Examining the Effects of “Japaneseness” as a Historically

Constructed Curriculum: Finding the Roots of Structural

Inequality and Identity Crisis

Abstract

1 Introduction

2 Structural Problems among Ethnic Minorities in Japan 2.1 Population composition of foreigners in Japan 2.2 The government’s reaction to foreigners and their

children in Japan 2.3 Criticisms of the government’s reaction

3 The origin of “Japaneseness” as the dominant societalnorm

3.1 “Japaneseness” as a symbol of supremacy overother cultures/nations

3.2 “Japaneseness” as a mass consumer product 3.3 Meritocracy and “Japaneseness” 3.4 Brief summary

4 The Effects of “Japaneseness” on Current EducationalSettings

4.1 A case study in an ethnic class4.2 A case study in a public school 4.3 Discussion

5 Conclusion

References

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Ryo Tanaka 16121000486

International Program

Prof. D. Haring

Themes in Asian Studies: Final Graduation Thesis

Examining the Effects of “Japaneseness” as a Historically

Constructed Curriculum: Finding the Roots of Structural

Inequality and Identity Crisis

Abstract

This thesis attempts to examine the effects of

“Japaneseness”, which is the invisible power to define and

distinguish people, on current educational policies and

practices in Japan. “Japaneseness”, which derives from the

traditional theory of Japanese people and culture, is the

product of modernization, including globalization and

nationalism. The case studies show that the preconceived

ideas of “Japaneseness” are collaboratively and either

subconsciously or unconsciously determine students’ self-

images and the ways in which students are treated in

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classrooms. In particular, “Japanenesess” in effect helps

1) universalize particularity, 2) essentialize

particularity/difference, and 3) individualize difference.

These points imply that students are failing to develop

their individual identities, and educators are overlooking

the universal need of all students to develop their

identities. It is finally emphasized that the current

education system should be reformed to deconstruct the

“Japaneseness” as the dominant curriculum and to meet the

universal need of all students regardless whether they are

“Japanese” or “non-Japanese” and regardless of their length

of stay in Japan.

1 Introduction

As Japanese society becomes more multicultural and diverse,

the distinction between the majority (Japanese) and

minorities (non-Japanese) is also becoming more visible. At

the same time, the power relationship between them is being

enhanced, and causing many conflicts. Particularly, how to

educate minority students and help them integrate into

Japanese society is one of the major issues involved in

such problems. The trouble is that minority students are in

limited education opportunities just because they do not

conform to Japanese customs or norms, or “Japaneseness”.

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However, Japan as a nation is slow to deal with this

problem. In order to address the serious identity issues

both “Japanese” and “non-Japanese” are confronting, it is

essential to look back on the process by which

“Japaneseness” was constructed and analyze how it has been

applied to educational policies and practices.

The concept of “Japaneseness” (Nihonjin-sei) was first

defined by Matsuo (2013a; 2013b). It literally means the

identity of the Japanese or the characteristics shared

among Japanese people. “Japaneseness” is created by the

categorical distinction between Japanese and non-Japanese,

and composed of invisible cultural practice by Japanese

people, the criteria for defining self (Japanese) and

others (non-Japanese) and structural advantages that can be

obtained by having these features (Matsuo, 2013a, p. 228;

Matsuo, 2013b, p. 11). The idea of “Japaneseness”

originally comes from the discourse of Nihonjinron (the

theory of the Japanese) or Nihon-Bunkaron (the theory of

Japanese culture). The theorists of Nihonjinron or Nihon-

Bunkaron, including both the natives and outsiders, have

attempted to describe the distinct characteristics of

Japanese people and their culture since when Christian

missionaries came to Japan in the 1500s. After World War

II, along with high economic growth, the theorists

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attempted to explain what caused the Japanese economy to

recover and rapidly develop, and attributed its economic

success to its “unique” society, culture, and psyche

(Crawcour, 1982; Befu, 1987). While there are many aspects

in the discourse of “Japaneseness”, this paper focuses on

how Japanese people recognize and categorize themselves in

relation to other countries and cultures, and explains how

that affects and even determines the relation between

“Japanese” and “non-Japanese”. This consideration will

guide the discussion to deconstruct the constructed notion

of “Japanese” and “non-Japanese”, overcome the hierarchical

power relations based on the distinction, and search for

another way to avoid unnecessary conflicts between them and

allow both groups to develop more equal and harmonious

relationships.

This paper will first illustrate the current

situation of foreign residents and their children in Japan

by referring to the government’s response to them and

reviewing the criticisms to it. The next section will

classify the characteristics of “Japaneseness” into its

distinctions and examine the conditions under which

“Japaneseness” functions as the dominant ideology or

hegemony, which helps determine the power relationship

between “Japanese” and “non-Japanese” and their relative

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statuses in Japanese society. In doing so, it will be

repeatedly emphasized that the categories of “Japanese” and

“non-Japanese” (including “minorities”, “Koreans”, etc.)

are constructed through relationships between them, and

simultaneously, sociological meanings are embedded in the

categories. In other words, every categorical word used in

this paper represents the historical and sociological

construction of the power relationships, not the nature of

the categorized people. After that, the following section

will examine its actual effects on schooling of “non-

Japanese” students. This thesis overall casts a critical

eye on the dominant education system based on conformity,

not diversity. In particular, it criticizes the fact that

unique backgrounds and experiences of individuals (both

“Japanese” and “non-Japanese”) are not valued, but rather

the quality of individuals is evaluated based on their

willingness to conform with the dominant ideology, namely

“Japaneseness”.

2 Structural Disadvantages among Ethnic Minorities in Japan

This section will list the facts about foreign residents

and their children living in Japan and illustrate how the

government is responding to increasing needs to provide

support for their lives and the children’s schooling. By

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reviewing criticisms of the government’s policy made by

several researchers, this section will also explore how

foreign children at school age, both those attending and

not attending classes, are structurally disadvantaged.

2.1 Population composition of foreigners in Japan

Through the modernization process, the population of

foreign residents has increased. The number of foreign

residents in Japan peaked at 2008, counting 2,217,426 (MOJ,

2012). It has been slightly decreasing since then due to

the effects of the worldwide economic depression and the

disaster in Tohoku (Yamawaki, 2011; MOJ, 2012). The latest

data shows that at the end of 2011, there were still

2,078,508 foreign residents in Japan, which account for

1.63% of the whole population of Japan. Their nationalities

include Chinese (32.5%), Korean (26.2%), Brazilian (10.1%),

Filipino (10.1%), Peruvian (2.5%), American (2.4%), and

others (16.2%) (MOJ, 2012). It must be noted here that the

actual number of foreigners and those who have foreign

backgrounds does not correspond to the number of people who

have a foreign nationality other than Japanese. Taking the

example of Koreans in Japan, Korean people who naturalized

as Japanese citizens by 2011 numbered 333,026, as reported

by Mindan, Korean Resident Union in Japan (Zai-Nihon

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Daikanminkokumindan). The increase in cases of mixed

marriage has accelerated naturalization and increased “the

number of Japanese nationals with a Korean background”

(Okano, 2011, p. 102). Now, the ethnic diversity of

Japanese society cannot be explained by the nationality

composition. It is also difficult to explain their

identities because these are not merely determined by their

nationality. The increasing number of international couples

implies that their children have multiple linguistic and

cultural backgrounds inherited from them and others. Also,

even children whose parents have the same backgrounds can

also be influenced by different cultures as long as they

live in Japan. Therefore, it is not easy for children with

foreign backgrounds to define their national and ethnic

identification basis.

As the number of foreigners increased, perception

towards them as “minorities” developed. Minorities in

today’s context are considered not simply as relatively

small in number within a society, but rather as alienated

from political authority and easily excluded or segregated

from the mainstream culture (Sakuma, 2006, p. 209). In

cases of ethnic minorities in Japan, such status and

position have been constructed with the development of

“Japaneseness”, which will be explained in the following

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section. In this sense, “minorities” are not a pre-existing

entity, but rather are represented through the power

relations with “Japanese”, the majority. In other words,

the meaning of “minorities” is embedded in the process and

the product of the constant power relations with the

majority.

2.2 The government’s reaction to foreigners in Japan

The national government does not itself take all the

responsibilities for foreigners’ lives. It rather shifts

them to local governments. Support for foreign children at

the national level has included the distribution of

national treasury disbursement for Japanese language

education, and decisions regarding specific contents of the

support have been left to local governments (Sakuma, 2011).

One example of this decentralization policy is “The Plan

for Promotion of Multicultural Coexistence at Regional

Levels” initiated by The Ministry of Internal Affairs and

Communications in 2006. In terms of education, it proposes

eight objectives which include 1) to provide information

and guidance about schooling, 2) to provide opportunity to

learn Japanese language, 3) to reduce the lack of

communication between parents and children and between

parents and educators by relying on schools, NGO, NPO,

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companies, and other voluntary organizations, 4) to improve

the learning environment for foreign children who are not

attending schools, 5) to support foreign students to go on

to higher levels of schooling and to get jobs, 6) to

promote education for international understanding (kokusai

rikai kyoiku) to attain multicultural coexistence, 7) to make

clear the legal status of schools of foreigners, and 8) to

support foreign preschool children in terms of language and

customs (MIC, 2006).

In terms of education for foreign children, the

Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and

Technology (MEXT) emphasizes the problem of language

acquisition, maintenance of cultural heritage, and school

refusal and non-attendance at school. In particular, they

recognize the necessity of nurturing Japanese language

skills needed to keep up with the curriculum offered by the

Japanese education system as well as respecting their the

mother tongue and culture by providing opportunities to

learn these. Also, they consider it important for schools

to provide foreign students a place to study without

anxiety and to distribute school brochures to foreigner

households whose children are at school age (MEXT, 2011,

pp. 8-9).

These responses show that the government policy

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recognizes and respects the unique linguistic and cultural

backgrounds of foreign residents and their children, and is

attempting to integrate them into Japanese school

environment and society. But what is the reality?

2.3 Criticism of the government’s response

Researchers have argued that the reality does not

necessarily correspond to what the ministries state it to

be. The reality mismatches, and sometimes contradicts, the

policy. At the legal level, according to Article 25 of the

Constitution, foreigners are not given the right and duty

to take compulsory education, as Japanese nationals are

(Ota, 2000). Under this system, foreigners are regarded as

“exception”, and disadvantages taken by them are ignored

and not regarded as the subject of public service (Ota,

2000, p. 216). At the ideological level, Sakuma (2006)

argues that the Japanese education system has been assumed

to consist of those who have Japanese nationality and speak

Japanese language, which he calls “supremacy of Japanese

nationality” and “supremacy of Japanese language” (pp. 257-

258). Meanwhile, Nomoto (2009) suggests that extensive

Japanese language instruction should be promoted in order

to nurture both basic interpersonal communication skills

(BICS) and cognitive/academic language proficiency (CALP).

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The importance of Japanese language acquisition for foreign

students can vary depending on their length of stay in

Japan and whether they wish to further study or work in

Japan in the future. More significantly, however, the

relative importance of Japanese language may affect how

they are positioned and treated within the school

environment and even help determine their self-images. In

short, researchers have argued that the pressure of

behaving like Japanese and speaking Japanese is the main

determinant of the treatment of foreign students in

Japanese schools.

3 How “Japaneseness” Was Constructed

“Japaneseness” is assumed to exist by unspoken agreement

and unconscious assumption (Matsuo, 2013b, pp. 239-240). In

particular, the notion helped advance colonization of

neighboring countries and encourage the polity’s loyalty to

the Emperor. The process by which basic notions of

“Japaneseness” were constructed corresponds to the process

by which Japan as a modern nation was established.

3.1 “Japaneseness” as a symbol of superiority over other cultures/countries

The first basic aspect of “Japaneseness” is that it

symbolizes Japanese collective, distinct, and sometimes

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superior, nation or minzoku as“a manifestation of common

ancestry rather than a shared culture” (Weiner, 2009, p.

5). The roots of this assumption can be found in the

relationship between Japan and other countries during the

modernization era in the late nineteenth century, when the

central government integrated all the ethnic groups

throughout the Japanese islands into “Japanese polity”.

Werner (2009) notes, “Throughout the final decades of the

nineteenth century, in particular, attempts to establish

what constituted ‘Japaneseness’ occupied the energy and

resources of statesmen, bureaucrats and unofficial

publicists alike” in order to establish Japanese national

identity equally assertive to “the muscular nationalism of

Western powers” (p. 4). The empire insisted upon

superiority of Japan as a nation and the Japanese as a

distinct racial or ethnic group, and utilized the idea as

an excuse to invade other “inferior” countries. In fact,

Japan colonized Korea from 1905 to 1945, and attempted to

assimilate Korean people as Japanese subjects. While Korean

people received Japanese nationality and equal legal status

as Japanese, they were at the social level treated

differently, often in negative ways, by Japanese (Harajiri,

2005). Under the policy of colonization, assimilation and

discrimination proceeded at the same time. In this sense,

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it was the clear criteria for defining the self and

distinguishing it from others that promoted the

colonization policy. This implies that the distinctiveness

of “Japaneseness” is the decisive effect on the ways in

which people are treated differently.

3.2 “Japaneseness” as the mass consumer product

The second aspect of “Japaneseness” was its homogeneous

ideology both at cognitive and behavioral levels.

Homogeneous Japanese features were determined by the

presence of, or the pressure from, Western Great Powers.

Japanese features seen in contrast with Western nations

represent Japanese culture and people, but similarities

between the nations are not taken into account (Befu, 1987

pp. 36-39). In this sense, “Japaneseness” does not reflect

diverse cultures within Japan, but only remarkable features

made by cross-national comparison.

It is also noteworthy, according to Befu (1987), that

Japanese people tend to internalize “Japaneseness” not

because they believe it reflects the “true” Japanese

personality, but because they want themselves to share a

common personality. Japanese people who believe they share

the same character assume that they “should” behave in a

certain way, as if all Japanese had the same pattern of

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behavior (p. 49). For them, “Japaneseness” is convention,

custom, or tradition (p. 53). Befu further developed this

idea into “Japaneseness” as a consumer product. After the

Second World War, many “Japaneseness” theorists published

various books, for mass consumers detailing the Japanese

self-image and the character of the Japanese. Japanese

people would buy and read those books if they were

persuaded by the self-image or the Japanese personality

described in them. Through this process, Japanese people

have made a habit to understand their collective

personality based on “easy-to-understand” theories of

Japanese, even though there was not any logical evidence to

support the theories (pp. 61-62). The point is that their

willingness to conform to “Japaneseness” is based largely

on arbitrary distinctions, rather than careful reflection

on their life experiences in Japan. The following section

will examine how this aspect of “Japaneseness” is

negatively impacting education for foreign students and

students with foreign backgrounds.

3.3 Meritocracy and “Japaneseness”

The establishment of meritocratic education system helped

spread “Japaneseness” and its doctrine. The idea of

meritocracy in Japan became widespread soon after the Meiji

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Restoration. Under the meritocratic education system,

“people were distinguished by ability, with the line of

separation being whether people were educated or not”

(Mizuhara, 2011, p. 16), rather than by social class or

ethnic background. However, it in effect allowed the

advantaged group, namely “Japanese”, to occupy their

privileged position because the aim of the government was

to generate ideal “Japanese” (Takeuchi, 1995). That is, the

meritocratic education system, which is endorsed by a

powerful centralized state, “provides the infrastructure to

evaluate and certify knowledge” (Castro-Vazquez, 2013, p.

33). Consequently, “[a]cademic certificates become evidence

of success and underscore a ‘fair’ distribution of labor

based on individual attainment at school” (Castro-Vazquez,

2013, p. 33). Despite its superficial neutrality,

conformity to the national culture can be exchanged with

academic ability in Japanese meritocratic education system

(Takeuchi, 1995). In this sense, the modern Japanese

education system, though seemingly culturally neutral, has

been in fact dominated by “Japaneseness” which includes

Japanese language, shared belief, customs, sense of value,

and patterns of behavior. Thus, people who internalize

these cultural elements and successfully become matured

“Japanese” can enjoy their privileged position, while those

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who fail to do so suffer various socioeconomic

disadvantages. In other words, one’s future socioeconomic

status depends largely on his/her achievements in schools.

In this sense, it would not be an exaggeration to say that

whether or not one can success socially and economically

enjoy his/her life are determined by how much he/she

conforms to “Japaneseness”.

3.4 Brief summary

In summary, the nature of “Japaneseness” can be indicated.

First, “Japaneseness” is the self-image imagined by

Japanese people themselves, which for the most part does

not reflect their actual life experiences or knowledge

learned through them. By internalizing “Japaneseness”,

people can feel superior over “non-Japanese”. Second, in

practice, because of the homogenizing pressure of

“Japaneseness”, individuals’ diverse experiences can be

overlooked. Therefore, the assumed effect of “Japaneseness”

in educational settings is that individuals are valued

based on their willingness to conform to this set of shared

assumptions and behaviors, not how they learn from their

own experiences. “Japaneseness” integrated into the

education system treats “Japanese” and “non-Japanese”

differently and structurally excludes those who do not

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conform to this from education opportunities. Third, in

theory, “Japaneseness” is reproduced by meritocratic

education system over time and consumed over generations.

Thus, it can be said Japanese people, or people who are in

an environment that pressures them to conform to

“Japaneseness”, are forced to demonstrate “Japaneseness”

they internalized, especially when making judgments about

their education choices and career development.

Matsuo (2013c) further states that “Japaneseness”

helps create ethnocentric perspectives which include 1) a

perspective of hypostatizing difference and 2) a

perspective of individualizing difference (pp. 234-236).

The first perspective stands on the position of

essentialism, creates dichotomy between “Japanese” and

foreigners, and attributes any visible, behavioral

differences of people of different culture to their culture

per se. This leads Japanese to overlook various factors

that determine behaviors of foreigners (pp. 234-235), and

vice versa. The second perspective encourages attributing

children’s academic and adaptation problems to individual

responsibility. According to the assumption on which

meritocracy functions, differences are ignored, and

children of differences are treated the same as other

students. Thus, the cultural barriers when adapting to

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Japanese school environment are not seen as a problem, and

their adaptation problems are regarded as the lack of

effort (pp. 235-236).

The aspects of “Japaneseness” are not mutually

exclusive factors, but function collaboratively to affect

and determine the power relations between “Japanese” and

“non-Japanese”. The next section will examine the how all

these factors influence students’ interactions and

educators’ attitudes towards support for students.

4 The effects of “Japaneseness” on current educational

settings

This section compares two case studies conducted by

different scholars, one of which investigated an ethnic

class and the other surveyed a regular class, which are

seemingly unrelated to each other. By comparing how

students at both schools are treated, the whole discussion

in this section attempts to explain how conforming to

“Japaneseness” described in the previous section, is

functioning to compel students to categorize themselves

into mutually exclusive categories and educators to take

part in assimilative and exclusive educational practices.

4.1 A case study in an ethnic class

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Song (2012) observed a Korean ethnic class in Osaka and

analyzes the education method for an ethnic class and its

effects. He describes the process of ethnic education as

follows. First, ethnic educators attempt to sharply

distinguish their own ethnicity from “Japanese”. Next, they

push the students to become proud of their own ethnicity

and further reinforce their ethnic consciousness. In so

doing, the students are encouraged to develop their

identity as “Korean” through symbolic, ethnic practices

such as adopting the Korean name, greeting in Korean,

wearing ethnic costumes, playing Korean traditional

instruments (p. 74). It should be noted that such practices

are conducted not under agreement with the students, but

rather as strategies by the ethnic educators to maintain

their proud identity and status. A detailed criticism of

this point will be made along with the analysis of the

following observation by Song.

One day, sixth-grade Korean students made “chijimi” in

their ethnic class. They invited Japanese friends in

their regular class, who just finished their

international understanding education class”, to the

classroom to eat “chijimi” and “kimchi” (Korean pickle)

together. One Japanese girl ate some kimchi and felt

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her face turn red, saying “Oh, it’s so spicy!” In

fact, the kimchi was very spicy even for me (Song) who

was born and brought up in Korea. But a Korean girl

(who was born and brought up in Japan), watching the

Japanese girl’s face turn red, took a bite of kimchi

and said, “Do you seriously think this is spicy? For

us it’s not spicy at all.”

(Song, 2012, p. 76, author’s note and emphasis added)

The Korean girl stated that the kimchi is not spicy for

them, not for her. This implies that ethnic consciousness

nurtured by ethnic practices helps establish collective

identity rather than personal identity. In fact, according

to Song’s remark, Korean students are able to recognize

themselves as a being distanced from the normal run of life

in Japan, but find it difficult to understand why they are

to be a separated being (p. 75). The interaction reported

above suggests that the Korean girl is successfully

developing collective identity as Korean. By contrast, she

is failing to understand her experience as personal

experience because she does not admit the kimchi as “spicy”.

She simply conforms to the ideological norm that “Kimchi

must not be spicy at all for authentic Koreans”. In other

words, while she is pushed to experience interactions with

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collective “others” at the ethnic level, she as an

individual seems to hesitate to interact with Japanese

students at the personal level.

It is also important to note that the education

method of the ethnic class is based on the assumption that

Korean students are being assimilated, or are to be

assimilated, into ideals of “Japaneseness”. Song points out

that the primary purpose of nurturing collective ethnic

consciousness is to cultivate self-esteem and distinguish

self as anassimilated Japanese from Japanese culture and

society (p. 74). In this sense, the Korean girl created and

internalized “Koreaness” in response to “Japaneseness”. In

other words, the ethnic consciousness of Korean students is

shaped by their interactions with “Japaneseness”, which is

presumed to exist a priori.

In addition to the education methods of the ethnic

class, Song also observes the self-image of the younger

generations of Korean residents. He reports that the youth

among Korean residents are suffering from “inferiority-

complex” (p. 66). That is, through ethnic education, they

are compelled to group themselves within lower ranks of the

ethnic hierarchy, the top of which is occupied by

“Japanese” (p. 66, 78). This pressure leads them to

experience identity crisis, which he defines as the lack of

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a sense of belonging to a homogeneous group (often referred

to as “the homeland” or sokoku) due to its notable,

geographical absence (p. 65). In this situation, Korean

ethnic educators regard the Korean Peninsula as the

“symbol” of their identity.

Korean residents who were born and brought up in

Japan are compelled to choose to be either “Korean” or

“Japanese”; however, they cannot embrace a “perfect” sense

of belonging either to one or to the other (Song, 2012, p.

86). Some Korean children in such psychologically unstable

condition strongly desire to be “Japanese”, contrary to the

aim of current ethnic education for Koreans. Song reports

the voice of a Korean student in the ethnic class insisting

that his homeland is Japan.

My country is here (Japan)! I have good reason to

live here! So, I only have to learn about here! (A

male sixth-grade student in the ethnic class)

(p. 78, author’s note added)

This student resists the pressure to regard Korea as “his

country” (p. 78). Although this attitude contradicts the

objective of the ethnic class, Song views it as natural

response. The Korean students internalize the hierarchical

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relations between Korea and Japan, and rank Korea lower

than Japan (p. 78).

The problem is that there is a gap between ethnic

consciousness as a group identity and self-image as an

individual. In fact, Song argues that educational practices

of the ethic class, employing the concept of ethnicity to

nurture the students’ ethnic pride and self-esteem, in

effect help them develop the idea of exclusion (p. 79). And

as mentioned before, a feeling of exclusion is not

developed through their own experiences in their daily

life. Therefore the point of debate is how to help such

students integrate their collective and personal identity.

4.2 A case study in a public school

As seen before, the government is trying to help

ethnic/foreign students establish stable identity by

providing them opportunities to learn Japanese language as

well as to maintain their mother tongue and cultural

heritage. However, the critics, as mentioned, have argued

that support tends to be too assimilative for the children

to really value their own experiences through learning and

develop their complex identities.

In an attempt to search for an alternative way to

help them avoid identity crisis and develop their self-

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consciousness through experiential learning, it is

necessary to unveil the process which compels students,

educators, and any other people associated with education,

to unwillingly, and sometimes unconsciously, participate in

assimilative and exclusive educational practices. If the

process, which is assumed to be based on “Japaneseness”, is

an inherent part of such educational treatment of foreign

children and children with foreign background, and if it

can be explained, it will be possible to make another

proposal to help them develop their complex identity and

enhance harmonious relations between these two groups.

Castro-Vazquez (2013) provides a case study which is

instrumental to reveal and modify the imbalance power

relations involved in this construction. It shows how

education personnel in public schools are compelled to

assimilate foreign students and students with foreign

backgrounds into an educational environment which is too

structured for them to learn effectively through reflection

on their unique backgrounds and experiences.

Castro-Vazquez conducted a research interview which

surveyed “three male officials working at the education

board, three male school principals and three female

teachers, aged between 27 and 55” (p. 60).

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Interviewee: I do understand that you worry because

we do not have a specific programme for tutoring ...

but please understand here in the education board a

programme for them is almost impossible to produce

because we do not speak but Japanese (sic) and … most

of the students will move away or return to their

home country … as I see it, tutoring is more like a

service to them …

(pp. 62-63 author’s note added)

Castro-Vazquez emphasizes that “language tutoring and

schooling for foreign children in general” are considered

as “a service rather than a right” (p. 62). His analysis

also suggests that “Japanese citizenship is viewed to be

linked to an ethnic identity rather than a legal status”

(p. 63). Some aspects of “Japaneseness”, despite its

historical construction, are reflected in the current

educational ideas and practices mentioned above. First, the

idea of equating Japanese citizenship with ethnic identity

seems tightly connected with “Japaneseness”.

Also, the fact that language instruction is regarded

as a service rather than a right represents the

subconscious power of assumptions of “Japaneseness”. There

is no doubt that education in general is thought to be the

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basic right shared among all the citizens in most

democratic communities. In case of Japan, however, the

right to take general education is both legally and

ideologically confined to those who are qualified as

“Japanese”. While “right” is a universal concept which can

be applied to anybody regardless of their backgrounds,

“service” by contrast is a particular notion. Generally

speaking, “service” is provided in response to the

consumers’ needs. On the other hand, “rights” are given to,

or naturally owned by, anybody a priori. What led the

official to consider language tutoring as a service, not a

right? This question can be analyzed from several

perspectives. First, he internalizes the distinction

between “Japanese” and “non-Japanese”. Thus, he considers

“Japanese” as the host and “non-Japanese” as the guest.

Also, in determining the status of “host”, it is impossible

to avoid internalizing the idea of how Japanese people

should be.

This idea is linked to “Japaenseness” as a consumer

product. As Befu (1987) suggests, Japanese people

internalize “Japaneseness” because they are willing to do

so as part of a convention, custom, and tradition. Here it

is important to note that their willingness to conform to

“Japaneseness” is linked to the general concept of service.

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This can be said in the way that Japanese people recognizes

their “needs” to share the common value system as

represented by convention, custom, and tradition. As long

as there are the recognizable needs to internalize a

certain character or doctrine, responding to them means

conforming to the system of value, which corresponds to the

practice of giving and receiving a service. This is

because, as Befu’s work suggests, Japanese people are

exchanging their willingness to share the common

personality, and that people in Japan have succeeded in

creating the distinct category of “Japanese” and to develop

the idea of “Japaneseness”, by “selling” the willingness to

do so and the idea of how Japanese people should engage

with each other, and by “buying” or soliciting such

behavior from each other. In this sense, the board

official, and probably most Japanese educators as well,

whether consciously or unconsciously, treat “non-Japanese”

within this same agreement for social relations as they

themselves do.

Consequently, at the philosophical level, the board

official is failing to locate particularity with

universality. That is, he simply considers being Japanese

as universal and being non-Japanese as particular. Thus, at

least for him, on a deep psychological level being Japanese

Tanaka 28

simply means being human. What is meant by “deep

psychological” is that being “Japanese” and behaving with

“Japaneseness” is almost unconscious, or at least

subconscious, activity. Education officials and teachers

therefore may not realize that they have the power to

exclude and marginalize minorities from the learning

opportunities. Rather, they may even believe that they are

doing the right thing, one example of which is the board

official interviewed by Castro-Vazquez.

In short, “Japaneseness” as a consumer product helps

its consumers to regard this package of ideas and behaviors

as equivalent “humanness”. This is one reason why Japanese

educators and administrators so easily justify the idea to

assimilate “non-Japanese” into “Japanese” and consider

support for language acquisition as a “service”, not a

“right”. This view can be extended to the assumption that

students’ cultural capitals such as language, cultural

ideas and practices, ethnic backgrounds, and any other

experiences can also be seen as “consumer products”, as

“Japaneseness” actually is. This is not educational in two

ways. One is in a way that obscures the effect of

“Japaneseness” and presence of “Japanese privilege”. The

other is it prevents students and teachers from learning

reflectively from their own experience and from

Tanaka 29

interactions with those who have different backgrounds.

Now the question is how to transform students’

cultural capital into potential learning instruments that

help them develop their identity though reflection on their

experiences, NOT merely service products that are exchanged

among people according to their willingness to share the

common value within their community, to establish the group

identity, feel superior to other groups, etc. In other

words, the discussion thus far guides itself to further

discussion on how it would be possible to create the

educational environment in which students’ developments are

assured by interactive and reflective learning regardless

whether they can speak Japanese or not, or regardless

whether they embrace “Japaneseness” or not.

4. 3 Discussion

The atmosphere of public schools in general can be

understood according to the criticisms made by the previous

scholarly works and the case study examined above. The

attitude of the board official and the analysis of Castro-

Vazquez suggest that public schools tend to see children’s

language ability as the instrument rather than the process

of identity development. In fact, according to the board

official’s remark, they teach foreign children Japanese

Tanaka 30

language because they have to use it to live in Japan, not

because it helps them develop part of their identity.

In this sense, the idea of ethnic classes or schools

can also be understood in relation to that of public

schools. That is, development of ethnic education is the

response, or antithesis, to public education designed to

generate “Japanese” citizens. The ethnic class studied by

Song can be regarded as a direct response to such

nationalistic mainstream education system. As reviewed in

Section 2, the Japanese education system was established to

generate idealized “Japanese” citizens. Therefore, it is

essentially disadvantaging for “non-Japanese” to study

under such a system. In this sense, it is not surprising

that ethnic minorities tend to establish their own space to

cultivate ethnic identity equally assertive to “Japanese”

as the dominant ethnic group. Ethnic classrooms and any

form of ethnic education can include a certain degree of

antagonism against “Japaneseness”.

It is then interesting to note that while ability is

seen as an individual matter, identity is regarded as a

collective element. Thus, Matsuo’s assumption, perspectives

of hypostatizing difference and individualizing difference

can be applied to the two different levels. The first

assumption applies to the case study in the ethnic class in

Tanaka 31

which the Korean girl views the taste of kimchi as Koreans’,

not hers. This way she subconsciously essentializes part of

the Korean collective identity. The second assumption

corresponds to the attitude of the interviewee board

official in a public school. By considering language

tutoring as a service, he regards the language acquisition

of foreign students as their individual problem. That is,

he is waiting for the students (or their parents) asking

him for language tutoring by saying “we do not speak but

Japanese” (sic) and “most of the students will move away or

return to their home country”. He then fails to recognize

the fundamental need regardless whether they leave the host

society soon or stay there for a long time, which is to

help them develop their multiple, complex identities.

5 Conclusion

In conclusion, “Japaneseness”, constructed and

reconstructed over time, is reflected in both policies and

practices of education in Japan. In actual practice, it

helps determines students’ self-images and educators’ ideas

about education for minorities. In particular, the effects

of “Japaneseness” can be summarized as follows.

First, current educational policy and practice is

based on the distinction between “Japanese” and “non-

Tanaka 32

Japanese” as essentialized notions. That is, students and

educators are encouraged to view “Japanese” as a collective

personality which has, or should have, essential

characteristics such as speaking Japanese, Japanese

appearance, Japanese proper behavior, etc. Consequently,

some students are likely to regard their ability to conform

to these standards as their essence, not as their learning

outcomes. They also tend to develop collective identity and

fail to integrate it with personal identity (See Section

4.1).

Second, even though this paper argued that the idea

of “Japaneseness” is shaped by distinguishing “Japanese”

from “non-Japanese” and emphasizing particularities of

“Japanese”, in practice the designation functions as a

universalized notion. People create images of the self and

others unconsciously and apply them subconsciously. In

fact, this paper suggests that public schools function as

environments in which educators fail to recognize “non-

Japanese” students as those who need adequate support for

their intellectual and identity development, and

subconsciously exclude them from necessary education

opportunities. It should then be noted that educators do

not consciously decide to treat foreign students based on

the ideas of “Japaneseness”. Rather, they are compelled,

Tanaka 33

subconsciously or unconsciously, to treat them as those who

have “special” needs as represented by Japanese language

acquisition. Consequently, while they are well aware of

visible, superficial problems such as language, they are

overlooking universal needs of all children, which is

support for identity development.

Third, the identity problem is not only that of “non-

Japanese”, but students in general. The reason for this is

because the subconscious practice of universalizing

“Japaneseness” leads educators to overlook particularities

of “Japanese” students as well. Though not examined in this

paper, children born and raised in Japan whose parents have

the same background as their children may also suffer

identity crisis. As mentioned, the homogeneity of Japanese

people and their culture is a myth rather than the reality.

In reality, Japan has many different regional cultures

within, and is influenced by foreign cultures as well.

Thus, it should be possible to find various forms or

aspects of culture that influence children’s development.

Not being obsessed with “Japaneseness” must lead

educational policy and practice to value students’ “real”

experiences rather than their willingness to conform to a

hypothesized notion of “Japaneseness” which does not

reflect actual experiences.

Tanaka 34

The discussions thus far provide significant

implication both for people living or residing in Japan and

Japanese society as a whole. First, observing diversity of

ethnic minorities and complexity of their identities and

analyzing their relative position in relation to

“Japaneseness” not only assembles a picture of themselves,

but also encourages “Japanese” people to find their

diversity and complexity within. It is true that Japanese

people originated from many different cultural and language

groups. Also, recent development in information and

transportation technology has made it possible for Japanese

people to interact with people from different cultural and

language backgrounds much more easily than before. There

points suggest that people living in Japan can be

influenced by different cultures though daily life. It is

then simply meaningless to assert that one belongs (or

should belong) to the pure, distinct category of “Japanese”

who have certain shared unchangeable features. Now, one’s

identity is considered to be changeable and flexible, or

“hybrid”, rather than previously determined or naturally

inherited. Also, deconstruction of “Japaneseness” and

celebration of diversity contributes to future Japanese

immigration policy, not merely the current reaction to the

increasing foreign population in Japan. The labor shortage

Tanaka 35

due to the growing population of aged people and a

declining number of working people has pushed the country’s

political and financial players to suggest accepting more

foreign people as workforce. Thus, deconstructing

“Japaneseness” reflected in education policies and

practices and altering education system to live up to the

universal need of all children can be beneficial both for

the dignity of people living in Japan and the socioeconomic

well-being of Japan as a country.

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