The Effects of Arguing Expectations and Predispositions on Perceptions of Argument Quality and...

ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY43 (Summer 2006): 1-13

THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION

ADVOCACYTHE EFFECTS OF ARGUING EXPECTATIONS

AND PREDISPOSITIONS ON PERCEPTIONS OFARGUMENT QUALITY AND PLAYFULNESS

by Dale Hample, Benjamin Warner, and Holly Norton

The production of arguments is, or is expected to be, influenced by a number of factors, including one's

expectations concerning what occurs during interpersonal arguments, one's emotional predispositions about

arguing, and the goals of making good, appropriate arguments. This investigation focused on these factors.

Argument frames refers to one's expectations concerning arguing, and personalization of conflict is an

index of feelings relating to arguing. These self-report batteries were compared to respondents'judgments of the

effectiveness, soundness, playfulness, and appropriateness of conversational argument moves, presented as

vignettes. Half of the vignettes presented arguments involving public issues while half concerned personal topics.

Half concluded with a rude argumentative move and half with a polite one. Respondents rated the concluding

moves. Appropriateness, effectiveness, arid soundness were so highly intercorrelated that respondents appeared to

be using the scales interchangeably; hence, these measures were combined into one, labeled a rgument quality.

Playfulness, however, was distinct. Thepolitenessof concluding moves affected arguments'perceived quality, but

effects regarding their playfulness were inconsistent. Perceived argument quality was poorly predicted by all the

expectations or predispositions, except conflict valence. Perception of the playfulness of arguments, in contrast,

were predicted by several individual differences measures, including the expected utility of arguments, use of

arguing to display dominance, the expectation that arguments can be playful, competitiveness, expectation of

civility, and conflict valence. Key words: argument quality, playfulness, argument frames, person-alization of conflict, public and personal argument topic, politeness

A variant of message production research (e.g., Greene, 1997b) focuses on the productionof interpersonal arguments (e.g., Hample, 2007). Concentrating on the argumentative natureof messages leads to examination of the content that is produced and tends to set asidequestions of form, organization, and timing. Most of the relevant research in these main andsubsidiary traditions is the same, and the two literatures are eeisily merged. This articleexamines some of the theorized processes involved in production of arguments. Generallyspeaking, we sought to discover how expectations and predispositions concerning face-to-face arguing affect one's judgments of the argumentative products themselves.

Dale Hample, Benjamin Warner, and Holly Norton, Department of Communication, Western Illinois University. Dale Hampleis now at Department of Communication, University of Maryland. An earlier version of this paper was presented atthe annual meeting of the International Communication Association, San Francisco, CA, May, 2007. Correspon-dence concerning this article should be addressed to Dale Hample, Department of Communication, University ofMaryland, 2130 Skinner Building, College Park, Maryland 20742-7635. E-mail: [email protected]

EXPECTATIONS AND PREDISPOSITIONS SUMMER 2006

Although fuller theoretical descriptions of the process of argument production are avail-able (e.g., Hample, 2007), we begin with a limited account, confined to the matters studiedhere. Anticipation of an interpersonal argument ostensibly activates certain cognitive ele-ments. Message production researchers ordinarily concentrate on the activation of goals andplans, but we have something different, perhaps more basic or preliminary, in mind.Situations are perceptually classified (Dillard & Solomon, 2000). These classifications, inturn, activate several types of phenomena besides goals: procedural knowledge of how toparticipate in such an episode (Greene, 1997a); expectations concerning what may happenduring the interaction (Burgoon, 1995; Honeycutt, 2003); and appraisals that result inemotional reactions to that sort of event (Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). We areconcerned chiefly with the latter two, operationalized as argument frames (Hample, 2005a)and the degree to which people personalize interpersonal conflicts (Hample, 1999), respec-tively. The sections that follow elaborate what is known about argument frames, personal-ization of conflict, and judgments of argument.

ARGUMENT FRAMES

Argument frames are people's understandings of why arguing occurs, how it takes place, andthe nature of interpersonal arguing (the original theoretical treatment of frames appears inHample, 2003; most research on frames is summarized in Hample, 2005a, ch. 2; see alsoHample, Warner, & Young, 2006). The various frames are organized theoretically into threegroups.

The first group is self-centered and concerns the primary goals that a person might pursueby meeins of arguing. These frames acknowledge that another person is involved in arguing,but the interlocutor is in the background and serves only as a means to or foil for one's owngoals. Although developmental research has yet to be conducted, Hample (2003) suspectsthat this frame is the first to appear in children. One such frame is utility, arguing to obtainor achieve something. Most arguments, after all, are undertaken in order to persuadesomeone, for instance, to go to lunch, share a toy, pick up dry cleaning, or some otherimmediate personal goal. Another reeison for arguing, another self-focused goal, is to displaydominance. A person higher in power (or one who wishes to appear so) may argue tooverwhelm the interlocutor, perhaps with argumentative skill, but also possibly with status,power, wealth, or a pointed vocabulary. More general than dominance is the expectationthat arguing reveals identity. For example, a student might write an argumentative essay toestablish that she is bright, or a minister might offer a proof of Christ's divinity to assure hiscongregation that his own faith is unwavering. A final self-oriented goal is play. Some peopleargue for fun or satisfaction, just as one might play chess. This frame is particularlyinteresting because some people, who simply do not understand that others argue playfully,take any argument at face value, with interpersonal difficulties the possible result.

The second group of frames takes into account the other person and conjoins one's goalsto those of one's interlocutor. Hample (2003) suspects that children arrive at this level ofinterpersonal sophistication only after learning what arguing can do for self. Blurting marksa transition from the first group of frames to the second. This behavior is characteristic ofcommunicators who do not take others into account (Hart & Burks, 1972; O'Keefe, 1988).Blurters believe that they should say what they think and not adapt to the other person. Ahigh score on this measure suggests that the arguer effectively is restricted to frames in thepreceding group. In the cooperation frame, the question is whether the respondent recognizes

ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY HAMPLE ET AL

that arguments are essentially cooperative (e.g., involve turn-taking, exchange of ideas, andconsideration for the other) in spite of the appearance of overt disagreement. A low scorerepresents a competitive orientation, which is a way of connecting one's goals to another's,although not a very developed one. The final frame in this group, civility, concerns whetherone believes that arguing is a polite, constructive activity, or sees it as nasty and brutish. Thisscale shares some content with both cooperation and the third group frame, which makes itanother transitional measure.

The third, final category contains only one frame. Professional contrast concems a reflective,naively theorized understanding of argument^ It represents several contrasts between ordi-nary actors and argumentation scholars (Hample, 2003). For instance, many people instinc-tively see arguing as a destructive activity, whereas scholars understand its enormousconstructive potential. A high score indicates that respondents' views and expectations aresimilar to those of professional scholars.

The frames measures, whose development continues, have been associated with numer-ous variables that are relevant here (Hample, 2005a, pp. 209-213; Hample, Warner, &Young, 2006). Highly argumentative people also have high scores for the utility, play,identity, and civility frames. Verbal aggressiveness relates directly to dominance, playful-ness, blurting, and competitive expectations, and negatively to civility and professionalcontrast. Most of the first group frames are positively associated with psychological reac-tance, as is cooperativeness. The frames scores predict editorial preferences, although therelationships are not especially strong. Prior work also has connected the frames measures tothose used to assess personalization of conflict; we defer these results until the end of thereview of literature relating to personalization.

TAKING CONFUCT PERSONALLY

Argument and conflict are not the same phenomena, although ordinary actors often viewthem as synonymous. Conflicts can unfold by nonargumentative means, such as a fistfight,a price war between soft drink companies, or a gossip campaign in junior high school.Arguments, in tum, need not be conflictual. For instance, we are making an argument in thisparagraph but are not aware of any opposition. Nonetheless, the pragmatic domains of thetwo phenomena overlap substanticdly: Interpersonal conflicts may well involve the exchangeof reasons and most interpersonal arguments (i.e., argumentS2) anticipate or manage dis-agreement (Jackson & Jacobs, 1980; Meyers & Brashers, 1999; O'Keefe, 1977).

Taking conflict personally (Hample, 1999; Hample & Dallinger, 1995) is captured by a set ofmeasures designed to tap people's emotional reactions to face-to-face conflicts. We know thatmany people regard arguments as negative, hostile, destructive episodes (e.g., Hample &Benoit, 1999; Martin & Scheerhom, 1985). The personalization scales reveal the extent ofthese feelings. The core idea is that, when they anticipate or recall a conflict, or realize thatthey are engaged in one, people recognize the situation as conflictual and appraise it(Scherer, Schorr, &Johnstone, 2001). These appraisals connect situational features to one'sown goals and produce emotional reactions and expectations. Inasmuch as ordinary actorsdo not distinguish carefully between conflict and arguing (Martin & Scheerhom, 1985), thesefeelings should typify emotional reactions to interpersonal arguing as well (Hample, 2005a).

The taking conflict personally (TCP) instrument has six subscdes. The first, direct person-alization, most immediately indexes the degree to which people take conflicts personally.High scores indicate that respondents feel that conflicts are about self in addition to or rather


than the ostensive topic. The persecution feelings measure is somewhat more specific. Thissubscale reflects the impression that the point of the conflict is simply to attack self, that is,to victimize. Third, stress reactions indexes physical and psychological feelings of pressure anddiscomfort. These three subscales are intercorrelated and sometimes are combined into asingle measure called core TCP. Positive relational effects reflects the degree to which peoplebelieve that conflicts can improve personal or workplace relationships. Its companion,negative relational effects, provides the reverse estimates. Although these subscales are nega-tively correlated, it is possible (ctnd interesting) to have high (or low) scores on both. The finalsubscale is like/dislike valence. This taps overall affect about engaging in conflict; high scoresindicate positive feelings. This battery offers a means to capture positive or negativeemotional reactions to interpersonal conflicts and face-to-face arguments.

The TCP scales show relationships to several other mejisures relevant here (Hample,2005a, pp. 209-212). Argumentativeness is negatively related to the core TCP measures,which indicates that those who personalize disagreement prefer to avoid arguing. Verballyaggressive individuals, on the other hand, often have high scores on the valence subscale.TCP results also have been compared to those for argument frames. Respondents reportinga positive valence for conflicts are open to playful arguing amd see arguing as a civil activity.Direct personalizers clearly recognize that arguments can perform identity work and regardarguing as imcivil. The dominance frame is positively correlated with feelings of persecution:Those who feel persecuted are unusually sensitive to dominance motives for arguing. Thosewho worry that conflicts will affect relationships negatively also have low professionalcontrast scores and regard arguing as uncivil. Dallinger (2004) asked respondents of knownTCP to indicate whether particular conflict moves (designed to embody personalization,persecution feelings, or stress reactions) were appropriate and effective. Respondents gen-erally found these TCP-expressive conflict moves to be appropriate but ineffective. Respon-dents' own TCP scores predicted both appropriateness and effectiveness ratings. These finalresults support our general view that people's predispositions toward cirguing and conflictwill affect their judgments concerning what one should or should not say, as did thepreviously mentioned report that argument frames are related to editorial choices (Hample,Wamer, & Young, 2006).

ARGUMENT JUDGMENTS

Respondents in the present study rated the appropriateness, effectiveness, soundness, andplayfulness of argumentative moves. The first three of these are critical to evaluation of theproducts of argument and so should be involved in production decisions and processes(Hample, 2005a). Appropriateness and effectiveness represent the standard conceptualiza-tion of communication competence (Spitzberg & Cupach, 1984). We were interested prin-cipally in whether respondents' expectations about arguing affect their judgments of it. Giventhese aims, appropriateness and effectiveness were fundamental qualities. The soundnesscriterion reflects our community's primary pedagogical commitment, namely, that peopleshould be sensitive to the structural quality of arguments (e.g., Govier, 2001; Toulmin, 1958).We added the playfulness evaluation not for its foundationeJ importance, but because itsunshcired character is interesting. When one person makes an outrageous argument just toenliven an evening but the other person fails to recognize the move as playful, entertainmentC£tn become relational damage. Some indirect evidence suggests that at least some playfularguers can be imperceptive about the danger: Verbally aggressive people report that they


often argue for play, and several studies indicate that verbally aggressive communicators areunaware of the interpersonal harm that they do (Rancer & Avtgis, 2006).

In view of the scholarship reviewed, we addressed the following research question:RQ: Will people's argument frames and the degree to which they personalize conflict affect their

judgments of arguments' appropriateness, effectiveness, soundness, and playfulness?Although we expected at lejist a partially affirmative answer to the question, prior researchdid not justify a framing hypothesis. In any case, the extent to which these phenomena occurwill be important in evaluating the place of expectations and predispositions in theories ofargument production.

METHOD

Participants

Undergraduate students enrolled in a variety of communication courses at the researchers'Midwestern regional public university took part in the study. Of the 188 participants, 51.6%were males. Ages ranged from 18 to 37, with a meJin of 21 and a standard deviation of 2.55.The participants received extra credit for completing the survey, which required 20-25minutes to complete. The study was approved by our Institutional Research Board.

Procedures

The students completed a 153-item survey that included various self-report scales and twovignettes. Figure 1 describes one of the eight vignettes used in the study. In developing thesevignettes, a panel of seven experts (graduate students in communication) rated each final tumat talk. All but one of the judges correctly rated the last tum of talk for each vignette as eithera polite or a rude comment. In addition, all of the expert judges appropriately classified each

After sharing an apartment for several months, Pat and Shawn have gotten tired of alwayscleaning up after their roommate Lee. Lee rarely did the dishes or helped to keep thebathroom clean. In addition, Pat and Shawn have both spent several hours picking upgarbage and doing dishes that were left after one of Lee's parties during which both Pat andShawn had to work. Having discussed their frustration, Pat was designated to talk with Leeabout cleaning up after these parties and doing a fair share of the work.

Pat asks: Last week's party must have been a pretty good one, huh?

Lee: Yeah, it was a blast!

Pat [Polite Version]: You know, Shawn and I don't have any problems with you having partieswhile we are at work, but it is really gnarly to come home to such a mess after a long nightat work. It would be a lot better if you could clean up after them yourself. We could also usesome help keeping the apartment picked up on a normal basis.

Pat [Rude Version]: Well damn it, you have to clean up afterwards, Shawn and I are getting sickand tired of always cleaning up after you. You aren't doing your share of the work aroundhere and we are tired of it!

Figure 1. A Personal Vignette, with Polite and Rude Last Turns


vignette's issue as a public or personal topic (Johnson, 2002). All of the items were of thefive-point Likert variety, with the exception of those in the professional contrast scale. Thisscale, an argument frames instrument, had a five-point semantic differential format.

We administered four different versions of the survey. Every participant received twovignettes, one involving a personal topic (e.g., cleaning the apartment; see Figure 1) and theother a public topic (e.g., whether smoking in public should be legal). Each final turn at talkin each vignette had two possible forms, either a polite argument or a rude one; otherwise,their content w£is similar.

Instruments

Argument Frames

The frames instrument was designed to consist of eight subscales, although analysis of thedata required some further distinctions. The battery has been under development for severalyears (Hample, 2005b; Hample, Warner, & Young, 2006). The final instrument appears inFigure 2.

Five subscales represented the first group of frames. Identity display, an 8-item measure, hada Cronbach's alpha of .80. Alpha ioT play, a 4-item scale, was .71. Dominance, a 6-item scale,had an alpha of .73. The utility scale had 13 items. Previous studies using an 11-item utilityscale have proved psychometrically disappointing. Eight of the original items for thatmeasure were retained and 5 new ones were added. Exploratory factor analysis yielded twofactors. The first, utility-flexibility, had 4 items with an alpha of .71. The second factor,utility-my needs, better represents the original formulation and had 4 items with an alpha of.64.

The second group of frames was captured by four subscales. Cooperation, which meeisuresthe degree to which respondents view an argument as either cooperative or competitive,originally Wcis a 6-item scale; however, 2 items were added because the estimated reliabilityof this scale in previous studies was troublesome. One of the new items was omitted; the finalvalue of alpha was .75. High scores on the measure indicated cooperation while low scoresindicated a competitive frame. Previous studies have found blurting difficult to measure. Inthese studies, the subscale consisted of 11 items. Our study employed a 16-item scalecontaining 8 of the previous measures and 8 new ones. Exploratory factor analysis of theseitems again suggested division into two measures. The first, blurting-not thinking, had 4 itemsand an alpha of .71. The second, blurting-honesty, consisted of 6 items and had an alpha of .66.Civility had 10 items and a Cronbach's alpha of .70. High scores indicated that the respon-dent expects civility, and low scores incivility.

The third group of frames was represented only by the professional contrast scale. This scalecontained seven bipolar items and had a Cronbach's alpha of .78.

Taking Conflict Personally

The measure of taking conflict personally (TCP) was the battery developed by Hampleand Daiiinger (1995). This instrument had items relating to six different dimensions of traitTCP. The first subscale, direct personalis^ation, included seven items having a Cronbach'salpha of .75. Persecution feelings was a six-item scale with a Cronbach's alpha of .73. Stressreactions was a five-item scale with an alpha of .69. Negative relational effects (five items) and

7


IdentityI use arguments to display my intellectual ability.Other people often use arguments to display their intellectual ability.Arguments are useful in snowing what I Deiieve.Arguments are useful in showing how smart I am.You can learn a lot about another person by watching what sorts of things he or she will say during an

argument.An argument can reveal as much about another person's character as friendly conversation.I use arguments to gain respect.You can see other people at their best or their worst when they argue with people.

PlayArguing is fiin.Arguing is sometimes just a way of passing the time between two friends.I like to challenge what other people say, just to see what else they'll say.Sometimes I say something outrageous, just to have the entertainment of defending it.

DominanceArguing successfully is a way of being dominant over the other person.Losing an argument means that the other person is dominant over me, at least for the moment.When I'm in an argument, winning is more important to me than being kind.When I'm in an argument, winning is more important to me than being correct in what I say.Regardless of what an argument is supposed to be about, it is very often really about who has power over

whom.When I'm in an argument, I feel like I always have to win.

CooperationI think it's important in arguing to feel flexible.A genuine agreement from the other person is more satisfying to me than a forced agreement.The other person's needs are really an important consideration to me when I'm trying to settle a disagreement

with him or her.The basic idea in arguing is to come together on some issue, not to overwhelm the other person.People who think that winning is the main idea in arguing are a little immature.When you're arguing with another person, you have to keep in mind your long term relationship with him or

her all the time.I try to be cooperative when I'm arguing.

CivilityArguments involve loud and negative voices, (reverse scored)Arguments involve cooperation Dy parties.Positive relational outcomes occur after arguments are over.Arguments involve closed-mindedness by the parties, (reverse scored)Arguments involve successful problem solving.Arguments involve irrational emotional displays, (reverse scored)Negative relational outcomes occur after an argument is over, (reverse scored)Arguments involve hostility, (reverse scored)Arguments involve genuine exchange of views by both parties.Arguments involve physical violence, (reverse scored)

Utility - FlexibilityPeople argue for other reasons than simply to get what they want. ,Amiments happen because two people need to settle a disagreement.If lwant someone else to do something, giving the other person a reason to do something is the best approach.There are many reasons to argue other than to get what you want.

Utility - My NeedsWhen I argue with someone it is to get what I want.Arguing is a way to get what you want.I use arguing as a way to get things done.The most important reason for arguing is to get something you need.

Blurting - HonestyWhen I interact with another person I just say what's on my mind.In an argument, if I think it, I will say it.I always say what's on my mind.In an argument, the other person knows exactly where I stand.I sometimes offend other people during arguments.Sometimes when I think of a really good point to make, I just can't stop myself from making it, even if I

shouldn't.Blurting - Not Thinking

During arguments, I don't have time to think about what I'm going to say.After an argument, I often regret some of the things I said.I a r ^ e without thinking before I speak.Durmg a heated argument, my mouth is engaged, but my mind often isn't.

Professional Contrastcompetition 12 3 4 5 cooperationaggression 12 3 4 5 assertivenessuncontrolled emotionality 12 3 4 5 reason givingviolence 12 3 4 5 pacifismdominance 12 3 4 5 issue resolutionpersonally punishing 12 3 4 5 personally satisfyingrelationafly damaging 12 3 4 5 relationally developmental

Figure 2. The Frames Instrument

8


positive relational effects (seven items) had Cronbach's alphas of .73 and .78, respectively.Finally, valence, measured by seven items, had an alpha of .81.

Ju^^ments of Arguments

One aim of this study was to determine the levels of perceived appropriateness, effective-ness, soundness, and playfulness of the last argumentative tum at talk in each vignette. Eachinstrument was modeled after Dallinger's (2004) appropriateness and effectiveness measuresctnd written to include the name of the interactcuit from the appropriate vignette. The itemsappear in Figure 3. Each respondent completed all four of the measures twice, once for eachargumentative scenario. There were two sets of reliability coefficients, one for the personaltopic cind another for the public issue.

Appropriateness. Dallinger's (2004) appropriateness scale included seven items that revealone's perceptions of the suitability of an interactant's last tum at talk. Cronbach's alpha forthe personal topic was .89 and for the public topic was .88.

Effectiveness. The measure of perceived effectiveness of an argument was developed byDallinger (2004) and consisted of three items that estimate the usefulness of the interactant'sfinal statement. Cronbach's alpha for the personal topic was .79 and for the public topic was.73.

AppropriatenessPat'sPat'sPat'sPat'sPat'sPat'sPat's

argumentargumentargumentargumentargumentargumentargument

EffectivenessPat'sPat'sPat's

argumentargumentargument

SoundnessPat'sPat'sPat'sPat'sPat'sPat'sPat'sPat's

argumentargumentargumentargumentargumentargumentargumentargument

PlayfulnessPat was having

was unsuitable.seemed out of place in response to the conflict.waswaswaswaswas

waswaswas

waswaswaswaswaswaswaswas

fun.

appropriate.improper.very suitable to the situation.very proper.simply incorrect.

effective in this situation.not useful.constructive.

logical.sound.based on a firm understanding of the situation.based on invalid reasoning.correct.based on believable and relevant data.legitimate.not based on standards of a sound argument.

Pat was joking around.Pat was only half serious.Pat was being ]jlayful.

Figure 3. Argument Eveiluation Items


Soundness. The soundness scale consisted of eight items bsised on those utilized by Trapp,Yingling, and Wanner (1987). For each item, respondents indicated their perception of thesoundness of the interactant's lsist turn at talk. Cronbach's alpha was .88 for the private topicand .90 for the public topic.

Playfulness. The playfulness scale was adapted from the argument frames play scale. Eachitem asked respondents to judge the playfulness of the actor's final tum at talk. Cronbach'scJpha was .84 for the private topic and .82 for the public topic.

RESULTS

Table 1 shows the correlation coefficients among the judgment measures. Appropriate-ness, effectiveness, and soundness were highly intercorrelated for each topic type (i.e.,personal and public). Although scholars distinguish among these three concepts, the respon-dents either did not distinguish among them at all or perhaps regarded them as causallyinterconnected to a marked degree. Substantively interesting in itself, this finding meansstatistically that the three meeisures were redundant Consequently, we combined th'em tocreate a single variable, argument quality, and performed further analyses for this dependentmeasure. Correlations between the original measures and the playfulness ratings within topictype indicated that playfulness was inconsistendy related to argument quality.

TABLE 1.

CORRELATIONS AMONG SUBJECTIVE RATINGS FOR PRIVATE AND PUBUC ISSUE ARGUMENTS

Argument Ratings by Topic Type

1 Appropriate Personal2 Effective Personal3 Soundness Personal4 Playful Personal5 Appropriate Public6 Effective Public7 Soundness Public8 PlaylHil Public

1

.80**

.78**-.16*-.48**-.51**-.50**-.03

2

* .73***-.06-.44***

* -.43**** -.47***

.07

3

-.25**'-.47***-.49***-.50***-.06

. 4

.16*

.21**

.19**

.29***

5

.77***

.85***

.08

6

.83***

.15*

7

.08

*p< .05**p< .01 ***/>< .001

Table 2 shows the relationship of our manipulations, issue type and argument politeness,to the respondents' judgments. Topic and politeness clearly affected ratings of argumentquality, with polite arguments generally being judged more positively. Playfulness judg-ments, on the other hand, did not differ for the personal topics and showed only one vignette(the polite argument in the browser exchange) to be unusually high in playfulness. Othervignettes were statistically indistinguishable in regard to playfulness. The argument qualityratings were influenced strongly by topic and politeness, but subjective perceptions ofplayfulness did not appear to be very sensitive to these matters.

Finally, Table 3 contains data pertaining to our research question. In contrast to Table 2'sfindings concerning the effects of the manipulations, these correlation coefficients reveal thatexpectations and predispositions were more predictive of argument playfulness than ofargument quality. Many of the correlations in Table 3 were not statistically significant, butnoticeably more than were attributable to chance (22%).

10


TABLE 2.

MEANS FOR SUBJECTIVE ARGUMENT QUAUTY AND PLAYFULNESS BY SrruATiON AND POLFTENESS LEVEL

Quality Playfulness

Personal

§ulet Rude 7.45 1.95.

lean Rude 9.13. 1.88.Quiet Polite 9.72. 2.14.Clean Polite 12.30 1.78.

adj. le .42"* .01Public

Browser Rude 6.20 2.48.Smoking Rude 8.40. 2.14.Browser Polite 8.54. 2.88Smoking Polite 10.82 2.40.

adj. R^ .38**' .06**

are for the overall between-subjects ANOVAs. "Quiet" refers to an argument about keeping quiet so one person canstudy, "CleEui" is the vignette about cleaning the apartment, "Browser" refers to which internet browser ought to beused, and "Smoking" is the argument about whether smoking in public should be permitted.•*/> < .01 • " p < .001

Perceptions of argument quality related weakly to expectations and predispositions.Quality judgments concerning personal arguments were largely unaffected by either framesor TCP, with only the valence subscale showing an effect. Notice that positive valence forconflict pointed to lower quality ratings for personal arguments but higher estimates forpublic issues. This sort of empirical distinction reinforces Johnson's (2002) insistence thatresearchers distinguish between these two sorts of interpersonal arguments. For public issuearguments, perceptions of quality were predictable with the individual differences measures[I^ = .14), particularly by positive relational effects (^ = .84, p < .05) and feelings ofpersecution (/3 = 1.08, p < .01), but not quite by blurt-honesty (j3 = - . 11 , p = .09) and

TABLE 3.CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FRAMES AND TCP SUBSCALES AND SuBjEcrrvE RATINGS OF ARGUMENTS

Rating

Utility For MeUtility FlexibleIdentity DisplayDominancePlayBlurt Without ThinkingBlurt For HonestyCooperationCivilityProfessional ContrastDirect PersonalizationPersecution FeelingsStress ReactionsPositive Relational EffectsNegative Relational Effectslike/Dislike Valence

R^

Quality

- .06- .01

.01- .04- .03- .02

.03

.03- .04- .03

.02- .03

.11- .11- .01- . 2 0 "

.08

Personal

Playftil

.13- . 2 9 " '- .13

.18*

.09

.03- .10-.26***-.14*- .06

.01

.16*- .02- .08- .03

.15*

.17*

Quality

.03- .01- .07- .02

.02- .07- .11- .06- .07

.03- .10

.09- .12

.15*

.02

.16*

.14*

Pubhc

Playfiil

.04-.17*

.03

.15*

.17*-.04-.09-.28***-.16*-.04

.02

.12

.01-.05-.05

.14*

.15*

*/)< .05"p< .01 ***/)< .001

11

ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOGACY HAMPLE ET AL

valence (^ = .72, /> = .07). People who were optimistic that arguments can improverelationships rated public arguments as higher in quality, as did those who had strongfeelings of persecution.

Perception of playfulness was related much more clearly to expectations and predisposi-tions. For personal issue arguments, playfulness was predicted by severed measures of eachtype in Table 3. Arguments were perceived as more playful by those who did not seearguments as having flexible uses, and involving dominance, competition, and incivility.These same respondents tended to feel persecuted but had a generally positive valence forconflict. The overall pattern was one of pointed, competitive play that involved the risk ofpersecution, but not to such an extent that the entertainment value was lost. However,multiple regression analysis [R^ = .17) indicated that only utility-flexible (j3 = -.06, p < .05)was a significant predictor when controlling for the other independent variables, althoughpersecution feelings (/3 = .23, p = .06) was close. Table 3's pattern for playfulness of publicissue arguments was similar, but differed slighdy in two respects. Those who saw the publicissue cirguments as more playful also scored higher on play themselves but were marginallyless likely to feel persecuted. Both differences between personal and public issue playfulnesspredictions were minor, and the general pattern was similar, regardless of issue type. Themultiple regression analysis (iJ^ = .15) revealed only one significant predictor, cooperation(^ = -.42, p < .01), which indicated that competitive expectations were associated withestimates of playfulness. Overall, perceptions of playfulness were consistent with seeingarguing as a domineering competition that might be severe enough to produce victimizationbut also might be enjoyable. In short, arguing can be undertaken as a kind of playfulaggression but only in the view of people prepared for this possibility. One certainly can seein these data the potential for relational difficulty, since even those who perceived playful-ness acknowledged that the arguments tended to be verbally forceful.

DISCUSSION

The high intercorrelations among argument effectiveness, soundness, and appropriatenessare interesting. Effectiveness and technical soundness £ire entirely distinct in theory (Wenzel,1990) even though, one hopes, they are associated in practice. We made no attempt tomanipulate either effectiveness or soundness here, so perhaps they did covary empirically.The size of the correlations (none was below r = .73), however, was greater than one wouldexpect of mere empirical covariation; it was more like what one might expect whensynonymous items are included in a single scale. Furthermore, appropriateness (i.e., polite-ness) not only wjis manipulated clearly here but also is theoretically irrelevant to soundness.Appropriateness should not have covaried with the other two measures because both therude and polite final turns were constructed to have essentially the same cirgumentativecontent.

This suggests that our respondents were not sensitive to fundamental distinctions neededfor argument evaluation. In fact, we suspect that we detected a generalized reaction to theargumentative moves that is not especially responsive to the arguments' probative content.Despite being asked to respond to questions concerning the quality of support, tightness ofthe argument scheme, and so forth, respondents merely assigned ratings that were consistentwith whether the argumentative moves were polite or not. It may be that what we calledargument quality actually was dominated by politeness and that the ratings of effectivenessand soundness were superficial afterthoughts. Because all college undergraduates have been

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exposed to instruction in argument quality in both college and high school compositioncourses, and because mctny of our respondents had received similar instruction in theirrequired public speaking courses, this is troubling. Although taught repeatedly, this materialapparently is not being learned in a way that passes into ordinary life. As a community ofteachers, perhaps we need to rethink our pedagogy in several disciplines. A first step,however, would be additional work to replicate these findings.

The main point of this study was to advance understanding of argument production byascertaining what sorts of things influence people's judgments of the arguments they mightconsider making. Our research question focused on two possible influences: expectationsabout the situation type and affective reactions to it. Both of these factors proved to beinvolved. The relationships between expectations and feelings on one hand, and argumentjudgments on the other, were affected by whether issues were personal or public andwhether the judgment concerned quality or playfulness.

Our results support previous findings that arguers react to personal cind public argumentsdifferently (Johnson, 2002). By their nature, personal arguments are more involving; hence,we might cinticipate that arguers will respond more to what actually is being said and be lessaffected by their general expectations about arguments. We found that such expectations hadvery little to do with judgments of argument quality for personal issues. In contrast, thequality ratings of public issue arguments were predictable from people's frames and person-alization levels. Although the effect size for this result {R^ = .14) was not unusually large, itappears to be substantial when one considers that no statistical account has been given of theactual qucJity of the arguments. It would be interesting in future work to manipulate qualityof argument as well as politeness, to determine whether technical soundness is moreinfluential in personal issues and generalized anticipations more important in judgments ofpublic issue arguments' quality. Playfulness judgments, on the other hand, are fairly consis-tent when the patterns for public and personal issues are compared, at least in our study.

We are beginning to develop an interesting empirical portrait of arguing playfully, andsome of what we have learned is cause for concern. Surely, genuine entertainment shouldgenerate pleasant reactions and high appropriateness ratings. This is not, however, what wefound. Playfulness judgments correlated negatively with appropriateness for personal issuearguments and not at all for public issues. Prior work indicates that verbally aggressivepeople score high on the play frame, which indicates that they think arguing can be donesolely for fun. Verbal aggression, however, is negatively associated with many measuresregarding positive relational, personal, and workplace outcomes (Rancer & Avtgis, 2006).This suggests that verbally aggressive people may not be aware of the harm they do. Wefound that those most likely to rate an argumentative move as playful were themselvesdominance-sensitive and competitive and also had positive valence for conflict.

We are suspicious of declarations that arguing is done for fun or that argumentative movesare playful. Although we do not doubt that people's ratings on these points are ordinarilyvalid, we wonder about the sophistication of their underlying understandings of fiin. We arereminded of what can happen when tickling a small child: Even when done playfully andreceived as such at first, sometimes the tickling continues so long and so intensely that thechild becomes hurt and upset. We have come to believe that genuinely playful arguingrequires two interlocutors who both enjoy it, who both understand the episode in exactly thesame way, and who both know when to stop. This would seem to be a sophisticatedcommunication skill, and we are not encouraged by the finding that verbally aggressive

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people are most likely to lay claim to it. This might well be an important topic for futureresearch.

Other future work should improve the frames scales. Several still are only marginallyreliable. One of the new utility scales, utility-flexibility, does not match the original theoreticalconceptualizations ctnd so may not be a first frame measure at all. The results of this study(see Table 3) suggested that it has more to do with cooperation, a second frame index, thanwith any of the first frame measures. The developing record of interesting associationsbetween argument frames and a variety of other measures indicates that this could be aworthwhile undertaking.

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