A Lewinian perspective on taking conflict personally: Revision, refinement, and validation of the...

A Lewinian Perspective on TakingConflict Personally: Revision,Reflnement, and Validation of theInstrnment

Dale Hample and Judith M. Dallinger

Taking conflict personally (TCP) has been defined as a negative emotional reaction toparticipating in a conflict. This paper locates the notions of affective climate in general,and TCP in particular, within a Lewinian frame. The theoretical connections amongfield theory, defensiveness, attributions, and TCP are described. Earlier work hasgenerated a multidimensional scale for measurement of TCP, and has shown thesubscales' associations with argumentativeness, verbal aggressiveness, communicationapprehension, own conflict style, superior's conflict style, arguing behaviors,communication competence, and organizational climate. The present investigationresponds to some psychometric and conceptual difficulties with the original version ofthe TCP scales by revising the measurement instrument. This paper proposes items forthe measurement of six TCP subscales: direct personalization, persecution feelings,stress reaction, positive relational effects, negative relational effects, and like/dislikevalence. The revised scales replicate the leading results from the original validatingstudy, and extend our understanding of TCP's relationship to a conflict's perceivedclimate.

KEY CONCEPTS: Interpersonal conflict, field theory, defensiveness, taking conflictpersonally

DALE HAMPLE (Ph.D., University of Illinois, 1975) and JUDITH M. DALLINGER(Ph.D., University of Nebraska, 1984) are Professors of Communication at WesternIllinois University, Macomb, IL 61455. An earlier version of this paper was presentedat the 1993 International Communication Association, Washington, D. C.

Field theory (Lewin, 1951; 1935; 1936; Deutsch, 1954; Leeper, 1943) was once a keyscholarly perspective in social science. Its development resulted in Lewin beingacclaimed the "father of social psychology," and its immediate offspring include

Heider's (1958) balance theory, Festinger's (1957) cognitive dissonance theory, Thibaut andKelley's (1959) social exchange theory, Cartwright and Zander's (1968) perspective on groupdynamics, and many other historically important developments, both in communication (Rogers,1994, ch. 8) and in the social sciences generally. Many of field theory's precepts have becomewell accepted, and appear in the textbooks of several disciplines without attribution. The theorycontinues to attract explicit attention in the Journal of Social Issues and at the meetings of theSociety for the Advancement of Field Theory (see Wheelan, Pepitone, & Abt, 1990; Stivers &Wheelan, 1986), but has, by and large, fallen out of fashion.

Nonetheless, our recent re-reading of the basic documents of field theory left us with theimpression that it remains a very contemporary approach to the study of human behavior. Fieldtheory is designed to account for all psychological activity, and so communication naturally falls

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under its domain. Hample (1992; 1994) has worked out a general application of field theoryto the topic of message production in general. Here, we want to use field theory as anorientation to interpersonal conflict, and more specifically, to some emotional reactions peoplemay have when confronted by argumentative discussions.

This leaves us with an unusual amount of material to examine prior to presenting ourempirical material. First, we will briefiy summarize field theory, and connect it to thosecharacteristics of interpersonal conflict that are relevant to this paper. Second, we will introduceour more particular topic, the admonition that people should not take confiict personally. Third,we will show how the general concept of taking confiict personally (TCP) relates to the morefamiliar idea of defensiveness. Fourth, we will emphasize the importance of attributions andother situational perceptions to the experience of confiict. The fifth section takes note of earlierresearch that has made use of our TCP notion. And finally, to develop our specific hypotheses,we will relate TCP to both verbal aggression and argumentativeness. Only then will we proceedto our method, results, and discussion sections. By framing TCP research within a generallyuseful theory of human communication, we hope to advance our understanding of the TCPphenomenon.

Field Theory Applied to Interpersonal ConflictIn Lewin's (1951) classic formulation, behavior is a joint function of the person and the

environment: that is, B=f(P,E). Environment is understood from the actor's point of view, andis termed the life space in field theory. Among the elements of a life space may be the person,goals, obstacles, barriers, plans, and climate.

The person (P) is the perceiving actor. Field theory is limited to what Lewin callspsychological behavior, that is, behaviors which are somehow under the control of the actor.These actions are produced in response to the situation as the person perceives it. While externalevents may affect the actor (e.g., an unnoticed baseball thrown by one's child), they will notaffect the person's behavior until s/he takes note. Similarly, the person's past and future are onlyrelevant insofar as they are salient in the moment. The person may be more or less aware ofself A fixation on self (e.g., what we sometimes see in an extremely anxious speaker) will leadto a highly differentiated (Barker, Dembo, & Lewin, 1941) perception of one's own features.More often, however, we communicate without any particular self-attention, and in theseinstances the person is not differentiated for self at all.

Goals are positively valenced regions in the life space. In a confiict, people may have oneor more of a very large number of goals: to win an argument, to express dominance, to protectone's feelings, to assault the other, to display friendliness, to get a promotion, and so forth. Agoal exerts an attractive force on P, and so changes the life space's force field, putting it intodisequilibrium. This causes P to move toward the goal region. This movement, or locomotion,can be understood as the successive relocation of P into various regions, until s/he has penetratedthe positively valenced area. Once P has reached the goal region (i.e., attained the goal), itsforce dissipates because of satiation, and the life space's equilibrium is restored. However, anumber of things can prevent P from arriving in the goal's region, and chief among these areobstacles and barriers.

An obstacle is a negatively valenced region, a negative goal. Where a goal attracts, anobstacle repels. A person in a confiict may perceive several obstacles which impede attainmentof a goal. Supposing that P's main goal is to win an argument, s/he might see any of thesethings as obstacles: inconvenient facts bearing on the topic, a high level of arguing skillpossessed by an opponent, the need to finish things in time for lunch, linguistic difficulties if oneof the participants has a different native language than the others, another person's temper, and

298 Hample and Dallinger

so on. Each of the items in this list is a region to be avoided if possible. To find oneself in anyof these areas of the life space is unwelcome: one does not wish to be factually embarrassed,out-metaphored, hungry, frustrated by misunderstanding, or the object of someone's outburst.So one tries to locomote around these repulsive areas, and plans a path toward the goal's regionto accomplish that. Notice that if P cannot figure out how to avoid an obstacle, s/he might quit,or might decide to plow through and endure some unhappiness in pursuit of a more valued end.

A barrier in field theory is different than an obstacle (see Hample & Dallinger, 1994). Allregions, including goals, have boundaries around them, and these boundaries vary in theirpermeability. Some goal regions are easy to pass into, while others are more difficult. A personin a conflict may find it simple to greet the other participants, but may feel resistance (fromwithin) when trying to express an unpopular opinion. Barriers are relatively impermeableboundaries. Because a barrier by definition surrounds the whole goal region, P cannot maneuveraround it. P can only abandon the effort, or mount a more forceful effort to locomote into thegoal.

Obstacles can completely surround a goal region, too, and will then have much the samefunction as barriers. The main difference is that an obstacle boundary is explicable (e.g., "Hewon't agree because he's too proud to give in"), while a simple boundary is not (e.g., "He won'tagree no matter what I say or how I say it"). Remember that the issue is what P thinks isoperating in his/her life space. P may be imperceptive about the reasons for failure, be correct,or have an imaginatively wrong explanation. But whatever P thinks will control what P does.

A plan is P's imagined sequence of locomotions, away from obstacles, through barriers, andinto goal regions. The plan may be simple or detailed. For instance, a person in an extendedargument might simply blurt out what s/he feels, or might generate a pseudo-military campaignto win one subargument, concede a second, confuse a third, and finally suggest a compromise.The plan is whatever P thinks it is. An external observer might suppose that P planned to dothree things in succession because P actually did, but this is not decisive evidence. P might havebeen doing what is called "opportunistic planning" (Ochs, 1979), a phrase which describes actingwithout much foresight.

The life space as a whole has a climate, or affective atmosphere. Lewin and his studentsoften focused their own confiict research on this topic, specializing in the analysis of cooperativeand competitive climates, and democratic/autocratic/lassiezfaire leadership styles (e.g., Deutsch,1973; Lewin, Lippitt, & White, 1939). People can have so many emotional reactions to confiictthat there may be little point in trying to catalogue them. Different people may regard the sameconfiict discussion as exciting, frustrating, threatening, fiirtatious, funny, or immoral. The centralimportance of climate is the degree to which it facilitates or impedes locomotion in the lifespace, whether we consider locomotion in general or one behavior in particular. For instance,feelings of anxiety and apprehension make any kind of communication less likely, while theperception of a competitive climate encourages threats and makes concessions more rare.

This paper focuses on the climate a person may perceive during confiict discussions, andaddresses this topic by means of research on people's tendency to take confiict personally. TCPis a multi-dimensional concept that we understand to be an index of one's affective climate. TheTCP instrument measures predispositions to personalize confiict, to experience stress during it,to feel persecuted, to project the possibility of positive or negative relational consequences, andto enjoy or dislike confiict interactions. We believe that this set of predispositions holds greatpromise in understanding people's orientation to, and behavior within, confiict discussions. Wedo not claim that TCP is always a factor in interpersonal confiict, because other climates and lifespace considerations may be more salient in a given circumstance. However, TCP is alwayspotentially relevant to an interpersonal confiict, and we believe it is salient to P often enough that

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the concept is worthy of study. Understanding TCP within a Lewinian framework permits usto locate affective reactions within the whole phenomenal context that P perceives. Thiscontextuali22tion immediately offers a perspective on TCP which helps us to see its connectionsto all the other features of the life space.

The Admonition Not to Personalize ConflictConflict researchers have for many years been sensitive to the potential problems which may

result when a participant takes others' comments personally. In Lewinian terms, we would saythat personalization creates an affective climate that impedes productive locomotion. It mightdiscourage any communication at all, as communication apprehension does, or it might hinderthe generation of messages aimed at mutually valued regions, while encouraging those likely toend in unwelcome parts of the life space. The advice that people ought to focus on thesubstantive issues, and avoid personal attacks and other behaviors which lead to negativeemotional reactions, is common (e.g., Hocker & Wilmot, 1985, pp. 99-102; Folger, Poole, &Stutman, 1993, ch. 5; Lippitt, 1982, p. 70; Filley, 1975; 1978, p. 63).

Furthermore, the advice seems quite sound to us. Thirty years ago, Collins and Guetzkow(1964, pp. 111-117) clearly distinguished between substantive and affective conflicts. Theformer are commonly brought to consensus by attention to relevant facts and use of a gooddecision making procedure, providmg that the personal climate is reasonably pleasant. Affectiveconflicts, in contrast, may never be resolved, and quite often result in avoidance and withdrawal.In fact, they report that the mere expression of personal needs during a dispute makes groupconsensus less likely (1964, p. 109).

While not equivalent to Collins and Guetzkow's contrast between substantive and affectiveconflict, a similar conclusion about taking conflict personally emerges from Coser's (1956)analysis:

Conflicts which arise from frustration of specific demands within the relationship andfrom estimates of gains of the participants, and which are directed at the presumedfrustrating object, can be called realistic conflicts, insofar as they are means toward aspecific result. Nonrealistic conflicts, on the other hand, although still involvinginteraction between two or more persons, are not occasioned by the rival ends of theantagonists, but by the need for tension release of at least one of them. (1956, p. 49,italics original)

Coser remarks that actual conflicts otten have features which are both realistic and unrealistic(p. 53), and suggests that a good mediator should try "to eliminate tension which merely seeksrelease so that realistic contentions can be dealt with without interference" (p. 59). Both Gibb(1961, pp. 147-148) and Deutsch (1973, p. 46) support this general thesis, arguing thatdefensiveness can spiral reciprocally, and that conflicts that challenge a person's self-esteem areespecially hard to resolve cooperatively.

As this brief review suggests, the idea that conflict ought not be taken personally emergesfrom a family of concepts, some empirical, some reflective, some similar, and some distinct.The ideas of affective conflict, unrealistic conflict, defensiveness, face threat, hostility, perceptionof aggressive intent, retaliation, reactance, and others, are all somehow conjoined into this onebit of advice: taking conflict personally damages a conflict's climate.

While field theory establishes a general frame for the examination of interpersonal conflict,a clearer understanding requires more attention to how people privately experience it. Ourimpression is that the bulk of research attention has focused on conflict behaviors—either


directly, by analysis of conflict discourse and decisions (e.g., Grimshaw, 1990), or indirectly, byassessment of people's preferences for conflict management styles (e.g., Garko, 1992). We haveno argument with the importance of such work, but we believe its preponderance has resultedin a scholarly undervaluing of the personal experience of conflicting (for an exception, seeWaldron & Krone, 1991).

Nor are we alone in this opinion. Recent years have seen an increased scholarly recognitionof the importance of emotion in communication (e.g., Metts & Bowers. 1994; Waldron, 1995;Dillard& Wilson, 1993). Earlier researchers (Mortensen, 1974, p. 109; Eadie, 1982, p. 169)have also suggested more attention to the role of affect in conflict, though their calls seem tohave been largely unheeded. We believe that our Lewinian approach to the study of conflictresponds to these suggestions, at least in part.

Field theory implies that participants' personalities and moods may be important to theprogress and outcomes of conflicts. However, we are obliged to note that some empiricalevidence concerned with conflict style suggests that individual differences research will be a deadend. Kohlenberg and Andersen (1987) report that four personality measures were able to explainonly 2% to 11% of the variance in their subjects' conflict style preferences. Bell and Blakeney(1977) had similar results, using another set of variables, as did Schneer and Chanin (1987).Overall, Putnam and Poole's (1987, p. 560) literature review suggests 9% as the most variancein style predilections one could expect to explain with individual differences measures.

This skepticism about personality research may tum out to be well founded (generally, seeAndersen, 1987), but we have several reasons for pressing on. First, we might reasonablywonder whether personality variables ought to have predicted style preferences, since Folger,Poole, and Stutman (1993, ch. 7) believe that styles are not traits at all, but are essentiallysituation-responsive behavior sets (but for a different view, see Neer, 1984; Ross & DeWine,1987; and especially Stemberg & Soriano, 1984). Besides, the traits usually studied arestraightforward personality measures, such as extraversion. They are not specific to conflictsituations, and are no more relevant to conflict than to any other life event. TCP, in contrast,is exactly and only about conflict, and so has a better chance of making substantial predictions.Further, even if TCP turns out not to have much to do with conflict behaviors, this will be worthknowing. If a variable as theoretically central to conflict as TCP does not index importantindividual differences, we will have much stronger grounds for ignoring trait and state variablesin our theories. Some positive results have recently been reported by Waldron and Krone(1991), who indicate that a person's emotions during a conflict episode can affect the likelihoodsof emotional expressions and changed relationships with the targets. The general absence ofencouraging results about individual differences may be due more to default than to study.

So let us continue with our examination of the literature. Since we have found no workexplicitly focused on taking conflict personally, but a great deal of research which seemsrelevant, we have had to impose our own organization on the material. We fmd it convenientto impose a Lewinian perspective on Gibb's notion of defensiveness and will go on to discussother work in connection with his ideas.

Defensive Reactions to ConflictIn the classic essay on defensiveness, Gibb (1961, p. 141) says that "defensive behavior is

defmed as that behavior which occurs when an individual perceives threat or anticipates threatin the group." We read this as a statement about the relationship between climate and behavior,rather than a necessary characteristic of defensiveness. Gibb's list of "behaviors characteristicof defensive climates:" evaluation, control, strategy, neutrality, superiority, and certainty (p.143), is far more helpful, but seems to be mislabeled. We think the list specifies attributions


o//noft'v«/or behaviors (also see Eadie, 1982, p. 164), rather than behaviors themselves. Thus,defensiveness is fundamentally a feeling or an affective climate; it derives from a person'sinterpretations of the other's actions; and it predisposes one to certain kinds of behaviors,notably self-defense, aggression, and avoidance.

We are otherwise comfortable with what Gibb and others have said about defensiveness.In our Lewinian perspective, defensiveness is identifiable only from P's perspective, and iscaused by the perception that others are evaluative, strategic, and so forth (Gibb, 1961; see Gibb,Smith, & Roberts, 1955). These attributions imply that the others are seen as judgmental aboutP, are thought to treat him/her as a manipulable object, seem to see him/her as an inferiorundeserving of empathy, and appear to have no respect for his/her opinions. Stamp, Vangelisti,and Daly (1992) report that four things are involved in the feeling of defensiveness: a self-perceived flaw, a sensitivity to the flaw, an attack by another person, and the feeling that theattack is focused on the flaw. These perceptions also seem likely to cause a person to takeconflict personally.

All this can be understood in a different way by centering on the idea of psychologicalreactance (Brehm, 1966). Defensiveness is caused, as we have seen, by the perception ofaggression or assertion of superiority. According to reactance theory, this will produce animpulse to push back; that is, new goals and plans will appear, giving attractive force to regionsthat otherwise might have been absent or negatively valued in the life space. The literature onthe use of power in conflict suggests that this is in fact the case. Fischer (1969, p. 311) indicatesthat when power in a conflict is unequal, the less powerful party is more likely to lie; deceptionis seen as an alternative to threat, used when threats may not be credible. Eisenhardt andBourgeois (1988, p. 753) studied the distribution of power within several electronics firms, andconclude that centralization in the hands of the CEO leads to competitiveness within the nextechelon of managers, while decentralization encourages cooperation and a corporate focus ongroup goals. Eisenhardt and Bourgeois' findings are consistent with Gibb's (1978, pp. 192-193)claim that many organizations have fear/distrust cycles because of their high level of latentthreat. The exercise of power by means of threats is a well established barrier to cooperativework (Deutsch, 1958; 1969; Deutsch & Krauss, 1962), and appears to elicit hostility in return.Conflict can be an intense emotional experience, involving anger (Coser, 1956, pp. 55-60;Mortensen, 1974; Sereno, Welch, & Bratten, 1987), especially when communication is not freelypossible (Thibaut & Coules, 1952). Wain (1982) reports that the more intense a conflict is, thefewer agreements and the more disagreements occur. So people will tend to take conflictspersonally when the perceived climate contains pressure, power, politics, threats, anger, or anyother intense emotions.

Reactance effects occur even with more subtle uses of power, however. One of Gibb's(1961, pp. 144-146) main points was that the effort to persuade the other can stinulatedefensiveness, because in Gibb's view (see Eadie, 1982, for a critique), persuasion involvesassertion of unilateral control: "Implicit in all attempts to alter another person is the assumptionby the change agent that the person to be altered is inadequate" (Gibb, 1961, p. 144). Peopleresent having goals imposed on them, and wish to develop their own (Gibb, 1964, p. 286).Thus, they react against perceived pressure, and take the conflict personally.

Reactance therefore seems useful in explaining aggressive reactions to a defensive climate.However, it does not help much in understanding the other side of defensiveness, the possibilitythat people will withdraw from or avoid unpleasant conflicts (generally, see Folger, Poole, &Stutman, 1993; for a field theory treatment of how frustration can be answered either byaggression or withdrawal, see Barker, Dembo, & Lewin, 1941).


Regardless of which type of defensive reaction occurs, however, we may be confident thatit will tend to be self-sustaining and mutually reinforcing. By reflex (Leary, 1957, ch. 7),defensiveness is answered with defensiveness. Stamp et al. (1992) indicate that respondents'estimates of own and other's defensiveness in a given interaction are associated at r = .60."Defensive communication consists of verbal and nonverbal behaviors that are threatening orpunishing to others and reciprocally invite and produce defensive behaviors in return" (J.Alexander, 1973, p. 224). Such a climate is destructive to conflict management. When they takeconflict personally, people ignore or distort messages, and become less and less capable ofperceiving the other accurately (Gibb, 1961, pp. 141-142). Gibb's paper concludes with thissentence: "Arousing defensiveness interferes with communication and thus makes itdifficult—and sometimes impossible—for anyone to convey ideas clearly and to move effectivelytoward the solution of therapeutic, educational, or managerial problems" (p. 148).

A number of prosocial behaviors may create or sustain a supportive personal climate, andso make overly personal reactions to conflict less likely: description, problem orientation,spontaneity, empathy, equality, and provisionalism (Gibb, 1961, p. 143). The point of Gibb'sand others' recommendations is that an atmosphere of trust (Gibb, 1978; Zand, 1972),supportiveness (Gibb, 1961), mutual respect (Filley, 1975), and cooperation (Deutsch, 1958)generates feelings of self-worth (Gibb, 1974) that make productive conflict discussions morelikely (Folger, Poole, & Stutman, 1993). These are also therefore the perceived features ofclimate which we expect will lower the likelihood of taking conflict personally.

For the most part, the literature treats defensiveness as something stimulated by theimmediate situation (E. Alexander, 1979; J. Alexander, 1973; Eadie, 1982; Winer & Majors,1981). However, there is some occasional mention of the possibility that people may differ intheir propensities to be defensive (e.g., Eadie, 1982, p. 169), and Gibb himself (1964, p. 279)says that people will react less defensively as their level of self-acceptance grows throughouttheir lives. We think it useful to maintain a clear distinction between the trait and state conceptsof defensiveness, and to regard both senses as legitimate. We will argue that TCP has a similarduality.

Defensiveness is Triggered by AttributionsIn the previous section, we described defensiveness as an emotional reaction to conflict.

Affect and cognition, though often sharply distinguished for researchers' convenience, are in factthoroughly integrated aspects of the same organic person. Here we will try to explain thatdefensiveness (affect) is mediated by, and occurs because of, attributions (cognition), and is infact a kind of summary of them. Two kinds of attributions, of other's intent and of fairness,seem to be especially important in affecting the probability that a conflict will be takenpersonally.

Other's IntentIf another person behaves hurtfully toward you, several interpretations of that behavior are

possible: that it was dictated by the situation, that it was accidental, or that it was intentional.P's attribution of aggressive intent is the one most likely to generate defensiveness. Deutsch(1958) reports, for instance, that when a higher power person is consistently malevolent,subordinates will try to return the damage if at all possible.

Epstein and Taylor (1967) studied the amount of retaliation undertaken in response toelectric shocks administered in a reaction time contest. Their subjects lost the contests 17%,50%, or 83% of the time, and the intensity of administered shocks also varied. They found that


people retaliated at the highest levels when they had themselves been shocked most extremely,and when they lost 50% of the time. But frequency of defeat only interacts with the strongereffect, intensity of shock; the latter is the variable that most clearly predicts retaliation. Thisis an important finding, for it indicates that level of frustration (i.e., frequency of defeat) is lessimportant than perceived aggressive intent of other (i.e., shock intensity). We might generalizethis to say that it is the attribution of other's intent that predicts defensive aggression, rather thanhow well or poorly one does in the conflict.

This interpretation receives firmer grounding through a study by Nickel (1974). In thisexperiment, subjects were shocked at varying levels of intensity for wrong guesses. However,when the subject and confederate traded roles, half the time the experimenter "discovered" aterrible error: the confederate's switches were mislabeled, and the administered shocks were notthe ones intended. The other half of the time, no "error" was discovered. This resulted in highor low shock conditions, crossed with high or low intended shock. Later, subjects' levels ofdisplaced hostility were measured by asking them to recommend a sentence for a criminal in avignette. The harshest sentences were suggested by subjects who were in the high intentconditions; level of actual shock did not predict sentence severity. Respondents had also beenfilling out Adjective Check Lists throughout the study. They endorsed more and more aggressiveadjectives as the study progressed when they were in high intent conditions, regardless of shockreceived, and also rated themselves as angrier and less socially affectionate. In other words,conflicts are taken more personally when people feel that the other has aggressive intentions.Nickel concludes that perceived intent is a more important variable than actual harm.

These findings permit us to see that hurtful behaviors themselves do not cause conflict tobe taken personally. They do so mainly when they are seen as threats (also see Deutsch, 1969;Deutsch & Krauss, 1962). This is a fairly common way to understand others' damaging actions,however. Thomas and Pondy (1977) observe that "the simplest attribution is that the actorintended to cause whatever frustration occurred" (p. 1099). So defensiveness in the face of harmis likely, and especially so when it is mediated by the attribution that the other intended injury.

Fairness

A second attribution of special importance concerns fairness. Abuse is more tolerable whenit is seen as justified, and is thus less likely to be taken personally. Dyck and Rule (1978) offersome usefiil data on this point. Subjects were punished with white noise of varying intensity,and were told what noise level was normal for the study. Some subjects received this level, andsome received more. Then the subjects "taught" nonsense syllables to confederates, andadministered shocks to punish errors. The highest shocks were given by subjects who hadthemselves received more noise than expected. Those who won 50% of the time (the otherlevels were 17% and 83% again) were most intense: they felt that the confederate had not beentrying to help them. The 83% winners apparently felt the noise had not been a hinderance, andthe 17% winners may have thought it justified. The 50% winners were also the most frustrated,felt the noise was most unfair, and regarded the shocks they administered as most justified.Notice the central role of the fairness attribution: subjects were most negative when the noiselevel was higher than thought normal or justified.

Fairness also seems to been important in a study by Sereno, Welch and Braaten (1987).Their subjects read a marital vignette in which anger was expressed, and the subjects wereinstructed to regard themselves as responsible for the other's outburst. Different versions of thescenario had high, medium, or low justification for the anger, and the mode of expression wasalso varied, being aggressive, assertive, or non-assertive. Respondents rated the other'sexpression for its appropriateness, competence, and satisfaction. All three measures had


generally more favorable scores as the level of justification increased. Mode of expressioninteracted with justification for the appropriateness and competence results, such that assertivebehavior was best for the high justification level but non-assertive expression was higher ratedfor the medium and low conditions. In other words, when an angry reaction is seen as fair, itis rated more favorably, and may properly be expressed in a stronger fashion. When seen as lessjustified, extreme expressions are resented and unfavorably evaluated.

Note, however, that even the high justification condition did not sanction the aggressiveexpression of anger. This corresponds with the findings of Keane, Wedding, and Kelly (1983).They asked adult Veteran's Administration patients to view a videotape in which a person reactedto someone else's unreasonable behavior, and to rate the likeability and competence of theassertive or passive reactions. They report that the assertive expressions were seen as lesslikeable but more able. An integration of these last two studies suggests that pleasant behavioris always preferred, but forceful action is allowable when it is also seen as being justified.

The last bit of evidence we will cite in regard to fairness comes from quite a different kindof study. Kaufinann and Stem (1988) surveyed businesses who had litigated against one anotheryears earlier. They report that retained hostility to the other firm is clearly predicted by theperceived unfairness of the other firm's actions at the time.

As was the case when we considered the evidence on other's intent, we conclude thatbehaviors do not stimulate self-defense: attributions regarding the behavior do. An injury maybe endured without protest if it is seen as accidental or justified, but hostility will be engenderedif the harm is thought to be purposeful or unfair. This is what we mean when we say thatdefensiveness is triggered by attributions. P's perceptions of the other's behaviors are the keyto P's affective climate.

Attributionat Bias

Before concluding our treatment of attribution, however, we need to consider a final issue:that there may be a general attributional bias that makes people likely to take conflictspersonally, thus perceiving climates that impede productive locomotion.

Sillars (1980) worries that people's attributions about the other may be exaggeratednegatively, thus reducing the chance of constructive conflict behavior. Deutsch (1969), too,remarks that misperceptions, especially in regard to the other's motives, can cause escalation.He adds that this is more likely under conditions of high stress, because he believes that stressgenerally increases the likelihood of defensiveness.

Thomas and Pondy (1977, pp. 1093-1094) offer some dramatic evidence on this sort ofattributional error. They asked executives to recall a conflict they had been in, and indicate theconflict styles used by themselves and their conflict partners. 74% of their own styles were ratedas cooperative, but only 12% of the others' styles were seen in this way. In contrast, the otherwas recalled as competitive 73% of the time, versus only 21% for self. In the face of no reasonto think that the managers in the study were unrepresentative, Thomas and Pondy label this asa serious attributional bias: the tendency to view self as cooperative, and other as competitive.With some understatement, they comment, "there is considerable room for divergence inattributed intent" (p. 1097).

That this sort of attributional error is common, and that it can lead to taking conflictpersonally, should be plain. The problem is magnified by the likelihood that the defensivenessgenerated by the error leads to further mistaken attributions (Gibb, 1964, p. 285). So affectiveclimate can be dominated by a dangerous cycle: unfavorable attributions of intent or fairnessarise, either legitimately or through error; they produce defensiveness; the defensivenessengenders further perceptual error; and so on. The cycle is likely to be accelerated if the


defensiveness produces aggression or avoidance behaviors, even if they are only perceivedaccurately. This is a way expressing the general idea that climates sustain themselves (Folger,Poole, & Stutman, 1993, ch. 6), perhaps because the force fields in life spaces orient to thepossibility of equilibrium.

Taking Conflict PersonallyThe material just reviewed enables us to sharpen our understanding of what is involved in

taking conflict personally. To be more specific, TCP is a feeling of being personally engagedin a punishing life event. P feels threatened, anxious, damaged, devalued, insulted. P's focusis necessarily on self, and so refiexively on the self of the other. Face becomes an issue whichoverwhelms the substantive grounds of confiict. Self-defense is the first priority, and this leadsto impulses for fight or flight, for competition or withdrawal. When people feel pressured, theyare more likely to see a conflict as a zero-sum exercise, and to consider it as being essentiallypersonal in nature.

Though we will suggest momentarily that TCP also has a trait component, it is immediatelystimulated by the present confiict situation. P perceives and interprets the other actor'sbehaviors. If unfairness or aggressive intent are seen, the confiict is likely to be takenpersonally. The exercise, suspicion, and appearance of power are instigations, and so are anypersuasive attempts which engender reactance. The TCP reaction is more likely when theconflict is stressful, either because of its substantive issues, or because of the interpersonalinterplays it contains. The presence of anger is threatening, as are other intense displays ofemotion. TCP is contagious: it can manifest itself as aggression or avoidance, and can challengeor frustrate others into reciprocal TCP reactions. Thus, TCP is an affective summary of aninterpersonal confiict's climate, absorbing and coloring P's perceptions of others, their actions,and their own feelings.

Though it will always be a specific situation that calls out the TCP reaction, people probablydiffer in their sensitivity. The trait component of TCP refers to a general level of readiness totake confiict personally. Some people are less tolerant than others, some more easily hurt, somemore generous in their attributions, some more trusting, some more self-interested, some moreconfident of their own self worth. We have no grounds at this time for speculating whether thetrait or state element of TCP is more important. The fact that the previous studies consider TCPto be a trait is due entirely to the exigencies of scale development and preliminary research, andshould not be seen as a prejudgment on this issue. The present study is one of the first to takethe immediate situation into account, but even here, we have been able to do little to assess thestate component of TCP.

Previous Research

Dallinger and Hample (1989) developed the original scale designed to measure individuals'feelings about engaging in confiict situations. Research using that scale has studied TCPreactions in relation to several other variables. Dallinger and Hample (1989) described theoriginal TCP scale as including five dimensions: general affect (later renamed directpersonalization), stress reactions, persecution feelings, relational effects, and personality bias. •That first study validated the idea that TCP is associated with other traits which represent eitheravoidant or aggressive impulses. People who had a high level of direct personalization, whofelt stress in confiict, and who thought that relational outcomes of confiict were negative, showeda strong tendency to avoid arguments. Those who felt high levels of persecution reported highlevels of verbal aggressiveness. In another investigation relating TCP to stable personal traits.

,306 Hample and Dallinger

Myers and Bailey (1991) found that communication apprehension positively correlated withdirect personalization, persecution feelings, and stress reactions, and it correlated negatively withthe feeling that conflict leads to positive relational effects.

Two studies examined the relationships among the TCP subscales and conflict style. .Dallinger and Hample (1991) found that when people reported a high level of directpersonalization, felt persecuted, and had high levels of stress, they were most likely to indicatethat they used a non-confrontational conflict style. In the second investigation, Dallinger (1991)asked organizational members to report their own TCP feelings and then rate their supervisor'sconflict styles. Those employees who reported strong persecution feelings indicated that theirsupervisors often tended to use forcing conflict styles. Direct personalization, stress reactions,persecution feelings, and relational effects all predicted satisfaction with supervisor.

The connections between the TCP scales and actual conflict behavior were explored inHample and Dallinger (1993). They coded argumentative interactions between people whoseTCP levels were known. Focusing only on three subscales (direct personalization, persecutionfeelings, and stress reactions), they report that high TCP scores are clearly associated withaggressive conflict behaviors. They also found some associations between TCP and avoidantactions, but the evidence was weaker. A follow-up investigation (Hample, Dallinger, & Nelson,1994) indicates that the TCP of one's partner in a dyadic conflict actually has a stronger effecton arguing behaviors than does own TCP, suggesting that affective climates are not entirelyprivate phenomena.

Two recent investigations suggest some very general characteristics of TCP. Barch (1994)studied the CEOs of Health Maintenance Organizations, and reports that the less they personalizeconflict, the higher they rate their own communication competence. And Lewis's (1995)investigation of one large corporation's workgroups shows that TCP self reports are associatedwith perceptions of organizational climate.

This pattern of results, taken overall, supports several claims. The Barch and Lewis studiesindicate that P's TCP feelings are connected to his/her self-assessment, as well as his/herperceptions of the workgroup's climate, considered globally. The Hample, Dallinger, and Nelsonstudy implies that people are sensitive to their partner's feelings, and are at least as reactive tothose as to their own. This result is a partial corrective to our emphasis on climate as perceivedonly by P, and points to the mutual construction of a conflict's affective atmosphere. The otherstudies show that personalization of conflict is associated with apprehension, avoidant impulses,and aggressive behavior. As Lewin's work has shown (Barker, Dembo, & Lewin, 1941),frustration can lead to either aggression or withdrawal, so the connections to both avoidance andhostility are not a theoretical problem, although we have not yet worked out the dynamics of thisduality. However, we feel that the scale ought to be revised before much more research on thistopic is undertaken.

Dissatisfactions with the TCP ScateThe main methodological goal of this study is to improve the TCP scale. Within each of

the studies which have used the original instrument, reliability and factor analyses have beenconducted. Examination of those results eventually led to dissatisfaction with the personality biasdimension of the original scale, due to its low reliabilities. In addition, several items on differentsubscales showed poor internal consistency with other items in one or more data sets. Theseproblems make integration of TCP research into the broader domain of field theory difficult tosustain.

Efforts to interpret connections between the relational effects dimension and other variablesalso led to concem. That dimension was originally defined by four items, two that suggested


that conflict leads to positive outcomes and two that indicated that conflict has negativeoutcomes. One set (the negative) was reverse coded, and then added to the remaining (positive)pair. The results of that scoring procedure produced difficulty in interpreting the results: doesa low score mean that the respondent feels that conflict has negative long-term effects on arelationship, or none at all?

Finally, as an inevitable consequence of conducting a series of studies and reflecting onLewin's work, more thought about the notion of TCP led us to consider an additional possibledimension in the collection of feelings associated with conflict interactions.

Development of a Revised Instrument

Thus, we attempted to do two things in our development of a series of new items relatingto TCP. First, we wrote additional items for each of the three scales that had performed in areliable and conceptually clear manner, in order to improve their reliabilities. These new itemswere generated for direct personalization, persecution feelings, and stress reaction. In addition,we included more items for the personality bias dimension in order to raise its reliabilitycoefficient to a usable level.

We generated a number of items to clarify the relational effects dimension. These werewritten to address the idea that conflict could have both negative and positive relationaloutcomes. We constructed these sets of items with the intention that each would be a separatedimension. We also generated items to create another measure of perceived relationalconsequences, with a new subscale called long-term consequences. This approaches the ideawhich stimulated the original relational effects scale, and is an attempt to see if respondents aresensitive to the generalized notion of the relational consequentiality of conflict, whether theresults are favorable or unfavorable. Finally, we developed items for the concept that individualsmay have either a positive or negative attitude toward conflict. Thus we anticipated producingscales to measure eight dimensions of TCP.

A second goal of this study was to reassess the validity of the TCP instrument by examiningits relationship with argumentativeness and verbal aggressiveness. Here we expected that thethree continuing dimensions would produce the same results as in the original study, and that thenew dimensions would fit the general pattern that high levels of TCP lead to avoidance and/oraggression. To extend our treatment of validity issues, we included a situation descriptionwhich was varied on the dimensions of intent and fairness. The conceptual complexity of TCPmeans that construct validity cannot be simply established, but we begin that enterprise here byexamining the relationship between TCP scores and those from two other instruments, verbalaggressiveness and argumentativeness.

Verbal Aggressiveness and ArgumentativenessWe consider that verbal aggressiveness and argumentativeness ought to be associated with

TCP scale results, as they were in the original study (Dallinger & Hample, 1989). Like TCP,both can be seen as relatively stable personal predispositions, although both are also expected tobe triggered by specific situational stimuli. Both seem to us pertinent to the likelihood thatsomeone will take a conflict personally.

Verbal aggressiveness refers to a person's inclination to make verbally hostile statements toothers (Infante & Wigley, 1986). Such expressions include insults and other utterances attackingthe other personally; their objective is to cause pain (Infante, 1988, p. 21). Verbalaggressiveness is directly associated with verbal hostility, assault inclination, and communicationapprehension, while it correlates negatively with cognitive complexity and social desirability

Hample and Dallinger

(Infante & Wigley, 1986). People high in verbal aggressiveness are less likely, to suppressmessages that might harm the other (Hample & Dallinger, 1987). Subordinates seen as high onthis measure were more often labeled as complainers, and least likely to be constructive inorganizational disputes (Gorden, Infante, & Izzo, 1988). Superiors rated as high on verbalaggressiveness were also least satisfying, and thought to be hardest to communicate with (Infante& Gorden, 1985).

Argumentativeness, which is uncorrelated with verbal aggressiveness (Infante & Wigley,1986), summarizes a person's approach and avoidance impulses toward arguing (Infante &Rancer, 1982; Infante, 1988). People high in argumentativeness are seen as being more skilledat argument (Infante, 1981), but less easily provoked (Infante, Trebing, Shepherd, & Seeds,1984). Workers who are rated as high in argumentativeness are also seen as more competent andconstructive in discussing organizational issues (Gorden, Infante, & Izzo, 1988). Superiorsassessed as being high in argumentativeness were most satisfying, and easiest to communicatewith (Infante & Gorden, 1985). Schultz (1982), using a different operationalization ofargumentativeness, found that extremely high ratings on this variable were associated with lowerleadership ratings. However, the correlation between argumentativeness and leadership ratingwas otherwise direct. In short, argumentativeness is a positive trait, involving a readiness todiscuss the issues (Infante, 1988, ch. 1). Therefore, we think that people inclined to take conflictpersonally will tend to avoid argumentative situations.

Based on Dallinger and Hample (1989), we offer these research hypotheses:

RHl: People high in direct personalization and stress reactions will prefer to avoidargumentative situations.

RH2: People who report high levels of persecution will also report more verbalaggressiveness.

Lacking a clear empirical record on other issues, we also offer this research question:

RQl: What will be the relationships among argumentativeness and verbal aggression,on one hand, and the remaining TCP subscales, on the other?

And finally, we begin an investigation of the connections between TCP and features of theconflict situation:

RQ2: What are the relationships between the TCP subscales and respondents'perceptions of the conflict situation?

MethodRespondents

Data were collected from 265 college students enrolled in upper division communicationcourses at our university. Fifty-eight percent of the respondents were male. Ages ranged from18 through 44, with an average of 21.3. Forty percent ofthe subjects were seniors, 35% werejuniors, 18% were sophomores, and only 6% were freshmen. Students were asked to completea questionnaire during a regular class meeting.

MeasurementQuestionnaires contained three major sections. First, several demographic questions were

posed. The second section was made up of questionnaires measuring argumentativeness (Infante


& Rancer, 1982) and verbal aggressiveness (Infante & Wigley, 1986) The third section includeda description of a situation, 60 items designed to measure aspects of Taking Conflict Personally,and six items assessing perceptions of the situation. In the situational descriptions given torespondents, intent to harm varied between high (another person "is looking for a reason to getrid of you") and low (the other is someone who "really likes you and values you as a person").Faimess was also divided into two levels. In the high fairness condition, the other person "triesto treat everyone equally," and in the low faimess condition, s/he "obviously has favorites, andyou are not one of them." Two base situations were developed: one asked subjects to imaginethemselves in a conflict situation in a job setting, and the other asked them to imaginethemselves in a conflict situation with their roommates. For each of the two situations, high andlow levels of intent and faimess were crossed, so that eight specific situation descriptions wereincluded within the study. Each subject responded to only one of these situations.

After asking subjects to imagine themselves in the situation, they were asked to respond (interms of their reaction to the situation) to the 60 TCP items on a 5 point scale, ranging from"I strongly agree" to "I strongly disagree." Twenty three items were included from the earlierversion of the TCP scale, and 37 new items were constructed for this study.

At the end of the third section of the questionnaire, a short series of subjective items wasincluded to assess respondents' perception of the situation. Six sets of bipolar adjectives orphrases were anchored on a 5 point semantic differential scale. The items were: fair-unfair,mean-nice, just-unjust, reasonable-unreasonable, likes you-doesn't like you, and concemed withyour feelings-unconcerned with your feelings.

This design should permit us (a) to revise the TCP scales, and (b) to revalidate it against theestablished measures of argumentativeness and verbal aggression.

Results

Taking Conflict Personally

The major goal of this study was to improve the measurement of the Taking ConflictPersonally concept. A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted on the 60 items. Two of theproposed subscales proved to be so unclear to respondents that we were unable to obtainadequate reliability, and we abandoned them (they were Personality Bias [alpha=.43] and LongTerm Consequences [alpha=.56]). The other subscales performed reasonably well, and theirmakeup was modified in minor ways to maximize reliabilities and the purity of their loadings.Every surviving item loaded on its originally intended subscale. After completing theconfirmatory factor analysis, we also conducted an exploratory factor analysis, forcing a sixfactor solution. Each item loaded purely on its appropriate factor.

Thus, six dimensions of the revised Taking Conflict Personally scale were deemed acceptablefor further analysis. The surviving items are presented in Figure 1. The subscale means,standard deviations, sample sizes, and alpha reliabilities are in Table 1, while Pearsoncorrelations among the variables are in Table 2.

Relationships to Other Variables

A canonical correlation between the set of six dimensions of TCP and the set ofargumentativeness, verbal aggressiveness, and the demographic items (sex, class standing, andage) was conducted to test the validity of the TCP instrument. Four roots were significant, withsquared canonical correlations of .558, .198, .129, and .055, respectively (see Table 3).

The first root shows a relationship between several TCP dimensions and theargumentativeness subscales. The like/dislike valence subscale dominates and enters positively,


while the set of direct personalization, persecution feelings, and stress reaction loads negativelyat a reasonably strong level. These results support the first hypothesis, since they show thatrespondents high on direct personalization and stress reaction are inclined to avoid argumentativesituations. The like/dislike valence outcome contributes to an answer to the first researchquestion, as do the lesser, but still noticeable, contributions of the positive and negative relationaleffects subscales. This root suggests that the second hypothesis, which predicted that persecutionfeelings would be directly associated with verbal aggressiveness, is wrong.

TABLE 1: Means, Standard Deviations, Sample Sizes andAlpha Reliabilities for Variables

MeanStandardDeviation

SampleSize

AlphaReliability

ARGUMENTATIVENESS

(Overall)

Argument Approach

Argument Avoidance

VERBAL AGGRESSIVENESS

TAKING CONFLICT PERSONALLY

Direct Personalization

Persecution Feelings

Stress Reaction

Positive Relational Effects

Negative Relational Effects

Like/Dislike Valence

CONGENIALITY

Fair/Unfair

Mean/Nice

Just/Unjust

Reasonable/Unreasonable

Likes You/Doesn't Like You

Concerned/Unconcerned with YourFeelings

4.82

33.64

28.81

50.97

22.30

17.22

15.66

23.33

16.50

17.61

15.55

2.56

2.74

2.66

2.43

2.78

2.37

11.88

6.90

6.72

10.42

5.62

4.08

3.93

5.06

3.46

5.46

5.16

1.14

1.01

1.11

1.11

1.27

1.11

265

266

265

260

253

249

357

257

255

256

211

215

214

214

214

212

214

.847

.797

.826

.866

.756

.769

.842

.718

.860

.857

TABLE 2: Correlations Among Variables

Direct Pers Persecution Stress Positive Negative Valence

Arg Approach

Arg Avoid

Verbal Aggress.

Congeniality

-.237***

.388***

-.012

-.109*

-.164**

.480***

.073

-.139*

-.245***

.451***

-.150**

-.099

.280***

-.235***

.122*

.199**

-.246***

292***

-.115*

-.216***

.579***

-.603***

.335***

.069


-.587

-.532

-.678

.434

-.411

.964

.659

-.876

.376

-.377

-.025

.082

-.596

-.468

-.481

-.184

.201

-.252

-.430

-.115

-.467

-.571

.310

.144

.197

-.608

.121

-.042

-.090

-.027

-.209

-.446

-.378

.683

-.072

.102

.357

.202

-.502

-.164

-.116

-.027

-.423

.071

.469

-.189

-.715

-.271

TABLE 3: Canonical Correlations and Structure Matrices for Prediction of TakingConflict Personally Factors by Individual Difference and Demographic Variables

Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4

Direct Personalization

Persecution Feelings

Stress Reaction

Positive Relational Effects

Negative Relational Effects

Like/Dislike Valence

Arg Approach

Arg Avoid

Verbal Agg.

Sex

Class

Age

Re -747 .445 .359 .235

Re' .558 .198 .129 .055

The second root indicates that high levels of direct personalization, persecution feelings, andstress reactions are associated with the tendency to approach arguments,' and to be verballyaggressive, and that this relationship occurs more often for males. These results are inconsistentwith the first hypothesis, but lend some support for the second.

The third root suggests that females feel low levels of persecution, and the fourth thatstudents in lower class ranks showed less stress reaction.

Our situational manipulations made a difference in people's perceptions of the confiicts. Aseries of one way analyses of variance using the eight situations as the independent variable, andeach of the perception items as dependent variables, produced significant results. Situations wereseen as significantly different on each of the six perceptual items. Further consideration andanalysis of the perceptual items suggest that they are highly intercorrelated. A factor analysisof the items resulted in a one factor model with high loadings for each of the six items, and thealpha reliability for the items taken as a set is .86. Thus, subsequent analysis of the relationshipbetween the TCP dimensions and the perceptual items used them as a single variable, namedcongeniality.

The congeniality variable was associated with four of the TCP subscales. Negative relationaleffects, persecution feelings, and direct personalization correlated negatively with congeniality,while positive relational effects associated positively with it (see Table 2).

Hypothesis and Research Questions

The first hypothesis was generally supported. Both the first root of the canonical analysis(Table 3) and the zero-order correlations (Table 2) show that argument avoidance is associated


FIGURE 1: Revised Taking Conflict Personally Scale

DIRECT PERSONALIZATION1. I usually take criticisms personally.5. Conflict is a very personal thing for me.6. When people criticize something I say, I don't take it personally. (R)8. It really hurts my feelings to be criticized.

26. When the rest of the group rejects one of my suggestions, I take it very personally.32. It doesn't bother me to be criticized for my ideas. (R)36. I have a strong emotional reaction to being criticized.

PERSECUTION FEELINGS10. In conflict discussions I often feel that other people are trying very hard to make sure that I lose.12. I think that some of the people that I often have conflict discussions with really like to pick on me.17. Conflict situations leave me feeling victimized.29. If you make a bad suggestion, people think you are stupid.35. Conflict situations make me feel persecuted.37. I think that people often attack me personally.

STRESS REACTION21. Sometimes when there are a lot of conflicts in a week, 1 feel like I'm getting an ulcer.23. Conflicts are not stressful for me. (R)24. Stressful discussions make my stomach hurt.27. After a stressful meeting, my day is usually ruined.30. Arguing is not very stressful to me. (R)

POSITIVE RELATIONAL EFFECTS2. Conflict can really help a relationship.7. Sometimes you can discover admirable features in a person who is arguing strongly.

11. A deep conflict can really bring people together after it's over.14. Conflict discussions can really strengthen working relationships with other people in the group.15. Conflicts have a positive impact on a relationship.19. Conflict discussions can really strengthen friendships.22. The honesty that often results from a conflict situation can lead to stronger relationships between

people.

NEGATIVE RELATIONAL EFFECTS9. Conflict can really hurt a relationship.

18. Conflict discussions can really jeopardize working relationships with other people in the group.25. Conflict discussions can really jeopardize friendships.31. Conflicts have a negative impact on a relationship.33. A conflict can really wreck the climate in the workplace.

LIKE/DISLIKE VALENCE3. I really hate to argue with people I don't know very well. (R)4. I hate arguments. (R)13. Conflict is an intensely enjoyable kind of interaction.16. I don't like to be in conflict situations. (R)20. I really hate to argue with friends. (R)28. To me, it's fun to argue.34. I often enjoy conflicts.


with high levels of direct personalization and stress reactions. Though the second, third, andfourth roots ofthe canonical analysis offer some support for the second hypothesis, neither thefirst root nor the Pearson correlations do, and we are doubtful about the relationship. It seemsto appear only after the chief statistical effects are eliminated from the canonical analysis, andso we consider that the second hypothesis was not supported. The first research question, whichinquired about the other TCP subscales and their associations with argumentativeness and verbalaggression, receives a clear answer. Persecution feelings, positive and negative relational effects,and like/dislike valence are all related to argumentativeness in interpretable ways. The morepersecuted one feels, the less one likes conflict, and the more negative relational effects oneexpects, the more one wishes to avoid arguments. Opposite effects occur for the argument-approach subscale, of course. Verbal aggression is highest for those self-reporting the leaststress, the most positive expectations for relational effects (and the least negative ones), and themost positive valence for confiict interactions. The other research question was concerned withsituational perceptions, and here we find that the higher the congeniality of the situation, the lessthe direct personalization, persecution feelings, and expected negative relational outcomes. Insum, the first hypothesis is supported, the second is not, and the answers to the researchquestions are compatible with our review of the literature. We consider that this set of resultsoffers evidence for the reliability and validity of the revised TCP subscales.

DiscussionThe first section describes the six dimensions of the new TCP scale. Next, the validity of

the scale in relation to argumentativeness and verbal aggressiveness will be examined. Third,implications ofthe situational perceptions will be discussed. Next, the general notion of TCPwill be distinguished from that of defensiveness. Finally, we offer a summary evaluation oftherelevance of field theory to interpersonal confiict.

The Revised TCP Scale

Six dimensions ofthe complex of feelings associated with Taking Confiict Personally areindexed by the revised TCP scale. Direct Personalization is the hurt that people may experiencewhen engaging in confiict. Most of the items refer to negative feelings that occur when peoplefeel that they have been criticized. Those who experience high levels of direct personalizationtend to avoid arguments, and, as has been the case throughout the research program (Dallinger& Hample, 1993), they tend to be female. This result corresponds to similar findings using theoriginal version of this subscale.

Persecution feelings result because a confiict interactant believes that others attempt to pickfights with him/her. This is a combative view of confiict which implies that one person is thewinner and the other is a loser. Results here, as well as in the original study, indicate that malestend to experience strong persecution feelings. The original study also indicated that these males(with strong persecution feelings) were likely to use verbal aggressiveness, though those resultswere not clearly replicated here. The original four items in this dimension remained in the newversion, and three items were added.

Stress reactions are feelings of tension and discomfort that result fi-om confiict. Two of theitems in this dimension suggest that the respondent experiences hurtful physical reactions toconfiict. Those people who report that they have high stress reactions to confiict situations tendto avoid arguments, as shown by results of both this study and the original one. The presentinvestigation also suggests that students who are freshmen or sophomores experience less stress


than those who are juniors or seniors. The stress reaction scale was modified considerably inthis scale revision. Three of the original five items were dropped, and three new items wereadded.

Positive relational effects indicates the extent to which confiict interactants believe thatconfiict can have positive outcomes for both friendships and working relationships. Thisdimension did not load particularly well on any of the four canonical roots, but Pearsoncorrelations indicate that those who feel that confiict can have positive outcomes tend toapproach arguments (r = .28) and slightly tend to be verbally aggressive (r = .12). Two of theitems from the original relational effects scale (the positive ones) are now included in thisdimension, along with five new ones.

The negative relational effects dimension measures the extent to which individuals feel thatconflict interactions can lead to unfavorable outcomes in both personal and work relationships.This dimension also failed to load well on any of the four significant roots in the canonicalanalysis. However, the Pearson correlations indicate that individuals who believe thatrelationships are damaged by confiict try to avoid arguments (r = .29) and they also tend toeschew verbal aggression (r = -. 12). The two negative items from the original relational effectsare included in this scale, along with three new ones.

Finally, the like/dislike valence dimension of the TCP scale was newly constructed for thisstudy. It assesses the extent to which individuals enjoy confiict. High scores on this scaleindicate that the respondent likes to participate in confiictual discussions. Results of thecanonical analysis indicate that people who enjoy confiict tend to approach arguments. Thelike/dislike valence dimension of TCP and the argumentativeness construct are obviously quitesimilar. However, examination of the content of the items from each of the scales indicates thatthe TCP subscale captures an emotional reaction to arguing, while argumentativeness is primarilya report of intended behavior regarding entering into or avoiding arguments.

Results of the analysis relating the TCP dimensions to argumentativeness, verbal aggression,and the demographic items, again support the idea that people who experience the feelingsassociated with TCP respond to confiict situations with both avoidance and aggression. HighTCP reactions point to a climate that impedes productive locomotion.

Situation InfluenceThere are several indications that individuals reacted to the situational manipulations, and

it is their perceptions of the life space that are important in field theory. The situation itemsasked respondents to rate the "other person in the 'heated discussion' that you imagined yourselfto be in earlier." The scales were highly intercorrelated, and we called the complex of feelingscongeniality. It consists of attitudes concerning the other's niceness and fairness, and we regardit as a global climate measure. This collective variable did relate significantly to several TCPdimensions. When P sees the other party in a confiict situation as being generally nice and fair,P tends to believe that positive relationships are apt to result from the interaction. Conversely,s/he does not feel that negative outcomes will occur. One is less likely to feel persecuted in theinteraction and not to take it quite so personally. So P's emotional climate (i.e., TCP) appearsto be sensibly connected to another general perception of the life space (i.e., congeniality).

TCP and DefensivenessWe have delayed until now a discussion of how TCP differs from defensiveness. Certainly,

they are related ideas, but we feel that there are some clear distinctions. First, the concepts havea different scope. Defensiveness, depending on the writer's context, can mean a feeling of beingattacked or devalued, an impulse toward self-defense, a characterization of a general climate, a


set of attributions, or a list of behaviors. While reading the literature, we occasionally foundourselves confused about how these meanings interacted. It seems possible, for instance, thata person in a generally defensive climate might manage not to behave defensively or to havedefensive feelings; this is, in fact, the possibility to which Gibb's (1978) work looks. TCP, incontrast, is.only a set of feelings.

Second, defensiveness is primarily thought to predict aggression. Although withdrawal issometimes mentioned as a possible outcome of defensiveness, the main concem is with reciprocalthreats, power plays, personal devaluations, and so forth. From the beginning, we understoodTCP to be relevant to both aggression and avoidance, and our data indicate that it is associatedwith both sorts of locomotion and preferences.

Third, defensiveness is an essentially self-contained idea. Gibb's (1961) classic essay hadonly a few references, all to his own work. Later work, by Gibb and others, also mainly tendsto cite defensiveness work. In contrast, we view TCP as a kind of amalgamation of manyresearch programs, of which defensiveness is only one. Defensiveness has the ethos of an ideawhich stands alone, whereas TCP is intended as an integration of several empirical projects.

A Field Theory of Interpersonal Conflict

This paper, of course, only begins the project of integrating the conflict literature into fieldtheory. We have not here explored the importance of goals, obstacles, barriers, planning, ordifferentiation for self and others. All these topics have been investigated elsewhere, andconstitute an enormous literature. We wish only to make the point that these essentiallyindependent scholarly enterprises are all potentially connectable under field theory's umbrella.

Our own investigation explored a number of variables relevant to the climate of a life space.As we have been emphasizing throughout the paper, we feel that TCP summarizes a whole rangeof private, emotional, and experiential reactions to interpersonal conflict. We have shown howthis collection of feelings is related to P's assessment of the conflict's congeniality, which isitself another measure of climate, but one formed from P's attributions about the other, ratherthan P's feelings about self

The purpose of field theory is to explain human behavior. This study did not advance tothat point, because it did not study actual confiict actions. Other papers have, however, and theyshow that own and other's TCP predict the aggressiveness, argumentativeness, and perhapspassivity of actual arguing behaviors (Hample & Dallinger, 1993; Hample, Dallinger, & Nelson,1994). Those results, in combination with the present ones, suggest again that the climate of aconflictive life space affects the ease and nature of locomotion within it.

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