Independent Research Project

Historically, How Genocide Starts and Ends:

A Bosnian Case Study

Jack Sigman

16 April 2013

Contents

Abstract 3

Literature Review 4

Introduction 5

Why Genocide Occurs 5

Did Genocide Occur 7

History of Bosnia

9

WWI/Yugoslavia Part One

12

WWII/End of Yugoslavia Part One

14

Yugoslavia Part Two

15

End of Yugoslavia Part Two

16

2

Bosnian Civil War/War of Independence

17

The End of Genocide

19

Conclusion

20

Bibliography

22

Abstract

Why does genocide start and stop? Many blame the start on

centuries-long ethnic animosity that eventually builds up and

erupts into an orgy of violence directed toward total

3

annihilation of one or more ethnic groups. This case study, of

the 1995 genocide in Srebrenica, Bosnia, aims to show that that

theory is incorrect and that genocide starts when a single

leader, or a small group of leaders, decide that their state

would be stronger if only the other groups were eliminated.

Additionally, the effective use of propaganda is important in the

initiation of genocide. The ability to exaggerate earlier

conflicts and mythic history to instill a feeling of rage, a

justification of violence, and dehumanization of the targeted

ethnic group in order to sustain that rage when the moral qualm,

normally associated with excessive violence, attacks the

conscience is not to be ignored. There is little controversy as

to when genocide stops. However, some consider denial of the

crime an indication that the genocide continues.

4

Literature Review

This literature review references the books and articles

that have covered the history of Bosnia and Yugoslavia leading up

to the Srebrenica Massacre in order to develop a case study

history of how genocide starts and ends. Additionally several

sources were utilized to understand the concept of genocide, why

genocide occurs, if genocide occurred, and what stops genocide.

Noel Malcolm wrote two well referenced books, A Short History of

Bosnia and A Short History of Kosovo. Both are frequently cited as

authoritative. Malcolm diligently covers the origins of the Serbs

and Croats, the introduction of Islam to the Balkans, as well as

the break up of Yugoslavia. Leslie Benson’s Yugoslavia: A Concise

History covers the history of Yugoslavia from its origins in 1918

as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to its demise in

1992, along with the various successions and wars ending in 1999.

5

Ivo Banac’s Historiography of Yugoslavia and Udovicki and Ridgeway’s

Burn This House add insight to the history of Yugoslavia and the

genocide and Rohde’s End Game, through first hand accounts,

covers the time frame of the genocide, day by day.

To determine if genocide occurred, the transcripts from the

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia were

consulted. Additionally, the works of Toufayan (2005), Totten and

Bartrop (2009), were consulted.

The works consulted for the “why” of genocide include the

works of Kissi (PBS 2005), Markusen and Mennecke (2004), Honig

(2009), and Stanton (2005). Dan Stone edited a very insightful

collection, The Historiography of Genocide, covering a scholarly

approach to discussing all aspects of genocide along with a case

study on Bosnia, by Robert Hayden. Finally, The Genocide Studies

Reader, edited by Samuel Totten and Paul Bartrop, was relied on

for key definitions and further research on the trials as well as

the events that occurred in Srebrenica.

Introduction

Yehuda Bauer, in his speech to the German Bundestag in 1998,

emphasized that when we teach history in broad sweeps we neglect

6

delving into the dark side, the horrific parts, and in doing so

we contribute to the feeling that history repeats itself, mostly

because we rarely learn the dark side of history (Bauer 2001,

262). It is from that dark side that we should consider,

historically, the events that led up to the genocidal massacre of

between 7,000 and 8,000 (Totten and Bartrop 2009, 135) Muslim

Bosnian (Bosniak) men and boys by Serb troops in Srebrenica,

Bosnia, between the 12th and 16th of July, 1995 (PBS n.d.). It

would appear that genocide starts with an idea of either a single

leader or small group of leaders who decides that the state, or

civilization, would be better if a particular people were

removed, that the ends justify the means, and that might is

right. To that end, conditions must be right in that there

should be a high degree of political instability along with

control of the press to promote a propaganda campaign which will

make it palatable to attack the targeted group. To accomplish

this, there needs to have been a previous historical drama that

can be used to justify genocide, or one that can be manipulated

to appear to be so. Additionally, it is beneficial that the cover

7

of a war exists – to excuse the genocide by making it appear that

it is no more than a casualty of the war.

However, prior to considering the history of Bosnia leading

up to the fatal episode, the Srebrenica Massacre, it must be

determined if this war crime, this crime against humanity, was an

act of genocide, and why genocide occurs.

Why Genocide Occurs

Edward Kissi, a renowned genocide scholar at the University

of South Florida, lists six factors, which when combined, are

almost a recipe for genocide to occur. These factors are:

1) ethnic prejudice, racism, and other forms of hatred; 2)

fear of the other; 3) extreme forms of nationalism; 4)

radical and absurd ideas of social change; 5) myth-making—

just simply the idea of creating mythologies around a group,

constructing the group as the embodiment of all evil; and 6)

the desire on the part of the state to engage in extreme

propaganda against the group that motivates large numbers of

people to go out and destroy that particular group” (PBS

2005).

8

Stanton advanced this concept with an early warning system

generated from the works of Harff and Fein, “that likelihood of

genocide is most often increased by six factors: prior genocide

in the same polity, autocracy, ethnic minority rule, political

upheaval during war or revolution, exclusionary ideology, and

closure of borders to international trade” (Stanton 2005, 271).

He follows with his own check list of the stages of genocide:

[C]lassification (us vs. them), symbolization, dehumanization, organization (hate groups), polarization, preparation (identification, expropriation, concentration, transportation), extermination, and denial” (Stanton 2005, 271).

Additionally, noted genocide scholar and historian Israel

Charny lists ten criteria as part of his Genocide Early Warning

System (GEWS). While the entire list applies to this incident,

the last six are of particular notice for the historical basis of

the genocide in Bosnia:

5. Orientation toward Force for Self-Defense and Solution ofConflicts, 6. Overt Violence and Destructiveness, 7. Dehumanization of a Potential Victim Target Group, 8. Perception of Victim Groups as Dangerous, 9. Availabilityof Victim Group, and 10. Legitimization of Victimization by Leadership Individuals and institutions. (Jacob 2011)

9

Most of the conditions found on Charny’s, Stanton’s, Harff’s,

Fein’s, and Kissi’s lists were seen in Bosnia, Croatia, and

Serbia.

Finally, it must be noted that the ‘constructivist theory”

of international relations applies in that the state actors who

perpetrated this crime did so not out of idealistic or realistic

reason but based on their world view and their visions of what

should be state interest via their own social identity (Dougherty

and Pfaltzgraff 2001, 166-7). Indeed, Stoessinger (2008, 137)

reflects that the architect of the genocide, Slobodan Milosevic,

was driven to his Serbian ultra-nationalistic beliefs by his

experiences as a child during and after World War II (WWII), as

well as being a refuge after his parent’s suicide. Further,

Stoessinger (2008, xv) reflects that the dismemberment of

Yugoslavia was due to Milosevic’s “destructive hubris.”

Did Genocide Occur?

To determine if genocide actually occurred, the act must

conform to at least one requirement stipulated by the “United

Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime

of Genocide” (UNCG):

10

Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. (Totten and Bartrop 2009, XI)

Markusen (2004, 194-5) states that the Serb’s “atrocities

were done in such a systematic manner and on such a vast scale,”

that the UN, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former

Yugoslavia (ICTY), and “prominent genocide scholars” determined

that genocide had been perpetrated. Markusen and Mennecke (2004,

74) indicate that the ICTY considered that the Bosnian Serbs’

systematic destruction of Bosniak cultural monuments and mosques

served as “circumstantial evidence of Serb desire to destroy Muslims

as a group; hence, of genocidal intent.” Additionally, Markusen and

Mennecke (2004, 74) state that the Serb wholesale attempt at

ethnic cleansing, along with the specific targeting of Bosniak

intellectuals, was performed in such a systematic method as to

fall within the definition of genocide.

11

Honig (2009, 193) indicates that the Serbs believed that the

removal of a “cross section of men from all over eastern Bosnia”

would prevent any serious resumption of Bosnian nationalism with

the intent to regain the territory lost to Serb forces. This

intent of action satisfies sections a) and c) of the UNCG in that

Bosniaks were deliberately targeted and that this act was done

with the intent to destroy Bosniak life in eastern Bosnia.

Additionally, Honig (2009, 193) posits that the major Serbian

state actors were indicted for the crime of genocide. Further,

the International Court of Justice (ICJ) accepted a case

concerning compensation for genocidal crimes committed by Serbia

against Bosnia in 1993 (Toufayan 2005, 235). Interestingly, in a

minority opinion of the ICJ, Justice Lauterpaucht alleged that

the UN “Security Council's continuous arms embargo imposed on

Bosnia had institutionalized the Serbs' arms advantage without

providing sufficient means for securing the right to life of the

Bosnian population, thereby contributing to the genocide of the

Muslim population” (Toufayan 2005, 237). Finally, the

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)

ruled that genocide had occurred in Srebrenica:

12

Moreover, as the Trial Chamber emphasized, the term “men of military age” was itself a misnomer, for the group killed bythe VRS included boys and elderly men normally considered tobe outside that range. Although the younger and older men could still be capable of bearing arms, the Trial Chamber was entitled to conclude that they did not present a seriousmilitary threat, and to draw a further inference that the VRS decision to kill them did not stem solely from the intent to eliminate them as a threat. The killing of the military aged men was, assuredly, a physical destruction, and given the scope of the killings the Trial Chamber could legitimately draw the inference that their extermination wasmotivated by a genocidal intent” (ICTY 2004, 27)

A later ruling in the ICJ in 2007 places all allegations of

genocide committed by Serbia into doubt. The ICJ ruled that the

Serbian government did not commit genocide, did not conspire to

commit genocide, and that the Serbian government was not

complicit in genocide. It appears that the worst act committed by

the that government, regarding the charge of genocide, was that

it failed to take steps to prevent genocide and failed to turn

over those indicted for the crime of genocide to the ICJ for

prosecution. Accordingly, Serbia had no requirement to provide

financial compensation to either Bosnia or Bosnian victims

(Hudson 2007). Basically, the prosecutor failed to show a Serbian

state policy that proved intent to commit genocide (Schabas 2007,

189).

13

Hayden (2008, 502-8) finds the ICTY’s rulings concerning the

basis for the finding that genocide occurred and that General

Radislav Krstic was responsible for the genocide troubling. It

appears that the ruling, that genocide occurred, hinged on

political identification, in that the local massacre of 7000 to

8000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica was both

symbolically and militarily important. This is a political

consideration rather than an application of the UNGC to the facts

of the case. Making the right decision for the wrong reasons sets

a precedent, that rulings might be made for political rather than

legal reasons. Additionally, due to ambiguities in the law

concerning genocide, many judges made compromised decisions and

considered those charged to be accomplices to genocide rather

than perpetrators (Schabas 2007, 183). Finally, Schabas,

considered the “leading legal expert on genocide,” concluded that

genocide did not occur in Bosnia (Markusen and Mennecke 2004,

80). Regardless, Markusen states that genocide scholars are not

bound by court decisions, they merely have to record and discuss

them (Mennecke 2013, 498).

History of Bosnia

14

Paul Bartrop, while being interviewed by Totten, explained

that the history of the subject state must be examined in order

to understand the “complex and often confusing ethnic and

religious environment” (Totten 2004, 224). The history of Bosnia

is one that appears typical of any small relatively isolated

state in Eastern Europe. While the origin of the Bosnian people

is uncertain, most likely they were originally Illyrians combined

with Slavs, who eventually mixed with several invading armies,

such as the Romans, Goths, Huns and Alans (Malcolm 1996, 1-6). By

700 CE Croats and Serbs had established population centers in

Bosnia under the auspices of the Holy Roman Empire. The Croats

and Serbs are thought to be Slavic tribes with an Iranian based

elite, giving rise to the Croat mythic claim of Iranian descent

with racial superiority over Serbs and Bosnians. Likewise, the

Bosnians claim Gothic descent in order to distinguish themselves

from Croats and Serbs (Malcolm 1996, 4-7). Regardless, Bosnia’s

separate ethnic groups are not actually separated by ethnicity

but rather by religious culture. Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats, and

Bosnian Serbs all look alike and speak alike (Rohde 1997, xi).

15

Bosnia fell under Byzantine control in the 900s, Hungarian

rule in 1100, back to the Byzantine in 1160, and finally

accidental independence with death of the Byzantine Emperor in

1180. While its lands were coveted by Hungary and Serbia,

Bosnia’s rugged terrain made it, militarily, a costly acquisition

and thus Bosnia maintained its independence as a kingdom from

1180 until invasion by forces of the Ottoman Empire in 1463

(Malcolm 1996, 43). This invasion ultimately led to the

Islamization of the Bosnian population, mainly by voluntary

conversion for economic, social, and political gain, rather than

by coercion, and by the early 1700s Muslims had become a

plurality in Bosnia. While Malcolm (1996, 64-5) disputes the

economic reasons, most of his narrative regarding the reasons for

conversion seems to be economic and socially based (Malcolm 1996,

51-69). Additionally, the conversion to Islam for economic

reasons is confirmed by Wood (2003, 59).

During the period of Ottoman rule, ironically, Serbs who

were members of the Orthodox Church were invited to settle lands

that had been vacated. The Orthodox Church was well respected

within the Ottoman Empire as the ruling seat of the Church was

16

within the empire and thus controllable. By contrast, the ruling

seat of Catholicism was outside the Ottoman Empire and was thus

seen as duplicitous (Malcolm 1996, 71). Regardless, while Bosnia

was under Ottoman rule, there was no record of unusual or

excessive animosity between the religious groups, despite

Klusemann’s (2010, 273) insistence to the contrary.

The 17th and 18th centuries were marked with an almost

constant state of war between the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-

Hungarian (Hapsburg) Empire (Malcolm 1996, 82). Catholic and

Orthodox Christian refugees streamed north into Hungary, Croatia,

and Serbia while Muslims took refuge in Bosnia. However, a

significant number of Orthodox Christians remained in Bosnia.

The middle 1800s saw an increase in conflict between the

three religious communities; with the two Christian communities

demanding equality while the Muslim population demanded the

status quo. At the same time, Serbia was undergoing a period of

intense nationalism with the intent of annexing Bosnia.

Unsurprisingly, Croatia had the same idea (Malcolm 1996, 127).

Despite these plans, the ensuing Russian win in the 1877-78 war

with the Ottoman Empire resulted in the Great Powers’ negotiation

17

that gave the Austro-Hungarian Empire permission to occupy and

control Bosnia, in order to quell the instability caused by the

increasing animosity between the religious communities (Malcolm

1996, 133-4). Apparently, despite difficulties, Austro-Hungarian

rule did prove even-handed and the communities returned to

relations on friendly terms (Malcolm 1996, 145). However, this

view is countered by Coleman (2012, 8) who indicates that the

regional administrator achieved balance by pitting the

nationalist feelings of the citizenry against each other.

The 1908 Turkish Revolution gave the Hapsburgs the

opportunity to finalize its absorption of Bosnia via annexation

on the pretense that Turkey’s insistence on reform jeopardized

Austria’s national interests should Bosnia gain autonomy (Ferraro

2010). This annexation was contested by both Russia and Serbia.

War was threatened, but Germany’s stance to ally with the Austro-

Hungarian Empire in such an event caused the Russian/Serbian

alliance to accept the annexation (Coleman 2012, 9), as Russia

had not yet recovered from the disastrous loss in the war with

Japan and could not sustain a war against both the German and the

Austro-Hungarian Empires (Kennedy 1987, 252-3). However, the

18

Serbs remained resentful over the annexation of the territory

they desired, and they eventually shifted from a Serbian

nationalism to a southern Slav (Yugoslavian) nationalism.

The Balkan War of 1912, wherein an alliance of Serbia,

Montenegro, Greece, and Bulgaria fought against the Ottoman

Empire, saw a further retreat of the Ottomans from the European

continent. The quick victories over the Ottomans gave the Serbs

reason to believe they could now challenge the Hapsburgs.

Serbia’s expansion through conquest of the Ottoman’s European

territory worried the Hapsburgs, and the tension between the two

powers increased significantly (Malcolm 1996, 154). One reaction

to this threat was the decision by the Hapsburgs to hold war

games in Bosnia as a show of force. The heir to the Hapsburg

throne, Archduke Ferdinand, while visiting troops in Sarajevo,

was assassinated by a Serb nationalist. One month later, the

Austro-Hungarian Empire declared war on Serbia and World War One

(WWI) commenced (Malcolm 1996, 155). Bosnia stayed within the

Hapsburg Empire and most Bosnians fought alongside Austro-

Hungarian troops in an effort to stave off absorption into Serbia

(Malcolm 1996, 159).

19

Yugoslavia Part 1

WWI ended with the defeat of the Central Powers; the German,

Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires. One of the outcomes of the

war was the creation of the multi-ethnic State of the Slovenes,

Croats, and Serbs, the state of the southern Slavs, which was

shortly joined by Serbia (including the Serbian-annexed

Montenegro) in late 1918, creating the Kingdom of the Slovenes,

Croats, and Serbs. The Serbs, with its size and army, were the

dominate ethnic group. The king of Serbia became the king of the

Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs (Malcolm 1998, 264; Judah 2011).

Unfortunately, the immediate aftermath in Bosnia consisted

of acts of violence by Serbs directed against the Muslim

population (Malcolm 1996, 162). These actions were likely typical

retaliatory violence directed toward a minority during a change

in government during times of stress. Serbs and Bosnian Muslims

were on separate sides during WWI, and as in earlier wars, brutal

treatment by each side seems more the norm than the anomaly.

Additionally, Banac (1992, 1085) specifies a history of

fratricide amongst the various Balkan nationalities during WWI as

20

a contributor to the animosity among those same groups 70 years

later.

Due to the constant political turmoil between the three

major groups, Croats, Serbs, and Muslims, including the

assassination of the lead Croat delegate by a Montenegrin deputy

in Parliament (Jonassohn and Bjornson 1998, 280), the

constitutional monarchy was ended in 1929 by King Aleksander’s

dissolving the government, suspending the constitution, and in an

attempt to force unity, changing the name of the state to

Yugoslavia and rearranging the internal borders so that the new

divisions crossed the old borders.(Malcolm 1996, 168-9). The

unintentional result was further dissatisfaction, along with the

assassination of the king in 1934. The new regent, Prince Paul,

instituted reforms. However, political fighting among the three

groups continued with Serbian nationalism being the most

disruptive (Malcolm 1996, 171). The finale of the first

incarnation of Yugoslavia commenced with the flirtation with

fascism initiated by Croatia’s largest political party, led by

Macek, who negotiated with Italy for assistance in recreating the

former Croatia (Jonassohn and Bjornson 1998, 280).

21

World War II – The End of Yugoslavia Part One

In 1941, Yugoslavia allied with Nazi Germany. However, Serb

forces staged a coup d’état, invalidating the Yugoslavian treaty.

Immediately thereafter, Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria

invaded and overran Yugoslavia. Croatia (including Bosnia and

Herzegovina (Hayden 1998, 490)) became a separate state under a

fascist government, the Ustashi, which had the same racist

ideology as the Nazis. The rest of Yugoslavia was split up

“among the Axis powers and ceased to exist as a state (Jonassohn

and Bjornson 1998, 281).

The Ustashi government of Croatia, exceeding the brutality

of Nazi Germany, commenced to create an ethnically pure state by

ruthlessly murdering hundreds of thousands of Serbs (Jonassohn

and Bjornson 1998, 283). The main identifier for targeting was

religion, as the Croats were Roman Catholic and the Serbs were

Orthodox Christians. While these genocidal crimes included the

murder of Jews and Gypsies, Serbs were the most numerous victims.

The Croat troops were aided by Muslims and the atrocities were

22

condoned and aided by the Croatian Catholic Church. Additional

aid and approval came from German officials (Jonassohn and

Bjornson 1998, 284-5).

Bosnia was the site for many of these genocidal episodes.

Hayden (2008, 487) states that 200,000 Serbs, along with 50,000

Muslims were murdered there. These murders were committed by the

Croats and can be classified as genocidal in nature.

Both the Serbian communist partisans, led by Tito, and the

monarchist party, the Serb Chetniks, fought the German Nazis and

the Croat Ustashi (Malcolm 1996, 174). However, Tito also offered

to fight with the Nazis against an allied invasion, believing

that an allied victory would restore the monarchy. Unfortunately,

neither Serb group could abide the other as their goals were

diametrically opposed. Additionally, Tito’s group engaged in

indiscriminate killing of Croatian civilians which led the

Chetniks, dedicated to restoring the monarchy to a united

Yugoslavia, to occasionally assist Ustashi troops in attacking

the communist partisans.

Serb nationalists in both groups sought to create a

“homogeneous Serbia” by expelling both Croats and Muslims from

23

the yet to be determined Serbian borders, but which did include

significant portions of Bosnia, Montenegro, Dalmatia, Croatia,

Slovenia, and a slice of Albania (Malcolm 1996, 178-9).

Surprisingly, the Muslim response was an appeal to Hitler

requesting permission to form a protective military legion under

the command of the Nazis. The military unit was formed but used

for other purposes. Finally, the Muslim military unit returned to

Bosnia where it commenced a campaign of indiscriminate reprisals

against local Serb villages (Malcolm 1996, 191).

Yugoslavia Part Two

The end of WWII brought about two significant events; the

slaughter of approximately 100,000 Croats by Serbs as revenge for

previous Croat genocidal activity (Mann 2005, 353) and the

reunification of Yugoslavia under communist rule, headed by Tito.

Despite the effort by Tito to blend the various ethnicities,

Bosnia refused to be integrated as such. Most still identified as

Serb, Croat, or Muslim (Malcolm 1996, 197). Perhaps for this

reason, Bosnia continued as the economic low man on the

Yugoslavian totem pole. Additionally, child mortality and

illiteracy were relatively higher than in the rest of Yugoslavia.

24

This caused many Serbs to move to other parts of Yugoslavia for

better standard of living (Malcolm 1996, 201-2). These conditions

led to further unrest among a population still seething over WWII

memories of ethnic brutality. Finally, the Serb migration made

Bosniaks the plurality in Bosnia.

The End of Yugoslavia Part Two

The death of Marshall Tito in 1980 heralded the death of

Yugoslavia. Despite the previous four decades of the “Brotherhood

and Unity” policy that balanced national tensions, no political

party could successfully campaign with such a platform (Hayden

2008, 490). The ultra-nationalism of Slobodan Milosevic,

coinciding with his rise in power in the 1980s, began to pit

ethnic Serbians in Bosnia and Croatia against their Bosniak and

Croatian neighbors to further his quest to create a “Greater

Serbia.” Milosevic controlled the media and used it to

characterize the Muslims, Croats, and Slovenes as “enemies of the

Serbian people” (Neier 1998, 195). Milosevic and his leadership

cadre blamed the previous communist government for the decline of

25

the Serbian people in that the quest for multiculturalism diluted

and ignored Serbian cultural contributions and strengths. As with

the Khmer Rouge campaign to return to an idealized past society

(Kiernan 2013, 322), Serbian nationalism stressed an “anti-urban”

mentality (Kiernan 2007, 592).

Serbian propaganda described the Muslim population as being

composed of an “inferior people” who had a genetic disposition to

commit acts of violence against Christians. Further, Islam was an

“infection” that would harm all of Europe (Kiernan 2007, 588).

Nationalist Serbs considered the Muslims to be a contamination.

Seeking to divorce themselves from Milosevic’s rule,

Slovenia and Macedonia declared independence. The ensuing war

between Milosevic-led Yugoslavia and Slovenia was short lived.

The percentage of Serbs living there was so slight that it was

not truly worth the fight. Following suit, Croatia declared

independence and was shortly thereafter invaded by the same

Serbian-dominated Yugoslavian army, supplemented by Croatian

Serbs (Waller 2002, 258).

The Serb minority in Croatia had true, though partially

manufactured by Milosevic, concerns. The Political leader of

26

Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, removed Serbs from government posts

(where they were well over represented), and reverted to the

Croatian national symbolism of WWII Croatia: the flag and the

military uniforms of the fascist Ustashi. That, along with the

immediate recognition of Croat independence by a recently united

Germany, fed into the Milosevic-heightened fears of the Serbs,

making an attack all but inevitable (Neier 1998, 5-6).

Additionally, most Serbs over the age of 55 had firsthand stories

to tell of Croatian atrocities committed in the Serbian genocide

during WWII (Benson 2001, 157).

A cease-fire took affect in early 1992 with Serb forces

occupying a portion of Croatia and an independent Croatia

recognized by the international community. In 1995, Croatia

initiated a massive attack on Serbian forces, recaptured the

Croatian territory under Serbian control, and successfully ended

the war.

Bosnian Civil War/War of Independence

In early 1992, the Bosnian Government declared independence.

As had happened in Croatia, the Serbian minority, a third of the

population, refused to accept the act of separation from Serbia.

27

Seeing this refusal as an invitation to succor the Serbian

population, Slobodan Milosevic armed the Bosnian Serbs and began

a war to capture Bosnian territory. Additionally, the Serbs of

Sarajevo physically divided the city into Serb and non-Serb

portions (Markusen 2004, 195). In the spring of 1992, Serbian

troops began a campaign of ethnic cleansing in the Drina Valley,

an area just outside the boundary of Serbia but desired by

Milosevic as part of his “Greater Serbia” dream (Lane 1995, 14).

Most of the Muslim refugees from the valley moved to Srebrenica,

nine miles away. Retaliatory strikes by Muslim forces were

equally brutal with evidence of burned Serbian villages and

headless corpses being well documented (Lane 1995, 14). Serbian

forces moved on in an attempt to take the town of Srebrenica.

However, the town was declared a safe haven by the UN and had

become a refugee center for fleeing Muslims. Unfortunately, the

UN provided no means to defend or supply the city and Srebrenica

became a convenient area for Serb troops to “herd” Muslims that

were being ethnically cleansed from other parts of Bosnia (Benson

2001, 168).

28

Throughout 1992, Serbian forces set up detention camps,

whereupon thousands of Bosniaks were housed, starved, beaten,

tortured, and raped (both sexes). Those considered to be elites

were singled out for special abuse and execution. Serbian forces

commenced a campaign of sexual terror, on order of Serb

authorities, with the explicit purpose of impregnating Bosniak

women (Markusen 2004, 195-6).

By April of 1993, Srebrenica was described as a “City of the

Damned” (Von Recklinghausen 2003, 40). It was one of the last

Muslim strongholds. It had been under siege by Bosnian Serbs for

a year. However, by the end of April, Srebrenica was on the verge

of being overrun by Serbian troops while the United Nations and

NATO were unable or unwilling to act. Additionally, Serb

authorities were preventing the transportation of humanitarian

goods into Srebrenica (Post and Barry 1993, 36). Srebrenica was

also being used by Bosniak forces to launch counter attacks which

increased the likelihood of the city being attacked (Benson 2001,

168).

In 1994, The US encouraged the formation of a joint Bosniak-

Croat military force to combat the Serbs in Bosnia. The success

29

of the joint Bosniak-Croat military forced the Serbian leadership

to secure the initial goal of the campaign, a 30-kilometer swath

of land bordering Serbia, which included Srebrenica, Zepa, and

Gorazde (Udovicki and Stitkovac 1997, 196). The original order

from General Ratko Mladic called for ethnically cleansing Muslims

from the three urban centers The Serb army captured the

Srebrenica and Zepa in July 1995 (Benson 2001, 169). The Serbs

disarmed the small UN peacekeeping force in Srebrenica, separated

the men and boys from the women, sent the women, in convoys, to

the border in an act of ethnic cleansing, and then the Serbs

committed an act of genocide.

On July 12, 1995, over 20,000 Bosnian women, children, and

elderly were bussed out of the front line to Muslim-controlled

territory. They were separated from the men and boys who were

taken by buses to execution sites where they were mowed down by

automatic weapons and machine guns. Upwards of 8,000 Bosnian

males from Srebrenica were systematically slaughtered in this

carefully planned operation. The bodies were then hauled to mass

graves. (Kennedy 2012).

The End of Genocide

30

Dirk Moses (2006) complains that genocide scholars are hard

pressed to determine when genocide ends. Unfortunately, he failed

to provide the answer. In a lecture given at Sonoma State

University, concerning the Armenian Genocide, Professor Kouymjian

(2003, 17) attests that genocide does not end as long as the

perpetrators deny the crime; that the suffering and mental

anguish of the victims and families continue with the denial.

However, Alex de Waal and Bridget Conley-Zilkic (2006) provide

the likely logical answer; genocide ends in one of two ways: the

genocide is completed in that there is no one left to kill, or

there is a military intervention that makes the perpetrator

unable to continue the killing because he/she now lacks the means

or opportunity.

The genocide in Bosnia ended with the arming of the joint

Bosniak-Croat Army which allowed for successful counter attacks

against Serb forces. This, along with Milosevic’s reduction in

influence over the Bosnian Serbs, allowed for a successful

negotiation resulting in the Dayton Accords (De Wall and Conley-

Zilkic 2006). Finally, NATO involvement ensured the terms of the

treaty were enforced (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2004, 169).

31

However, this end was just the end of the wholesale slaughter of

Muslims in Bosnia. It did not mean that Muslims in other parts of

the former Yugoslavia were now safe, as proven by the later

genocidal massacre of ethnic Albanian Muslims in Kosovo.

Conclusion

There are some who say that the genocide in Bosnia was the

end result of 600 years of ethnic strife (Gratz 2011, 410; Allen

1996, 15), beginning with the battle of Kosovo. More are

convinced that it is the result of 50 years of simmering ethnic

hatred born from the ashes of WWII (Haynes 2007, 1122) and the

genocide of the Serbs (Kiernan 2007, 588, Mann 2004, 385), along

with the retaliatory massacre of the Croatians. However, based on

the numerous witness testimonies of Bosniak survivors who insist

that they were on quite friendly terms with their Serb and Croat

neighbors prior to the Bosnian independence movement, as well as

the historical record of only a few atrocities committed in time

of war, it is clear that neither aforementioned reason is correct

(Mann 2005, 359; Haynes 2007, 1120). This not to say that these

events were not used to stir up hatred and encourage the

commission of heinous atrocities against the Bosniaks, because

32

they were. As previously mentioned both Slobodan Milosevic and

the leader of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, adeptly utilized the

state-controlled media to remind everyone of their historical

narratives as well as inventing other stories to encourage

exclusionary nationalistic feelings (Haynes 2007, 1120).

Additionally, Rohde states that “exaggeration and manipulation”

of the truth was standard for all sides of the conflict as an

“accepted tool of survival” (Rohde 1997, x). Playwright James

Goldman sums it up when he has Eleanor of Aquataine, Queen of

England, tell her three sons:

Oh, my piglets, we are the origins of [genocide]. Not history's forces, nor the times, nor justice, nor the lack of it, nor causes, nor religions, nor ideas, nor kinds of government, nor any other thing. We are the killers. We breed [genocides]. We carry it, like syphilis, inside. (Goldman 1968)

Despite the claim of historical motives in the narrative,

the genocidal actions in Bosnia came about to fulfill the

“Greater Serbia” territorial desires of Slobodan Milosevic

(Waller 2002, 258). The additional crimes against Bosnia in

Franjo Tudjman’s campaign for “Greater Croatia” came about

because of Milosevic’s successes and the lack of international

33

intervention in response. In other words, both Milosevic and

Tudjman were the driving factors in the quest for the removal of

the Bosniaks, that the state would be better without them.

Milosevic and Tudjman controlled the organs of mass media in

order to create their respective propaganda campaign against the

targeted populations and both used the cover of war to hide their

crimes and genocidal actions. They were only stopped by the

intervention of others by either arming the opposition or

directly threatening force.

Some historians claim that the genocidal action could

have been arrested had the international community intervened.

The examples used for such lessons are Korea, wherein

intervention prevented North Korea from committing an expected

genocidal massacre in South Korea, and when the lack of

intervention allowed Japan to take China, Germany to take

Czechoslovakia, and Italy to take Ethiopia, as preludes to WWII

(WRMEA 1993). However, like many other opinions regarding what

might have been, there can only be regretful thought of what was

possible. History only tells us what happened and possibly why it

happened. What might have been is mere speculation.

34

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