revising Talmy’s force-dynamic “tendency” . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

2.3 Interpreting Talmy’s “onset/extended causation” distinction in terms

of cause and effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

3 Successful causation (s-causation) 15

4 Failed causation (f-causation) 19

5 Negative causation (n-causation) 23

6 Disengaged potential negative causation (dpn-causation) 29

7 Discussion 34

7.1 Digital and analog representation in mental causality . . . . . . . . 36

7.2 Basic opposition vs. basic opposition/concordance . . . . . . . . . . 37

7.3 Force-dynamic elementary causation and epistemics . . . . . . . . . 39

7.4 Force-dynamic elementary causation and counterfactual and prob-

abilistic theories of causation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

7.5 Force-dynamic elementary causation and the mental time line . . . 44

(table of contents is only added for overview purposes; will be removed in the final

version)

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1 Introduction

Cognitive science has developed many different theoretical approaches to causality.

Among the most prominent contemporary ones are: force dynamics (Barbey & Wolff

2007; Jackendoff 1990, 1996; Talmy 1985, 1988, 2000a; Wolff & Song 2003; Wolff 2003,

2007), causal model theory (Ali et al. 2011; Sloman 2005; Sloman et al. 2009), mental

model theory (Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird 2001), and counterfactual and probabilistic

accounts of causality (e.g., Pearl 2000; Spirtes et al. 2000). All of these approaches

assume, either explicitly or implicitly, that we conceptualize causality in terms of cause

and effect. This basic assumption is also in accordance with classical philosophical

treatments of causality (e.g. Hume 1748/1999; Kant 1787/2009). Yet despite this wide

agreement on the mental existence of cause and effect, this article argues that the

elements—the conceptual primitives—of a cause and of an effect have not been iden-

tified yet. In the light of this, this article sets out to carry out cognitive-linguistic

analysis (systematic sentence manipulations) to answer the two following questions:

(1) What are the mental elements that make up a cause? And (2) what are the mental

elements that make up an effect? It is argued that Talmy’s force dynamics (Talmy

1985, 1988, 2000a)—with three revisions (Section 2)—can be used as a basis to iden-

tify these elements. These three revisions of Talmy’s force dynamics are necessary for

two main reasons. First, Talmy’s account cannot handle all cases of physical causation

(Section 2.1). Secondly, while Talmy has dealt with some metaphorical extensions of

force dynamics, for certain causation phenomena that go beyond the physical domain

it is still unclear how Talmy’s account could be applied —for instance for causation in-

volving ideational entities (cf. Sections 3–6). Thus while the present account of mental

causality1 is still largely in spirit with Talmy’s original account, it additionally attempts1The term “mental causality” is ambiguous. On the one hand, it can refer to how we mentally

construe causality. This is the meaning intended in this article. On the other hand, “mental causality”can also mean that thinking is subject to some general causal laws. This latter possibility is not the

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to provide an account that can in principle be applied to all causal conceptualization—

to all mentally construed physical causation and to all mentally construed causation

that goes beyond the physical domain. The causal concepts investigated are: success-

ful causation (CAUSE) (Section 3), failed causation (DESPITE) (Section 4), negative

causation (PREVENT) (Section 5), and what this article characterizes as “disengaged

potential negative causation” (ENABLE) (Section 6). The so-developed account is then

discussed in relation to: other variants of force-dynamic theory (Sections 7.1–7.2); epis-

temic phenomena (Section 7.3); counterfactual and probabilistic reasoning accounts of

causality (Section 7.4); and spatiotemporal structure (Section 7.5).

2 Revising three basic concepts in Talmy’s force dy-

namics

In this section, reasons are given why three basic concepts of Talmy’s force dynamics

need to be revised or refined to some degree: the “action/rest” dichotomy (Section 2.1),

the notion of a force-dynamic “tendency” (Section 2.2), and the “onset/extended cau-

sation” distinction (Section 2.3).

2.1 Revising Talmy’s force-dynamic “action/rest” dichotomy

Talmy’s force dynamics (Talmy 1985, 1988; 2000a; 2011, pp. 633–634) involves the

assumption that mental causality involves the conceptualization of entities that are in

opposition and that are engaged in force interaction, a view that can be traced back

to Kant (1787/2009, p. 229; 1781/1998, p. 314).2 Consider an example adapted from

subject of the current investigation.2Jackendoff (1990) and Wolff & Song (2003) challenge Talmy’s assumption that most force-dynamic

interactions involve opposition and propose that many of these interactions also basically involveconcordance. This issue is taken up in Section 7.2.

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Talmy (2000a, p. 416):

(1) The ball kept rolling because of the wind.3

Using Talmy’s force-dynamic framework, in (1) the ball takes on the role of what is

called the agonist (Ago). In Talmy’s framework, Ago is an entity with an intrinsic force

tendency either toward action or toward rest. In (1) Ago (the ball) is conceptualized as

having the intrinsic tendency toward rest. In Talmy’s force dynamics, there are always

two force entities. The second force entity is called the antagonist (Ant). In (1) this role

is taken on by the wind. Ant is always conceptualized as (i) having the opposite intrinsic

force tendency of Ago and as (ii) as trying to impose this opposite tendency onto Ago.

Thus in Talmy’s force dynamics if Ago has the intrinsic tendency toward rest, Ant will

attempt to make it act and if Ago has the intrinsic tendency toward action, Ant will

attempt to make it stop. Consequently in (1) the wind is conceptualized as having the

opposite intrinsic force tendency of the ball: it is conceptualized as having the tendency

toward motion which it tries to impose onto the ball. The resultant of the interaction

always relates to Ant. This resultant depends on which intrinsic force is conceptualized

as being stronger. In conceptualizations underlying the use of because—as in (1)—Ant

is always stronger. Thus, in (1) Ant’s tendency (the wind’s intrinsic tendency toward

motion) is stronger than Ago’s tendency (the ball’s intrinsic tendency to stationariness)

and hence the ball is conceptualized as being moved by the wind. (It could of course

also be that Ago’s—here the ball’s—force is stronger; see Section 4.)3The generated example sentences that start here have been approved as a set by one native

American English speaker.

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Figure 1: Talmy’s system of force-dynamic diagramming (Talmy 2000a, p. 414).

Talmy uses a specific system of diagramming (Figure 1) to represent force-dynamic

interactions. Thus, (1) would be notated as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Talmy’s system of force-dynamic diagramming for the conceptual structureunderlying because (as well as other forms of s-causation, see below).

Thus in Figure 2, using (1) as an example, Ago (the ball) with its intrinsic tendency

for rest is diagrammed as a circle (=Ago) with a dot (= rest). Ant (the wind) is

diagrammed as a concave figure. Ant being stronger (+) causes the ball to move (>, on

the resultant line). I shall adopt a notational variant of this diagramming system that, I

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think, will help to flesh out the cause-and-effect relationship that is implicitly assumed

in Talmy’s force dynamics. With this variant, (1) can be notated in the following form:

(2) Notational variant of Talmy’s system of force-dynamic diagramming, exemplified

with the conceptual structure underlying because

C: Ago-T (–), Ant-T>(+) → E: Ago>

The left side of the arrow (→) now represents the cause (C) and the right side the

effect (E). Thus the cause (C) can be identified as involving the following scenario:

Ago has the tendency (Ago-T) for rest ( ), Ant imposes its stronger (+) tendency

(Ant-T) of motion action (>) onto the weaker (–) Ago. This intervention of Ant on

Ago has the effect (E) that Ago is forced to move (Ago>).4

As has just been shown, in Talmy’s force dynamics (Talmy 1985, 1988, 2000a),

when Ago’s intrinsic tendency is rest, then Ant’s intrinsic tendency must be action

and vice versa. However, Talmy’s rest/action dichotomy cannot essentially capture

the cause-and-effect relationship that is expressed by because, as the following example

demonstrates:

(3) The rolling ball changed direction because of the wind.

Clearly, in (3) the ball (Ago) has already at the outset the intrinsic tendency to ac-

tion (movement) and the stronger wind (Ant) changes this intrinsic tendency to yet

another motion action. In other words, one cannot identify a toward rest/toward action

dichotomy, which we should be able to in Talmy’s force-dynamic framework. Thus

Talmy’s action/rest dichotomy cannot essentially capture the relationship of cause and

effect (or the conceptual structure underlying because). A solution to this problem is

to abstract away from the action/rest dichotomy in the following way:4On the key importance of the concept of “intervention” in mental causality see Sloman (2005);

cf. also Section 7.4).

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(4) Redefinition of Talmy’s force-dynamic action/rest dichotomy

a. Ago (agonist): a force-dynamic entity with any given intrinsic tendency

(tendency x)

b. Ant (antagonist): a force dynamic entity that (i) has an intrinsic tendency

which is different (diff) to the intrinsic tendency of Ago (tendency xdiff) and

that (ii) attempts to impose xdiff onto Ago

(4a) proposes to replace Talmy’s notion of an agonist which always has a tendency either

toward action or rest with the more abstract notion that Ago can in principle have

any given intrinsic tendency. This “any-ness” is termed x, hence the term tendency x.

(4b) proposes to replace Talmy’s notion of an antagonist which always has an opposite

tendency that is either action or rest with the more abstract notion that Ant in principle

always has an intrinsic tendency that is simply different to the intrinsic tendency of

Ago (I will notate this as tendency xdiff).5 Overall, (4) leads to the following revision

of (2):

(5) C: Ago-Tx(–), Ant-Txdiff(+) → E: Ago-xdiff

The cause (C) can now be identified as involving the following scenario: Ago has any

tendency (Tx) and Ant then imposes its stronger different tendency (Txdiff) onto the

weaker (–) Ago. This intervention of Ant has the effect (E) that Ago takes on the

imposed different value of Ant (Ago-xdiff). Thus, (5), unlike Talmy’s (2), can capture (3):

The ball has a given tendency x (here, rolling in a certain direction), then there is Ant’s5When presented with example (3), Talmy (2012, personal communication) agreed that his ac-

tion/rest dichotomy cannot capture it. I then suggested that Ago can have any given tendency (ten-dency x) and that Ant could have any tendency that could be construed as a rough opposite (I calledit an intrinsic tendency that is “oppositable” to the intrinsic tendency of Ago). It was then Talmy whoin this discussion immediately came up with a much simpler solution for Ant: that Ant’s tendency issimply different to Ago’s tendency. I do not know if Talmy would stick to his insight after reflectingabout it. But, as far as I can see, replacing the action/rest dichotomy with an x/xdiff dichotomy is thecorrect solution—a solution that works for all instances of s-causation (see Section 3) and f-causation(see Section 4) that I can think of.

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intervention which imposes Ant’s stronger different tendency (its tendency of making

the ball roll in another direction) on Ago—with the effect (E) that Ago is forced to

roll on in the different direction given by the wind. As mentioned above, the notation

developed in this article—for instance, as in (5)—is not meant to suggest a different

mental reality than Talmy’s system of force-dynamic diagramming (Talmy, 1976, p. 62;

1985; 1988; 2000a, p. 414). As also mentioned, the main function of the notational

system is to separate the force-dynamic cause-and-effect elements—cause: elements on

left side of arrow; effect: elements on right side of arrow.

2.2 Revising Talmy’s force-dynamic “tendency”

Consider the contrast between the following two causal scenarios:

(6) Onset and extended causation

a. Onset: The ball started rolling because of the wind.

b. Extended: The ball kept rolling because of the wind.

Talmy makes the basic distinction between onset and extended causation (1976, pp. 63–

66; 1985; 1988; 2000a, p. 417–419). In onset causation, Ant’s entrance or exit initiates

the effect whereas in extended causation, Ant’s force is exerting its influence onto Ago

during the entire conceptualization. (6a) is an example of onset causation. Thus the

appearance of wind initiates the rolling of the ball. (6b) is an example of extended

causation. Thus the wind is exerting its rolling influence onto the ball during the entire

duration of the conceptualized scene. As has already been discussed extensively in the

previous section, Talmy characterizes Ago and Ant as having intrinsic force tendencies.

A crucial point is that for Talmy the notion of “tendency” is a basic inherent feature

of Ago and Ant (Deane 1996; Talmy 2000a). This means that it is assumed that

tendency is a indispensable primitive of Ago and Ant—no matter if onset or extended

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causation is involved. However, the main point to be made in the present section

is to point out that there is a conceptual problem when the notion of a “tendency” is

applied to onset causation (the previous section, where the notion of “tendency” featured

prominently, all contained examples of extended causation or at least examples where

an extended-causation interpretation was possible). To start investigating this issue,

let us first turn briefly to extended causation again where the notion of an “(intrinsic)

tendency” seems apt, using (6b) as an example. As mentioned, in (6b) the ball is

conceptualized as rolling during the entire scene, as we should expect in extended

causation. Consequently, the idea that the ball is somehow related to stationariness

can only be abstractly inferred. Thus, it makes perfect sense here to say that the ball

has a tendency toward stationariness—a tendency which it is not able to manifest at

any point because it is continuously suppressed by Ant’s impingement.

Let us now turn to onset causation. As Talmy (2000a, p. 417) remarks, in onset

causation the mental scene is basically segmented into two parts: the scene before the

Ant intervention and the scene after the Ant intervention. Thus in (6a) Ago is first

in a certain action or state before Ant’s impingement (that is, the ball is stationary)

and Ago is then in certain action or state after Ant’s impingement (that is, the ball

is rolling now). Note now, that before Ant’s impingement, Ago has not necessarily

abstract tendency toward stationariness: Ago simply is stationary—that is, in this

before-condition Ago is conceptualized to be in the state of stationariness rather than

having merely the tendency toward stationariness. It is only after Ant’s impingement,

where one can clearly characterize Ago to have the tendency toward stationariness.

Now Ago’s stationariness is not manifesting itself any longer in overt ways, but can

only be abstractly inferred.

We may therefore note that Talmy’s characterization of “tendency” does not seem

to be necessary in the before-impingement situation of onset causation. I would like to

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suggest that Ago and Ant must necessarily be conceptualized to be in a given action or

state in this particular mental situation (in onset causation, before Ant’s impingement).

How can one incorporate these observations into the notational force-dynamic variant

of (5)? One solution is to remove “tendency” (T) from the description (cf. with (5)):

(7) C: Ago-x(–), Ant-xdiff(+) → E: Ago-xdiff

(7) for instance correctly predicts that (8) makes no sense:

(8) *The already rolling ball started rolling because of the wind.

This example demonstrates that the values of x and xdiff can in principle never be the

same, as captured by (7). Instead of standing for a “tendency,” x can now stand for

any value (any action or state) ascribed to Ago and xdiff can now stand for any value

(any action/state) ascribed to Ant, as long the values of Ago and Ant are not the

same. In relation to (6a) (onset causation), the cause (C) can now be identified as the

scenario before the impingement: Ago (here, the ball) is conceptualized to be in a given

action or state (x, here stationariness) and Ant (here, the wind) is conceptualized to

be in a different given action or state (xdiff, here motion). Ant imposes its stronger (+)

different value (xdiff, here motion) onto the weaker (–) Ago. This intervention has the

effect (E) that Ago takes on the imposed different value of Ant (motion). From this

it also follows logically that Ago can no longer manifest its initial value that it had

before the Ant intervention. Thus in (6a), in the postinterventional state, Ago’s initial

action/state value is suppressed—and now becomes a tendency. This observation of

a suppressed inherent value can also be logically derived from (7) without having to

explicitly incorporate the notion of “tendency” into the description. When compared

to Talmy’s solution of making “tendency” a primitive that holds throughout onset and

extended causation (2000a, p. 413–419), the present solution—(7)—has the advantage

that it avoids to speak of tendencies where the notion does not seem to be necessarily

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involved (namely, in onset causation before Ant’s intervention). But how are we to

deal with the notion of “tendency” in extended causation? Should we simply add the

“T” (tendency) as a primitive again? I think that the systematic breaking up of force-

dynamic elements into a cause and into an effect (as has been done in Section (2.1))

will give us a more general solution, as we shall examine next.

2.3 Interpreting Talmy’s “onset/extended causation” distinction

in terms of cause and effect

Kant considered the contrast between onset and extended causation a long time ago:

If I consider a ball that lies on a stuffed pillow and makes a dent in it as

a cause, it is simultaneous with its effect. Yet I still distinguish the two by

means of the temporal relation of the dynamical connection. For if I lay

the ball on the pillow the dent follows its previously smooth shape; but if

(for whatever reason) the pillow has a dent, a leaden ball does not follow it

(1781/1998, p. 312).

Let us first consider the onset-causation example of Kant (“. . . if I lay the ball on the

pillow the dent follows its previously smooth shape”). This onset-causation scenario can

be captured with (7). The cause (C) involves conceptualizing Ago (the pillow) to be in

a given action/state x (smoothness) and conceptualizing Ant (the ball) as attempting

to impose a given action/state xdiff (denting) onto Ago. The ball intervenes on the

pillow’s smooth state by imposing its stronger (+) different value of denting onto the

weaker (–) pillow. This intervention has the effect (E) that Ago (the pillow) has to take

on the imposed different value (being dented) of Ant (the ball).

Let us now consider the extended -causation example that Kant examines (“If I con-

sider a ball that lies on a stuffed pillow and makes a dent in it as a cause, it is simulta-

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neous with its effect”). In terms of cause and effect Kant aptly captures the very basic

distinction between onset and extended causation: in the former, cause and effect oc-

cur in sequence and in the latter, cause and effect occur simultaneously. Furthermore,

Kant also makes it clear that the conceptualization of extended causation requires the

assumption of an underlying onset-causation conceptualization (in extended causation

we “still distinguish the two [cause and effect] by means of the temporal relation of

the dynamical connection”). Thus, following Kant, onset causation is the unmarked

(default) case and extended causation is the marked case. Talmy also recognizes this

unmarked/marked distinction by calling onset causation the “prototypical form” (2000a,

p. 418). However, he does not develop this mentioning of “prototypical” status of onset

causation any further. The notational system developed in this article can capture the

unmarked/marked distinction between onset and extended causation in the following

way:

(9) Force dynamic elements in sequential and simultaneous occurrence of cause and

effect

a. Sequential cause and effect (onset causation): C: Ago-x(–), Ant-xdiff(+) → E:

Ago-xdiff

b. Simultaneous cause and effect (extended causation): [C: Ago-x(–),

Ant-xdiff(+) → E: Ago-xdiff]simul

(9b) is the same as (9a) except that in (9b) cause and effect are cognized simultaneously.

This is notated with [. . . ]simul which indicates that the entire cause-and-effect structure

is embedded within simultaneous cognition. For illustration we may put Kant’s two

examples into the notational description:

(10) Sequential and simultaneous occurrence of cause and effect with Kant’s

pillow/ball example

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a. Sequential C→E: C: Agopillow-xsmooth(–), Antball-xdiff dented(+) → E:

Agoball-xdiff dented

b. Simultaneous C→E: [C: Agopillow-xsmooth(–), Antball-xdiff dented(+) → E:

Agoball-xdiff dented]simul

(10a) reads: the cause (C) involves cognizing an entity pillow (Ago) as being in an initial

smooth state (x) and as being weaker (–) than another cognized entity ball (Ant) which

is conceptualized as imposing the different action/state of denting onto the pillow.

Since Ant’s imposing force is conceptualized as being stronger (+) than Ago’s force,

the cognized effect (E) is that the pillow gets dented (E: Ago-xdiff).

(10b) reads: The cause (C) involves mentally construing a pillow (Ago) being in a

weaker (–) state of smoothness (x), a state which the stronger (+) ball (Ant’s inter-

vention (/) successfully changes by denting the pillow (xdiff). So far (10b) is identical

to (10a). But now this basic embedded sequential C→E relationship is additionally

cognized as occurring simultaneously. This process of simultanization allows the C→E

relationship to extend, so that Ant has the effect on Ago continuously over the entire

duration of the mental representation.

Coming back to Talmy’s notion of “tendency” (see Section 2.2), in the simultaneous

occurrence of cause and effect (extended causation) the situation for Ago is that its

inherent tendency is suppressed for the entire conceptualization. Thus, for instance

in Kant’s extended-causation example, the pillow’s tendency to have a smooth surface

is suppressed throughout the entire cognition of the scene. However, comparable to

the remarks in Section 2.2, this observation of a suppressed action or state can also

be logically derived from (9b) without having to explicitly incorporate the notion of

“tendency” into the notational system. Thus, as far as I can see, there is no need to

incorporate “tendency” as a conceptual primitive into force dynamics.

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In this section, three basic concepts of Talmy’s force dynamics (1985; 1988; 2000a;

2011, pp. 633–634) have been revised: (i) the action/rest dichotomy has been replaced

with an x/xdiff dichotomy (Subsection 2.1); (ii) the notion that Ago and Ant have

“tendencies” has been replaced with the notion that they have “values” (actions or

states that are either expressed or suppressed (Subsection 2.2); and (iii) the onset/offset

distinction has been further refined in that it has been brought into an unmarked form

(sequential occurrence of cause and effect) and a marked form (simultaneous occurrence

of cause and effect) (Subsection 2.3). Let us then see how this somewhat revised account

of Talmy’s original force-dynamic account can handle successful causation (CAUSE,

Section 3), failed causation (DESPITE, Section 4), negative causation (PREVENT, 5),

and disengaged potential negative causation (ENABLE, Section 6).

3 Successful causation (s-causation)

One way of looking at constructions containing because—such as The ball started rolling

because of the wind—is to view them as successful causation (Jackendoff 1990, 131–133;

Jackendoff 1996, pp. 120–121). That is, a cause—such as the wind blowing onto a

ball—is successfully realizing the effect—such as making the ball roll. For convenience,

successful causation will be abbreviated to s-causation. Note now that (7) cannot only

capture the causal conceptual structure underlying because (of) (which linguistically

surfaces either as a subordinate conjunction or a subordinate preposition). (7) is also

readily used to analyze the conceptual structure underlying other linguistic forms that

express s-causation, as (11) suggests.

(11) Some linguistic variants of s-causation that can be described with (7)

a. Subordinate preposition: The ball started rolling because of the wind.

b. Subordinate conjunction: The ball started rolling because the wind blew on it.

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c. Verb: The blowing of the wind caused the ball to start rolling.

d. Adverb: The wind blew. Therefore the ball started rolling.

All of the linguistic variations of expressing that a ball moves from the wind blowing

on it are readily analyzed with (7): They can all be described as involving a weaker

Ago (stationary ball) and a stronger Ant imposition (movement), which results in Ago

having to take on the different value of Ant. Thus I propose that (7) can stand for the

mental representation of s-causation in general. The concept of s-causation corresponds

to what sometimes is referred to as “CAUSE” (Sloman et al. 2009; Walsh & Sloman

2011; Wolff & Song 2003; Wolff 2007). I propose that (7) can capture s-causation

(which includes what is sometimes referred to as CAUSE), no matter how this concept

linguistically surfaces.

Thus far it has been demonstrated how (7) can be applied to the physical realm

(with the example of wind intervening on the condition of a ball). It has also been

demonstrated how (7) can deal with physical force-interactions that Talmy’s action/rest

dichotomy cannot handle (see (3)). In the remainder of this section it will be demon-

strated that (7) can also be applied to all sorts of phenomena that go beyond the

physical domain. Indeed, it seems to be the case that (7) is neutral to what kind of

conceptual content it can “handle.” As already pointed out by Talmy (1985; 1988;

2000a; 2011, p. 634) force-dynamic patterns are found in relation to all sorts of concep-

tual content (cf. also Wolff 2007). To give a sense of this content-neutrality, (12) gives

some examples of phenomena that go beyond the physical domain and where (7) seems

apt.

(12) s-causation in a variety of contexts that go beyond the purely physical domain

a. Human-physiological states: Mary went to bed because she was tired.

b. Social pressures: The tenor gave an encore because this was what the

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audience expected of him.

c. Ideational: The argument is convincing because of its logical structure.

(12a) demonstrates that the x/xdiff dichotomy of (7) can be applied to totally differ-

ent causal scenarios—different to highly transparent physical motion examples (like

wind/ball examples)—where the Ago/Ant force interaction is perhaps more obscure:

for instance, a scenario where we conceptualize someone as going to bed because she

is tired. What is the causal force interaction that underlies a sentence such as Mary

went to bed because she was tired? (7) predicts that one should be able to identify an

Ago which must be in a condition (action or state) that can be conceived of as being

different to the condition of an Ant. When one is tired, it is only natural that one

wants to be somewhere where one can sleep, like being in bed. However, before going

to bed, one is not in such a place. Thus in (12a), Ago can be identified as Mary “being

out of bed” (that is, her “locational state” before she has actually walked to the bed and

lain down on it). Now the x/xdiff dichotomy suggests that we should find an Ant, in

this case a cognitive construct that has a different action/state value to “being out of

bed.” The solution seems to be that Ant is “Mary’s tiredness” which carries within it

the suggestion that it would be indicated to go to bed (linguistically implied in “went to

bed because she was so tired”). (7) can capture (12a) in the following way (the content

that appears in association with the s-causation elements has been added in underlined

subscript right after the element):

(13) C: AgoMary-xout of bed (–), AntMary’s tiredness-xdiff indication to go to bed (+) → E:

AgoMary-xdiff goes to bed

This reads: the cause (C) involves cognizing Mary’s current locational state (Ago-x:

Mary–out of bed) which is intervened by Mary’s tired state that carries within it the

suggestion that it would be indicated to go to bed (Ant-xdiff: Mary’s tiredness–indication

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to go to bed). As in all s-causation, Ant is stronger (+), thus the effect (E) is that Mary

indeed goes to bed (E: Ago-xdiff: Mary–goes to bed).

(12b) demonstrates that the proposed x/xdiff dichotomy also easily works for socio-

dynamic metaphorical extensions of force dynamics (Talmy 2000a and Wolff 2007 have

both also demonstrated such force-dynamic extensions):

(14) C: Agotenor-xstop singing (–), Antexpectation of audience-xdiff give an encore (+) → E:

Agotenor-xdiff give an encore

This reads: the cause (C) involves cognizing the tenor’s current emotional state in

relation to interacting with the audience—the show is over and he does actually not

feel like giving an encore (Agotenor-xstop singing). But his Ago-state is intervened by him

cognizing that the audience has a different expectation: it expects him to give an encore

(Antexpectation of audience-xdiffgive an encore). Ant is stronger (+), thus the effect is that the

tenor gives the audience an encore (E: Agotenor-xdiff give an encore).

(12c) demonstrates that the proposed x/xdiff force-dynamic dichotomy can also be

extended to abstract realms where Ago and Ant are cognized as ideational entities.

Additionally, the most likely reading of (12c) is the one where cause (C) and effect (E)

occur simultaneously (cf. Section 2.3):

(15) [C: Agoargument-xdoubtful (–), Antlogical structure-xdiff convincing(+) → E:

Agoargument-xdiff convincing]simul

The underlying sequential cognition of cause and effect ([C→E]) reads: the cause (C)

involves cognizing the argument as being initially cognized as doubtful (Agoargument-

xdoubtful). (If the argument were not construed as possibly being initially doubtful,

there would be no reason why one would have to give a reason for its convincibilty.)

This possible initial doubtfulness is intervened by cognizing that the argument does

18

have a logical structure, which carries within it the force of convincibility (“is convinc-

ing because of its logical structure”; Antlogical structure-xdiffconvincing ). As in all s-causation,

Ant is stronger (+), thus the effect is that the argument is cognized as convincing (E:

Agoargument-xdiffconvincing). Additionally, the cognitive process of cause-and effect simul-

tanization ([C→E]simul) allows the C→E relationship to extend, so that Ant (the logical

structure) has the effect (of being convincing) on Ago (the argument) continuously over

the entire duration of the mental representation. A sequential occurrence of cause and

effect in relation to the basic ideational content of (12c) would of course also be pos-

sible (for instance underlying a sentence like The argument was eventually convincing

because of its logical structure).

The examination undertaken in this section has provided evidence that we mentally

dichotomize s-causation (CAUSE) into a cause—C: Ago-x(–), Ant-xdiff(+)—and an

effect—E: Ago-xdiff.

4 Failed causation (f-causation)

In the previous section mental causality has been examined in relation to successful

causation (s-causation). There is also the opposite: the instance of what one might

view as “failed causation” (Jackendoff 1990, pp. 131–133; Jackendoff 1996, pp. 120–

121). In such a case the cause—such as the wind blowing onto a ball— fails to realize

the potential effect—fails for instance to make a ball roll. Failed causation will be called

f-causation. What linguistically surfaces when expressing f-causation is for instance the

preposition despite (Talmy 1976, 1985, 1988; 2000a; 2000c; Wolff 2007; Wolff & Song

2003).

(16) Contrasting successful and failed causation

a. Successful: The ball started rolling because of a sudden gust of wind blowing

19

on it.

b. Failed: The ball remained still despite a sudden gust of wind blowing on it.

The newly developed x/xdiff dichotomy allows one not only to systematically describe

s-causation (Section 3), it also provides a means to describe f-causation, as for instance

underlying the use of despite. This is so because the conceptual structure underlying

because and the conceptual structure underlying despite contain the same elements,

with the only difference that in the former Ant is stronger than Ago and in the latter

Ago is stronger than Ant (Talmy 2000a, pp. 415–417). Using the notational variant

that has been introduced in the previous sections, f-causation can be captured in the

following way (cf. with (7) in Section 2.2):

(17) Force-dynamic elements of failed causation (f-causation)

C: Ago-x(+), Ant-xdiff(–) → E: Ago-x

Thus in (16b), the (failed) cause (C) is: a stronger (+) Ago (the ball) with some

given action/state (x: stationariness) resisting the imposition of a different action state

(xdiff: motion) of a weaker (–) Ago. Given that Ant is weaker, the (failed) effect (E) is

consequently in accordance with Ago’s initial value x—the ball’s (Ago’s) inertial force

is stronger than the wind’s (Ant’s) pushing force and is therefore not moved by it.

(17) can also be used to analyze the conceptual structure underlying other linguistic

forms that express f-causation, as (18) suggests.

(18) Some linguistic variants of f-causation that can be described with (17)

a. Subordinate preposition: The ball remained still despite a sudden gust of

wind blowing on it.

b. Subordinate conjunction: The ball remained still although a sudden gust of

wind blew on it.

20

c. Adverb: A sudden gust of wind blew on the ball. Nevertheless the ball would

not move.

All of the linguistic variations of expressing that a ball does not move despite a sudden

gust of wind blowing on it, are readily analyzed with (17): They can all be described

as involving a stronger Ago (ball) intervened by a weaker Ant (gust of wind), which

results in Ago not having to take on the different value of Ant. Thus I propose that (17)

can stand for the mental representation of f-causation in general. f-causation is some-

times also referred to as “DESPITE” (Wolff & Song 2003; Wolff 2007). Thus I propose

that (17) can also stand for DESPITE. Further evidence for this proposition is given

in (19), which demonstrates that (17) can adequately describe f-causation in a large

variety of conceptual contexts that go beyond the physical domain (these f-causation

examples are systematically contrasted with the s-causation examples of (12) in Sec-

tion 3).

(19) f-causation in a variety of conceptual contexts

a. Human-physiological states: Mary had to stay up although she was tired.

b. Social pressures: The tenor decided not to give an encore although this was

what the audience expected of him.

c. Ideational: The argument is doubtful despite its logical structure.

(19a) can be notated as (cf. (13)):

(20) C: AgoMary-xout of bed (+), AntMary’s tiredness-xdiff indication to go to bed (–) → E:

AgoMary-xout of bed

This reads: the failed cause (C) involves cognizing Mary’s current locational state (Ago-

x: Mary–out of bed) which is intervened by Mary’s tired state that carries within it

21

the suggestion that it would be indicated to go to bed (Ant-xdiff: Mary’s tiredness–

indication to go to bed). But as in all f-causation, not Ant but Ago is stronger (+).

Thus the effect of Mary going to bed fails—she has to (for some unspecified reason)

stay out of it (E: Ago-x: Mary–out of bed).

Turning to (19b), this can be notated as (cf. (14)):

(21) C: Agotenor-xstop singing (+), Antexpectation of audience-xdiff give an encore (–) → E:

Agotenor-xstop singing

This reads: the failed cause (C) involves cognizing the tenor’s current emotional state

in relation to interacting with the audience—the show is over and he does actually

not feel like singing an encore (Agotenor-xstop singing). His Ago-state is intervened by him

cognizing that the audience has a different expectation: it expects him to give an encore

(Antexpectation of audience-xdiffgive an encore ). However, his Ago-state is stronger (+). Thus

the effect is that the tenor decides not to sing an encore (E: Agotenor-xdiffsing an encore),

despite the audience expecting him to do so.

Finally, turning to (19c), this can be notated as (cf. (15)):

(22) [C: Agoargument-xdoubtful (+) / Antlogical structure-xdiff convincing(–) → E:

Agoargument-xdoubtful]simul

In (19c) the underlying sequential cognition of cause and effect ([C→E]) reads: the failed

cause (C) involves cognizing the argument as being doubtful (Agoargument-xdoubtful). This

is intervened by cognizing that the argument does have a logical structure. While this

logical structure is conceptualized to carry within it the possible force of convincibility,

this force nevertheless fails to have an effect, since the initial impression that the ar-

gument is doubtful remains stronger. (An argument might for instance have a logical

structure, but remains doubtful for other reasons—e.g., ethical reasons.) Additionally,

the cognitive process of cause-and-effect simultanization ([C→E]simul) allows the failed

22

C→E relationship to extend continuously, so that Ant (the logical structure) has no

(convincing) effect on Ago (the argument) over the entire duration of the mental rep-

resentation. A more sequential occurrence of failed cause and effect in relation to the

basic ideational content of (19c) also seems possible (for instance underlying a sentence

like The argument started to become doubtful despite its logical structure).

The examples of (19) suggest that (17)—analog to (7) in Section 2.2—is neutral

as to what kind of conceptual content can be conceptualized within it. As long as

we conceptualize a “failed cause-and-effect relationship” within this mental scaffolding,

then (17) is “willing” to let content from any given conceptual realm splay across it.

The examination undertaken in this section has provided evidence that we mentally

dichotomize f-causation (DESPITE) into a “failed cause”—C: Ago-x(+), Ant-xdiff(–)—

and a “failed effect”—E: Ago-x.

5 Negative causation (n-causation)

There is also one particular kind of cause-and-effect relationship that has received much

separate attention in the literature: the concept of “PREVENT” (Sloman et al. 2009;

Talmy 1985, 1988; 2000a; Walsh & Sloman 2011; Wolff 2007; Wolff & Song 2003).

PREVENT is often characterized as “negative causation” (e.g., Barbey & Wolff 2007;

Walsh & Sloman 2011; it will thus be abbreviated to n-causation in this article). When

contrasting n-causation with s-causation (Section 3), then s-causation (“successful cau-

sation”) can also be viewed as “positive causation”:

(23) Contrasting positive and negative causation

a. Positive: The ball started rolling because of a sudden gust of wind blowing on

it.

b. Negative: The ball (on the incline) could not start rolling because of a stone

23

lying in the way.

(23a) is “positive” in the sense that conceptualizing this kind of causality does not

involve conceptualizing negation (presumably not even implicitly): The effect, the ball

rolling, is conceptualized in positive terms—that is, no negation is added to the concept

of rolling. In contrast,(23b) is “negative” in the sense that conceptualizing this kind

of causality does involve conceptualizing negation: the effect—the ball not rolling—is

conceptualized in negative terms—that is, negation (here in the form of not) is added

to the concept of rolling.

Thus, when contrasting it with n-causation, it seems natural to characterize regu-

lar causation (Section 3; for instance the conceptual structure underlying because) as

positive causation. But when regular causation is contrasted with f-causation (Sec-

tion 4; for instance the conceptual structure underlying despite) it seems more natural

to characterize it as successful causation (as has been done in Section 3). Given that

a cognitive-linguistic analysis acknowledges, for instance, “partial overlaps” or “interac-

tions that lead to mutual modifications” (Talmy 2011, p. 624; cf. Section 1) this presents

no problem. Rather than having to fix our mind on whether we shall best characterize

regular causation (because, to cause and so on) as successful or positive, we can state

that this might differ depending on what regular causation is contrasted with. Thus,

while I will keep to refer to regular causation as successful causation (s-causation), one

should bear in mind that, depending on context, it might just as well be called “p-

causation” (positive causation). Allowing for this degree of freedom in the descriptive

framework is perhaps a good example how the current cognitive-linguistic approach to

force dynamics differs from a more typical algebraic account like Jackendoff’s concep-

tual semantics. He adopts a fixed notion of “successful causation” with the use of “the

notation CS+ to encode application of force with a successful outcome” (1990, p. 132).

But, as we have seen, linguistic evidence suggests that we might—as this article does—

24

need a more dynamic description of regular causation, one that can encode either the

notion of success or of positivity.

In (23b), n-causation is expressed with “not X because Y” (not rolling because of a

stone) (cf. Walsh & Sloman, 2011). The conceptual structure of “not X because Y” can

also be captured with the notational variant of Talmy’s force-dynamic diagramming

system (Talmy 2000a, p. 414) that has been developed thus far in this article. Recall

that so far Ago has been characterized as having any (overt or suppressed) action/state

value x and Ant as having an action/state value that differs from Ago’s value (xdiff)

(Sections 3–4). One may note that when contrasting an action/state with the negation

of that action/state, that then this negated action/state can also be viewed as a kind of

difference: doing something and not doing something are, after all, two different kinds

of scenarios. In n-causation the value of Ant differs from the value of Ago in always the

same way: Ant always “wants” a result that negates the initial value of Ago. For these

reasons I will replace difference (diff ) with negation (neg) in capturing n-causation

notationally (cf. with (7) in Section 2.2):

(24) Force-dynamic elements of negative causation (n-causation)

C: Ago-x(–), Ant-xneg(+) → E: Ago-xneg

Considering (24) a theorist who would want to stick to a more typical algebraic nota-

tional system might ask: Can one simply replace diff with neg? But in a cognitive-

linguistic analysis in the sense of Talmy (2011, p. 624; cf. Section 1), it would perhaps

even be a surprise if a rigid notion of difference would characterize all tendencies of

an Ant. Instead, we find, as one expects in a cognitive-linguistic analysis, that a very

broad, somewhat vague notion of difference applies, one that includes negation within

its scope. Such a notion of negation, viewing it as a specific case of “differentness” also

differs from the concept of negation in propositional logic where the notion of negation

is not explicitly linked to the notion of “differentness”.

25

In (24) the “negative cause (negative C)” (an action/state which will result in

negating some action/state of Ago) is represented as a weaker (–) Ago with a given

action/state x and a stronger (+) imposing Ant with the value to negate this ac-

tion/state x of Ago (xneg). The “negative effect (negative E)” on Ago is represented as

“Ago-xneg”: Ago has to take on Ant’s negation and is thus “prevented” from acting out

its its initial state or action.

Furthermore, in (23b), the negative effect is present during the entire conceptual-

ization, thus C and E occur simultaneously ([C→ E]simul; cf. Section 2.3):

(25) Simultaneous occurrence of negative cause and effect

[C: Ago-x(–), Ant-xneg(+) → E: Ago-xneg]simul

(23b) can also be described as an “extended negative onset” cause-and-effect relation-

ship: The negative causation (preventing the ball from moving) extends continuously—

the stone exerts its blocking force onto the ball on the incline continuously—and contin-

uously prevents the ball from starting to roll. Hence negated onset causation is extended

repeatedly over the entire duration of the mental representation. Thus we may note

that the notions of extendedness and onsetness can feature within a single mental repre-

sentation of causation. This is an observation which Talmy’s onset/extended causation

dichotomy (1976, pp. 63–66; 1985; 1988; 2000a, p. 417–419) does not seem to predict,

since Talmy characterizes mental representation of causation as occurring in either on-

set or extended form. This conflation of onsetness/extendedness in a single mental

representation is less directly relevant to the present article, since this onset/extended

distinction has been captured as the difference between sequential or simultaneous oc-

currence of cause and effect—which does not result in a comparable conflation.

Thus far in this section, (24) has been examined in relation to the linguistic con-

struction “not . . . because” (“not X because Y”). However, the same description can

26

readily be applied to refer to the verb form that expresses roughly the same concept,

to the verb prevent (from):

(26) Two linguistic variants of n-causation

a. Subordinate preposition and negation adverb: The ball (on the incline) could

not start rolling because of a stone lying in the way.

b. Verb: The stone prevented the ball (on the incline) from starting to roll.

The conceptual structure of both linguistic variants are readily described with (24)

or (25): They can both be described as involving a weaker Ago state (the ball’s sta-

tionariness) that is intervened on by a stronger negation Ant (stone), which results in

Ago having to take on the negative value of Ant.

Thus I propose that (24)—or if the negative cause and effect occur simultane-

ously: (25)—can stand for the mental representation of the concept of “prevention”

in general. The concept for the mental representation of prevention is often referred

to as “PREVENT” (cf. Sloman et al. 2009; Walsh & Sloman 2011; Wolff & Song 2003;

Wolff 2007). Thus I propose that (24) can stand in general for n-causation or what is

often characterized as PREVENT.

Further evidence for the proposal that (24) can stand quite generally for the concept

of n-causation is given in (27) which demonstrates that (24) can adequately describe

n-causation (or PREVENT) in a large variety of conceptual contexts. This is demon-

strated with both examined linguistic variants of PREVENT, with ”not X because Y”

and “prevent (from)” (these n-causation examples are systematically contrasted with the

s-causation examples of (12) and with the f-causation examples of (19), in Sections 3

and 4, respectively):

(27) n-causation in a variety of conceptual contexts that go beyond the purely physical

domain

27

a. Human-physiological states: Mary could not fall asleep because she had had

two double espressos. / Having had two double espressos prevented Mary from

falling asleep.

b. Social pressures: The tenor did not give an encore because the audience was

booing. / The booing of the audience prevented the tenor from giving an encore.

c. Ideational: The argument was not convincing because it was lacking a logical

structure. / Lack of a logical structure prevented the argument from being

convincing.

(27a) can be notated as (cf. (13)):

(28) C: AgoMary-xintends to fall asleep (–), Antdouble espressos-xneg not fall asleep (+) → E:

AgoMary-xneg not fall asleep

This reads: the cause (C) involves cognizing Mary’s intentional state (Ago-x: Mary–

intends to fall asleep) which is intervened by Mary’s having had two double espressos.

These double espressos are experienced as carrying within them the power of negating

the possibility of falling asleep at the moment (Ant-xdiff: double espressos–not fall

asleep). As in all n-causation, the negating Ant is stronger (+), thus the effect is that

Mary is indeed unable to fall asleep (E: Ago-xdiff: Mary–not fall asleep).

(27b) can be notated as (cf. (14)):

(29) C: Agotenor-xfeels like giving an encore (–), Antbooing of audience-xneg not give an encore (+) →

E: Agotenor-xneg not give an encore

This reads: the cause (C) involves cognizing the tenor’s current emotional state in re-

lation to interacting with the audience—the official performance is over and he at first

actually feels like giving the audience an encore (Agotenor-xfeels like giving an encore). But

this initial Ago-state is intervened by noticing the booing of the audience, which carries

28

within it the suggestion that he should refrain from giving an encore (Antbooing of audience-

xneg not give an encore ). Ant is stronger (+), thus the effect is that the tenor (Ago) is pre-

vented from acting out his initial desire to sing an encore (E: Agotenor-xneg not give an encore).

Finally, turning to (19c), this can be notated as (cf. (15)):

(30) C: Agoargument-xconvincing (–), Antlack of logical structure-xneg not convincing(+) → E:

Agoargument-xneg not convincing

This reads: the cause (C) involves cognizing the possibility that the argument could

be convincing (Agoargument-xconvincing). But noticing that the argument is lacking a

logical structure (Antlack of logical structure) eventually prevents the argument from being

convincing (E: Agoargument-xneg not convincing).

The examination undertaken in this section has provided evidence that we mentally

dichotomize n-causation (PREVENT) into a “negative cause”—Ago-x(–), Ant-xneg(+)—

that has a “negative effect”—Ago-xneg.

6 Disengaged potential negative causation (dpn-causation)

In Section 5 the mental representation of n-causation has been characterized. In this

section, analysis is carried out which suggests that the concept of “ENABLE” (Sloman

et al. 2009; Talmy 1976, 1985, 1988; 2000a; 2000c; Wolff 2003, 2007; Wolff & Song

2003) can be characterized as “disengaging the potential effect of negative causation”—

that is, as disengaging a potential n-causation (PREVENT) scenario (cf. Talmy, 2000a,

p. 421 and Section 7.2). When contrasting “disengagement of potential negative causa-

tion” (which will be abbreviated to dpn-causation) with what has been characterized as

n-causation or PREVENT (Section 5), n-causation can also be viewed as “realized neg-

ative causation.” Contrasting the following sentences brings out the proposed contrast

between n-causation (PREVENT) and dpn-causation (ENABLE):

29

(31) Contrasting realized negative causation and disengaged potential negative

causation

a. Realized negative causation (n-causation): The ball (on the incline) could not

start rolling because of a stone lying in the way.

b. Disengagement of potential negative causation (dpn-causation): The ball that

potentially could not have started rolling because of a stone lying in the way

could start because someone removed the stone.

c. Disengagement of potential negative causation rephrased in terms of

ENABLE: Removing the stone enabled the ball to start rolling.

(31a) represents “realized negative causation” in the sense that conceptualizing this kind

of causality actually results in the negative effect: the ball is in effect conceptualized as

not rolling. In contrast, in (31b–c) “negative causation” is only a potential. The actual

result is that a potential prevention is disengaged : removal of the stone lets the ball

roll on.

The conceptual structure underlying dpn-causation can also be captured with the

notational characterization developed thus far in this article—as long as we allow to add

“potentiality” (pot) and “disengagement” (disen) as cognitive elements (cf. with. (7), (17),

and (24), in Sections 2.2, 4, and 5, respectively):

(32) Force-dynamic elements of disengaged potential negative causation

(dpn-causation)

a. dpn-causation (ENABLE)

C: [[C: Ago-x(–), Ant-xneg(+) → E: Ago-xneg ]pot ]disen → E: Ago-x

b. dpn-causation (ENABLE) formulated with the n-causation (PREVENT) part

not written out:

30

C: [PREVENTpot ]disen → E: Ago-x

When dpn-causation is—as in (32a)—fully written out, then a sense is provided of the

proposed conceptual complexity that is involved when one conceptualizes ENABLE.

However, since a large part of this characterization represents the characterization

of n-causation (PREVENT, (24)), one can also notate dpn-causation simply as done

in (32b), which presupposes PREVENT (see Section 5). Thus (32) proposes that dpn-

causation—based on the linguistic observations in (31)—in principle involves the con-

ceptualization of an embedded potential PREVENT scenario. In (31b–c), for instance,

the ball could potentially not roll because of a stone lying in the way. In ENABLE,

however, such potential negative causation is always made ineffective by disengaging

(disen) it. Thus in (31b–c) the disengagement of potential negative causation mani-

fests itself as someone removing the stone. Since the whole potential negative effect

of the negative causation is annihilated (disengaged), Ago can act out its initial ac-

tion/state x—or the disengagement gives Ago at least the potentiality to now act out

its initial value (see further below in section). In (31b–c), for instance, the effect of the

disengagement is that the ball can act out its initial Ago-action of rolling.

Evidence for the proposal that (32) can in principle adequately describe the con-

ceptual structure of dpn-causation (ENABLE) is given in (33), which demonstrates

that (32) can adequately describe dpn-causation or ENABLE in a large variety of con-

ceptual contexts (these dpn-causation examples are systematically contrasted with the

s-causation examples of (12), the f-causation examples of (19), and the n-causation

examples of (27), in Sections 3, 4, and 5, respectively):

(33) dpn-causation in a variety of conceptual contexts that go beyond the purely

physical domain

a. Human-physiological states: Mary who potentially could have been unable to

fall asleep because she had had two double espressos, could fall asleep because a

31

few hours had passed since she had had them. / Allowing enough time to elapse

between having two double espressos and going to bed enabled Mary to fall

asleep.

b. Social pressures: The tenor who may have potentially felt unable to give an

encore because of some booing in the audience could sing an encore because he

realized that most people were applauding. / Realizing that many more people

were applauding than booing enabled the tenor to be in the right mood to sing

an encore.

c. Ideational: The argument that was potentially unable to proceed with

clearness because it seemed at first to lack a logical structure could proceed with

clearness because the (initially intransparent) logical structure was made

transparent. / Making the logical structure of the argument transparent enabled

it to proceed with clearness.

All these instances involve (i) an Ago with a given initial action/state; (ii) an Ant with

a potential to negate (un-) the initial x-value of Ago; (iii) a potential intervention on

a weaker Ago by a stronger Ant; (iv) the disengagement of such potential negative

causation; and (v) an Ago that can act out its initial action/state value due to the

disengagement of the potential negative causation. Thus all these instances can be

aptly characterized with (32), the proposed conceptual structure of dpn-causation or

ENABLE. What still must be dealt with, however, is a refinement of (v): while it is

true that Ago is now in a position to act out its initial action/state value due to the

disengagement of the potential negative causation, it is not always the case that Ago

actually manifests its initial Ago action or state. This becomes particularly clear when

Ago is an agent: a person who is enabled to do something may or may not engage in

this action. As Talmy puts it, the actual occurrence of an effect is “not entailed in the

usual reading of the enable verbs” (1976, p. 508). The following examples bring out

32

this contrast:

(34) dpn-causation with and without the occurrence of an effect

a. dpn-causation with the occurrence of an effect: Realizing that many more

people were applauding than booing enabled the tenor to be in the right mood

to sing an encore [and so he went ahead and gave an encore].

b. dpn-causation without the occurrence of an effect: Realizing that many more

people were applauding than booing enabled the tenor to be in the right mood

to sing an encore [but remembering that he should not overuse his voice, he

nevertheless decided against giving an encore].

In other words, enabling empowers the enabled one to bring about the effect, but the

enabled one might still decide to not bring about the effect. What is needed notationally

for this conceptual refinement then is that the effect either takes place or remains only

a potential. This can be characterized with the notational system developed in this

article in the following way:

(35) dpn-causation with and without the occurrence of an effect

a. dpn-causation with the occurrence of an effect:

C: [PREVENTpot ]disen → E: Ago-x

b. dpn-causation without the occurrence of an effect:

C: [PREVENTpot ]disen → [E: Ago-x]pot

For (35a), the effect is not marked as a mere potential and thus takes place (E: Ago-

x). In (34a) for instance, the potential negative causation (the booing of some in

the audience that could potentially have prevented the tenor from feeling able to give

an encore) is disengaged (by others in the audience who are applauding). The tenor

33

decides to use this empowerment to have an effect and thus he gives an encore (E:

Agotenor-xgives an encore).

For (35b), the effect is marked as only being a potential ([E: Ago-x]pot). Accordingly,

the effect remains only an unrealized possibility. In (34b) for instance, the potential

negative causation (the booing of some in the audience that could potentially have

prevented the tenor from feeling able to give an encore) is—as in (34a)—still disengaged

(by others in the audience who are applauding). However, the tenor decides not to use

this empowerment to bring about the effect (of giving an encore). Thus the effect

remains only a potential ([E: Agotenor-xgives an encore ]pot).

The examination undertaken in this section has provided evidence that we mentally

dichotomize dpn-causation (ENABLE) into a “disengaged potential negative cause”—

[PREVENTpot ]disen—that either has the overall effect of letting Ago act out its initial

value—E: Ago-x—or that at least lets this effect exist as a potential.

7 Discussion

As has been demonstrated in the previous sections (Sections 2–6), the cause-and-effect

structure of four major forms of mental causality—s-causation (CAUSE), f-causation

(DESPITE), n-causation (PREVENT), and dpn-causation (ENABLE-)—can be argued

to involve the following cause (C) and effect (E) descriptions:

(36) Elementary descriptions for four major forms of cause and effect

• s-causation: C: Ago-x(–), Ant-xdiff(+) → E: Ago-xdiff

• f-causation: C: Ago-x(+), Ant-xdiff(–) → E: Ago-x

• n-causation: C: Ago-x(–), Ant-xneg(+) → E: Ago-xneg

• dpn-causation with E occurrence: C: [PREVENTpot ]disen → E: Ago-x

34

• dpn-causaton without E occurrence:C: [PREVENTpot ]disen →[ E: Ago-x]pot

Furthermore, C and E can also occur simultaneously (Sections 2.3, 4, and 5), which for

instance in relation to s-causation (Section 2.3) is represented in the following way:

(37) [C: Ago-x(–), Ant-xdiff(+) → E: Ago-xdiff]simul

If one breaks down these descriptions of mental cause and effect into their conceptual

primitives, then one derives at the following inventory of the elements that make up

cause and effect:

(38) The elements of cause and effect (of s-causation, f-causation, n-causation,

dpn-causation)

• agonist (Ago)

• antagonist (Ant)

• any state/action (x)

• difference (diff)

• stronger than (+)

• weaker than (–)

• negation (neg)

• potentiality (pot)

• disengagement (disen)

• sequentiality (→)

• simultaneity ([→]simul)

These eleven elements arrange themselves in the specific ways that have been described

(Sections 2–6) to provide the cause-and-effect structure of s-causation, f-causation, n-

causation, and dpn-causation. Some of these elements cluster together to form a cause

35

(C)—a successful cause, a failed cause, a negative cause, or a disengaged potential

negative cause. And a few elements cluster together to form the conceptually much

more simply structured effect (E)—a successful effect, a failed effect, a negative effect,

or a disengaged potential negative effect.

Having this mental inventory of the elements of major forms of causation at hand

now, let us in the present discussion section examine some further aspects of mental ele-

mentary causality. First the contrast between digital and analog cognition (Section 7.1)

and the concept of concordance (Section 7.2) are examined in a causal context. Then

the question how the elements of cause and effect feature in epistemics (Section 7.3) and

in counterfactual and probabilistic reasoning (Section 7.4) is addressed. Finally, it is

discussed how these force-dynamic elements might manifest in spatiotemporal structure

(Section 7.5).

7.1 Digital and analog representation in mental causality

Deane has stated that Talmy’s force dynamic account is “implicitly analog” (1996, p. 57).

In this context he envisions what a force-dynamic theory of mental causality must also

be able to account for in analog terms:

From a cognitive perspective, Talmy’s theory is a striking example of a

psychologically plausible theory of causation. Its key elements are such

concepts as the (amount of) force exerted by an entity, the balance between

two such forces, and the force vector which results from their interaction.

Such concepts have an obvious base in ordinary motor activities: the brain

must be able to calculate the force vector produced by muscular exertion,

and calculate the probable outcome when that force is exerted against an

object in the outside world . . . the amount of force exerted may vary con-

tinuously; the forces may be directly (or partially) opposed, or they may

36

coincide partially or in full. The state resulting from a force-dynamic inter-

action may vary both in the direction and magnitude of the resultant forces

(1996, pp. 56–57).

While Deane makes the valuable point that analog aspects are also important for force-

dynamic theory, his assumption that Talmy’s force dynamic account (1985; 1988) can

capture such mental analog calculations does not seem correct. Take Talmy’s system

of force-dynamic diagramming (1985; 1988; 2000a; as presented in Section 2.1). I know

of no way how these notational elements—Ago, Ant, , >, (+), (–), and so on—

could for instance represent how “the amount of force exerted may vary continuously.”

Accordingly, it seems that Jackendoff is right when stating that “Talmy’s [force-dynamic]

representations are as symbolic as mine” (1996, p. 122; cf. also Jackendoff 1990, pp. 130–

150). The Talmyan variant of force dynamics developed in this article—which revised

three basic concepts of Talmy’s force dynamics (Sections 2.1–2.3)—is also as symbolic

(or digital) as the accounts of Talmy or Jackendoff (Stocker, 2013). As also pointed

out by Stocker (2013), future research could determine how digital aspects of force-

dynamic causality (Jackendoff, 1990, 1996; Stocker, 2013; Talmy, 2000a) interact with

analog (vectorial) aspects of force-dynamic causality (Talmy, 1976, pp. 62–63; Barbey

& Wolff, 2007; Wolff, 2003, 2007; Wolff & Song, 2003; Wolff & Zettergren, 2002).

7.2 Basic opposition vs. basic opposition/concordance

Wolff and Song write:

. . . in Talmy s (1988) account, ‘‘underlying all more complex force-dynamic

patterns is the steady-state opposition of two forces. . .’’ (p. 53). Thus, in

Talmy’s theory the vast majority of force dynamic interactions are said to

involve opposition. However, in our account, we follow Jackendoff’s (1990)

37

observation that many such complex interactions appear to involve concor-

dance rather than opposition between the affector and the patient (2003,

p. 283).

Thus, one may divide the theoretical approaches of force dynamics into two broad

categories: in the former, all complex force-dynamic interactions basically involve op-

position (Talmy 1985; 1988; 2000a; and the Talmyan variant outlined in this article); in

the latter, complex force-dynamic interactions can basically either involve opposition

or concordance (Jackendoff 1990, pp. 133–134; Wolff & Song 2003; Wolff 2007). Jack-

endoff and Wolff base their analyses of concordance on ENABLE or ENABLE-related

analyses. Indeed, they treat ENABLE (or what is called dpn-causation in this article)

as a basic case of concordance. However, as has been given evidence for in Section 6, an

underlying opposition (difference) is clearly there as a potential in ENABLE. As Talmy

remarks in general in relation to disengaged force-dynamic interaction:

The notions of Agonist and Antagonist, it can be argued, intrinsically in-

volve the engagement of two bodies in an opposition of force, and reference

to an Agonist and Antagonist not so engaged necessarily depends on their

potential for such engagement (2000a, p. 421).

One can note that ENABLE generally involves the notion that a certain result cannot

be reached without aid, without the aid of the enabling entity—an observation that is

also in accordance with Wolff (2007, p. 93). Thus, for instance in (31b–c) (Section 6) the

stone’s rolling can only result from some external aid. In conceptualizing dpn-causation

or ENABLE, this “aid” is realized through the examined disengagement of the potential

negative causation. It is this disengagement that is in concordance with Ago’s initial

value. However, there is still the potential underlying Ago-Ant opposition: What is not

considered in the analyses of ENABLE of Jackendoff and Wolff is that the very idea

38

that some result cannot be reached without aid, logically requires that there must at

least be potential opposition to the desired result (as proposed in Section 6)—because

if there was no potential opposition whatsoever, then there could be no reason why aid

should be required to begin with. Thus the challenge for the force-dynamic theories

of Jackendoff and Wolff is to explain how ENABLE can make sense without assuming

some underlying potential opposition.

7.3 Force-dynamic elementary causation and epistemics

Consider:

(39) Mary must have gone to bed early, because she was so tired.

(39) is an inferred version of (12a)—of Mary went to bed because she was tired (Sec-

tion 3). Perhaps the most basic distinction in epistemics is whether a speaker knows

or infers a stated proposition (Talmy in Ibarretxe Antuñano 2006, pp. 260–261). Thus

a speaker uttering (12a) treats this proposition as “factual s-causation”. In contrast, a

speaker uttering (39) (let’s call this speaker John) infers that this causal proposition is

very likely to have occurred—John mentally engages in “inferred s-causation”.

A cognizer making an inference must also have some information in mind that she or

he treats (implicitly or explicitly) as factually unknown. Only when there is something

treated as factually unknown can there be a contrast with information that is inferred.

The piece of information that John implicitly assumes as factually unknown in (39) is

that he does not know if Mary went to bed early. If he knew it as a fact, then there

would be no need for an inference. It is the very act of inferring that implies that the

matter that is inferred upon is not known to a speaker. In order for an inference to occur

in such a state of unknowing, it seems plausible to assume that there must be some

cognitive trigger that prompts the making of an inference. In (39) this trigger for John is

39

Mary’s tiredness (“because she was so tired”). So the basic pieces of mental information

that John contrasts are: his factual unknowing if Mary went to bed early versus his

inferring that she must have gone to bed early, the latter being prompted by knowing

of Mary’s given tiredness. One may also notice that the cognitive trigger itself—Mary

being tired—is treated as fact by John. s-causation can provide an apt explanatory

framework of how inference allows one to override factual unknowing (cf. with (7) in

Section 2.2):

(40) C: AgoMary-xunknown if went to bed early (factual) (–),

AntMary’s tiredness-xdiff went to bed early (inferred)(+) → E:

AgoMary-xdiff went to bed early (inferred)

This reads: the cause (C) first involves John cognizing that he in fact does not know if

Mary went to bed early. Since this factual value will not be the main resultant value, it

can be viewed as weaker than the inferential value that will be the resultant value. Ac-

cordingly the fact of unknowing can be treated as a weaker (–) Ago-force of s-causation

(Ago-x: Mary–unknown if went to bed early (factual)). This cognition of factual un-

knowing is then intervened in John’s mind by knowing of Mary’s tiredness, which serves

as a trigger to build up an inferential force suggesting to him that she must have gone

to bed early. Thus the act of inferring can be treated as the stronger (+) Ant-force

(Ant-xdiff: Mary’s tiredness–went to bed early (inferred)). Since Ant is stronger (+),

the effect (E) is that John does not simply state that he does not know for certain if

Mary went to bed early, which also would be a possible statement after all. Rather

John indeed infers that Mary went to bed early (E: Ago-xdiff: Mary–went to bed early

(inferred)).

Future research could determine if all inferred causal statements can be analyzed as

involving a weaker Ago-force of not knowing about a situation that is overruled by a

stronger Ant-trigger that allows one to infer something about a situation that in actual

40

fact is unknown.

7.4 Force-dynamic elementary causation and counterfactual and

probabilistic theories of causation

The account of force-dynamic cause and effect, as developed in this article, is fully

compatible with both counterfactual and probabilistic accounts of causality (such as

the ones found in Pearl 2000; Sloman 2005; Sloman et al. 2009; Spirtes et al. 2000). Let

us turn to counterfactuals first.

A counterfactual criterion of causation states that an event can only be viewed as

the cause to bring about an effect on another event, if it is the case that if cause had

not occurred, then the effect would not have occurred either (e.g., Pearl 2000; Sloman

2005; this view can be traced back to Hume 1748/1999). Let us exemplify this with the

following sentence (this is a deterministic sentence, a probabilistic example is provided

further below in this section):

(41) The land was flooded because of the heavy rain.

Elementary s-causation—(7) in Section 3—-can capture this deterministic sentence in

the following way (the content that appears in association with the s-causation elements

has been added in underlined subscript right after the element):

(42) C: Agoland-xdry (–), Antheavy rain-xdiff flooded (+) → E: Agoland-xdiff flooded

This reads: the cause (C) involves a cognized entity land (Ago), cognized to have the

initial action/state value of being dry (x), which is weaker (–) than another cognized

entity heavy rain (Ant), cognized as having an action/state value that is different to the

one of Ago (xdiff, here, flooding). Since Ant (heavy rain) is stronger (+), the effect (E)

of the interaction is that Ago has to take on the value of Ant, hence the land is flooded.

41

If one now were to remove the stronger Ant (the conceptualization of heavy rain) and its

stronger force (the power of flooding), then the resultant would not be different to the

initial state of Ago: the land would be conceptualized as remaining dry, in accordance

with the initial state that is conceptualized in relation to the land (in relation to Ago).

In counterfactual words: In the possible world where the heavy rain had not occurred,

the land would have remained dry. In force-dynamic terms, the possible world where

Ant and xdiff(+) are removed can be represented as something like:

(43) s-causation with removal of stronger Ant

Agoland-xdry → Agoland-xdry

In other words, removing the imposing stronger Ant (heavy rain) with its different

value (flooding) leaves nothing but Ago, the land, with its state of being dry. Since no

Ant intervention takes place, the resultant is that the land remains unflooded. In the

possible world where Ant did not intervene, Ago remains unchanged. This then is how

digital force dynamics can specify the actual mental elements and structures needed to

conduct counterfactual reasoning about causation (cf. Wolff, 2007, p. 104, who develops

a comparable argument for analog force dynamics).

Similarly, force-dynamic elementary causation can also be integrated into proba-

bilistic causation (cf. again Wolff 2007, p. 104). Consider the following example taken

from Wolff (cf. with (41)):

(44) Heavy rains cause flooding.

What one needs to additionally consider in relation to the elements of s-causation—as

formulated in (7)—is a distinction that a causal relationship of an individual occurrence

(such as (41)) is deterministic and a causal relationship of multiple occurrences (such

as (44)) can be probabilistic. A simple solution to this is to treat the individual oc-

currence as the unmarked (default) case and multiple occurrences as the marked case.

42

Thus for s-causation in an individual occurrence—such as (41)—the description in (7)

suffices. In case of multiple occurrences—the marked case—I suggest adding to this

elementary description the concept of probability (prob) as an element that can embed

the entire s-causation structure (the newly added conceptual elements multiplex 6 and

probability have been marked bold in (45b), so that they can be spotted at a glance):

(45) Probabilistic s-causation

a. [C: Ago-x(–), Antmultiplex-xdiff(+) → E: Ago-xdiff]prob

b. [C: Agoland-xdry(–), Antmultiplex heavy rains-xdiff flooded (+) → E:

Agoland-xdiff flooded]prob

(45b) reads: the cause (C) involves a cognized entity land (Ago; which in (44) is not

linguistically mentioned, but must be there for logical reasons) with the cognized initial

value to be dry, which is weaker (–) than another cognized entity heavy rain (Ant)

which is cognized as having the different value of flooding the land. Since Ant (heavy

rain) is stronger (+), the effect (E) of the interaction would be that the land were

flooded. However, if Ant is additionally marked as multiplexed (Antmultiplex) within the

cause (within C), then this results in the entire cause (C) and effect (E) to be embed-

ded in probability. This contrast of uniplex= deterministic / multiplex= probabilistic

reflects the common-sense notion that a generalization over a group of entities might

not necessarily hold true for each individual entity within the group.

This solution to integrating force-dynamic cause and effect into probabilistic causa-

tion is quite different to the one proposed by Wolff (2007) for his account of force dy-

namics. In relation to his model he writes: “In the dynamics model, uncertainty is built6Multiplexity is a term from Talmy (2000b, pp. 48–50). It stands for “conceptual plurality” (rather

than grammatical plurality). Thus chair and furniture are grammatically speaking both singular,while conceptually the former is uniplex and the latter multiplex. Since the basic issue here is “con-ceptual plurality,” the conceptual uniplex-multiplex contrast is considered here rather than the formal(morphologically and syntactically relevant) singular/plural contrast.

43

into the representation of causation because people do not know the exact magnitude of

the vectors” (p. 104). However, this proposed solution is somewhat contradictory, since

Wolff also—rightly, I suppose—assumes that people also do not know the exact mag-

nitude of the force-dynamic vectors for a single occurrence either (pp. 88+98). Given

this, there is nothing in the logic of this reasoning that could prevent the prediction

that a single causal occurrence—for example (41), The land was flooded because of the

heavy rain—could also be probabilistic, which of course it is not. Thus Wolff’s link-

ing of imprecise (subjective) vector magnitudes with the notion of probability leads to

a problem that one could call “overprobability”—the problem that probability can be

wrongly predicted for a deterministic scenario. The solution in (45) does not suffer from

this drawback since probability can only be triggered off by multiplexity and thus is

effectively excluded from the realm of singular (uniplex) occurrence. In sum then, the

current force-dynamic account of cause and effect is, like Wolff’s force-dynamic account,

compatible with counterfactual, deterministic, and probabilistic causation, but unlike

the latter does not face the problem of “overprobability.”

7.5 Force-dynamic elementary causation and the mental time

line

Based on decades of research, Talmy has sketched a comprehensive theory of concept

structuring. Thus far this theory has four main schematic systems: configurational

structure, perspective, attention, and force dynamics (Talmy 2000d). Talmy also pro-

vides a first sketch how force-dynamic elements relate to the other three schematic

systems:

. . . force dynamics is a fourth schematic system: to the preceding basically

pictorial complex [consisting of the schematic systems configurational struc-

44

ture, perspective, attention], one now adds the forces that the elements of the

structural framework exert on each other. While the first three schematic

systems [configurational structure, perspective, attention] relate most di-

rectly to our system of visual perception, force dynamics relates most to

the kinesthetic system (2000a, p. 467).

Stocker (2012a,b) has provided some suggestions how the first three schematic systems

of Talmyan concept structuring—configurational structure, perspective, and attention—

are mentally represented. In this context he has proposed the mental existence of points,

lines, embodied/disembodied perspective points, and the like in an overall framework

of what he refers to as Talmyan concept structuring. One suggestion in Stocker (2012a,

2013) is for instance that the mental time line is not merely a didactic aid that al-

lows us to think about time, but that it is an actual spatial structure in our mind

that allows for mental time travel—for example by projecting one’s mental gaze along

this mentally construed past/future line or by mentally construing one’s whole body

to move along that line (cf. Hartmann & Mast 2012; Merritt et al. 2010; Miles et al.

2010a,b,c, 2011; Ulrich & Maienborn 2010; Ulrich et al. 2012). As a first approximation

toward an integration of mental force-dynamic interactions with the work on the mental

time line in an overall framework of Talmyan concept structuring, one can speculate

that, on the one hand, the elements of a (successful) mental cause—that is, Ago-x(–),

Ant-xdiff(+)—are draped onto one temporal region of this time line and that, on the

other hand, the elements of a (successful) mental effect—that is, Ago-xdiff—are draped

onto a subsequent region on this mental time line. This draping of these two clusters of

force-dynamic elements onto the two temporal regions turns these two temporal regions

into a cause and into an effect.

45

Acknowledgements

(not added yet to ensure anonymity)

46

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