Independent Research Project
Historically, How Genocide Starts and Ends:
A Bosnian Case Study
Jack Sigman
16 April 2013
Contents
Abstract 3
Literature Review 4
Introduction 5
Why Genocide Occurs 5
Did Genocide Occur 7
History of Bosnia
9
WWI/Yugoslavia Part One
12
WWII/End of Yugoslavia Part One
14
Yugoslavia Part Two
15
End of Yugoslavia Part Two
16
2
Bosnian Civil War/War of Independence
17
The End of Genocide
19
Conclusion
20
Bibliography
22
Abstract
Why does genocide start and stop? Many blame the start on
centuries-long ethnic animosity that eventually builds up and
erupts into an orgy of violence directed toward total
3
annihilation of one or more ethnic groups. This case study, of
the 1995 genocide in Srebrenica, Bosnia, aims to show that that
theory is incorrect and that genocide starts when a single
leader, or a small group of leaders, decide that their state
would be stronger if only the other groups were eliminated.
Additionally, the effective use of propaganda is important in the
initiation of genocide. The ability to exaggerate earlier
conflicts and mythic history to instill a feeling of rage, a
justification of violence, and dehumanization of the targeted
ethnic group in order to sustain that rage when the moral qualm,
normally associated with excessive violence, attacks the
conscience is not to be ignored. There is little controversy as
to when genocide stops. However, some consider denial of the
crime an indication that the genocide continues.
4
Literature Review
This literature review references the books and articles
that have covered the history of Bosnia and Yugoslavia leading up
to the Srebrenica Massacre in order to develop a case study
history of how genocide starts and ends. Additionally several
sources were utilized to understand the concept of genocide, why
genocide occurs, if genocide occurred, and what stops genocide.
Noel Malcolm wrote two well referenced books, A Short History of
Bosnia and A Short History of Kosovo. Both are frequently cited as
authoritative. Malcolm diligently covers the origins of the Serbs
and Croats, the introduction of Islam to the Balkans, as well as
the break up of Yugoslavia. Leslie Benson’s Yugoslavia: A Concise
History covers the history of Yugoslavia from its origins in 1918
as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to its demise in
1992, along with the various successions and wars ending in 1999.
5
Ivo Banac’s Historiography of Yugoslavia and Udovicki and Ridgeway’s
Burn This House add insight to the history of Yugoslavia and the
genocide and Rohde’s End Game, through first hand accounts,
covers the time frame of the genocide, day by day.
To determine if genocide occurred, the transcripts from the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia were
consulted. Additionally, the works of Toufayan (2005), Totten and
Bartrop (2009), were consulted.
The works consulted for the “why” of genocide include the
works of Kissi (PBS 2005), Markusen and Mennecke (2004), Honig
(2009), and Stanton (2005). Dan Stone edited a very insightful
collection, The Historiography of Genocide, covering a scholarly
approach to discussing all aspects of genocide along with a case
study on Bosnia, by Robert Hayden. Finally, The Genocide Studies
Reader, edited by Samuel Totten and Paul Bartrop, was relied on
for key definitions and further research on the trials as well as
the events that occurred in Srebrenica.
Introduction
Yehuda Bauer, in his speech to the German Bundestag in 1998,
emphasized that when we teach history in broad sweeps we neglect
6
delving into the dark side, the horrific parts, and in doing so
we contribute to the feeling that history repeats itself, mostly
because we rarely learn the dark side of history (Bauer 2001,
262). It is from that dark side that we should consider,
historically, the events that led up to the genocidal massacre of
between 7,000 and 8,000 (Totten and Bartrop 2009, 135) Muslim
Bosnian (Bosniak) men and boys by Serb troops in Srebrenica,
Bosnia, between the 12th and 16th of July, 1995 (PBS n.d.). It
would appear that genocide starts with an idea of either a single
leader or small group of leaders who decides that the state, or
civilization, would be better if a particular people were
removed, that the ends justify the means, and that might is
right. To that end, conditions must be right in that there
should be a high degree of political instability along with
control of the press to promote a propaganda campaign which will
make it palatable to attack the targeted group. To accomplish
this, there needs to have been a previous historical drama that
can be used to justify genocide, or one that can be manipulated
to appear to be so. Additionally, it is beneficial that the cover
7
of a war exists – to excuse the genocide by making it appear that
it is no more than a casualty of the war.
However, prior to considering the history of Bosnia leading
up to the fatal episode, the Srebrenica Massacre, it must be
determined if this war crime, this crime against humanity, was an
act of genocide, and why genocide occurs.
Why Genocide Occurs
Edward Kissi, a renowned genocide scholar at the University
of South Florida, lists six factors, which when combined, are
almost a recipe for genocide to occur. These factors are:
1) ethnic prejudice, racism, and other forms of hatred; 2)
fear of the other; 3) extreme forms of nationalism; 4)
radical and absurd ideas of social change; 5) myth-making—
just simply the idea of creating mythologies around a group,
constructing the group as the embodiment of all evil; and 6)
the desire on the part of the state to engage in extreme
propaganda against the group that motivates large numbers of
people to go out and destroy that particular group” (PBS
2005).
8
Stanton advanced this concept with an early warning system
generated from the works of Harff and Fein, “that likelihood of
genocide is most often increased by six factors: prior genocide
in the same polity, autocracy, ethnic minority rule, political
upheaval during war or revolution, exclusionary ideology, and
closure of borders to international trade” (Stanton 2005, 271).
He follows with his own check list of the stages of genocide:
[C]lassification (us vs. them), symbolization, dehumanization, organization (hate groups), polarization, preparation (identification, expropriation, concentration, transportation), extermination, and denial” (Stanton 2005, 271).
Additionally, noted genocide scholar and historian Israel
Charny lists ten criteria as part of his Genocide Early Warning
System (GEWS). While the entire list applies to this incident,
the last six are of particular notice for the historical basis of
the genocide in Bosnia:
5. Orientation toward Force for Self-Defense and Solution ofConflicts, 6. Overt Violence and Destructiveness, 7. Dehumanization of a Potential Victim Target Group, 8. Perception of Victim Groups as Dangerous, 9. Availabilityof Victim Group, and 10. Legitimization of Victimization by Leadership Individuals and institutions. (Jacob 2011)
9
Most of the conditions found on Charny’s, Stanton’s, Harff’s,
Fein’s, and Kissi’s lists were seen in Bosnia, Croatia, and
Serbia.
Finally, it must be noted that the ‘constructivist theory”
of international relations applies in that the state actors who
perpetrated this crime did so not out of idealistic or realistic
reason but based on their world view and their visions of what
should be state interest via their own social identity (Dougherty
and Pfaltzgraff 2001, 166-7). Indeed, Stoessinger (2008, 137)
reflects that the architect of the genocide, Slobodan Milosevic,
was driven to his Serbian ultra-nationalistic beliefs by his
experiences as a child during and after World War II (WWII), as
well as being a refuge after his parent’s suicide. Further,
Stoessinger (2008, xv) reflects that the dismemberment of
Yugoslavia was due to Milosevic’s “destructive hubris.”
Did Genocide Occur?
To determine if genocide actually occurred, the act must
conform to at least one requirement stipulated by the “United
Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide” (UNCG):
10
Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. (Totten and Bartrop 2009, XI)
Markusen (2004, 194-5) states that the Serb’s “atrocities
were done in such a systematic manner and on such a vast scale,”
that the UN, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), and “prominent genocide scholars” determined
that genocide had been perpetrated. Markusen and Mennecke (2004,
74) indicate that the ICTY considered that the Bosnian Serbs’
systematic destruction of Bosniak cultural monuments and mosques
served as “circumstantial evidence of Serb desire to destroy Muslims
as a group; hence, of genocidal intent.” Additionally, Markusen and
Mennecke (2004, 74) state that the Serb wholesale attempt at
ethnic cleansing, along with the specific targeting of Bosniak
intellectuals, was performed in such a systematic method as to
fall within the definition of genocide.
11
Honig (2009, 193) indicates that the Serbs believed that the
removal of a “cross section of men from all over eastern Bosnia”
would prevent any serious resumption of Bosnian nationalism with
the intent to regain the territory lost to Serb forces. This
intent of action satisfies sections a) and c) of the UNCG in that
Bosniaks were deliberately targeted and that this act was done
with the intent to destroy Bosniak life in eastern Bosnia.
Additionally, Honig (2009, 193) posits that the major Serbian
state actors were indicted for the crime of genocide. Further,
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) accepted a case
concerning compensation for genocidal crimes committed by Serbia
against Bosnia in 1993 (Toufayan 2005, 235). Interestingly, in a
minority opinion of the ICJ, Justice Lauterpaucht alleged that
the UN “Security Council's continuous arms embargo imposed on
Bosnia had institutionalized the Serbs' arms advantage without
providing sufficient means for securing the right to life of the
Bosnian population, thereby contributing to the genocide of the
Muslim population” (Toufayan 2005, 237). Finally, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
ruled that genocide had occurred in Srebrenica:
12
Moreover, as the Trial Chamber emphasized, the term “men of military age” was itself a misnomer, for the group killed bythe VRS included boys and elderly men normally considered tobe outside that range. Although the younger and older men could still be capable of bearing arms, the Trial Chamber was entitled to conclude that they did not present a seriousmilitary threat, and to draw a further inference that the VRS decision to kill them did not stem solely from the intent to eliminate them as a threat. The killing of the military aged men was, assuredly, a physical destruction, and given the scope of the killings the Trial Chamber could legitimately draw the inference that their extermination wasmotivated by a genocidal intent” (ICTY 2004, 27)
A later ruling in the ICJ in 2007 places all allegations of
genocide committed by Serbia into doubt. The ICJ ruled that the
Serbian government did not commit genocide, did not conspire to
commit genocide, and that the Serbian government was not
complicit in genocide. It appears that the worst act committed by
the that government, regarding the charge of genocide, was that
it failed to take steps to prevent genocide and failed to turn
over those indicted for the crime of genocide to the ICJ for
prosecution. Accordingly, Serbia had no requirement to provide
financial compensation to either Bosnia or Bosnian victims
(Hudson 2007). Basically, the prosecutor failed to show a Serbian
state policy that proved intent to commit genocide (Schabas 2007,
189).
13
Hayden (2008, 502-8) finds the ICTY’s rulings concerning the
basis for the finding that genocide occurred and that General
Radislav Krstic was responsible for the genocide troubling. It
appears that the ruling, that genocide occurred, hinged on
political identification, in that the local massacre of 7000 to
8000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica was both
symbolically and militarily important. This is a political
consideration rather than an application of the UNGC to the facts
of the case. Making the right decision for the wrong reasons sets
a precedent, that rulings might be made for political rather than
legal reasons. Additionally, due to ambiguities in the law
concerning genocide, many judges made compromised decisions and
considered those charged to be accomplices to genocide rather
than perpetrators (Schabas 2007, 183). Finally, Schabas,
considered the “leading legal expert on genocide,” concluded that
genocide did not occur in Bosnia (Markusen and Mennecke 2004,
80). Regardless, Markusen states that genocide scholars are not
bound by court decisions, they merely have to record and discuss
them (Mennecke 2013, 498).
History of Bosnia
14
Paul Bartrop, while being interviewed by Totten, explained
that the history of the subject state must be examined in order
to understand the “complex and often confusing ethnic and
religious environment” (Totten 2004, 224). The history of Bosnia
is one that appears typical of any small relatively isolated
state in Eastern Europe. While the origin of the Bosnian people
is uncertain, most likely they were originally Illyrians combined
with Slavs, who eventually mixed with several invading armies,
such as the Romans, Goths, Huns and Alans (Malcolm 1996, 1-6). By
700 CE Croats and Serbs had established population centers in
Bosnia under the auspices of the Holy Roman Empire. The Croats
and Serbs are thought to be Slavic tribes with an Iranian based
elite, giving rise to the Croat mythic claim of Iranian descent
with racial superiority over Serbs and Bosnians. Likewise, the
Bosnians claim Gothic descent in order to distinguish themselves
from Croats and Serbs (Malcolm 1996, 4-7). Regardless, Bosnia’s
separate ethnic groups are not actually separated by ethnicity
but rather by religious culture. Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats, and
Bosnian Serbs all look alike and speak alike (Rohde 1997, xi).
15
Bosnia fell under Byzantine control in the 900s, Hungarian
rule in 1100, back to the Byzantine in 1160, and finally
accidental independence with death of the Byzantine Emperor in
1180. While its lands were coveted by Hungary and Serbia,
Bosnia’s rugged terrain made it, militarily, a costly acquisition
and thus Bosnia maintained its independence as a kingdom from
1180 until invasion by forces of the Ottoman Empire in 1463
(Malcolm 1996, 43). This invasion ultimately led to the
Islamization of the Bosnian population, mainly by voluntary
conversion for economic, social, and political gain, rather than
by coercion, and by the early 1700s Muslims had become a
plurality in Bosnia. While Malcolm (1996, 64-5) disputes the
economic reasons, most of his narrative regarding the reasons for
conversion seems to be economic and socially based (Malcolm 1996,
51-69). Additionally, the conversion to Islam for economic
reasons is confirmed by Wood (2003, 59).
During the period of Ottoman rule, ironically, Serbs who
were members of the Orthodox Church were invited to settle lands
that had been vacated. The Orthodox Church was well respected
within the Ottoman Empire as the ruling seat of the Church was
16
within the empire and thus controllable. By contrast, the ruling
seat of Catholicism was outside the Ottoman Empire and was thus
seen as duplicitous (Malcolm 1996, 71). Regardless, while Bosnia
was under Ottoman rule, there was no record of unusual or
excessive animosity between the religious groups, despite
Klusemann’s (2010, 273) insistence to the contrary.
The 17th and 18th centuries were marked with an almost
constant state of war between the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-
Hungarian (Hapsburg) Empire (Malcolm 1996, 82). Catholic and
Orthodox Christian refugees streamed north into Hungary, Croatia,
and Serbia while Muslims took refuge in Bosnia. However, a
significant number of Orthodox Christians remained in Bosnia.
The middle 1800s saw an increase in conflict between the
three religious communities; with the two Christian communities
demanding equality while the Muslim population demanded the
status quo. At the same time, Serbia was undergoing a period of
intense nationalism with the intent of annexing Bosnia.
Unsurprisingly, Croatia had the same idea (Malcolm 1996, 127).
Despite these plans, the ensuing Russian win in the 1877-78 war
with the Ottoman Empire resulted in the Great Powers’ negotiation
17
that gave the Austro-Hungarian Empire permission to occupy and
control Bosnia, in order to quell the instability caused by the
increasing animosity between the religious communities (Malcolm
1996, 133-4). Apparently, despite difficulties, Austro-Hungarian
rule did prove even-handed and the communities returned to
relations on friendly terms (Malcolm 1996, 145). However, this
view is countered by Coleman (2012, 8) who indicates that the
regional administrator achieved balance by pitting the
nationalist feelings of the citizenry against each other.
The 1908 Turkish Revolution gave the Hapsburgs the
opportunity to finalize its absorption of Bosnia via annexation
on the pretense that Turkey’s insistence on reform jeopardized
Austria’s national interests should Bosnia gain autonomy (Ferraro
2010). This annexation was contested by both Russia and Serbia.
War was threatened, but Germany’s stance to ally with the Austro-
Hungarian Empire in such an event caused the Russian/Serbian
alliance to accept the annexation (Coleman 2012, 9), as Russia
had not yet recovered from the disastrous loss in the war with
Japan and could not sustain a war against both the German and the
Austro-Hungarian Empires (Kennedy 1987, 252-3). However, the
18
Serbs remained resentful over the annexation of the territory
they desired, and they eventually shifted from a Serbian
nationalism to a southern Slav (Yugoslavian) nationalism.
The Balkan War of 1912, wherein an alliance of Serbia,
Montenegro, Greece, and Bulgaria fought against the Ottoman
Empire, saw a further retreat of the Ottomans from the European
continent. The quick victories over the Ottomans gave the Serbs
reason to believe they could now challenge the Hapsburgs.
Serbia’s expansion through conquest of the Ottoman’s European
territory worried the Hapsburgs, and the tension between the two
powers increased significantly (Malcolm 1996, 154). One reaction
to this threat was the decision by the Hapsburgs to hold war
games in Bosnia as a show of force. The heir to the Hapsburg
throne, Archduke Ferdinand, while visiting troops in Sarajevo,
was assassinated by a Serb nationalist. One month later, the
Austro-Hungarian Empire declared war on Serbia and World War One
(WWI) commenced (Malcolm 1996, 155). Bosnia stayed within the
Hapsburg Empire and most Bosnians fought alongside Austro-
Hungarian troops in an effort to stave off absorption into Serbia
(Malcolm 1996, 159).
19
Yugoslavia Part 1
WWI ended with the defeat of the Central Powers; the German,
Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires. One of the outcomes of the
war was the creation of the multi-ethnic State of the Slovenes,
Croats, and Serbs, the state of the southern Slavs, which was
shortly joined by Serbia (including the Serbian-annexed
Montenegro) in late 1918, creating the Kingdom of the Slovenes,
Croats, and Serbs. The Serbs, with its size and army, were the
dominate ethnic group. The king of Serbia became the king of the
Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs (Malcolm 1998, 264; Judah 2011).
Unfortunately, the immediate aftermath in Bosnia consisted
of acts of violence by Serbs directed against the Muslim
population (Malcolm 1996, 162). These actions were likely typical
retaliatory violence directed toward a minority during a change
in government during times of stress. Serbs and Bosnian Muslims
were on separate sides during WWI, and as in earlier wars, brutal
treatment by each side seems more the norm than the anomaly.
Additionally, Banac (1992, 1085) specifies a history of
fratricide amongst the various Balkan nationalities during WWI as
20
a contributor to the animosity among those same groups 70 years
later.
Due to the constant political turmoil between the three
major groups, Croats, Serbs, and Muslims, including the
assassination of the lead Croat delegate by a Montenegrin deputy
in Parliament (Jonassohn and Bjornson 1998, 280), the
constitutional monarchy was ended in 1929 by King Aleksander’s
dissolving the government, suspending the constitution, and in an
attempt to force unity, changing the name of the state to
Yugoslavia and rearranging the internal borders so that the new
divisions crossed the old borders.(Malcolm 1996, 168-9). The
unintentional result was further dissatisfaction, along with the
assassination of the king in 1934. The new regent, Prince Paul,
instituted reforms. However, political fighting among the three
groups continued with Serbian nationalism being the most
disruptive (Malcolm 1996, 171). The finale of the first
incarnation of Yugoslavia commenced with the flirtation with
fascism initiated by Croatia’s largest political party, led by
Macek, who negotiated with Italy for assistance in recreating the
former Croatia (Jonassohn and Bjornson 1998, 280).
21
World War II – The End of Yugoslavia Part One
In 1941, Yugoslavia allied with Nazi Germany. However, Serb
forces staged a coup d’état, invalidating the Yugoslavian treaty.
Immediately thereafter, Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria
invaded and overran Yugoslavia. Croatia (including Bosnia and
Herzegovina (Hayden 1998, 490)) became a separate state under a
fascist government, the Ustashi, which had the same racist
ideology as the Nazis. The rest of Yugoslavia was split up
“among the Axis powers and ceased to exist as a state (Jonassohn
and Bjornson 1998, 281).
The Ustashi government of Croatia, exceeding the brutality
of Nazi Germany, commenced to create an ethnically pure state by
ruthlessly murdering hundreds of thousands of Serbs (Jonassohn
and Bjornson 1998, 283). The main identifier for targeting was
religion, as the Croats were Roman Catholic and the Serbs were
Orthodox Christians. While these genocidal crimes included the
murder of Jews and Gypsies, Serbs were the most numerous victims.
The Croat troops were aided by Muslims and the atrocities were
22
condoned and aided by the Croatian Catholic Church. Additional
aid and approval came from German officials (Jonassohn and
Bjornson 1998, 284-5).
Bosnia was the site for many of these genocidal episodes.
Hayden (2008, 487) states that 200,000 Serbs, along with 50,000
Muslims were murdered there. These murders were committed by the
Croats and can be classified as genocidal in nature.
Both the Serbian communist partisans, led by Tito, and the
monarchist party, the Serb Chetniks, fought the German Nazis and
the Croat Ustashi (Malcolm 1996, 174). However, Tito also offered
to fight with the Nazis against an allied invasion, believing
that an allied victory would restore the monarchy. Unfortunately,
neither Serb group could abide the other as their goals were
diametrically opposed. Additionally, Tito’s group engaged in
indiscriminate killing of Croatian civilians which led the
Chetniks, dedicated to restoring the monarchy to a united
Yugoslavia, to occasionally assist Ustashi troops in attacking
the communist partisans.
Serb nationalists in both groups sought to create a
“homogeneous Serbia” by expelling both Croats and Muslims from
23
the yet to be determined Serbian borders, but which did include
significant portions of Bosnia, Montenegro, Dalmatia, Croatia,
Slovenia, and a slice of Albania (Malcolm 1996, 178-9).
Surprisingly, the Muslim response was an appeal to Hitler
requesting permission to form a protective military legion under
the command of the Nazis. The military unit was formed but used
for other purposes. Finally, the Muslim military unit returned to
Bosnia where it commenced a campaign of indiscriminate reprisals
against local Serb villages (Malcolm 1996, 191).
Yugoslavia Part Two
The end of WWII brought about two significant events; the
slaughter of approximately 100,000 Croats by Serbs as revenge for
previous Croat genocidal activity (Mann 2005, 353) and the
reunification of Yugoslavia under communist rule, headed by Tito.
Despite the effort by Tito to blend the various ethnicities,
Bosnia refused to be integrated as such. Most still identified as
Serb, Croat, or Muslim (Malcolm 1996, 197). Perhaps for this
reason, Bosnia continued as the economic low man on the
Yugoslavian totem pole. Additionally, child mortality and
illiteracy were relatively higher than in the rest of Yugoslavia.
24
This caused many Serbs to move to other parts of Yugoslavia for
better standard of living (Malcolm 1996, 201-2). These conditions
led to further unrest among a population still seething over WWII
memories of ethnic brutality. Finally, the Serb migration made
Bosniaks the plurality in Bosnia.
The End of Yugoslavia Part Two
The death of Marshall Tito in 1980 heralded the death of
Yugoslavia. Despite the previous four decades of the “Brotherhood
and Unity” policy that balanced national tensions, no political
party could successfully campaign with such a platform (Hayden
2008, 490). The ultra-nationalism of Slobodan Milosevic,
coinciding with his rise in power in the 1980s, began to pit
ethnic Serbians in Bosnia and Croatia against their Bosniak and
Croatian neighbors to further his quest to create a “Greater
Serbia.” Milosevic controlled the media and used it to
characterize the Muslims, Croats, and Slovenes as “enemies of the
Serbian people” (Neier 1998, 195). Milosevic and his leadership
cadre blamed the previous communist government for the decline of
25
the Serbian people in that the quest for multiculturalism diluted
and ignored Serbian cultural contributions and strengths. As with
the Khmer Rouge campaign to return to an idealized past society
(Kiernan 2013, 322), Serbian nationalism stressed an “anti-urban”
mentality (Kiernan 2007, 592).
Serbian propaganda described the Muslim population as being
composed of an “inferior people” who had a genetic disposition to
commit acts of violence against Christians. Further, Islam was an
“infection” that would harm all of Europe (Kiernan 2007, 588).
Nationalist Serbs considered the Muslims to be a contamination.
Seeking to divorce themselves from Milosevic’s rule,
Slovenia and Macedonia declared independence. The ensuing war
between Milosevic-led Yugoslavia and Slovenia was short lived.
The percentage of Serbs living there was so slight that it was
not truly worth the fight. Following suit, Croatia declared
independence and was shortly thereafter invaded by the same
Serbian-dominated Yugoslavian army, supplemented by Croatian
Serbs (Waller 2002, 258).
The Serb minority in Croatia had true, though partially
manufactured by Milosevic, concerns. The Political leader of
26
Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, removed Serbs from government posts
(where they were well over represented), and reverted to the
Croatian national symbolism of WWII Croatia: the flag and the
military uniforms of the fascist Ustashi. That, along with the
immediate recognition of Croat independence by a recently united
Germany, fed into the Milosevic-heightened fears of the Serbs,
making an attack all but inevitable (Neier 1998, 5-6).
Additionally, most Serbs over the age of 55 had firsthand stories
to tell of Croatian atrocities committed in the Serbian genocide
during WWII (Benson 2001, 157).
A cease-fire took affect in early 1992 with Serb forces
occupying a portion of Croatia and an independent Croatia
recognized by the international community. In 1995, Croatia
initiated a massive attack on Serbian forces, recaptured the
Croatian territory under Serbian control, and successfully ended
the war.
Bosnian Civil War/War of Independence
In early 1992, the Bosnian Government declared independence.
As had happened in Croatia, the Serbian minority, a third of the
population, refused to accept the act of separation from Serbia.
27
Seeing this refusal as an invitation to succor the Serbian
population, Slobodan Milosevic armed the Bosnian Serbs and began
a war to capture Bosnian territory. Additionally, the Serbs of
Sarajevo physically divided the city into Serb and non-Serb
portions (Markusen 2004, 195). In the spring of 1992, Serbian
troops began a campaign of ethnic cleansing in the Drina Valley,
an area just outside the boundary of Serbia but desired by
Milosevic as part of his “Greater Serbia” dream (Lane 1995, 14).
Most of the Muslim refugees from the valley moved to Srebrenica,
nine miles away. Retaliatory strikes by Muslim forces were
equally brutal with evidence of burned Serbian villages and
headless corpses being well documented (Lane 1995, 14). Serbian
forces moved on in an attempt to take the town of Srebrenica.
However, the town was declared a safe haven by the UN and had
become a refugee center for fleeing Muslims. Unfortunately, the
UN provided no means to defend or supply the city and Srebrenica
became a convenient area for Serb troops to “herd” Muslims that
were being ethnically cleansed from other parts of Bosnia (Benson
2001, 168).
28
Throughout 1992, Serbian forces set up detention camps,
whereupon thousands of Bosniaks were housed, starved, beaten,
tortured, and raped (both sexes). Those considered to be elites
were singled out for special abuse and execution. Serbian forces
commenced a campaign of sexual terror, on order of Serb
authorities, with the explicit purpose of impregnating Bosniak
women (Markusen 2004, 195-6).
By April of 1993, Srebrenica was described as a “City of the
Damned” (Von Recklinghausen 2003, 40). It was one of the last
Muslim strongholds. It had been under siege by Bosnian Serbs for
a year. However, by the end of April, Srebrenica was on the verge
of being overrun by Serbian troops while the United Nations and
NATO were unable or unwilling to act. Additionally, Serb
authorities were preventing the transportation of humanitarian
goods into Srebrenica (Post and Barry 1993, 36). Srebrenica was
also being used by Bosniak forces to launch counter attacks which
increased the likelihood of the city being attacked (Benson 2001,
168).
In 1994, The US encouraged the formation of a joint Bosniak-
Croat military force to combat the Serbs in Bosnia. The success
29
of the joint Bosniak-Croat military forced the Serbian leadership
to secure the initial goal of the campaign, a 30-kilometer swath
of land bordering Serbia, which included Srebrenica, Zepa, and
Gorazde (Udovicki and Stitkovac 1997, 196). The original order
from General Ratko Mladic called for ethnically cleansing Muslims
from the three urban centers The Serb army captured the
Srebrenica and Zepa in July 1995 (Benson 2001, 169). The Serbs
disarmed the small UN peacekeeping force in Srebrenica, separated
the men and boys from the women, sent the women, in convoys, to
the border in an act of ethnic cleansing, and then the Serbs
committed an act of genocide.
On July 12, 1995, over 20,000 Bosnian women, children, and
elderly were bussed out of the front line to Muslim-controlled
territory. They were separated from the men and boys who were
taken by buses to execution sites where they were mowed down by
automatic weapons and machine guns. Upwards of 8,000 Bosnian
males from Srebrenica were systematically slaughtered in this
carefully planned operation. The bodies were then hauled to mass
graves. (Kennedy 2012).
The End of Genocide
30
Dirk Moses (2006) complains that genocide scholars are hard
pressed to determine when genocide ends. Unfortunately, he failed
to provide the answer. In a lecture given at Sonoma State
University, concerning the Armenian Genocide, Professor Kouymjian
(2003, 17) attests that genocide does not end as long as the
perpetrators deny the crime; that the suffering and mental
anguish of the victims and families continue with the denial.
However, Alex de Waal and Bridget Conley-Zilkic (2006) provide
the likely logical answer; genocide ends in one of two ways: the
genocide is completed in that there is no one left to kill, or
there is a military intervention that makes the perpetrator
unable to continue the killing because he/she now lacks the means
or opportunity.
The genocide in Bosnia ended with the arming of the joint
Bosniak-Croat Army which allowed for successful counter attacks
against Serb forces. This, along with Milosevic’s reduction in
influence over the Bosnian Serbs, allowed for a successful
negotiation resulting in the Dayton Accords (De Wall and Conley-
Zilkic 2006). Finally, NATO involvement ensured the terms of the
treaty were enforced (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2004, 169).
31
However, this end was just the end of the wholesale slaughter of
Muslims in Bosnia. It did not mean that Muslims in other parts of
the former Yugoslavia were now safe, as proven by the later
genocidal massacre of ethnic Albanian Muslims in Kosovo.
Conclusion
There are some who say that the genocide in Bosnia was the
end result of 600 years of ethnic strife (Gratz 2011, 410; Allen
1996, 15), beginning with the battle of Kosovo. More are
convinced that it is the result of 50 years of simmering ethnic
hatred born from the ashes of WWII (Haynes 2007, 1122) and the
genocide of the Serbs (Kiernan 2007, 588, Mann 2004, 385), along
with the retaliatory massacre of the Croatians. However, based on
the numerous witness testimonies of Bosniak survivors who insist
that they were on quite friendly terms with their Serb and Croat
neighbors prior to the Bosnian independence movement, as well as
the historical record of only a few atrocities committed in time
of war, it is clear that neither aforementioned reason is correct
(Mann 2005, 359; Haynes 2007, 1120). This not to say that these
events were not used to stir up hatred and encourage the
commission of heinous atrocities against the Bosniaks, because
32
they were. As previously mentioned both Slobodan Milosevic and
the leader of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, adeptly utilized the
state-controlled media to remind everyone of their historical
narratives as well as inventing other stories to encourage
exclusionary nationalistic feelings (Haynes 2007, 1120).
Additionally, Rohde states that “exaggeration and manipulation”
of the truth was standard for all sides of the conflict as an
“accepted tool of survival” (Rohde 1997, x). Playwright James
Goldman sums it up when he has Eleanor of Aquataine, Queen of
England, tell her three sons:
Oh, my piglets, we are the origins of [genocide]. Not history's forces, nor the times, nor justice, nor the lack of it, nor causes, nor religions, nor ideas, nor kinds of government, nor any other thing. We are the killers. We breed [genocides]. We carry it, like syphilis, inside. (Goldman 1968)
Despite the claim of historical motives in the narrative,
the genocidal actions in Bosnia came about to fulfill the
“Greater Serbia” territorial desires of Slobodan Milosevic
(Waller 2002, 258). The additional crimes against Bosnia in
Franjo Tudjman’s campaign for “Greater Croatia” came about
because of Milosevic’s successes and the lack of international
33
intervention in response. In other words, both Milosevic and
Tudjman were the driving factors in the quest for the removal of
the Bosniaks, that the state would be better without them.
Milosevic and Tudjman controlled the organs of mass media in
order to create their respective propaganda campaign against the
targeted populations and both used the cover of war to hide their
crimes and genocidal actions. They were only stopped by the
intervention of others by either arming the opposition or
directly threatening force.
Some historians claim that the genocidal action could
have been arrested had the international community intervened.
The examples used for such lessons are Korea, wherein
intervention prevented North Korea from committing an expected
genocidal massacre in South Korea, and when the lack of
intervention allowed Japan to take China, Germany to take
Czechoslovakia, and Italy to take Ethiopia, as preludes to WWII
(WRMEA 1993). However, like many other opinions regarding what
might have been, there can only be regretful thought of what was
possible. History only tells us what happened and possibly why it
happened. What might have been is mere speculation.
34
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